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

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REVIEWS

NEW ZEALAND SOCIOLOGY

Research Monograph Series

New Zealand Sociology is about to launch a research monograph series. There is a great deal of social science research carried out in New Zealand each year which is not widely known as the market for such findings is not 'commercial' with the small population base that exists in New Zealand. The purpose of the monograph series is to make important research-based studies on aspects of New Zealand society and culture more readily available to the social science community, and to the wider public.

Consequently, we are seeking suitable manuscripts which report on the results of research-based studies that satisfy the above purpose.

Manuscripts should:

1. be between 20,000 and 25,000 words in length;

2. should conform to the editorial guidelines set out inside the back cover of the Journal;

3. be submitted on computer disk (in either DOS or Macintosh format, in Word-perfect, or some equally well known form), accompanied by a high quality printed version;

4. be accompanied by two referee's reports from individuals selected by the author(s) as competent to make recommendations to the editors. The Editors of **New Zealand Sociology** reserve the right to submit manuscripts to other referees as they see fit.

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The Languages of Aids

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Since the identification of the disease in the early 1980's, AIDS has come to represent a major new challenge with profound sociological and social policy implications. It has come into a world in which, for developed countries at least, the major focus of health expenditure had become maintaining quality of life in the face of long term chronic degenerative illnesses. Of infectious diseases there was little experience; it had become widely believed that problem of infectious epidemic diseases had passed or only occurred in third world. The 'discovery' of AIDS has challenged many of the routine ways of thinking about how society operates including the nature of progress itself.

We suggest that debates about AIDS are deeply structured in vocabularies specific to social groups. These groups have their own way of looking at the world and compete with each other to enforce their definition of the situation. We identify three groups, each with a distinctive vocabulary about AIDS. These are the esoteric knowledge producers - the scientists of institutes such as the Centre for Disease Control. Sometimes within, more often working parallel to the esoteric group, is the dissenting enclave. This group, in one way or another, systematically shows the value ladenness of science, and criticises its claim to be a disinterested observer of nature. Surrounding these two groups is the exoteric body of lay people who wish to limit the impact of the dissenting enclave and to use the work of the esoteric knowledge producers to underpin their claims about the naturalness of certain social institutions - the family, hetereosexuality, and monogamy.

What we understand AIDS to be is the product of the balance of power between these three groups and their different vocabularies. At some moments AIDS is virus which we do not understand, but with the progress of science we soon will. At other moments it is the product of political and social relationships - of colonialism and imperialism in the third world, or of patriarchal relations in a homophobic culture. At other moments it is the product of freely chosen deviant lifestyles and the just desserts for that deviance. Each of these perspectives is not the product of the psychology of each groups members but of their structural positions in the production and consumption of knowledge. By documenting these vocabularies we hope to demonstrate that AIDS is the product of social processes and not a natural, inevitable occurrence. Our first task then is lay out the vocabulary that allows us to analyse sciece as a social process.

It has long been a truism among sociologitsts of health that germs are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for disease. For a bacteria to realise its potential as a disease it has to be mediated by the appropriate social conditions (Twaddle 1982). The case studies which back this up this claim have their origins at the very beginning of the sociology of health and were presented most strikingly by R. Virchow in his study of typhoid in Upper Silesia (Taylor and Reigeer 1984). The sociological argument that disease is socially produced was also at the heart of Frederich Engel's study of the British working class in 1844 (Engels 1952). The weak position of this argument is that viruses, bacillus or whatever interact with social conditions which either exacerbate or ameliorate their impact on social relations (eg McNeill 1976; Kunitz, 1989). From this perspective diseases are conceptualised as having a seperate ontological existence from society. Thus this approach produces studies which document the interaction of 'diseases' with 'society' in a way which takes these concepts as ontologically given. Thus it takes as its field of analysis statements about reality, as real, when in fact they are the outcome of social relations. This weak approach takes as given the categories which are the outcome of social relations rather than examining the ways in which these categories are actually developed by competing social groups. Alternatively we argue that what we take a disease to be is not given by nature; nor is society the pregiven datum of sociological analysis, since it too as a concept has been developed and mobilised by particular groups.

The general theoretical basis of this more critical approach was given strongest voice in the sociology of knowledge by Georg Lukacs (1973) who argued that any social science which started with the facts could only reproduce the crystallised power relations which are embedded in them. This general sociological argument which has been formulated through out twentieth century sociology - from Marx to Lukacs, from Weber to Mannheim, - was paralleled by developments in the philosophy of science. These studies demonstrated that thoeries do not reflect some underlying nature, but themselves determine how, and what it is, that we will understand as nature (Bachelard 1968).

The outcome of these arguments was a radicalised health sociology (Wright and Treacher 1982). This approach has a number of central propositions. In the first it argues that medicine is not distinct from the social - what will count as valid medical knowledge is the outcome of social struggles within the profession as well as in struggles by the profession with other social groups (Stern 1927 provides an early formulation of this argument). Detailed studies in the sociology of the medical profession have illustrated that the boundaries of medicine are not defined by 'natural' objects but rather are the outcome of struggles with other paramedical and lay groups over specific areas of practice. The domain of medical knowledge is a negotiated one (Willis 1989; Smith, 1981). In the second place medicines claim to study and to be shaped by natural objects has been disputed by studies which show that groups claiming technical knowledge redefine knowledge to enhance their power, in turn enhancing their knowledge (Dussault and Sheiham, 1982; Lawerence 1985). The third major plank in this health sociology has been provided by Mary Douglas (1970, 1973) who argued that medicine, like other areas of thought that are essentially cosmological, is a set of categories that constructs experience (see also Comaroff 1982). When combined with the recent philosophy of science, particularly that of Hesse (1980) and Feyerabend (1975) the sociology of health takes on a sharp edge for cutting through claims of the naturalness of disease and the facticity of the domain of medical knowledge. The thrust of these critiques of science, that theories are always undetermined by the evidence, and will depend on auxillary hypotheses not covered by the theory, have been developed by Foucault (1973).

We provide this brief historical sketch of the sociology of health because for the most part sociological analysis of AIDS have slipped back into a mode of analysis which gives positivistic medicine the centre court in the analysis of the

problem. The facticity of the virus is presumed; the independence of technical medical knowledge from social interests presumed; and sociology reassigned the role of handmaiden to medically defined social problems. AIDS - as every one points out - presents an enormous challenge to medical researchers, to policy analysts, to health economists, to those who have to bear the ascription of its diagnoses, and to society at large. But what we are overlooking is the basic challenge to sociology: we are being asked to take for granted the facts as they - no matter that the specialists are having trouble agreeing on them - are given. It may even be as Small (1988) has argued that " The impact of AIDS is essentially linked with modernity - its virulence and relative untreatability leads us to question a cornerstone of faith, science, experts and progress". But we would argue that this is a very managed questioning which is leading not to the search for the social etiology of AIDS but for the redirecting of knowledge/power within the medical profession. Sociology is in a vulnerable positon first because of the power of the medical professions lobby. Second, it is vulnerable because of intrinsic factors in the sociology of health. That professional control over the problem is a central issue was made clear in Australia in 1989. Dr David McNicholl defending a call by surgeons for compulsory HIV testing of patients commented that those who sought to defend the rights of the patient were politicising and socialising the issue and demedicalising "one of the most serious public health issues that this country has had to face" (quoted in Lloyd, 1990:167). There is enormous pressure being brought to bear in the debates surrounding AIDS in which the medical profession is trying to exclude alternative - political and social analysis - of the condition.

The second reason that sociology tends to slip into a medical framework is to do with its long term flirtation with positivsm. A precise illustration of sociologies tendency to slip back into a medicocentric positivism is provided by the methodologies utillised in AIDS studies. There are many and varied methodological problems in this field of research (see Ankrah,1989, Kaplan,1989), but one particular one is the reliance on quantitative survey research rather than building into the research design more sensitive qualitatively oriented research strategies. As Silverman (1989:124) argues:

'Nor, despite its appeal to policy makers and funding agencies, should we assume that survey research alone will help us understand lay and professional responses

to HIV. Indeed, if ever there was an area where frozen 'attitudes' told you very little about behaviour, it surely must be in response to AIDS.'

One prime example is the use of the designation 'bisexual': widely used and considered important to the transmission of the HIV virus because of the link between homosexual and heterosexual contacts. A number of studies have found quite high levels of people self-describing their sexual identity as 'bisexual'; only one study we have found thought to go on and investigate what being 'bisexual' meant (Simon Rosser,1988). In his study of 159 homosexual and bisexual males in Auckland, he found that 41.5% of those who had designated themselves bisexual had had no heterosexual contact in the last three years. It could be, and only qualitative research could tell us, that only those men who have 'come out' and are comfortable with the label 'homosexual' are willing to self identify themselves in this way. Those who are not comfortable with the label may prefer the less precise label of 'bisexual'. Simon Rosser himself suggests that this reluctance to identify as homosexual could be an artefact of internalised homophobia.

Qualitative research can also provide different sorts of evidence on the social processes occurring around AIDS. For instance, for all the promotion of condoms as means of preventing the spread of the virus, it is clear that this technology retains some of its traditionally problematic social relations. Observing and analysing interactions in AIDS clinics, Silverman and Perakyla (1990) found that talking about condoms was a 'delicate' topic. On the first occasion (only) that it was introduced into the discussion, a pause in the conversation was observed. This provided a means they argue of dealing with embarrassment. These two brief cases show that we cannot take the categories defined for us by epidemiologists - bisexuality - as unproblematic. Nor can we adopt positivistic methods which tell us nothing about the social relations of sexual behaviour. There is little point in conducting quantitative surveys on condom use if the term and the topic is inherently embarrasing for the community.

Without decrying the subdiscipline it is particularly vulnerable to cooption by the medical profession given its management bias - it has a series of medical presumptions built into much of its work. (Roth 1962; Gold 1977). These biases are further reflected within the subdiscipline in the ongoing debate about the utility of the constructionist model in which analytical philosophy is pitted against

the sociology of knowledge (Bury, 1986, Nicholson and McLaughlin 1987). There are developments in philosophy which are congruent with sociological accounts of science (Collins, 1988; Bauman 1990) and these have been explored in relation to Aids (Lloyd, 1990). Rather than developing and contributing to this debate we sidestep it and by draw on other resources in sociology, especially those that have been developed in the social problems literature. Let us briefly recount these. From a sociological perspective social problems are not selfevident - and this includes Aids. Whether or not a set of conditions is held to be 'objectively' harmful or unwanted will be the outcome of struggles to define them as constituing a risk to ongoing paterns of social life (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Further the range of social problems is infinite and consequently no social problem has a prima facie existence. Social problems need to be defined by a group as unwanted (Lowry 1974), have to compete with other groups' ideas of what social problems are (Gusfield, 1981; Spector and Kitsuse, 1977) and groups must successfully mobilise resources around their position (Mauss, 1975). Social problems are always the product of debate, negotiation and power relations that vary culturally and historically (Schneider and Kitsuse, 1984).

In this paper we attempt to trace how the language of AIDS as a social problemdeveloped. We attempt to show that the discourse can be read as a series of vocabularies reflective of different motives, as different interest groups have attempted to make sense of the epidemic and turn it to their own ends.

In this we take our lead from the germinal papers by C.W. Mills (1939, 1940). Mills argued that in our use of words we provide to other social actors the motives for our actions. Against the psychologists he developed the argument that these motives are not private matters that the individual formulates for him/herself but rather are provided for the individual by the social group to which they primarily belong. Thus we are socialised into our vocabularies, and our adequate performance as social beings depends on our use of the appropriate vocabulary. For Mills words are not private products but social acts, and as vocabularies reflect the individuals membership of social groups.

This is not to argue crudely in terms of conspiracies it should be noted but to encourage consideration of how the different interest groups socially construct the meaning and therefore the language of AIDS both in terms of the 'sense of problem' that the knowledge base with which they operate gives them, and also

the practice based upon that knowledge. We argue that the language of AIDS signifies the knowledge about the disease syndrome and that different languages reflect different paradigms of knowledge. These different paradigms can be characterised by the different 'sense of problem' they construct, both about the 'causes' of the diseases syndrome as well as what to do about it.

What we are getting at is that in the debates over AIDS different group will bring to the task different vocabularies that can be summarised in the phrase **thought styles**. The word is Ludwik Fleck's coined in his book The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (originally published in 1935). In it Fleck develops a philosophical analysis of science - that the discovery of scientific facts depends on nonscientific factors such as religious, political or economic factors. For something to be acceptable as a fact it must be congruent with broader streams of culture. In his analysis of the development of the germ theory for example, Fleck argues that it could only develop in a culture which already had the idea of the world being full of hostile invasive forces (which was provided by Christian-Judeaic theology) and in which the ideas of war, conquest and domination prevailed (provided by the political and diplomatic circumstances of 19th century imperialism). He combines this analysis with the sociological argument that styles of thought are collective phenomenon, which are the product of socialisation in closed communities (Cohen and Schnelle 1986). Thus Flecks work resonates nicely with the later work of Mills and allows us to conceptualise debabtes on AIDS as structured vocabularies which are produced in groups. For Fleck scientific knowledge is collective knowledge, historically located and the product of interactions between competing groups with alternative definitions of reality. Fleck distinguishes between specialists in a scientific feild - what he calls the **esoteric** circle - and the wider group of informed lay people - the **exoteric** circle. These two feilds confront and support each other. The exoteric circle relies on the textbook knowledge provided by the esoteric circle (who communicate with each other in the less settled language of journal knowledge). But at the same time the knowledge produced by the esoteric circle must accord with the cultural presuppositions of the exoteric group. Thus the stabilisiation of a claim to have estabilished a scientific fact is the outcome of a dynamic series of interchanges and struggles between specialists and lay people. At the same time specialists are members of the wider lay groups in debates outside of their areas of competnce, and as such they bring the thought style of this lay membership into their practice as specialists. Thus while areas of knowledge are professionally

carved out the specialists who work in them are not divorcded from their historical and cultural location. There is then no realm of pure scientific knowledge or practice. Armed with these insights we can now start to appreciate the complex webs of social interest and the definitional debates around the nature of aids.

The current state of knowledge has to be seen as the result of negotiation and struggle between the various levels - 'lay' knowledge, textbook knowledge and journal knowledge. The struggle is to construct the meaning of the disease syndrome as the basis for establishing ownership of it and controlling it in ways defined by the group who successfully own it. Knowledge about AIDS thereforedoes not developed through some uncovering of nature; of some underlying biomedical reality about the disease syndrome. Rather as Latour and Wolgar (1986:242) argue "Scientific activity is not 'about nature', it is a fierce fight to construct reality". Struggle over the language of AIDS is no exception; at many points in the unfolding social process surrounding AIDS there has been quite explicit contestation over what language should be used; with the different interest groups promoting the language which best suited their interests.

The work of Susan Sontag (1983) has alerted us to how illness can act as a metaphor for aspects of the society we live in. Diseases signify sociocultural and moral meanings as the reality of individual suffering becomes lost in the powerful expression of social fantasy.

Studying the language of AIDS reveals the heavy symbolic weight the disease carries. The symbolic meaning ascribed to AIDS continues the already lengthy list of diseases in the history of modern capitalist societies - cholera, syphilis, cancer, tuberculosis, and of course homosexuality. More than this though the disease syndrome has telescoped many of the crucial issues about social change. As Weeks (1989:18) argues:

> ...the only way to understand the political and ethical implications of AIDS is to see it in a wider context; of rapid social change and the anxieties attendant upon this, especially those changes that have affected sexual behaviour and values, race and social nonconformity: of political and moral struggles in which old certainties have collapsed and new and competing ones emerged: of new personal identities, many of them now fashioned in the furnace of personal suffering.

> In all, AIDS is the quintessential postmodernist condition! It brings into the open and embodies the breakdown of the old certainties of science and reveals for all to see the essentially constructed nature of scientific knowledge. It thus threatens not only individual lives, but whole empires of professional power, and the preeminence of science and medicine as a value free, asocial activity.

Responses to AIDS

Although there is a temptation to view the history of AIDS thus far as an undifferentiated whole, Jeffrey Weeks (1989:3-8) has argued that there are three separate phases in the responses to AIDS. Following our discussion of Fleck we would also say that there is more than one thought style involved in the recording of AIDS. In this section we analytically try to single out these vocabularies. One voice belongs to the medical specialists, the esoteric cirle. Within it, disputes which in normal scientific debates are restricted to the journals, spill out of the community and provide resources for competing explanations and analysis of aids. A second voice belongs to the 'dissenting enclave' (Douglas and Calvez 1990) of those researchers who explicitly acknowledge the social processes and value ladenness of the construction of AIDS. While some members of the esoteric circle crossover, this is predominantly the community of gay activists, and social science researchers. They challenge the claims to scientificity of the esoteric circle and continually confront it with its value assumptions. The third voice is the exoteric community, who provide the chorus against which the claims of the first two are evaluated. This is the stock pile of commonsense knowledge that the community operates with. As is the case with all epidemic disease the core values of this group are put most at risk and they rally most strongly to protect these values - of the family, of hetereosexuality, and to limit the spread of information about alternative lifestyles that AIDS has produced.

Our aim is to trace how the discourse of AIDS emerged over time and to identify the vocabularies of aids each of these three groups use.

1. The Dawning Crisis (1981-2), Esoteric Knowledge and the Dissenting Enclave.

From the summer of 1981, Weeks argues, AIDS began to emerge as an embryonic public issue as stories began to appear both in the gay press and medical journals of a mysterious new illness affecting gay men in the United

States. There followed exploratory medical and scientific attempts to define the new disease. The earliest labels for the disease were reflective of the group with which it was first associated. First it was called 'gay cancer', then GRID (gay related immunodeficiency disease), before the acronym AIDS was adopted as less homophobic in 1982. This reflected the outcome of a struggle between the esoteric researchers and gay researchers who tackled the scientific community for its homophobia (Altman 1986). While this was an advance for the dissenting enclave - to remove the explicitly pejorative consequences of identifying it with what was being marketed as a deadly disease, it had an unforseen consequence. It expanded the potential patient pool to include everyone. In this a complex redefinition of the category of disease was going on.

This predates the AIDS phenonoma and reflects the medicalisation of social relationships (Armstrong 1983). Identifying at risk groups has been part and parcel of epidemiology and public health since the late 19th century. Using the physio-anatomical methods of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries medicine had taken the individual organs as the target of its theoretical focus and practical application. Put simply disease was firmly located inside the body of the sick person. From the beginning of the twentieth century this started to change. The four newest specialities in medicine -peadiatrics, psychiatry, gerontology and community medicine - have in common this new definition of disease. Disease may manifest itself in the body, but it is derived from the structure of the patient's social life. Rather than disease being located in singular, individual bodies, it is now being located in the spaces between bodies. Disease is seen as residing in our social networks, our interactions with others and even in our communications, for whatever the physical form of sexual activity, the social basis is communication. This broad historical change in the conceptualisation of disease is one of the major reasons for the hiatus which surrounds AIDS - it is the first disease of a new classificatory system.

A debate raged, Weeks outlines, on how to define the new disease:

> Too narrow a definition of AIDS, relating only to its terminal stages, threatened to encourage the view that the illness was invariably fatal, and resistance to it was hopeless. But too broad a definition,to cover all of what became known as AIDS related conditions and the presence of sero-positivity, threatened to obscure important distinctions. Alongside these debates, feeding them and confusing them, was the beginnings of a highly competitive race to identify the

> cause of AIDS, and find a cure - a race tainted by the lure of Nobel laureates, high prestige and profits (1989:5).

Also during this period there developed what Weeks calls the characteristic style of government response that was to extend to the next period as well. The exoteric community during this period exhibited widespread indifference to the issue. Partially, this was the result, he argues, of the disease being thought of as confined to marginal and morally and politically embarrassing communities. Only haemophiliacs were an exception to this.

2. Moral Panic (1982-5), Exoteric Knowledge and the Community.

During this phase, AIDS became the subject of the latest of a series of moral panics over sexuality that have occurred this century. As Weeks (1989:5) outlines "Moral panics occur in complex societies when deep rooted and difficult to resolve social anxieties become focused on symbolic agents which can be easily targeted". The anxieties, political, moral and social in nature, were condensed into a crisis over AIDS. Anxieties around the theme of 'permissiveness' were particularly focussed on AIDS; the main transmission routes being held to be 'promiscuity', permissive lifestyles especially which condoned homosexuality, and drug taking. To describe the epidemic as 'the gay plague' became common particularly in the United States.

During this period the stigmatised pejorative meanings being attached to the disease syndrome saw changes by those in the core community to avoid contamination by association with AIDS. The Artificial Insemination by Donor Sperm Program, which had been known as the AIDS program rapidly stopped using the acronym and changed the name of the program - a change made all the more poignant and tragic by the fact that four out of eight Australian women who received semen from a single infected donor to the programme, became infected themselves (Allen and Curran,1988). A number of organisations and businesses that had AIDS in the sense of assistance in their titles, rapidly changed. All over Australia for instance, businesses known for selling 'Marital Aids', redesignated themselves 'sex shops' or 'adult bookshops'. Technical support departments in many tertiary institutions stopped being 'Teaching Aids' departments and began offering educational technology services. Sign writers report never being busier! No doubt, the occupation of State enrolled Nurses were relieved that only a

couple of years previously they had independently changed their name from Nurses' Aids!

'Victim-blaming' became a frequent ideological means by which individuals could distance themselves from the disease syndrome. This ideology attributes social structural conditions to human agency. Aids was seen as the consequence of life style choices being freely made by individuals (see Tesh 1989 on theories of disease). Since the beginning of the epidemic, people who are HIV positive have been labelled 'victims', the metaphor being one of terrorism. A label was attached reflective of the mode of transmission. Since AIDS was constructed as a disease of the socially and sexually deviant, the designation of 'innocent victim' as in the case of haemophiliacs or children came into the language of AIDS. By contrast and usually by unstated implication a 'guilty victim' was blamed for results of deviant forms of behaviour such as homosexual relations or drug taking. The ideology of 'victim-blaming' accounts for the strength of the reaction in terms of 'innocent victims'. In the early stages of the epidemic in the United States, a classification that rated blood transfusion recipients as 'high risk' along with homosexuals, IV drug users and immigrants from high incidence countries, lead to a public outcry and the criteria was changed to exclude them from the high risk category. (McCombie,1986:456).

