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REVIEW SYMPOSIUMS

The Mervyn Thompson Controversy:
A Feminist Deconstructive Reading

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History is retold to suit the purposes of the
teller; and if part of it is history one has lived
through, one simply rebels at the
misinterpretation.
- C.K. Stead, `The New Victorians'

The one whose subjectivity becomes the
objectivity of `what happened' is a matter of
social meaning, that is, a matter of sexual
politics.
- Catharine MacKinnon,
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State

The `Mervyn Thompson controversy' concerned an
anonymous attack on a university lecturer and
playwright alleged to be a rapist. There was
considerable public conflict over the truth of both the
case itself and the meaning of sexual violence. The two
main opposing stances represented in the media were a
radical feminist story and a dominant liberal version.
Post-structuralist theories, in particular deconstructive
criticism, can be shown to support a radical feminist
view of the conflict and its challenges to liberal
interpretations. However, this also produces a critique of
dualism in which all representations of the issue,
including radical feminism, are implicated, although to
varying degrees.

Introduction

On 1 February 1984, Mervyn Thompson, a university lecturer and playwright, was chained to a tree near Auckland zoo by a group of women. The word `rapist' was spraypainted on his car, and posters around Auckland University campus also denounced him for rape. Further conflicts arose over the performance of Thompson's plays, which resulted, among other outcomes, in the cancellation of a proposed production in Wellington. The group of women was never identified, and Thompson was never officially charged with sexual harassment. Whether Thompson was guilty as alleged and deserving of the attack was hotly debated in New Zealand university and theatre circles, and became a broader cultural controversy via media coverage.[1]

For anyone trying to assess the facts of the case in order to make their own judgment, it soon becomes clear that there were and still are unresolved questions and conflicts over what actually took place, both in terms of Thompson's actions and the subsequent attack. For example, many of the media stories, several of which were written by or extensively quoted Thompson,

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[1]   I focus here primarily on media accounts in *The Listener* and *Metro*, and to a lesser extent on newspaper articles and other related magazine constructions. The case tends now to be represented by the media as a kind of landmark for synopses of Thompson's life and for discussions of NZ sexual politics (e.g. Comer, 1991; `Playwright Loses Fight with Cancer', 1992); and there are several more fictional resonances (Atmore, 1992b).

emphasised the seriousness of the attack in terms of his physical injuries. Yet this claim was disputed by other media texts citing alternative official sources such as a police (Women Against Sexual Harassment [WASH], 1984; Rankine, 1984; Atmore, 1992a: 156-60). There were also some discrepancies among Thompson's own media accounts over details like the prelude to the attack.

Thompson also stated that although none of the attackers were known to him previously, he could identify several of them again, and he had `a fair idea of where they live'.[2] Other media articles took this claim further: in a follow-up investigative story for *Metro,* Carroll Wall claimed that `the woman alleged to have been raped is an actress living in the central city, while the vigilantes are reportedly a group of feminists who share a house in Ponsonby' (Wall, 1984). Even if Wall's claims are dismissed as speculation, Thompson himself indicated feminists, and at times lesbian feminists, as his attackers.[3] Hence, as Wall noted, the size of the pool of

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[2]   Thompson, from an *Eyewitness News* interview with Genevieve Westcott (TVNZ, 12 April 1984).

[3]   Thompson was asked in the *Eyewitness News* interview whether he believed some of the attackers were lesbians; and despite his assertion that he did not know any of them, he replied `Some of them' (TVNZ, 12 April 1984). A letter to the editor of the *NZ Times* from Thompson (1984b) also suggested that he knew immediately by her voice that the woman who he said telephoned him and set up the attack was a lesbian. The general targeting of lesbian feminists in the Thompson media stories has been pointed out by Rankine (1984), WASH (1984), Rogers (1984), and Goddard (1984). Later references to the case often assume lesbian feminist responsibility as fact (e.g. Thompson, 1987; Corbett, 1989: 167).

potential suspects in Auckland was not large (considerably smaller than the number of possible rapists in most investigations), and certainly not beyond the scope of police questioning and identification of suspects by Thompson; yet the women were never found.

Conflict Over the Case as a Dichotomy

`Bare facts' were not relayed in unmediated fashion into one true story about the Thompson incident. Rather, they were constructed and then resourced by conflicting interpretations as part of a battle for truth over the meaning of violence and its politically charged connections to sexuality (Foucault, 1980a: 90-91; 1980b 114-15; de Lauretis, 1987: 31-50), which therefore had larger stakes than simply the `correct' meaning of the Thompson controversy.

This conflict can be represented as a dichotomy between two main stories which vied with each other for monopoly on `the truth', each claiming this status in contrast to its denigrated alternative. In the first version, represented most coherently in media accounts by the radical feminism of `Women Reply' (WASH, 1984) and `The Media and Mervyn' (Rankine, 1984; Porszolt, 1984), Thompson used his university position to sexually harass women students, including committing several rapes. A group of women decided action was necessary. Lacking confidence in the official channels' likely response to acquaintance-rape charges levelled against a white professional man, they chose direct action. When Thompson was treated sympathetically by the media, feminists supportive of the original women tried to

influence public opinion by targeting Thompson's plays with some success.

The second version articulated a `pro-Thompson' perspective and was the dominant stance in the mainstream media. Stories of this kind not only supported Thompson's interpretation of events (e.g. `Vigilantes Rape Natural Justice', 1984; Wall, 1984) several of the major detailed accounts either featured Thompson's remarks extensively or were written by Thompson himself.[4] Thompson's role in the media coverage of the attack therefore suggests a strong parallel to his stage career, in which he frequently performed one-man shows from his own scripts. If the media representation of the case was, as some pro-Thompson accounts suggested, a trial by proxy (Thompson, 1984a; Wall, 1984), Thompson represented himself in more than one sense.

From this perspective, Thompson was an active supporter of feminist and other `progressive' causes. Hence he was not a rapist, but was scapegoated by fanatical (and probably lesbian) feminists who believe all heterosexuality to be rape. These women then amplified the doubt produced by the chaining incident into more

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    Eyewitness News interview, TVNZ (12 April 1984); Thompson (1984a; 1985; 1987). Although the media was initially alerted by the attackers, there was no substantial coverage until Thompson identified himself as the victim. However, there were also some dispute among media personnel over the dominance of Thompson's interpretation, and feminist protests eventually led to a right of reply in *the Listener* (WASH, 1984). For more details discussion of the media dynamics of the case, see Atmore (1992a: 168-93),;1993; 1994a).

slurs on Thompson. They attempted to censor his plays, with some success, due to feminist influences in theatre and to fear and knee-jerk guilt reactions to rape accusations among liberals.

There are many themes that could be addressed (e.g. Atmore, 1993; 1994a; 1994d), but I am particularly interested here in considering how the critique of binary oppositions offered by deconstruction might be useful to understand the conflict.

The concept of deconstruction `originated' with Jacques Derrida (1976; 1981). Deconstructive criticism describes dominant forms of Western thought as logocentric; that is, as structured in terms of hierarchical binary oppositions or dichotomies, which rely for their meaning on devices which fall outside this logic and are therefore denied in the official text (Grosz, 1989: 26-37). Deconstruction itself is:

> ...spawned by logocentrism as its internal condition and its necessary by-product. It is a series of close readings of particular philosophical and/or literary texts, seeking out the traces or remainders of textuality or materiality that are its central points, hinges, in a destabilisation of the text's explicit ideals.
> These metaphors, images, tropes, phrases, linguistic and technical devices are both necessary for the text to function (and are thus *untranslatable*, irreplaceable) but fall outside its logic and explicit goals. They resist the otherwise logocentric mobilisation of language. They signal blindspots, points of

> unrecognised vulnerability that can be
> exploited in, as it were, turning logocentrism
> inside out. They are points of paradox or
> excess, sites of difference, non-identity, where
> the text spills over its conceptual boundaries
> (Grosz, 1989: 28, Grosz's emphasis).

To deconstruct a text is therefore to draw out its
conflicting logics, `with the object of showing that the
text never exactly means what it says or says what it
means' (Norris, 1988: 7). The binary oppositional
framework of logocentrism excludes and marginalises
alternative meanings, which nevertheless can be shown
to leak out of any official text.

But first, a word from our sponsor ...

My particular truth of the case is shaped not only by an
interest in post-structuralisms, but also by my
intellectual-political involvements with feminisms and
lesbian/gay cultural milieux. These strands combine in
an interesting and uneasy fashion, because to take a leaf
from Alison Jones' (1990) paper, I was and am `in the
text' of the Thompson controversy. Like many other
feminists in Aotearoa, I was largely supportive of the
radical feminist version of the story, but unlike most, I
am positioned in a more literal sense of Jones' phrase.[5]

5
    I was one of two feminist 'representatives' interviewed
about the attack, as a brief follow-up to the interview with
Thompson on *Eyewitness News* (TVNZ, 12 April 1984). As a
member of Women Against Pornography, I was also
involved in a coalition which met with members of
Wellington's Depot theatre, leading to the cancellation,of a

Ten years later I return to the scene, wishing to assess the accounts and to redefine my position more (now) at the juncture of feminist and post-structuralist theories.

I argue that while not without tensions, there are highly productive possibilities in producing a kind of cautious coalition between a radical feminist account of rape and post-structuralist critiques of representation,[6] and in drawing on the insights of deconstructive criticism for sociological theorising which demands that texts be conceived as more than `literary' in any narrow sense, and as inextricably connected to social practices like sexual coercion (e.g. Young, 1990; Cheah, 1991; Game, 1991).

I want to assert that the radical feminist version of the Thompson case is the more compelling of the two, using post-structuralist theory as my favoured reference. This links to my more general theoretical argument: while it is becoming commonplace in feminist and social theory to employ some form of post-structuralist thought, this approach is often explicitly validated against denigrated and homogenised modernist political theories, as if they

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proposed production of Thompson's `Songs for Uncle Scrim' (Grant, 1984; Atmore, 1992a: 168-71, 186-92).

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Feminists have a particular interest in the workings of power suggested by Derrida's description of *phallo* logocentrism as `the complicity of Western metaphysics with a notion of male firstness' (quoted in Nelson, 1987). For discussions of deconstruction's possible relationship to feminist politics, see Poovey (1988), Rabine (1988), Scott (1988). For more background to my approach, see Atmore (1992a, 1994a, 1994d).

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themselves were two (unequal) halves of a dichotomy. In feminist texts of this kind, the inferior term is frequently radical feminism (see e.g. Weedon, 1987; Cocks, 1989). This seems both anathema to the percepts of deconstruction and perhaps detrimental to the state of sexual coercion theorising, given its strong links to radical feminist theories (Atmore 1992a, 1994c).

In contrast then, my interest is less in the rounding up of radical feminist arguments for a kind of `demolition derby' (Bordo, 1990: 154, n7) in which post-structuralism emerges the victor, but rather more in arguing that the `cautious coalition' between radical feminism and deconstruction is possible because there is some degree of pre-existing affinity in the way sexual violence can be conceptualised.[7] But at the same time, if radical feminism and deconstruction are not completely radically distinct, nor are they conflatable. If I can use a deconstruction-influenced approach to support the radical feminist version of the Thompson story, my reading of the media accounts must also draw attention to inconsistencies, exclusions and strategic moves not only in the pro-Thompson accounts, but also in the radical feminist interpretation I favour. Nevertheless, I see this as not necessarily undermining important radical feminist claims about sexuality and masculinism, but

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[7]   Patti Lather has suggested that the concept of pre-existing post-structuralist impulses in modernist feminisms might be better invoked by the term `organic' (Post-Structuralism - its place in Feminist Scholarship', workshop at Sociological Association of Aotearoa (NZ) Conference, Victoria University, 2 December 1989).

rather as indicating new and productive directions for future work (Atmore, 1994a; 1994d).

I focus first on the distinctions between the two main versions of the Thompson story in terms of their constructions of rape, by suggesting that the radical feminist version can be read as a deconstructive critique of the liberal stance.

Sex and Violence

> All I had to do was have sex with somebody - and for that somebody to be less than discreet.
>
> - Mervyn Thompson, `Another Life'

A Radical Feminist Analysis of Rape

Radical feminist analyses challenge the way in which dominant discourses, heavily influenced by the law, define rape. One important strand of radical feminist theory criticises the phallogocentric framework which adjudicates rape charges according to a series of binary oppositions.[8] Crucial to these dichotomies is the conceptualisation of `sex' and `violence' as two distinctly

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[8] For example, see Jackson (1978); MacKinnon (1982; 1983; 1989:;171-83); Kelly (1987, 1988). this is the basis for most of the radical feminist discourse in the media accounts, although I have made the deconstruction connections explicit. For more overt feminist post-structuralist approaches to rape, see also Plaza (1980); de Lauretis (1987: 31-50); Woodhull (1988); Gavey (1989, 1990); Smart (1989: 26-49, 1990); Michie (1990); Cheah (1991); Marcus (1992); Atmore (1994a, 1994d).

separate spheres. For a situation to be interpreted as rape rather than consensual sex, it must be seen as violence, not sex.[9]

In contrast, radical feminists argue that opposing `sex' to `violence' excludes and marginalises the realities experienced by women, and favours the accused in rape cases. In the discourses and other material practices of a phallogocentric culture, there is frequently sex in violence and violence in sex.[10] `Force' and `sex' are often not mutually exclusive in women's experiences, yet the legal definition of a situation as `sex' tends to override signs of force, suggesting a definition of `serious' force as that beyond the sexually normative (MacKinnon, 1989: 171-83). Distinguishing force from sex in order to indict the `sex' is further problematised when dominant social practices eroticise force and dominance more generally (MacKinnon, 1989).[11] Hence rape is `a sex crime that is not a crime when it looks like sex' (MacKinnon, 1983: 649).

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[9] This emphasis on rape as being about `violence not sex' also appears in another form of radical feminist theorising (eg., Brownmiller, 1975), but could be criticised as formally liberal (eg., MacKinnon, 1982: 528; 1983: 646) for reasons outlined subsequently.

[10] For example, a substantial minority of rapists genuinely believe their victim enjoyed the rape, even when she strongly resisted their overt force (MacKinnon, 1983: 652-3; Russell, 1984: 154; Scully, 1990).

[11] Even the apparent evidence of a large degree of force may not be sufficient to produce a verdict of rape: see eg., `Injuries from Consenting Sex Possible, Court Told', *Dominion*, 22 February 1991: 3.

The radical feminist-originated term to describe rape and other forms of sexual assault, `sexual violence', can therefore be interpreted as the `hinge term' (Grosz, 1989: 28-31) of a deconstruction of the dominant binary opposition.[12] Consequently other related dichotomies are also problematised. For example, the production of a verdict of rape or consensual sex, and hence the resolution of the innocent-versus-guilty binary choice in a rape case, depends on another binary opposition, of `consent' versus `non-consent' (Smart, 1989: 26-49, 1990). This does not allow for complexity and gradation: a woman may consent to some sexual intimacy, but not to sexual intercourse; yet the law tends not to consider the co-existence of consent to one and not the other (Smart, 1989). The concept of submission, a response to coercion without outright force, also tends to be read legally as failure to establish non-consent (Smart, 1989; MacKinnon, 1989: 171-83).

It is also significant that notions of women's consent, rather than non-mutuality, mark the dominant definitional line between rape and intercourse, indicating again the blurring between `sex' and `force'.

> If sex is ordinarily accepted as something men
> do *to* women, the better question would be
> whether consent is a meaningful concept

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[12] Although even here there is more work to be done. It may be that the term `violence', while used by radical feminists to underline what is wrong with the `sex', still implies the more `extreme' end of the spectrum, whereas alternative concepts like `force' and `coercion' move closer to the middle regions between rape and consensual heterosexual sex (cf. Gavey, 1990).

(MacKinnon,   1982:   532,   MacKinnon's
emphasis).

The counterposition of `sex' to `rape (violence)' in the
dominant framework means also that rape is constructed
as an uncommon phenomenon unconnected to women's
everyday experiences, and rapists are represented as far
removed from `average' men. Hence further dichotomies
like `normal' versus `aberrant', and `typical' versus `rare'
are involved. Everyday masculine sexual violence is
judged and justified in relation to a standard of
commonplace masculine sexual behaviour, in contrast to
the continuum of radical feminist analysis.[13]   Hence
there exists a problem for women raped in `ambiguous'
situations:

> As   women's   experience   blurs   the   lines
> between deviance and normalcy, it obliterates
> the distinction between abuses of women and
> the social definition of what a woman *is*
> (MacKinnon,   1982:532   MacKinnon's
> emphasis).[14]

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[13]
On the `normality' of rape see Walby et al. (1983); Russell (1984);
Kelly (1987, 1988); Scully (1990). Gavey (1990: 90-116) notes the lack
of research on the prevalence and incidence of rape in New Zealand,
but her own study suggests that overseas evidence is relevant to the
local context.

[14]
Thus Gavey (1990: 115) notes that the `reality' of sexual victimisation,
in relation to her own finding that 50% of women have been sexually
victimised, is `probably both not as bad as this and yet much worse
than this'. Gavey points out that the results of research are also
produced by the typical/aberrant dichotomy, so the data in her study

These dominant assertions that rape is uncommon, pathological and not tolerated by official policing thereby help to maintain the normality and high prevalence of rape. While the legal process requires a clean truth, `beyond all reasonable doubt', women are already defined as sexually duplicitous even before they claim rape (Smart, 1989: 42-3). The courtroom, like the literary text, is not detached from the gendered discursive practices of the rest of the world. For example, juries authorised to decide the `facts' of a rape case bring to their readings their positioning by social relations in the rest of their lives.[15] These tend to disqualify women's experiences of sexual coercion.

Carol Smart (1989:34) is therefore not overstating when she describes the rape trial as `truly Kafkaesque' Statistics of extremely low conviction rates are evidence of the filtering out of already highly selective police processing of, in turn, grossly under-reported rape situations, even by legal definitions (e.g. Smart and Smart, 1978; Russell, 1984). To this must be added the scenarios where the rapist is found guilty but is partly exonerated through a lenient sentence, or through

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was probably more reflective of what was conceptualised by the respondents as `unusual'.

[15] For example, Smart (1989: 42) raises the question of the woman jurist who `has been pressured into sex but who has not called this rape, how difficult is it for her to identify another women's submission as rape?' Media discourses on rape also play an important role here, not only in producing a third ordeal for rape survivors, but in generally constructing and reinforcing dominant public narratives of `real rape' (Atmore, 1993, 1994a).

judicial and media comments mitigating his actions or indicting the complainant's.

Now consider a case regarded as truly borderline according to a vast number of criteria, but rape from the woman's point of view. A man known to the woman, in a position of institutional authority over her, coerces her into sex without recourse to overt force. It is this kind of scenario which is at the heart of the conflicts between radical feminist and liberal constructions of rape in relation to the Thompson case.

I now move on to criticise the liberal position of Version Two from the perspective of the radical feminist, deconstruction-affined Version One.

A Liberal Construction of Rape

> Increasingly I find it impossible to communicate what I mean.
>
> - Mervyn Thompson, `Another Life'

Pro-Thompson media accounts mainly produced a liberal construction of rape[16] shaped by the dominant

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[16] Although I dichotomise a singular radical feminism versus a monolithic liberalism for ease of analysis at this point, `liberalism', like `radical feminism', is plural. For example, Karl Stead, who supported Thompson's version, explicitly positions himself against liberals (eg., Stead, 1989), yet this can be read together with his claim that liberals have been co-opted by radical feminists, as an urge for a return to a more `authentic' liberalism (see also Williams, 1990: 57-63).

oppositions of phallogocentrism, and hence emphasising the discreteness of the terms 'sex' and 'violence'. This liberal view can be seen as a reassertion in response to radical feminists' degree of success in re-articulating public discourse. The radical feminist account of rape was therefore represented in liberal stories as a discredited opposite.

> It seems that among extremist elements in the feminist movement a semantic chain operates which permits words to take on any meaning that is desired. Feminist rhetoric steps in where facts never trod (Thompson, 1984a: 22).

The word 'rape' had 'become part of the verbal violence of sexual politics' (Rankin, 1984). Radical feminists have 'set out to subvert ... the English language, in this case, the word "rape" (Wall, 1984: 104), and this strategy was 'muddying the issue alarmingly' (Wall, 1984: 106).

The question of 'where to draw the line' was a source of considerable perplexity in these accounts, because radical feminism insists that it occur somewhere in the milieu of normal heterosexual behaviour.

> At the rate these meanings are travelling we will soon be in Orwell's 1984, where the 'thought police' will be able to punish people for harbouring 'treasonable' (for which read 'sexual' or even 'heterosexual') thoughts (Thompson, 1984a: 22).
>
> It does, however, seem to be going a little the other way when feminists argue that a woman

should be able to allege rape when a man puts
psychological pressure on a woman to have
sex by sulking for a day or two when the
woman pleads a `headache' (Wall, 1984: 106).

The dominant discourses in the pro-Thompson stories
conceptualised rape as being about violence, not sex.
This worked in a circular fashion to recuperate `sex' - as
defined in dominant discourses, phallic heterosexuality -
as unproblematically good (MacKinnon, 1987:73).
Masculine heterosexual behaviour was also `natural',
where nature was valorised as unchangeable and pure.[17]

The liberal view is that rape is a relatively uncommon
aberration, a misplacement of power onto natural and
untainted sex. A version of sexual essentialism operates
in this account, `as if sexuality comes from the stork'
(MacKinnon, 1987: 69). `Sex' is therefore outside `the
law' of culture (cf. Bulter, 1990). In a more literal
application of this, Wall (1984: 106) urged `you can't
legislate romance and lust and power and passion'.[18]

Yet at the same time, the law was appealed to as the gold
standard for the truth of rape and the Thompson case.

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[17] The liberal association of (heterosexual) sex with a privileged nature,
in contrast to a feminist-influenced puritanical culture, is a
continuing discourse in NZ `liberal glossy' magazines (Atmore, 1991,
1992a).

[18] Some radical feminists and feminist post-structuralists also
emphasise that line-drawing is not always clear-cut (eg., Gavey,
1990). But they and I differ from the liberal approach here in
conceptualising sex as always-already infused with cultural power.

For example, pro-Thompson accounts presented an account of rape in which the justice system provided a perfect conduit for `proper' rape cases. Thompson was constructed as `not a rapist' because no case had gone to court (`Vigilantes Rape Natural Justice', 1984). Thompson's accusers had not followed the correct procedures, instead making `anonymous and unspecified accusations' (`Playmarket "Disquieted" ', 1984). This proved that there was no case to answer. The definition of rape equalled the legal concept, hermetically sealed, so not only was Thompson not a rapist because he was not tried in court, but he was not tried in court because he was not a rapist.

In referencing law as authoritative discourse with the status of truth about rape, media stories disqualified other knowledges.

> If anyone really believes me to be a rapist, then let her say it to my face before witnesses and take the consequences ... the hundreds of women who seem to be working full-time on destroying me and those I love have not managed to produce evidence of a single instance of rape or sexual coercion ... I have had a gutsful of the gutlessness of people who cry `rapist' whenever they think it is legally safe to do so, but in their written statements craftily limit themselves to innuendo (Thompson, 1985).[19]

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[19] A minority of pro-Thompson writers constructed even this legal sanctuary as contaminated by feminist bias (eg., Grant, 1984).

Legal standards require substantiated facts and the presence of identifiable individuals, including crucially in this case, a victim. Thompson's accusers were portrayed as `taking refuge in anonymity' (Thompson, 1985). However, this did not acknowledge that Thompson's attackers were liable to assault charges. The pro-Thompson stories tended only to refer explicitly to the workings of the law inside the officially sanctioned arena of the courtroom, and even then only in terms of whether Thompson was guilty or innocent. Also largely excluded from the accounts were the effects of libel and defamation laws. These laws helped to construct the media stories, and worked in favour of privileging the pro-Thompson version.[20]

The law as official arbiter was also combined with `objective' research to cast suspicion on feminist readings. For example, Wall (1984: 104) described rapes as being `for the first three months of this year ... up 20%', and noted the success of neighbourhood support groups in reducing rape figures in St Mary's Bay and Mt Eden by `50 percent'. `Real rape' was equated with officially reported incidence. Yet contradictorily, on the same page, Wall referred to the Justice Department's Rape Study (Stone, Barrington, and Bevan, 1983) which `showed that less than four percent of reportable rapes

However, for most pro-Thompson writers, the fair trial was to be found in the legal courtroom.

[20] For a more detailed critique of how law structured the media accounts, see Atmore (1992a: 168-71).

resulted in the conviction of the rapist' (Wall, 1984: 104). Rape was, however, still only rape when the law says so - when it is 'reportable'. Wall's only discussion of an uncritical use of statistics was reserved for her comment on a feminist extrapolation of the number of unconvicted rapists, because 'some men rape more than once' (Wall, 1984: 106).

The pro-Thompson accounts therefore projected as Other what was internal to them, through their accusation of the feminist misuse of statistics and facts.[21] Similarly, they constructed the feminist redefinition of rape as transgression, even as their own discursive strategies also battled for an exclusive claim on its meaning. In these texts, a radical feminist continuum approach was both rejected as a starting place and a feared result.

> A man shows an interest in a woman and before he knows where he is, he is being accused of 'sexual harassment'. It takes very little intellectual juggling before an even more serious smear-word appears: 'rape'. Used ever more loosely the words become catch-cries: formulations by which all men are accused (Thompson, 1984a: 22).

Such liberal texts wrench examples from their context and detail, and then use these 'bare facts' to illustrate the difficulties of 'gray areas' and the perils of the slippery slope of inappropriate definitions.

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[21] On a more recent version of this argument, see Atmore (1991).

> Will simple good manners be regarded as an
> affront by feminists as it was when the
> Australian writer Thomas Keneally, author of
> *Schindler's Ark* and honoured guest of the
> English Department was greeted by a feminist
> who snarled `sexist' at him when he held open
> the door for her ... Opening the door is small
> stuff compared to the time-honoured arts of
> flirting and seduction. The question arises:
> When does `chatting up' become sexual
> harassment? (Wall, 1984: 100)

As criticised by radical feminist analysis, the pro-
Thompson stories implied that everyday masculine
sexual violence and sexist practices are justified precisely
because they are normal masculine sexual behaviour, in
the typical, `common' sense of the word. The threat to
the liberal construction of rape is radical feminist
insistence that `rape is taking place, not down dark alleys
off Karangahape Road but under the duvets of Remuera,
Pakuranga and Takapuna' (Wall, 1984: 106). A radical
feminist account implicates `normal' men and even
cultural heroes - `Thomas Keneally, author of *Schindler's
Ark* and honoured guest of the English Department' - in a
continuum of masculinist behaviour. As a letter to the
editor of the *NZ Listener*, supporting Thompson's
innocence, argued:

> To asset that [Thompson] is sexually
> indiscreet, and not very good at getting his
> facts straight, is beside the point. Half the
> country should be tied to a tree (Jensen, 1984).

Interval

In keeping with the performance theme of theatre, courtroom and media drama, I use this interval as a space to try to destabilise my reliance so far on the adversarial model of Versions One versus Two, by addressing some ambiguities and exclusions produced in this reading of the Thompson story.[22]

Although I have tended to conceptualise the two main versions as binary and opposed, they cannot be simply represented as a radical feminist/liberal dichotomy. To begin with, this buys back into the logic a deconstruction-influenced critique ought to problematise; and on the contrary, there are important shared aspects. For example, both sets of accounts attempted to legitimise their claims to `the truth' through particular logocentric appeals to authority. The truth claims in the feminist accounts were not explicit, because of the absence of an identifiable victim(s) of Thompson. However, within the framework of a radical feminist account of rape, truth is appealed to on the basis of a standpoint epistemology (Harding, 1986; Hawkesworth, 1989) in which women's experience provides access to `the real'. Similarly, even feminist contestations of phallogocentric science and law are ultimately bounded by the need to operate within such discourses in order to

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[22] See also Alison Young's (1990) justification of the theatrical thematic device; first in order to regulate what she argues is, due to the complex cultural codings involved, necessarily a lengthy piece of feminist post-structuralist media reading; and second, to emphasis the `constructed and staged quality of representational forms'.

try to achieve some kind of justice for raped women, producing an ambivalent relationship to post-structuralist critiques of knowledge (e.g. de Lauretis, 1987; Smart, 1989: 26-49, 1990).

The pro-Thompson accounts appealed to a liberal construction of rape and its overlap with legal definitions. However, they made a similar claim to that of radical feminism for the significance of personal experience. Most prominently, as I have discussed, Thompson wrote his own scripts in many of the dominant media stories. But Thompson's one-man show was at the same time not a solo performance. Its representation as such was the product of a number of discursive positionings in which first-person authorship and eyewitness status gave Thompson's version of the story the `ring of truth' (Wall, 1984: 98).[23] Thompson also claimed the truth of personal experience in mediated form, via radical feminist discourse: he suggested that he could not be a rapist because his mother was raped (Thompson, 1984a: 21).

Both main versions of the Thompson story therefore insisted that some form of authoritative approach could be distinguished from fiction in claiming the truth.[24] In

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[23] I argue elsewhere that this was at least in part due to Thompson's occupying the `victim' slot in a dominant media rape narrative (Atmore, 1994a).

[24] Ironically, for any strict maintenance of a fact/fiction dualism, in accounts supporting his version Thompson also appeared to be granted authenticity because of his credentials of creativity. His playwright and drama teaching positions seemed to qualify him as

particular, by focusing on the presence or absence, identity or anonymity of Thompson's victim(s), both liberal and radical feminist versions suggested that it remained possible for the truth to be revealed and for the conflict to be resolved once and for all.[25]

But there was no key: even if a woman came forward and was prepared to charge Thompson, truth conflicts would only be deferred, not just to contestation of her credibility, but more broadly to battles over the meaning of rape. Both sets of accounts appealed to the framework of phallogocentrism, and in so doing, produced inconsistencies and exclusions. This was particularly the case for liberal discourse, although as I have suggested, feminist accounts are not exempt from the dominant codings they are required to contest (see also Atmore, 1993, 1994a, 1994b). There is no way on this kind of logocentric ground alone to find `the truth' of the Thompson case, because the perspective of each `side' backs up its particular version.

As MacKinnon (1983: 651-5) suggests, rape is frequently a classic example of conflicting realities.[26] Hence for

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journalist in the *Evening Post*, the *Listener*, and *Metro*. See also Atmore (1992b).

[25] `yes, but did he do it?' remains the most common response to my presentations of the controversy.

[26] My choice of MacKinnon to make this implicitly post-structuralist point emphasises again that radical feminism (in which MacKinnon is often located as an archetypal exponent) could, and indeed must in

instance, Thompson's innocence may well have been his truth. Similarly, his claims that he was unfairly singled out cannot be simply dismissed as false. For example, Thompson's narratives of the injustice and seriousness of the attack addressed the attempted feminist renegotiation of the atypical/normal dualism in relation to the characteristics of identified rapists. At one point, he addressed his accusers as `the daughters of privilege' who `know very little about poverty and class' (Thompson, 1985; see also Reid, 1984). The implication is that it was easy to target him falsely because as a man of working class origins, he did in fact at least partly fit one of the `normal rapist' police blotter categories. His claims of unfair treatment therefore achieved a triple effectiveness, and were also `true' from a radical feminist perspective. Thompson was singled out for doing what most men do, which is therefore by dominant definitions, not rape; he was targeted because he was white and professional; and his class origins gave him some authentic claim to a history of official persecution.

I have also represented `sides' in quotation marks, because not only were radical feminist and liberal stories of the case not totally opposed, nor could either version be conceptualised as a unified, un-contradictory whole. Accounts which I treated together for ease of analysis also diverged significantly from one another. For example, stories classifiable into `liberal' versus `radical feminist' discourse over the question of Thompson's guilt were not similarly opposed dichotomously over the

my view, make more of these complexities, rather than be assumed to be completely undone by them.

question of the moral justification of violence. Feminist redefinitions of violence cannot simply be counterposed to the law as advocating `chaos'. If no liberal media account endorsed the attack on Thompson, neither did narratives which might on some grounds be tagged as `radical feminist' directly justify the attack.[27]

Even the category of `radical feminism', if this is defined by the radical feminist analysis of rape I have drawn on, was not monolithic on this issue. Some women may have believed Thompson was innocent and condemned the attack. Others tended to accept claims that Thompson was guilty but deplored the methods of punishment and publicity (e.g. Calvert, 1984; Cato, 1984; Maes, 1984; Ryan, 1984). A few represented the action as unproblematically in women's interest (e.g. Lee, Holdt, Moran, and Marsik, 1984; Ord, 1984a, 1984b). Still other feminists did not unequivocally endorse the attack on Thompson and its general implications for anti-rape strategies, but were more supportive of it (e.g.

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27   Partly this reflects the `middle ground' of liberal feminism. Compare, for example, liberal texts opposing `vigilante justice' (eg., Jensen, 1984; De la Bere, 1984) with a letter to the editor of the *Listener* which contained at least fragments of radical feminist discourse: `[The facts of rape] make women angry and can lead to the kind of action taken against Mervyn Thompson, either because of his own behaviour or as a symbolic act of protest generally. Unfortunately two wrongs - rape by men and assaults by women - do not make a right ... [perhaps] some of the objectives which women seek ... cannot be achieved within our adversary system of criminal justice, but they cannot be achieved by vigilante action either ... Surely it is to everyone's benefit that we find more appropriate solutions before others take out their frustration in this matter' (Barrington, 1984).

Bidge, 1984; Else, 1984; Johns, 1984; Porszolt, 1984; Ruth, 1984; Scott, 1984).

From Feminism ... to Feminism

> It would take (she said) more than overalls and spiky hairstyles to overturn a million years of biological history.
>
> - C.K. Stead, *The Death of the Body*

The liberal accounts also contained discursive fragments which cannot be read as simply `liberal'. In the remainder of the essay, I will explore the utility of the radical feminist - deconstruction coalition by taking some of these fragments, or `points of paradox or excess' (Grosz, 1989: 28; see also Gavey, 1989, 1990) as more foci for my critical reading of the pro-Thompson accounts I concentrate on one theme in Carroll Wall's (1984) follow-up article, `From Feminism to Fascism'. Wall's story was an expansion of the link made in many of the pro-Thompson accounts, that the motive for the attack on Thompson could be supplied by identifying his attackers as lesbian feminists.

Wall's account claimed to give the in-depth background to the case by describing `the climate of fear and loathing that is the fascist fringe of feminism in Auckland in 1984' (Wall, 1984: 97). Among a number of representations of lesbians and lesbian feminists (Atmore, 1992a, 1992b, 1993), lesbian feminists were constructed in Wall's and other pro-Thompson texts as `man-haters' (e.g. Wall,

1984: 101, 106, 110), in contrast to acceptable heterosexual and more moderate feminists.