If governments were slow to react during this period, the dissenting enclave of gay organisations were not. They organised to oppose the discourse which was emerging by that time which focussed on 'high risk categories' or 'high risk groups'. This stereotyping, lead to the avoidance of groups such as homosexuals and the sorts of gross discrimination which was characteristic of this period. In the United States in particular, but in other countries to a lesser extent, what Weeks calls the 'rituals of decontamination' were followed: homosexuals were refused service in a number of social settings such as restaurants, having their garbage collected, or burying their dead. The little girl Eve Van Grafhorst perhaps symbolises this period in Australasia.

Instead of 'high risk **groups**', 'high risk **activities or practices**' were stressed since it was not the groups themselves but some of the activities those groups indulged in that was the cause of concern. Mostly this struggle concerned homosexuals who strongly opposed the blanket construction of themselves as 'risky' people to associate with. Rather the emphasis was put upon those sexual

practices common to homosexuals or hetereosexuals which carried a significant risk of transmission of the virus - such as unprotected anal intercourse. A study of over 5,000 Canadian first year university and college students, for example, found that of those students with 10 or more partners only 21% of the men and 7.5% of the women used condoms. However this group practised anal intercourse - 26.9% of the men and 34.8% of the women (MacDonald 1990).

3. Crisis management (1985 to the present), Esoteric Knowledge, the Community and the Dissenting Enclave.

O'Neill (1990) provocatively argues that it has become apparent that AIDS is not just a disease of stigmatised minorities but a threat to life styles on a global scale which has the potential to destabilise capitalist social relations. O'Neill postulates a cadre of entrpreneurial risk takers who exchanged their labour time in capitalist societies not only for money but for a ife style. By withdrawing access to casual sex and the drug enviroment as rewards for total dedication to the capitalist enterprise the reward structure of the first world has lost legitimacy. This crisis is reflected in the deaths of those such as film stars, for example Rock Hudson, from the disease, and has stimulated the current response of crisis management.

Governments began at last to respond. In 1985 President Reagan finally uttered the word 'AIDS', in his first public speech on the topic, by which time 36000 Americans had been diagnosed as having AIDS and almost 20,000 had died. (Shilts,1988) In 1985 also, the first test to detect the presence in the blood of antibodies to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, was licensed for use as a screening technology in the United States by the Federal Drug Administration. The presence of these antibodies was held to be predictive at some indeterminate future time, of conversion to AIDS. The meaning of the test was initially constructed as a form of screening, but no other screening test carries such ideological baggage; discussion is never heard of an innocent victim of elevated blood cholesterol for instance. The historical equivalent would be if a screening test had been available for leprosy, or with the development of the Wasserman test for syphilis (see Fleck,1979). As McCombie (1986:455) argues contagion has a social definition not only in 'primitive' societies studied by medical anthropologists, but also in the context of western scientific medicine. The rapid

diffusion and implementation of HIV testing technology, he argues, demonstrates how cultural beliefs and attitudes affect both medical practice and public health.

The debate between the dissenting enclave and the esoteric knowledge producers has continued. During this time, the metaphor of 'victims' has been challenged by the enclave and the alternative social identity of "People with Aids' developed. While in scientific circles at least, a less pejorative designation of 'medically acquired AIDS' has become more common, The debate continues in other areas.

An Australian proposal (DCSH, 1990) is to discriminate on the basis of mode of transmission by establishing a special fund to pay for the medical costs of treatment only for those who contracted AIDS 'innocently' such as haemophiliacs or through transfusion. By implication those who contracted it by deviant sexual practices constitute by implication but never or rarely by open statement the 'guilty' victims. Arguably all people who are antibody positive are victims, but the attachment of anthropological meanings of pure and impure, taboo violation and pollution (Douglas 1973) are powerful social meanings attached to the conditions which even researchers in the field find it difficult to escape from.

The central community still adheres to the contagion model of AIDS since this the one which allows most hope that a cure will be found. It is also the one which prescribes rigid quarantining of those 'tested' and found to be diseased. This forms the basis of the vocabulary of this group. There is for instance continual reference, especially in the media to **'the AIDS test', 'the AIDS virus'** and **'AIDS carriers'.** None of these exist, AIDS itself is not a virus but as the name implies a syndrome of conditions. From the perspective of both the esoteric circle and the dissenting enclave this community response is wrong. There is no AIDS test, the only available screening is for the presence of antibodies to the HIV virus. It does not diagnose AIDS. This continued conflation of HIV and AIDS, to some observers is not innocent. As Watney (1987:141) argues:

> It should by now be clear that the entire subject of HIV antibody testing, wilfully misinterpreted as 'AIDS testing', reflects an entirely **nonmedical** agenda, and is the latest and lowest strategy developed by bigots and moralists of all persuasions to turn this terrible human tragedy to their own repugnant and sickening purposes.

Case Study : The Vocabulary of Sexuality.

The earliest attempts to construct the meaning of AIDS arose from the dominant paradigm of knowledge of health and illness, the biomedical model - what we have called the esoteric community. The 'sense of problem' that this paradigm generated focussed upon AIDS as an individual and a biological phenomenon; in short the story of AIDS was the story of a virus. Gradually however other constructions - from the dissenting enclave - of the meaning of AIDS arose to complement and in some important respects challenge the biomedical understanding of the disease syndrome. A more social model of ill health stressed disease not as an individual and biological phenomenon, but as more of a social and political one. Dealing with AIDS needed a broad, not a narrow focus. An important part of this focus, stressed by writers such as Jeffrey Weeks was upon sexuality; a traditionally private area of human life, but as we know from Foucault (1979) a area of surveillance of populations, and a part of the construction of social identity and social policy since last century. The limitations of our understandings of forms of sexual expression soon became apparent. As O'Neill put it we are confronted with "socially structured carnal ignorance" (1990;336). In a number of cases data has had to be extrapolated from Kinsey evidence collected in the specific cultural context of the United States some 30 years ago. An example is a study examining amongst other things the experience of anal intercourse amongst heterosexual tertiary students, with Kinsey evidence being the only benchmark against which to compare the study results (MacDonald 1990)

Nonetheless, the advent of AIDS has resulted in some significant changes in the regulation of sexuality. In New Zealand for instance, the homosexual law reform occurred in 1986 after at times an hostile public debate; the effect of which was to decriminalise homosexual acts between consenting adults. The need to control the looming AIDS epidemic was one of the important reasons cited for the need for such law reform. In 1990, further law reform repealed the prohibition of the giving of contraceptive advice to young people under the age of 16 years. Again, the public health rationale to protect potentially vulnerable groups of the sexually active population from AIDS was a major rationale. Condoms have also 'enjoyed' a major rehabilitation in the AIDS era; now officially promoted and widely sold for almost the first time historically. In New Zealand, we have even had the

experience of 'condom education nights' in Scout troops. Public health education campaigns have encouraged their use. In one such, now famous television campaign, the problematic social relations of the technology of condoms was dealt with the very traditional approach of calling them by a euphemism - in this case Parachutes ('you wouldn't jump out of an aeroplane without a parachute, so why have sex without a condom'). One effect has been on the language of seduction in the new rules dating in the AIDS era. Asking someone if they'd 'like to come parachuting with you' has a whole new meaning! Likewise being told that a potential new sexual partner donates blood regularly functions as a code to indicate serological status and deal with the awkwardness of negotiating around the threats relating to AIDS.

As sexuality has begun to be examined more closely, two things have become patently obvious. Firstly, that there is an urgent need for better, more recent evidence on forms of sexual expression and patterns of sexual behaviour in different countries aimed to help devise preventive strategies to contain the spread of HIV. Such surveys have now commenced in a number of countries including New Zealand. They have rarely been unproblematic however. In Britain, attempts to secure state funding for such a survey was vetoed by the conservative government; the funding was eventually taken up by a drug company.

Secondly it has become patently obvious that the traditional discourse of sexuality with its 'commonsense' concepts used to describe and analyse forms of sexual expression are inadequate for the task involved. More than that, the argument can be made that the continued use of the traditional discourse is inappropriate for developing an adequate understanding of sexuality in the context of the AIDS epidemic. Not only do many of the terms used carry substantial ideological baggage ('promiscuous') but are located within a hegemonic male heterosexual discourse of sexuality which may actually be counterproductive not only in attempting to formulate policies and educational campaigns which will control the epidemic, but also in attempting to work through the complex moral issues about sexual diversity that the epidemic raises.

Several examples are relevant. In the AIDS era, we have heard public figures in Australia involved in the response to AIDS describe their own sexual status as radical celibacy, not ordinary celibacy mind you; but observed radically! The person is question did not go on the define what this designation might mean! A

monogamy, the social construction of the meaning of which is struggled over because it is held up by conservative political forces as the most appropriate strategy for dealing with the threat of AIDS. There is now a considerable literature dealing with the problems of this approach . For example, monogamy per se will not protect one, if one's partner is not also monogamous. This has lead to some refinement of the concept; not only is ordinary monogamy required, but **complete, mutual monogamy!** Further research on the contextual context of monogamy is urgently needed; amongst young people for instance, it appears most are monogamous, but it is serial monogamy. Most have only one sexual partner at a time but may have several different sexual partners in the course of a year. Monogamy in this sense will not protect them from the transmission of the HIV virus. Likewise, as Dennis Altman (pers comm) has pointed out, amongst homosexuals, monogamy has a different meaning than amongst heterosexuals. Monogamy or fidelity refers to one's primary emotional relationship and not in the same way to notions of sexual exclusivity common to heterosexual understandings. Hence one can have a number of different sexual partners while still being considered to be monogamous. As with young people, monogamy per se will not prevent the spread of the epidemic.

This problem with the language carries over into the esoteric feild of knowledge production. As Fleck argued, specialists cannot seperate themselves from the historical and cultural period in which they live. Science is inextricably social because, while it develps a specialised vocabulary, it also participates in the communities vocabulary. Thus the use of words with pejoratve meanings cannot be avoided. While - in response to the dissenting enclave - considerable effort is made to avoid such words, references to terms such as 'promiscuity' (rather than something like 'multi-partnered') and 'monogamy' treated as if it were an unproblematic concept, are still to be found. This is only to be expected if scientific activity is viewed as essentially a social process in which the researchers inevitability bring some aspects of their social location (class, gender, race, sexual orientation etc) to their research, rather than some neutral objective process.

One example of this is the way that condom use is discussed in some of the literature. It is widely accepted that the early and proper use of condoms will significantly reduce the likelihood of transmission of the HIV virus. How to encourage couples to use them and men to wear them however has proved to be

a substantial obstacle to the effectiveness of this strategy given the traditional male objections to their use in the patriarchal heterosexual discourse of sexuality. Public health campaigns have encouraged a level of assertiveness by women to get their male partners to wear them (tell him if it's not on, it's not on, or the American version 'no glove, no love'!). Apart from the traditional (male) view of the female responsibility for safety and contraception, some of it is portrayed as if it was women that wore condoms; what one writer whose reference I can't find has called "the evacuation of male bodies". (see Campbell, 1990). One of the problems with getting the message about sexual responsibility, including condom use, in the AIDS era across, is that 'safe sex' is everything that the so called 'sexual revolution' is not; highly regulated, 'once-a-week, on a Saturday night, with the light off' type sex. As O'Neill has pointed out this has enormous consequences for the reward structures of late capitalist societies, particularly at the administrative level. But a similar occurence is likely at the other end of the socioeconomic scale. One of the major reasons for the stability of the class structures of modern capitalist societies is that workers work to have leisure (Moorhouse 1983). One major impact of the Aids phenomenon as it is currently understood is to radically restructure the leisure activities of both the working class and the yuppies. The legitmation crisis that O'Neill anticipates may be underestimated.

The vocabularies of describing sexual practises provide the biggest challenge to the esoteric enclave, occasionally to our view with slightly ludicrous results. The various sexual practices, especially homosexual ones which have sometimes come into public scrutiny for the first time as a result of the AIDS epidemic, have often been 'sanitised' when used in a research context. Hence the sexual practice of 'fisting' (which the glossary thoughtfully provided indicates refers to the sexuo-erotic practice of inserting the hand and\or forearm into the rectum) is referred to as **brachioproctic erotic activity** while placing the finger or fingers into the rectum as a sexuo-erotic activity is referred to as **digito proctic activity.** (Simon Rosser,1988).

Conclusion

In the light of our discusion of the vocabularies of motive this is no squeamishness on the part of the researchers. They are constrained to develop a

vusabulary that conforms to their professional socialisatiqn, and which accounts for their interest in the AIDS phenomena : they are scientists. Their vocabulary is challenged by that of the dissenting enclave, those who question the self proclaimed characteristics of science and medicine - that it is disinterested, value free and nongendered. To the enclave the neutralisation and sanitisation of their acts of sexual communication is the consequence of a deep homophobia. In making this claim it is not necessary that the individual scientists own relationship to homosexuality be taken into account. As Fleck argued, for their utterances to gain the status of scientificity they must conform to the cultural epoch of which it is a part. In this the voice of the community is heard. The esoteric circle may wish to distance itself from connatative language, but it must still resonate with the homophobia of patriarchal, Christian-Judeacic society. The voice of the community in the Aids dialogue is the call for moral certainties - of the family, of monogamy, of legal drugs - and the role that it casts for science is the role of justifying these perspectives: it must demonstrate why homosexuality is unnatural.

In this perspective Aids is not a single story but the outcome of competing vocabularies and thought styles. There can never be one story of AIDS and no matter what settled knowledge decisions are made about it, they are the product of social processes and not the workings of science on the one hand, as the esoteric knowledge producers would have it, or 'free' lifestyle choices made by deviants, or the workings of either a nature or a god that punishes 'unnatural acts' as the community would have it.

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Marxian Class Theory: Towards Synthesis

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Abstract

This paper divides Marx's writing on classes into three main accounts. The tensions in Marxist class theory, it is argued, to a large extent, stem from the tensions between these different accounts. The bulk of the paper is concerned with the problem of how to resolve the tension between the different accounts.

Introduction

The tension between the overriding logic of Marx's theory of class as reducing to the economic contradiction between capital and labour, and the complex class struggles of historical conjunctures has been and continues to be a central debate in Marxist thought. Orthodox Marxism has never confronted the problem because it doesn't recognise its existence. The neo-Marxist class theories of Poulantzas and Wright have attempted to remain true to an economic-structural account of classes, while at the same time recognizing the increasing complexity of class structures in contemporary capitalist societies. Recognition of this complexity has led such writers to re-think the relationship between exploitation and class structure. Erik Olin Wright has argued that though exploitation is the key to a Marxist theory of class, this does not imply a simple dichotomous class structure. A range of placements relative to the exploitation relation are viewed as possible. Other writers, from Antonio Gramsci to E.P. Thompson and Adam Przeworski have been concerned with the historical and political process of class formation. They share a common interest in the idea of classes being 'made' in the process of struggle through politics.

In this paper, different elements of Marx's theory of class are taken as a point of departure for re-examining their relationship.

The Elements of Marx's class theory

As is well known, Marx never presented a comprehensive theory of social class. Nonetheless, three major accounts of class in capitalist society can be inferred from Marx's writing. In the *Holy Family* and in the *Communist Manifesto,* Marx works up a skeletal framework of essential class antagonisms at the core of capitalist society. From this abstract essential base, Marx infers a politics and consciousness for the working class. A second account, which follows on logically from the first account, places the first framework within the logic of the dynamic of Capital: a 'logic of Capital' model *(Manifesto* and *Capital Vol I).* Marx also presents a third account which does not follow chronologically in Marx's work, but rather follows third methodologically. This account analyses a concrete period of historical development: a 'conjunctural account' in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Boneparte* and *The Class Struggles in France.*

(i) The first account abstracts fundamental features of the capitalist class structure and class struggle. The model characterizes relations under capitalism at all stages of its development. The essential antagonism between capital and labour is expressed in relations of exploitation, alienation and subordination which arise primarily out of the separation of the means of production between the direct producers and the owners. Such antagonism implies a struggle of liberation by the class of workers (producers) against the class of capitalists (owners) The interests of the working class are abstractly viewed as irrevocably opposed to those of the capitalist class. The exploitation relationship between workers and capitalists is the primary root of the consequent politically organised struggle against capitalism and the struggle for socialism, even though the full articulation of these interests only emerges with the maturation of capitalism, its crisis and the emergence of the conditions for socialism (second model).

(ii) The second account substantiates the first account by offering an historical prognosis on the basis of an abstract identification of the dynamic of capital and labour. This substantiation into future history is selectively based in the framework laid down in the first model. The second model gives the first model a dynamic. The capital logic model basically provides a number of particular theories which lend evidence

of the concretisation of the first model. These theories integrated into *Capital* include: the growth of wage labour, the concentration of capital, the degrading and homogenisation of manual labour, the elimination of small capital and intermediary social classes, economic crisis, and the emergence of nascent socialist forms within the antagonistic capitalist framework.

Marx offers a future history of capitalism which, in the end, predicts the emergence of a class structure and class struggle which conforms to the first abstract model. The logic of capitalism (in future history) is ultimately reduced to a dramatic struggle between two diametrically opposed classes within the context of a crisis of capitalism and the emergence of the conditions for socialism. The class struggle becomes crystallized around the opposed forces of proletarian socialism and capitalist reaction:

> 'Along with the constant decrease in the number of capitalist magnates ... the mass of misery, oppression, slavery and degradation grows; but with this there also grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly increasing in numbers, and trained, united and organised by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of production. The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which has flourished alongside it and under it. The centralisation of the means of production and the socialisation of labour reach a point at which they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of the capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated' (Marx, *Capital Vol.I*, 1976, p.929).

(iii) In the the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Boneparte* and *The Class Struggles in France* a more complex articulation of class struggle is presented. Here, Marx analyses the interaction between six major classes (peasantry, lumpen-proletariat, proletariat, petit-bourgeoisie, bourgeoisie, aristocracy). Within each class further subdivisions or fractions are identified (e.g. industrial bourgeoisie, financial bourgeoisie) which arise according to not only economic criteria of distinction, but also political, ideological and cultural criteria.

> 'it was not a faction of the bourgeoisie held together by great common interests and marked off by specific conditions of

> production. It was a coterie of republican minded bourgeois, writers, lawyers, officers and officials. Its influence rested on the personal antipathies of the country against Louis Phillipe, on memories of the old republic, on the republican faith of a number of enthusiasts, above all, however, to *French Nationalism...* ' (Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Boneparte*, p.157).

Marx also refers to strata or 'gradations' of classes and in particular refers to the intellectuals or ideological representatives of different classes.

Each class fraction is viewed separately as a political actor. Marx analyses how the different class fractions organise themselves, how they pursue their particular demands, how they interact with other class fractions. And, how out of this complex struggle, historical outcomes emerge. Class struggles in these commentaries involve a complex interplay of different class fractions within the framework of flexible interaction between politics, ideologies and economic circumstances. Different possible outcomes arising from specific conflicts and changing coalitions characterise the analysis.

Conflicting Accounts or Complementary Elements

Marx's accounts can be viewed as elements of an integrated theory. The first and second accounts are clearly compatible elements, and the third account is only of passing conjunctural significance as long as one maintains a faith in future history. Marx himself saw little discrepancy between the first two accounts and third account, and thought that in time the central tendencies of capitalism would work their way through complicating historical circumstances.

However, if the future history of capitalist societies, like their past, is characterised by class complexity and political indeterminacy, then the question of the status and validity of each account, and the relationship between the three accounts is far from straightforwardly compatible. In short, a much more complex set of questions and issues arise once a counter-factual belief in the future of capitalism is dropped.

First, if it is the case that the logic of capitalist historical development does not simply accord with Marx's prognosis (account two), then the relation between the first two accounts is brought into question. Certainly, the development of capitalist societies has generated economic and political logics which suggest a more complex and ambiguous economic class structure. Wage and skill stratification, the emergence of a service class of managers and accountants, the growth of wage earning shareholders, contradictory class locations (Wright), labour market segmentation (Piore and Sabel), the intersection of these divisions with ethnic, gender and age divisions, the growth of market responsive sub-cultural groupings complicate the class structures of contemporary advanced capitalist societies. Although not predicted by Marx, these developments can, in part, be explained as logical outcomes of the systemic imperatives of capital accumulation.

Not only does this imply a lack of compatibility between the first two accounts. The second account may also be seen as a false solution for solving the relationship between the second and third accounts. It could be seen cynically (though it is much more) as an attempt to explain away the need to make that link by positing a counter-factual future -which is always to be distinguished from a transitional present- in which the abstract and the conjunctural become one and the same. The complexity of class society at all stages of capitalist development suggests that the conjunctural account can no longer be passed off as only of passing significance, but, rather, should be viewed as a permanent feature of capitalist societies. On a more directly political plane, the lack of a clear and straightforward link between class interests and political and ideological organisation also implies problems with the economistic thrust of the second account, and its relation to the third account.

Second, once the complexity of class structures of contemporary capitalist societies is accepted, and the lack of simple correspondence between 'interests' and politics is dropped, then the politics of class, as involving choice and agency, must increasingly become a more significant element of class theory. This is the case if one retains a Marxist political aspiration rooted in the goal of the emergence of a revolutionary-socialist class agent. In a more significant way, political indeterminancy could be said to increase with class complexity because complexity opens up more and more political options, and possible outcomes. If these arguments are accepted, then the third account becomes more than just

useful as a commentary on a past conjuncture. It could rather be viewed as the basis for an element of a theory of the historcial dynamic of classes in capitalist societies.