`Man-hating', like the attack on Thompson in most of the media accounts, and in direct contrast to the lack of media construction of rape as`woman-hating', was represented as a particularly serious crime. However, Wall's depiction of lesbian feminist man-hating as the `real' crime deconstructs to undo the liberal view of rape in the Thompson case, and to support instead a radical (and lesbian) feminist conceptualisation of sexual violence.

Wall's argument runs as follows. The definition of rape here is

> traditional ... as defined by the Crimes Act,
> and admittedly, one or two subtle variations
> on it (Wall, 1984: 104).

The phrase `one or two subtle variations' suggests some ambivalence toward the radical feminist definition, also illustrated by Wall's discussion of how to define when seduction becomes rape.

> As most women know, there are occasions
> when there is only a fine line between the two.
> And the sexual revolution has blurred that
> line even further (Wall, 1984: 100).

Nevertheless, Wall's official text privileges the liberal concept of the pro-Thompson accounts. Hence while rape is an important issue, as '[i]t's got to the point where

ordinary women are scared to go to sleep when their men are out of town' (Wall, 1984: 104), lesbian feminists go too far in indicting, and hating, all men.

> The fear and the hatred triggered by rape does not drive deep enough for them [radical and lesbian feminists]. It gets women good and mad - the thought that they or their daughters or even their mothers may be raped - but it does not push them over the edge to the point where they espouse the lesbian hatred of men (Wall, 1984).

However, lesbian feminists can use rape as a lever to push normal women over the edge.

> [F]or the separatist lesbians to make their attack truly effective they must persuade the world that ALL MEN ARE RAPISTS. And since they clearly are not, rape must be redefined ... It's by convincing women at large that all men are rapists, the separatist feminists are trying to inveigle the mob into revolution (Wall, 1984: 104-106).

Why do 'the separatist lesbians' believe all men are rapists? Because they hate men. Why do they hate men? Because they believe all men are rapists. Man-hating is both crime and motive. The bias for such a construction must be located outside this circle's perimeter, patrolled as it is by the liberal account of rape. Lesbian feminists are man-haters because they do not 'love' men. This shifts the level of explanation: man-hating and lesbianism are not natural or normal. Why do these

women hate men and believe that they are all rapists?
Because they are lesbians.[28]

Why are they lesbians? Wall's account emphasises the
socially constructed status of lesbianism. At first glance,
this seems 'progressive'. Wall quotes 'clinical
psychologist and sex therapist Aloma Colgan'.[29]
According to Colgan, via Wall:

> [L]esbians, on the whole, are 'made not born'.
> 'It's a choice, a lifestyle, an option. Lesbianism
> is not an incurable disease', says Dr Colgan
> (Wall, 1984: 107).

However, constructionism is resourced by Wall in a
specific way which is integrally connected to the
Thompson narratives. Wall immediately precedes her
quote from Colgan with a discussion of the kind of rape
Thompson was accused of, and concludes:

> That kind of rape may be one of the reasons
> some women turn dyke in the first place
> (Wall, 1984:107).

28
To the extent that lesbians were positioned in the dominant accounts
as Thompson's 'rapists' (Atmore, 1993), it is interesting to return to
MacKinnon's analysis that 'rape is a sex crime that is not a crime
when it looks like sex', which is often. In the pro-Thompson texts,
lesbianism is a sex crime which *is* a crime when it does *not* look like
sex, which is, again, often.

29
Colgan subsequently criticised Wall's use of her statements ('Letters
from the Sisters', 1984: 188).

Rape is dangerous precisely because it makes ordinary women go off the rails of normality. But more significantly, the implication is that rape survivors are responsible for the attack on Thompson.[30]

Colgan's social constructionist statement is sandwiched between Wall's rape-causes-lesbianism claim and a second quote from Colgan:

> ...she perceives a more political reason for lesbianism in the young. `There's a trend, but not among a vast majority, for university students to go gay', she says although she doesn't see some of the politically motivated lesbians remaining gay for their entire lives (Wall, 1984: 107).

The 'political' motivation could be traced back to an experience of rape. Those who `get over it' - lesbian feminist brainwashing, rape - reassume normality. `Lesbianism is not an incurable disease'.

For Wall's account to make these claims coherent, the Thompson story must ultimately be constructed ambivalently. I quote the following passage in detail because of the way it represents rape, lesbians, and Thompson's status as accused.

> Take the following scenario. A woman in her mid twenties is having dinner with her ex-teacher at a city restaurant. He says he must

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For a more detailed discussion of this connection, see Atmore (1993).

go home to make a phone call. She agrees to come along because she wants to watch a television programme. The television set turns out to be in the bedroom. He suddenly throws her back against the bed and has sex with her against her will. Does she run to the police and so put a friend in jail for up to 14 years or does she lie back and think of England, then go home and have a hot bath? The mildest feminist answer, of course, is to lay a complaint. The extreme is to get out the chains. The human answer is not quite so clear. But for wimmin [lesbian feminists], as avowed man-haters, the decision is easy. Which is one of the reasons why Mervyn Thompson became the subject of their first vigilante attack. [Thompson] is well known for his interest in women. He's a self-confessed womaniser, a man of violent temperament ... So it's men like this who can be most easily accused of the kind of rape the radical feminist fringe insists is rife amongst just about all heterosexuals, when a man won't take no for an answer, or when a man in authority intimidates a woman into letting him have his way with her, maybe without him realising his rank has anything to do with it (Wall, 1984: 106-7).

Wall's account is ambivalent about whether the situation represented is rape, but also suggests that this sums up Thompson's actions. The question of Thompson's guilt or innocence is also not resolved.

When I let it be known that I was writing this article, although *almost every woman I talked to*

thought that what had happened to Mervyn Thompson was rather good and a warning to rapists, they also thought the methods deplorable and the choice of alleged rapist extremely strange (Wall, 1984: 102, my emphasis).

Via phrases and words like `well known', violent', and `self-confessed', Wall implies that perhaps unwittingly, Thompson set himself up for the attack. As one *Metro* reader praising Wall's article put it, `poor silly Mervyn Thompson' (Williams, 1984: 231). Like Rosemary McLeod's columns in *North and South*, such narratives suggest a number of contradictory subject positions.[31] Thompson, or at least men like him, must be a rapist in order for Wall's link between rape and lesbian feminism to be sustained. But this indicts normal, even pro-feminist men, and hence undermines the liberal construction of rape. Wall therefore attempts to position Thompson as somehow atypical - but then she is shoring up the construction of him as a rapist, and in any case, the abnormal-rapist categorisation of Thompson is undercut by other pro-Thompson accounts. The indictment of lesbian feminism as unnatural, in the sense of not being an uncoerced choice, relies on the possibility of Thompson's guilt.

But if the attackers were right about Thompson, broader lesbian and radical feminist truth claims about

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[31] There are also resonances here with Gavey's (1989, 1990) analysis of heterosexual women's representations of the `grey areas' between consensual sex and sexual coercion.

masculinism and heterosexuality (defined by more mainstream interpretations as `off the wall') are supported. Hence within this logic, the heterosexual-normal/lesbian-abnormal line is in danger of at least partial reversal and dissolution. The alternative is to play down the seriousness of this kind of rape - but Wall has already acknowledged that it is rape (`and admittedly, one or two subtle variations on it') and that it is powerful enough to make `some women turn dyke'.

In the Hope of Not Concluding

I have given some examples of conspicuous silences and contradictions in the pro-Thompson accounts which prevent their hermetic sealing against a radical and lesbian feminist-influenced deconstruction. These are signs of ongoing struggles over definitions of rape, and of the impact of feminisms on the broader narrative field of New Zealand sexual politics (see also Atmore 1994a, 1994d). However, I have also suggested that a deconstruction of apparently polar opposites works both, or more, ways. For example, I have argued that radical feminist and post-structuralist theories are not binarily opposed over their conceptualisation of sexual violence.[32] By the same token, liberalism and radical feminism, as represented in the two dominant versions of the Thompson conflict, are not two elements of a

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[32]   Although it needs to be repeated that radical feminism, like feminism more generally, brings its own contributions to post-structuralist theorising, not simply a reiteration: post-structuralist theories have generally not been notable for their rigorous critiques of masculinism, rape included (eg., de Lauretis 1987).

dualism but rather necessarily share logocentric discursive strategies, although I have been less interested in pursuing those particular overlaps here.[33]

At the same time, if radical feminism and liberalism do not simply reduce to versions of the same under the withering fire of deconstructive critique, it is also important for feminist work on sexual coercion to emphasise that while heterosexuality and rape are not diametric opposites, nor are they identical. There is important work to be done in refashioning radical feminist arguments about rape, with and against post-structuralist concepts.[34]

Similarly, my own critical interpretation does not escape the pull of the logocentric framework it tries to deconstruct, and not only because of its radical feminist influences. Post-structuralism, as the name reinforces, cannot leave the legacy of logocentrism behind, and like Thompson, I did not write this `on my own'. Deconstruction's advocates therefore insist that deconstructive critique, as an activity of textual close reading, must in accordance with `its' own approach

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[33] This point might lend itself to a deconstructive re-working of categorisations of the media response to feminist initiatives as a `backlash' (eg., Rosier, 1989; Sabbage, 1989; Faludi, 1992). See also Atmore (1993, 1994a, 1994b).

[34] As I have suggested, many post-structuralist critiques of radical feminism, even from feminists, base their critiques on what appears to be wilful or at least careless `mis-readings'. This is still a minority view, but see in my support Bordo (1990, 1992); Modleski (1991 esp 135-163); de Lauretis (1993).

resist a unitary, `last word' summary of both `itself' and the text (Benjamin, 1988; Norris, 1988; Spivak, 1990; Cheah, 1991).

As I have illustrated, deconstruction can provide a powerful and innovative critical tool in supporting my stance on the case. Feminist texts engaging with post-structuralism might rely on their power to convince through a combination of `up-front' decentring of more traditional authoritative strategies, and the persuasive passions of politics, as I have done here.  But if `we' still wish to give legitimacy to our particular emancipatory claims in an unevenly matched discursive contest, always with more at stake than `just' rhetoric (de Lauretis, 1987: 31-50), ambiguities and ambivalences remain.  `Well-intentioned' political motivation - and however that is defined - cannot exempt a knowledge claim from a post-structuralist-informed reflexivity.[35]

Any story constructs and is produced by specific truth-power strategies. This cannot be even my own last word on the case, let alone `the' definitive analysis of all its aspects.  The attack on Thompson and its aftermath is important in New Zealand sexual politics, influencing more recent conflicts and having cross-cultural resonances with broader controversies over `PC' and ongoing struggles for the meanings of sexual coercion (see e.g. Atmore, 1994c).

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[35]   Young (1990 esp. 160, 165) discusses this dilemma for a feminist post-structuralist media critic, who wishes to subject a monologic text to `the absences of the other(s)', and hence also risks slippage `into modernist mastery and authoritarian exegesis'.

My interests in the controversy are, like anyone else's, harnessed to my own strategic projects. I interpret deconstruction and post-structuralism more generally as supporting a greater explicit reflexivity about positionality and investments, which `leaves a track of responsibility in the text to be traced by future readers' (Cheah, 1991: 127). Other work on the Thompson case will add its own tracks in tracing a semiotic-material network in which this essay, too, plays a part.

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Parents in Paid Work
The Workforce Patterns of Parents with Children Under Five Years of Age.

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A long-term trend for women to move into the paid labour force and men out of it applies also to the parents of young children in New Zealand. The paper uses census data to analyse differences in labour force participation by ethnicity, for mothers and fathers, in one- and two-parent family situations, with trends over the decade of the 1980s. Particular situations in two-parent families are examined - where both parents are employed, where neither have paid work, and the traditional breadwinner father/homemaker mother pattern. The changes outlined not only challenge the traditional roles of mothers and fathers, but have implications for the distribution of unpaid caring work and for family incomes and wellbeing.

Introduction

Social and economic change in society is reflected in family life. Arguably the most dramatic changes affecting the family in the last few decades has been the trend for partnered women with dependent children to

participate in paid work outside the home. The factors involved include smaller families, delayed child-bearing, financial imperatives and the growth of liberal feminism with its focus on individualism and equality for women. These trends have led to an interest in the ways in which women's labour force participation has impacted on their domestic responsibilities in the form of housework and childcare, in particular in the household division of labour (Sandqvist, 1987; Hochschild, 1989).

But other long term labour force trends have affected both women and men. These include the shortening of the working week and lengthening of leave entitlements; the rise of the service sector; later entry into employment and earlier retirement; growth in part-time work and increased self-employment. More recently, in New Zealand, unemployment has spread, not only among young workers, but increasingly among so-called 'prime aged' males. Economic circumstances have combined with policy initiatives to produce greater labour market flexibility. Within this complex pattern of change, two generalised and contrasting strands can be discerned - an increase in paid work by women and a decrease in paid work by men (Dave, 1993). One result of this change is that many men, usually through no choice of their own, now have an opportunity for greater involvement in the private sphere of unpaid and caring work.

This paper focuses on the changing patterns of paid work for parents of children under five years of age in New Zealand since 1981. The presence of pre-school children in a family is usually taken to entail limitations on workforce participation by one or both parents,

particularly in the first year if the baby is breastfed. Information on the participation of parents in paid work has been derived from New Zealand census sources in the course of research undertaken by the two authors. The databases allow separate analysis of patterns for mothers and fathers; for one and two-parent family situations; with special attention to disaggregation by ethnicity. While the two data bases cover similar variables, they differ slightly in their focus. Section A of the paper uses the *From Birth to Death III* database which presents the percentages of children in particular situations. In section B, the data is drawn from the *Families and Patterns of Work* database which is based on a count of families (see Appendix for information on these projects and for technical details on the databases).

Section A

1. Children in Two Parent Families

(a) Fathers' Participation in Paid Work

A man's ability to earn a living and support a wife and family is the pivot of the male role and a crucial aspect of the male identity

Sue Kedgley - The Sexual Wilderness - Men and Women in New Zealand, 1985

Research, both from within New Zealand and overseas, suggests that, in recent times, heterosexual male identity and self esteem has been very much based around participation in paid work, especially as the earnings gap

between men and women shrinks. A range of analysts have suggested that to compensate for the movement of women into the `public sphere' men should also re-balance their lives by undertaking a greater share of the work in the `private sphere'.

There are a number of arguments for such a change. Liberal feminist thought suggests that women will always be constrained in the public sphere if men are not taking an equal share of the work in the private sphere (Rantalaiho, 1993). Dinnerstein (1977) and Chodorow (1978) put forward theories that the oppression of women originates in the female monopoly on mothering. To counter this they argue for the concept of dual or shared parenting. A number of psychologists and anthropologists also suggest that men will gain emotionally from the experience and a positive spinoff is that men will make better decisions in the public sphere with this new dimension to their being (Smith, 1990; Kitzinger, 1992). In addition, there are a number of studies which suggest that there may be positive gains for children in two-part families from increased participation by men in childcare (Callister, 1993). Since the early 1970s, social commentators have suggested that male expectations and behaviour need to change. But it is not clear whether the major challenge to the traditional role of 'breadwinner' has come from socio-cultural change, the influence of the women's movement, or through economic restructuring with its resulting increase in male unemployment, and in particular, unemployment amongst fathers of young children.

Changes in the labour force status of fathers in two-parent families over .the last ten years have been dramatic. For Pakeha children under five, the proportion with fathers in full-time employment has fallen, from 97% in 1981 to 86% in 1991. But the drop has been even greater for other ethnic groups. In 1981, 90% of Maori children in two-parent families had fathers who were in paid work, but this had dropped to 63% in 1991. For Pacific Islanders, the decline was from 89% to 56% (Figure I)

There has also been an increase in the proportion of children with fathers working part-time, even though it is not very common. The figure was 1% in 1981 and 3% in 1991, with similar proportions for the three ethnic groups. This growth of part-time work appears to have been a result of economic restructuring rather than changing social attitudes (Callister, 1991).

Figure 1

Percentage of children under five in two parent families with fathers in full-time or part-time work

Source: 'From Birth to Death III' database

(ii)   Mothers' Participation in Paid Work

The most important task a woman can have is
that of wife, homemaker and mother

Truby King (quoted by McKinlay, 1983)

The ideology and practice of motherhood has undergone
several changes since the turn of the century. While in
previous   decades,   motherhood   was   regarded   as
women's social identity and her life was seen as centred
around children, from the 1970s onwards, motherhood
has become only one of women's 'choices' (McKinlay,
1983). Popular writers such as Friedan in the United
States and Phillips in New Zealand, have argued that
women, in order to achieve equal status with men, need
to enter the public sphere and compete in the world of
commerce,   politics,   academia   and   all   the   other
institutions outside of the home (Friedan, 1963; Phillips,
1983).   However, other feminist writers argue that it is
not so much the nature of full-time motherhood which is
problematic, but rather the way in which motherhood
has been devalued in a patriarchal society (Rich, 1976). In
New Zealand, Max (1990) and Woods (1993) argue there
are a new set of moral pressures on mothers to be in paid
work.

Whether from a belief that mothers should be at home
with their children while they are young, a lack of
affordable quality childcare, insufficient employment
opportunities, inflexibility by employers, or lack of
support by fathers, a high proportion of pre-school
children have others who do not participate in paid

work. This is particularly evident when the child is under one year old, a period in which a high proportion of New Zealand babies are breastfed (Plunket, 1993). However, the percentages of children with mothers who are `not in the labour force' have fallen over the 1981-1991 period, in all ethnic groups (Table 1).

Although fewer mothers are in paid work compared to fathers, their participation, both full-time and part-time, has increased. Between 1981 and 1986, the proportion of pre-school children in New Zealand with mothers in paid work rose from 28% to 35%.[1] Growth stalled in the subsequent inter-censual period, to give a figure of 37% overall in 1991.

As a result, fewer pre-school children, even those under a year old, have mothers at home full-time. Variation by ethnicity for the younger group is slight (Table 1). For children aged one to four, Pacific Islanders were more likely to have mothers in paid work in 1981 and 1986.

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[1]   While there has been an increase in both full-time and part-time work, it is worth noting that full-time employment for women can often involve considerably fewer hours of work per week than for men. For example, in 1991, of the women in two-parent families working full-tine, with a child under one, 70% worked between 30 and 44 hours per week, while less than half of the fathers worked under 45 hours. In addition, hours of part-time work increase for women as their children get older. For example, 35% of women in two parent families who work part-time put in less than 10 hours per week when their children are under one, but this proportion drops to 29% in the 1-4 age group, and drops further to 16% when children are 5-15.

Table 1   Children under five in two-parent families, percent with mothers not in the labour force, percent of children in each age group, by ethnicity.

	1981	1986	1991
MAORI			
Under one	84	73	70
One to four	72	56	59
PACIFIC ISLAND			-
Under one	81	70	70
One to four	64	53	60
PAKEHA			
Under one	82	71	68
One to four	70	57	54
TOTAL			
Under one	82	72	68
One to four	70	56	55

Source: 'From Birth to Death III' database

However, the pattern changed in 1991, when the downward trend of non-participation was reversed for the Maori and Pacific Island groups. By 1991, almost half of Paheka children aged one to four had mothers in paid work, as opposed to 49% of Maori and Pacific Island children.

Figure 2

Percentage of children under five in two parent families with mothers in full-time and part-time work

Source: 'From Birth to Death III' database

Participation in full-time work has been consistently highest for the Pacific Island group, and participation in part-time work highest for the Paheka group (Figure 2). While there are ethnic differences in full and part-time work in New Zealand, there are also differences between nations. In the UK, mothers in two-parent families with young children follow a similar pattern to New Zealand, while in the USA, mothers are more likely to work full-time (Morris, 1990).

2. Children in One-Parent Families

Over the last decade, there has been a rapid increase in the proportion of families headed by a single parent. While the majority of sole parents are female, there has been a small but significant growth in sole fathers, not only in New Zealand but in most 'western' nations (Wilson, 1990). The modern growth in sole parenthood is linked to increased marriage breakdown and, to a lesser extent, to unmarried parenthood. The social circumstances differ from a period earlier in the century when widowhood was the leading factor. Acceptance of unpartnered parenthood is now reflected in policies such as the Domestic Purposes Benefit.

The proportion of pre-school children living with a sole parent has more than doubled over the 1981-1991 period, to reach one in every five. Figures are higher for Maori and Pacific Island children (respectively 43% and 31%).

(i) Mothers' (Female Sole Parent) Participation in Paid Work

Patterns of mothers' paid work participation over the 1981-1991 decade are very different for children in one-parent families compared to those in two-parent situations. Fewer mothers in one parent families are in paid work. Over the period there has been a decrease in the proportion of children with sole mothers in paid work (Table 2). This applies to all ethnic groups. Hence there is a greater likelihood for children to have a mother at home if they are in a one-parent family situation: 88% of children under five in families headed by a female solo

parents had mothers who were out of the paid workforce, compared to 63% of children in two-parent families.

Table 2

	1981		1986		1991	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
MAORI	6	4	7	3	4	4
PACIFIC ISLAND	13	4	11	3	7	3
PAKEHA	7	9	6	7	7	8
TOTAL	8	6	8	5	6	6

Source: "From Birth to Death III" database

While paid work by mothers in two parent families is more common than for sole mothers in New Zealand, the situation is reversed in some 'western' economies with sole parent mothers in the USA, Austria, and Finland more likely to be in paid work than married mothers (*The Economist*, 1993).[2]

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[2] The role of the DPB in New Zealand in facilitating, or even encouraging, non-participation in paid work by sole parents is controversial. The objective of the DPB to support sole parents in their child-rearing role can be seen in conflict with attempts to reduce welfare dependency and encourage self-reliance through labour market activity.

(ii)   Fathers' (Male Sole Parent) Participation in paid work

The numbers of children living with sole parent fathers has trebled over the 1981-1991 period, but are still small, amounting to only 2 in every 100 pre-school children. Of these, 58% were Maori or Pacific Island according to the 1991 Census.   Further information is needed on the actual living circumstances of such families, for example whether they are part of larger households, and who is actually caring for the children involved.

Despite the numerical growth, decreasing proportions of pre-school children have lone fathers in full or part-time work, falling overall from 70% in 1981 to 45% in 1991 for children under one, and from 63% to 35% for children aged one to four.   Maori and Pacific Island children are less likely to have sole fathers in paid work than Paheka children.   Overall, only one in three children who lived with a male solo parent had their father in paid work, compared to four out of five where their father was part of a two parent family.

The labour force characteristics of sole fathers are quite different to those of sole mothers.   Their overall participation rate is similar to that of mothers in two-parent families.   However, the work profile of those in the labour force, in terms of hours of paid work, is similar to that of men in two-parent families.

Section B

Particular Situations in Two-Parent Families

Table 3 indicates that there are a wide range of possible combinations of family types and participation in paid work. But it also shows that, despite the changes in family types and the growth of mothers in paid work, when the youngest child is under five, the traditional family model of male `breadwinner' and female parent not in paid work still remains the most popular arrangement for raising the children.

The following sections examine particular situations in two-parent families with pre-school children vis-a-vis labour force participation by parents. At one end of the paid work spectrum are what might be termed 'two job' families, where both parents are in full-time paid work (11% of the total). In a further 28% of families, both parents have some paid work involvement. At the opposite extreme are families where neither partner is in paid work - the 'no job families' (10%). The status of the traditional family unit, with the father in full-time paid work, and the mother not in paid work - the situation for one in three families with pre-school children - is also examined.

2.   Two Job Families

A significant amount of American literature on women moving into paid work is focused on families with both parents in full-time work (Pleck, 1985; Hochschild, 1989, Crosby, 1991). In 1988, over a half of all married women in the USA, with children under one, were in paid work.

Table 3　　　**Families with youngest child under five - Ranked order by family type and participation in paid work - 1991 (includes one and two parent families)**

	Actual	%
Two-parent family - Father full-time, mother not in paid work	66114	34.3
Sole mother not in paid work	36509	18.9
Two-parent family - Father full-time, mother part-time	31125	16.1
Two-parent family - Both in full-time paid work	21507	11.1
Two-parent family - Neither in paid work	18957	9.8
Sole father - Not in paid work	2961	1.5
Sole mother - Full-time paid work	2745	1.4
Sole mother - Part-time paid work	2594	1.3
Two-parent family - Father part-time, mother not in paid work	2433	1.3
Two-parent family - Father not in paid work, mother full-time	2298	1.2
Sole father - Full-time paid work	1719	0.9
Two-parent family - Father not in paid work, mother part-time	1698	0.9
Two-parent family - Both part-time	1125	0.6
Two-parent family - Father part-time, mother full-time	951	0.5
Sole father - Part-time paid work	174	0.1
Total	192910	100

Source: Statistics NZ and *A Profile of Sole Parents From the 1991 Census*, Research report No. 15, Department of Social Welfare.

Note: The category 'paid work' in this and subsequent tables is equivalent to the official Statistics New Zealand classification 'gainfully employed in the labour force' and in fact includes a small number of unpaid workers in family businesses. 'Not in paid work' includes those unemployed and looking for work and those not in the labour force.

(McGovern, 1992). In New Zealand, once children reach school age, the two-income family is the norm. But this is not true for families with children under five. Less than half have both parents in paid work, and situations where both parents work full-time are rare, especially where the youngest child was under a year old in 1991 (Table 4). There is little qualitative information on two job families in New Zealand, or even studies of how parents cope with paid work and childcare. The Society for Research on Women carried out two small studies in the mid-1970s, looking at two job families with pre-schoolers in Hamilton and professional women with dependent children in Wellington, but these are now dated (SROW: 1976 a and b).

Table 4

Age of youngest child	Both full-time	Both in paid work (part or full-time)
Under 1	10.3	25.5
1-4	16.5	42.3

Source: Statistics NZ

The concept of both parents working part-time when children are young has been put forward as a model for combining work and family, while at the same breaking down traditional gender roles within the family, but only 0.8% of two-parent families, with a child under five, operate this way (Callister, 1994). This is despite the very strong growth in part-time work by men and women over the last decade.

A range of factors affect labour market participation, in particular the level of formal education. Low levels of education not only make it more difficult to obtain paid employment, but also reduce earning capacity, making it more difficult to pay for childcare. This suggests that the highest rates of labour force participation will be found where both parents have tertiary qualifications. Where both partners have university qualifications, under a fifth are both working full-time when their child is under five. If part-time work is included (for either partner), the participation rate for university educated couples rises to just over 50%. Where both have no formal qualification, only 11% of couples both work full-time when their youngest child is under five.

In two-parent families where the father is in full-time paid work, the highest level of participation in full-time paid work by mothers is where the mother has a tertiary qualification and their partner has no formal qualification (24.3%). The data suggest that while a higher level of formal education increases the likelihood of participation in paid work for mothers and fathers as individuals, the level of qualification of their partner also influences their behaviour.

3.   'No Job' Families

In New Zealand, as in other `western' nations facing high levels of unemployment, there has been a growth in two-parent families where neither partner earns income from the market (Morris, 1990). This situation may only occur for a short period, but it is likely a significant

group will be part of the long term unemployed (Grimmond, 1992).

Between 1986 and 1991, the percentage of New Zealand two parent families with pre-school children in which neither parent was in paid work trebled from 3.9% to 13%. This is associated with the loss of full-time work for men in the same period (Figure 1).

While this growth has been driven by the loss of paid work by men, research in the UK indicates that as men drop out of paid work, their partners often also move out of paid work (Cooke, 1987). Benefit eligibility and abatement sometimes may, in fact, discourage earning by spouses of unemployed people (Hills, 1993).

The growth of 'no job' families has been particularly significant for Maori families, amounting to one in three where both parents identify as Maori. This drops to one in five if one parent is Maori, and one in ten if neither are Maori. Information for Pacific Island families is not available in this analysis, but the figures for Pacific Island children shown in Figure 1 suggest that their pattern may be similar to Maori. No one factor is likely to explain the differences between Paheka parents.

The effect of parental qualification level on family participation in paid work is significant. One in three families where neither parent has any educational qualifications are 'no job' families, as opposed to less than one in ten where both parents have at least school qualifications. Only 3% of couples where both have

university qualifications were, at the time of the 1991 census, 'no job' families.

The link between qualifications and the ability to participate in paid work is reinforced in a family setting because people tend to form relationships with partners who have similar levels of educational attainment. For example, in 1991, in two-parent families with the youngest child under five, 58% of women with a university qualification were with men who were similarly qualified, and only 5% were with men with no qualifications. Similarly, for women with no qualifications, 51% were with men with no qualifications, and only 2% were with men with university qualifications. If individuals with few qualifications are being marginalised in the labour market, or forced out entirely, then clearly this is reinforced where both parents have little in the way of formal credentials. This flows though to family income, and hence to standards of living for both parents and children.

The 'Traditional' Family

The traditional family, with a father in full-time paid work and a mother fully engaged in childcare and home-making, has been declined in statistical terms throughout the 'western' world. However, in New Zealand, it is still the dominant paid work/childcare option for two-parent families with a child under five. Where both parents are non-Maori, such families are 47% of the total two parent families. However, the proportion falls to one third in families where both partners are Maori.

The parents' level of formal education has already been shown to influence involvement in paid work. Neo-classical economic models, based on rational decision making within an 'altruistic' family setting, predict that in one income families, it should be the higher qualified parent, with the greater earning potential, who will take on the bread-winning role while the less qualified partner will take the unpaid work at home (Becker,1991). As predicted, the highest percentages (over 50%) conforming to the 'traditional' family type are found where fathers have tertiary qualifications and mothers do not. Where mothers have university credentials and fathers no formal qualifications, the traditional pattern is least prevalent with only 30% of this group operating as 'traditional' families. But this latter group is of a sufficient size to indicate that factors other than economic rationality come into the decision making process when choosing someone to stay home to look after children.

A 'mirror image' of the traditional family would be where a mother is in full-time work and a father not in paid work. This would again appear to be a rational economic response to the female partner having higher qualifications and earning potential. However, in 1991, such a 'role reversal' occurred in only 7.5% of families where the father had no qualifications but the mother had a university qualification. This again brings into question simple decision making models. Non-traditional roles for both parents are most common where both parents are Maori (3.4%) and the least common when both are Paheka (1.3%). Overall, in 1991, only 1.6% of two-parent families with pre-school children

had a 'role reversal' pattern of paid work, up from 0.6% in 1986.

Conclusion

Census data indicate that for many New Zealanders, there have been significant changes in their pattern of paid employment and their family settings over the last decade. Changes indicated have considerable implications for the social and economic wellbeing of families. Three important issues are the effects on the distribution of unpaid work, on expectations of male roles in two parent families, and on family income.

The lack of value placed on unpaid work means that comprehensive data are not available to assess the changes in the division of labour occurring within the home. This topic will be discussed in a subsequent paper, again drawing on the two databases.

Despite the move into paid work by mothers of pre-school children and the move out of paid work by many men, the traditional pattern of the father as 'breadwinner' and the mother not in paid work still remains the most common parenting arrangement when children are under five. Compared with the USA and some Nordic countries, participation rates for mothers in two-parent families in paid work are still quite low in New Zealand.[3] In terms of paid work, there is still a lack

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As a wider comparison, in New Zealand the proportion of all women in the 15-64 age group who were in paid work stood at 63.8% in 1990. According to

of symmetry, with fathers generally working longer hours than mothers.

For sole parents, participation in paid work are low and have been declining over the last decade. They are significantly lower for sole mothers than for mothers in two-parent families. In a small number of 'western' countries, this situation is reversed. This behaviour is no doubt influenced by a variety of labour market conditions and official policies, including childcare subsidies and benefit levels.

Changes in parental workforce participation have had a profound effect on family income levels, which have been further affected by changes in income tax and benefits (Mowbray, 1993). Two-parent families range from situations in which both parents have well-paid full-time jobs to situations in which the family has no market income. There has been particularly strong growth in the proportion of two parent families where neither partner is in paid work. If, however, the female partner takes on, or is obliged to take on, the role of 'breadwinner', family income is likely to be lower because of the wage gap. Long spells of unemployment disrupt not only current income but also the potential for saving and accumulation.

The overall pattern for the 1980s in New Zealand, which has been presented in this paper, is therefore movement into the paid workforce by mothers of young children

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the OECD in the same year, the figure for Sweden was 83.5%, Finland 72.9%, Norway 72.6%, USA 69.6%, Canada 69% and UK 68.4%.

and movement out by fathers. But alongside this is a growing divergence between 'two job' families, particularly where both parents work full-time in well paid careers, and 'no job' families where both are non-earners. With the latter can be grouped the majority of the growing number of male and female sole parent families. These trends continue to greater disparity in the financial wellbeing of families.

The data also illustrates important ethnic differences. The movement of fathers out of paid work has been especially striking in the Maori and Pacific Island groups between 1986 and 1991. The same groups are over-represented among sole parent families. High levels of unemployment and decreasing labour force involvement lead to high levels of benefit dependency and disadvantage among these groups. This underlines the need for disaggregation by ethnicity in the analysis of social trends and their policy implications.

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Appendix

Information for this analysis is derived from the *From Birth to Death III* database covering the censuses of 1981, 1986 and 1991, and the *Families and Patterns of Work* database covering the 1986 and 1991 censuses. The databases each include over 90% of the New Zealand population

Ethnicity is based on the 1991 Census definitions, with three groups in the *From Birth to Death III* database - Maori, Pacific Island and Paheka (Other). In the *Families and Patterns of Work* database, there are only two

categories - Maori and Pakeha. In this database, Pakeha includes Pacific Island families.

It is important to remember that the figures from the *From Birth to Death III* database represents counts of children, not parents (section A), while the *Families and Patterns of Work* represents counts of families (section B). Checks reveal that, at the level of dissaggregation used in this paper, the differences in the two sets of data are not significant.

The labour force status categories are 'employed full-time' or part-time, 'unemployed' and 'actively seeking work' (1986 definition) or 'not in the labour force'. The Statistics New Zealand definition of part-time work is under 30 hours per week.

Information is available for mothers and fathers in two-parent families, for male and female solo parents in one-parent families. The majority of families live as separate households, but this is less likely to be the case for one-parent, Maori and Pacific Island families.

Pluralisms

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1.   Overview

In a recent essay entitled 'A Pluralist Analysis of the New
Zealand State', Richard Mulgan (1993) has defended the
idea that 'pluralism' is the best available theoretical
perspective for analysing the workings of a liberal
capitalist democracy. Mulgan lays out what he thinks
pluralism involvés as a general outlook, and outlines the
way in which the New Zealand polity and society can be
analysed in pluralist terms. In this contribution, I offer
two sets of reflections on Richard Mulgan's keynote
discussion in the first batch, I summarise Mulgan's main
contentions, take issue with some of them, and overall
try to 'rescue' some substantial ideas in the paper from
the mood of resigned compliance which eventually
comes to dominate it. Such a critique is worth airing
because Mulgan has been a prominent political scientist
in this country, and the piece appears in a very useful
collection of essays on the New Zealand state and
economy (Roper and Rudd, 1993). If there are problems
with his presentation and defence of pluralism, these
should not pass without comment.

Secondly, and more generally, I want to question the
background claim which gives Mulgan's (1993:128)
argument its apparent punch, namely that 'pluralism is

not highly regarded among theorists of the State'. In fact, for some years now, pluralism has been making a distinct comeback in political and social analysis, not only in its conventional expression, but in ostensibly radical forms too. In particular, pluralism has emerged as one of the more tangible and consensual elements of the recent debates around postmodernism, post-Marxism, post-feminism, and so on. I therefore blend into the later stages of my critique of Mulgan a (highly schematic) alternative sketch of the career of the concept of pluralism, and try to frame some residual dilemmas for all varieties of pluralism.

2.   Political Pluralism Restated

In his main section on the intellectual history and conceptual meaning of pluralism Mulgan (1993:129-133) concentrates on three 'general assumptions' of the pluralist outlook, then in effect shows that they can be taken in either a 'conservative' way or a more 'radical' way. These assumptions are:

1.   that 'society consists of a plurality of different groups', and that in liberal democratic capitalist societies, 'individuals live their lives as members of a large number of different overlapping groups with different interests and values' (Mulgan, 1993:129)

2.   that the institutions of the state 'respond to inputs from the various sections of the society' (Mulgan, 1993:129)

3.   that an 'ideal polity is one where all interests would be equally effective politically' (Mulgan, 1993:130).

Now, as is well known, through the 1960s and 1970s radical theorists spent much energy drawing out the conservative implications of these assumptions, identifying in the writings of some of the pluralist 'empirical democratic theorists' what amounted to nothing less than an academic apologia for 'democracy - American style' (Margolis, 1983). Mulgan's whole way of addressing the three assumptions reflects this history of debate. Moreover, the stance he adopts on each assumption aligns him with what, following the literature, he calls 'neo-pluralism' as against 'early' or 'classical' pluralism. Now my own preferred term for the latter is 'critical pluralism' in contradistinction to 'conventional pluralism' (McLennan, 1984; 1989: Ch.2). This is because the 'classic' and 'neo-' terminology of some commentaries (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987: Ch.6, Held, 1987: Ch.6), or the 'Pluralisms I & II' in terms of which John Manley (1983) engaged Dahl and Lindblom in interesting debate, do not seem to me to pinpoint clearly enough the substantive direction of the shifts within the pluralist tradition over the decades.

Be that as it may, the 'neo' or critical pluralist perspective has it that whilst the three assumptions can be interpreted in a conservative way, they need not be. Thus, Mulgan denies that Assumption One entails the elimination of a crucial **public interest** existing over and above the combined interests of sectional groups.

Secondly, the state itself should be conceived as having interests of its own - indeed the state contains within itself a number of diverse interests and interest groups. The state is thus **not** (as Assumption Two might imply) simply a broker or weather-vane, reactively tracking the flow of group demands. Moreover, whilst empirical observation of actual pressure group behaviour, and state responses to it, is central to the 'empirical democratic' tradition, this does **not** rule out 'structural' analysis of the political process.

Under Assumption Three, Mulgan points out that whilst all pluralists share the ideal of interest group equality and genuine influence, only some (the apologists) felt that contemporary democracy approximated to that lofty condition. Many others did not, and indeed some used the ideal to draw attention to a range of socio-political inequalities in liberal capitalist democracy.

I do not want to dispute this sequence of argumentation; rather I want in a moment to criticise what Mulgan goes on to make of it. To that end, notice in passing how each critical point is framed in the **negative** mood. In other words, Mulgan is saying that the obvious, or commonly heard interpetation of each Assumption can readily be countered.

Armed with these conceptual distinctions, Mulgan sketches an analysis of economic interests in New Zealand, with a view to confirming the promise of his (revised) pluralist standpoint. In a compelling survey, he lists a number of groups, interests, and channels of quasi-political activity in this country. For all its

diversity, the spread of interest intermediations nevertheless is recognised to possess an enduring overall shape: 'the political playing field is permanently tilted in favour of business interests' (Mulgan, 1993:139). Such a conclusion is attested **observationally** : 'there is evidence that representatives representing the wealthiest sectors of the economy seem to be disproportionately powerful in the making of economic policy' (Mulgan, 1993:137). Indeed, in turn, within each economic sector, 'those with greater resources tend to be more effective than those with less' (Mulgan, 1993:137). The conclusion is also supported **theoretically** : business interests are deemed to have a 'dominant position...in any capitalist economy' (Mulgan, 1993:138). That is to say, it is accepted as being 'inherent' in any modern market economy that such structural advantages are real, that they are likely to have an international as well as a domestic basis, that they place 'severe limits' on government action and independence, that they impede 'left-of-centre parties in implementing policies...which threaten the dominance of business', and that these structural interests, moreover, are not normally publicly acknowledged by governments even to exist (Mulgan 1993:139).

3.   Complications

In making these critical moves, Richard Mulgan might to some ears sound rather like Ralph Miliband, and indeed in some ways Mulgan's identification of key New Zealand players on the tilted pluralist field sets the scene nicely for Brian Roper's straight-ahead neo-Marxist expose of the hand of big business in the following

chapter of the volume in which Mulgan's essay appears. Yet Mulgan not only seeks to defend the unqualified label Pluralism, he explicitly says that it is 'more satisfactory' than Marxism as a theory of political inequality. And one gets the feeling that to clinch this ranking is actually the principal goal of the piece. This seems strange in the light of the Marxist-sounding propositions about the location of power and influence in liberal democracies such as New Zealand.

In order to show that he is a pluralist and not a Marxist, Mulgan goes on to introduce a few complicating factors into his sketch of political power in general and in New Zealand in particular. Firstly, he summons up the neo-pluralists in his support: Lindblom and others, for example, especially in their later work, happily acknowledged the privileged position of business interests without thereby becoming Marxists. Secondly, business interests face limits, and sometimes suffer outright defeats in the political realm. For example, no account of the politics of the Treaty of Waitangi, Mulgan suggests, could be sustained on the basis of a supposed capitalist conspiracy. If the latter did exist, the Treaty would surely be quickly dismantled as an irritating political obstacle to profitability and business confidence (Mulgan, 1993:140). Here as elsewhere, Mulgan maintains, serious political analysts must accept the significant role played by countervailing forces, the importance of public opinion, the independent force of moral and political variables in the policy equation, the effects of the 'politics of embarrassment', and so on.

Thirdly, business interests are themselves diverse, and so the common interests which are shared amongst business groups 'are not necessarily more important to the respective groups than those interests which they do not have in common' (Mulgan, 1993:144). A fourth argument of a more normative cast is inserted in between these others. According to this one, and by supposed contrast with Marxists, pluralists are committed to accepting that people are the best judge of their own interests, and that interests largely derive from subjective preferences (Mulgan, 1993:141-2). Thus, if ordinary New Zealanders wish to purchase their own homes and consume commodities, then why should we not take them at their word instead of declaring them unconscious of their true class interests? Why should we see them as abjectly manipulated by the business groups who profit by the sale of those consumables, and by the pro-business mass media?

4.   Critique

Let me now engage critically with the series of analytical points I have described (I hope accurately).

i.   The summoning up of the neo-pluralists is appropriate to any discussion of this kind. Yet there is something odd about claiming these critical insights as endorsing a defence of pluralism as such rather than as serving to **undermine** some touchstone propositions within orthodox pluralism. At the very least, Mulgan needs to allow that the shift from unadorned

pluralism to 'neo-', 'critical' or 'phase II' pluralism is not merely a matter of semantic fashion. After all, Lindblom, as cited by Mulgan (1993:142), openly accepts that the process of critical revision has left him as merely a '0.4 pluralist', and he has also admitted that the pressure of radical (including Marxist) political theory partly accounts for these positional shifts. Dahl, for his part, has radically extended his ideas about pluralism into the sphere of industrial organisation itself (Dahl 1985). So for Mulgan then to claim that the unprefixed label pluralism has been vindicated as a result of neo-pluralist complexity, especially by comparison with Marxism, seems not only tendentious but disingenuous, particularly since Mulgan's account of business interests is every bit as tough as that of the later Dahl and Lindblom.

Let me emphasise here that a major problem with Mulgan's whole effort lies in this apparently minor terminological decision to claim that what he is defending is pluralism per se. As I said at the start, I am persuaded by many of his local arguments, but it is extremely misleading to say that they are arguments for (unqualified) pluralism. Yet this is the impression the paper repeatedly conveys to unwary readers. Moreover, the heavily qualified pluralism which is the substance of his position is not at all incompatible with certain forms of neo-Marxism. Put simply, Mulgan is guilty of a serious sleight of hand in marshalling his case. To see further how this

operates, let us return to the discussion of pluralism's three assumptions.

Mulgan's preferred readings of these assumptions are perfectly legitimate, but they are certainly somewhat 'deviant' readings, given the predominant impulse of the pluralist tradition. This explains why Mulgan is compelled to couch his readings of the assumptions in the negative mood: it is more natural and more commonplace to assume that conventional pluralism entailed the following:

- the considerable reduction in importance of the supposedly misty notion of the public interest - this was after all part of the very attraction of the hard-nosed empirical wing of pluralism;

- the broker/weathervane image of the state - Mulgan uses the capitalised term 'State' throughout, but conventional pluralism quite deliberately sought to **replace** talk of the state with talk of 'the governmental process' conceived in terms of disaggregated interest group inputs and outcomes;

- the practical realisation of the democratic ideal in the existing western 'polyarchies'. Polyarchy was the term Dahl coined to indicate the existence of open political competition within the advanced societies,

and the consequent spread of power across a variety of organisations and institutions. Dahl himself accepts that whilst polyarchy is certainly a limited democratic achievement, it is nevertheless a very substantial one, standing as an absolutely necessary, though not sufficient, condition of full pluralist democracy (cf. Dahl, 1989: 221-2). Less idealist pluralists than Dahl believed that efficient polyarchy in fact required very limited citizen/interest group participation in politics. Indeed, limited democratic participation and limited information were held to be a veritable **precondition** of stability in liberal societies (eg. Berelson, 1970)

Mulgan's radical reading of the key pluralist tenets may thus be regarded as legitimate argumentation, but it is not fully acceptable just as a matter of the intellectual record. The fact is that with his re-interpretations, something importantly different from straight pluralism has been introduced, something that is not only fairly close to an empirically-minded Marxism, but has actually been influenced by the latter. Thus, the very question which drives Mulgan's whole inquiry, namely 'how can...persistent inequality be analysed?' (Mulgan, 1993:128), is simply **not** the type of question political science pluralists have had at the forefront of their attention. Whilst certain kinds of inequality were, it is true, often

recognised to exist, the mainstream pluralist argument was usually that inequalities were 'piecemeal' and thus not normally 'cumulative' across different social and political domains. So if pluralists are now more openly engaged in looking at the political consequences of 'structural' social disadvantage, then this is due in no small measure to the persistent challenge of strong critics of pluralism, including Marxists.

ii.   What about the diversity of business interests, blockages to the latter's bulldozing path through the tangles of civil society, and the independent force of moral and political organization? Well, undoubtedly, there are some Marxists whose version of the creed will be seriously dented by these signal disruptions to the smooth logic of capital. But surely not Marx (whose historical-political writings abounded in just such considerations as those mentioned)? And certainly not the vein of neo-Marxism as represented by the likes of Jessop, Block, Wright, Poulantzas, Hall, Urry, Therborn, or Laclau, who between them have provided a highly persuasive accomodation to oft-cited 'awkward' facts, such as the existence of competing fractions of capital, the paradox that the ruling class does not rule, the impact of countervailing forces within civil society, and the 'relative autonomy' of the many identities and movements which are 'interpellated' in and through political discourse.

Mulgan (1993:143) is aware of this revised Marxist tradition, of course, and acknowledges it, but not so much as to suggest a serious convergence with his own view. The difference, he insists, boils down to the assertion that pluralists find 'unnecessary and unproven' the (supposedly Marxist) assumption that members of social classes display a 'fundamental unity of purpose which transcends supposedly surface difference' (Mulgan, 1993:144).

But hold on. If this clause means that capitalists and workers consciously and purposefully and always create deep unity out of surface difference, then I doubt that any Marxist, not even a 'vulgar' one, would put their names to it. If anything, the idea refers to tendential coincidences of situation and behaviour, no doubt empirically variable and continually to be set against various counter-tendencies. Business class unity on political questions, for example, might therefore be expected in 'pure' and visible form only at times of real or perceived threat to the economic and social order - though it would be naive to imagine that such occasions are very rare. Interestingly, the hardheaded first-phase pluralist writer V.O.Key (1964:73ff.) had no hesitation in stating that business class unity was distinctive, fairly routine and usually quite up-front. In any case, for neo-Marxists these days, tendential patterns of influence often get theorised in an essentially provisional way and framed as an empirical research agenda.

iii   Now consider Mulgan's sentiment that, unlike
       Marxists, pluralists tend to take people's sense of
       their own interests pretty much at face value. My
       own sense here is that this contrast has once
       again been grossly overdrawn. Mulgan for his
       part accepts the idea that people can be said to
       have objective interests which conflict with their
       subjective preferences at times (here we might
       think of the pros and cons of buying a nice cheap
       house in the quiet residential district around
       Chernobyl in the Ukraine). He also accepts that
       our desires and aspirations undergo a certain
       amount of shaping by the mass media and so on
       (Mulgan, 1993:142). Further still, he sees that our
       own interests (in having cars, say) may coincide
       with capitalist interests to the latter's great
       material advantage. But still, Mulgan insists, even
       in this case of direct coincidence, that our
       interests (in transport) are not the same as the
       capitalists' interests (in profit). With this in mind,
       pluralists must therefore 'reject' positions which
       assert that business groups 'enforce' their
       interests, their 'hegemonic ideology' and their
       values upon a gullible public (Mulgan, 1993:142).

       Notice once more how this conclusion is phrased
       in the negative, in terms of what pluralists cannot
       accept. It might be worth mentioning here as an
       ironic aside that Dahl and Lindblom(1976: xxxix)
       in the 1976 preface to their phase-one pluralist
       classic *Politics, Economics and Welfare* wrote
       uncompromisingly of the baleful effects of the

mass media ·in producing a generalised 'indoctrinated complacency'. The later Dahl came to believe that the celebrated civic culture of democracy, which took people's interests at face value, was really 'an irrational and deformed public consciousness' (Dahl 1980:29). Lindblom for his part came to speak of a 'rigged, lopsided competition of ideas' and indeed of the achievement of democratic consensus by 'propaganda' (Lindblom 1977:202-212). So in a sense, self-declared pluralists do seem perfectly able to digest large chunks of conspiracy theory.

And contrary to rumour, neo-Marxists for their part are **not** necessarily committed to that approach, though again it would surely be naive to think that 'conspiracies of ideas' do not frequently occur. In any case, it is well acknowledged in critical social science (including neo-Marxism) that the formation and transformation of consciousness is a complicated matter. From that angle, indeed, Mulgan's own treatment of the question of interests, and the related issue of who is to be deemed the best judge of people's interests, could be said to **lack** sufficient complexity. He seems to want to force a simple choice: either people's wants and interests are enforced upon them, or they are to be taken at face value as autonomously formed and valued as such. Yet before we are reduced to this highly restrictive choice, some sustained and nuanced discussion of the distinctions between such terms as wants, needs, desires, preferences, interests,

aspirations, and the like would be quite essential. Also, it is highly problematic to assume that 'people' do have a 'relatively stable' set of interests even in the sense of 'subjective preferences' (Mulgan, 1993:142). One persuasive contribution of poststructuralist thought is to insist that subjectivities tend to be somewhat unstable and 'fractured', with contradictions existing not only between the conscious and the unconscious parts of our identities, but between the different discursive 'interpellations' in terms of which our social and political identities are usually constructed. Thus we may often simply not know what our stable 'preferences' or 'interests' are (and may well be open to persuasion about them). We may also have genuinely conflicting preferences and interests.

Thus, as 'ordinary people' - is this really an adequate summation of our subject positions? - we might experience, and deliberate over, the differences in our perceived interests, for example, as consumers in the market place as against our interests as workers. Or between our interests as homemakers as against our interests as professionals or political activists - and so on. Moreover, the better surveys seem to suggest that many people **can** in fact readily distinguish between a certain kind of 'objective' or 'long-term' or 'ideal' interest, and what they feel obliged to settle for in the short term, often knowing too well that the satisfaction of short-term, pragmatic needs and goals can effectively **preclude** the

satisfaction of long-term aspirations. A further and related distinction can be made between our **self-regarding** interests (whether short- or long-term), and our more **solidaristic** interests, tha latter clearly emerging when we imagine 'ourselves' and our interests to be an intrinsic part of the common interests of, for example, a nation, a cultural group, a particular gender, or even - dare we say it? - a socio-economic class.

Given this vital complexity of social identity formation and change, it will hardly do to see people and their 'interests' as simply manipulated. Mulgan is right about that. But this assessment is not at all incompatible with fairly strong theoretical and empirical claims about dominant ideologies (prevalent ideologies might be a better term), about the motives and beneficiaries of the persuasion industry, and about the governing interests in different types of social system. Neo-Marxists certainly require that within a capitalist society, 'interests' should be seen as being materially related to the structural features of that social system and its main beneficiaries. They thus propose that people's needs, wants and beliefs will be significantly shaped by the actions and interests of resourceful and powerful groups. And indeed, that the latter are themselves strongly shaped in turn by systemic incentives and imperatives. But none of this entails that people be conceived as cultural dopes, that short-term interests be short-changed,

or that interests must be conceived as entirely material, singular or transparent.

5.   Methodological   and   'Temperamental' Pluralism

So far I have maintained that pluralism is a misleading label for Mulgan's actual position, and that none of the arguments designed to systematically differentiate (his) pluralism from neo-Marxism, or those designed to demonstrate the superiority of the former over the latter, succeed. By the same token, he has passed up a valuable opportunity to declare something much more progressive, and something which is actually there in tacit form in his piece: that neo-Marxist and neo-pluralist insights are increasingly combined to interesting effect, even if tensions between the perspectives are bound to remain.

I now want to back off a little, because in the concluding section of his paper, Mulgan does two things which distinctly run against the grain of his preceding discussion, and this complicates my understanding and response. Firstly, Mulgan adopts a more normative and personal tone than is apparent in the body of the argument, and the convictions which emerge are paradoxically those of the **conventional** pluralist that Mulgan had earlier dealt with rather severely. Secondly, from its location within a fairly narrow political science orbit, the piece takes flight at the end into the vaguer climes of methodological and temperamental reflection. These are only briefly and inconclusively raised by Mulgan, but they are sufficient to connect his discourse

to the richer and more amorphous intellectual world of pluralism that I mentioned at the start. Let me take these new complications in turn.

In his closing *resume*, Mulgan effectively demotes the 'tilted playing field' view of group interaction in favour of the far tamer, flatter assertion that there are, in the end, simply 'many different and overlapping social divisions' (Mulgan, 1993:144). This terminology echoes the uncritical language of first-phase pluralist writers such as David Truman (1951) rather than the neo-pluralism of the later Dahl or Lindblom. Moreover, as we saw, part of the force of Mulgan's 'critical' reading of the three pluralist assumptions rested on his acceptance of the central role of theoretical coherence in political analysis. But in his round-up of points, a straightforward return to empiricism is implied: Rather than theorise the structural tendencies of the social system, we are simply to look and see, it seems, which interests and groups just happen to be powerful (Mulgan, 1993:144-145). Lastly, there is a marked normative jump from the sympathetic idea that we should respect people's sense of their own interests to the distinctly compliant proposition that pluralists must remain committed to **existing** pluralist democracy, imperfect though it may be. If full pluralist democratic equality cannot be achieved within capitalist society, then 'the most we can hope for is the amelioration of existing inequalities - not their removal' (Mulgan, 1993:145).

But this last conclusion is a stunning **non-sequitur** , and a quite surprising moral climb-down, since at no point in the paper did Mulgan offer the sentiment, nor support

for it, that existing democracy in capitalist societies was satisfactorily pluralistic. Indeed, the burden of the argument through the paper seemed to be that a pluralist perspective can mount its own powerful theoretical and practical critique of existing democracy without undue help from doctrinal Marxism. Although I have taken pains to criticise parts of that train of thought, it contains a great deal more interest and radical bite than the whimper with which Mulgan ends: that there may after all be grounds 'for labelling pluralists as uncritical and conservative' (Mulgan, 1993:145). (Compare Dahl's (1989:326) recent statement that if democracy is to develop fully, then our market-oriented society will have to be very substantially changed.)

Secondly: though it takes a conventional political science pluralist form, Mulgan's concluding section - entitled 'An Open-Ended Approach' - contains hints of a much wider sense of pluralism, a kind of methodological and temperamental pluralism. And this shift in the very expression of the essay prompts us to question, or at least supplement, Mulgan's stated notion of the pluralist heritage.

At the start of his account (Mulgan, 1993:128), pluralism is characterised by Mulgan as being disliked by sociologists, partly because by contrast with the European origins of sociology, pluralism comes straight out of American political science. But stated as such, this is simply mistaken. First of all, conventional pluralism is very much a 'society-centred' theory of politics, as many 'statist' writers have emphasised. It is thus a form of the 'sociology of politics', the very mention of which should

dispel the mirage of a fundamental division between sociological and political analysis. Furthermore, whilst the Americanisation of pluralism has certainly been an important phase in its wider intellectual career, pluralism started (like everything else) with the Greeks, later emerging in its modern form in Continental legal theory in the nineteenth century. In this incarnation - a key thinker here was Otto von Gierke - pluralism posited the notion of the corporate personality, which got developed into ideas of corporate and functional representation, serving as such to undermine prevailing concepts of sovereignty and liberal democracy (cf. Nicholls, 1974,1975; Breitling, 1980; Hirst, 1989).

These early formations migrated westward through the turn of the century, coming to more precisely connote **multiple** sources of political authority, but the idea of pluralism nevertheless retained some distinct metaphysical and social as well as political dimensions. Pluralism has a certain 'formal' quality in that sense, taking its root in a generic dislike of 'monistic' doctrines of one kind or another - be they doctrines of singular existence, of indubitable knowledge, or of political sovereignty. Pluralism thus has radical and critical implications *vis a vis* monism, and the freshness and bite of that challenge was perfectly caught in one of the seminal statements of philosophical pluralism, namely William James' assertion of a 'pluralistic universe' (1977 [1908]). This contribution, not itself uninfluenced by political considerations, in turn had a considerable impact on political discourse, notably on Harold Laski's pluralist critique of the state (eg.Laski, 1917) and

subsequently on G.D.H. Cole's (1920) proposals for democratic self-government and guild socialism.

The migration of Continental and English pluralism to the USA took place via pragmatism's influence on empiricist methodology, and via Laski's endorsement of both James' philosophical pluralism and the **Federalist Papers'** political pluralism. Pluralism then met behaviourism in A.F.Bentley's (1967 [1908]) landmark text of political science and so the scene was set for a lasting American tradition in that discipline, finally flowering in the 1950s and 1960s. This substantial intellectual history, with currents of sociological and philosophical thought running strongly within it, is not properly conveyed by Mulgan's conventional benchmark.

Moreover, the question of pluralism has today reverted once again to something like its former, richer constellation of meanings. Political science pluralism, as noted, has become radicalised to a notable degree. As if in parallel movement, a whole swathe of socialist and Marxist discourse has become markedly more pluralistic in an effort to register the centrality of democratic participation, and the social necessity of pluralism, for a viable contemporary Left (cf. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Rustin, 1985; Johnston, 1986; Keane, 1988; Hall & Jacques, 1989; McLennan, 1989; Held, 1989; Martell, 1992; Mouffe, 1992; Hirst, 1987, 1993). The politics of diversity has also been on the feminist and anti-racist theoretical agendas for some years, and these movements have been instrumental in helping radical currents to confront the issue of pluralism head-on (cf.

CCCS, 1982; Hamilton and Barrett, 1986; Gilroy, 1987; Nicholson, 1990; Young, 1990; Bock and James, 1992; Barrett and Phillips, 1992; Phillips, 1992; Rattansi and Donald, 1992). Finally, under the influence of postmodernist and poststructuralist challenges to the 'modernist' theoretical imagination (conceived as including both Marxism and conventional political pluralism), the question of pluralism has become not only a debate about the diversity of interest groups and nodes of power, but also one about the diversity, authority and power of political discourses themselves (cf. Heller and Feher, 1988; White 1991).

In this latter vein, not only the issue of social and institutional pluralism, but also of **methodological** pluralism is of great significance for the politics of intellectual work. People now ask: is it either possible or desirable to subscribe to, or even to articulate, a single, all-powerful theory or discourse? And is it so wrong to piece together bits of perspectives in an eclectic, shifting and avowedly interpretative way? Do the complexities of our contemporary social and personal identities not in fact demand a much more 'hybrid' conception of ideological and political exchanges (cf. Hall, 1991)? And is not the very conception of intellectuals as working under the auspices of the authority of Knowledge both contestable and dangerous as a summation of their cultural role?

Put this way, the new inclination towards humility, co-operation and interpretation is both challenging and generous of spirit. Yet there are obvious problems which need to be registered too. Firstly, as with political

pluralism in the narrow sense, methodological pluralism is easier to state as a negative doctrine than a positive one, and this hesitation characterises the increasing number of texts in the philosophy of social science which are committed to some kind of non-prescriptive pluralist approach (eg. Fiske and Schweder, 1986; Roth, 1987; Bohman, 1991; Deising 1991). The enduring difficulty here is that the assertion of a necessary diversity of approaches to the explanation of social phenomena, together with the prohibition of unduly 'legislative' modes of enquiry, seems to encourage an 'anything goes' style of relativism, or at least a potentially boundless 'multifactorial' approach to the process of research and theory.

Now whilst some postmodern, pluralistic writers are quite happy to court the kind of inexplicability and multifactoriality highlighted in this example, and to welcome the release from the rigid structural mentality of classical social science and orthodox politics that total open-endedness offers, many other New Pluralists are less comfortable. In some form, they want to hold on to the notion that there are distinct **limits** to epistemic and explanatory openness. They do not want to offer specific grounds for what is to count as an adequate explanation, but neither do they want completely to give up on the idea of explanatory adequacy.

A parallel issue confronts assertions of socio-political diversity. Many radical and feminist statements, for example, can be found in the recent literature which assure us that the new affirmation of pluralism, both methodological and political, is not at all the same as that

bad, old 'liberal' or political science pluralism (eg. McClure, 1992). But in fact, there certainly **are** very distinct similarities between these genres, and in some ways it is only the lingering stigma of being associated with conservatism that prevents proper acknowledgment of this overlap. Partly, though, postmodernist-feminist-socialist-radical pluralists are also genuinely compromised in the extent of their pluralism, since they too want to 'draw the line' somewhere, to try to establish some kind of 'principled positions' (Squires, 1993). After all, not all expressions of cultural diversity are progressive (think of Bosnia); diversity therefore has to be the 'right' sort of diversity. This limitation on what can be accepted into the pluralist republics of theory and politics cannot but be 'legislative' in some way: if it were not, then there would probably be no more distinctive 'isms' to argue over, and no limit to what was tolerable in a 'democratic' society. That is why expressions of radical pluralism today, popular though they are, are still liable to be qualified by some more substantive prefix. The simple assertion of the desirability of methodological pluralism or pluralist democracy in the end still leaves the bulk of the argument to be thrashed out.

In the light of this brief discussion (cf.McLennan, forthcoming), it may be worth putting on hold the tacit assumption at work in much of the contemporary literature that diversity and plurality are intrinsically 'good things'; that non-unity and non-universality are somehow necessarily conducive to honest, complex and fulfilling social relations. This somewhat intangible 'value added' inscription of things plural is a fascinating aspect of current debate, and it amounts to what I have

termed 'temperamental pluralism'. This, it seems to me, is part of the underlying 'structure of feeling' of the new political and methodological mood of our times. But even as we feel the weight of its considerable cultural resonance - and let me stress that I too feel this weight - we should also be alerted to the downside of temperamental and methodological pluralism. Plurality or unicity in themselves, arguably, are nothing but modes of being: their goodness or badness will depend very largely on the concrete form that they take in particular cultural situations, and on the balance sheet of their human consequences. In that sense, the current discursive 'positivity' attaching to notions of pluralism and diversity, and the 'negativity' attaching to absolutism and unicity must not be elevated into a (paradoxical) absolutism. It is quite conceivable that the current assignment of value to these modes could be reversed over the long haul of cultural and political change.

That rough sketch of the rich and troubling domain of pluralist thought is offered as a kind of countervailing pressure on Mulgan's narrow characterisation of pluralism's origins and provenance. As already suggested, there is, in any case, a rather sudden change of tack in Mulgan's concluding reflections, and this I think is because Mulgan's attraction to pluralism turns out in the end to be as much methodological and temperamental as empirical, political or theoretical: he simply feels (along with many other new or born-again pluralists) that we are basically overdue a sense of release from all that structural theory of the last twenty years, and from the legislative consciousness which it

embodies. Mulgan therefore argues for the essential 'open-endedness' (Mulgan, 1993:144) of pluralism as its main redeeming feature, and this involves a certain methodological catholicism, and perhaps even a downright 'anti-theory' stance (Mulgan, 1993:145). Still conscious, however, that sheer eclecticism and anti-theory are not finally sustainable attitudes (but why not: why not just stand up and be anti-theoretical?), Mulgan rephrases the theoretical assumptions of pluralism in the nowadays familiar terms of 'the complexity of society and the dispersal of power'. Also, of course pluralism must be taken to involve the rejection of the idea of a single definitive theory of society (Mulgan, 1993:145).

So whilst his concluding thoughts are, in my view, neither independently convincing, nor backed up by much of the paper they conclude, it is fitting nevertheless that Richard Mulgan takes flight somewhat at the end, in effect connecting the pluralist debate in political science to a wider range of intellectual moods and strategies. For it is in that wider setting that the meaning and future of pluralism is most alive - and continually problematical.

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Immigrants and Occupational Status in New Zealand: Some Cross-National Comparisons

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Introduction

In most Western immigrant receiving countries clear patterns of segmentation are evident in the contrasting positions of different immigrant groups in the labour market. These patterns are determined not just by the background of the immigrants themselves but also by the manner in which changing economic requirements and related changes in immigration policy have served to channel succeeding waves of migration from different countries into different sectors of the economy.

In this respect, New Zealand's experience is closely comparable with those of Australia and Canada. Each country encouraged relatively high levels of immigration in the post-war period when sustained economic growth and industrialisation created a strong demand for foreign workers. Skilled manual and white collar migrants were largely recruited from Britain and Northern Europe, while most of the demand for unskilled or low skilled migrants in Canada and Australia was met from Southern Europe, and in New Zealand from the Pacific Islands. Each country initially maintained a preference for British or European immigrants and restrictions on non-European immigration, but these policies were

gradually eroded. The removal of discriminatory barriers coincided with a structural shift in employment demand from manufacturing industries to service industries and therefore from unskilled to skilled, technical and professional workers, an increasing proportion of which has been met by Asian immigration. At the same, time less skilled migrants from various sources continue to make up substantial proportions of the immigration flows, entering under family reunion provisions or as refugees or temporary labour migrants.

Methodological Issues

In analysing the employment profiles of selected immigrant groups, we have drawn upon the latest cross-national census data on occupation by birthplace available at the time of writing, namely 1991 figures for New Zealand and 1986 figures for Australia and Canada.

The 1991 data for New Zealand allows us to examine the most recent picture of immigrants in the labour force and the immediate effects of recent major policy changes. The additional inclusion of 1986 New Zealand data would have allowed a contemporaneous comparison of New Zealand with Australia and Canada as well as an analysis of changes between the last two local censuses. However, a different classification for the major occupational groups was used in the 1986 census, meaning that a comparison with 1991 figures would have involved a costly reclassification of the data beyond our means.

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The use of more recent data for New Zealand raises some questions regarding its comparability with the Australian and Canadian figures, given that changes in immigration policy and the labour market may have altered the employment profiles of some immigrant groups in each country in the intervening period. Certainly this is the case in New Zealand where recent major developments in immigration policy and economic restructuring pointed to the wisdom of using 1991 figures. In Australia and Canada, however, immigration policies similar to those recently adopted by New Zealand were in place well before 1986 (see Hawkins, 1989) and subsequent changes in both immigration and economic policies to date have not been as far reaching as those locally. We would therefore expect that any changes in the employment profiles of immigrant groups in Australia and Canada between 1986 and 1991 would not be significant enough to invalidate the comparisons made in this paper. Where such changes are likely to have been significant, for instance in the case of Fijian migrants in Australia subsequent to the 1987 coups, attention is drawn to such matters in the text.

A further methodological issue concerns differences in occupational classifications used in the censuses of each country. Direct cross-national comparison is hampered by these variations and by differences in the numbers with occupations not specified (note especially the large proportions in the "other" category in the Canadian data). However, the classifications used in the respective censuses are broadly similar and thus, we would argue, general comparisons are feasible.

Finally, it should be noted that the birthplace groups identified in the tables include a mix of immigrants, some recently arrived and others longer established. This is an important consideration given that the selection criteria and economic conditions at the time of migration play a crucial role in determining what type of migrants are recruited and how they are allocated to particular positions in the labour force. While it would certainly have been useful, therefore, to introduce duration of residence as another variable in the analysis, this is beyond the scope of the current paper. In dealing with birthplace groups at an aggregate level, however, we have endeavoured to make some general comments on the likely differences between earlier and more recent immigrants where appropriate.

The Migratory Process

This paper undertakes a cross-national comparison of the occupational profiles of selected immigrant groups representative of these different streams of migration. Brevity demands that our main focus is on presenting empirical data relating to the positions that immigrant groups occupy in the workforces of the societies being compared, rather than contributing substantially to theoretical debate about the roles that these groups perform in advanced capitalist economies. Suffice to note that we eschew those models that over-emphasise, often in an ahistorical manner, the process of labour migration as a question of individualistic 'push-pull' choices and constraints. But neither do we subscribe to over-reductionist approaches that seem to view migrant workers as impelled by political-economic forces

completely beyond their control.[1] What seems to be required is a theorisation along the lines of what Castles and Miller (1993) have recently called the migratory process. In their approach, informal migrant networks at the micro-level are linked to macro-structural imperatives in a complex multi-causal way over time and space.