Can the elements of Marx's theory be retained while accepting the above points? Much Marxist class analysis has been concerned to try and find a way out of the increasing divergence between the elements of Marx's theory of class, while still retaining them in some form or another. Most have moved some degree towards the third account, some much more than others. Antonio Gramsci has emphasised that class hegemonies are political constructions, products of political will, though still founded on 'the organic terrain of production'. E.P. Thompson has emphasised class formation as a political process in which the working class is 'made'. He argues that social class can be understood as 'a self-defining historical formation, which men and women make out of their own experience of struggle...' (Thompson, 1976, p.46) Production relations remain in Thompson's analysis as an undeveloped background. More recently Przeworski writes of 'classes as effects of struggle', that are 'structured by objective conditions that are simultaneously economic, political and ideological.' (Przeworski, 1985, p.47) Other writers, such as Erik Olin Wright, have emphasised the ways in which class structures only provide a set of broad limiting conditions to possible historical trajectories. This schema of class positions, based in the structure of exploitation, does not generate or account for the forms of class formation. Rather there is 'relative indeterminacy of the relationship between the class structure class formation relationship.' (Wright, 1989, p.29) In general, the concrete structures of exploitation represent the core which sets loose and broad limits to the process of class formation. 'The class structure itself does not generate a unique pattern of class formation; rather it determines the underlying probabilities of different kinds of class formations.' (*Ibid*, p.29) The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the different accounts in more explicit theoretical and methodological terms.

Methodological Progression

Marx's accounts of class development could be linked to a methodological progression from the abstract to the concrete, as undertaken in the Introduction to the *Grundrisse*. In the Introduction, Marx outlines a mode of inquiry which

begins with the assertion of the organic nature of social existence. He then moves from this assumption of a totality, towards its most absract and fundamental determinants. He derives the central category of labour or production, and then argues for a hierarchy of abstractions moving from production to exchange and consumption. As more categories are introduced, their relationships are analysed. This process of abstraction, and the gradual relaxing of assumptions as more categories are introduced, is seen as a methodological progress towards the concrete. 'The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse.' (Marx, *Grundrisse,* p.101.) However, Marx is clear to distinguish between the method of 'appropriating the concrete' and the 'process of the concrete': '...the method of rising from the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete itself comes into being.' *(loc. cit.)*

With class theory, the first account is nearer to the abstract and the conjunctural (third) account is nearer to the concrete. The abstract fixes the essential elements of society for a given historical epoch. The essential class antagonism represents the core antagonism of capitalist social relations. It fixes the invariant and defining principle of capitalism. It abstractly presents capitalism's key relationship in its most extreme and unambiguous form. All the characteristics of the wealth creator are given to the 'worker' and all the characteristics of the wealth appropriator are given to the 'capitalist'. There is no ambiguity in the relationship. There is no room for people to have conflicting characteristics (e.g. characteristics of both exploiter and producer, characteristics external to this relationship, or tangential to this relationship, or derivative of this relationship).

This abstraction provides a conceptual basis for examining the concrete specifications and variants of this relation in practice. It provides an agenda for analysis by pinpointing the central social contradiction of capitalism. However, it does not follow that this abstraction can be seen as equalling the possible concrete forms of the exploitation relation in all their contradictory and complex forms, or that this abstraction determines (in a singular way) the concrete specification of the class struggle, or that the logic of capitalism will for some or other reason reduce ultimately to this relationship. But the abstract model is more than just a conceptual framework, to be put in the background once analysis moves towards the concrete, even though it should not be treated as the direct or

singular determinant of the concrete. The abstract model fixes conceptually the invariant core of capitalist social relations, which take various forms as part of the dynamic of the conjuncture. Marx would argue that the abstract core is the defining characteristic of capitalism in general.

The second account could be understood as focusing on the logic of the first account placed within a framework of dynamic reproduction. In methodological terms, Marx's second account, though dynamic, is not a dynamic of the concrete. Rather, it is an abstract dynamic which focuses on the logic of exploitation over time. In order to move towards the third account, and the concrete, the role of State and class struggle need to be included in the analysis. Methodologically, the purpose is to move beyond the logic of the economic, since it is only an abstraction from the concrete, and to introduce further dimensions to the analysis that approach a general theory of capitalist conjunctures, albeit a theory which can offer no clear logic of history with singular outcomes.

Once the logic of capitalism is seen to be imbued with class struggle and politics, within a framework of increasing economic class complexity, a pandora's box is opened. There are two key issues which I focus on here: the question of class formation, and the sense in which the politics of class struggle can be seen to be linked to the economic terrain.

If one maintains that the economic simply generates a political and ideological superstructure as a reflection of the economic base (and this follows in the classic relationship between 'class in itself' and the 'class for itself'), then the logic of capital is not really affected by politics. However, once this is challenged then the happy seamless integration between the three accounts as a historical reductionism has to be dropped.

A number of reasons can be offered which imply a much greater significance to the political dimension. First, the economic gives rise to class complexity and political indeterminacy. In other words, the logic of capital engenders a class complexity. Both of these factors open up a structure of choice, a strategic terrain of class struggle. Second, the politics of complex class struggle is the terrain on which such indeterminacy is resolved in practice, in one way or another. Class struggle here focuses on the process of 'organisation, disorganistion and reorganisation' (Przeworski, 1985) of class forces. Third, the factors which

determine the outcome of class struggles are not defined by the economic. That is, class struggles take place within the terms of a given historical conjuncture within which political and ideological structures and forces define, and therefore, limit the terrain of class struggle.

Fourth, the changing terms of this resolution can directly alter and modify the logic of the economic and the class structure. The outcomes which emerge from the strategic terrain of class struggle not only imply that a particular structural option has been chosen. A specific outcome may also involve the ruling out of other options in the future. In this way the structure of choice can be altered by the process of class struggle.

This dialectic between struggle and structure, each determining the other, provides a point of departure for a general theory of the concrete. Such a view is in line with Marx's methodological prescription in the Grundrisse, where he argues that 'mutual interaction takes place between the different moments. This is the case with every organic whole'. *(Ibid,* p.100.)

Esoteric and Exoteric

The nature of the relationship between the three accounts can be reconstructed in terms of Marx's conception of the relation between the 'esoteric' and the 'exoteric'. Here, the relationship is not simply methodological. In this relationship, the elements are seen as 'levels' or dimensions of the social process.

In Marx's analysis of the structure and dynamic of the capitalist economy, he distinguishes between the esoteric world of 'value' and the exoteric world of 'price and competition', between the essential underlying structure and its manifest surface forms. Marx's criticism of Adam Smith for his failure to understand and apply the distinction clarifies Marx's position:

> Smith himself moves with great naievete in a perpetual contradiction. On the one hand he traces the *intrinsic connection* existing between economic categories or the *obscure structure* of the bourgeois economic system. On the other, he simultaneously sets forth the connection *as it appears* in the *phenomena* of competition and thus as it presents itself to the unscientific observer just as to him who is actually involved and interested in the process

> of bourgeois production. One of these connections fathoms the inner connection, the *physiology, so* to speak, of the bourgeois system, whereas the other takes the *external* phenomena of life, as they seem and *appear*, and merely describes, catalogues, recounts and arranges them under formal definitions. (Marx, *Theories of Surplus Value*, Moscow, 1968, Vol.2, p.165. Quoted in Lipietz, 1985, p.10. emphasis added.)

It is in the world of value that the secret exploitative core of capitalism is revealed. While in the exoteric world of surface connections the exchange of equivalents (price) reigns supreme. There is no sense in which Marx suggests that the exoteric reduces to the esoteric, as if the surface forms of capitalism actually disappear and value relations become the transparent and overriding reality[1]. Indeed, the economic process of capitalism operates at two levels simultaneously. The exoteric world of the capitalists and workers is a struggle within the framework of profits and credit, and the accumulation of 'use-values' in the form of material commodities and productive forces are 'relatively autonomous' processes. This is the case in the sense that these processes have independent and specific dynamics, that are not reducible to the esoteric. Furthermore, these processes on the 'surface' are seen to hide the underlying core structure:

> The finished configuration of economic relations, as those are visible on the surface, in their actual existence, and therefore also in the notions with which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to gain an understanding of them, is very different from the configuration of their inner core, which is essential but concealed, and the concept corresponding to it. (Marx, Capital Vol. III. p.311.)

The esoteric constitutes the fundamental core of the logic of capital: the invariant element of the capitalist process. The deep abstract structure of value represents the fundamental nature and limit of capital. Value is the process by which concrete labour and concrete use values are transformed into a homogeneous standard of necessary abstract labour time. The limits of capitalism are rooted in the limits of value, in the sense that capitalist wealth and capitalist accumulation

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[1] Lipietz is very clear on this. "For Marx, although the esoteric explains the exoteric, the latter could never be reduced merely to the form in which the esoteric appears: it retains its independence and its own efficacity. Consequently, rather than an opposition between two views: it retains its independence and its own efficacity." (Lipietz, 1985, p.12.)

are fundamentally based in the ability of capital to increase surplus value and to reduce the value of labour power. Other processes occurring in the 'enchanted world' of prices and competition cannot break out from this fundamental core. That is, dynamic capital accumulation can only continue to occur as long as the commodity value of labour power continues to fall, and relative to this, surplus value increases. Arbitrarily defining profit margins cannot alter a declining relative surplus value. It merely implies inflationary tendencies. The esoteric places limits on the dynamic of the exoteric.

Nonetheless, economic crises take the conjunctural form of a 'gradual accumulation of divergences' between the esoteric and the exoteric. (Alain Lipietz, *The Enchanted World,* Chapter 7). The problem of declining surplus value cannot be redressed by Keynesian demand led intervention. In fact, such policies only exacerbate the tendency to economic crisis when relative surplus value is declining, creating an 'accumulation of divergences'. It is only with the emergence of a full-fledged economic crisis that re-creating both an increase in the rate of surplus value and a re-creation of a closer convergence of the esoteric and the exoteric is made possible, i.e., value and price converge.

There are several crucial points raised by this analogy with Marxian economic analysis that may usefully be addressed in terms of the nature of class. What is the status and character of the exploitation basis of the class structure and the class struggle in the sense of an esoteric set of limits? What is to be defined as the esoteric and the exoteric in terms of class, and what should be characterised as the relationship?

The exploitation abstraction identifies the central division underlying economic and class processes in capitalism. It identifies the underlying driving force of the capitalist mode of production in the contradictory core of the capitalist economic structure. The underlying antagonism is based in the drive to privately appropriate socially produced surplus value. In what sense can this abstraction be identified as a real causal mechanism, an enduring force which is driving the economic and class process? Certainly, this abstraction is not a material object. As a causal mechanism it has a purely abstract, i.e., non-material, existence. It is only a causal mechanism in the sense of a principle of social organisation. This principle offers a causal base in the sense of defining a set of limits of possible social configurations which are to differing degrees compatible with it. Causal is only

causal in the sense of defining, or even generating perhaps, a terrain of possibilities. Further, what defines the outcome on the terrain of possibilities is not given by this core mechanism.

Class conflict has its continuing origin in this fundamental capitalist core. However, the distribution of class positions defined by this fundamental core do not simply reduce to this contradiction, i.e., a dichotomy between social production and private appropriation. The esoteric core does not directly include the ambiguous empirical forms of the exploitation relation. The actual concrete forms of the exploitation process, in terms of the production and distribution of value, offer a range of different possible configurations of the social division of labour and its exchange and distribution. The esoteric core of capitalism suggests a range of possible economic class positions which have different alignments to the fundamental dichotomy.

Wright, for example, suggests an initial schema of a number of possible sets of different class locations in capitalist society defined in terms of the exploitation relationship. (Wright, 1985) Re-defining the essential dichotomy in 'methodological individualist' terms could increase the number of empirical class positions even further. That is, once exploitation is defined for each individual in terms of whether or not certain categories of high wage earners are receivers of surplus value to the extent that they receive more than they produced in the act of production or not; then the whole structure of class can be atomised in terms of those who are net exploiters and those who are net exploited (Roemer, *Free to Lose).* But, I don't want to get into the details of this argument here. Rather the general point is that while the esoteric core of capitalism can be expressed as a dichotomous and contradictory principle of social organisation, this principle opens up a range of possible class configurations defined purely at an economic (i.e. exploitation) level.

These possible configurations of exploitation relations form part of the exoteric logic of capitalist societies. The surface visible connections of class are not simply political and ideological, they are also economic. What determines the economic configuration of class positions, similarly, is not reducible to the esoteric. Rather, the economic configuration of class positions is the effect of a process which not only has roots in the esoteric core of capitalism, but also in terms of the specific dynamic of capitalism's exoteric forms, which are

established, modified and overturned in class struggle. The class structure of exploitation is maintained and modified through politics, and through 'regulation'. 'Modes of regulation', as habits, values and institutions reproducing a social formation, are established, modified and overturned through class struggle. For example, the mode of regulation is central to determining the structure of labour market divisions, and thereby different possible exploited-exploiter positions.

Similarly, the process of class formation occurs on the terrain of the exoteric. The limiting forces of particular forms of political organisation (political parties, Trade Unions), the terms of specific cultural and political conjunctures, the range of available ideological forms all determine the process of class formation. However, the process of class formation also occurs on the terrain of possibilities originally defined by the esoteric core of capitalism. Further, class formation is limited by the particular configuration of class positions. The configuration of class positions offers a set of building blocs which can be organised in various ways, which in turn, depends on other factors to do with relative power, size and political organisation.

All these elements of the exoteric have their own semi-independent processes which cannot be reduced to the generative capacity of the esoteric. The esoteric core and exoteric forms of capitalism is a very different idea from the economic base and political and ideological superstructure. The esoteric core of capitalism is a principle of social organisation which can take a range of different economic, political and ideological forms. The invariant core of capitalism provides a constant causal base. However, the complex and dialectical determinations that are possible between the economic, political and ideological dimensions of the exoteric logic of capitalism imply a range of possible social formations which remain compatible with this esoteric base.

The concrete dynamics of class in capitalist societies are flexible, contingent and conjunctural. A given set of economic class positions places limits on possible political struggles. Possible political struggles are further limited and defined by the potential of a given political system, the latter taking many possible forms within capitalism. The process of class formation occurs on the terrain of these interacting conditions. Class struggle between social classes, which are being formed and re-formed in different historic blocs on a complex economic and political terrain, constantly modifies and redefines the nature of the economic and

political terrain on which the class struggle occurs. The complex and dialectical nature of the class struggle is like waging war on constantly shifting sands, different combinations of class forces are trying to shift in different ways in order to improve their position relative to others.

Though the esoteric could be seen as the key underlying principle of economy and class, it is inadequate to deal with other class processes and their interconnections. The esoteric only provides a most general and abstract set of limits to the possible forms of this shifting war of position. In what sense, does the esoteric remain constant? Under what circumstances might the esoteric be seen to no longer have any sense of solidity or independence from interference and alteration by the exoteric? The esoteric core of capitalism is a constant limit in the sense that if society is to remain essentially capitalist, it must keep within this limit. If the core capitalist contradiction is eventually broken down through political struggle, then obviously all the rules change. A whole new terrain of possibilities would emerge.

Can the class process be seen to involve a changing relationship of divergence/ convergence between the esoteric and the exoteric, as with Lipietz's account of economic crisis? Whereas Lipietz identifies economic crises as about divergences between the esoteric and the exoteric, this does not make sense within the context of the class process. For class, exoteric relations may correspond more with the esoteric under certain structural conditions than under others, but the degree of convergence or divergence can only be politically and ideologically constructed in the final analysis. That is to say, the model of convergence between the esoteric dichotomy, on the one hand, and a concrete class structure and formation, on the other, depends on the ability of political actors to forge a unity out of contradictory circumstance based on the commonality of exploitation. Because the changing terms of class struggle suggest a number of possible classes, the revolutionary struggle is complex, with different possible strategies and outcomes. Only the abstract essential core of the esoteric unambiguously represents the revolutionist's picture of a process of class unity, class struggle, and potential class transformation. But this core cannot ever accord with a concrete process of class struggle, but revolutionary political and ideological activity is nonetheless directed at moving towards this ideal. On the other hand, the strategy of the capitalist could be seen as maximising the degree of divergence between the

esoteric and the exoteric, in order that the unity of the exploited can be submerged by a range of divisions of the exoteric.

Conclusion

The seamless integration of Marx's three accounts into a theory of classes in capitalist society falls apart rather easily. Reconstructing a theory of social class which does not simply discard the first two accounts, and which can re-integrate: (1) a static analysis of class under capitalism with its dynamic development; (2) the relationship between a class dichotomy and a class complexity and (3) the relationship between the economic and political dimensions of class struggle, is a rather more difficult task. The above reconstruction of Marx's theory of classes in capitalist society is both partial and inadequate. Nonetheless, the application of Marx's methodological prescription, and his distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric provided a framework for thinking through a reconstruction.

This paper struggles towards some kind of retention of the class dichotomy of capitalism in the notion of the esoteric core of capitalism. In this account, class structures, class formation and forms of struggle appear as only very loosely 'determined' by this core. The logic of the exoteric involves a complex mutual determination between the economic and political dimensions of the class process, which can never be reduced to the esoteric core. The structural dichotomy between social production and private appropriation, nonetheless, reveals the revolutionary core of class struggle in capitalist societies.

The logic of capitalism, once placed within a political context in line with a methodological progression towards the concrete, suggests a much more complex, contingent and flexible range of historical outcomes. A range of historical projects are compatible with the logic of capitalism. The dialectic of history as the class struggle between different possible projects, and the effect of different outcomes on the range of possible projects in the future, undermines the idea of any necessary long-term convergence of the economic dynamic of capitalism with its esoteric core.

Marx's third account ends up taking a much more central place in Marxist class theory. The task becomes not one of simply discarding this third account by

asserting the eventual coincidence of the first and second accounts. Instead, the task becomes one of considering whether or not the first and second accounts can be retained in some form or another, and remain compatible with the central third account.

The conclusion reached is that the class process comprises a multi-leveled social dynamic of interacting elements between the esoteric and the exoteric. Identifying the connection between the two levels provides only a point of departure for analysing the dialectic of the now over-loaded exoteric level. The dynamic of the exoteric implies a contingent and conjunctural view of class development. Therefore, the development of Marxist class theory requires more than ever the pursuit of historical and comparative analysis of specific social formations.

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Mobility and Change in Wellington 1881-1980

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Abstract

This paper, drawing on a large sample from central Wellington marriage registers, provides a profile of male occupational mobility (groom's father to son) over a hundred year period. Using descriptive statistics, the paper illustrates: firstly, that there has been a considerable degree of upward and downward occupational mobility between occupational categories for all of the period surveyed; secondly, there is a consistent pattern of limited long-range mobility between the apex and base of the occupational status model used.

Finally, some conclusions are drawn about the possible relationship between high levels of occupational mobility and class structuration and consciousness.

Occupational Mobility and Change in Wellington 1881-1980

In the late 1970s Peter Davis stated that: 'analysis of class and stratification in New Zealand among sociologists has proceeded quite independently of any extensive discussion of social mobility and its articulation with wider issues of social hierarchy and related political and ideological processes' (Davis, 1979:50). With very few exceptions this statement still holds true today. Most previous studies have been very small-scale and time specific. There is a cluster of studies concerned with small samples drawn from late nineteen century New Zealand (see Toynbee, 1979; Pickens, 1976). A further set of small regional samples (Robb & Cloud, 1970) and student surveys (O'Malley & Collette, 1974) were used to plot mobility patterns in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Even the one national retrospective survey study (Davis, 1979) of occupational inheritance undertaken in New Zealand, despite its considerably enhanced methodological sophistication, is restricted to a limited historical period.

More recently, work in Wellington and Christchurch using marriage records has attempted to build time series that extend across longer time periods (See

Pearson, 1980; Pearson & Thorns, 1983; Hall, Thorns and Willmott, 1983; and Pearson & Thorns, 1986). These studies have allowed us to look at patterns of occupational mobility over the past two centuries in specific suburbs with their own particular residential histories. For example, we have been able to compare patterns of occupational inheritance in predominantly working class areas (Johnsonville in Wellington, Richmond in Christchurch) with more prestigious, middle class suburbs (Karori in Wellington, Fendalton in Christchurch). Even more recently I have built on this previous work by looking at the results of a much larger sample, drawn from a longer time period and wider residential base within central Wellington. I have already reported findings on spouse selection from the Wellington marriage records study (Pearson, 1988), so in this paper results on occupational inheritance patterns will be presented.

Methodology

This study is based on approximately 16000 marriages recorded in the registers of five central city churches, covering the period from 1881 to 1980. The churches in the study were drawn from most major denominations, namely Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregational. All marriages for these churches were recorded but the sample discussed in this paper is restricted to 11,732 grooms aged thirty-five years of age or less naming Wellington as their place of residence at time of marriage.[1]

Following the convention established in earlier studies of mobility in Wellington and Christchurch suburbs, (See Pearson, 1980; Pearson & Thorns, 1986) an eight-point occupational classification was used which included three non-manual categories spanning the distinctions between professional, managerial and routine white collar work, and three manual occupational categories differentiated by skill

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[1] In United States historical mobility studies age 30 has commonly been regarded as the earliest age that one can presume that a final occupational status will be reached (Griffens, 1985:117), whilst in Britain, Goldthorpe (1980:51), for example, claims that age 35 is the time when most men have achieved a stage of relative 'occupational maturity'. The average age of marriage of grooms in New Zealand was 29 before the Second World War, 26 between 1941 and 1960, and 24 for the last two decades of the study (Vosburgh, 1978:32).

levels. Two farming categories were also used, although the incidence of farm labourers was so limited as to warrant dropping this category from this analysis. Similarly, those recorded as 'farmer' were either placed in a separate category or left out of many comparisons over time.

I have commented at length on the methodological problems of measuring occupational mobility in general, and the use of marriage records in particular, in Pearson (1988), so I need not cover old ground here. Suffice to say that familiar problems were met with respect to occupational classification, particularly in a cross-cultural and transhistorical situation; the trade off between in-depth scrutiny of the local time-series and the more expansive but historically limited coverage of the retrospective survey method; and, most pertinently, the partiality of the available sample.