Consequently, emphasis is given here to the structural and historical context of migration in determining the location of particular groups in the labour market, but it is also acknowledged that at an individual level there are many diverse factors influencing employment opportunities. These include educational and occupational background prior to migration, proficiency in English, age and length of residence in the receiving country and difficulties with cultural adjustment, employer discrimination and non-recognition of overseas qualifications. It is beyond the scope of this paper to quantify the effect of each of these factors, and existing research on immigrants in the New Zealand labour market is sparse and of limited assistance in this regard (Poot, 1993). Australian and Canadian research, however, provides some indications of the significance of such variables in determining individual occupational opportunity and this allows us to make some general observations regarding their likely effect at an aggregate level in New Zealand.

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[1] For a useful recent outline of competing approaches to international labour migration and employment see Castles and Miller (1993), especially chapters 2 and 7.

Sex is one key variable which is quantified here. The segmentation of labour markets by gender as well as birthplace ensures that female immigrants have quite different employment patterns from male immigrants. Females in general are less likely to be found in managerial jobs, the higher professions and certain types of manual work. This pattern can be compounded amongst some immigrant groups, where males have largely entered under provisions for skilled or independent migrants and women have predominantly entered as family members, often without comparable qualifications (Chapman and Miller, 1985:309).

British and European Immigrants

In all three countries, British immigrants formed the majority of the foreign - born populations prior to the Second World War, although Canada had considerably more non-British immigrants than Australia or New Zealand. Post-war immigration policies continued to favour British migrants, allowing them largely unrestricted entry, but in Australia and Canada, the high demand for immigrants also necessitated large scale immigration from continental Europe. By 1961, there were more European-born than British-born immigrants in both countries (Hawkins, 1972, 1989; Collins, 1988).

As non-European immigration to Canada and Australia was severely restricted until the 1960s, almost the entire demand for foreign workers during the post-war economic boom was met from Britain and Europe. With expansion occurring in both the manufacturing and service sectors, these groups were therefore incorporated

into the paid workforce in a variety of positions. It is possible, however, to identify three broad streams with differing employment outcomes.

First were the displaced persons of Central and Eastern Europe, who came from a range of occupational backgrounds but were often employed as indentured labour and, particularly in Australia, consigned to unskilled or low skilled manual jobs (Kunz, 1988; Satzewich, 1990). Another stream came from Southern Europe, mostly made up of sponsored relatives of Australian and Canadian residents and originating from less developed rural areas. With few skills or qualifications of value in the receiving countries, these migrants tended to enter the unskilled or low skilled jobs being generated in the growing secondary industries. The third stream were Northern or Western Europeans, including British migrants, and were more likely to be selected under assisted passage schemes and to have the skills and qualifications that would allow them to enter white collar or professional occupations and skilled manual jobs (Birrell and Birrell, 1987; Hawkins, 1972; Richmond and Zubrzycki, 1984).

By contrast, New Zealand maintained a strong preference for British immigrants and did not encourage large scale migration from continental Europe, essentially because it was not required. New Zealand's immigration policy was a cautious one which eschewed the population building objectives of Australia's policy in favour of a focus on short-term labour market requirements (Farmer, 1986). Although rapid growth was experienced in protected manufacturing industries

and in the tertiary sector during the post-war boom, the demand for new workers was numerically far smaller than in Australia and Canada. With substantial sources of unskilled labour available amongst the rural Maori population and in nearby Pacific Islands, New Zealand's remaining needs could be satisfied by immigrants from Britain and limited numbers from selected Northern European countries without recourse to large scale Southern European labour migration (Farmer, 1985).

Changes to immigration policy in Canada in the 1960s and in Australia and New Zealand in the early 1970s removed the preferential rights of British and European immigrants and introduced non-discriminatory selection systems based on criteria of close family links or occupational skills and qualifications of value to the receiving countries.[2] In Canada, this change was prompted by the transition to a post-industrial phase of economic development which involved a declining demand for low skilled labour and a growing need for skilled, technical and professional workers who could best be recruited by widening the range of source countries (Richmond and Zubrzycki, 1984:23-24). Similar policy changes later introduced in Australia and New Zealand were prompted less by structural change than by pressures to abandon discriminatory selection systems and simultaneously restrict high immigration flows at a time of reversals in the world economy

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[2]   Although New Zealand's 1974 policy review supposedly introduced universal selection criteria, a preference for migrants from "traditional source countries" was maintained until 1986.

(Hawkins, 1989:93-106; Colman and Kirk, 1974). The resulting emphasis on selecting skilled migrants from more diverse sources has been reinforced by subsequent structural changes in employment similar to those occurring earlier in Canada.

In all three countries, the more stringent selection criteria and greater competition amongst a wider range of applicants, combined with a lessening of emigration pressures in Europe, resulted in a substantial decline in British and European arrivals and increasing diversity in immigration flows (Houghton, 1987; Farmer, 1985). Nevertheless, as Table 1 shows, British and European migrants continue to make up the majority of the immigrant populations in each country - with New Zealand being distinguished by a greater predominance of British and Irish migrants and fewer continental Europeans than Australia and Canada.

This historical pattern of immigration has resulted in the occupational profiles illustrated in Tables 2-4. Three key features concerning British and European immigrants are readily apparent. Firstly, British and Northern European groups such as the Dutch and Germans are generally well represented in managerial, professional and technical occupations. Secondly, these groups are better represented in higher status occupations in New Zealand than in Canada and more particularly Australia. Thirdly, Southern European groups such as the Italians and Yugoslavs are concentrated in lower status manual occupations in Australia and Canada but not in New Zealand.

TABLE 1: BIRTHPLACES OF IMMIGRANT POPULATION

COUNTRY OF BIRTH	NEW ZEALAND (1991)		AUSTRALIA (1986)		CANADA (1986)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
UK/Ireland	239,157	45.4	1,127,201	34.7	818,975	21.0
Europe						
Germany	5,394	1.0	114,806	3.5	189,560	4.9
Netherlands	24,276	4.6	95,099	2.9	134,155	3.4
Italy			261,879	8.1	366,820	9.4
Yugoslavia	2,538	0.5	150,041	4.6	87,755	2.2
Other	14,190	2.7	472,778	14.6	837,835	21.4
Total Europe	46,398	8.8	1,094,603	33.7	1,616,125	41.4
Asia						
China	9,222	1.7	39,524	1.2	119,190	3.0
Hong Kong	4,929	0.9	28,293	0.9	77,405	2.0
Vietnam	3,132	0.6	83,048	2.6	82,760	2.1
Other	47,436	9.0	385,287	11.9	413,240	10.6
Total Asia	64,719	12.3	536,152	16.5	692,595	17.7
Africa						
South Africa	5,655	1.1	37,058	1.1	18,780	0.5
Other	4,455	0.8	71,489	2.2	95,635	2.4
Total Africa	10,110	1.9	108,547	3.3	114,415	2.9
America						
Canada	6,699	1.3	20,435	0.6		
USA	8,451	1.6	42,381	1.3	282,025	7.2
Jamaica					87,600	2.2
Other	1,872	0.4	53,643	1.7	253,635	6.5
Total America	17,022	3.2	116,459	3.6	623,260	15.9
Oceania						
Australia	48,738	9.2			13,585	0.3
New Zealand			211,670	6.5		
Fiji	16,713	3.2	14,757	0.5		
Samoa	43,332	8.2	2,966	0.1		
Cook Islands	15,411	2.9	1,458	0.0		
Other	22,581	4.3	33,549	1.0	20,700	0.5
Total Oceania	146,775	27.8	264,420	8.1	34,285	0.9
Other Countries	3,156	0.6			8,495	0.2
Total Immigrants	527,337	100.0	3,247,382	100.0	3,908,150	100.0

Source: Censuses

TABLE 2: OCCUPATION BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH, NEW ZEALAND 1991 (%)

BIRTHPLACE	OCCUPATIONAL GROUP (SEE NOTES)									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
MALES										
UK/Ireland	18.0	15.0	15.6	5.0	7.9	5.0	19.0	7.9	5.6	1.1
Germany	18.8	17.4	16.3	3.0	9.5	5.7	18.8	5.9	3.4	1.3
Netherlands	16.1	10.2	11.8	2.9	5.8	16.1	23.3	7.7	4.7	1.4
Yugoslavia	19.3	6.2	4.2	1.9	7.3	11.2	29.3	11.2	6.9	2.3
Total Europe	17.8	11.4	11.8	2.8	7.4	12.5	22.4	7.9	4.6	1.6
China	21.5	6.1	6.9	1.5	34.2	11.2	6.4	5.2	4.8	2.3
Hong Kong	22.2	20.0	12.3	3.7	24.3	2.5	6.2	4.3	2.2	2.5
Taiwan	50.0	6.3	13.5	2.1	9.4	4.2	6.3	3.1	3.1	2.1
Vietnam	16.2	5.7	4.4	2.2	16.2	0.4	18.8	23.6	9.6	3.1
Total Asia	18.5	16.9	10.9	3.7	15.9	6.4	10.1	8.9	6.4	2.3
Samoa	2.9	3.3	3.9	6.3	6.0	1.4	17.0	33.9	20.8	4.4
Cook Islands	3.1	2.6	3.3	4.0	6.0	2.5	18.1	33.3	26.3	2.8
Fiji	15.1	14.0	9.8	7.0	9.8	2.8	17.9	12.3	9.4	1.9
Total Pacific Is	5.4	5.5	4.9	5.5	6.8	2.6	17.0	27.9	20.9	3.4
Australia	17.5	12.5	13.2	5.3	9.7	6.9	16.5	9.4	7.9	1.3
Total Immigrants	15.9	13.7	12.9	4.6	8.7	5.8	17.3	11.1	8.1	1.7
New Zealand Born	13.4	8.9	10.7	4.5	8.3	13.6	17.8	13.1	8.2	1.4
Grand Total	13.6	9.6	11.1	4.5	8.4	12.2	17.7	12.7	8.2	1.5
FEMALES										
UK/Ireland	10.0	18.6	11.6	30.9	15.5	4.0	1.4	3.3	3.7	1.1
Germany	12.3	18.0	14.8	20.5	17.0	6.8	2.5	3.0	3.5	1.8
Netherlands	10.6	14.4	11.8	20.2	18.2	11.5	2.1	4.4	4.2	2.6
Yugoslavia	17.2	6.9	4.3	12.9	19.8	10.3	2.6	15.5	6.9	3.4
Total Europe	11.4	15.5	11.7	19.5	18.2	9.6	2.4	5.0	4.3	2.5
China	18.5	5.6	2.6	6.6	28.6	11.4	1.7	17.0	5.7	2.2
Hong Kong	18.1	15.7	9.6	18.5	20.9	1.6	1.6	8.8	2.4	2.8
Taiwan	29.7	10.9	3.1	17.2	18.8	3.1	3.1	6.3	3.1	4.7
Vietnam	18.8	3.9	3.2	9.7	24.0	0.8	5.8	21.4	9.7	2.6
Total Asia	12.9	15.7	7.8	17.0	20.4	4.0	2.0	12.1	6.0	2.4
Samoa	2.5	7.3	4.1	18.8	18.4	0.8	3.5	20.4	20.4	3.9
Cook Islands	2.4	6.6	3.8	15.7	19.8	2.0	3.0	23.4	19.9	3.4
Fiji	6.2	12.5	6.8	28.6	18.8	1.9	1.7	9.8	7.6	2.0
Total Pacific Is	3.6	8.2	5.3	19.3	18.8	1.6	2.8	19.2	17.7	3.4
Australia	10.4	16.8	10.6	26.7	18.7	6.7	1.3	3.2	4.1	1.5
Total Immigrants	9.5	16.7	10.3	25.4	17.0	4.4	1.7	7.0	8.2	1.9
New Zealand Born	8.5	14.4	10.3	27.6	18.8	7.1	1.4	4.6	5.6	1.7
Grand Total	8.7	14.8	10.3	27.2	18.5	6.6	1.5	5.0	5.7	1.7

Note: Occupational groups
1. Legislators, administrators and managers
2. Professionals
3. Technicians and associate professionals
4. Clerks
5. Service and sales workers
6. Agriculture and fishery workers
7. Trades workers
8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers
9. Elementary occupations
10. Not adequately defined

Source: 1991 Census of Population and Dwellings, unpublished tables.

TABLE 3: OCCUPATION BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH, CANADA 1986 (%)

BIRTHPLACE	OCCUPATIONAL GROUP (SEE NOTES)									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
MALES										
United Kingdom	19.3	20.2	6.2	8.8	9.0	2.6	7.2	6.6	10.1	9.5
Germany	18.2	14.2	4.6	7.1	7.5	5.6	12.7	10.9	12.3	8.8
Italy	6.7	5.7	4.1	6.0	11.5	2.3	23.7	12.4	14.5	11.2
China	12.9	14.2	5.6	7.9	36.3	1.3	2.6	6.2	7.4	5.7
Hong Kong	15.1	29.4	9.3	8.6	20.4	0.5	1.6	3.1	5.6	6.1
Taiwan	15.1	30.9	8.1	11.6	13.2	1.5	2.9	2.6	6.4	7.7
Vietnam	2.7	11.2	5.3	3.2	20.3	1.9	4.1	18.3	22.6	10.5
Jamaica	6.7	10.9	10.0	6.4	13.7	0.9	6.6	14.3	17.3	12.9
Trinidad & Tobago	11.1	18.4	13.0	6.5	8.4	0.6	4.4	10.1	15.5	11.9
Total Caribbean	8.1	14.4	10.6	5.9	12.5	1.0	5.5	12.6	16.7	12.6
Total Immigrants	13.2	15.5	6.0	7.4	11.9	4.0	10.0	9.9	12.3	9.9
Canada Born	12.4	12.4	7.0	9.1	9.9	8.6	10.1	7.6	9.4	13.1
Grand Total	12.6	13.1	6.6	8.8	10.2	7.9	10.1	8.2	9.9	12.4
FEMALES										
United Kingdom	9.7	21.2	36.3	11.4	13.6	1.3	0.3	1.1	2.3	2.5
Germany	9.9	17.7	29.7	12.4	17.6	3.3	0.4	2.0	4.0	3.1
Italy	4.6	6.6	21.8	7.4	20.0	1.1	0.6	5.7	25.9	6.1
China	5.5	10.4	16.1	6.4	29.0	1.4	0.3	4.6	20.6	3.8
Hong Kong	10.2	19.3	35.4	7.8	16.4	0.1	0.0	1.3	7.4	2.0
Taiwan	7.0	21.6	37.3	7.2	15.0	0.7	0.0	1.5	6.3	3.5
Vietnam	2.4	8.0	13.0	4.0	24.3	1.8	0.4	8.7	33.1	6.3
Jamaica	3.9	24.3	26.7	5.3	21.1	0.1	0.4	3.1	8.1	5.0
Trinidad & Tobago	7.5	23.7	39.6	5.9	12.0	0.2	0.1	1.9	5.5	3.5
Total Caribbean	4.7	24.5	30.1	5.3	17.7	0.1	0.3	3.0	9.6	4.6
Total Immigrants	7.2	18.5	27.9	8.6	18.0	2.4	0.3	3.1	10.0	3.8
Canada Born	7.8	21.3	34.7	9.6	15.6	2.6	0.3	2.2	2.9	2.8
Grand Total	7.8	20.9	33.5	9.4	16.1	2.5	0.3	2.4	4.2	3.0

Note: Occupational Groups
1. Managerial, administrative and related occupations
2. Professional and related occupations
3. Clerical and related occupations
4. Sales
5. Service
6. Primary
7. Construction, trades
8. Processing
9. Product fabricating, assembly and repair
10. Other

Source: 1986 Canadian Census, unpublished tables.

TABLE 4: OCCUPATION BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH, AUSTRALIA 1986 (%)

BIRTHPLACE	OCCUPATIONAL GROUP (SEE NOTES)								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
MALES									
United Kingdom	12.8	13.5	8.1	7.3	8.2	24.2	9.7	13.5	2.7
Germany	14.3	11.7	6.9	5.5	5.9	32.4	9.5	10.5	3.1
Netherlands	17.5	11.2	7.5	5.0	6.9	28.0	10.3	11.1	2.6
Italy	13.2	4.3	2.4	3.2	6.3	30.1	13.5	23.9	3.1
Yugoslavia	5.5	3.2	2.5	2.8	3.3	33.1	19.3	26.7	3.6
China	10.6	20.8	5.8	6.6	6.5	16.1	14.0	16.3	3.4
Vietnam	2.7	5.3	2.3	6.1	3.6	17.7	22.1	38.2	4.1
Fiji	7.6	18.5	5.0	8.3	7.3	20.5	13.0	16.8	3.0
New Zealand	12.6	12.0	5.0	4.7	9.4	24.2	12.3	17.3	2.3
Total Immigrants	11.8	11.9	5.8	6.0	7.4	24.9	11.9	17.4	3.0
Australia Born	15.4	11.6	6.3	7.9	8.3	22.0	11.2	14.6	2.7
Grand Total	14.5	11.7	6.1	7.4	8.0	22.8	11.4	15.4	2.8
FEMALES									
United Kingdom	5.9	11.4	8.3	34.5	18.2	3.3	2.6	13.7	1.9
Germany	7.6	12.0	8.4	30.7	16.7	4.9	3.7	15.2	2.9
Netherlands	9.9	9.6	7.8	26.8	18.5	4.2	3.5	16.6	3.0
Italy	9.6	4.2	1.3	18.1	14.0	7.2	18.0	25.8	3.7
Yugoslavia	3.5	3.4	2.4	14.6	9.2	5.4	17.7	39.8	3.8
China	5.5	15.7	7.1	25.3	14.5	4.8	6.0	18.4	2.7
Vietnam	2.6	3.9	2.1	14.3	8.6	6.3	24.9	31.9	3.5
Fiji	4.2	9.0	10.1	30.7	15.4	2.5	5.5	20.2	2.4
New Zealand	5.7	11.0	8.7	32.8	20.4	3.9	3.3	12.4	1.6
Total Immigrants	6.2	10.5	6.7	28.3	16.1	4.2	6.9	18.5	2.6
Australia Born	7.8	12.5	7.2	33.2	20.2	3.6	2.2	11.0	2.3
Grand Total	7.4	12.0	7.0	32.0	19.2	3.8	3.3	12.8	2.4

Note: Occupational Groups
1. Managers and administrators
2. Professionals
3. Para-Professionals
4. Clerks
5. Sales and service workers
6. Tradespersons
7. Plant and machine operators and drivers
8. Labourers and related workers
9. Inadequately described and not stated

Source: Bureau of Immigration Research - "Community Profiles" and unpublished tables.

The New Zealand figures show that British and Irish immigrants are significantly over-represented in the top three occupational brackets of managerial, professional and technical workers. This is particularly marked amongst males, almost half of whom occupy such jobs. Conversely, both sexes are under-represented in the lower skilled manual categories of operating and assembling and elementary occupations (such as labouring work). Significant proportions of British and Irish-born males are also employed in the more highly skilled manual category of trades workers, while large numbers of females work in clerical occupations.

The pattern of over-representation in managerial and professional jobs is repeated in Canada, and again is especially marked amongst males. British males, however, are more likely to be found in the low skilled manual categories in Canada than they are in New Zealand and are in fact slightly over-represented in production work.

In Australia, British and Irish immigrants are less likely to be found in higher status occupations than in both Canada and New Zealand, being slightly under-represented in managerial occupations and only marginally over-represented in professional and technical jobs. Conversely, they are considerably more likely to be found in the low-skilled manual occupations than in New Zealand, with females actually being slightly over-represented in labouring and related work.

New Zealand's largest Northern European groups, the Dutch and German-born, also have a significant presence

in high status occupations - the Dutch less so and the Germans more so than the British. Both groups, but particularly German immigrants, are correspondingly under-represented in low skilled manual occupations. Dutch males have a higher than normal concentration in the skilled manual trades, and along with Dutch females have high proportions working in the primary sector - the Dutch being one of the few groups of post-war immigrants to enter agriculture in significant numbers (Thomson, 1967).

The major Northern European groups are also well represented throughout the occupational structure in Canada and Australia but without faring as well as their compatriots in New Zealand. German immigrants in Canada, for instance, include significant numbers of managerial workers but males are also over-represented in all manual categories while females are under-represented in the professions and over-represented in sales and service jobs.

In Australia, German immigrants have no more than an equitable representation amongst managers and professionals. Almost a third of German males work as tradespersons while women are over-represented in the less skilled manual categories. Australia's Dutch immigrants have a similar profile but are more likely to be managerial workers and slightly less likely to be professionals or tradespersons.

Reflecting the two-tier pattern of European immigration that prevailed during the post-war boom, the occupational profiles of Southern European immigrants

in Canada and Australia are quite different to those of Northern Europeans. Italians, the largest European group in both countries, are generally under-represented in all categories of white collar work, most strikingly in the professions where educational background is a significant obstacle. In Australia, however, they are well represented in the managerial class primarily due to the establishment of small businesses which have provided one of the few opportunities for independence and social mobility (Collins, 1992). Italians are heavily over-represented in all categories of manual work in both countries, most strikingly amongst labourers and related workers in Australia and amongst female production workers in Canada. Italians do, however, have a strong representation in the skilled manual trades in both countries.

Although the pattern of concentration in lower status occupations persists, there is evidence that age and duration of residence brought some individual social mobility for Italian immigrants, primarily via small businesses, and that as this occurred, later waves of migrants from other sources replaced them in the low skilled manufacturing jobs (Birrell and Birrell, 1987:75). In Australia, one such group was the Yugoslavs, who arrived in increasing numbers during the 1960s as Italian immigration was declining. It is apparent that Yugoslavian workers are even less likely than Italians to hold white collar jobs and more likely to be low skilled manual workers.

Yugoslavian immigrants constitute New Zealand's largest Southern European minority but they have not

been part of a large scale migration of low skilled workers in the post-war era. Consequently they are far smaller in numbers, on average older and longer established, and have a different employment profile from Southern Europeans in Australia and Canada, without a comparable concentration in low skilled manual jobs. The effect of educational background is, however, evident in the relative absence of Yugoslavian immigrants from the professions and clerical occupations and their over-representation amongst male trades workers and female operators and assemblers. On the other hand, both sexes are more likely to be found in managerial jobs than members of the other major European groups, reflecting an emphasis on small businesses similar to that found amongst Italians in Australia. Data on employment status in fact shows that Yugoslavian males are more likely to be self employed than any other major immigrant group.[3] The legacy of their strong involvement in agriculture prior to the Second World War is also apparent in the numbers working in primary sector jobs (Trlin, 1968, 1979).

Australian and Canadian studies indicate that the contrasting employment profiles of Northern and Southern Europeans are largely a reflection of divergent levels of education, skills and English language proficiency prior to migration (Wooden, 1990; Li, 1988). Discrimination against Southern Europeans appears to be a less important factor, although there is some dispute and little quantifiable evidence as to its extent (Wooden,

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[3]   Based on unpublished 1991 census data.

1990:264-5; Foster et al, 1991). British immigrants have particular advantages in the job markets of the receiving countries, sharing the same language, having the least difficulties with cultural adaptation, being more universally accepted by the local populations, and having the most compatible qualifications. In each of these regards, other Northern Europeans also generally have an advantage over Southern Europeans (Lever-Tracy and Quinlan, 1988:110-112).

The position of Southern Europeans cannot be fully explained, however, without regard to the relationship between structural economic conditions and immigration policy. Australia and Canada admitted large numbers of unskilled or low skilled Southern European workers at a time when there was a demand for such labour in expanding secondary industries, while at the same time recruiting Northern European immigrants for skilled manual and white collar jobs (Collins, 1975). New Zealand did not utilise Southern European labour in this way but, as will be shown later, a similar process has occurred with Pacific Islanders (Ongley, 1991).

Overall, the comparative occupational profiles of British and European immigrants indicate that they have generally fared better in New Zealand than in Canada and more especially Australia. British and Northern European immigrants are more strongly represented in the upper occupational brackets in New Zealand while Southern Europeans are not as heavily concentrated in low skilled manual jobs. The distinctiveness of the New Zealand situation reflects smaller and more selective British and European flows, with the majority of

unskilled and low skilled labour coming from other sources and most of the remaining opportunities being in the more highly skilled occupations. Similarly, the fact that British and European immigrants have tended to fare better in Canada than Australia may be attributable to Canada's earlier shift to a skills based selection policy while Australia continued to recruit large volumes of immigrants of all occupational backgrounds in order to sustain its population building objectives (Richmond and Zubrzycki, 1984:23-4).

Asian Immigrants

Australia, Canada and New Zealand all pursued restrictive immigration policies before and following the Second World War, largely excluding Asian immigrants except for the immediate family of existing residents. Canada was the first to liberalise its policy, instituting universal selection criteria for independent migrants in 1962 and introducing a fully non-discriminatory points system in 1967. Australia partially liberalised its policy in 1966 by allowing the admission of highly skilled non-Europeans, but did not formally replace the "White Australia" policy with non-discriminatory selection procedures until 1973 (Hawkins, 1989).

In New Zealand, the admission of Asian immigrants was subject to Ministerial discretion and thereby severely restricted (Brawley, 1993). Supposedly universal selection criteria were introduced in 1974 but a preference for migrants from 'traditional source countries' remained until the 1986 Policy Review which established a new objective of enriching the 'multi-

cultural social fabric of New Zealand society', thus opening the door to more Asian immigration (Burke, 1986:10). The points system introduced in 1991, along with a more expansive pro-immigration policy, affirmed this intent by aiming 'to attract quality migrants from a wider catchment of countries' (NZ Immigration Service 1991:1).

Asian immigration increased gradually from very low levels in each country following major policy changes, but in all three countries, the most rapid acceleration has been since the mid-1980s, due to a combination of liberalised immigration policies in the receiving countries and increasing emigration pressures in Asia. The Asian region became the most important source of new immigrants for Canada in the late 1970s, for Australia in the mid-1980s and New Zealand in the late 1980s (Castles, 1992; Richmond, 1991; Trlin, 1992). Table 1 shows that each country now has a significant Asian immigrant population, albeit considerably smaller than the numbers of British and European-born. New Zealand's more recent shift towards Asian immigration is reflected in the proportionately smaller Asian population relative to those in Australia and Canada.

The lifting of restrictions on Asian immigration in each country coincided with changes in immigration policy, discussed in the previous section, to a more selective recruitment of the highly skilled. The new Asian migrants selected in the independent categories were therefore more likely to be highly educated and qualified than earlier waves of European immigrants (Basavarajappa and Verma, 1985; Hassan and Tan, 1990).

The movement of highly skilled Asian migrants has been facilitated by the extension of Western educational systems to Asian countries so that professional and technical training is often directly transferable (Bolaria and Li, 1988:210).

Another policy development attracting new Asian immigrants to high status occupations has been the business immigration programmes introduced by each country in the late 1970s and expanded during the 1980s. The programmes aim to attract investors and entrepreneurs with the capital and skills to establish new ventures with the potential to provide employment, and in each country Asians have constituted the majority of successful applicants (Ministry of Commerce 1989; Trlin and Kang, 1992; Inglis and Wu, 1992; Nash, 1987).

A major exception to this pattern of skilled and wealthy Asian immigrants is the Indochinese refugee movement. During the peak years of this movement from 1975 to 1985, Canada and Australia both accepted almost 100,000 refugees while New Zealand admitted just over 6,000 (Hawkins, 1989:182; Hawley, 1986:59). While New Zealand has been more selective than Australia and Canada, the receiving nations have clearly not been able to exercise the same degree of selectivity in respect of refugees as they have with other Asian migrants. The Indochinese movement has therefore included far greater proportions of unskilled or low skilled workers and non-English speakers than the flows from other Asian countries, while occupational opportunities for the more highly skilled have been restricted by non-recognition of

their qualifications (Coughlan, 1992; Montgomery, 1986; Farmer, 1988).

It should also be noted that the increased volumes of Asian independent and business migrants and refugees provides a base for the growth of family reunion migration, the composition of which is largely beyond the control of the receiving countries and therefore includes higher proportions of unskilled or low skilled migrants than the independent flows (Li, 1988:83).

The comparative occupational profiles of selected Asian immigrant groups in New Zealand, Australia and Canada are illustrated in Tables 2-4. It is important to remind readers here that immigrants in these tables are grouped on the basis of country of birth, not ethnicity. Chinese persons, if designated by ethnic background, arrive in New Zealand from a wide variety of countries. We can assume, for example, that most, but not necessarily all, recent migrants from Hong Kong in our tables are 'culturally' Chinese, but they were not born in mainland China. Hence, in subsequent discussion, the 'Chinese' refers exclusively to persons whose birthplace was China.

Tables 2-4 reveal marked differences in the positions of longer established immigrants from China, the more recently arrived and highly skilled Hong Kong and Taiwanese migrants, and Indochinese refugees. They also show that Asian immigrants, like British and European immigrants, are generally better represented in higher status occupations in New Zealand than in Canada and Australia. The comparison at an aggregate

level of Asians and Europeans in New Zealand show that the former are more likely to be managers and professionals but also more likely to be in the less skilled manual categories - marginally so in the case of males and more markedly in the case of women, who are mainly admitted as family members.

New Zealand's Chinese-born population (see Table 2), long established and sustained to a large degree by family migration, is heavily over-represented in service occupations, with significant numbers also in managerial jobs and agricultural occupations. This pattern reflects the importance of small family businesses, especially in various sectors of the food industry, which have provided an important avenue for independence and mobility. Compared to other Asian immigrants and to European immigrants the Chinese are poorly represented in professional, technical and clerical occupations, and women are heavily over-represented amongst plant and machine operators and assemblers.

Chinese immigrants in Canada (see Table 3) exhibit a similar occupational profile, with comparable concentrations in service occupations and high proportions of women in lower skilled production work. Compared with New Zealand, however, fewer are in managerial jobs and more in the professions, particularly males. In Australia (Table 4), Chinese males are still less likely to be in managerial jobs but are significantly over-represented in the professions. In marked contrast with New Zealand and Canada, they are actually under-represented in sales and service jobs. Chinese males have a stronger representation in all manual

categories than in New Zealand and Canada, with high proportions of females working as labourers and related workers.

The more recently arrived Asian immigrant groups, with the exception of Indochinese refugees, are more likely than the Chinese to have been selected on the basis of skills and qualifications or investment capital. This is reflected in the occupational profiles of New Zealand's Hong Kong and Taiwanese immigrants. The Hong Kong born have a slightly greater representation in managerial jobs than the Chinese and a considerably greater representation in the professions, where males are also far more strongly represented than European immigrants. Hong Kong immigrants, particularly males, are significantly over-represented in sales and service occupations but not to the same extent as the Chinese. Hong Kong males are less likely than both the Chinese and European-born to be manual workers, and while Hong Kong women are slightly over-represented in operating and assembling jobs, their presence in such work is far smaller than that of the Chinese.

Together Hong Kong and Taiwanese migrants make up the majority of New Zealand's business migrants but whereas Hong Kong immigrants represent a mix of business, skilled and family migrants and have a longer history of immigration to New Zealand, the Taiwanese population is almost exclusively made up of recent business migrants and their families. This is clearly reflected in their occupational profile, with half of Taiwanese males and thirty percent of females being concentrated in the administrative and managerial

category. On the other hand, they have relatively low proportions in the professions and, compared to Hong Kong and Chinese immigrants, smaller proportions of sales and service workers.

Hong Kong migrants in Canada also have a strong representation in managerial work but not to the same degree as in New Zealand. Their strongest presence is amongst male professionals, and although comparison is difficult because of differences in classification, it would seem this is more marked than in New Zealand. As in New Zealand, Hong Kong males are markedly under-represented in manual jobs while women are slightly over-represented in production work but far less so than Chinese women. Taiwanese migrants have a very similar occupational profile except for lower proportions of males in service work. Compared to their compatriots in New Zealand, they have not featured as strongly in the business immigration intakes and thus there are fewer managers and more professionals.

The Vietnamese populations of all three countries provide a marked contrast, as could be expected from a group admitted almost exclusively as refugees or family migrants. In New Zealand, however, they appear to have fared better than in Australia and Canada. The most distinctive feature of the New Zealand situation is that Vietnamese, particularly women, are over-represented amongst managerial workers, albeit to a lesser extent than the Chinese, Hong Kong and Taiwanese-born. At the same time, however, they are markedly under-represented amongst professional, technical and clerical workers and heavily over-represented in manual

occupations, particularly in operating and assembling. They also have a strong presence in sales and service occupations but not to the same degree as Chinese and Hong Kong immigrants.

Canada's Vietnamese workers are far less likely to be in managerial jobs but are better represented in the professions than in New Zealand, particularly in the case of males. They are more heavily over-represented in low skilled manual work than in New Zealand and more so than any other major immigrant group in Canada. In Australia, the concentration in low status occupations is even more marked, with well over half of both sexes in the two low skilled manual categories and a corresponding under-representation in all the white collar categories, including sales and service work. This pattern of segmentation is more marked than in the case of Southern European immigrants. It is also worth noting that at the same census, the unemployment rate of Vietnamese in Australia was particularly high at 32 percent amongst males and 41 percent amongst females.
The more favourable position of Vietnamese in New Zealand relative to Australia and Canada may be partly attributable to the fact that the New Zealand data is from a more recent census and in the intervening period there may have been a degree of upward mobility in each country. The extent of intercensal occupational mobility in New Zealand is difficult to judge because of changes in census classifications, but data on employment status indicate a considerable increase in self employment which may have occurred in response to restricted opportunities in other skilled and professional occupations. Another consideration contributing to the

higher status of Vietnamese in New Zealand may be this country's more selective policy on refugee admissions. Finally, the substantial migration of Vietnamese refugees from New Zealand to Australia, particularly among those who found it difficult to get employment here, is a further contributory factor to consider in seeking to explain the different trans-Tasman Vietnamese employment profiles.[4]

There is clearly a diverse pattern of employment amongst different Asian immigrant groups. A number of factors could be expected to provide obstacles to the equitable integration of Asians into the workforces of the receiving countries. In the case of refugees and family migrants, these include individual attributes such as low levels of English proficiency, education and relevant occupational skills. For these and independent migrants, other factors may include non-recognition of qualifications, discrimination, problems of cultural adjustment, recency of migration and the economic climate prevailing when they arrive. Australian and Canadian studies confirm that all these factors are significant (e.g. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1990; Jones, 1992; Li, 1988; Basavarajappa and Verma, 1985). But despite these barriers some of the newly arrived Asian groups are very strongly represented in high status occupations, often more so than European immigrants. These are the groups who have been

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[4]   The 1988 working group on social services for refugees and immigrants reported that at least twenty-five percent of post-1977 Indochinese arrivals had moved across the Tasman (Personal communication, Ministry of Social Welfare).

recruited for their professional skills, entrepreneurial ability and investment capital under immigration policies geared to the requirements of post-industrial economies. This again points to the need to consider the relationship between immigration policy and structural economic conditions when explaining the socio-economic position of immigrant groups.

The contrast between these and refugee groups such as the Vietnamese also points to the importance of the category under which migration occurred. Compared to independent migrants, refugees and family migrants are far less likely to be proficient in English, highly educated and skilled or wealthy. They are therefore far more likely to end up in low skilled and low status manual jobs. Furthermore, the fact that their migration has occurred at a time when economic restructuring is resulting in declining demand for such workers places them in an especially vulnerable position (Coughlan, 1992:107).

Pacific and Caribbean Migrants

Migration from the Pacific Islands to New Zealand and from the Caribbean to Canada are both intra-regional movements from small and less developed island nations subject to high emigration pressures and have both included a degree of temporary labour migration. However, there are also distinctions in that the Pacific Islands are generally smaller and less developed than the Caribbean nations, with fewer highly educated and skilled workers. The Caribbean movement also includes greater proportions with European or Asian ethnic

origins than the Pacific movement.[5] A further distinction is that whereas the Pacific Islands were New Zealand's main external source of unskilled and low skilled labour during the post-war boom, for Canada the Caribbean was a less important source than Southern Europe. Migration from the Pacific to New Zealand gathered pace in the 1960s, stimulated by excess labour demand in manufacturing industries benefiting from high levels of protection and a growing domestic economy (Gibson, 1983). Cook Island, Niuean and Tokelauan migrants enjoyed unrestricted rights of entry as New Zealand citizens, while Western Samoans could be granted permanent residence under an annual quota or under family reunion provisions along with Tongans, Fijians and others. In addition, there was a significant volume of temporary migration which resulted in high rates of overstaying. Official tolerance of overstaying lasted as long as the economic boom, but a deteriorating economic situation in the early 1970s prompted severe clampdowns and the introduction of an official and tightly controlled guestworker scheme (Bedford and Gibson, 1986). The latter has been used primarily for the recruitment of rural labour from Fiji, until that country was suspended from the scheme after the 1987 coups (Levick and Bedford, 1988). Other groups have been

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[5] The1981 figures indicate that just 26 percent of Caribbean immigrants in Canada are of wholly Caribbean ethnic origin, including 44 percent of those from Jamaica and 41 percent of those from Trinidad & Tobago. However, Richmond (1989:9) suggests these figures involve a significant underenumeration due to some confusion regarding the census question. The 1991 census figures show that 80 percent of New Zealand's Pacific Island immigrants are of wholly Pacific ethnic origin (Department of Statistics, 1993:29-31).

more inclined to enter as non-working visitors and find employment on arrival. Few Pacific Islanders have been able to meet the stringent educational and occupational criteria for permanent entry as independent migrants but large numbers continue to enter as family migrants, under the Samoan quota, as New Zealand citizens or as temporary migrants (Bedford and Larner, 1992).

Caribbean countries did not have colonial relationships with Canada comparable to those existing between Pacific Island nations and New Zealand, and so Caribbean citizens enjoyed no preferential entry rights. Immigration was minimal under the discriminatory post-war immigration policy but accelerated when this was dismantled in the 1960s and peaked in the mid-1970s. Caribbean migration did not have the characteristics of a large scale labour migration but was rather a combination of skilled independent migrants and low skilled temporary migrants who were recruited mainly as seasonal farm labour and domestic service workers, some of whom were later granted permanent residence status. Since the 1970s, an increasing proportion of the Caribbean movement has been in the family reunion category, consisting predominantly of unskilled or low skilled workers (Richmond, 1989; Satzewich, 1990).

Tables 2 and 3 show that Pacific migrants in New Zealand are far more concentrated in lower status manual occupations than Caribbean migrants in Canada. Pacific Islanders are in fact more heavily over-represented in such jobs than any major immigrant group in any of the three countries, with the exception of

Vietnamese in Australia. Conversely, they are poorly represented in managerial, professional and technical jobs. Outside of production and elementary occupations, the only significant area of employment for Pacific Islanders is in the trades for males and in clerical, sales and service work for females. To compound their unfavourable situation, the recent period of restructuring has had its most severe effects on the low skilled manufacturing jobs in which Pacific Islanders are concentrated, and at the 1991 census, eighteen percent were unemployed, compared with ten percent of the general population - a higher rate than for any other major immigrant group in New Zealand.

The largest Pacific Islands groups, from Samoa and the Cook Islands, have very similar employment profiles, although Samoans are in a marginally better position. This has been attributed to differences in educational background and citizenship rights - the significance of the latter being that the Cook Islands flow is less selective and that Samoan migrants perceive a need to work harder to secure permanent residence in New Zealand (Bedford, 1985:83). Fijians are an exception to the general pattern for Pacific migrants, being well represented amongst managerial, professional and technical workers - especially in the case of males - while their only significant over-representation in manual work is amongst female production workers. The majority of these Fijian immigrants are of Indian ethnic origin and the flows have included significant proportions of skilled independent migrants, especially since the 1987 coups (Bedford, 1989).

Fijians, as one can see in Table 4, are the only sizeable group of Pacific Island immigrants in Australia, where Pacific migration has been restricted by the combined effects of the "White Australia" policy, the subsequent skills based selection criteria, and a rejection of temporary labour migration in favour of permanent settlement for the purposes of population building (Connell, 1985). Australia's Fiji-born population, mostly Fiji Indian by ethnicity, includes significant proportions of male professionals and female para-professionals but compared to Fijians in New Zealand, they are generally not as well represented in high status occupations and are more likely to be in manual jobs. This may be largely attributable to the fact that the Australian figures pre-date the large movement of skilled Indo-Fijian migrants since 1987.

The position of Caribbean migrants in Canada equates more closely to the Fijian position than to that of other Pacific migrants in New Zealand, reflecting a mix of skilled, family and temporary migrants as well as overseas students who have settled in Canada. Caribbean migrants are more likely to be in high status occupations and less likely to be manual workers than Pacific Islanders in New Zealand. Although over-represented in processing and production work, their presence is certainly not as marked as that of Pacific Islanders, and while they are under-represented amongst managers, they are over-represented in professional jobs, especially in the case of women. Migrants from Trinidad & Tobago are better represented in managerial, professional and clerical jobs than those from Jamaica, while Jamaicans have a greater representation in manual

occupations and in servicing. The high proportions of women in the latter category indicates the importance of the domestic workers scheme.

The position of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand is indicative of their role in providing unskilled and low skilled labour to fuel the expansion in manufacturing industries from the 1950s to the early 1970s (Gibson, 1983; Brosnan and Wilson, 1989; Ongley, 1991). Those who have migrated in subsequent years have generally not been selected according to educational and occupational criteria but have been admitted as family migrants, temporary labour migrants or New Zealand citizens. Lacking the skills and qualifications of other immigrant groups, they have therefore continued to enter low skilled occupations and experience high rates of unemployment.

While this experience is similar to that of Southern Europeans in Australia and Canada, the pattern of segmentation is considerably more marked in the case of Pacific Islanders. This may be partially explained by the greater proportions of younger and recently arrived migrants amongst the Pacific Island minorities and perhaps by lower average levels of education and marketable skills, although these factors are difficult to quantify on a comparative basis. It is likely also that Pacific Islanders, as a non-European group, would face greater difficulties with employer discrimination and cultural adaptation (cf, Spoonley, 1978; McDonald,

1978).[6] The relative importance of each of these factors is a matter requiring more detailed research.

Trans-Tasman Migrants

So far we have dealt mainly with migrants who have had to meet some form of selection criteria and, with the exception of British migrants, originate from countries which are to varying degrees linguistically, culturally or economically different from the receiving countries. Another form of migration occurs with unrestricted flows between neighbouring countries that are essentially similar in each of these regards, such as the trans-Tasman flows between Australia and New Zealand.

Trans-Tasman immigrants form roughly similar proportions of the population in Australia and New Zealand, although there are considerably greater numbers of New Zealand-born immigrants in Australia than vice versa. The major phase of Australian migration to New Zealand in the post-war period occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s during New Zealand's most concerted period of economic growth. Migration from

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[6]   It would also seem that amongst the second generations the barriers of class, racism and ethnicity are more significant for Pacific Islanders in New Zealand than for Southern Europeans in Australia. While there are strong indications of social mobility amongst New Zealand-born Pacific Island Polynesians (Bedford and Didham, 1989) it is not as great as that achieved by the children of Southern European immigrants in Australia, who are generally equitably represented at all educational and occupational levels (Collins, 1988:187-193).

New Zealand to Australia gathered pace in the late 1970s and early 1980s during a prolonged period of recession and rising unemployment and has since continued at high levels (Carmichael, 1993).

The comparative employment profiles in Tables 2 and 4 show that both groups are fairly equitably represented throughout the occupational structures but that Australians in New Zealand are more likely to be found in managerial, professional and technical jobs than New Zealanders in Australia. The latter are slightly under-represented amongst managerial workers and amongst female professionals and in the case of males slightly over-represented in manual occupations. New Zealanders in Australia also have higher than average unemployment rates, which is not the case with Australians in New Zealand.

The less favourable position of New Zealanders in Australia would seem largely attributable to the fact that there are greater proportions of young and recently arrived migrants in the population. Analysis of older and longer established New Zealand migrants shows that they have a superior employment profile to the locally-born in the same age groups. Australians in New Zealand tend to be longer established, and the smaller recent flows have been more selective, including significant proportions of managerial or professional workers on corporate transfers (Carmichael, 1993).

Because of their similar backgrounds, trans-Tasman migrants could be expected to have employment profiles comparable to British immigrants. In general terms, this

is the case, although trans-Tasman migrants have not fared quite as well, particularly in the case of New Zealand males in Australia. This may again be attributable to differences in age and length of residence, along with the fact that British migrants have had to meet selection criteria since the 1970s while trans-Tasman flows have been unrestricted and therefore more likely to include migrants with low levels of education and skills. However, large scale migration of unskilled or low skilled workers from New Zealand to Australia has clearly not occurred despite recent heavy job losses in this area of the New Zealand labour market. This indicates that the trans-Tasman movements are to a large extent self-selecting based on opportunities in the receiving countries, rather than being determined solely by push factors.

In contemporary terminology the trans-Tasman flows could be seen as an outcome of market forces, in the form of differential demand and supply between two similar labour markets. Migrants also compete on what some may call a 'level playing field' in that they enter cultural and economic environments similar to their own. The result is a more balanced employment profile than in the case of groups with different backgrounds whose presence results from the regulation of immigration flows to suit prevailing economic requirements.

Flows between the United States and Canada are comparable with the trans-Tasman flows to the extent that they occur between neighbouring and socially and economically similar countries. However, the American flows are no longer unrestricted and migrants must meet

selection criteria. Consequently, U.S. migrants in Canada are more strongly represented in the upper occupational brackets than trans-Tasman migrants, with over a quarter working in professional occupations in 1981 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990:44-5).

Conclusion

New Zealand has pursued immigration policies closely comparable to those of Canada and Australia since 1945, recruiting similar groups for similar purposes, albeit on a smaller scale. The result is a comparable pattern of labour market segmentation in which some groups are more heavily concentrated in lower status manual occupations and others more strongly represented in higher status white collar jobs. The most distinctive feature of the New Zealand situation is the absence of large scale Southern European migration and the recruitment of unskilled and low skilled migrants from the Pacific Islands and internally from the rural Maori population.

With the notable exception of Pacific Islanders, immigrants generally appear to have fared better in New Zealand and achieved a greater representation in higher status occupations than in Canada and more particularly Australia. It would seem that this is largely attributable to a more cautious immigration policy, a lower demand for foreign workers, and the role of Maori and Pacific Island workers in meeting much of the demand in the lower sectors of the labour market.

The pattern of labour market segmentation in all three countries is complex and does not lend itself to dichotomous conceptualisations. Many Australian and Canadian studies, for instance, distinguish between migrants from English and non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB), between visible and non-visible minorities or between those from traditional and non-traditional source countries. They contend that visible or NESB migrants and those from non-traditional sources are more likely to occupy inferior socio-economic positions. While this may hold true at a very general level, the over-simplifications of such conceptions are evident in the contrasting positions of Asian business migrants and Indochinese refugees, and indeed of Northern and Southern Europeans.

This paper reveals a more complex pattern of distribution within the labour market which can only be explained in terms of each group's educational and vocational background, the category under which they migrated and the structural conditions prevailing in the economy at the time of migration. Contrasts in the socio-economic positions of different groups are to a large extent the result of governments recruiting groups from distinct backgrounds to fulfil different economic requirements in various phases of development.

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The New Science Policy Regime in New Zealand: A Review and Critique

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The reforms of science in New Zealand in the late 1980s and early 1990s are undoubtedly the most fundamental since the establishment of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) in 1926. If the major innovation of the 1920s was to provide a more integrated industrial and research policy geared to New Zealand's actual needs in science and technology (Hoare, 1976), the reforms of today concentrate even more single-mindedly on the objective of economic growth. The then Minister of Research, Science and Technology, Simon Upton, in his foreword to the Summary of the Report of the Ministerial Task Group (1991:4), leaves little room for misunderstanding when he states that science and technology are the 'cornerstones of economic growth and sustainable management' and that the restructuring of traditional science departments into commercially-oriented, research companies 'forms part of a much broader blueprint for economic change'. Ironically, while the goal of both sets of reforms may be considered similar in intent, the focus and the structure of Government science, and the underlying principles of science policy have changed dramatically - leading to the disassembly of the DSIR.

Up until the early 1980s, the structure and funding of scientific research in New Zealand had remained unchanged for over fifty years: the state, involved in a

high level of intervention, provided the major share of total investment which funded state research agencies, including the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Forest Research Institute, MAF Technology, and the NZ Meterological Service. The underlying argument for a such a high degree of state involvement traditionally cited the high risk of research, its long lead development time, and the inability of the market to produce either the right amount or mix of research.

In this paper, I firstly provide the necessary background to the reforms instituted by the Labour Government in 1989 and continued by the present National Government in 1992 with the establishment of crown research institutes (CRIs). Second, I describe the reforms and, third, view them in terms of the wider policy context by focusing on the principles underlying public sector restructuring in New Zealand. Finally, I provide a brief evaluation of the reforms, focusing on the CRIs.

Background to the Reforms

Authors of the reforms like to trace the initial impetus for change back to 1986 when the Working Party on Science and Technology under Sir David Beattie published its report, *The Key to Prosperity: Science and Technology*. They like to view the creation of crown research institutes as the logical extension of recommendations made in the Beattie Report (Science Task Group, 1991:4). The Beattie Committee made a number of recommendations based on the importance of science and technology to what they perceived to be a more diverse,

knowledge-intensive, skills-based, post-industrial economy in New Zealand. In the report, they strongly indicated that market forces alone could not provide the necessary basis for development and argued that 'the government must also help to create a science and technology framework' including the establishment of a new ministry. The Beattie committee also recommended that the Government double its investment in science and technology and introduce 150% tax rebate on private R&D expenditure. This was an extremely bold statement given the fervour and commitment with which free market principles were held at that time among influential politicians on both sides of the House. Only a couple of years earlier, the then Labour Government had employed a crude 'user-pays' approach as the policy instrument for achieving greater equity of research funding. As Scobie and Jacobsen (1991:16) comment, the results of this policy were, to a large extent, predictable:

> Total funding fell, new capital investment and recruitment dried up, scientists shifted their attention to finding 'clients', and public funds were used to cross-subsidise commercial activities, with one state agency with another.

Under these circumstances and the furore that accompanied the more controversial recommendations of the Beattie Report, it is perhaps a little surprising that the Labour Government, following the report, established the Science and Technology Advisory Committee (STAC) in 1987. Its report, *Science and Technology Review: A New Deal* (1988) made a number of key recommendations which were adopted by the

Government as the basis of the new science policy regime.

In brief, the new regime, then, includes the following features:

- the separation of policy formulation and advice from the purchase of scientific goods and services (called 'outputs' under the Public Finance Act 1989), and the establishment of a new structure comprised of a Ministry and a Foundation of Research, Science and Technology thereby institutionalising the separation;

- the definition of the nature of science and technology the Crown is prepared to purchase, i.e. public good science outputs that:

    - are likely to increase knowledge or understanding of the physical, biological or social environment;

    - are likely to develop, maintain or increase research skills or scientific expertise that are, or is, of particular importance to New Zealand;

    - may be of benefit to New Zealand, but are unlikely to be funded, or adequately funded, from non-governmental sources;

- the establishment of a process for the purchase of outputs based on the notion of 'contestability';

- the establishment of a priority-setting and consultation mechanism for determining what science and technology outputs the Crown will purchase.

Science Reforms: The Establishment of New Institutional Structures

The Ministry of Research, Science and Technology was established by Cabinet minute on 18 December, 1989. Its principal functions involve formulating advice to the Minister and to the Cabinet Education, Science and Technology Committee on policy and its implementation. In particular, the Ministry advises the Minister on matters related to the identification of national priorities and appropriate levels for output funding so as to achieve the broad objectives agreed by Cabinet. In effect, the Ministry has been responsible for developing the science output classes (some 40 in total) and the framework for the science priority setting process which determines the annual level of funding available for allocation to science 'providers' by the Foundation. The development of a framework for priority setting was a joint Ministry/Foundation project.[1] The model (a decision support methodology)

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[1] Overseas experience indicated that priority setting is a very political process and is driven, to a large extent, by 'big' science. A local innovative strategy for prioritising the Government's investment in science and technology and for distributing the $256 million of the Public Good Science Fund (PGSF) has been developed around three components: a time frame over which the priorities remain valid - a period of five years; a framework in which priorities are set and

developed for determining the distribution of the PGSF between output classes is given in Figure 1..[2]

The Foundation's principal role is to purchase public good science and technology within and across the 40 science outputs. It also advises the Minister on matters related to science policy and carries out science reviews, the results of which feed into the priority setting process.

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implemented and a process by which the priorities are derived (*Sci-Tech*, 1991). The framework includes consideration of: the total size of the PGSF; the distribution of funding between 40 science output classes; the identification of themes both within and across output classes; and the identification of 'structural' (i.e. input-related) priorities.The model assesses a set of key criteria for each output class: strategic importance and socio-economic benefits; the ability to capture benefits; research potential; research capacity and appropriateness of Crown funding.

[2] The key principles of the process are 'that priorities should be developed in a rational, systematic, transparent and comprehensive manner using a structured methodology based on inputs from both community wide consultation and comprehensive analysis of national and international information on science and technology'. In practice this means widespread consultation with stakeholders by 'sectors' including science providers - universities, research institutes - and science users. Convenors are appointed to facilitate the process and to develop an information package on PGSF priorities which is then presented to a science and technology expert persons (STEP) panel. Sector groups are given the opportunity to present their views in an open forum and the result of the panel process is an interim Science Priority Statement which becomes the basis for wide public distribution. This information gained through structured consultation is combined with other elements of the information base to yield a strategic direction for New Zealand. The STEP process was initiated in 1992.

The structure and institutional relationships of the Government science system is given.

The other major part of the science policy regime was put in place by the present National Administration on 1 July 1992. The Government decided to establish ten crown research institutes (CRIs) out of the assets and activities of the DSIR, MAF Technology, the Forest Research Institute and the Metrological Service. The ten institutes (shown in Figure 3) are sector and resource-based with a new company and management structure. Each institute has up to nine directors who are appointed to the governing board by Cabinet. Each board is accountable for the direction and performance of its Institute. The statement of corporate intent is the main public accountability statement which is negotiated annually between the shareholding ministers and the directors. The Institutes operate under their own Act (modelled on the State Owned Enterprises Act) and the shares are owned by the Minister of Finance and the Minister responsible for CRIs. It is claimed that the free-standing institutes have greater independence, powers (eg. to borrow and joint venture) and management flexibility than the previous government departments. The Crown, for example, does not guarantee to underwrite their liabilities. At the same time, the CRIs are said to be 'competitively neutral', i.e. placed upon a more equal basis with other research agencies in applying for research funding. The Institutes are funded by the Crown to produce science outputs which are determined by their boards and not specific to the Government's priorities (non-specific outputs).

The new institutional framework represents a fundamental change in the way Government funds research and development in New Zealand. The new funding system is based on a national strategy which is developed through the identification of broad national science priorities. More importantly, the new system represents a distinct move away from institutional-based funding to a system based on the funding of outputs. The new system of output-oriented competitive funding is based on the belief that 'contestability' will help achieve greater efficiency, equity and accountability in publicly funded research and development.[3]

The Policy Context: Public Sector Restructuring

Just as science policy must be understood within the wider context of public sector restructuring, so the restructuring of the public sector must be understood as a part of the 'radical' structural economic reform embarked upon by the Fourth Labour Government and accepted and consolidated by the National administration that succeeded it. The commitment by Thatcher and Reagan administrations to monetarism and supply-side economics, and the general move towards

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[3] Contestability is a process whereby the Foundation invites applications each funding round related to each of the 40 science outputs. The applications are then judged by peer review on the basis of being a public good (as defined in the Foundation's Act), scientific quality, relevance to Government's science priorities, price and timeliness of provision. It also is claimed that the Foundation as the purchaser of strategic research can emphasise collaboration as much as competition between research organisations.

economic liberalisation by Western governments provided a global context for structural reform in New Zealand and politicians on both sides of the house slavishly adopted these economic doctrines. This international development was reinforced by the rapid dissemination of a particular set of theoretical developments in microeconomic theory, which emphasised notions of public choice, contestability and property rights, amongst the control departments of the New Zealand bureaucracy (the Treasury and State Services Commission). Public choice theory, transaction cost analysis, and principal-agency theory (Easton, 1988, 1989; Holland and Boston, 1990) were now in vogue. Further, criticism of the 'Think Big' projects which emphasised the failure of a huge public investment programme in the 1970s was ultimately directed at the nature of *direct* government intervention in the economy, a criticism that was to be made more fiercely some time later with the breakup of the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe. At the local level, there was also the perception that New Zealand had performed poorly in terms of productivity and growth since the mid-1970s, together with a record of devaluation, inflation and stabilisation attempts and the *ad hoc* development of a set of 'restrictive' regulatory government interventions since the 1970s (Duncan and Bollard,1992).

Historically, a party of the welfare state and the regulated economy with links to the union movement, a newly-elected Labour Government discarded this tradition without warning and became a party of the New Right' (Jesson, 1992:37). Constitutionally, operating

on the basis of a 'thin' political system (a two party system with a single parliamentary chamber and few checks and balances to the exercise of executive power), Labour pushed through its reforms at an astonishingly rapid rate. That this was a deliberate strategy based on a deliberate 'politics of reform' is clearly evidenced in the following statement made by Roger Douglas, then Minister of Finance, to the Mont Pelerin Society in 1989. Douglas listed ten principles which underlay Labour's strategy for politically successful reform, including:

-       Implement reform by quantum leaps. Moving step by step lets vested interests mobilise. Big packages neutralise them.
-       Speed is essential. It is impossible to move too fast. Delay will drag you down before you can achieve your success.
-       Once you start the momentum rolling, never let it stop. Set your own goals and deadlines. Within that framework consult in the community to improve implementation (Douglas, 1993: 215-38).

In the six years to 1990, Labour almost completely deregulated the New Zealand economy, including the deregulation of the financial sector and other factor markets, the termination of subsidies for agricultural products and exports, the abolition of import licensing, the heavy reduction of tariffs, the removal of controls on international capital and the liberalisation of foreign investment and the floating of the exchange rate (Duncan and Bollard, 1992: 6).

A review of the role of the state and the 'restructuring' of the public sector was seen as a part of the wider structural economic reform. In particular, the new microeconomic theorists argued that state-owned and controlled trading organisations performed poorly because they were constrained by the institutional environment and lacked the same incentives as the private sector. From the mid-1980s, the Government pursued a programme of corporatisation and later, privatisation, as twin strategies for improving the efficiency and accountability of departmental trading departments. In 1985, the Minister of Finance made public five general principles for the restructuring of trading departments. First, non-commercial functions would be separated from major state trading organisations. Second, managers would be required to run departments as successful businesses. Third, managers would be responsible for pricing and marketing within performance objectives set by Ministers. Fourth, the new state enterprises would be required to operate in a competitively neutral environment. Last, state enterprises would be set up on an individual basis depending on their commercial purposes and would be modelled on the private sector each with its own board of directors. These principles were enshrined in the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) Act 1986. Nine SOEs were created from former government trading departments on 1 April 1987. Subsequently other SOEs have been created.[4] Under the

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[4]   The nine SOEs were: Electricity and Coal Corporations (from the Ministry of Energy); NZ Post, Post Office Bank and Telecom (from the former Post Office); Land and Forestry Corporations (from NZ Forest Service and the Lands and Survey Department); Airways

Act, trading departments became state corporations regulated by company law. They are required to make a profit and to be as efficient as their private sector counterparts. User charges have been introduced for government services purchased from the corporations and the SOEs, in the newly established competitively neutral environment, are also required to pay dividends and tax. Ministers are now 'shareholders' and chief executive officers, while given the freedom to manage without political interference, must provide a 'statement of corporate intent' and annual reports.

A privatisation programme followed corporatisation, against an explicit election promise. Advocates of state sector reform had seen corporatisation as a preliminary and partial solution (Treasury, 1984, 1987; Dean, 1989). In general, the arguments for privatisation centred on alleged operational weaknesses in the SOE model which arose from differences with the private sector, eg. no threat of take-overs or bankruptcy, non-shareholding directors, state guarantees and monitoring roles. Treasury (1987), alongside the Business Roundtable (1988), were the strongest voices in favour of privatisation arguing that a transfer of assets to the

Corporation; and Government Property Services. Subsequently, the Works Corporation was set up from the old Ministry of Works and Development (1988); the Government Supply Brokerage Company was formed from the old Government Stores Board; public sector superannuation funds were separated from Treasury; the Government Computing Services was split from the State Services Commission. Under the National Government, the health system has been 'restructured', as has the science policy regime: the larger hospitals have become Crown Health Enterprises.

private sector would address efficiency shortfalls of the SOEs, help reduce the public debt, continue the process of 'load-shedding', and aid capital accumulation in the private sector. Opposition to privatisation came from a variety of sources: Maori contested the Government's right to sell off public assets under the Treaty of Waitangi; unions not only feared huge redundancies but also critiqued the 'emerging privatised market society' focusing on the way a *political* debate over the role of the state and democracy had been reduced to, or subsumed, by economic arguments (PSA,1989).

Labour's state asset sales programme which took place from 1988 to (June) 1990 included fifteen major businesses totalling a massive $10 billion. (The sale of Telecom at $4.25 billion in 1990 was the fourth largest global sale that year). The timing of the sales was appalling. The first sales followed rapidly on the huge stock market crash of 1987 which experienced a fall in value of over 50 per cent and the economy was in a deep recession. Also the valuation and marketisation processes were open to question. Sale by treaty (tender followed by negotiation) was criticised as open to political interference. No full market floatations occurred. Many of the agreed asset prices, it has been justly asserted, were much too low: the assets sold off had been greatly under-valued. It is not clear to what extent the level of public debt was reduced through the privatisation programme or, indeed, whether the sales programme was in the best long-term interests of New Zealand.

The reform of the remaining core public sector (i.e. the residual non-SOE public sector) including defence, policing and justice, social services such as health and education and research and development (among others), was based on two major pieces of legislation: the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989. Reforms based on these Acts have been described as 'the most far-reaching and ambitious of any of their kind in the world' (State Services Commission, 1991). Christopher Hood (1990:210), commenting on the Treasury's (1987) treatise, *Government Management*, the basis and inspiration for the reforms, described it as 'remarkable' implying that it was vastly more coherent and intellectually sophisticated than its equivalents elsewhere: 'Neither Canberra nor Whitehall has produced anything remotely comparable in quality or quantity to the New Zealand Treasury's "NPM manifesto"'. He cites the cardinal principles of what he terms 'New Public Management', set out by Treasury, as: goal clarity, transparency, contestability, avoidance of capture, congruent incentive structures, enhancement of accountability, and cost-effective use of information.

The impetus for the reforms was economic efficiency and, accordingly, the reforms 'focused upon generating improvement by clarifying objectives and allowing managers to manage within a framework of accountability and performance' (State Services Commission, 1991:5). The State Sector Act had two main aims: to redefine the relationship between ministers and permanent heads from one based on the Westminster system (eg. permanent tenure, independently set remuneration) to one based on a performance contract

(guided by principal-agency theory) and to apply similar labour-market regulations to both state and private-sector employment (Scott et al, 1990:153). Where the State Sector Act made changes in industrial relations and in the appointment and employment of senior managers, the Public Finance Act 1989 clarified the meaning of 'performance' in the Public Service by establishing criteria for monitoring.The reform of financial management under the Act has followed changes adopted elsewhere (in particular, Britain's FMI and Australia's FMIP) with two important differences: the first is the distinction between purchase and ownership and the second is the distinction between outputs and outcomes. The tension between the government's aims as owner of its agencies and its aims as consumer of their outputs can be resolved through the market, i.e. contestability. Chief executives are directly responsible for the outputs (the goods and services) produced by their departments and the ministers are responsible for choosing which outputs should be produced and therefore also the outcomes (the effects of those outputs on the community). The first task of policy advice, according to this model of management, is to identify the connection between the outputs and the outcomes, the tradeoffs between different outcomes and the best source for the supply of outputs. The justification for public expenditure is related to the directness and quality of the connection. These two major differences have also influenced methods of appropriation (which is now directly linked to performance), the nature of reporting, and the nature of policy advice (Scott et al, 1990:156).

While the restructuring of the state under Labour was not restricted to the core public sector - education, health and local government underwent major reorganisation - it was with the newly elected National Government, which came to power in 1990, that the 'residual' public sector was redefined in terms of a more limited state. The National Government embarked on the most significant changes to the welfare state since its establishment in the 1930s. The major initiatives have included substantial cuts in benefits and other forms of income support, together with much stricter eligibility criteria, greater targeting of social assistance and changes to the method of targeting and 'a radical redesign of the means by which the state provides assistance', particularly in the areas of housing, health care and tertiary education (Boston, 1992:1). While the changes have been justified in terms of the need for fiscal stringency given the country's high external debt and the failure of the previous policy regime, it is clear, as Boston (1992) notes, the changes 'also originate from a marked shift in political philosophy' which focuses on the question of the nature and scope of the State.

The National Government, in addition, has committed itself to a privatisation programme and to the corporatisation of remaining public sector organisations, including electricity companies, crown research institutes and crown health enterprises. Perhaps, most importantly National has introduced the Employment Contracts Act 1991, which complements social welfare changes in the sense that it is 'decidedly anti-collectivist in philosophy and intent', shifting as it does 'the focus of labour law

from the collective to the individual' (Walsh, 1992: 59 and 64).

In general, then, it can be argued, that the National Government has accepted, continued with and attempted to complete the transformation initiated under the 'New Right' ideology of the previous Labour Government (Easton,1993).

Evaluation of the New Science Policy Regime: The CRIs

The SOE model, clearly, has been followed for the establishment of the crown research institutes but with one important difference. As Duncan and Bollard (1992:167) write:

> ...the Crown Research Institutes structure implies a compromise between a commercial structure (the corporate form, financial requirements, and operating conditions) and a less commercial structure (their employment policies, their ownership, and their long-term public research objectives). This potential inconsistency is an attempt to meet the need to organise these large scale science activities more efficiently, while at the same time recognising that public good research has long-term objectives and cannot be run successfully in a narrow commercial way.

The 'potential inconsistency' identified in the establishment of the CRIs has been criticised from

various points of view. Those who support the market approach look upon the changes as being largely cosmetic for, it is argued, that while the CRIs have some autonomy to generate contract income, they are still limited by being state-owned enterprises and the fact that they receive a state grant of some 15 per cent of their operating budget makes them subject to rent-seeking by industry lobbies. CRIs, it is alleged, will also be able to use state funds to cross-subsidise 'commercial' activities. Scobie and Jacobsen (1991: 20) as an example of this perspective, for instance, argue:

> The subsidy perpetuates the old approach whereby all state appropriations were for current expenditure, overlooking the fact that R&D is a form of investment. Without a proper balance sheet, the CRIs will fail to account to and pay a return on their shareholder's capital.

The market 'purists', thereby, criticise the recent science reforms responsible for setting up the CRIs for overlooking the lessons of reform established by economic liberalisation. To them, the CRIs perpetuate the role of the state in subsidising R&D and at the same time blur the lines of public accountability. Accordingly, from this viewpoint, the CRIs reflect the fact that the science lobby has captured the State. The solution from this point of view is, of course, relatively straight-forward and unproblematic: to resolve the 'inconsistency' by completely removing any form of state subsidy and to establish a truly competitive market without any state intervention whatsoever.

Those who support the 'government' position on the issues, that is, a position which defends the current reforms and policy strategy, have tended to argue that there are strong reasons for not placing the funding and practice of science under the control of market forces. They, in contrast to market 'purists', argue that the market place is not a neutral arbitrator of resource allocation and therefore, that the market will not necessarily provide either the right amount or mix of research. This line of thinking constitutes the main rationale for the Public Good Science Fund (PGSF). Where government policy by successive administrations has rested upon a greater reliance on market forces for the provision and distribution of social goods and services, the PGSF is seen as going against this trend: 'its very existence is an admission on the part of government that markets do not always deliver the products that are necessary for society to function for the good of all', as one manager in the Foundation expressed the point to me in correspondence.[5] That same manager went on to argue the case as follows:

> The PGSF is based upon the concept of 'market failure', a concept that states quite explicitly that when markets fail to deliver what is needed the government must 'intervene' (an increasingly vilified word

> during the last decade) and use public funds
> to overcome the failure of market forces and
> ensure that the product, in this case scientific
> research, is delivered.

The upshot of this position is to recognise that despite the commercial orientation of the CRIs, the research they undertake is not as heavily influenced by market forces as it may first appear. The major source of funds for the CRIs is the PGSF and while the contestable funding system is modelled on the concept of market competition, the notion of 'public good' and the criteria for assessment used by the Foundation serve to ensure that research is not captured by private interests.

This position was put to me in response to a paper I had delivered to Conservation Department staff, including scientists, in Wellington in 1992 (Peters, 1993). In that paper ('Postmodern Science in Aotearoa? Conservation, Cosmology and Critique') I discussed science as 'a reason of state' (the phrase is Ashis Nandy's, 1988) indicating the ways it had become part of the politics of development and the perceived basis for national competitiveness in the global marketplace. In this connection, I referred to the French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) who maintains that in the 'postmodern condition', science has fallen under the sway of technology which has as its goal efficiency (rather than truth), and follows the principle of optimal performance (maximising output, minimising input). In rather ominous terms, Lyotard (1984: 4) argues:

> Knowledge is and will be produced in order to
> be sold, it is and will be consumed in order to

be valorized in a new production: in both
cases, the goal is exchange.