Many mobility studies, by virtue of their use of male paid work status as a guide to mobility, ignore the unemployed, all those engaged in the 'informal economy' of self-provisioning and/or moonlighting, and, of course, many if not all women (see Payne, 1987:147). This study is no exception. Female paid employment status, for example, could not be assessed at all for most of the time under consideration since very few women recorded a paid employment status on their marriage record before the 1950s - the vast majority recording 'domestic duties' or leaving the 'employment' space blank - and the records are extremely uneven thereafter until the late 1960s.[2]

Despite these acknowledged imperfections, New Zealand marriage records provide the researcher with one of the very few available records of occupational background for particular individuals and their immediate kin that allow a strictly circumscribed set of conclusions about the permeability or otherwise of male inter-generational occupational status (see Griffens, 1985:117).

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2 The omission of women therefore reflects the limitations of the data not my sympathy with the so-called 'conventional' view of mobility studies (Goldthorpe, 1983). For criticism of this view see, for example, Abbott and Sapsford (1987).

National and Local Occupational Transitions

This paper examines patterns of male occupational inheritance from the 1880s to 1980. Wellington city and New Zealand society have undergone considerable change over this time span, not least in their occupational structure. There has been a national decline in agricultural employment, a marked reduction in blue collar paid work, a shrinking of the self employed sector, and, especially in Wellington, remembering our period pre-dates the welfare state cut-backs of the 1980s/90s, a rapid increase in white collar jobs, particularly with the public service sector. All these trends are illustrated in the occupational profile of the sample of grooms shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1

Occupational Distributions of Grooms 1881-1980 (Percentages)

	1881-1910	1911-1930	1931-1950	1951-1970	1971-1980
Grooms					
Professional & Managerial	18	15	14	18	27
Clerical	12	21	26	27	29
Skilled Manual	31	28	30	32	24
Semi-skilled & Unskilled	34	29	27	21	18
Farm	5	7	3	2	2
Total Number	2,419	2,918	3,308	2,305	7,821

Between 1881 and 1910 almost 20 percent of the grooms in our sample had professional or managerial occupations. This figure marginally declined over the next four decades, but it rose again from 1950 onwards, reaching a figure of over one quarter of total grooms by the 1970s. Those in routine white collar jobs were not over-numerous in the first two decades of our period. Indeed, the term clerical is a more accurate term to describe their employ since the status and paid work conditions of (male) clerks were considerably higher at this juncture than

later in the century. By 1911 white collar workers were more numerous and their numbers continued to rise from a figure of 21 percent (in 1911) to 29 percent in 1980. The numbers of skilled manual workers remained the most stable component of our occupational profile, declining from almost a third of the sample at the turn of the century to just under a quarter in the 1980s. Not so for semi and unskilled manual workers who show a decline from over a third of the total in the 1881-1910 decades to less than 20 percent in the 1980s. The overall balance between white collar and blue collar jobs shifts markedly over our one hundred year period. In the late nineteenth, early twentieth centuries two thirds of grooms getting married in Wellington central churches were blue collar workers, by the 1960s there was a fifty/fifty chance that this would be the case; by the 1970s less than half of local grooms were manual workers. All through our period farmers and farm workers had a minor presence. Between 1881 and 1930 five to seven percent of grooms had agricultural backgrounds, but this figure steadily declines to a mere 2 percent by the 1950s and remains there until our most recent decade.

This shift in balance between white and blue collar, and farm/non-farm backgrounds fits the overall shape of what Payne (1987:59) has called the 'occupational transition', a phenomenon that is discernible in all western capitalist societies, including New Zealand (see Jones & Davis, 1986). The overall pattern of occupational change in Wellington reflects the national profile, although we need to be mindful of the possibility of variations in the occupational backgrounds of grooms residing in particular parts of the city.[3]

It is only recently that inner city redevelopment and gentrification have not only reduced the residential density of the inner city but also altered the occupational background of its occupants. The Dress Circle in Wellington has always been dominated by the better-off, but the flat basin of the central city originally contained many working class residents (Franklin, 1978:346). Post Second World War expansion of the state not only increased the numbers of routine and non-routine white collar workers, thus increasing the flow of 'mobility' from blue to

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[3] Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing how many grooms resided in the immediate vicinity of the church since weddings usually take place at a church near the home of the bride. Most grooms included in the sample simply wrote 'Wellington' as their 'Usual Address' at time of marriage, so finer discrimination of location in the city was impossible.

white collar jobs for the local and incoming populace, the growth in office building displaced many of the manual workers who lived in the central city, many of whom we could surmise had already moved to the suburbs anyway. Continued expansion of office buildings and changes in transport networks, most notably motorway construction in the mid-1970s, sharply reduced the number of dwellings in the city centre per se, whilst concomitant sharp rises in property prices and rentals also displaced some of the original working class population.[4]

Mobility and Self-Recruitment

Patterns of self-recruitment of occupational status, in other words the level of occupational inheritance of a father's status by a son at time of marriage, can be shown by referring to the following outflow[5] Tables 2, 3 and 4, that illustrate changes over three periods of time - 1881 to 1910, 1911 to 1950, and 1951 to 1980. The figures on the diagonals show the percentage of self-recruitment for particular decades within these time spans.

As one can see from Table 2, the level of occupational inheritance of professional/managerial occupations rose from 20 percent to 33 percent over the decades spanning the turn of the century; but clearly most high white collar sons had not attained the same occupational status as their father's by the time of their marriage. This reatively low level of self-recruitment is partly explained by the

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4 These brief allusions to changes at different levels of analysis reaffirm my belief in the implausibility of isolating so-called 'structural' from 'exchange' mobility. (see Pearson & Thorns, 1986:214-216) As Payne points out, the practice of dichotomising 'actual' and 'pure' occupational mobility patterns is a dubious proposition (Payne, 1987:17). Technically it may be an attractive option to isolate individual mobility patterns from the structural changes those patterns occur within, but the possibility of such a separation, particularly within the confines of the methodological difficulties already outlined, is, at best, highly debatable (see Noble, 1979). Problems relating to censoring bias, referencing difficulties and composition effects are also technical problems that are acknowledged but cannot be controlled for with this type of data.

5 In outflow tables percentages are calculated across the rows, giving the destinations of men from given origins. In inflow tables (see Table 6) percentages are calculated down the columns showing where men currently in a given class came from.

relationship between occupational careers and position in the life cycle. A father in middle age has most probably already reached the highest point in his career, his son(s) (in their twenties) can still hold hopes of advancement. Entry into a clerical position, still a relatively small and prestigious sector of the employment market for males in the 1890s and 1990s, offered a route to greater professional and managerial rewards. Approximately 15 percent of professional/managerial sons (in Table 2) were engaged in routine clerical work at the time of their marriage, but it would be unwise simply to describe this as downward mobility.

As noted earlier, the manual/non-manual divide was a meaningful barrier at the turn of the century, depending on levels of literacy and education, and offering rather different career opportunities and work conditions. Nevertheless, even at this stage one can see that this boundary was far from impermeable. Admittedly as the level of self-recruitment of professional/managerial positions rose, the incidence of high white collar sons acquiring skilled manual work declined (from 40% in 1881/1890 to 29% in 1901/1910), but the possibility of the son of an accountant or business manager becoming a semi or unskilled manual worker was hardly insignificant, with between a quarter and a fifth of such sons reaching this occupational destination. A further explanatory factor that must be contemplated when considering the fate of those on the top-most rung of the occupational ladder, is that the only direction they can move in is down! This is not a fate shared by clerical workers, so we add another dimension to our description of the self-recruitment of different occupational placements. As one can see from Table 2, the percentage of self-recruitment of clerical and other white collar workers rose from 17 to 23 percent over the period 1818-1910. The percentage of clerks moving into professional/managerial positions rose by exactly the same margin over the same period. The chances of a clerk seeing his son enter into skilled manual work at the turn of the century were considerable if our Wellington grooms are any guide. Fully 42% of fathers in lower white collar employ had a son who wore a blue collar to work between 1881 and 1911, although this figure fell to under a quarter in the first decade of the twentieth century. At this time the chance of movement from a clerical background into skilled or semi/unskilled jobs was approximately 50:50.

Table 2

Intergenerational Mobility 1881-1910 : Outflow

Son's Occupation	I%	II%	III%	IV%	V%	Ns (100%)
Father's Occupation						
I Professional & Managerial						
1881-1890	20	15	40	23	3	75
1891-1990	30	12	32	25	2	220
1901-1910	33	15	29	20	3	434
II Clerical						
1881-1890	17	17	42	25	0	12
1891-1900	12	15	42	27	4	26
1901-1910	24	23	21	32	1	92
III Skilled Manual						
1881-1890	16	10	48	26	0	61
1891-1900	14	12	42	28	4	156
1901-1910	12	10	41	36	1	369
IV Semi-skilled & Unskilled						
1881-1890	7	8	22	59	4	99
1891-1990	10	6	24	58	2	195
1901-1910	10	10	30	47	2	347
V Farm						
1881-1890	8	13	18	45	17	78
1891-1900	17	11	15	32	26	109
1901-1910	12	12	23	28	26	188

The highest levels of self-recruitment in these early decades (1881-1911) are to be found among blue collar workers, although the trend is towards lower levels of occupational inheritance as we move through this period. Almost half (48%)

of artisans' sons stepped into their fathers' occupational shoes in the 1880s, and well over half (59%) of semi/unskilled manual workers reveal the same pattern of occupational inheritance. These figures had fallen to 41 percent and 47 percent respectively by the 1900s. The chances of a skilled carpenter, plumber or printer having a son who wore a white collar both in church and at his workplace remained relatively constant across two decades, but it was just as likely that their son could be in semi or unskilled manual work, and this likelihood increased over the period from 1881 to 1910 (from 26 to 36 percent). This trend is reversed among the sons of lower blue collar workers, who being on the lowest rungs of our occupational ladder can only stay put or move up. Clearly sizeable numbers (22 to 30 percent) of the sons of labourers or storemen moved into skilled manual work, and an increasing percentage (15 to 20 percent) made it into the white collar ranks - in roughly the same proportions into the higher and lower white collar echelons.

Farming remained a unlikely destination for all the sons in our sample throughout the period of our study. The degree of diffusion of farmers' sons across the occupational spectrum confirms our earlier caution about the difficulty of using the farming label. Self recruitment in the farming category rises from 17 to 26 percent in Table 2, and the possibility of farmers' sons working in semi/unskilled manual work fell quite sharply (from 45 to 28 percent), but the pattern of movements into skilled blue collar or routine or high white collar work is far from clear-cut.

If we turn to examine the figures in Table 3, that illustrate outflow patterns between 1911 and 1950, both consistency and change can be found. Levels of self-recruitment within the professional/managerial ranks remained relatively stable (between 31 and 26 percent) over the forty year period, although this reflects a downward trend in self-recruitment from earlier decades. Levels of outflow into skilled manual work remain steady since the 1890s. The most interesting feature of professional/managerial occupational inheritance is the increasing incidence of high white collar sons in more routine clerical work and the parallel trend of decreased chances of the son of a lawyer or medical man doing semi or unskilled manual work.

Whereas just over a quarter of clerks' sons could expect to wield a pen in a similar desk job to their father between 1911 and 1920, the chances of

occupational inheritance soared (to 51 percent) in the 1920s, and fell back to a still sizeable figure of 36 to 38 percent in the 1930s and 40s. As for moves across the non-manual/manual line, these were erratic, but there was a tendency for the sons of clerical workers to acquire a skilled trade, although the changes of sliding into lower manual employment declined between 1911 and 1950.

Over this period the sons of skilled manual workers reveal a stable pattern of self-recruitment (33 to 37 percent inherit their fathers' occupational station in life), although this reflects a marked shift downward in self-recruitment from the earlier decades in our study (see Table 1). Between a quarter and a third of skilled manual workers continue to display a similar incidence of moves into lower manual work (possibly en route for a skilled manual status), thus confirming the relative stability of blue collar background. Nevertheless, by the 1940s a quarter of artisans' sons on average can expect to be found behind a desk, and a further 10 percent could have risen into the professional/managerial ranks.

Despite the greater prevalence of routine white collar work, semi and unskilled manual workers continue to show high levels of self-recruitment. One of the most interesting features of the lower blue collar figures is that the chances of moving into skilled manual or white collar employment remain fairly similar. However, the probability of making a major occupational transition from the bottom to the top of the occupational ladder (at least by age of marriage) is low - a trend we will explore further later in the paper.

The incidence of farming occupations appearing among our Wellington grooms reaches negligible proportions by the 1950s. The level of self-recruitment among farmers increases just before the 1920s and then stabilises around 17 to 20 percent in the 1930s and 40s. Farmers' sons reflect an overall trend of movement into white collar jobs, most noticeably in the lower echelons. Interestingly, almost a quarter of farmers' sons on average (in this period) moved into semi or unskilled manual work. A further reflection of the vagueness of the farming title and the impossibility of distinguishing between agricultural ownership and employment in particular, and manual employee (farm labourer) statuses in general.

Table 3

Intergenerational Mobility 1911-1950 : Outflow

Son's Occupation	I%	II%	III%	IV%	V%	N's
Father's Occupation						
I Professional & Managerial						
1911-1920	31	19	26	21	3	386.00
1921-1930	36	25	27	16	6	342.00
1931-1940	27	28	28	16	1	377.00
1941-1950	26	29	31	12	1	371.00
II Clerical						
1911-1920	17	27	21	26	8	118.00
1921-1930	15	51	18	14	2	146.00
1931-1940	20	36	18	24	1	176.00
1941-1950	17	38	28	16	1	231.00
III Skilled Manual						
1911-1920	14	22	33	27	3	305.00
1921-1930	12	21	35	30	2	414.00
1931-1940	10	25	33	30	1	424.00
1941-1950	10	25	37	26	1	451.00
IV Semi-skilled & Unskilled						
1911-1920	10	16	26	46	2	335.00
1921-1930	9	17	29	44	1	512.00
1931-1940	6	20	32	41	1	504.00
1941-1950	5	23	31	41	0	471.00
V Farm						
1911-1920	9	16	21	22	32	198.00
1921-1930	9	19	22	26	23	216.00
1931-1940	14	25	20	24	17	178.00
1941-1950	8	25	24	24	20	187.00

By the 1950s the welfare state is well established in New Zealand and Wellington has confirmed its status as the hub of public servant employment. Unskilled blue collar jobs have declined to be replaced by a far more buoyant market for routine white collar workers. One should note that important market segregations on the basis of gender and ethnicity are unreflected or remain hidden in our sample of Wellington grooms. This sample, as I noted above, reflects a larger proportion of professional and managerial positions, particularly for grooms married in the 1970s. This increase could denote a widening of mobility possibilities as this market sector widened, but the credentials for entry into the upper echelons of the professions and management continue to rise. The balance between an expanding occupational sector and the patterns of closure that operate to restrict entry into high white collar work are exemplified by the figures for self-recruitment of the professional/managerial category in Table 4.

By the 1970s 44 percent of the fathers in this category had sons who directly inherited their professional or managerial status. The possibility of remaining within a white collar job is further confirmed by the upward trend of those on the two highest rungs of our occupational ladder having sons who have at least attained employment in the rung below them at time of marriage. These sons are either on the way up to their fathers' status, or have only slipped down one rung.

Any tendency to over-emphasise a debatable status distinction between white and blue collar employment in the post-Second World War period, should be nipped in the bud by noting that sizeable numbers of professional/managerial sons continue to engage in skilled manual work, although this eventuality becomes less likely the nearer we move to 1980; and the chance of a high white collar man's son sliding into semi/unskilled manual work grows increasingly remote as time passes.

Clerical workers' sons continue to inherit their fathers' occupational status in increasing numbers (from 37 to 49 percent) and their chances of acquiring a professional/managerial position continue to improve between 1951 and 1980, although hardly spectacularly. This overall consolidation of white collar status is confirmed by the declining trend of moves by the sons of routine white collar workers across the non-manual/manual line. Nevertheless, the barriers, if such a word is appropriate, to recruitment to white collar positions are hardly formidable as a glance at the sizeable figures for skilled manual workers' sons

moving 'upwards' reveal. Over a third (35 percent) of the clerks and salespersons standing at the altar in a Wellington central city church in the 1970s has a father who had a blue collar job; and a further fifth of such grooms had attained a professional or managerial position by this decade.

Table 4

Intergenerational Mobility 1951-1980 : Outflow

Son's Occupation	I%	II%	III%	IV%	V%	N's
Father's Occupation						
I Professional & Managerial						
1951-1960	29	26	29	14	2	298
1961-1970	35	33	20	10	1	249
1971-1980	44	35	14	7	0	135
II Clerical						
1951-1960	22	37	23	16	1	223
1961-1970	17	45	25	12	1	163
1971-1980	25	49	19	6	0	67
III Skilled Manual						
1951-1960	14	22	43	20	0	348
1961-1970	16	34	34	15	0	227
1971-1980	20	35	33	12	0	83
IV Semi-skilled & Unskilled						
1951-1960	7	18	37	38	0	399
1961-1970	10	22	38	30	0	204
1971-1980	21	20	36	20	3	75
V Farm						
1951-1960	11	25	26	29	22	113
1961-1970	10	10	23	20	6	69
1971-1980	7	11	4	4	1	27

Moreover, the prospect of the son of a skilled tradesman sliding into less skilled manual work was becoming less likely, although whether this continues to be the case in the downward employment spiral of the 1980s and early 1990s is beyond the scope of this study. Finally, one can note that the number of farmers in our 1951-1980 sample has declined to the point where discussion of percentage trends is unprofitable.

Patterns of Observed Mobility

If we total the cells below, on and above the main diagonals from top left to top right in Tables 2, 3 and 4 above, we can display (in Table 5 below) the general trends of observed mobility patterns across our hundred year span, retaining the three broad time periods used in the previous section on patterns of self-recruitment.

As one can see the overall pattern is one of considerable fluidity. Almost a third of professional and managerial grooms on average directly inherited their fathers' occupational status by the time of their marriage, but clearly this left around two thirds who moved downwards, albeit perhaps temporarily for some. The possibility of a lower white collar worker stepping straight into the shoes of their father has doubled over our hundred year span, although we need to remember the very small number of clerks in our sample for the end of the nineteenth century. The entrenchment of lower white collar life chances is also indicated by the declining probability of clerical and sales workers donning a blue collar.

Interestingly, the possibility of upward mobility into the professional/managerial ranks remained fairly constant across the decades. Skilled manual workers had a quite consistent pattern of self-recruitment, but they display a trend towards increasing possibilities of upward mobility as the numbers moving into white collar employment rise rapidly over our period. This is matched by the sharply declining possibilities of skilled manual downward mobility, particularly in the most recent set of decades. By way of contrast semi and unskilled manual workers, with the highest level of immobility at the turn of the century, display increasing possibilities of upward mobility as we move closer to the present.

Table 5

Observed Mobility 1881-1980

	Immobile	%	Down	%	Up	%	Totals
I Prof. & Managerial							
1881-1910	224	31.7	483	68.3	0	0	707
1911-1950	406	28.3	1,028	71.7	0	0	1,434
1951-1980	234	34.7	441	65.3	0	0	675
II Clerical							
1881-1910	27	21.2	74	57.8	27	21.1	128
1911-1950	257	39.3	280	42.8	117	17.9	654
1951-1980	190	42.2	164	36.5	95	21.2	449
III Skilled Manual							
1881-1910	245	42.6	192	33.4	138	24.0	575
1911-1950	557	35.6	451	28.8	557	35.6	1,565
1951-1980	254	38.7	115	17.5	288	43.8	657
IV Semi & Unskilled							
1881-1910	333	53.3	0	0.	292	46.7	625
1911-1950	781	43.3	0	0.	1,023	56.7	1,804
1951-1980	227	33.6	0	0.	448	66.4	675

These patterns of absolute mobility may be explained by a combination of 'ceiling' and 'floor' effects at the top and bottom of our occupational scale, the relative numbers in particular categories and the characteristics of the locality from which our data is drawn. For example, we could suggest that we might expect rather higher levels of immobility within more occupationally homogeneous residential areas compared with the relatively more mixed character of central Wellington. This assertion is confirmed from my previous studies of occupational inheritance in Karori and Johnsonville that followed the same methodology and covered approximately similar time periods to the central Wellington study (see Pearson & Thorns, 1986:219). In Karori, a predominantly middle class suburb, the level of self-recruitment across the period 1883 to 1970 fell within the narrow range of 59 to 66 percent, so on average almost two thirds of sons had directly inherited their fathers' occupational status at time of

marriage. In Johnsonville, a solidly working class suburb for much of its history, the degree of occupational closure across an identical time-span to the Karori study, was even more marked. Between 1883 and 1905 fully 87 percent of Johnsonville grooms had directly inherited the (largely blue collar) occupational status of their father at time of marriage. This figure declined steadily over subsequent decades, but by the 1960s (1961-1970) the overall level of self-recruitment still remained at 64 percent. These Karori and Johnsonville figures are significantly higher than any of the central Wellington figures irrespective of occupational category or period. These figures also reinforce the expectation from other New Zealand studies that movement between adjacent occupational categories is a great deal more 'open' than between distant categories (see Pearson & Thorns, 1983; Jones & Davis, 1986).

Long Range Occupational Mobility

The trends illustrated in the above tables pose a number of interesting questions. Most pertinently, are we viewing evidence for the increasing 'openness' of society in terms of occupational inheritance, at least until the beginning of the 1980s? The imprecision and regional specificity of our data hardly allow us to be anything more than speculative, but our central Wellington data seem to confirm the results from previous national and New Zealand local studies (see Davis, 1979) that movement between adjacent occupation categories was a very common eventuality. However, there is ample evidence, despite the considerable debate about how to deal with this conceptually (see Burris, 1989) that the manual/non-manual division as a guide to class boundaries becomes increasingly questionable over time as lower white collar work becomes more routinised and gender based, and the divisions between specific categories of new forms of 'white collar' work become more complex.

If short range movement across increasingly implausible occupational category boundaries is the norm, the real test of permeability would seem to rest with the relative life chances of those at the apex and base of our occupational framework. What is the pattern of movement for those grooms describing themselves as lawyers or accountants, our professionals; in comparison with labourers and roadmen? If we disaggregate professionals from category I and unskilled workers

from category IV this comparison can be drawn. Table 6 below plots this relationship over the past one hundred years.

Table 6

Mobility between Professionals and Unskilled Manual 1881-1980 (%)

	Total N	Percent	Total N	Percent
Professional		**Inflow from Unskilled**		**Outflow to Unskilled**
1881-1910	172	2.3	124	4.0
1911-1950	319	2.5	294	4.1
1951-1980	178	2.3	238	3.8
Unskilled	**Inflow from Professional**		**Outflow to Professional**	
1881-1910	192	1.7	265	1.5
1911-1950	785	1.5	422	1.9
1951-1980	245	3.7	105	3.8

If the data presented earlier in this paper shows a picture of considerable fluidity between occupational categories over the years Table 6 reveals that there are clear limits to mobility. Between 1881 and 1980 there was a considerable degree of closure within the professional ranks as far as recruitment from unskilled manual is concerned. Less than 3 percent of labourers or storemen succeeded in attaining a professional status by the time of their marriage, and we can speculate that this indicates their chances of doing so later in life were not high. Similarly whilst earlier tables certainly show a considerable level of downward mobility out of the professional/managerial ranks the chances of a groom with a professional background having to don overalls or wield a pick and shovel was slight - only approximately 4 percent of such grooms had reached this destination by the time of their marriage. Looking at the outflow figures for the other end of the scale, the negligible chances of an unskilled manual position being filled by a person with a professional background are confirmed, and the possibilities of upward mobility into higher white collar employment are equally remote.

Conclusion

The results in this paper, bearing in mind the considerable difficulties of comparing studies that use different methodologies to study different times and places, add further weight to those who wish to argue that at least until the 1970s, New Zealanders (and one could be more confident if one restricted one's comments to Pakeha males) lived in a society where many sons did not directly inherit the occupational background of their father. Short range mobility up and down between adjacent occupational categories, and indeed beyond, was a common occurrence right across our 100 year time span, although the possibilities of more distant moves between pinnacle and base were far more remote. The degree of within 'class' recruitment in central Wellington was far lower than for Karori or Johnsonville, thus confirming popular perceptions of particular suburbs typifying marked differences in the occupational backgrounds of their residents. Overall, this study of central Wellington confirms the broad parameters of the arguments put forward by Davis (1979; and 1986) that an image of New Zealand as a closed or rigidly stratified society is rather inapposite - at least for the period covered by this paper.

However, one should remain cautious about how far we should be prepared to link these occupational mobility trends to arguments about class structure and formation (see Pearson, 1987:147). Within the broadly Weberian perspective adopted in this paper the relative closure of classes as abstractions (and more pertinently social classes as communities) is intimately related to the inheritability or otherwise of life chances in the labour market. In Giddens' (1973) parlance I would agree that the relationship between mobility closure and market capacity is a vital indicator of class structuration. But there are dangers in viewing occupational mobility rates in isolation as an unproblematic indicator of class mobility. As Payne notes:

> 'Social' and 'class' mobility is normally thought of as a movement between social classes, whereas it is operationalised in occupational mobility, and so it is a product of employment processes that have taken place in specific historical and economic circumstances.' (Payne, 1987:ix)

Such employment processes are heavily influenced, for example, by changes in the occupational structure, employment status and labour process, educational attainment, family and household structure, migration, and the changing structure

and workings of the state, none of which are adequately addressed in this study, nor are most of these processes addressed in the other New Zealand studies cited above.

The process through which individual sons and their fathers obtained their jobs is, therefore, intimately tied to class differentiation, but this is not to say that an occupational distribution is a neat surrogate for class division (see Abercrombie & Urry, 1982). The neglect of property relations, in Marxian or Weberian analyses, is a classic illustration of the dangers of a facile elision between occupational status and class position in many mobility studies. Nevertheless, no better method appears to have been found to replace viewing occupation as the backbone of social grading. One's occupation is one of the most useful, if hardly infallible, guides to income acquisition and consumption patterns; to levels of skill and educational attainment; to mortality and fertility rates; to friendship and kinship patterns; to levels of social prestige; and, even less concretely, to sets of opinions, values and attitudes that influence, for example, political behaviour (Payne, 1987:17). A person's occupational status, therefore, has an important degree of significance for life styles and group identity. Occupational status also has a close relationship with social status, although the reintroduction of gender or ethnicity immediately confirms that ***occupational*** mobility is not necessarily ***social*** mobility per se.

What one can argue is that rates of occupational mobility are a vital part, if not the whole, of the equation relating to how persons assess the extent of fluidity in the class structure. Indeed, they are central to the question of how persons come to decide whether there ***are*** classes in their society at all. Studies of the links between social origins, migration and perceptions of opportunities for social ascent and descent, therefore, provide one important dimension of class structuration and it is to be hoped that this paper illustrates the complementarity of local and national research in the study of this process.

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Rogernomics and the Labour Market

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This paper uses data, mainly from the Household Labour Force Survey, to examine changes in the New Zealand labour market during the period of the Fourth Labour Government. The paper examines trends in women's labour force involvement, the growth of part-time employment, the changing industrial distribution of employment, trends in the distribution of income and the differential impact of unemployment over the period between December 1985 and December 1990.

Introduction

The Labour Government which held office from 1984 to 1990 is credited with transforming the New Zealand economy. The Labour Government's strategy was almost immediately nicknamed "Rogernomics" (a variation of Reaganomics) after Roger Douglas, the first minister responsible for it. Although Douglas was replaced as Minister of Finance in December 1988, a similar programme continued to be implemented until the Government was defeated at the polls in October 1990. Consequently, we will use the term Rogernomics in this paper as a shorthand for the plethora of economic and social policies implemented by the Fourth Labour Government between July 1984 and October 1990 (Bollard and Buckle, 1987; Collins, 1987; Easton, 1989).

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Rogernomics was always controversial (Zanetti *et al.*, 1984; Treasury, 1985; Zanetti, 1985; Dalziel 1991). The set of policies which identified Rogernomics was almost a complete contradiction of traditional Labour Party policy, and stood in sharp contrast to the legacy of previous Labour administrations. For example, big business were the immediate beneficiaries of much of the programme (e.g., privatisation), rather than Labour's traditional constituency, the working class (Jesson *et al.*, 1988). The inspiration of Rogernomics were the New Right ideas of monetarism and neoclassical economics. The programme was largely developed by Treasury officials, whose published briefing papers (1984, 1987) could be construed as a New Right manifesto, despite attempts to deny this (Jesson, Ryan and Spoonley, 1988). Unfortunately, rather than providing a convincing argument, these briefing papers reveal a serious divergence between Treasury's analysis and the actual conditions in the New Zealand economy. The dimensions of that gulf have become increasingly obvious as most indicators (other than inflation) reveal a distinctly inferior performance.[2]

This paper examines only one aspect of the failure of Rogernomics, the labour market. Supporters of Rogernomics, including Roger Douglas himself, pointed to the labour market as an anomaly within the Rogernomics programme. They argued that Rogernomics was unfinished because the labour market had not been deregulated. There are two problems with this claim. In the first place, it understates the extent of changes which the Labour Government made to the legislative and social frameworks which regulate the labour market. Secondly, deregulation in other markets interacted with these legislative and social changes to produce significant changes in the structure of employment, the pattern of bargaining, and in labour supply. We look at these two aspects first.

Legislative and Social Change in the Labour Market

Although the New Zealand Labour movement had been looking, since 1983, at the possibility of copying the Australian Accord, the suddenness of the snap election in 1984, and the pre-emptive strike by the Rogernomics clique

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[2] The New Zealand experience is by no means unique. Kevin Phillips (1990), a Republican strategist, has concluded that the effect of Reaganomics on the United States economy was similar.

immediately after the election (Jesson, 1989), ruled out such an arrangement as a practical option. When the new government turned its attention to the wage fixing system, its thinking was oriented towards the problems of inflation, a major concern being the breakout from the wage-price freeze. Consequently, in late 1984, the Government amended the Industrial Relations Act to *inter alia* abolish the compulsory arbitration of interest disputes. This was the most significant change to the wage fixing system in half a century; it allowed employers in weakly organised industries to refuse to settle awards and eroded the historical system of relativities. Thus it caused a significant breach in the national award system.

The major change came with the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 1987. This Act was a major component of Rogernomics. It was seen as crucial in "the fight against inflation". Its role in this fight was to outlaw second tier bargaining, which was believed to be a source of wage inflation. The new Act required that a worker be covered by only one registered instrument. If a union wished to have separate negotiation with a particular employer, that employer had to be cited out of the award. The separate negotiations were not underpinned by the award as they had been previously. Again, this gave a significant advantage to employers. Moreover, the Government itself benefited in its own role as an employer as the principle of fair relativity was abolished by the State Sector Act 1988, and the provisions of the Labour Relations Act were applied to the State sector.

The wage determination system was only on part of the package to directly affect the labour market. The programme of corporatisation and redundancies in the State sector directly destroyed about thirty thousand jobs. In addition, welfare benefits were reduced, unemployment benefit was made taxable, temporary job schemes were scrapped, and taxation was increased for the lowest paid, and reduced for the highest paid. Meanwhile, the Government gave clear signals to the private sector that real wages were to be driven down. The Government did its best to reduce wages in the state sector, it gave moral support to private sector employers who followed their lead, and, to reinforce the point, it virtually abolished the system of wage inspection which had been in place since 1894.

Labour Market Regulation

Those who called for labour market deregulation wanted the sorts of changes which have now been implemented through the Employment Contracts Act 1991. However, for some, such as the Business Roundtable, even these changes do not go far enough. (See, for example, Brook, 1990; or New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1988.) These groups are opposed to any state or centralised regulatory systems, or anything that grants power to organised labour. Their arguments are couched in terms of "labour market deregulation". It is impossible, however, for modern labour markets not to be regulated. The nature of the employment contracts ensures this. In the extreme position of there being no labour law and no employment contracts, employment would still be regulated by the activities of trade unions and management, and the activities of work groups. Even in the least structured labour markets, management's rules, however informal they might be, exist as a form of regulation.

The crucial issue in legal deregulation, and one recognised by Roundtable staff, is the role of the common law. A continuous theme in the history of industrial relations in common law countries has been for parliaments to legislate to suppress the common law, which is biased very heavily in favour of employers (Collins, 1986), and to substitute legislative regulation which removes some of the imbalances in the employment relationship. In New Zealand, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration system set up an alternative system to the common law, although it left much of the common law intact; for example, the right to sue for damages caused by strike action (Brosnan, Smith and Walsh, 1990). Brook (1990) argued for the common law as an alternative form of legal regulation. However, her optimistic expectations of the common law are quite at variance with the historical evidence (Pelling, 1976).

The calls for labour market deregulation made during the Rogernomics era, and which continued beyond, were not aiming for a total deregulation, although those who made the calls endeavoured to give that impression. Rather, they wanted to remove those aspects of regulation which reduced the disproportionate power of employers. Thus, the main thrust of these demands was directed at the removal of legislation which suppressed the common law, supported collective activity (trade unionism), and gave positive legal rights to individual workers. In a nutshell, what was sought, and mainly delivered through the Employment

Contracts Act 1991, was a revised system of legal regulation which favoured employers and disadvantaged workers.

Overview of the Labour Market Under Rogernomics

We examine the effects of Rogernomics on the labour market in the main part of the paper but an overview is useful here. The main movements in the labour force are summarized in Table 1. Total employment fell by about 5 percent during the period of Rogernomics; consequently, unemployment rates more than doubled. Apprenticeship numbers were cut significantly. The increases in unemployment might have been greater were it not for the continual loss of population through emigration, and a severe reduction in labour force participation. Also, the era saw a reversal of the historical trend for women's labour force participation to increase continuously (Revell and Brosnan, 1986). Beyond these changes, there was a restructuring of many full-time jobs to part-time jobs.

Table 1: Labour Force

	1986[a]	1987[a]	1988[a]	1989[a]	1990[a]
Employed (000s)	1544.3	1554.1	1502.4	1460.9	1472.0
Unemployed (000s)	64.1	65.8	88.7	112.2	124.1
Labour Force (000s)[b]	1608.5	1619.9	1591.1	1573.1	1596.1
Working Age Population (000s)	2429.2	2451.5	2466.7	2478.9	2506.0
Male Participation Rate (%)	78.8	78.1	75.8	74.5	73.9
Female Participation Rate (%)	54.21	54.59	53.69	52.86	53.90
Unemployment Rate (%)	4.0	4.1	5.6	7.1	7.8

Source: PC INFOS.
Note: [a] = December year quarterly averages.
[b] = Totals may differ due to rounding.

Furthermore, real wages fell substantially and the distribution of labour market income became more uneven. Aside from a small gain in women's earnings relative to men's, women, Maori and Pacific Island workers suffered the most from the Rogernomics programme. The labour market legacy of Rogernomics has been increased inequity and disadvantage.

Labour Market Adjustment

The New Right might argue that had there been more extensive legislative change, the labour market would have cleared and none of the undesirable consequences described above - and set out in more detail below - would have occurred. There are three problems with this response. First, as the experience in 1991 has shown, more extensive legislative deregulation has not produced any turn around. In fact, all the indicators outlined in the two proceeding paragraphs have deteriorated sharply since the National Government introduced further benefit cuts and implemented the Employment Contracts Act. Secondly, the Rogernomics period saw many of the adjustments which the New Right sought, such as falling real wages and a regressive redistribution of income, but this was accompanied by a declining demand for labour, not an increase as they had predicted. Thirdly, the New Right argument for "deregulation" is a political argument for shifting the balance of power in the labour market, and it fails to take account of the systems of regulation that operate in labour markets.

The New Right's approach is to treat the labour market as any other market. There are severe difficulties with this approach. For one thing, all markets have their own special characteristics and few adjust in the simple manner depicted in elementary economics textbooks. Unfortunately, many of the New Right are mostly familiar with financial markets which arguably come closest to the textbook model. But labour markets are very different to both financial markets. The major difference between labour markets and other markets is that the commodity being traded is a social relationship. This influences all aspects of the market. Social processes interact with economic factors to produce labour markets which are heavily segmented.

Any attempt to deregulate the labour market will also affect the pattern of segmentation. Legal systems of regulation are one of many economic and social

factors which interact to produce labour market segmentation.[3] On the demand side, the process of segmentation creates a structure of occupations characterised by varying degrees of stability and a varying susceptibility to competition. On the supply side, the process of segmentation ensures that socially powerless and disadvantaged groups are structured into the least desirable occupations.

This has two important implications for attempts to deregulate. Firstly, legislative change is unlikely to reduce the degree of segmentation. What it will do is re-segment the market along different lines as greater priority is given to alternative systems of regulation. Secondly, the deregulation and subsequent re-segmentation is likely to affect the groups most disadvantaged in the labour market. Without the protection of legislation, they will suffer a disproportionate loss of bargaining power, be forced to work for lower wages and/or worse conditions, and be more vulnerable to capricious or autocratic management.

The pattern of segmentation interacts with, and forms part of, the process of adjustment to change in product markets, financial markets and labour markets. Many different variables will adjust in response to changes in supply or demand. For example, a decrease in demand in product markets may lead to price, quantity, quality, marketing or technological changes. On the supply side, workers may vary their hours, the quit rate may decrease, job search times may lengthen, participation in education systems may increase, migration processes may alter in terms of direction and intensity, and participation in unwaged domestic labour may change. On the demand side, firms may reorganise production by laying off staff and replacing them with sub-contractors, casual and part-time labour, or by postponing the introduction of new technologies. Firms may also respond by altering their personnel policies (relative pay or promotion rates), or by making adjustments in their product mix or inventory policy.

Groups who are concentrated in occupations susceptible to the effects of competition are further disadvantaged by adjustment. The magnitude of changes in wages, conditions, and stability of employment will vary across the different

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[3] A number of processes have been identified in the literature as producing segmentation. For example, discrimination (Roemer, 1979), internal labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971), social networks (Mainwaring, 1984), trade unions (Rubery, 1978), political power (Brosnan, Rea and Wilson, 1991) and education (Bowles and Gintis, 1975).

segments of the labour market. Thus adjustment compounds the differential reward of workers between different segments. Segmentation ensures that the burden of labour market adjustment is borne by disadvantaged groups.

Data

Unfortunately, we do not have the ideal data to analyse the labour market over the Rogernomics period. The best data we have are from the Household Labour Force Survey. (Coincidentally, it was the Labour Government which approved the financing of the Household Labour Force Survey.) But the first results from the Household Labour Force Survey cover the December 1985 quarter. There are no comparable data which cover the period before December 1985. The nearest equivalent is the 1981 Population Census. Unfortunately, data from the Census and the Household Labour Force Survey, although similar, are not strictly comparable.

The Quarterly Employment Survey is another data source which is available over the whole period. However, it is not comparable to the Household Labour Force Survey at all, and has a restricted coverage of enterprises and industries. Moreover, the management of the Quarterly Employment Survey was transferred from the Department of Labour to the Department of Statistics in 1989 and the data from the two departments' surveys are not comparable. In this paper, we will use both sources of data supplemented with other series where appropriate.

Since the Rogernomics programme was launched in the latter half of 1984, and the effects of the policies would not be felt immediately, we will take 1985 as the base year for analysis where possible. Using the Household Labour Force Survey data, we will be restricted to beginning most annual analysis in 1986. Although Douglas resigned from office at the end of 1988, his policies continued for the remaining life of the Labour Government. Allowing for lags again, we will take December 1990 as the end point for our analysis.

As the Household Labour Force Survey results are based on a sample, it is necessary to allow for sampling error in interpreting the results. In the discussion which follows, we mainly concentrate on changes in averages between 1986 and 1990, although we also report average data for the intervening years. We shall

only discuss changes in the tables which are significant at the 5 percent level. The only exception is in the discussion of participation rates (Table 12) where we concentrate on the divergence between participation rates in 1990 and those that would have occurred had participation profiles maintained their historical trends.

We turn now to a consideration of Rogernomics with its changes to the bargaining system, to social welfare eligibilities, to taxation, to State sector employment, to industrial protection and to the level of aggregate demand, and the effects of these on employment, wages, unemployment, the labour force and training.

Employment

(i) Persons in Jobs

The population of working age increased by approximately seventy-seven thousand between 1986 and 1990, i.e., at an annual rate of about 0.8 percent annually. The number of jobs, as reported by the Quarterly Employment Survey, grew until 1986, then fell by between 1 and 3 percent annually after that. The Household Labour Force Survey reported a similar rate of job loss except for a small increase in 1990 of 0.8 percent. This increase, however, was only half the increase in the labour force over the same period. Thus, the period from 1985 onwards saw a continual rise in the number of unemployed.

(ii) Part-time and Full-time Jobs

The rate of job loss is somewhat understated by these data, for they disguise the transformation of full-time into part-time jobs. As Table 2a shows, male employment fell by 8 percent between 1986 and 1990, but the fall in male full-time employment was 10.4 percent, and was offset by a 30.2 percent rise in part-time employment. The female pattern, shown in Table 2b is similar, although less spectacular. Female employment fell by just 0.1 percent, but the drop in full-time employment was 4.7 percent, offset by an increase of 9.6 percent in part-time employment.

Table 2a : Full-Time and Part-Time Employment and Unemployment: Males (000s)					
	1986[a]	1987[a]	1988[a]	1989[a]	1990[a]
Employed Full Time	848.9	836.5	800.1	769.1	760.8
Employed Part Time	54.3	63.2	63.1	68.0	70.7
Employed Total[b]	903.2	899.8	863.2	837.1	831.4
Full Time by Total Employment (%)	94.0	93.0	92.7	91.9	91.5
Part Time by Total Employment (%)	6.0	7.0	7.3	8.1	8.5
Unemployed Full Time	28.6	32.6	46.2	59.6	66.5
Unemployed Part Time	4.5	4.0	5.2	6.4	7.6
Unemployed Total[b]	33.0	36.6	51.3	66.0	74.0
Labour Force Full Time	877.5	869.2	846.3	828.7	827.2
Labour Force Part Time	58.8	67.2	68.2	74.5	78.2
Labour Force Total	936.2	936.4	914.5	903.2	905.4
Full Time Rate of Unemployment (%)	3.4	3.8	5.5	7.2	8.0
Part Time Rate of Unemployment (%)	7.6	5.9	7.6	8.6	9.7
Total Rate of Unemployment (%)	3.5	3.9	5.6	7.3	8.2
Working Age Population	1189.1	1199.3	1206.5	1211.6	1219.4
Full Time Rate of Labour Force Participation (%)	71.8	72.5	70.1	68.4	67.8
Part Time Rate of Labour Force Participation (%)	4.9	5.6	5.7	6.1	6.4

Source: PC INFOS

Note: [a] = December year quarterly averages.
[b] = Totals may differ due to rounding.

Table 2b : Full-Time and Part-Time Employment and Unemployment: Females (000s)					
	1986[a]	1987[a]	1988[a]	1989[a]	1990[a]
Employed Full Time	435.7	439.9	419.9	410.9	415.4
Employed Part Time	205.6	214.4	219.4	212.9	225.3
Employed Total[b]	641.2	654.3	639.2	623.8	640.6
Full Time by Total Employment (%)	67.9	67.2	65.7	65.9	64.8
Part Time by Total Employment (%)	32.1	32.8	34.3	34.1	35.2
Unemployed Full Time	19.0	17.5	23.2	28.5	32.0
Unemployed Part Time	12.1	11.8	14.2	17.6	18.0
Unemployed Total[b]	31.1	29.3	37.4	46.2	50.1
Labour Force Full Time	454.7	457.4	443.1	439.4	447.4
Labour Force Part Time	217.7	226.2	233.6	230.5	243.3
Labour Force Total	672.4	683.6	676.7	670.0	690.7
Full Time Rate of Unemployment (%)	4.2	3.8	5.2	6.5	7.2
Part Time Rate of Unemployment (%)	5.6	5.2	6.1	7.6	7.4
Total Rate of Unemployment (%)	4.6	4.3	5.5	6.9	7.2
Working Age Population	1240.2	1252.2	1260.3	1267.3	1276.5
Full Time Rate of Labour Force Participation (%)	36.7	36.5	35.2	34.7	35.0
Part Time Rate of Labour Force Participation (%)	17.6	18.1	18.5	18.2	19.1

Source: PC INFOS
Note: [a] = December year quarterly averages.
[b] = Totals may differ due to rounding.