Already knowledge has become the principal force of
production, severely altering the composition of the
work force inmost developed countries. The
merchantilisation of knowledge will further widen the
gap between developed and developing countries. It will
disrupt the traditional view that learning falls within the
purview of the state and raise new legal and ethical
questions between the state and 'information rich'
transnational corporations. This scenario, · Lyotard
admits, is not original or even necessarily true, but it
does have strategic value in allowing us to see the effects
of the transformation of knowledge on public power and
civil institutions. In societies where knowledge has been
transformed into a commodity, where knowledge and
power have come to be regarded as two sides of the
same question, the problem of legitimation of knowledge
becomes a central issue. 'In the computer age', Lyotard
(1984: 9) maintains, 'the question of knowledge is now
more than ever a question of government'.

Concluding Comments

Since the Second World War, science and technology
have been seen as having a fundamental role to play in
economic development, especially in terms of: the
relation between new forms of multi-disciplinary basic
science and emerging generic technologies (eg.,
micro-electronics, information and communications,
advanced materials and biotechnology); the role of these
generic technologies in driving a new Kondratiev 'long

wave' of economic development; the consequent need for countries to fund future-oriented programmes of basic mission-oriented or strategic research; and the changed external 'boundary conditions' under which the scientific research system must now operate given that science has entered a 'steady-state' (Ziman,1987) where demands for public accountability and 'value-for-money' necessarily imply greater selectivity in the allocation of funds and more systematic approaches to planning.

A recognition of these kinds of factors could be seen as underlying the restructuring of the science policy in New Zealand based on so-called New Public Management which combines 'new institutional economics' (public choice theory, principal-agency analysis, and transaction-cost analysis) built around the notions of contestability, 'user pays', transparency, and new incentives structures, with elements of the fashionable 'corporate culture' doctrines of the 1980s. In the document *Investing in Science for Our Future* (MoRST, 1992) I would argue that what we have been presented with is a market model of knowledge, entailing the commodification of science. This state of affairs, is not surprising given the underlying neo-liberal policy context. Accordingly, it was most unlikely that the market model of knowledge and research would be able to deal effectively with conservation issues - indeed the notion of sustainability (a national strategic goal) does not sit well with the market - or address Maori interests.

In response to the comments and arguments raised against my criticisms, I made the following comment:

I accept your description of the PGSF and its theoretical underpinning in the concept of 'market failure'. However I remain very sceptical of this piece of policy as a bulwark against free market ideology, given the whole sway of government policy since 1984 - the SOEs, the privatisation programme, the commercialisation of social services, etc. My questions become political ones. Even given the PGSF and public good criteria, isn't it naive to expect one [small] policy regime/one set of institutions to function in an independent way, unaffected by the wider restructuring of the public sector? Doesn't the 'contestable funding' system - itself a Treasury concept inherited from the mix of imported neo-liberal theory - already indicate contradictions within the science regime? These are also empirical questions. I'm afraid I do not share your optimism and we will have to wait and see how the notion of the PGSF fares (Letter, 3 March, 1993).

I believe that the line of argument I have advanced above is valid. Indeed, those on the far right are absolutely correct to point out the inconsistency or better, contradiction, of the PGSF given the broad sweep of government policy and the commitment to the market. If the Government is to remain consistent in terms of its espoused ideology, it would see that on its own criteria there are no grounds for state funding or intervention. The fact that the Government has recognised an argument for its role in the support and funding of 'public good science' is an argument that I would want to extend across the board to a range of policy areas which

the state, under a social democratic model, has been involved in traditionally. It is not the place here to consider theories of market or government failure (Le Grand, 1992) or the operation of quasi-markets (Le Grand, 1991; Glennerster, 1991), but it may be in order to make a few remarks about the notion of 'public goods' which carries conceptual weight in these debates.

The notion of public goods was originally defined in opposition to private goods by Paul Samuelson (1954). They were seen to be goods that could not be produced on a market basis and they were defined as possessing the characteristics of non-rivalry (one person's consumption can not reduce that of another) and non-excludability (impossible to exclude from consumption a person who refused to contribute to the cost of production). Just how *useful* this definition is has recently been questioned. Marginson (1992: 4), for instance, makes the case that Samuelson, at the time he made the distinction, was locked into the market/state dualism where the relationship between them was seen as both mutually exclusive and uneven - 'the market is prior to and superior to the state':

> In this framework, the market is seen as the norm, and that which cannot be produced via the market lies in the sphere of the state/government/public. Thus Samuelson superimposed a public/private distinction on top of what he was really talking about: a market/non-market distinction. He should have used the term *non-market goods,* not public goods (Marginson, 1992:4).

By doing so, Marginson maintains, Samuelson would have avoided defining public goods negatively and would also have recognised a more complex and 'richer' reality where, in the public sphere, the production of both market and non-market goods occur. In public science, as in public education, Marginson argues, two main commodities are produced - intellectual property and positional goods. Positional goods are those which provide an individual or a firm with a relative or 'positional' advantage. In addition, science and education may take the form of a *common good* - a good which can be used by anyone without reducing its value to others. This terminology avoids the simplistic dualism of the earlier economic discourse and, at the same time, it allows us to see the hollowness and inappropriateness of an a priori commitment to the market as a basis for the restructuring of public science (see also Marginson 1993; Cowen, 1992).

Indeed, it is not just the terms 'public' and 'private' which are problematic but the tradition of neo-classical economics which insists on treating the economy as an analytically separate realm of society. As Block (1990: 3) remarks:

> Increasingly, public debate has come to hinge, not on what kind of society we are or want to be, but on what the needs of the economy are. Hence, a broad range of social policies are now debated almost entirely in terms of how they fit with the imperatives of the market.

Certainly, this has been the case in New Zealand where science and education have been largely restructured

according to market principles yet where the theory of market failure, based on the notion of public goods, still carries some conceptual weight in official thinking, if only in limited policy areas.

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Figure 1.

# Frame Work for Determining Government
Funding by Output Class

Figure 2.
Structure of Government Involvement
in the Science System

Figure 3.

Crown Research Institutes

Research Institutes

Orientation

Productive sectors

Pastoral Agriculture

Horticultural Products

(

Field Crop Products

Primary sector

Forestry and Wood Products

Fisheries Development, Aquaculture and Aquatic Products

Industry Development

Secondary sector

Environmental Health & Forensic Science

Services sector

Resources

People

Social & Economic Development

Land Environments

Atmosphere and Water

Natural resources

Geosphere

Review Symposium (Part II)

Feminist Discourses and Postmodernity

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Beginnings are never easy. I have found myself in the course of writing this paper hovering on the edge of various possible directions, trying to decide where to begin the story and what in the process to exclude: the process of beginning has been complicated by my consciousness of feminism as a contested site - and further complicated because I cannot neatly separate post-modernism from the sort of feminism that I do. And then there is a further problem. Talking about `feminism' implies the existence of a unitary, internally uncontested body of knowledge, whereas postmodern feminism is writing/speaking the importance of problematising itself, of moving away from what Braidotti has called `the deep sense of determinism, of certainty of the course of history' (quoted in Probyn, 1992: 508). Should I in fact be talking about feminisms? And particularly, where to begin?

Although writing of `feminism', I want to foreground the plurality of feminist discourses and of feminism's internally contested boundaries. I want to address what are for me some of the singular features of feminist epistemologies (while at the same time remarking that these features are not peculiar to feminism alone but are certainly present in much of postmodernist writings). I

want to emphasise that this is just one account of feminist discourses, inevitably partial, and certainly truncated.

Feminism centres on addressing the condition of women through insisting that cultural, social, psychological and economic maps have to include women and, further, that including women makes a difference to dominant cultural, economic, social and psychological representations. The feminism of the 1960s centred on a seemingly simple proposition about the oppression of all women, a proposition to which many women gave consent. Research focused around the constraining (mis)representations of women in dominant paradigms. Susan Bordo (1990: 134) wrote: `The male-normative view of the world ... had obscured its own biases through its fictions of unity (History, Reason, Culture, Tradition, and so forth). Each of those unities was shown to have a repressed shadow - an Other whose material history, values and perspectives, had yet to be written'. And in tracing the course of feminism since the 1960s, Catherine Stimpson (1988) has noted the ways in which women confronted these misrepresentations initially by:

(i)   exposing the mechanisms of misrepresentation;

(ii)   seeking to reinterpret the past and to define a period when women were powerful;

(iii) generating an accurate representation of the present, which led to a exposure of male lies and alternatively, to women's `truths'; and

(iv) through a projection of a cultural future in which womanly qualities were dominant rather than suppressed (and I am thinking here of Ursula Le Bruin's science fiction novels).

But it is not that simple.

If there were differences between women and men, then differences between women and women had to be acknowledged too. The construct `woman' could no longer stand. The first feminist consensus had to confront itself as in fact differently constituted by ethnicity, class, culture, age and history. In having to recognise its own totalising tendencies and to face the realities of multiple subjectivities, feminists began to ask who was speaking for whom, whose feminist voices silenced or marginalised other voices speaking from other cultures and other spaces; how difference was admitted/contained/responded to (Patai, 1990; Spivak, 1988). In the development of cultural politics, what alliances could occur?

What I am talking about then are a series of overlapping processes of identification, excavation, assertion, and expansion of epistemological frameworks. Stimpson (1988: xiii) writes of the three filaments of thought holding feminism together: the first, `... the restriction against women as agents of culture' which has generated a passionate concern for the positioning of women in societies and, as a consequence of women's concern about their positioning, `scorns neutrality' and `burns

bright and hot with anger because of the pain, the beatings and the rapes it documents'; the second filament, an exploration of women's resistance to violence; and the third, a `reconstruction of culture', which has focused on the inclusion of women and gender in the arts, letters and sciences and the implications of so doing. These filaments record also a transition from `woman as victim' to `woman as agent', (albeit) positioned within discourse.

I want to comment on the second filament, the one that highlights passion and action, a dimension of feminism which is of considerable significance yet is not overtly present in much postmodernist theory. Feminism is synonymous with working for an improvement (and therefore change) in women's status and for their participation in their society while also questioning the current grounds on which that participation is permitted. Feminism calls for a persistent foregrounding and articulation of the continued social and political exclusion and suppression of women and of the issues relevant to them.

There is another way of conceptualising the feminist epistemological contribution. By insisting on the inclusion and value of what was politically, socially, culturally, economically and philosophically marginalised, feminism has assisted in the challenge to what Lyotard has called the `grand narratives of legitimation' (Nicholson and Fraser, 1990: 22); it has highlighted the power relations inherent in such narratives, it has emphasised the significance of locale, of

historical positioning and of the local (Probyn, 1990), all of which restrict claims to the universal nature of truths. Feminism has participated in clarifying how all discourses and the epistemologies they generate (and this includes feminism and its own epistemological frameworks) cannot be taken at face value, but must be interrogated in relation to how and what they exclude, as well as how and what they include, and the terms on which that inclusion or exclusion occurs.

What we are looking at then is the question of language. What are the implications of words; how do discourses get constructed; what does it mean to engage in particular discourses and not in others? In order to avoid the constraints of masculine discourses, do alternative languages have to be constructed? Is it possible to write beyond discourse? What does it mean to write as a woman? Do or can women write differently from men? Are there particular truths available only to women? What are the implications of methodologies constructed around the assumptions that there are essential womanly characteristics, empathies, identification and so on? (And as a corollary to that, have feminist research methodologies been too smugly constructed; the assertion of equalities between unreflexively defined `woman' suppressing the real inequalities between researcher and the researched?) Within these questions, it is possible to identify two major representations of women. One is an essentialist representation focusing on the moralities, values, characteristics and truths peculiar to woman; the other is a linguistic construct of women,

which centres on how women are constructed through and by language and through discourses.

At this point, I want to sidetrack briefly to outline how I am using discourse. Discourse is the means by which a society assigns truth values. It is intimately linked to power and to the shaping of power relations within society. It is closely linked with ideology, but goes beyond ideology because of its invisibility and taken for grantedness. Fairclough has remarked that the extent to which a discourse is naturalized indicates its acceptance. `The apparent emptying of ideological content of discourses has, paradoxically, a fundamental ideological effect: ideology works through disguising its nature ...' (Fairclough, 1989: 92). A study of discourse then aims to `describe the surface linkages between power, knowledge, institutions, intellectuals, the control of populations, and the modern state as these intersect in the functions of systems of thought' (Bove, 1990: 54-55). A focus on discourse, which addresses the self-evident and commonsensical, enables one to examine how power and control are embedded within systems of knowledge. It facilitates an engagement with the way knowledge-systems possess a `kind of power that generates certain sorts of questions, placed within systems that legitimate, support and answer those questions ...' (Bove, 1990: 54).

What I wish to emphasise here is an internally powerful system of reference. Discourse sustains itself through itself, not just through the images it projects but, more complexly, through what Foucault has called the micropolitics of discourse. The latter includes those

everyday patterns of behaviour which underpin everyday life and which, because they are embedded in familiar patterns, are frequently invisible. Although a powerful, self-referential system, discursive practices can be articulated to others -- so these practices can be opened to inspection, to questioning and to change. I am thinking here of an essay by Dorothy Smith (1990), `Femininity as Discourse', where she writes of teenage girls seen window shopping, their activity, clothing and make-up articulating a restricted femininity; simultaneously, their ridiculing the feminine fashions seen while gazing engages them in alternative representations. The significance of these girls lies in their multiple siting, being within a discourse yet able to poke fun at it, participating in, while disrupting, a discursive practice, determined by, yet determining, gender. One of the major contributions of feminism, then, has been its sustained and increasingly intricate critique of discursive practices, its foregrounding of marginalised and alternative discourses (and therefore of modes of resistance), its expansion of discourses through achieving, with different and still tenuous degrees of success, attitudinal, behavioural and political change to discourses of power.

Let me come back to the issues of the representation of women because how women are represented within gendered discourses is central to reflexive feminist practices and to the discourses that develop from those practices. The early universalised and uncritical reading of oppressed woman has been problematised through much subsequent historical and cultural research. Rather

than conceptualising oppression as identical for all women, feminists now recognise oppression as differently experienced in relation to variables such as ethnicity, class, historical and geographical location, age and culture. This is not to remove oppression as a concept to be investigated but indicates the need to explore its local manifestations and to avoid the perpetuation within feminism of those binary universals within Western thought which rightly has been criticised by feminist approaches. Feminism, within the broad parameters of its focus on oppression, needs to address the production of difference, on how women are inscribed within their different societies and cultures, on their modes of resistance to particular oppressive structures, while also not losing site/sight of points and moments of linkage across culture; and remaining conscious of who is making those links and for what purposes.

In an essay on her interview with a prominent Sudanese activist about the development of feminism in her country, Hale (1990) noted that throughout the lengthy interview, the speaker addressed only her achievements and excluded from her account all other women who had played a significant role in a major organisation. In the course of the interview, Hale recognised that what she had been offered was `the portrait of a life-time in which there were no contradictions, no mistakes, no moments of human frailty: a heroic narrative' (Hale, 1990: 132). Such an account contradicted Hale's assumptions about feminist practice and process. In attempting to make sense of what had taken place, Hale could have

discounted or dismissed what she had been told. Instead, she recognised the discursive and `strategic' formation of the account, where different (for each of them) political reputations were at stake; she recognised too how the interactional and intersubjective were mediated by different concepts of modesty; authority; self-disclosure, what it means to be honest; the role of faking; and when it is acceptable to use someone (Hale, 1990: 132). Similarly, Trinh Minh-ha (1992) suggests that it remains too easy for Western feminists to seek to incorporate Third World feminists into their world view in order to give their own discourses more power. In order to combat such appropriative tendencies, feminists need to engage in a constant process of de-construction/ re-construction/ de-construction; speaking, yet questioning for whom they speak, asking where they have drawn their boundaries and, by exploring and acknowledging the consequences of those boundaries, seeking to enlarge their interpretive spaces.

Similarly, texts tracing the development of feminist thought demonstrate the development of representations beyond a unitary sexed subject, woman, to a more complex gendered subject, rejecting the binary, logocentric universe constructed around sexual difference. By speaking/writing not woman but women, we can move from a biological subject to an active subject constructed by and constructing discursive relations (de Lauretis, 1987). Differences between women can then be explored as well as points of intersection with and differences from men. Tickner has written of gender as a recognition of the processes of sexual differentiation, the

instability of gender positions, and the hopelessness of excavating a free or original femininity beneath the layers of patriarchal oppression (quoted in Stimpson, 1988: 189). Feminism can focus on the interplay of difference - difference not as competitive; or as engaged in determining the superiority of knowledges, but as allowing an engagement with new knowledges, new sites, even if these are disruptive and causing disquiet.

This is not easily achieved.

All representations have political consequences. Susan Bordo (quoted in Nicholson, 1990: 8) has expressed hesitation about the implications of this postmodern/feminist unstable and fluidly gendered body. If the body is a metaphor for our locatedness in space and time and thus for the finitude of human perception and knowledge, then the postmodern body is no body at all. Further, at what point does the concept of gender as shifting and nuanced itself become a totalising theory? Should one, she asked, in this case then argue against the inclusion of gender because it is no longer a relevant category? Yet this would occur in a context where gender (however it is theorised) is still a highly contested site, and the excising of gender as a relevant category for investigation could inadvertently contribute to maintenance/grandisement of an intellectual tradition which for thousands of years has excluded considerations of gender and class, and which now at best admits them most reluctantly. Bordo suggests representations of gender which acknowledge the

multiple sites in which it is constructed and exhibited. But she is also pragmatic. She writes:

> We need to preserve practical spaces for both generalist critique (suitable when gross points need to be made) and attention to complexity and nuance. We need to be pragmatic, not theoretically pure, if we are to struggle effectively with the inclination of institutions to preserve and defend themselves against deep change (Bordo, 1990: 153).

I want to move on now, away from the issue of representations and discourses to two other intimately related issues. One is to do with writing texts; the other to do with the questions asked of texts. Both connect with the development of a more reflexive sociology. I shall focus first on writing and locating my comments within both feminism and post-modernism. Once again, the difficulty is where to begin and what to exclude.

If I define the nature of representations, the identification and opening up of discourses and the political consequences of both as central to the feminist endeavour, then I understand feminist postmodernist writing as informed by passion, written at times passionately (but not abusively or overly seriously because then it becomes locked into fixing meaning and becomes a pawn in the power games (Trinh Minh-ha, 1992)), and admitting its relativity (and after all these years of feminist and other critiques of the Western myth of objectivity, the fiction of the objective, disassociated writer is carefully preserved in many mainstream

sociological journals and the `I'/`eye' (Pfohl, 1992) of the writer deleted. Feminist/postmodern writing is concerned with disruption (and inevitably creating discomfort); it is writing which implicitly if not explicitly raises issues about what passes for knowledge and emphasises alterity, so voicing alternative knowledges. It is, as Bordo as indicated, a writing in which politics cannot be overlooked; a writing where the significance of theory lies not just in its intellectual delights but as a tool for theorising with, and not about. The value of theory is its illuminatory power, its ability to frame consciousness and, in posing challenges, to lead to personally as well as theoretically difficult places because of its interrogation not just of data but of self (Trinh Minh-ha, 1992). There is also an overt pragmatic element, an element which tends to sit uncomfortably in much mainstream sociology. Feminism is concerned with, if you like, the outcome of theory, its applicability and sensitivity to difference and to location. Theory/ analysis/description are persistently interwoven, not carefully held separate from each other. It is a writing which attends to the marginal (its own as well as that of its subject); which foregrounds but does not write out, or displace, contradiction and difference. Trinh Minh-ha writes of not turning difference into opposites, or insecurely, trying to assimilate it.

If I write further that a reflexive feminism is centrally involved in criticising representations (not just those of others, but also of its own), then this brings me to the fictive nature of such writing, a fictiveness which has to be recognised if the constructed/invented nature of representations is granted (Opie, 1993). By using the

word `fiction', I am not talking about the `truthfulness' of representations (and indeed to introduce the word `truth' suggests an ultimate point of arbitration) but more, that they are limited; that I have to recognise that any representation, and this includes feminist ones, mine as well as yours, is as remarkable for what it excludes as what it includes; for the ease with which the `other' about who I am writing slides into exoticness or is distanced, the creation of difference becoming the way in which my own values, sense of normality, are preserved (Pfohl and Gordon, 1985).

An important question for me: how to represent this partialness - a partialness which goes well beyond writing, `this report does not cover...'. There the partialness remains caught in topicality. I am talking of something different here. I am talking about my persistent anxiety that in my work on dementia and caregiving, I gave too much emphasis to distress and not enough weight to those other moments of affection, willingness to continue, love, because I found the fieldwork so distressing and consequently was having nightmares; that subsequently it remains so easy to slip into the discursive shorthand of `stress' which again suppresses the positive affect spoken of by some caregivers; that in writing up my current work on the effectiveness of some areas of social work practice, there is the persistent problem of balancing restrictive organisational discourses, policies and culture, limited training and a lack of detailed knowledge against, in some instances, professional incompetence and lack of motivation. I am in a sense writing a documentary, and

as we all know, documentaries deal in `truth'. If I were filming, I could more easily disrupt the `truthfulness' of my account through repetition, fuzzy shots, jump shots, juxtaposition of angles, shots taken from too far away, disruption of sequencing and so on.

So, how to unsettle my own writing? How to move beyond the reading of an interview not as the transmission of truth but as performance, a dimension that I can now demonstrate visually through the manner in which I have done my transcriptions. But do I want to? If I am to follow Jackie Orr and present a report in which my text interrogates the `powerful fictive representation of the real' through, in part the incorporation of `fragments of images, dream, poetry and fiction' (Orr, 1992:482), how will it be read? What authority will be granted it? This business of the fictive nature of representations could be a minefield politically. What happens if I get blown up? Do I have the time and energy to write competing versions for different audiences? And even if I do, who will publish the more radical version at a period when publisher after publisher is going to the wall, and manuscripts are being judged, very understandably, on the breadth of their appeal to potential audiences. Texts which are innovative, creative and challenging in their content and construction may not easily meet this criteria.

Instead, such texts are likely to disrupt smoothness, coherence, easy transitions across topics, all elements in writing which we have been taught to value; all elements which make it more difficult to go beyond the surface

appearance. Nor are these texts simple in their construction. How, in writing constrained passages within a linear framework, do you offer easily perceived and simultaneously conflicting/interrogating representations of realities anyway; how do you avoid privileging one representation through its positioning on the page? What are the issues around the overt introduction of multi-media into texts? I am thinking of the crafting of Orr's `Theory on the market: panic incorporated' with its interweaving of the Marxist theory of commodification, passages of the contract between Calvin Klein and the women modelling Klein's jeans (the (literal) commodification of the body); the account of personal panic/ public condition, and the commodification of (women's) panic/women's bodies by Littlejohn into a highly lucrative, multi-national industry, a process of commodification which relies on representations of women as hysterical, as unable to control themselves, as requiring the control from without, as requiring, in a profitable word, sedation.

Are, asks Orr, such texts `sociological'?

What does it mean to even ask that question? What disciplinary powers of control, suppression and canonical authority are embedded in it?

I want to end by raising very briefly issues of reading/writing. I don't think the relevant questions are any longer, `What does this mean'? or `What is this writer saying?'. Such questions are located within the canon and within logocentrism; they privilege one

interpretation and deny the range of sites from which alternative interpretations may be offered. Within the context of my reading of feminism/postmodernism, the questions are different and focused around how a text works. They need to address the positioning of writers in their texts; ask who is speaking for whom; ask about the discourse informing the text; examine the breadth and nature of representations, categorisations, the presence or absence of multiple subjectivities and of binary constructions; take note of what the discourse/representations/writing have excluded and the implications of such inclusion/exclusion. There is a shift here from a concentration on meaning to a concentration on text and textuality, and thus an attention on language and the way in which language is used as central to all interpretive processes. The issue is no longer centred on the truthfulness of the account, but on an analysis of its power and the strategies it uses to maintain and/or deconstruct its own authoritativeness.

I wrote `writing/reading'. I see theory as a tool. The significance of reading is whether it enlarges my universe, expands or alters how I think; actively feeds back into my writing and theorising. Foucault (quoted in Probyn, 1992: 509) has written:

> What would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the knower's straying afield of himself? There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks,

and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all.

Strengths of Feminism/Postmodernism

The contribution of postmodern feminism seems to me to lie in its attention to discourse/ power/ knowledge, its questioning of hegemonic narratives, its breaking of boundaries, its reflexiveness and its engagement with the political. This is not to say that all feminist writing achieves this, or that the best achieves it all the time but that postmodern feminism has provided a framework and strategies which facilitate such work. I leave the last word to Mary Jacobus who writes of feminism as a `movement', a `getting together and ... getting across ... its itinerary incomplete and its destination deferred' (quoted in Stimpson, 1992: 267).

But there is never a last word...

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Crossroads and Cul-de-Sacs: On Directions in Contemporary Sociology.

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Introduction

Naturwissenschaften-Geisteswissenschaften; bourgeois and Marxist sociology; positivist versus phenomenological approaches; theoretical and empirical

sociologies; quantitative and qualitative methods; legislative and interpretive strategies; modern and postmodern orientations. The history of sociology is permeated by such distinctions. And the riddles which have accumulated around sets of distinctions such as these, by no means exhaustive examples, some but not all of which are related, remain for the most part unresolved. If there is any accumulation going on in sociology, one might be forgiven for thinking that it concerns the range of theoretical perspectives, methodological orientations and approaches available within the discipline, rather than any growth in the stock of knowledge about social phenomena. But then again, the very assumption of the possibility of sociological knowledge accumulating may be considered unjustified, representing simply one of the illusions under which the modern sociologist has laboured for too long.

Sociology is a discipline which has been continually divided and sub-divided by theoretical, methodological and, at times, political differences. In consequence, throughout its history, a divided sociological community has had to cope with disagreements about which of the directions the discipline should take. Perpetually located at one crossroads or another, sociology has been continually open to the charge that it isn't going anywhere. But the charge is unwarranted and the directional metaphor inappropriate.

I am not going to attempt to give a history of the various divisions and differences which have been a feature of the development of sociology; they are already well

enough known, if not accepted. I propose to confine my brief observations to contemporary sociology. I will try to recall and reflect upon a few responses which the absence of a governing paradigm has continued to attract and I will suggest that the `postmodern' preoccupations which have become a controversial feature of contemporary sociology are more in tune with the *realities* of social analysis, the social processes such analyses seek to understand, and the complex forms of articulation which exist between the two.

Whilst directional metaphors have been a longstanding feature of modern sociology, modern practitioners have found it difficult to leave the concerns of their forebears behind. Rather than a progressive increase in learning and an associated cumulative ordering of knowledge about social processes, conditions and relations, contemporary sociology has found itself returned, time and time again, to basic questions about subject matter, conceptualisation, theoretical standpoint and method of research. This is a constitutive feature of the practise of sociology, as Giddens (1987) has demonstrated in his discussion of the `double hermeneutic'. Sociological knowledge is unavoidably an integral part of the social world and, in consequence, it both contributes to the transformation of social processes and in turn is itself necessarily transformed as it attempts to come to terms with the mutation of prevailing conditions and experiences. In a context where there is `wholesale reflexivity', knowledge is continually open to revisibn and social phenomena to processes of transformation. In consequence, it is inappropriate, if not self-defeating, to

regard sociology, 'the most generalised type of reflection upon modern social life' (Giddens, 1990: 41), as engaged in the pursuit of cumulative knowledge of social phenomena.

Directions and Developments in Modern Sociology

There has been no shortage of attempts to set the discipline on a new path, to promote a new direction, or to achieve more coherence through the generation of syntheses which aim to reconcile and build upon different traditions of inquiry - the respective works of Parsons and Habermas constitute two important contemporary examples. But to date such attempts have achieved little more than an increase in the range of variation in theory and method.

Back in 1946, T. H. Marshall gave an inaugural lecture at the London School of Economics on the subject of the state of sociology and its possible futures. Marshall (1963: 3), asked: 'Where does sociology stand today?' What is striking about Marshall's answer is that most of the issues and concerns broached at that time remain matters of debate. The reputation and contribution of the discipline; relationships with cognate fields of inquiry; the competing claims of different ways of doing sociology, for example grand narratives claiming to provide a total explanation of social development ('the way to the stars') and empirical studies of social phenomena, involving the collection of a multitude of facts ('the way into the sands'); as well as the connexion

between sociology and policy, continue to promote discussion and attract controversy. And the road Marshall (1963: 34) proposed sociology should take at the crossroads, namely `studies in depth of limited areas of selected social systems', has itself become simply another option, one direction among many suggested by contemporary sociologists, and a controversial one at that in so far as it begs the question of how precisely the `systemness' of social phenomena is to be conceptualised.

The discourse of the `new' is a modern preoccupation and an effective history of contemporary sociology might well be constructed around the various forms this preoccupation has assumed. The `new' has continually been presented as that which promises, or claims, to bring closer a resolution of the problems and paradoxes which have beset sociology since its inception. During the past fifty years, there have been repeated diagnoses of a turning point or crisis in sociology and so many different remedies have been proposed that `methodological pluralism' has become an almost incontestable feature of the discipline. As there are far too many examples to deal with here, I will focus on a few related critical responses to the direction in which modern sociology has been developing.

Sociology has been put `on trial' for becoming too preoccupied with the performance of tasks considered necessary to achieve the status of a modern scientific profession and, in consequence, for losing its `critical sense', that is its ability to critically reflect upon both

social processes and sociological practice itself (Stein and Vidich, 1963). In a comparable fashion, a parallel text argues that the increasing packaging of sociology, its tendencies, tangents and theorists, `has put this discipline into a *cul de sac*' (Horowitz, 1965: 3) and made necessary a new direction, a `new sociology'. A similar critical concern with the way in which modern sociology was developing led Gouldner (1970) to argue for a radically `reflexive sociology', that is to propose a different way of working which challenges the modern legislative conception of `sociologist-as-liberal-technologue' and promotes instead the idea of sociology as an interpretive and moral activity.

Each of the examples I have briefly cited draw inspiration from critical reflections on the problems of modern sociology developed by C. Wright Mills, reflections which anticipate, in some respects at least, preoccupations which have subsequently been identified as `postmodern'. It is worth emphasising here that many of the issues currently associated with the idea of the postmodern are by no means new. They have a long history in social thought and traces may be found not only in the work of Wright Mills, but also in the contributions of many earlier figures, such as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Weber (Smart, 1993).

Drawing on a tradition of critical inquiry, within which the work of Max Weber occupies a prominent place, Wright Mills (1970[1959]:183), argues for the reconstitution of sociology as a form of cultural analysis concerned with `the present as history and the future as

responsibility'. In a context where the relationship between reason and freedom is identified as problematic, where the expectations and assumptions of the Enlightenment have proven to be questionable, if they have not collapsed altogether, Wright Mills argues that the practice of social analysis needs to be radically revised and recast. Reflecting on the limitations of modern social thought, Wright Mills (1970:184) observes that `our basic definitions of society and of self are being overtaken by new realities', realities which have subsequently been explored in more detail by analysts such as Giddens (1990) and Touraine (1989), both of whom are concerned with the impact of processes of globalisation on forms of social organisation and the extension of social relations beyond the geo-political boundary of the nation-state, an extension which renders the modern sociological preoccupation with a conception of society, itself something that is assumed to coincide with the formation of the modern nation state, problematic. The new realities overtaking our understanding of `self' have been explored in a parallel manner by structuralist and poststructuralist forms of analysis which effectively extend the criticisms of assumptions about the human subject articulated by Wright Mills (1970: 182), namely that there may be no universals, nothing beyond social and historical specificity, `nothing but 'human culture', a highly mutable [and variable] affair'.

Wright Mills argued that we are living through the ending of an epoch, entering a `post-modern period', and

>that when we try to orient ourselves - if we do
>try - we find that too many of our old
>expectations and images are, after all, tied
>down historically: that too many of our
>standard categories of thought and of feeling
>as often disorient us as help to explain what is
>happening around us; that too many of our
>explanations are derived from the great
>transition from the Medieval to the Modern
>Age: and that when they are generalized for
>use today, they become unwieldy, irrelevant,
>not convincing. I also mean that our major
>orientations - liberalism and socialism - have
>virtually collapsed as adequate explanations
>of the world and of ourselves (Wright Mills,
>1970 [1959]: 184).

The sense that we are living in an interregnum, along with the associated judgement that conventional modern narratives and assumptions about the social world no longer seem appropriate or adequate, have subsequently become key elements in sociological debate over the notion of the postmodern.

However, rather than treat the notion of the postmodern as a periodising term, as does Wright Mills, following Toynbee's historical schema, I regard it as synonymous with a radical questioning of modernity, literally a consequence of the wholesale reflexivity of modernity, of the process of radical questioning being turned on the project of modernity itself. In short, it constitutes a way of relating to the modern world, as it is, and as it cannot avoid being. In Bauman's (1991) words, postmodern means 'living *without* securities, guarantees and order,

and *with* contingency and ambivalence'. It means living without illusions. The sociological corollary of the above, or to be more precise the implication of postmodern preoccupations for sociology, is that a number of the assumptions, expectations and objectives ascribed to the discipline increasingly seem to be inappropriate and unrealisable (Bauman, 1992; Seidman and Wagner, 1992; Smart, 1993).

One possible response to the postmodern configuration is to argue that it merely constitutes another version of the `new', and that with the passage of time, it will be forgotten, or at best may constitute simply another idiosyncratic position on the sociological continuum. The implication being that in due course we can all return to business as usual, that is practising our preferred variant(s) of sociological analysis. There are two things I want to say about this. One is that we certainly should be sceptical about the cult of the new. But as I have indicated above, the themes and issues associated with the idea of the postmodern have been around, in one form or another, for most of the century, in short for a substantial part of sociology's history, and to that extent they can not be considered new. For example, it might be argued that postmodern philosophy emerges in the work of Nietzsche; postmodern concerns are present in the respective works of Weber and Adorno; `postmodern preoccupations' may be found in the work of Marx; and that Simmel is the first postmodern sociologist.

The second point that I'd like to make is that the issues raised in connection with the postmodern call attention

to significant and controversial matters that sociology can not simply brush aside. For example, the strategy of `legislative' reason on which modern sociology has been so dependent has been undermined, not so much by the rise of an alternative `interpretive' strategy as by its own, increasingly evident, intrinsic limitations. The pursuit of universal epistemic warrants or foundations has proven to be a futile task, one continually undermined by local and/or ethnocentric differences. And, in addition, there is the question of possible new or different objects of sociological investigation (viz. post-full-employment or consumer society; the impact of global flows on social life; and so on).

Sociology Without Illusions

In so far as sociology is necessarily subject, knowingly or not, to reflexivity and concerned with understanding the salient features of the present, the question of where it stands can not receive a definitive answer. The question is destined to continually return, for it constitutes an exemplification of sociology's necessary reflexivity.