The transformation of full-time into part-time jobs has reflected both supply and demand side considerations. Nevertheless, over the period of Rogernomics, an increasing proportion (and number) of individuals had to accept part-time employment, when they actually wanted full-time employment. In December 1985, 4 percent of male part-time workers and 3 percent of female part-time workers wanted full-time employment. This proportion had increased to 12 percent and 5 percent respectively by December 1990. Also, over the same period, an increasing proportion of part-time workers were constrained by the numbers of hours of work offered. In December 1985, 13 percent of male part-time workers, and 15 percent of female part-time workers wanted more hours of part-time work. By December 1990, 37 percent of female part-time workers wanted more hours of part-time work. By December 1990, 37 percent of male part-time workers, and 29 percent of female part-time workers wanted more hours of part-time work. This seems to indicate that much of the increase in part-time employment has reflected employer strategies, rather than the preferences of workers.

(iii) Industrial and Occupational Structure of Employment

The effect on the industrial structure of employment is indicated by the data in Table 3. Most sectors experienced declines and the total drop in employment was roughly 6 percent, an average rate of job loss of 1.2 percent annually. The only sectors to grow were Finance and Community and Personal Services. The largest and most severe loss of employment was in manufacturing, which employed about a quarter of the labour force in 1985, and where a fifth of the jobs had disappeared by 1990. The other major losses were in agriculture, where one job in seven was lost, and construction where almost a quarter of the jobs were lost. This pattern of job losses had severe implications for the differential impact of unemployment, which we discuss below.

Corresponding to the loss of jobs in these industries, there was a corresponding loss of jobs in particular occupations. The pattern of losses by occupation is summarized in Table 4. Given the declines in manufacturing and construction, it is not surprising that the largest losses were borne by production workers and labourers. Twenty-three percent of male workers and over 40 percent of female workers in that category lost their jobs. There was a heavy loss in agricultural

Table 3
Labour Force Distribution and Employment Change by Industry: December 1985 to 1990

	Agric. Hunting, Forestry, Fishing	Mining and Quarrying	Manufac-turing	Electric, Gas and Water	Building and Construc-tion	Wholesale and Retail Trade	Transpt. Storage and Comms	Financing, Insurance, etc.	Community Social Personal Services	Total
Employment Change 1985-1990 (%)	-13.5	-5.5	-20.3	-13.9	-23.3	0.8	-7.8	16.1	3.3	-5.9
Distribution of Male Labour Force 1986 (%)										
Pakeha	13.0	0.6	23.1	1.6	10.4	16.8	8.9	7.3	17.6	100.0
Maori	12.9	1.2	32.1	2.5	14.4	8.3	10.6	1.8	14.4	100.0
Pacific Island	2.0	0.2	59.5	0.9	7.1	8.3	8.2	2.1	9.6	100.0
Distribution of Female Labour Force 1986 (%)										
Pakeha	7.6	0.1	16.0	0.4	1.2	23.2	6.1	12.6	32.1	100.0
Maori	7.0	0.2	31.6	0.2	1.2	15.9	8.1	4.5	29.7	100.0
Pacific Island	0.8	0.0	47.6	0.2	0.4	6.8	5.0	5.1	26.5	100.0

Sources: *Key Statistics*, April 1989; *Census of Population*, 1986.

employment too. The other major loss was the substantial reduction, by about a fifth, of the number of males employed in clerical work, presumably in the manufacturing and building sectors. The number of clerical jobs held by women actually increased, but these data hide the transformation of full-time jobs into part-time jobs.

Table 4 : Employment Change by Occupation: December 1985 to 1990 (%)

	Professional Technical	Admin.	Clerical	Sales	Service	Agric-ultural	Production	Total
Males	9.3	34.7	-21.6	25.5	-3.4	-10.1	-22.9	-7.9
Females	16.1	56.9	3.6	5.6	-9.0	13.8	-40.9	-3.1

Sources: *Key Statistics*, April 1989; *Census of Population*, 1986.

Most striking, when we analyse these data on a quarter by quarter basis, is the relentlessness of the job loss. Although there is a seasonal element - the total number of jobs always increased between the September and December quarters - every quarter between December 1985 and December 1990 saw at least two industries suffering significant job losses, and most quarters saw most industries having job losses. Moreover, the rate of job loss continued over the whole period, and there were never more than two consecutive quarters where the net result was a gain in the number employed.

Wages

(i) Movements in Wages

The movement of wages over the period since 1984 is rather complicated. Whereas employment reduced more or less continuously, wages were subject to more complex influences. Despite this, the diminishing number of job opportunities increasingly became an important factor. As unemployment accumulated, the bargaining power of employed workers was severely curtailed. However, institutional factors were just as important. The wage freeze, which had been applied in 1982, was still in force when the Labour Government was

elected in 1984. The freeze was extended to the end of the year, when a managed wage round was permitted. However, many employers took the opportunity to increase wages anyway. Thus, despite the constrained award round, wages moved significantly. The first, unrestrained, post-freeze wage round began in September 1985, and was used as an opportunity for catch up. The Labour Relations Act took effect from August 1987. The architects of the new legislation believed that outlawing second tier bargaining would slow the growth of money wages. However, this was at the expense of wage flexibility.

The effect of these influences can be seen in Table 5. The movement in award wages over 1984-1990 was considerably less than the rate of inflation. There was a substantial jump in pay of more than 15 percent over 1985-1986, but from then on the rate of increase settled down to single figures. The wages actually paid, as shown by the prevailing wage index, declined in real terms. After 1985, award wages and paid wages increased together. The statistics in table 5 show average earnings as holding up better than the movements in award wages and paid wages, but this is due to the effect on the average of some of the worst paid jobs actually disappearing. The employment losses, revealed in the two previous tables, were mainly in the worst paid industries and occupations. Thus, because the lowest paid were the ones who mainly lost their jobs, there was an increase in average earnings despite the decline in wage rates overall.

Roger Douglas bragged to German bankers in 1985 that he expected real earnings to fall by 6 percent by 1986 (*Dominion*, 11 April 1985). We can see from the table that this was not achieved within a year but, by 1990, had been achieved twice over. The actual real wages paid to workers (as measured by the prevailing wage index) fell every year except for 1987-88. Even the large increase over 1985-86 was less than the rate of inflation. The total increase in wages fell less slowly than other inputs, and pressure continued for reductions in real wages throughout the whole period.

(ii) Growth in Low Pay

The lowest paid members of the labour force suffered particularly badly during the Rogernomics programme. Not only did real wages reduce on average, but the distribution became more unequal. Table 6 presents data on the incidence of low pay for the main ethnic groups. Examining these data, we find that the

increasing proportion of the labour force earning below the "decency threshold" (68% of mean adult earnings) is due mainly to the proportion of males in this category increasing. The proportion of females receiving low pay declined - although two out of five women were low paid, twice the proportion of men.

Table 5 : Movements in Prices and Wages (%)

Index	1984-85	1985-86	1986-87	1987-88	1988-89	1989-90
Consumers Price Index[a]	15.3	18.2	9.6	4.7	7.2	4.9
Prevailing Weekly Wage Index[a]	13.7	15.1	7.5	7.1	3.8	4.4
Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings[a]	6.4	17.5	14.7	10.5	3.2	5.8
Harbridge/ McCaw Measure of Mean Movement in Awards[b]	8.5	15.8	6.9	7.5	4.0	4.4
Harbidge/ McCaw Measure of Mean Movement in Non-award Settlements[b]	9.4	17.2	7.8	8.0	4.3	4.6

Sources: *Key Statistics*, December 1989, 1990. Department of Statistics. Harbridge, R., 1990.
Notes: [a] = December year quarterly average.
[b] = September year.

Table 6 : Incidence[a] of Low Pay[b] (%)				
Ethnic origin	1985-86		1988-89	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Pakeha	16.6	40.2	20.9	37.3
Maori	28.1	59.1	26.9	52.6
Pacific Island Polynesian	32.4	62.7	45.7	66.5
Other	21.2	45.0	38.6	51.8
Not Specified	16.7	71.4	35.8	81.2
All Ethnic Origins	18.1	42.8	22.4	39.9

Source: Special analysis of Household Expenditure and Income Survey data prepared for Low Pay Unit, Department of Labour.

Note: [a] = The number of low paid workers in each category, expressed as a percentage of all the workers in that category.

[b] = Less than 68% of mean adult earnings.

This reduction in the proportion of women in the low paid category was no great victory for women. There was, as Table 7 shows, a small improvement in women's pay relative to men's over the period. However, the main reason for the reduction in the proportion of the low paid was the loss of jobs in the lower paying industries. Two of the industries with the lowest pay for women, Agriculture and Manufacturing, had large job losses while employment gains were in two of the highest paying, viz. Finance and Community and Personal Services. While this restructuring of demand reduced the incidence of low pay among Pakeha and Maori women, it was of no help to other women who had restricted access to the jobs created in the best paid sectors. Thus, the proportion of Pacific Island women who were low paid increased by four percentage points over the period.

The proportion of Pacific Island men who were low paid increased by much more, from 32 percent to 46 percent. Another 4 percent of Pakeha men moved below the decency threshold over the period. Maori were the only group of men whose incidence of low pay did not increase.

Table 7 : Female-Male Earnings Ratios							
	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Ordinary time hourly earnings	0.79	0.78	0.79	0.79	0.80	0.81	0.81
Total hourly earnings	0.78	0.77	0.78	0.79	0.80	0.81	0.81
Ordinary time weekly earnings	0.76	0.75	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.78	0.77
Total weekly earnings	0.71	0.71	0.73	0.73	0.74	0.74	0.74

Source: Computed from Quarterly Employment Survey.

A further insight into the redistributional effects of government policy is provided by the income data in Table 8. Income is a broader concept than wages but, for most of the lower quintiles, wages would be the sole source of income. The table shows how most of the income gains over the period accrued to those already on higher incomes. The table shows that in the period from December 1984, real gross incomes rose by 1.2 percent (on average). Although the highest quintile gained an increase of 3.0 percent, the lower quintiles had increases of half a percent or less. Taxation increased inequity further. Personal income tax rates were reduced substantially for the highest paid but increased for the lowest paid. The effect of this is shown in Table 8. We can see that the highest quintile gained a larger increase in disposable income than in gross income. Their disposable incomes grew by 6.0 percent. The lower quintiles had only a minimal increase in disposable income, less than the increases in their gross incomes. The effect of increased taxes on the very lowest quintile was modified through Family Support payments and the burden of the tax changes fell most heavily on the second lowest quintile, whose disposable income fell by 1.8 percent. The effects of these changes on the lowest quintiles are somewhat worse since the introduction of GST added a further layer of taxation which hurts the lowest quintiles more (since they spend all of their incomes, and all of it in New Zealand). This compares with the upper quintiles, which save part of their income or spend it abroad.

Table 8 : Percentage Growth in Real Gross and Real Disposable Income: Wage and Salary Earners: December Quarter 1984 to December Quarter 1990		
	Real gross income	**Real disposable income**
Lowest quintile	0.6	-1.4
Second quintile	-0.8	-1.8
Third quintile	0.5	0.6
Fourth quintile	1.2	1.5
Highest quintile	3.0	6.0
All quintiles	1.2	2.0

Source: *Key statistics.*

Impact of Unemployment

The continual destruction of employment opportunities led to a substantial increase in the rate of unemployment. Unemployment rates were shown in Table 2. It will be seen from Table 2 how the rate of unemployment increased continuously from 1986, a result confirmed by the increasing number registered as unemployed with the Department of Labour. In fact, the registration data pin-point the growth in unemployment as having begun in the fourth quarter of 1985.

Male unemployment rates were substantially less than female rates until 1988, after which time male rates increased much faster. This switch in the relative impact of unemployment was due to two separate phenomena: the declining labour force participation by females, which we discuss below, and the pattern of job losses in industries which had a high proportion of male workers. Males suffered most of the job losses in Agriculture, Construction, and Manufacturing. On the other hand, employment increased in the Finance sector and in Community, Social and Personal Services, which together employ about half the female labour force.

(i) Age

The weight of unemployment was borne mainly by the young over the whole period. However, as unemployment worsened, the burden began to be carried proportionately by all age groups. The age profile of unemployment is given in Table 9. The pattern of unemployment remained the same for each sex over the whole period, ie., unemployment rates declined with age until about age 50 where they increased slightly.

Unemployment grew at such a rate that virtually all cohorts had worse rates by the end of the period, despite most of them moving into age groups where the relative impact of unemployment was less. For example, a male aged between 15 and 20 who left school in 1985 faced an unemployment rate of 9.4 percent compared to the rate of workers aged 20 to 25 at that time of 5.3 percent. By December 1990, when the 1985 school leaver was aged 20 to 25, their cohort faced an unemployment rate of 13.8 percent. The only cohort not to experience a worse situation was the cohort of female workers aged between 15 and 20 in 1985 which had an unemployment rate of 11.3 percent; by the end of 1990 when they were aged 20 to 25, their rate was slightly lower at 10.6 percent.

The decline of employment probability was the worst for middle age workers. Males in their forties had unemployment rates of only 1 or 2 percent at the end of 1985 but by 1990, these individuals faced rates of more than 5 percent. The female rates increased too but not by so much.

(ii) Ethnic origin

The impact of employment loss on the different ethnic groups is also demonstrated by Table 10. Employment growth, where it occurred in Financing, Insurance and Real Estate, had relatively little impact on the employment of Maori and Pacific Island workers who are under-represented in those sectors. On the other hand, the rate of job loss in Manufacturing had a dramatic effect.

Table 9 : Unemployment Rates by Age (%)					
Age Group	1986[a]	1987[a]	1988[a]	1989[a]	1990[a]
Males					
15-19	11.8	10.8	13.9	15.8	17.8
20-24	4.7	6.4	9.9	13.1	12.8
25-29	3.4	4.1	5.6	7.9	8.8
30-34	2.6	3.1	4.5	6.3	7.6
35-39	1.8	2.1	3.9	4.9	5.7
40-44	1.7	1.6	3.2	3.7	5.4
45-49	1.6	2.2	2.9	3.9	5.1
50-54	2.3	2.1	3.1	5.0	5.7
55-59	2.1	2.4	2.9	5.1	5.6
60-64	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]	3.3
65 plus	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]
Total	3.5	3.9	5.6	7.3	8.2
Females					
15-19	11.0	9.8	12.3	15.9	16.8
20-24	5.1	5.4	7.4	9.6	10.0
25-29	5.7	4.9	5.8	7.5	7.4
30-34	4.5	4.2	5.5	6.4	7.1
35-39	3.3	3.0	4.6	4.9	5.2
40-44	2.3	2.4	2.9	3.6	4.1
45-49	2.9	1.9	2.6	3.4	3.5
50-54	2.6	3.0	3.3	5.0	4.5
55-59	-[b]	-[b]	3.6	3.5	4.7
60-64	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]
65 plus	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]	-[b]
Total	4.6	4.3	5.5	6.9	7.2

Source: PC INFOS

Note: [a] = December year quarterly averages.

[b] = Recorded numbers below the margin of error.

Table 10 : Surveyed Unemployment Rates by Ethnic Origin and Sex (%)

	1986*		1987*		1988*		1989*		1990*	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Pakeha	2.7	3.9	3.1	3.6	4.5	4.4	5.7	5.5	6.3	5.7
Maori	10.7	12.4	10.5	10.7	15.0	13.6	20.4	18.9	22.2	21.2
Pacific Island Polynesian	5.9	7.3	7.5	6.2	14.3	12.0	21.2	15.0	24.3	16.2
Total	3.5	4.6	3.9	4.3	5.6	5.5	7.3	6.9	8.2	7.2

Source: PC INFOS.
Note: * = December year quarterly averages.

Manufacturing accounted for more than two-thirds of the jobs lost in the economy between 1985 and 1990. If affected Pacific Island people severely since three out of five Pacific Island men, and almost half the Pacific Island women, were employed in Manufacturing. Table 10 shows that the increase in Pacific Island unemployment has been the most rapid. Maori were also vulnerable to job loss in Manufacturing, although less so since they were employed in a wider range of industries.

Labour Force

(i) Migration

Migration statistics show a net loss to the labour force through migration of about fifty-five thousand between 1986 and 1990. The loss over the whole period from 1984 to 1990 was in the order of eighty-five thousand. As can be seen from the data in Table 11, this net emigration is the result of much larger gross flows. Nonetheless, the effect on the labour force was considerable. The labour force shrunk by just under 1 percent per annum due to net emigration. The largest losses were of workers from the Clerical and Production groups. There were large losses too from the Professional and Technical group but these were partially compensated by a significant in-migration of workers in that category.

(ii) Participation

One of the most spectacular labour market effects of the Rogernomics package was to induce a break in the historical trend for women's labour force participation rates to continue growing. New Zealand women have always had comparatively low participation rates, but rates have been increasing rapidly since the 1950s. The historical trend in New Zealand has been for male labour force participation rates to decline and for female rates, other than for the 15-19 age group, to increase (Revell and Brosnan, 1986). This is revealed by Table 12, which gives the mean participation rates by age and sex for each year. It will be seen that the trend for male rates to decline at every age continued over the period. It will also be seen, however, that female rates declined for the majority

Table 11 : Net Long Term and Permanent Labour Force Emigration*: 1984-1990

Occupation	Arrivals	Departures	Net Departures	Proportion of Net Departures %	Net Departures as Proportion Occupation %
Professional, Technical etc.	48559	56503	7944	9.5	3.1
Admin. and Managerial	7795	10582	2787	3.3	3.4
Clerical & Related	21171	40698	19527	23.4	7.8
Sales	9066	18046	8980	10.8	5.2
Service	12614	19814	7200	8.6	4.6
Agriculture	5603	9940	4337	5.2	2.6
Production	33178	65894	32716	39.2	7.8
Total	137986	221477	83491	100.0	5.6

Source: PC INFOS.
Note: * = Data exclude persons not actively engaged.

Table 12 : Participation Rates by Age (%)					
Age Group	**1986[a]**	**1987[a]**	**1988[a]**	**1989[a]**	**1990[a]**
Males					
15-19	67.5	66.2	61.2	58.6	57.7
20-24	91.8	91.8	89.5	88.8	86.6
25-29	95.0	95.3	93.9	93.8	92.9
30-34	95.0	95.2	94.7	94.3	93.6
35-39	96.4	96.3	95.6	94.2	93.8
40-44	97.0	96.9	95.6	94.9	94.6
45-49	95.9	95.0	94.3	93.8	93.7
50-54	94.1	92.8	92.6	92.3	90.9
55-59	86.1	84.7	81.5	78.6	78.6
60-64	44.8	42.8	37.5	33.0	34.5
65 plus	14.5	14.1	11.1	10.5	10.3
Total	78.7	78.1	75.8	74.5	73.9
Females					
15-19	59.7	61.7	58.6	54.5	57.7
20-24	73.5	74.2	69.1	69.3	71.5
25-29	61.2	61.8	61.8	62.0	61.6
30-34	63.4	63.5	61.5	61.2	61.5
35-39	72.5	71.6	70.9	70.9	72.0
40-44	80.0	79.1	78.7	77.6[b]	78.6
45-49	74.0	75.8	74.7	75.6	77.7
50-54	59.7	64.2	67.5	67.1	68.6
55-59	43.7	44.5	47.6	47.3	44.6
60-64	20.4	18.2	16.4	13.9	16.6
65 plus	4.3	3.6	4.2	3.6	3.6
Total	54.2	54.6	53.7	52.9	53.9

Source: PC INFOS.
Note: [a] = December year quarterly averages.

of age-groups too. The only groups of women to increase their participation were those aged 25 to 29 and 40 to 59.

A simple comparison like this actually underplays the overall decline in participation. Although female participation did increase for the 25-29 and 45-59 age groups, those increases were lower than they would have been if past trends had continued. What is more, the groups for which the trend of participation has been downwards reduced their participation at an accelerated rate; thus, females aged 15-19 and every age group of males, except for the 30-34 age group, had much lower rates of participation in 1990 than we should have expected from historical trends. Interestingly, the only groups to have higher participation rates than the historical trend would have suggested, other than males aged 30-34, were women aged 60 and over.

We can estimate the effect of these changes in participation on the labour force by estimating the changes in the participation rates which would have occurred if the trend between 1981 and 1986 had continued over 1986-1990. Applying these "expected" rates to the population in 1990, we get the "expected" labour force for 1990. Comparing the actual to the "expected" labour force, we can calculate the shortfall in the labour force which is due to the changed trends in participation. We could only use the data from the 1981 to 1986 censuses for this extrapolation because of changes in the definition of the labour force. However, this is not a serious problem because, as Revell and Brosnan (1986) found, the trends had been virtually linear in the post-war period.[4]

The results of this exercise suggested that the effect of these changes in participation was to reduce the 1990 male labour force by approximately thirty-five thousand, and the female labour force by sixty thousand. Taken over the whole period since 1986, these losses, due to reversals and accelerations in participation trends, average out as a further reduction in the labour force of approximately 1.5 percent per annum.

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[4] In any case, we would rather use more recent trends than longer trends which may not be applicable.

It should be stressed that the shortfall in participation could be due to a variety of responses by potential members of the labour force. The numbers of young adults below the age of 25 in the labour force is thirty to forty thousand less than the trend in historical data would lead us to expect. Many appear to have remained in the education system rather than seeking work. In response to decreased employment opportunities, participation has also decreased as some individuals have been forced to stay on some social welfare benefits longer. There has been dramatic increase in the number of recipients of welfare benefits which are not contingent upon job search (i.e. other than Unemployment Benefit). A decreased rate of exit from benefit, rather than an increase in enrolments, increased the numbers on Sickness Benefit, Invalids Benefit, and Domestic Purposes Benefits by approximately ten thousand, eight thousand and thirty-eight thousand respectively between December 1985 and December 1990.