Forty years after T H Marshall's discussion of sociology's location at the crossroads, Kurt Wolff (1989: 322), asks: `Is there a place, a role, a function, is there any justification for sociology? If so at all, for what kind of sociology?' And it is the posing of the question, the implied advocacy, as Wolff puts it, of the `suspension ... of received notions' which is all important. And it is this

epistemic suspicion which is intrinsic to the postmodern condition of sociology.

Suspicion about the pretensions of epistemology in sociology has elicited a number of critical responses. One example is the reaction, amongst some members of the American Sociological Association, to `postmodern' criticism of the preoccupation with epistemological foundations in sociology. This reaction has assumed the form of a plea for the standardisation of `basic sociological concepts' and the pursuit of secure, universal `foundations' in which sociological theory would become a metatheoretical discourse (see issues of *Perspectives,* the ASA Theory Section Newsletter, 1990-1991). This constitutes a familiar feature of the discipline, one to which debate has returned from time to time, a cul-de-sac from which there is no prospect of escape for the very terms of the plea demonstrate a misunderstanding of the discipline.

There is now a pervasive sense that the context in which we are reflecting on the discipline is significantly different. Witness the growing number of references to `New Times'; `reflexive modernisation'; the impact of the revolution in information technologies upon socio-spatial structures; and so on. The postmodern constellation has been invoked to describe significant aspects of the changing times in which we live. Whether the various issues and symptoms outlined above are to be described as postmodern, or as signs of a radically transformed, reflexive or hyper modernity, is not to my mind particularly decisive.

Our primary concern in this discussion has been with various social transformations and their implications for the practice of sociology. In my view, the current debate which has developed around the postmodern configuration has served to draw attention to the illusions which have distracted generations of sociologists. It is not simply this or that variant of sociology which has been placed in question, but the dominant assumptions and objectives of modern sociology as a whole. Such questioning makes necessary a radical reconsideration, if not a reconstitution, of the practice of sociology (focus of sociological inquiry; appropriate style of analysis; objective etc.). In a postmodern setting, sociology becomes one of a number of increasingly closely related disciplines, others being philosophy, history and anthropology, which contribute to self-reflexive social processes of interpretation and reinterpretation (Bauman, 1992).

Sociology is concerned with the salient features of the time and, as is well known, modern times are constantly in a state of flux. In such circumstances, there is one thing of which we can be sure, namely that sociology will continue to be subject to transformation and controversy as it attempts to make sense of complex fast changing social conditions and processes.

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Review Symposium:

Recent New Zealand Books on Political Economy

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Introduction

The relationship between sociology and the broader concerns addressed by what might be broadly termed 'political economy' has taken a variety of forms over time.

At the heart of political economy lies a concern with issues which are central to the development of a society or group of societies. How is the economy functioning? What are its long-term prospects? What are the constraints it faces? In what direction is it moving? Who has power? To what extent are current arrangements legitimated? Who are the winners and who are the losers in the distribution of resources? What stresses, strains, concerns and opportunities face the population? In sum, political economy is a mode of analysis (that is not confined to any single social science discipline) which focuses on economic development, but places this firmly within the political and other social structures in which the economy is embedded.

Many sociologists, and much sociology, has become concerned with the 'residual', and 'private' areas of social life, such as the family, education, welfare services etc.

For this dominant type of sociology, the broader structures in the society have at best been a distant social framework within which to situate their studies and writing.

On the other hand, a strong tradition within sociology has been an engagement with the central economic and social issues facing societies, a tradition which originates with Marx, Weber and Durkheim. This concern with a sociological political economy has waxed and waned C Wright Mills was a major post-war standard-bearer and sociological interest in political economy has undoubtedly strengthened with the stronger growth of comparative and historical sociology (eg development and world-system theories) since the late 1960s, and the more recent attention to economic sociology in a broad sense.

However, sociological attention to issues of political economy remain non-routine and non-institutionalised. As with other social science disciplines, the challenge of political economy is too often deflected into rather more safe and highly technical concerns and approaches. Some years ago, during the fruitful revival of Marxism, some Marxist sociologists abandoned any sociological input in their engagement with political economy, and they became rather second-rate economists or historians attempting to work over areas where they had very little technical competence.

I think that a more mature sociologically-based intervention in political economy should be more subtly modulated. What specialist knowledge might

sociologists contribute to political economy? In particular, sociologists should be sensitive to the people who inhabit the societies being analysed: not just their needs, concerns, motivations and actions, but also the ways in which they are structured in aggregations, informal groupings and movements, as classes, ethnic groups, genders, communities etc. Sociologists are alert to the way in which organisational structures operate, and the ways in which formal and informal processes subvert ostensible goals through unintended consequences.

The lack of continued and driving involvement by sociologists in political economy has some definite consequences, for sociology but also for society. For sociology, there been an insufficient centering: social phenomena have been studied without showing how they are constrained by broader contexts and sociological explanations have been truncated by a lack of an understanding of broader issues. And within the realms of societal debate, economists - particularly the new right economists - have maintained their intellectual hegemony, unchallenged by societal perspectives with enough teeth to engage them. My criticism of the limited attention paid to the political economic issues at the centre of many societal debates is seemingly in direct opposition to the feminist critique that sociology confers too much value on the 'public (male) sphere' at the expense of the treating the remainder of social life: sociology should indeed be stretched in both directions.

The more general pattern of interrelationship between sociology and political economy has been reproduced in New Zealand sociology. In the Spoonley et al (1994)

reader, the occasional texts, and the more general array of journal articles and conference papers that constitutes New Zealand sociology, engagement with issues of political economy is distinctly marginal. The international marginalisation of political economy is reproduced locally. On the other hand, we have a strong 'native' sociological political economy in the work of David Bedggood, and in a handful of other studies (eg Georgina Murray, Geoff Pearce, Brian Roper, David Thorns, Chris Wilkes). Indeed, on some issues in New Zealand sociology, it is possible to cast more recent debate as a dialogue with Bedggood's work. However, the volume of such material is small, and I think it is reasonable to comment that many sociologists react negatively to it because of its lack of specifically sociological sophistication.

Instead, a sociological political economy of New Zealand could be most readily furthered by retrieving sociological lodes from the veins of material contributed by a wider range of social scientists. This review symposium, then, tackles the task of endeavouring to extract from a number of recent books on New Zealand, sociological themes and to identify an agenda of sociological issues which these books may have insufficiently covered. The remainder of this introductory essay seeks to sketch the content of several recent New Zealand books on political economy to allow the contributors to this symposium to develop themes without being too encumbered by a need to describe the contents of the books. The books reviewed are Franklin (1991); Boston and Dalziel, (1992); Britton et al (1992); Deeks and Perry (1992), Franklin (1991) and James (1992): other material will be drawn on

where appropriate. More recent books such as Thorns (1992), O'Brien and Wilkes (1993) and Roper and Rudd (1993) came to hand to late for inclusion in this symposium.

There is one preliminary question that might be posed: why has there recently been such a bunching of New Zealand books with relevance to political economy? The answer seems quite simple: there has been a nice conjuncture between the end of the 1980s and the replacement of the Fourth Labour Government with the Bolger National Government. These books deal with the Rogernomics era and its immediate aftermath, and in part follow up on a similar bunching of books published in the late 1980s after the first term of that Labour Government (Boston and Holland, 1990; Jesson, 1988). One drawback of the end-of-decade marking point is that those books using census data are awkwardly stuck with 1986 data, which appears quite dated in an early 1990s publication.

The most general of the treatments is the special 'decade review' issue of **Pacific Viewpoint** (Franklin, 1991) which follows several earlier and similar reviews. The volume covers many areas of social life in New Zealand in brief descriptive chapters - population, Maori, Pacific Islanders, women, the economy (and specifically farming, manufacturing, transport), corporatisation, employment, the environment, politics and foreign affairs - although there are also obvious gaps (as the editor points out) - social and cultural life, the financial and services sectors, and the regions. One added bonus, though, is the (accidental?) inclusion in this issue

of a very useful set of book reviews covering New Zealand material relevant to political economy.

The analysis of New Zealand has been facilitated from time to time by journalistic works which nevertheless focus attention of key issues. In his **New Territory,** Colin James (1992) updates his earlier work (1986). In an account mainly written while a Robert Stout Fellow in 1991, James provides a readable, comprehensive and balanced account which follows through several themes across the economic, political, social and cultural arenas of New Zealand society. The close-reading and insights of the text give it its power. The theoretical apparatus structuring the several interwoven stories is more difficult to elicit. It seems to be a classically Weberian picture: the faltering engine of the New Zealand economy has long been slowed by international changes and by internal drag. In response to this, the new-right paradigm of ideas acts as the 'switchman' and the social groups pushing this approach are shown in operation. Between the machinery in the engine-room, and the intellectual changes on the bridge, is the central guiding theme of politics which James unerringly returns to again and again as the arena in which societal issues are posited and responded to.

Controlling Interests (Deeks and Perry, 1992) consists of 'a dozen cases [ie case-studies] of disorderly conduct' which address the relationship between business, government and interest groups. The subject-matter of the book is difficult to pin down exactly as it includes some attention to organisational processes but more to inter-organisational arenas of activity and the wider

contexts of organisations. In some part, the case studies examine the ways in which changes in the business situation have impacted on government activities and the ebb and flow of collective interests, but the volume insists on the inherent complexity and contingency of these processes and how they interact in complex ways and change over time. Indeed, in his closing chapter, Perry shies deliberately away from any 'authoritative account' (as in a meta-narrative of 'Rogernomics') of the pattern of recent change and implores the undergraduate reader, whom the book is targeting, to use the rich descriptive materials to develop their own theoretical approaches.

As Deeks (1992:14) summarises the situation: "There is undoubtedly an important reciprocal relationship between business and government. In some cases, business interests effectively dictate government policy. In other cases, government policies override business interests. But on occasions, both business and government accede to the public agendas of other groups within the community. Domestically, at least, a form of pluralism survives....". He further goes on to note the dynamics involved. "Nor in any specific case are the public-policy outcomes..immutable. ..A particular piece of legislation reflects only a temporary resolution of conflicting group interests, and provides a new focus for new or continued political action. ..As a result of this constant ebb and flow of interest-group pressures, public policy-making is an ever shifting sand of adjustments and accommodations". On the other hand, Deeks does see the restructuring engendered by Rogernomics as having had a major impact. This passage (and in contrast to Perry's summary) strikes me as a reasonable

summing- up of the main thrust of this collection.
However, the book does not provide a very solid test of
these propositions since little of the material strikes at the
heartland of New Zealand capitalism or government,
and by concentrating on a variety of (highly interesting)
side-shows the resulting image of pluralism is almost
inevitably dictated by the design of the book.

Changing Places in New Zealand (Britton et al, 1992) is
an interesting text which seeks to provide "..a
comprehensive assessment of the context and results of
the restructuring for companies and workers [and] ..its
impacts on people and places, the environment and
regions" (Britton et al, 1992: ix) through patching
together the collaborative work of some 50 geographers.
(When editor Steve Britton died during the production of
the book, which is dedicated to his memory, Eric Pawson
assisted in finishing the task.) Moreover, the volume is
organised around a theoretical perspective drawn from
recent industrial geography which posits the central
mechanism of society as the capitalist firms involved
with economic production, with the state, local state,
households etc. involved with and reacting to the
strategies of these firms. The main driving-force of the
whole system is seen as the dynamics of capitalism at
the global level, which then is picked up and reworked at
national, regional and local levels. Change is seen as
generally working down the different spatial scales of the
system, although there is also a counter-emphasis on
the strategies of lower levels in reacting to these top-
down changes. The organising perspective of the book
includes attention to locating the winners and the losers
from these change processes.

This immense task is tackled at some length and with deliberate pace, with theoretical comment and commentary interweaving material from a large range of case study material, which often includes useful illustrative statistics.

The last main text to be included here represents a publishing feat in so quickly producing a well-prepared and nicely-published volume (Boston and Dalziel, 1992) criticizing the first year of the National Government's policies . To some extent, this is a reworking of an earlier volume on the **Fourth Labour Government** (Holland and Boston, 1990). The title of the book points to its theme: that having committed themselves before the 1990 election to 'creating a Decent Society', the Bolger Government has pursued social policies which are inconsistent with this slogan.

> Rather than encouraging harmony and social cohesion, National's policies have produced greater conflict and strife. Rather than fostering a common sense of belonging and enhancing the rights of citizenship, National has intensified the degree of social stratification and made those from poorer backgrounds feel increasingly like second-class citizens. Rather than encouraging a sense of security and safe prospect, National has created greater insecurity, especially for the elderly, the sick, the poor, and the vulnerable. Rather than fostering justice and social compassion, National's policies have generated greater inequality and growing poverty (Holland and Boston, 1992: viii).

A Decent Society? tackles this task by reviewing a series of policy areas in which the National Government has made major policy moves, including macro-economic policy, public expenditure control, the Employment Contracts Act, targeting of benefits, the benefit cuts, superannuation policy, health services, housing, and tertiary education. The editors note major gaps as 'changes to the accident compensation scheme, employment policy, the issues relating to data matching and the privacy of information, Treaty issues and the changes to Maori policy as a result of Ka Awatea, and the combined social impact of National's policy initiatives, especially on women and minority groups" (Boston and Holland, 1992: vii). The chapters describe the policy changes and then subject these to rigorous criticism from a broader policy analysis framework.

I would like to close with the three questions that were presented to the other contributers to this symposium:

-       what is the role of sociologists in the debates reported in these volumes?

-       what effect have these volumes had on the wider agenda of debates about political economy in New Zealand?

-       how do these volumes (both separately but also collectively) contribute to the further development of a sociological political economic perspective on New Zealand?

There are a scatter of sociologists included in these volumes: Cluny Macpherson (on Pacific Islanders) and Ted Douglas (on Maori) in the *"Pacific Viewpoint"* decade review; Nicola Armstrong and Bev James in the Britton et al collection, while *Controlling Interests* features a range of socioloists (Nigel Haworth, Nick Perry, Terry Austrin, Michael Powell). But in the "Decent Society?", social issues chapters are handled by economists (or policy analysts): Jonathan Boston, Susan St John, Toni Ashton, Elizabeth McLeay and Paul Dalziel (in the earlier Boston and Dalziel volume, Peggy Koopman-Boyden wrote a social policy chapter). It should be noted that those few sociologists included in these collections are 'underlabourers' providing their particular area of expertise rather than any overarching perspective or analytical frameworks. The sparseness of sociological authorship is aggravated by the paucity of reference to sociological work in the bibliographies of these books. How in fact, has the sociological task of tracking the social consequences of recent change been discharged? Sociological work seems rather to have been carried out by social commentators (Methodist Mission, 1991; Waldegrave and Frater, 1991) or agencies such as the late New Zealand Planning Council. There are, though, a few exceptions to this. This review symposium seeks to widen the academic debate and draw attention to themes running through them.

Is Sociology Catching on in New Zealand?

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Why do certain intellectual disciplines such as psychology, sociology and geography catch on in some societies and not in others?

In ten years of observing schools and life in Japan, I have not encountered a Japanese psychologist. School phobia, for example, (a large problem: 40,000 students refused to attend the 3-year junior high schools in 1990) is mostly handled by classroom teachers who use home visits, moralizing and old-fashioned discipline. Lately, there have been a few special classes but no educational psychologists. The Japanese have a word, Karoshi, for death from overwork, which is treated legally and politically. I have seen sociological explanations for the phenomena, as sociology is widely taught at tertiary level in Japan, but not psychological. It seems that psychology has never caught on in Japan: it is not a part of the popular or intellectual culture.

In the United States, psychology and sociology are integral parts of both intellectual and popular culture. For me, sociology essentially provides explanations of social change, including the maintenance and meaning of social patterns. Despite the downturn in sociology during the 1980s when some university departments were closed, there is still an abundant public demand for sociological explanation in North America. It has been evident in TV debates as well as in widely read articles

and books, about major public events such as the Los Angeles riots in 1992, and about longterm trends including changes in family patterns, the globalisation of business, or post-industrial society. The Bureau of the Census hires sociologists to explain census results: international trade issues prompt major sociological studies.

In New Zealand, by contrast, it appears that sociology has never really been taken onboard. After three decades of university teaching and publishing by academic and other sociologists, the subject and the occupation are still more often referred to derisively than taken seriously in both intellectual magazines and daily newspapers. Sociology here does not have a clear, positive image in either intellectual or wider public circles.

There is little call for sociological explanation. Government agencies are content with descriptions of `social impact'. The Department of Statistics merely documents the numbers. Royal Commissions, better at collecting sentiments about the past than explaining social trends, and reflecting rather than understanding interest group pressures, are preferred over systematic enquiry and explanation. The public media seldom consult sociologists about major events or longterm social trends. When they do, it is my impression that they are more likely to get description, with `implications' or speculation based on overseas writings, than explanation grounded in New Zealand experience. In `popular' social reports, such as those in `The Smith Women' and the New Zealand Planning Council genre, descriptive accounts suffice; sociological

explanation apparently was neither sought nor developed.

That the situation is changing can be seen in the books under review. Two reveal exciting new possibilities for sociological theory, while the other is in the `old' style: academic bookchat and description which, though it contains some useful data and insights, lacks systematic explanation.

Significantly, it is the journalist Colin James who develops sociological theory, indicating a changing public demand for sociological explanation, and it is the geographers who provide a clear vision - almost a new paradigm for studying New Zealand - suggesting an agenda for further research. This is not surprising as among the social sciences, geography has long been strong in New Zealand.

In **New Territory**,Colin James (1992) sets out to explain the political changes of 1984-1992 which, he says, transformed New Zealand. He recognises that they were a series of human responses to underlying large-scale economic and social changes that had been occurring for some time. While he documents the economic trends with some care, he is not so good on social structural changes, mainly because the relevant analyses do not exist. Political decision-making is the target of his explanation.

At the core of the book is a generational account: decision-makers whose behaviour derives in part from the formative experiences and expectations of their

cohort and who, when in power, make use of ideas and resources that were available to them at the time. Among the intellectual resources available in New Zealand when the key decisions were made, a sociological component was missing.

1984 was a watershed year in New Zealand politics because of the sharp distinctions between the outgoing and incoming cabinets. For one thing, there was a twenty-year average age gap. James contrasts the situation of the 1980s decision-makers, not with the experiences of the preceding generation, but with that generation's central values, which he calls the `prosperity consensus'. He sketches the primary production colonial economy which sustained it and he proposes, arguably in my view, that a welfare state which guaranteed jobs, maintained this consensus.

Sometimes the values are hard to distinguish from myth (e.g. `All who wanted to, could go to university', James, 1992: 30) and sometimes they are given a power over events that is debatable (eg James, 1992: 26-29 where it is suggested that guaranteed jobs and profits derived from economic management practices that were guided by values). I think it was more that we were still an economic colony, our management was weak and we were lucky. New Zealand's economic growth rates have long been comparatively low. Shortage of food in Europe after the war and British buying played a bigger role than marketing by New Zealanders, which was negligible. We are only now becoming a true trading nation. However, it is an original and interesting synthesis that should stimulate further research on this

understudied period, and on the role of values   in shaping New Zealand's direction.

Without a deeper analysis of the power arrangements that created the consensus and kept it in place, the list of values, as it stands, appears ad hoc and ingenuous. There is a tendency to impose some latter-day beliefs and miss out on important social structural changes that were occurring. For example, James (1992: 31) asserts that during the 1950s and 1960s, the Maori were `fleeced, forgotten and fobbed off'. In fact, in that period, Maori were urbanising with extreme rapidity and, despite the cultural fragmentation usually associated with such dislocation, including continued loss of land, they were making the substantial gains in health, education and political vantage point that enabled the `renaissance' which was to follow.

Further, had James examined the cohort experiences of the 1950-1980 governors, he might have called their values an `adversity consensus' rather than a `prosperity consensus'. The 1930s depression and the war were crucial to their central theme of security which became increasingly at odds with the sentiments that came to prevail, especially during the 1970s.

In contrast, the early baby boom cohort was outward-looking and confident. It took part in the 1960s protest movement which opposed heavy-handed government, valued participatory democracy and individual freedom and had an internationalist outlook. In New Zealand during the late 1960s - early 1970s, young activists contributed to the government's decision to withdraw

from Vietnam, halted the rugby tour and founded a myriad of interest groups influencing Maori, feminist, environmental, trade union and political party initiatives.

Perhaps it was the success of these interventions in major public events which gave this generation, when it came to govern, a self-confidence that made it less security conscious and more prepared to take risks than its predecessor. Yet, strangely, James calls this cohort the `Gimme Generation' and never adequately explains why. I suspect James confuses the optimistic generation of the protest movement with the generation that immediately followed, whose more inward-looking features were discernible by 1979. I tried to capture this shift in an article I wrote that year, `Life re-style, from Mass Protest to Me-Too', for a journal which James edited (Levett, 1979). The article reviewed the 1970s decade and characterised the different experiences and styles of the two generations.

James has long been an outstanding observer of the New Zealand socio-administrative context in which key political decisions are made. In this book, chapters 12 and 13 in particular, provide quite brilliant accounts of political decision-making during the period and especially during those crucial first few weeks when the core pattern was established. He manages to combine close personal observation of key people with the problems they faced, including relevant international events and long-term trends, influences from the rapidly changing domestic scene, and the immediate and medium-term effects.

James's book is much richer than Pusey's (1991) narrow study of a similar arena in Canberra. With James we see all the main players and their interests and philosophies, within cabinet and caucus, in the bureaucracy and the political parties, and among the interest groups as well as the public at large. We can thereby better understand both the contending and the compromising which produce eventual outcomes. For example, James shows that with the long-term expansion of international trade, the increasing numbers of people in financial, commercial and managerial occupations affected the political composition of the New Zealand electorate, in particular tilting the balance in favour of deregulation and privatisation policies. The analysis suggests that political outcomes on any issue are the outcome of contention between various interests in a particular arena at the time, an important sociological proposition.

James's argument is better documented for state decisions about the economy than for social policies. He considers that the commercial outcomes have been beneficial for the New Zealand economy, for trade and for services affecting the consumer. On the other hand, while he thinks more progress has been made in the social areas than many critics will allow (for example with respect to Maori issues), James is less sanguine about what will eventuate in health and education. He is concerned about the lack of agreement within these areas.

Beyond this, it seems to me that James wishes his analysis to contribute to the creation of a new national vision. He observes: 'There is not anything like the

powerful cohering force of the (previous) prosperity consensus. New Zealand society is fragmented, not unified... there is no social consensus' (James, 1992:319), and goes on to say: 'A language is needed... here where we find ourselves' (James, 1992:320). This is partly why James deals with values and with political and other philosophies. He says: `A language is needed if we are to fashion society here where we find ourselves' (James, 1992: 320).

James argues that the intellectual resources available at the time in New Zealand, when decisions had to be made quickly, were not up to the job of defining new national purposes - in two particular ways. First, the language of the policy changes was mostly negative: it was about removing obstacles, `downsizing dependency rather than creating independence', and had neither vision nor a unifying idea. Second, insofar as `the intelligentsia' ventured commentary on the changes, it was of `unrelenting negativity', focussing on the `empty part of the vessel instead of the full part', on those things that were not accomplished while neglecting advances that were made. The result is a long season of irrationality in the public discourse on the social changes that have been occurring.

These are fascinating insights, and to the extent they are true, they pose important questions. Why were the dominant professional economists, the group which drove the reforms, so narrowly focussed and seemingly bereft of vision? Why were the humanists often unable to take a balanced view, to see the larger picture, and to provide unifying ideas? There was a huge gap between the outlooks of the two groups.

James is more interested in the prime movers whose major concern was economic growth and so gives a fuller answer to the first question about the economists. First, he notes a traditional split in intellectual life in New Zealand which others have also seen. Little value had been attached to:

> ...acquiring and applying knowledge to improve economic life. The cycle between the individual and education was relatively well-developed; but the cycle between education and the economy was neglected in favour of a security that that neglect helped make illusory... (James, 1992: 80).

Second, James shows that with the emergence of stagflation and increasing unemployment, and evidence that new inequities were being created by welfare state policies, Keynesian theories of economic growth were discredited. He then outlines the narrow range of intellectual options canvassed by the dominant New Zealand economists, and the experiences of just the United Kingdom, United States and Australia. Some elements of the theories - self-reliant individualism, freedom from state interference and a desire for international effectiveness - resonated well with the generation's experiences in the protest movement.

It seems to me that these choices also reflected a certain Anglo-American parochialism and insularity in the intellectual debate and research in New Zealand at the time. As became apparent during the life of the Royal Commission on Social Policy (1986-88), which had been asked to show how the economy and society might be

connected up but failed to do this: the contribution available from sociology was not great.

In New Zealand, sociology has largely aligned itself with the humanists. We are not strong in the teaching of either theory construction or research methodologies. We do not seriously study economic life and we neglect the comparative study of whole societies, especially some of a similar size and complexity, and those in Asia with which New Zealand has major trade connections. Thus we seldom ask big research questions about New Zealand, for example about large-scale change and major institutions. Most of all, we do not develop grounded theories about this society. I will return to these matters.

James' book with its many fine-grained observations and astute, sometimes sweeping interpretations that are not formal statements of theory, will be useful for exercise assisgnments in the teaching of theory construction in sociology departments where, apparently, the subject is sorely needed.

In calling for a new social consensus James holds in front of us "the powerful cohering force of the `prosperity consensus'". Is this an appropriate model of a national vision for the post-industrial, post-modern age? Have we not become a more diversified, decentred society for which, at this stage of our nation's trajectory, such a set of values is no longer possible nor applicable? What are the forces which make up New Zealand society at the close of the twentieth century? In the end, James's book is a call for sociologists to address such questions of major public import. These are challenges for a more compelling sociology than we have had to date.

Changing Places (Le Heron and Britton, 1992) has a scope which is equally suggestive of theory development and of theoretically-driven research. Most important is the admirable intent, not always successful, to systematically connect global events to local developments: "...restructuring must be situated in its global historical context". In contrast to **New Territory**, this textbook sometimes leaps from external trends to internal geographical effects without the intermediary of political decision-making. There is often no human agent at all, let along New Zealand politicians. It can be determinism on a grand scale!

The theoretical framework, the so-called `geographic restructuring model' encapsulated in a mere eight pages in the introduction, is highly deterministic. It does less than justice to the theme of the book as developed in subsequent chapters. As stated in such brief fashion, the framework is a crude, old hat scenario suggesting just one type of capitalism that changes in linear ways through phases of expansion and development. Surely it has become a truism to say that changes within nation states are due to global capitalism; an assertion that is neither intellectually interesting nor helpful in understanding the particular directions taken here in New Zealand - or anywhere else for that matter. Exciting work on many continents during the 1980s took us beyond such simplicities, some of it summarised, for example, in Lester Thurow's recent book, **Head to Head** (1992). It is more useful to specify different kinds of capitalism, and choices within capitalist enterprise. Nevertheless, the point about the importance of New Zealand's external connections is well taken and it will be

up to subsequent research to develop a more sophisticated model and to fill out the details.

The central theme is elaborated in the first substantive chapter, `Internationalization of the Economy' which builds on the impressive body of work initiated and carried out over the past decade by the two instigating editors, Richard Le Heron and the late Steve Britton. Though again brief, the introduction to this chapter is full of wisdom and suggestive ideas for further research. For example:

> Too often internationalization is discussed in terms of its most obvious expression, trade... Understanding the political economy of trade, particularly the mix of organizations involved in the day to day conduct of trade, and how and where imports and exports are sourced and sold, is essential... (Le Heron and Britton, 1992: 19-20).

The editors point out that, with both capital and labour increasingly internationalised, small states like New Zealand are vulnerable and could easily be swamped by large companies (or lose their expensively trained skilled workers to more powerful economies). They recognise that the main role for government in post-industrial times is not the minimalist state propounded by the Treasury and State Services Commission, dreamers in the heyday of the reforms in the later 1980s, but the effective management of New Zealand's external relations (see the particularly useful discussion on pages 19 and 295-5). It is this challenge, for which it would seem we are still relatively unprepared, that gives urgency to the theme of the book and to its grand

proposal to ensure that local social processes are always studied in the context of relevant international trends.

There are nine more substantive chapters. Each chapter contains reports on recent work, case studies and unifying statements. The case studies, undertaken specifically for this volume, can be descriptive snapshots that are too small, or provide an incomplete picture (eg Chapter 7, `The State Sector'). The statements can fail to make adequate connections between internal developments on the one hand, and state action or external events, on the other. For example, there is no mention of the Trade Development Board. Nevertheless, over-all, the scope and the vision are impressive. The book is replete with pointers to uncharted territory and to possibilities for further theorising and research.

The book has unity and exhibits a passionate concern for what happens in New Zealand. It is a considerable and intellectual and logistical achievement. **Changing Places** will have a wide variety of uses in upper secondary schools and tertiary classrooms, for sixth form projects and the teaching of theory construction to graduate students. It could be a core text in that too-seldom-taught sociology course on New Zealand society.

Controlling Interests is a collection of descriptive snippets and bookchat, for which the grandiose title, the introduction and the aptly named conclusion "...a dozen cases of disorderly conduct", provide insufficient intellectual coherence or overall vision. This may seem a harsh judgement, especially because some of the snippets are interesting. But the essays show the

limitations of their genre. Many provide a blow by blow, often chronological account, and take the vantage point of the interest group being described. Lacking a larger context from which explanations might be sought, the chapters appear curiously and frustratingly incomplete.

Nick Perry's chapter, `Upside Down or Downside Up? Sectoral Interests, Structural Change and Public Policy', is prototypically bookchat. Various authors are cited in a search for insights on the local scene using a format that derives more from the literary essay than sociological explanation. There is more talking about books than about the subject of analysis. The language can be high-flown and esoteric. The essay begins like a film review with a series of images about the climate and topography of Auckland and Wellington, the harbour bridge and the `beehive... this formal centre of New Zealand's policy-making appears as a curiously shaped structure which goes round and round in ever-decreasing circles'. They are described as `metaphor(s) for the interrelations between economic imperatives, public policy outcomes and changes in the social structure of a small capitalist society' (Perry, 1992: 37). The design of the Beehive, for example, is used to characterise ways in which the political arena operates in New Zealand:

> ...the distinctiveness of the Beehive's architecture both evokes the circular structure of New Zealand's public policy, and highlights how the peculiarities of the local site provide the rationale for its strange shape (Perry, 1992: 37)

That this is a suitable image for `the established pattern
of public policy formation' in New Zealand prior to 1984
is never actually put to the test. Instead, a descriptive
passage from Castles's (1988) account of the policy
structure in Australia is used to suggest that the pattern
applies here. I doubt that it did, ever, but especially in
the 1970s, despite the dominance of Muldoon. James's
`prosperity consensus' was falling apart at that time. It is
not clear what Perry means to include or what processes
he refers to: the legislature and the select committees,
government departments, political parties, the quangos,
pressure groups?

While one can be grateful for Perry's erudition, and
particularly his attempt to make purposeful
comparisons with Australia, one is confronted with a
kind of labelling procedure which, when not associated
with the development of systematic theory, can appear
simply as a series of ad hoc observations that add up to a
fuzzy picture. All the bookchat hardly seems necessary
to the Chapter's one original sociological proposition
about New Zealand:

> The speed with which a more market regime
> has been introduced in New Zealand was
> predicated upon a unicameral, centralized,
> political system that contrasts with the
> institutional inertia and greater dispersion of
> state power that is characteristic of Australian
> federalism (Perry, 1992: 50).

The proposition is plausible (the argument is similar to
reasons advanced for introducing MMP in New Zealand)
but is hard to reconcile with the vaguely defined

corporatism, and it is simplistic when compared with the less deterministic theory and closer observations of Colin James. Nevertheless, it is a kernel of a theory that could have been developed to provide an analytic framework for the book as a whole, a theoretical structure to which each case study can be related.

The bookchat approach used by the editors, Deeks in the introduction and Perry in the conclusion, again proves inadequate. In searching for a framework, or for meaning in the case studies, they briefly visit the work of other scholars. Perry includes characters in novels, movies or plays, (Marx, Madonna, Marilyn Waring and Bill Manhire are named in one sparkling three-page sequence) piling up image upon image that are widely disparate in time and space. The results of such virtuosity, inevitably, are undeveloped insights that may or may not apply to the New Zealand situation. At the end, we are left with a thin, unsociological thread to grasp.

Why has sociology not been taken onboard in New Zealand? The reluctance in New Zealand to embrace sociological explanation (which I suggested earlier) no doubt has reasons which lie deep in our British colonial frontier past. Land-focussed geography, also strong in the United Kingdom, was early and surely taken up in New Zealand, with impressive results to date. Whatever the cultural causes for the late and shaky development of sociology here, are there reasons in the teaching of sociology and in the ways we operate as sociologists?

First, there is an obvious lack of unanimity about the nature of sociological work among practitioners in New

Zealand, and a seeming disinterest in discussing outcomes. This feature is in striking contrast to geographers, who devote considerable professional energy discovering the work which geography graduates undertake, and use that information to recruit students and to modify their teaching programmes.

Second, few New Zealand-based sociologists share a common graduate culture. They were educated for the discipline in various universities all over the English-speaking world. In addition, there are some not actually trained in sociology as such, but in related fields.

The lack of a clear view of their profession among sociologists is apparent in the graduate programmes in our university sociology departments, as reported in a newsletter of the sociological association (Crothers, 1993). There is plainly no consensus across the five departments as to what constitutes the sociological core: only one department requires both theory and research methods to be studied, surely the basis of the discipline. The substantive courses show enormous diversity and little sense of a sociology that is serving this society.

Who Needs Liberals?

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These three books are old-fashioned (read `wet') liberal academic responses to the neo-liberal shock therapy of the last decade. They argue that left to its own laws, the

free market creates excessive inequalities. I cannot dispute this. They object to the hardline new liberals' attack on the state sector as unnecessary and extreme. They argue for a return to a state-managed mixed economy in which economic objectives are in harmony with social justice and equity. This is a nice ideal, but is it possible? To make their case stick, they have to prove that capitalist firms can make profits by being kind to workers. They have to convince those with the money and the power that old-fashioned liberal social justice is more profitable than the new right's `dry' revolution.

This is latter-day Keynes. Keynes thought that capitalists were unreliable and motivated by greed. Rather than invest in production, they would hoard and speculate unless the state legislated to make them obey Say's law - the neo-classical dogma that demand creates it own supply. Paying workers good wages topped up with a generous social wage would create the demand to meet the supply. Not only would this regulate the market and avoid the worst excesses of capitalists, it would create full employment and social equity - the decent society.

What these would-be Keynesians forget is that their demand-side economics could not prevent stagflation in New Zealand and the collapse of the post-war boom. The reason for this was that state intervention taxed profits to encourage investment in production. This drain on profits could only be sustained if profits were high and rising. Essentially this meant taxing farmers, who earned super-profits from good export prices, to pay for subsidies for profits and wages in the manufacturing sector. Ironically, farmers were then subsidised to compensate for this tax on profits by state borrowing.

However, by the late sixties, profits were falling. Roper argues this happened because the costs of plant, machinery and materials outstripped the productivity of labour (see Roper and Judd, 1993). However, in my view, this underlying mechanism was somewhat suppressed in New Zealand because protection limited competition between firms. Before any such decline in profits could bite, local firms had saturated the protected market and needed to become internationally competitive to be profitable. Profits fell in the first instance as a result of insufficient domestic demand.

Farming exports were also being cut by EEC protectionism. But nor was this the main cause of the end of New Zealand's post-war boom as Jesson (1989) argues. The immediate and major cause was that capitalist firms had outgrown the small-scale domestic market. The state cost-plus structure now no longer served a productive purpose. Rather, it had become a huge unproductive drain on profits, the more so it resorted to borrowing. It had the effect of suppressing the law of value by which the market reallocates investment into relatively efficient branches of production in the world economy. What had to happen now was the deregulation and restructuring of the economy to first cut costs to make all industry export competitive and to cut spending to eliminate the debt drain on future profits.

So while demand-side Keynesian policies were able to create the semblance of managing capitalism during the post-war boom, this was only because conditions

enabled profits to be made in a protected economy. But state policies did not create the boom and were incapable of preventing those conditions from changing and putting a limit on profits. These limits were reached in the 1970s, resulting in stagflation and progressively worsening recessions which could not be corrected by Muldoon's continued economic insulation. The only course of action was deregulation and so Rogernomics was born. The only surprise was that it was the Labour and not the National government who first took the plunge.

Far from new right ideas, it was the necessary re-assertion of the Marxist `law of value' which caused the Rogernomics 'revolution'. The law of value means that social labour is not allocated to the production of a commodity unless (a) it has a use-value (there is a demand) and (b) it represents the most economic use of labour-time (socially necessary labour time) which means that its value (labour-cost) and its price is competitive. If capitalists cannot be assured of a profit based on an ability to compete, they will not invest. This means that not only was Rogernomics necessary, it was inevitable so long as the capitalist class calls the tune.

Part-Time Realists.

The reason that liberals cannot see this is that they see only the surface features of capitalist society. They see the marketplace and the role of the state in moderating the market and influencing the distribution of income. When a crisis occurs, it must therefore be the result of a bad policy or the bad distribution of income. Boston and Dalziel (1992) echo the common criticism that the

extreme economic hardship of recent reforms is caused by new right 'philosophy' that abandons the 'egalitarian society' (Boston and Holand, 1992: ix). Moreover, these reforms are excessive and immoral because they have been rushed through without sufficient research into their social effects (full employment for academics).

In other words, given their assumptions about capitalism and the need for growth, they think that other policies could have got both profits and equity. In particular, the authors don't see the necessity to sacrifice growth, full employment and decent wages for the sake of price stability, fiscal balance and external- balance. What this means is that capitalism should not solve its crisis at the expense of workers. But how did they think the crisis occurred in the first place?

According to their economic model, if profits fall they must do so as the result of increased costs, including unnecessary jobs and wages. How are profits going to recover except at the expense of jobs and wages? But to tax profits to allow the state to ameliorate living standards and boost consumption is to suppress the law of value again. Even by their own standards, the argument is self-contradictory and utopian.

Weberian Sociology

Deeks and Perry (1992) is a slight advance on Boston and Dalziel, if only because it broadens the analytical framework to encompass a fashionable neo-Weberian sociology. What Weber adds to Keynes is a structural

theory of class, status and power which goes some way to explain the inequalities in the marketplace. But despite that, this explanation remains superficial. For example, Julius Vogel's thesis is used to describe the fact that state intervention varies with the rate of growth of the economy. During slumps, business tends to dominate the state while during booms, the state becomes more independent of business. All this means is that the state derives its income from taxes on profits. When profits are good, taxes can go up; when bad, taxes must fall. But this begs the question as to why profits must fall in the first place.

For Weberians, as Keynesians, profits fall as the result of other factor incomes going up - invariably wages. Like Keynesians, they have to accept the requirement of capitalist profitability as a `fair' reward for the economic productivity of capital. For them, income shares result from a power struggle over assets and income. The stakes are getting bigger in the world economy where giant MNC's are able to dominate small, dependent states like New Zealand. This means that the citizens of small states will lose `national sovereignty' and become powerless. While nationally, interest groups such as women and Maori can achieve some equity, this is likely to be lost in the international marketplace. Consistent with its analytic framework, the book hints at structural solutions along the lines of `meso-corporatism' - similar to the tripartite accord between business, labour and government promoted by Mike Moore and Ken Douglas. But when it comes to dealing with the power of the MNC's, it retreats into post-structuralist academic platitudes about the 'globalisation of social life' (Deeks and Perry, 1992: 237). It doesn't even put up a fight.

National Geographics

Britton, Le Heron and Pawson (1992) covers much the same ground and comes to similar conclusions. There is some attempt to introduce a wider analytic framework, drawing on some neo-Marxist writers. There is an insistence on explaining New Zealand's restructuring crisis within an international model of capital accumulation and periodic crises, including de-stabilising political and ideological effects. However, for all this promise, the definition of capitalism is not Marxist, and not even explicitly neo-Ricardian. True, crises are `inherent' and take the form of overproduction or underconsumption, but such crises must, in the absence of an explanation for crisis which traces falling profits to the inability of capitalists to exploit workers enough, result from rising wages.

We are back to the familiar liberal analysis of crisis and restructuring in New Zealand. But within these limits, the book does a good job. At the level of describing and analysing the process as part of the world economy, the book is systematic and thorough. Once more, however, on the issue of solutions, the liberal stance is clear. While crises may be inevitable, their effects are not. The authors want to moderate the effects of crisis by 'reconstructing a state framework' which allows people more say in decisions determining production and consumption. That is, reconciling capitalist growth and profits with equity and environmental sustainability. Dream on.

Conclusion

The liberal case is not made. Nowhere can liberals claim to have restored growth in profits and equity as the result of some neo-corporate state balancing act. New Zealand is a test case. It shows that capitalism in crisis must necessarily be destructive of equity in order to survive. Nor can Clinton or any other politician return to increased taxation and massive state spending - except perhaps for the purpose of war. Worldwide profits have not been restored to the point where the international economy can begin a new period of expansion and afford increased taxation for equitable redistribution. In New Zealand, the odds are strong that it never will until capitalism becomes restructured as socialism.

Views from Australia

Boston and Dalziel

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One of the most conspicuous characteristics of contemporary social science has been its continual fragmentation. As political scientists, economists and sociologists have devised their tools and techniques, they have become increasingly more specialised and isolated in their spheres of expertise. However, in recent years, there has been a growing interest in breaking down some of the boundaries which have divided the social science disciplines during the twentieth century. Efforts to forge

links between the various disciplines have been wide-ranging and have been met with varying degrees of success. New interdisciplinary study programs and disciplinary subfields have been established. Additionally, we have seen the emergence of new political and sociological journals to cater for these new orthodoxies. The emergence of political economy - basically highlighting the political aspects of economics - is one of the most interesting new branches of the social sciences. The relationship of political economy with sociology has been one of the more successful linkages in social science.

Modern students of political economy are not all made from the same mould. They come from a variety of disciplines and reflect a large array of value orientations and systemic approaches. Post-Keynesian economists, public choice theorists, political scientists concerned with the institutional make-up of the modern state, world system sociologists - all have appropriated the appellation `political economist'. What has devalued the political economy area somewhat, in my view, is its almost total recent preoccupation with party political machinations, political systems and public policy, to the exclusion of social determinants of the effects of government policies on individual citizens. Whatever the differences that may separate students of political economy, they are tied together by the social structures they encounter as they move beyond the traditional disciplinary boundaries and `look broadly at the interfaces among economic processes, political institutions and social organisations' (Harpham, 1984: 937). These sociological criteria (e.g. the effects of welfare

provision on family structures) allow the political economist to be much more aware of the ways in which organisational structures operate and the manner in which formal (and informal) processes undo justifiable welfare goals through unintended consequences.

Boston and Dalziel (1992) utilises a political economic schema to evaluate various aspects of the National's public policy output in the first year of their tenure. Various authors subject specific aspects of New Zealand's welfare state to close analysis, especially highlighting the effects of benefit rate reductions and labour market deregulation on individuals.

National's overriding rationale for introducing its economic and fiscal strategies was that New Zealand had become ungovernable. The central state had become too large and cumbersome; too many citizens who could afford to fund their own welfare requirements were instead relying on the state to dispense welfare charity. National's increased targeting of benefits to those most in need (residual instead of universal provision), and the introduction of a greater user-pays principle in health care and tertiary education for `those with reasonable means' were meant to create a new mood of self-reliance and individualism in New Zealand society (surely, the experience of Thatcher's Britain shows that in fact the opposite occurs). Boston's (Chapter 5) contribution on targeting social assistance argues that National's desire, to provide only a `modest safety net' instead of universal welfare coverage, leads to social and administrative inefficiency and inequity, and thus poor and low-income earners are invariably faced with lower living standards. To be charitable, this may have been an unintended

consequence of National's austerity program but, to date, the government has made no moves to redress this situation. While admitting that the creation of a more universalist welfare state would not `satisfy all the objectives of social policy', Boston reasons that, on balance, increased social cohesion through a `sense of participation in and belonging to the community' would result from a universalist welfare state.

The later chapters of the book give an overview of the specific changes in policy that National has instituted in the areas of superannuation, health services, housing and tertiary education. Susan St John's critique of National's superannuation policy highlights the lack of forethought and adequate consultation on the government's behalf. Prior to taking office, National promised to guarantee each and every retiree the right to a universal pension from the state and to protect retirees' living standards; however in their first budget, retirees' pensions were frozen until 1993 and existing transfer payments were severely means tested. Additionally, the pension eligibility age was to be raised to 65, `leaving those who did not quality and could not support themselves to the austere provisions of the new unemployment benefit, sickness benefit or invalid's benefit'.

Toni Ashton emphasises that the radically new means-testing of health entitlements, which had been previously universal in nature, and cuts in the funding of state provision of medical services, are likely to lead to a reduction in the health of New Zealanders and also in the provision of health services. Elizabeth Mcleay's

evaluation of National's housing policies mirrors the complaints made by other contributors regarding National's ignorance of the negative effects of policy changes on vulnerable groups in the community. The reduction of housing benefit levels, house acquisition and the general subsidising of housing contribute to an increase in rental charges and waiting periods for previously affordable subsidised housing. Jonathan Boston argues that National's implementation of a new Study Right scheme which imposes means-tested eligibility criteria for not only student assistance subsidies but also on tertiary course costs are changes are 'among the most important in the tertiary sector for many decades' (Boston, 1992: 186).

The concluding chapter, by Paul Dalziel, synthesises the thrust of each of the preceding chapters. The central argument for Boston, Dalziel et al is that successful public policy-making is dependent on the inclusion of people in the devising of economic and social policies, for it is only through a more co-operative form of policy development that both the intentional and unintentional effects of state policies can be ascertained. The New Right-inspired neo-liberal economic policies pursued by National have fiscal stability and economic growth as their goal but, to date, they have not satisfied these aspirations. The economic and social dislocation in New Zealand seem to be the only economic indicators on the increase.

The relationship between political economy and sociology is clearly apparent in Boston and Dalziel's book. The authors highlight not only the overall macroeconomic effects of the public policy changes

instituted by National but also their impact on individuals. T.H. Marshall's thesis, that the evolution of civil and political rights in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gave rise in the twentieth century to social citizenship rights - the `right to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society, primarily through public education and social services' - demands that governments with a new-liberal bent reverse their policies of self- reliance, individualism and efficiency. According to this view, social justice principles are to be pursued not only through a tax/benefit system but also through waged work. This is in keeping with the emphasis that there has been in New Zealand and Australia on adequate wages and full employment. Though these objectives were historically pursued and maintained in a non-competitive labour market, protected by tariffs and selective immigration policies, whether these strategies can be reformulated in the 1990s remains unclear. While it may no longer be appropriate to pursue wage justice and social policy goals through the same centralised system, a return to what Australian Prime Minister Keating describes as the `master/servant mentality of the nineteenth century' also appears inappropriate. New, equitable and socially-just methods of governing society must be found whilst not losing sight of the need to increase worker productivity in order for New Zealand to compete successfully in the interconnected world economy. The problems of social amelioration are already pervasive enough without government adding to the dislocation of contemporary society.

Changing Places

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Changing Places is a solid book, though often repetitive, boring and, typical of political economy texts globally, it ignores the plight of women as a category.

As a teacher, I will use this text for any appropriate course, certainly not as the key text, but at least as a supplementary one. This is not a mean admission from a sociologist reviewing work written by geographers and it means that the work is admirably cross disciplinary in its appeal. Unfortunately, as a teaching text, its presentation is `sixties-New Zealand'. Text books, in these days of advanced computer aided desk-top publishing, do not need to come in this poorly presented form. We have been exposed to the big, the bright and the bold American first year text - this is one of the few advantages of American cultural hegemony, why not utilise it? But more imagination in the layout would have helped, rather than the single New Zealand map repeatedly used.

As a researcher, I think that this work gives me confidence, for it does not shine so much as an outstanding theoretical contribution or thrill as a tertiary text, but, as a resource manual, it is at its best. I will use it with confidence as a reference for my own work on big business in Australia and New Zealand and it will give me the empirical data to support a critical perspective on New Zealand as a country weakened by a regime of neo-classical economics operating in a `stacked hand' global

economy. In general terms, the book leaves the reader with a satisfied feeling that what are commonly understood to be the ingredients for a good (if sexist) political economy text have been met. For **Changing Places** does question the source of global power and the consequences of that power rather than focussing on the micro-economic issues that mesmerise neo-classical texts.

At the level of the market, this macro focus means finding out about how transnational corporate firms relate to other international organisations, such as parties, governments, bankers, university research centres and perhaps labour unions. There is also a necessary awareness of the significance of the changing role and goals of states and their relationship to international finance.

Second, there is an awareness of the disappearing significance of the nation-state (eg Britain) against the new trading block (eg the EC), old boundaries are often no longer helpful. In relation to New Zealand, this means reconceptualising it within a trading block of the Asia/Pacific rim constellation. What does this new arrangement of the Asian/Pacific region mean? Where is it going? What is its resource base? These are the important questions of the nineties. This leads to a related and necessary understanding of security and defence structures surrounding the management of scarce and natural resources - oil, water, air and forests. New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s is portrayed as being a centre of new activity patterns, evolving organisations, altered personal and household circumstances - all outcomes of a state restructuring which directly affects the lives of all New Zealanders.

This traumatic restructuring has been (in the authors' opinion) poorly documented. Indeed, so poor, that they make only six references to its chronicling. This is problematic. Sociologists have been writing in this area for years (eg Bedggood, 1980; Murray, 1989; Roper, 1989).

What is the theoretical base from which this geographic restructuring model operates? `Restructuring is about changes in global, national and local forces that combine to shape the material world'. The authors offer the reader a `broad architecture to interpret the 1980's restructuring crisis'. They make a distinction between the simple restructuring analysis and the complex, that is, the Geographic Restructuring model. The simple restructuring model is economic rationalism based on a belief in the `free market' and greater investor autonomy. This was, and is, the model that was used to justify privatisation/corporatisation practised by first the Labour Government of 1984-1990 and by the present National Government. In this model, problems of the New Zealand economy are the result of internal mismanagement and are seen as being related to the global market. Local actions can contribute or be the recipients of actions that happen at a variety of spatial levels - particularly global and national.

The effects of the internationalisation of the economy are charted, including both trade patterns and the wider relationships in which these are inserted, which opened the financial markets to the debacle of the black Friday of October 21 1987. One upshot of these events was that prior to October 1987, successive waves of overseas capital were attracted to high interest bearing bonds and

securities, inflated stock market prices, and to steeply rising commercial business district land and office rental values. Other than share buying, an important area of investment that took place in this over-capitalised market, was corporate investment off-shore. This increased enormously, as did overseas investment in New Zealand. What this work does not talk about, but is addressed by van Fossen (1992), is the amount of New Zealand corporate investment that took place (to the detriment of the national economy) in tax havens throughout the world, but particularly in the Cook Islands. This, of course, (plus delayed corporate taxation programmes) facilitated corporate tax avoidance and further drained an already weakened welfare state of revenue.

This internationalisation of the economy with the dramatically new connections in trade, finance and production brought forward a dramatic change in the nature and organisation of companies. Company structures have been rebuilt since the 1980s into a pattern of the concentration and centralisation of capital. The main corporate recipients of this are FCL and Lion Nathan, who have also made a lot of money from the purchase of state assets, Telecom and Electricorp. This easy access to state assets Britton et al have rightly linked to New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBRT) membership. (NZBRT companies control approximately 20 percent of GDP). Many of the other NZBRT companies have similarly profited from the privatisation of the states assets. The NZBRT has been instrumental in introducing economic rationalist policy to the state. It is a right-wing `think tank' which has had an extraordinary

amount of power when you compare it with its Australian counter-part the BCA, or any other top lobby group in `the western democracies'.

The chapter on the workers is premised on the assumption that power went from labour in the 1950-1980s to employers in the 1990s, crowned by the Employment Contracts Act 1991. I personally think that this is an incorrect reading. The employers always had power over production, consumption and distribution. Workers never received an equitable proportion of the profits: they have always had what they needed to reproduce themselves and very little else. Now they don't even have that.

New Zealand became a colony on the basis of its fertile soil and desirability as a `bread basket' for the mother country, ie Britain. During the restructuring, there has been a 'rural crisis' in agriculture and the sale of forestry resources overseas. Manufacturing has suffered most in relation to the theories of the deregulated market. When the post-1984 Labour Government effectively stopped tariff protection for domestic industry, `manufacturing, services and tourism have been restructured to a global harmonic'. The car industry is an extremely graphic example of the demise of domestic assembly industry. In 1985, there were fourteen plants throughout New Zealand. In 1991, there are six. This represents the loss of many jobs. What has eventuated is that New Zealand is now a society of predominantly service workers. Tourism, the archetypical non-productive industry, has expanded as a result of large scale overseas promotions.

The state sector has a declining role. All of the market-related enterprises controlled by the state were privatised, corporatised or departmentalised in some form. The state sector was throughout encouraged to embrace market structures and techniques. The social sector ramifications of this have been very traumatic (eg the effect of the demise of the local post offices) and this has contributed dramatically to the Labour electoral defeat in 1990. However, the National Government, since 1990, has moved to take the restructuring even further, however.

New Zealand, probably because of its brave and forward thinking nuclear stand, has always in my memory held a glow of environmental purity. According to the chapter on environment, there are two competing contestants in the environmental stakes - the conservationists and the advocates of development (ie advocates of exploitation of the environment for immediate short term gains or profit). This chapter goes into some detail as to the process of restructuring environmental legislation, ministries and departments between 1986-7 and then gives some case study material including such riveting (to geographers!) information as the restructuring of water and soil administrations.

Local government has not been spared radical reform, for with their `small business' mentalities, they were always a thorn in the side of big business. These councils were usually run by, and in the interests of, small businessmen. Local government has always been characterised as overly large, inefficient and ineffective. The Local Government Amendment Act 1988 changed all

that. The result was a large scale reorganisation of the local body territories, and a nation-wide tier of local and regional councils were created which absorbed the functions of many environmental and ad hoc bodies. Commercial imperatives and accountability were similarly forced on to these bodies. This chapter ends with a plea for attractive physical and environmental cities which of course requires a blend of local, central and corporate integration and planning and a local and regional government structure to facilitate this. The obvious irony is that with the `productivity and efficiency' dictum that calls the tune with these bodies, they will most likely be whistling in the wind.

The chapter on policy and regions should have been included in the chapter on farms. The rural demise does not warrant a whole section as it develops along exactly the same lines as that looking at agri-commodities in the previous chapter. The chapter on senses of place is that of the `new age geographer' (similar to the sensitive new age man but with a slightly different (non-sexual) agenda). This chapter is about the plight of the dispossessed Rousseauian man (ie one who feels more comfortable with the soil between his toes and seeing the wife washing the crappy nappies in the stream) and the Maori people. (At least Maori, unlike women, get introduced in the penultimate chapter). Restructuring of the economy and society has speeded up the process of alienation. I sympathise with the anger but the sentiment is mawkish and misplaced. It is dippy hippy, sixties stuff.

The Geographic Restructuring model dedicated to `modelling a changing world' by decoding change is

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pompous and was unconvincing to the end. Not that the need to look globally rather than nationally is not important, it is crucial. But it is easy to say that, `Here are the globally interrelated facts as we see them. This is the way that it is because of these factors and this is what we think that you and ourselves can do about changing them'. Simple. The message is too important to be fluffed up by intellectual territorial claims. New Zealand has changed from a more socially equitably society: the poor have paid for it and are likely to go on paying for it unless this tide of economic rationalism is changed. It must be changed because the evidence throughout the world where economic rationalism has reigned (eg Britain, Chile etc.) shows that it does not work. No big words or fancy phrases need be used, people everywhere can understand that message. They do not need to be patronised by making simple ideas inaccessible and to be alienated by academic pomposity.

However, despite these concerns, this is largely a good piece of work. I particularly enjoyed the way that a cross- disciplinary approach to political economy was applied to the theoretical understanding of crisis in international relations of which New Zealand is a very small party. I have two small criticisms.

Britton et al could have used indigenous work (eg apart from Harvey, 1982 etc.) that has analysed New Zealand capitalism in crisis over a long period of time in relations to circuits of capital (eg Bedggood, 1980), or as cycles (eg Pearce, 1986, or Murray, 1989). These cycles are seen, as in the cursory allusion on page eleven, as not immutably fixed but with reoccurring patterns of economic crisis

resulting in unemployment and fiscal blowouts which in turn excite a political cyclical response of restructuring, corporatisation, privatisation and austerity measures disproportionately born by the middle to poor workers. In New Zealand, the extent of the reaction (as documented in this book) has been extreme even by British and American standards. The welfare state is in a serious state of demise; working people have lost (particularly with the Employment Contracts Act 1991) what little gains that they ever made. It will take workers a long time to regain advantages, when, and if, we ever get back to a period of state accumulated surplus (given the global restructuring of tax havens siphoning money away from nation state coffers, this is extremely unlikely). This book, crammed as it is with information, has contributed something positive to the process of re-educating people to the dangers of the `neo-classic nightmare' of economic rationalism which is the restructured New Zealand that Britton et al describe so well.

The second criticism is that women are absent from this account: even the 1987/8 New Zealand Year Book had a section on women.

Controlling Interests

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The chapters in Deeks and Perry (1992) cover a variety of current New Zealand economic and political issues in a generally lucid and often very perceptive manner. For a reviewer writing from Australia, perhaps the greatest pity of the book is that it is unlikely to receive a significant audience here. It contains much that is directly valuable to an understanding of political and economic debates occurring in Australia today. A distinctive feature in this respect is the knowledge of the Australian situation (which often serves as a reference point) exhibited by many of the contributors. It would be rare to find an equivalent Australian publication which indicated a comparable awareness of current New Zealand issues.

The contributions range from the strongly theoretically informed (Deeks, Haworth, Perry and Harvey) to the more straightforwardly empirical (such as those by Hanley and Walker) and they stem from quite diverse political perspectives. The introductory chapter sets the different chapters within the context of the upheavals in New Zealand's economy and society which began with the Fourth Labour Government. Deeks's commentary is strongly informed by theories of the state, government and interest group mobilisation (mainly the variants of pluralism and corporatism). He relates the content of the different chapters to these overall concerns. As the

relationship between government and big business has been strengthened and with the rapid shift towards market-derived criteria for decision-making, other interest groups (including unions) have progressively become more marginal to policy processes. As he asserts, there is a basic conflict between the unregulated operation of market forces and the achievement of genuine social equity. Indeed, the unregulated operation of markets erodes the very social context within which markets themselves exist (Deeks, 1992: 10-11). Especially in a situation where the main political parties have similar agendas, interest groups may emerge as the most crucial avenues for change: this is associated with the developing professionalisation and internationalisation of the organisation and management of pressure-group activity (Deeks, 1992: 12). However, it may be that we are experiencing only a short-term convergence of the mainstream political parties. The issue of internationalisation is also crucial to Nigel Haworth's analysis of the potential of economic deregulation to weaken irretrievably New Zealand's national sovereignty. Deregulation has not only stimulated transnational investment in New Zealand but there has been the concurrent emergence of New Zealand companies (such as Fletcher Challenge, Goodman Fielder Wattie and Brierley) as international players. Australia in particular, under the Closer Economic Relationship (CER), has become an attractive destination for New Zealand companies.

Howarth shows that there has been an expansion of MNC control over an increasingly internationalised New Zealand economy. New Zealand will, as a result, become vulnerable to fluctuations in the international

economy, with serious consequences for both the capacity of citizens to control their destinies and for the maintenance of national sovereignty.

Nick Perry deals with the extent to which small states such as New Zealand can establish strategies to preserve a degree of independence while their economies are 'internationalised'. He also demonstrates how the strengthened Australian connection under CER has supplanted import-substitution strategies by giving New Zealand companies direct access to a considerably much larger market, while the rapidity of New Zealand's internationalisation has fuelled demands for the Australian Government to follow suit. One of the cornerstones of the New Zealand institutional arrangements has been the arbitration structure. The New Zealand arbitration system seems to have had fewer corporatist characteristics than its Australian counterpart. New Zealand incomes policy has been conducted through state-imposed wage freezes rather than through negotiation. However, as Perry shows, the power of large and transnational capital is increasingly undermining the efficacy of state action in this respect. While broadly similar, the pace of such change has been less rapid under the Australian Hawke-Keating Government. In Australia, the 'politics of domestic defence lingers on; whereas in New Zealand it is now dead' (Perry, 1992: 54). Perry optimistically suggests that New Zealand has greater prospects than Australia of forging a 'politics of domestic compensation' appropriate to a small state, since it is 'less compromised by the legacy of domestic defence and the institutional inertia of a federal system' (Perry, 1992: 54). This conclusion may

be debated. Perhaps the complexity of Australia's system of Federal and State awards, coupled with strong popular resistance (as demonstrated recently in Victoria), may prevent total labour market deregulation. This might leave New Zealand on its own as the leading example of a small nation which, in the fullest sense (including a low-wage economy - with wage rates now among the lowest in the OECD, at US$8.35 an hour) is open to the vicissitudes of unregulated markets. In such circumstances, there may be a case for `institutional inertia'.

One major factor distinguishing the Fourth Labour Government in New Zealand from the ALP Federal Government in Australia has been that the New Zealand union movement has exerted considerably less influence on policy decisions than the ACTU has achieved through its Accord with the Government (which has gone through seven versions). The belated, in fact too late, attempt by the New Zealand Government and the newly-formed New Zealand Council of Trade Unions to emulate the Accord relationship, via the Compact, is discussed by Owen Harvey. Whereas in Australia the union movement could place a brake on movements towards economic liberalisation, the New Zealand union movement was reduced to little more than just another interest group, largely excluded from policy processes. The New Zealand labour movement was ill-equipped to exercise a substantial influence on the Fourth Labour Government. It was divided, poorly informed and disinclined to negotiate with a government bent on sweeping deregulation and a general reduction of the role of the state. Historically, New Zealand unions have

been restricted to the arena of wages and conditions, the `ruthlessness of capital' impeding the development of `a more expansive, cooperative and sophisticated style of unionism' (Harvey, 1992: 60). Harvey (following the arguments of Campbell and Kirk, 1983) asserts the need for the union movement to pursue a more proactive role, particularly with respect to the construction of economic and industrial policies. He demonstrates that, although the ALP-ACTU Accord was influential in the emergence of moves towards what is usually referred to as `political unionism', there are substantial differences between the Australian and New Zealand situations, the most crucial being the historical closeness of the links between the ALP and ACTU. The lack of control which the New Zealand union movement had over what is nominally the `political' wing of the labour movement was critical in allowing the Fourth Labour Government to embark on `a radically different programme that had nothing to do with striking wage accords or sharing power with the union movement, but a lot to do with the New Right ideological imperatives of the Business Roundtable and the monetary orthodoxy of the International Monetary Fund' (Harvey, 1992: 61). It may be worth pointing out, however, that the ACTU has been very much the junior partner during the term of the Hawke and Keating Governments - the objective of `internationalising' the economy generally winning out over the pursuit of stated Accord goals such as full employment. Also, another important difference between the Australian and New Zealand situations is that national capital in New Zealand, through the Business Roundtable, appears to be considerably more cohesive than in Australia, where business interests are fragmented among several

organisations such as the Business Council of Australia, the Metal Trades Industry Association and the Confederation of Australian Industry. As a consequence, business in Australia has repeatedly failed to present a unified voice, often a source of consternation to the government.

One critical area of political contestation in which the New Zealand experience is particularly instructive for Australia is that of land ownership and the indigenous peoples. The contentious issue of the competing claims of business and Maori are dealt with from different perspectives by Garry Hanley and Ranginui Walker. In the case of the New Zealand Steel, the general effectiveness of Maori mobilisation and their readiness to use innovative tactics could afford considerable insights for Aboriginal campaigns. Also, New Zealand Steel appears to have adopted a more conciliatory stance than is often found among the more zealous of Australian mining companies and their political allies in mining areas. Hanley makes the point that Maori actions are (like other processes described in the book) part of an international movement, asserting the rights of indigenous peoples which are too often overridden by governments and corporate interests. Walker's chapter details the Maori claims to fishing rights.

Margaret Wilson's chapter on the Employment Equity Act 1990 illustrates the protracted nature of any campaign which seeks to achieve substantive social and economic change, in this case for women. Through the action of women's organisations there was, for the first time, a coherent set of proposals aimed at eroding gender inequalities. The attainment by women of key

government, party and bureaucratic positions laid the groundwork for the introduction of the Employment Equity Act (which appears to have been more far-reaching than any equivalent legislation in Australia). However, as Wilson argues, the government's overall programme of labour market deregulation came into conflict with the establishment of greater equity in the workplace. Yet she makes the questionable comment that `it could have been argued that employment equity legislation does not necessarily contradict the overall equity objectives of the deregulatory policy, which were stated to be the construction of an economy based on the concepts of efficiency and equity' (Wilson, 1992: 118). However, this `equity' is market-oriented; that is, `equity' means that everyone (regardless of gender, socioeconomic background, race, etc.) should be paid the market rates for their labour or should pay the market price for goods and services. This notion is radically different from the positive concept of equity associated with reducing societal inequalities between men and women. As Du Plessis/Novitz and Jaber (1990) have demonstrated in their own discussion of pay equity legislation in New Zealand, such equity can only be attained through increased state intervention against the operation of markets.

Austrin delineates the rapid progression from 'a basically male clerical/machine-operator-type workforce' to a `feminised' workforce `which operates with electronic texts but is essentially concerned with sales and marketing' (Austrin, 1992: 179-81). Engaging the concept of a shift from modern to post-modern society, Austrin elaborates upon the massive changes in banking's

ownership, advertising and service delivery which are part of the emergence of `a real-time retailing finance industry'. The deregulation of New Zealand banking has led to a rapid invasion of the industry by foreign, mainly Australian, banks. Austrin relates these developments to a change in managerial strategies from `Industrial Relations' to `Human Resource Management'. The establishment of HRM as the master discourse for managers (and, increasingly, for university IR departments) is scrutinised, indicating how HRM is used to exclude unions from workplace negotiations and to move from centralised wage-fixing to enterprise bargaining.

The book's theme of the consequences of deregulation and the accelerated integration of New Zealand into an international economy are investigated with respect to television by John Farnsworth. The opening up of the television industry to market imperatives (including the abolition of restrictions on foreign ownership of broadcasting companies) has been comprehensive and its effects on levels of local content and coverage of local issues has been devastating. The most profitable alternative often may be to purchase overseas programmes rather than produce programmes in New Zealand.

The final chapter examines a somewhat less sweeping transformation: the introduction of business management principles to the organisation of the legal industry. This involves the hiring of business managers, the introduction of corporate management, including such innovations as performance, rather than seniority, based promotion, which with other changes

would lead to the loss of some valuable aspects of professionalism , such as the maintenance of standards and an overarching code of ethics.

The conclusion commences with a cultural analysis approach to summing up the different contributions, rather than seeking to elaborate on the more substantive political and economic implications. In this respect, the conclusion may initially appear anomalous, since none of the chapters (including Perry's own) is genuinely set within a cultural studies framework. However, in the closing pages, he draws together some of the main political and economic issues addressed throughout the book, such as the future of the nation state, the role of business and the perils of embracing `Gordon Gekko's reductionist view of life' (Perry, 1992: 239).

This volume as a whole provides an antidote to such a view, since each of its case studies illustrates, in specific ways, the need to question the operation of market imperatives and the headlong pursuit of profit. Also, most of the chapters offer positive suggestions on how to achieve policy objectives. In this respect, they demonstrate a more policy-oriented future for social, economic and political research. Above all, the book highlights the need to locate national political and economic developments within the context of an international political economy in which transnational capital has become increasingly preeminent. For a reader in Australia, the different chapters provide a discomforting but instructive indication of the effects of rampant neo-liberalism. The Coalition Federal-National parties have repeatedly expressed admiration for the

'New Zealand model', particularly the abolition of the industrial relations system and the introduction of a GST. Therefore, the need for Australians to achieve an improved understanding of the New Zealand experience is even more pressing than it has been under the past decade of ALP government. **Controlling Interests** represents a valuable resource in this regard.

A key question alluded to occasionally in the book is to what degree any subsequent Labour (or Alliance) New Zealand Government might be able to reduce the level of internationalisation and reintroduce a significant measure of state regulation of the economy. For example, how might labour market intervention be implemented to achieve a more equitable distribution of jobs and a more participatory organisation of workplaces?

The New Zealand experience reveals how rapidly long-established institutions and conventions can be dismantled or destroyed. To re-establish and expand upon such principles as equity and wage justice will require painstaking political organisation informed by the type of policy-oriented research which this collection provides. The book's editors, Deeks and Perry, have done an impressive job of bringing together these chapters on what would appear at first glance to be a disparate array of subjects. Yet the collection is endowed with a considerable measure of internal coherence and logic by the prominence of such intersecting themes as economic internationalisation, the after-shocks of deregulation and privatisation, the roles of the state, business and unions, the dominance of transnational capital, the growth of pressure group activity and

changes in the organisation of work and labour markets. If feasible policy alternatives to simple faith in the benevolence of markets and transnational capital are to be constructed, increased cross-Tasman discussion is required to assess the full implications of the political and economic upheavals of the past decade. In the context, **Controlling Interests** is a timely contribution to current debates on political mobilisation and policy formation which merits a sizeable readership in both New Zealand and Australia.

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