Some proportion of those exiting can be counted as discouraged workers. However, there are others who would not be counted as such. In fact, the recorded level of discouragement, as revealed by the data in Table 13, shows a relatively small rise over the period since 1986 - an increase of only five thousand in the officially discouraged, and about twelve thousand in the other categories of jobless whose job search efforts do not meet the criterion for their enumeration among the official unemployed. Many "discouraged" individuals many not even have conceived of themselves as discouraged, yet had the levels of demand been higher, they may have been drawn into the labour force. Had these persons joined the labour force, as the trend data suggest they would have, the level of unemployment would have been one hundred thousand higher. Thus, the unemployment rates for 1990 in Table 2 would have been 4 percent higher for males and 9 percent higher for females, i.e. rates of 12 and 16 percent respectively.

The reduction in labour force participation rates is particularly horrifying when broken down by ethnicity. As can be seen from Table 14, the declines in male participation are much higher for Maori and Pacific Island workers. Male Maori participation dropped by 10 percentage points between 1986 and 1990, and Pacific Island participation by almost 13 percentage points. Unfortunately, the small sample size of the survey prevents our examining participation cross-tabulated by both age and ethnic origin together.

Table 13 : The Jobless (000s)

	1986[a]	1987[a]	1988[a]	1989[a]	1990[a]
Males					
Officially Unemployed	33.0	36.6	51.3	66.0	74.0
Available but Not Actively Seeking Work:					
- Seeking Work Through Newspaper only	1.9	2.1	3.2	4.4	4.5
- Discouraged	2.2	2.3	4.2	4.1	5.3
- Other	9.1	9.0	8.5	10.3	12.8
Actively Seeking but Not Available for Work	5.3	5.5	6.1	5.6	7.2
Total Male Jobless	51.4	55.5	73.3	90.3	103.8
Females					
Officially Unemployed	31.1	29.3	37.4	46.1	50.0
Available but Not Actively Seeking Work:					
- Seeking Work Through Newspaper only	3.5	3.9	5.2	5.7	6.9
- Discouraged	5.8	5.3	7.1	7.1	7.8
- Other	18.6	16.5	16.4	17.6	20.3
Actively Seeking but not Available for Work	6.6	6.6	7.1	6.7	8.2
Total Female Jobless	65.6	61.6	73.2	83.1	93.2
Total Jobless	117.0	117.0	146.5	173.4	197.0

Source: PC INFOS
Note: [a] = camber year quarterly averages.

Table 14 : Participation Rates by Ethnic Origin (%)					
Ethnic Origin	1986*	1987*	1988*	1989*	1990*
Males					
Pakeha	78.2	77.6	75.7	74.6	74.1
Maori	81.5	80.7	73.9	71.2	71.5
Pacific Island Polynesian	86.2	82.6	78.9	78.1	73.0
All Ethnic Origins	78.7	78.1	75.8	74.5	73.9
Females					
Pakeha	54.0	54.6	54.0	53.1	54.6
Maori	53.9	50.5	48.1	44.5	45.0
Pacific Island Polynesian	56.7	59.7	53.7	50.9	50.9
All Ethnic Origins	54.2	54.6	53.7	52.9	53.9

Source: PC INFOS.
Note: * = December year quarterly averages.

The female participation data show that Pakeha women actually increased their participation between 1986 and 1990. Thus the decline in female participation is entirely accounted for by a decline in the participation of Maori women (roughly 9 percentage points), and Pacific Island women (almost 6 percentage points). Given that Maori women already had low participation rates, the decline has serious implications for the incomes of Maori households.

Training

With the decline in employment, and the greater uncertainty which arose from the Rogernomics programme, it was inevitable that there would be a decline in industry training. Until 1989, the Vocational Training Council collected levies from employers and organised a series of industry boards to co-ordinate training.

The Council was abolished in 1989. Although some industries have maintained training on a voluntary basis, the effect of the poor economic climate, combined with laissez-faire training policies, has been to reduce the amount of training. Thus there has been a significant decline in the number of apprenticeships. Table 15 charts the movements in apprenticeships during the Rogernomics period. Despite the continuous loss of jobs from late 1985, apprenticeship numbers held

up until 1987. But after that time, numbers fell rapidly. The number reduced by 23 percent between 1987 and 1990. The number of women employed as apprentices outside of hairdressing continued to grow until 1988, but then fell rapidly in 1989 and 1990. The result was a decline in total apprenticeship numbers of 15 percent.

Table 15 : Total Apprenticeships* (000s)

	Total	Female	Female (excluding hairdressing)
1984	23843	2194	499
1985	24898	2408	614
1986	25675	2632	689
1987	26334	2842	734
1988	26256	2830	800
1989	22926	2699	714
1990	20363	2594	656
Percentage Change from 1984-1990	-15%	+18%	+31%

Source: Education and Training Support Agency, 1991.
Notes: * = Year ending June 30.

Conclusion

The dramatic but disastrous changes in the labour market over the period from 1984-1990 are one of the worst legacies of Rogernomics. Over the period of the Fourth Labour Government, three sets of policies stand out as being particularly destructive towards the labour market. These were the Governments anti-inflation policies, various "pro-market" policies, and various forms of labour market deregulation.

Firstly, the Government attempted to reduce inflation by relying on monetary policy. However, the labour market was expected to play a crucial role in the monetarist attack an inflation. Monetary policy forced up both interest rates and the exchange rate and the economy lapsed into a recession. It was hoped that the resulting unemployment would moderate inflation - that workers, fearful of losing

their jobs, would reduce their wage demands. Central to this strategy was the weakening of the award system by the removal of both compulsory arbitration and second tier negotiations.

Secondly, many of the government's pro-market policies left the labour market in the parlous state. Most significant amongst these policies was the internationalisation of the economy (trade reform and the floating of the exchange rate), the reduction in the size of the state sector (corporatisation and privatisation) and the so-called "level playing field" (the removal of various forms of industry assistance). The net effect was a reduction in activity in most sectors of the economy. Employment in the state and manufacturing sectors shrunk dramatically.

The wider economic policies of Rogernomics gave rise to a serious crisis in the labour market. In a curious twist of logic, the problems in the labour market were blamed, not on the failed policies of Rogernomics, but on the labour market itself. It was argued that the only alternative was to deregulate the labour market and to allow a faster process of adjustment (i.e. falling wages) to boost employment. However, as we have argued, this was misguided.

Firstly this is because labour market deregulation is essentially about re-regulating the balance of power in the employment relationship. Secondly, the argument is misguided because changes to wage rates, as envisioned by the protagonists of deregulation, are only one of a number of possible adjustment mechanisms. In the current economic environment, they may be undesirable because of their negative effect on aggregate demand. Thirdly, the argument is misguided because many types of adjustment are inherently inequitable. Because of labour market segmentation, the burden of many types of adjustment falls disproportionately on disadvantaged groups.

Although the New Right claims that "there is no alternative" (TINA), in fact there are numerous alternative policies; the number is limited only by the experience and imagination of the government's advisers. One alternative which was considered briefly, and revived in 1990 as a last ditch effort by the Labour Party to hold onto power, is a negotiated "accord" or corporatist labour market policy as was followed in Australia. The Australian Accord produced substantial falls in unemployment, at the same time as moderated inflationary effects (Lewis and

Spiers, 1990). This was achieved by negotiation over an appropriate mix of wage, taxation, monetary and welfare changes. At the level of labour market regulation, the negotiated Accord policies enabled the promotion of sustainable long term adjustment in an equitable manner. This was achieved by policies which promoted flexible working time arrangements, broke down demarcation barriers, introduced better management practices, facilitated and encouraged on-the-job training, extended EEO and pay equity and, where necessary, award restructuring. In a separate paper, we have compared the experiences of Australia and New Zealand during the 1980s (Brosnan, Burgess and Rea, 1991). Whereas the two countries produced closely comparable measures on a range of variables until 1984, their experiences after that time diverged dramatically. Equally relevant, Australia's unemployment has rocketed since the Accord has broken down and monetarist policies akin to the Rogernomics programme has been implemented. The success of the Australia Accord between 1984 and 1989 provides an almost prima facie case for a comparable set of policies being implemented in New Zealand.

History records that they were not implemented and, despite the resistance of the trade union movement, the process of labour market deregulation has steadily progressed. The end result is, of course, the Employment Contracts Act 1991. The changes brought about by this Act have enhanced the ability of employers to offer sub-standard employment. As the new legislation begins to impact upon the labour market, increased segmentation is likely to become apparent. A greater amount of employment will be characterised by low wages, insecure employment and arbitrary discipline, while firms are provided with no incentives for training (Brosnan and Rea, 1991).

Despite the clear rejection of Rogernomics in the last election, the new National Government has simply intensified the Rogernomics programme. The obsessions of monetarism, free trade and the minimal state continue. However, now they have been combined with further reductions in social welfare entitlements, the Employment Contracts Act, and more extensive user part charges in health and education.

As is to be expected, the programme continues to have deleterious effects on the labour market. As of the last reported survey results (June), total employment has continued to decline, and there has been a continuing conversion of full-time

into part-time jobs. Some full-time workers have had to move to a four day week (*Dominion*, 13 September 1991 p.1). At the same time, unemployment continues to grow and becomes increasingly burdensome to the Maori and Pacific Island populations. Furthermore, in contrast to the claims of upskilling the workforce, the number of apprenticeships fell by 11 percent in the first year of the National Government. Unless there is a clear and decisive reversal of the Rogernomics (Ruthanomics) programme, the number of New Zealanders with appropriate employment experience and training will continue to decline and the chances of economic recovery will disappear completely.

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The Teaching of Sociology in New Zealand Secondary Schools : A Review of the First Four Years (1988-1991)

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Abstract

Sociology has been taught in New Zealand schools at sixth form level since 1988 and at the present time there is growing support for the introduction of the subject in seventh forms. It is timely, therefore, to review the teaching of the subject since its inception four years ago and to consider the immediate needs of this senior secondary school curriculum initiative.

The Teaching of Sociology in New Zealand Secondary Schools: A Review of the First Four Years (1988-1991)[1]

School sociology has had advocates in New Zealand for at least two decades (Davies 1979; Garrett 1972) and it has been observed that there was a distinctly sociological dimension in an earlier social studies curriculum (Stevens 1975a; 1975b; Willmott 1978). It was not, however, until 1988 that sociology was introduced in the senior secondary school in this country as a subject in its own right. In the four years since sociology was introduced into New Zealand sixth forms the subject has proliferated and there is now demand for it to be offered at seventh form level. Sociology has grown in a haphazard fashion and Dixon and Stevens (1991) found little coordination amongst those who teach it, few New Zealand resources and some doubt in the teaching profession as to whether this is a suitable subject for young people to study.

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1 The results of this research were presented at the annual meeting of the Sociological Association of Aotearoa, University of Waikato, Hamilton, December 1991.

In Britain, sociology has been established for at least two decades (Sklar 1973; Wormald 1974) but the subject was not introduced without doubts being expressed (Abrams 1968). There is now a well established national curriculum at both O and A levels, the subject is popular and British teachers of sociology are well resourced. At the present time in New Zealand schools the subject is growing in popularity and teachers with knowledge of the discipline are in short supply. School sociology in New Zealand however, lacks the national curriculum structure, public examinations and status that it enjoys in British schools.

In the early 1970's, when school sociology was in its infancy in Britain and being discussed in New Zealand, the possibility of the introduction of the discipline for Australian secondary school students was considered (Hickman 1971). As far as can be ascertained however, sociology is not yet a significant part of the Australian secondary school curriculum.

The 1988 and 1989 Surveys of New Zealand Schools Teaching Sociology

In 1988 all New Zealand schools that offered sociology at sixth form level (N=12) were surveyed (Stevens 1988) and publication of the research (Stevens 1989a; 1989b) provided teachers of the subject with some insight into what their colleagues in other schools were doing. At this time most teachers of sixth form sociology did not know how many others in the country were teaching the subject, what was being taught or the nature of the difficulties being experienced by their unknown colleagues. A sociology teachers' newsletter was subsequently established and links were made with the Sociological Association of Aotearoa. In 1990 three sociologists at Massey University surveyed teachers of sixth form sociology and a position paper was published (Harker et al 1990). This provided a tangible link between sociologists in New Zealand universities and secondary schools.

The picture of sociology in New Zealand secondary schools that emerged from the first survey in 1988 was not an encouraging one: the main findings were that sixth form teachers of this new subject lacked contact with professional sociologists and few had academic backgrounds in the discipline from which to teach. As a result, many teachers were unsure of what they should be doing in selecting content for sixth form certificate sociology. Indeed, there does not

appear to have been any attempt to define sociology as a discipline or to consider what the subject should attempt to cover. The interpretive dimension of the discipline was never considered in its introduction in secondary schools. The result has been that there have been uneven results in the teaching of such matters as social theory which was reported to be a difficult area of the subject for many classes. A variety of methodologies were reported to be used in various class projects and teachers generally noted that this aspect of sixth form sociology was more successful than the theoretical dimension of their new courses. Only two schools reported that no methodological work was attempted and in each case the teacher had no sociology in his or her academic background.

The 1988 survey found that sociology was a largely feminine subject in terms of those who chose it for study and many students were counselled not to proceed with it, especially if a more "academic" option was available. Student response to the first year of sixth form sociology was consistently positive and many expressed the wish to continue to study it at seventh form level. In this way a confusing picture emerged from the 1988 survey: opposition to the introduction of sociology was reported from many teachers of other subjects in the schools where it was offered but at the same time and in the same schools, those who had finished their first year of teaching the subject were overwhelmingly positive about the experience and consistently asserted that this new addition to the sixth form curriculum had considerable merit for students. These affirming views should be considered in relation to the widespread difficulties that were reported. At the end of the first year of teaching sociology there were major differences in what was being taught in the eleven schools that responded to the survey and a determination that teachers of the subject should in future publicise their classroom activities as well as their difficulties through a newsletter.

At the end of the following year schools were again surveyed (N=18) and several changes were noted (Stevens, 1989c). The professional isolation that was reported the previous year had improved through the circulation of a newsletter from Otumoetai College and links to the Sociological Association of Aotearoa. Demand for the subject had grown by 50% in one year with six new schools offering this option at sixth form level. By 1989 several matters that were noted in the 1988 survey reappeared: the subject's continuing popularity with students was confirmed but its reputation as a "soft option" remained as many teachers (of other subjects) did not regard it as suitable for "academic" young people. As part

of the sixth form curriculum in 1989 sociology remained entirely located in the North Island, in urban state schools and largely feminine in terms of those who chose it as a subject for study.

School Sociology in 1991

In 1991 teachers of sixth form sociology were surveyed for a third time and an increase of 100% was found in the number of schools offering this as a subject since 1988. Unfortunately, in the 1991 survey of schools teaching sociology (N=24), only 14 replied (58%). As part of the sixth form curriculum sociology remains almost entirely located in the North Island and there are no private schools listed as offering this subject. (There is only one school offering sociology in the South Island). The overwhelming majority of the schools that offer sociology at sixth form level remain state owned, coeducational, North Island and urban.

Respondents were asked how they became teachers of sociology in their schools. The responses varied but the majority, predictably, were recruited from other academic backgrounds. Only one respondent noted that he was specifically recruited to teach sociology; most teachers of the subject have degrees in other disciplines, usually history or geography. One teacher noted that as head of the social studies department he took over the development of the subject as no-one else would do so and that he found he enjoyed the experience. Several respondents were primarily social studies teachers who had persuaded their schools that sociology would have value for senior students and, as an extension of their work in the lower school, taught a related subject at senior level. Three teachers took over established sociology positions in their schools (along with the teaching of other social science subjects such as history and geography). The links between social studies in the lower secondary school and sociology in the sixth form are strong (Stevens, 1991) and the publication of a new journal in 1992, *The New Zealand Journal of Social Studies*, should strengthen this relationship. A noticeable change in this survey from the one conducted in 1988 is that relatively more sociology teachers now have formal qualifications in the discipline. Half of the 1991 respondents had sociology in their degrees, one had a post-graduate degree and two others had majors in the subject. A further development in the four years since the initial survey was undertaken is the

increasing level of communication school sociology teachers now have with others who teach the subject, through links developed and maintained through the Otumoetai College newsletter. In the 1988 survey a small variety of aging University texts were used by teachers in their sixth form classes: Berger 1963; Donnelly 1978; Pitt 1977; Robertson 1981 and Worsely 1976. Textbooks that were mentioned in the latest survey included Gleeson (1990) *Sociology: A Modular Approach* and Smith (1988) *Becoming Your Own Researcher*. Most of the respondents however, pointed out that they did not use any textbook, because they could not find one that was considered suitable. Several said they used "class sets" that they compiled themselves and most pointed out the continuing difficulty of teaching a subject with no suitable books and few other resources. Teachers of school sociology in New Zealand in 1991 therefore continue to compile their own materials rather than use textbooks because of a shortage of suitable local publications.

In 1991 teachers presented a wider range of topics in their sociology classes than they did in the first two years. A number of new topics were taught this year including: the socialisation of preschool children, the sociology of leisure, the Treaty of Waitangi, the notions of prejudice, political protest, ageism and violence in the family. The study of communities remains popular and in this survey less frequent mention was made of theoretical aspects of sociology, an area of difficulty identified in 1988 and 1989. Those theorists that respondents mentioned as part of their courses were largely the standard classics: Marx, Durkheim and Weber. There are many difficulties in these areas of sociology in New Zealand secondary schools of political, sociological and methodological dimensions. It is possible that these difficulties, particularly when related to the problems that have been reported in teaching social theory, will make some schools reluctant to introduce this subject into the senior secondary school curriculum.

Teachers were asked to state what they thought the most successful aspect of their sixth form sociology course had been in 1991 and responses included the following:

- Class discussions following observations and interviews
- Discussion of issues in the community
- Developing assignments related to student interests

- The building of self esteem through increased knowledge of selves
- Studies of other cultures
- Seeing things from different perspectives
- Investigation of stereotypes
- Looking at the social environment with "new eyes"

These and other responses indicated the value of this subject for students in senior secondary school classes. While most respondents were able to point to their successes, some difficulties were raised in addition to the perennial one of this being an under-resourced subject. These included:

- The lack of status of the subject within the school
- Low budget allocation for sociology within the school
- Translating theories into "something that the students can grasp"
- Finding a balance between theory and practice
- The "academic language" of many of the available books
- Teaching to a wide ability range within a single class
- Students who see the subject as a "soft option"

Most of these problems were identified in 1988 and do not appear to have changed in the four years since the initial survey. Several teachers noted that many students of sixth form sociology continue to be of "low ability", something that contributes to the low status of the discipline in schools and compounds the problem of teaching with unsuitable reading materials. In anticipation of this problem being raised, teachers were asked to identify what content they would like to see in a textbook written specifically for New Zealand sixth form students of sociology. The major requirements that teachers identified in such a book were:

- New Zealand case study material on the family, socialisation, deviance, research methods, population statistics, gender and age issues should be included;
- Language (in such a book) should be suitable for young people;
- Changes in New Zealand society at the present time should be described and explained;

- Ethnic issues should be given prominence;
- Wealth and poverty should be defined and their social implications outlined;
- Practical New Zealand-oriented exercises on a wide range of topics should be developed.

Many of the teachers who responded to the 1991 survey mentioned the issue of teaching sociology at seventh form level. The lack of recognition of sociology as a subject for university bursary examinations precludes its acceptance in seventh forms although many teachers pointed out the student demand that now exists for such a move. (This would equate to the British A-level examination in sociology). As in the 1988 survey, students in 1991 were found to have little difficulty perceiving a vocational relationship between what they were studying in their sixth form sociology classes and the jobs they hoped to get when they left school.

The First Four Years of Sociology in New Zealand Sixth Forms

The changes in the teaching of sociology in New Zealand secondary schools that have been identified, apart from a 100% increase in the number of schools that offer the subject, are fairly small. The same problems remain: the subject lacks status in many schools and continues to attract students not intending to sit University Bursary examinations and there is a chronic shortage of suitable textual material both in terms of level and New Zealand orientation. Links with the sociology profession are stronger than they were in 1988 and some more modern textbooks are mentioned as being in classroom use, but the overall picture is not an encouraging one. Comments that are reported from the students who are taking the subject by their teachers indicate strongly that they see this as both an important and an interesting subject. When it is considered that New Zealand society continues to undergo massive social and economic change, it is not surprising that a subject that enables young people to study their own society will be popular. It is difficult to explain why, at this of all times, sociology is so under-resourced in New Zealand schools. Those aspects of sixth form sociology that teachers identified in the 1991 survey as successful in their classes suggest that the subject has an important place in the education of young people.

There appears to be a contradiction in the teaching of sociology in New Zealand secondary schools: in spite of the growing demand for the subject by students, an adequate supply of course materials is not being developed. This situation exists at a time of widespread social change in New Zealand when sociologists could have a public profile at least as prominent as that of economists. The most urgent and immediate need is for the development of sociological materials that senior secondary school students will enjoy using and which will provide those who subsequently enrol in sociology courses at university level with appropriate introductions to the discipline.

The three surveys that have been conducted have shown the inappropriateness of using university sociology texts at sixth form level. In writing senior secondary school course materials, teachers themselves should be involved at all levels of development. To enable such materials to articulate with first year university work, academic sociologists should be in a position to contribute.

Goodson (1983) outlined the case of rural studies in the British curriculum and it should be noted that that subject faced many of the difficulties sociology is experiencing at the present time in gaining acceptance in New Zealand. He recorded an observation of a rural studies teacher in a British secondary school:

> "what has been forgotten in our exuberance to thrust forward rural studies as an examinable subject is the mainspring of its very creation. This is the joy, experience, and most of all, the practical and useful logic which is gained during the release from far-sighted concepts which many other subjects tend to involve themselves in."

Perhaps the introduction of school sociology in New Zealand, which is still at an early stage of development, should be considered in these terms. At the present time, when New Zealand society is undergoing rapid and far reaching change, the practical experience of analysing the society is likely to hold the interest of most students.

Hodson (1987) however, noted that the way in which subjects in the school curriculum are perceived is "not the end result of inevitable progress in the disinterested search for 'curriculum truth'. Rather, it is **socially constructed,** being the product of particular sets of choices made by particular groups of people at particular times, in furtherance of their particular interests."

This research suggests that the future of the senior secondary school sociology curriculum, which is in the process of being constructed, will be shaped by social forces within and to an increasing extent between schools. It is at the present time very much the product of particular groups of people who are attempting to introduce and develop the sociological study of a society that is in the process of unprecedented change and in which there is considerable social dislocation. The big sociological question for future research should perhaps be why, in these circumstances, the development of this curriculum has been so difficult to establish in New Zealand schools.

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Issues in Research

The 'Exposed Hand' of Treasury

David Bettison

Since retiring almost two years ago, my interests have turned to understanding the Treasury in the first instance and, in the second, the re-structuring - if one can call it that - of scientific research in New Zealand. Needless to say, these are not disparate phenomena. In this note I record only the outcome of a limited sojourn into the way the intellectuals of Treasury see themselves as appropriately organised to do their job, and some of the difficulties they have got into.

Former colleagues may recognise my continuing interest in identifying 'the economy', and in deciphering the mysteries so conveniently attributed to it. In this instance: why intellectuals so dedicated on the one hand to the pursuit of genuinely accurate understanding should, on the other, allow themselves to use a mechanical metaphor of accounting practice as their means of identifying what has to be done in practical life. Classifications, and the reifications used to support them, become taken for granted. Adam Smith's wondrous 'hidden hand' may be thought to contribute to a collective well-being; but the issue today is to ask if the blatantly 'exposed hand' of Treasury should contribute so much to whatever is going on.

This study of the Treasury, I am happy to report, has uncovered only one signpost pointing to 'the economy'! Treasury's **Corporate Plan 1991-92**[1] has an 'Output Class' (I will try to explain that later) involving almost $5.5m. expenditure that states: '...this output class involves the provision of advice spanning the whole economy and substantial sections of it' (p.11). Examples offered are: '...this class of advice include macro-economic advice, advice on fiscal strategy, advice on medium term strategies, and the general economic implications of major regulatory issues'. These examples, I am led to assume,

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[1] The Treasury, Wellington, New Zealand. 1991. Since writing these Notes, Treasury has provided the 1992 documents, but I have not yet studied them.

are of what the class includes rather than what 'the economy' constitutes, but this point is not clarified in the Plan.

To be fair, a quick inspection shows the above quote to be the only place in the Corporate Plan where 'the economy' gets special mention. Treasury's planners prefer to limit the term to the widest possible context of economic interaction and influence affecting New Zealand. Elsewhere in Treasury drafting its use is extensive. Within the Corporate Plan, Treasury's activities and its mode of organisation are stated in terms specific to its practice, to the jargon of accounting, and to its particular approach to the country's affairs fashionable at this time.

The term 'Output Class' is part of the, so called, 'production function approach' that Treasury has developed and thrust upon the administrators of public institutions.[2] Its own Corporate Plan is arranged through eleven output classes involving an 'input' (i.e. expenditure in the old terminology) of $77.5m. in 1991-92. The concept of 'output' (as well as 'input' and 'outcome') is described in the 1990 Treasury publication *Putting it Simply - An Explanatory Guide to Financial Management Reform.* I saucily call this 'The Little Blue Book' in recognition of its colour and symbolic similarity to a little book elsewhere. On P.11, under the sub-heading 'Speaking the Lingo', we are told that: 'Outputs are the goods and services produced by departments'. Examples would be policy advice, the administering of regulations, the provision of services, the production of goods, the administering of grants and benefits etc. The point is that units of organisation, in the manner of machines, have to be recognised as 'outputting' distinct things. They then become measurable, and implications follow for other units as well as for the people involved.

The Little Blue Book describes what it calls 'a quiet revolution' - a revolution capable of removing from Parliament and Ministers the uncertainty of not knowing if they were getting value for the public money they spend, or from chief executives and managers the agony of not knowing if 'they were delivering value' (P.10). Financial Management Reform is thought to ensure Parliamentary

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[2] See, for example, Treasury's early publication *Government Management: Brief to the In-Coming Government*, 1987, Government Printer, Wellington.

scrutiny of the entire operation of public expenditure, to enhance accountability of both people and units of organisation; more generally, it ensures the efficient use of resources through improved managerial performance. The Little Blue Book ends in these terms: 'Many of the reforms are innovative and unprecedented elsewhere in the world. During the next few years, as the Government changes the way it manages its finances, every New Zealanders will come to enjoy the long-term benefits of this quiet revolution ' (P.39).

Treasury's eleven Output Classes may be grouped in the following way. Each output class is to be delivered within the appropriated amount shown.

	$ (millions)
* 4 offer 'Policy Advice'; namely	
- General Economic and Financial Strategies	5.5
- Taxation	6.2
- Demand and Supply of goods, services, labour and capital	8.6
- Financial Performance of the Crown, its departments and agencies	28.2
	48.5
* 3 offer 'Management' activities, namely	
- Asset Sales	10.9
- Budget, financial information and operational activities of the Budget process	3.6
- Liabilities, refinancing, managing liquid funds and liabilities portfolio	6.4
	20.9

* 4 offer either routine or *ad hoc* activities; namely	
- Crown Financing Reporting	3.8
- Actuarial, regulations for superannuation, actuarial advice	1.1
- State-Owned Enterprises, information and advice to the Minister	1.2
- Electricity Restructuring, advice to Minister	2.0
	8.1

The total for 1991-92 is $77.5m. The estimated expenditure for the previous year was $155.9m., but in that year, Management of Asset Sales, as an 'output' of Treasury, was estimated to cost $80.8m., and Policy Advice was up on three of its four Output Classes. One advantage of an accounting emphasis on 'outputs' is that government can swing money ('inputs') about in terms of the priorities it sets and knows the cost of doing so.

It is important to recognise that Output Classes are merely a way of identifying what the Treasury, as a unit of organisation, puts out. They do not reflect its organisational structure. That is arranged through sections shown in an Organisational Chart in an appendix to the Plan. Compared with Output Classes the arrangement of sections is disparate and confused. When a policy of restructuring is recommended by Treasury, an analyst needs to focus on Output Classes rather than a sectional structure of an entity.

The theory is that government decides what it wants to achieve. As an engineer knows, this implies specified outputs from suppliers. Quality must be specified. government then purchases these, even from its own departments or utilities. Measurement of any unit's performance, it is thought, is most readily obtained from splitting up homogeneous wholes (like the old D.S.I.R.) in Herbert Spencerian style, into specialised, heterogeneous, stand-alone units. Costs and outputs (i.e. 'efficiency') then become subject to Performance Measurements. The principle of accountability 'identifies areas within departments where activities need to be modified in the light of past performance' (P.17). One 'core

business' of Treasury is '...bedding in and refinement of the Financial Management Regime and associated systems' elsewhere in the public domain' (P.3 of the Plan).

One of these associated systems is what Treasury calls Accrual Accounting. This technique goes beyond cash transaction accounting to matching the cost of resources consumed (monetary and tangible) in the production of goods and services to the revenues or services produced. Even the smallest of units must account in these terms. The Little Blue Book says that the adoption of this mode of accounting 'means that departments and the government as a whole can, for the first time, work out their real financial status' (P.26). I admit to being uncertain over what a 'real' financial status might be. The latter parts of this Note attempt to get at this. We are told elsewhere that accrual accounting 'gives a much clearer picture of the organisation's financial performance and position'.

Bearing this in mind, I was quick to order *The Financial Statements of the Government of New Zealand* for the Six Months Ended 31 December 1991 (Published by order of The House of Representatives, 1992). I was informed, in the Foreword, written by the Minister of Finance, that: 'These Financial Statements represent an important milestone in the financial management reforms that the New Zealand Government has been engaged in over the last three years. They are the only comprehensive set of audited accrual statements being prepared for a sovereign government'. The public press at the time of their release in the House made a brief reference to the negative net worth of our government (liabilities in excess of assets) of somewhat under $14.4 billion, and the Minister herself explained the situation as 'the consequence of New Zealand governments persistently running budget deficits' (P.4 of the Financial Statements).

The Treasury opens the sub-heading, 'Interpreting the Statements' in these terms: 'The accrual financial statements provide significant new information. Although the format and presentation of the information resembles a company's financial statements, those of the Crown will be analyzed in a different context from a firm's. This is because the Government's objectives relate to the welfare of New Zealanders rather than making a profit. Further, the Crown has the power to tax which, while not included in the balance sheet, ensures that a negative Crown balance does not mean that the Crown is insolvent' (P.5). How relieved I was! The Crown's reporting reforms, as the Treasury calls this aspect of its activities,

are to be improved yet again at 1st of July, 1992, when the Crown's 'entire estate' (i.e. all entities such as School Boards, Accident Compensation, Transit New Zealand etc.) become added into the present Statements. This exercise is expected to reduce the negative net worth of the Crown to just over $10 billion. I was coming to wonder how Treasury proposed to handle New Zealand's affairs 'in format and presentation' but yet differently from that of a company.

But the more I read, the more worried I became - not over the possible seriousness of our plight, as that is common to countries paying off interest and principal on excessive overseas borrowings. My worry was over the persistent connection Treasury was making between the model of the private company and Treasury's most ardent pursuit of accounting perfection, allegedly in the public interest. As enumerated above, Treasury prepares and offers Policy Advice as part of its Outputs to the tune of at least $48.5m., or for about 63% of its total 'output classes' expenditure. Despite the caveat of analysis 'in a different context', the model of the private company seemed to have some to dominate the logic of the exercise and, in that respect, must raise doubts about its usefulness to reflect the state of major aspects of the human delivery system at all.

To put the issue into perspective, I reviewed Professor Gerald Grace's Inaugural Lecture, given in September 1988 on taking up the Chair of Education at Victoria University of Wellington. He titled his lecture 'Education: Commodity or Public Good?'[3] The evidence for his analysis is the Treasury's two volume publication of 1987 and 1988 called *Government Management: Brief to the In-Coming Government*, that I footnoted earlier. Grace recognises '.. a distinct Treasury agenda which has the status of an ideological position...' (P.4), complete with its own terminology and whose use facilitates a process of 'radical restructuring', as Treasury parlance has it.

This process involves applying a vigorous form of economic and quantitative analysis that, among other things, makes education a commodity in the market-place. From this, the opportunity arises to introduce what Adam Smith in 1776 called a 'hidden hand' and what Treasury describes as '... the self-steering mechanism inherent in society to reach optimal solutions through the mass of

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[3] Victoria University Press, Wellington. 1988.

individual actions pursuing free choice without any formal consensus'.[4] The search for 'optimal solutions' is the enduring strength of the economists' enterprise. Professor Grace's plea is the retention of a liberal education, a cultured intellect, a constructive contributor to the common weal. This has a rigour of its own, but one quite different from the technical one of Treasury.

Interestingly, though their respective approaches come across to a reader as antithetical, each is at pains to identify some merit in the other's position. Grace's solution for the future is '.. to avoid crude reductionism and learn to frame our analysis with the sophistication and qualifications that the complexity of our subject requires' (P. 14). Treasury cautions: 'A moment's reflection will lead to the conclusion that a production function approach to education (and indeed to many other 'industries') is fraught with difficulties' (Vol ii P. 7, quoted in Grace P. 6). But argues, nonetheless, that the scale of resources involved demands that research be undertaken into production functions. In practical terms, Treasury's approach necessitates a form of organisation that enables this exercise to be done. The ideal model is the private, stand-alone company wherein small organisational units and high technical, managerial skills are combined.

The private company is the outcome of a person or persons having an image of an opportunity or service and a means, legalised by Parliament, to create a deliberately structured organisation in order to pursue and exploit that image and the situation tied up with it. The 'company' is the subject of freedoms, inspections and controls that enable it, as an organisational form, to be used within and beyond national boundaries and, theoretically, over all intentions and purposes. The managers conducting its affairs are duty bound to act through the principles of 'business', i.e. to measure resources as assets and obligations as liabilities, to measure relations to other people through the rigour and accuracy of contract, and so on. In brief, it is organised money. The company's success or failure is measurable only in cash terms. Monetary accounting is the preferred form of its public statements and achievements. A mechanical weighing up of inputs and outputs, storing up of assets and excesses of obligation, enables the

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[4] *Government Management* .... Vol ii, P. 41 quoted in Grace P. 17, footnote No. 11.

accounting record to show up as balance sheets, or as cash evaluated assets or liabilities.

This whole construct is simultaneously deliberate yet fictive. It is ideal for the making and saving of money in so far as 'money' is itself the perfect fictive construct through which people can come to express such relationships as are mutually reducible to its use. But there can be no greater contrast in the way people are perceived than between a company model and spontaneous aspects of a nation. Within a nation, people are unwittingly organised as by kinship, or spontaneously organise themselves through associations of enormous variety and purposes quite outside of money. Heroes emerge and die in pursuit of common causes. Citizens arrange their activities deliberately to help other people both within kinship links and beyond them. Education, health, welfare, restoring the dignity of minorities, encouraging customs or religious expression etc. are but a few of collective activities. Professor Grace's plea and the research intentions of Treasury in education are but a small sample of a general issue.

It is no coincidence that health and education have been the *bête noire* of government reform measures since 1987. Restructure after restructure have been attempted, but with increasing uncertainty of purpose and intent. Experiment has given way to conflict; the big stick has generated resistance. By 1992, a major issue over which conflict emerges includes the actual practice, the professional attribute, of person to person conduct - teacher to pupil, medic to patient - as much as over retaining pay or conditions. The face-to-face professions feel threatened. Time and motion measures, cybernetic synergies etc. can be attached to routines of administration or management, but the practice of the caring professions is forced to the sidelines, or even to oblivion, by such trivia. Yet the intellectuals of Treasury persist with attempts to measure the intractable features of spontaneous organisation and person to person meanings.

Accrual accounting, the Financial Statements suggest on P. 72, removes the deficiency of '... an incomplete picture of assets and liabilities, and revenue and expense flows .... the Financial Statements now give Parliament a quality of information exceeding the standards expected by the shareholders of a company'. But in trying to work with deliberative, fictive constructs, Treasury is unavoidably skating on very thin ice. The concepts of 'Crown' and 'government' increasingly become metaphoric, contracting legalities, conveniently standing in place of

people who are the only possible actors of substance in the situation. Care has to be taken over the extent to which assemblies of people become delegated to fictive things, and the nature of the delegation that has become extended in doing so. The essential ingredients of any technique used to measure the networth of a nation - or any surrogate such as Crown or Government - must be given explicit clarity rather than the technical difficulties emerging in doing the job by similarity with a company. By maintaining the mechanical approach of balances and a cash only mode of measurements appropriate to a deliberately constructed company, Treasury appears to have turned its considerable efforts to enhancing confusion and complication.

The *Financial Statements...* contain page after page of 'Statement of Accounting Policy', Notes, Commentary etc., Nothing is left to misunderstanding about how figures are arrived at or what interpretation is possible. The skills of accounting expertise involve international justifications and appear in the 1991 Budget Annexures as publicly available but not part of the regular fiscal documentation.

Assets, we are told, have to be 'owned by the organisation' and be capable of reliable valuation. Conservation and heritage assets, for example, pose a difficulty because they contravene a further principle - that assets have to be classified by their nature e.g. as investments or physical assets, rather than the purpose for which they are held (P. 78). This difficulty is dealt with not by questioning the concept 'ownership' or of 'value' in such circumstances, but by making 'an exception' and a distinct entry in the Statements. I wonder how land under Treaty of Waitangi dispute, involving the Maori concept of 'ownership' might, with integrity, be valued or put into an asset category appropriate to a Pakeha company. Similarly, native indigenous forest could hardly be valued *pari passu* with a commercial plantation under political pressures coming, for example, from the Rio de Janiero World Summit conventions.

The concepts of liability and asset pose other difficulties. The Commentary on the Statements itself offers good examples. The Crown's monopoly to tax the citizenry and companies might possibly be construed as an asset. Personally I would think that in private hands it might be more asset-worthy than a monopoly in a 'free-market'! The Treasury's view of the matter is in these terms: 'one way to view this is to interpret this power as analogous to mutual or co-operative organisations with power to levy their members. In such cases, the power to levy

is not treated as an asset' (P. 79). Similarly, future payments to National Superannuation and other welfare benefits are not included under liabilities as they are financed from general taxation and are non-contributory benefits. There is also uncertainty about these as a liability because their rates are varied by government from time to time. With regard to valuation more generally, the Commentary states: 'A minimum condition for inclusion in the Financial Statements is that the information should be reliable. A valuation of power to tax is most unlikely to meet this criterion' (P. 79).

The emphasis on reliability could in this instance be a protection against one of the genuinely hot potatoes of politics - the extent richer people and companies, i.e. organised money, are expected to contribute to the common cause. The Crown's net worth is a rather hollow idea if matters of this sort have to be omitted without comment from financial statements that are explicitly intended to be useful. Treasury is clear about its view that these Financial Statements are 'a significant advance over the former Public Accounts' (P. 70). Through accrual accounting techniques, the Statements, it is said, '.. show more clearly the economic impact of government activity', or 'provide better information for Parliament and the public to assess government's management of public resources' (P. 70).

Despite the theoretical compromise these statements imply for 'the self-steering mechanism inherent in society', the intense efforts of Teasury's intellectuals to generate measurements of and apply techniques of interpretation to public affairs that will have as 'outcomes', efficiencies and public benefits are very apparent in these Statements. At the conclusion of their exercise, there is a concise and clear comparison between 'private-sector reporting' and 'the new Crown Financial Statements' (Section 4.4 PP. 83-4). Treasury knows only too well the difficulties involved in the exercise.

What appears to me to be at stake is the misguidedness involved in devoting so much effort to applying principles of accounting admirably suited to 'the private sector' but so evidently unsuitable to much of public affairs. Perhaps the very classification so popularly employed over the decades to our collective affairs, that of 'private' and 'public', constitutes a mind-set (to use modern speak) that makes it very difficult to formulate another approach in the accounting profession. Doubly difficult would this be for intellectuals carrying weighty,

direct, responsibilities to politicians and the governance of New Zealand's public affairs. To experiment with concepts almost foreign to accountants well versed in the successes of the 'private sector' to generate real wealth, i.e. measurable money, may be expecting too much. There remains, however, the persistent contradiction of our time: namely, the more control we appear to have over resources and ourselves, made possible by science and technology, the more do masses of people appear to suffer from uncertainty and even outright want. Despite the claim in The Little Blue Book about 'the long term benefits of this quiet revolution', there appears to be no necessary connection between intellectual experimentation with accrual accounting and the general welfare of the populace at large.

The issues raised here are of a sociological character. The routines of life with their associated responsibilities, with classifications of people and events that pose 'problems' and the 'only possible range of solutions' that emerge, and so on, have been the stuff of social scholarship for some time. Professor Grace saw, very early on in Treasury's adventures with public affairs (and so too did members of the womens movement at that time), the challenge posed to education. In a more general sense, applying the company model to what has now become known as 'Public Good Research' may well for sociologists be an appropriate starting point. After all, there is something of a mixed metaphor implied in the concepts of public good research and monetary efficiency.

Celia Briar, Robyn Munford and Mary Nash (Eds) **Superwoman Where Are You? : Social Policy and Women's Experience.** Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 1992.

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This book brings together essays on aspects of recent social policy development in New Zealand as they affect women. This is not an area which has been extensively researched here and in the light of the last years of new right economics and the accompanying re-writing of the welfare state, it is all the more important that the issues addressed in the book gain visibility. The book is designed as a working text. It is intended to assist in a process of demystification of the values and assumptions of social policy and to enable women to understand how decisions are made and for whose benefit. The encompassing objective is one of empowerment - by understanding how policies are made, women will be in a stronger position to 'join the debates and influence their outcome' (p. 13). In order to begin this process, each contributor has included questions for readers to discuss and evaluate and, in addition to the bibliography accompanying each chapter, included several texts for further reading.

Following the Introduction, the editors have divided the book into four parts - a more general overview (which includes Briar's very useful analysis of women's economic position in New Zealand society), issues pertaining to women and work; equal employment opportunities; and women in focus (a more diverse section, including articles on rural women, women in prison, women and divorce and social policy and death. The reader is therefore presented with a wide range of different social policy issues. Some of these move, in terms of their subject matter, across ground which feminists are well familiar but where there has been slow progress in achieving change, such as issues associated with state provision of childcare (Easting) and the incorporation of women's work into Supplementary Accounts as part of the National Accounts, to ensure that the latter better reflect the value of unpaid work (McKinlay).

Although these are areas which have been researched elsewhere (Smart, 1984) Nash provides a valuable analysis of women's experiences of lawyers during their divorce and, in the only markedly theoretical essay in the book, Munford discusses the role of women as caregivers. She addresses not only the importance of defining and naming women's experience as part of empowerment and consciousness raising, but also highlights the need for articulating the process of the 'technologies' of organisational power. Other chapters discuss what are for me less familiar areas of social policy such as the historical and continuing subordination of women prisoners' needs to those of male prisoners (Phillips); the work of an EEO Officer at Victoria University (Korndorffer) and the demeaning experiences of lesbians in the Department of Social Welfare whose colleagues' desire to magically convert their deviant work associates to heterosexuality via 'magic twinkie' indicates an appalling degree of bigotry (Raven). Given Shipley's emphasis on 'core families', lesbianism in this institutional context can easily be interpreted as a (moral) contradiction, positioning lesbians in a complex relationship with the state about disclosure of their sexual identity.

Through these different strands runs a dominant common thread addressed by each contributor - that social policy has typically not taken the complexities of women's lives into account, persistently subordinating women's needs and rights to those of men. The book's coherence is sustained further by additional, interwoven themes. One is the importance of making women's issues and needs visible to those involved in the definition of social policy and, consequently, the need to bring women in from the margins to a more central position in informing such decision-making; the second, the way location alters meanings of words. Words do not have a single meaning. Their meanings, and especially their political outcome, depend on context and power. A critical dimension for attempting to ensure that social policy includes and positively values women's experiences and contributions to society involves unpacking the multiple implications of words beyond their more restrictive references, and ensuring that these broader implications are actively understood by policy makers. The third strand is around issues of dependence and independence, and the historical and present economic and social consequences for women of state assumptions of women's dependency on men.

As a collection of the essays the book makes for extremely interesting, albeit rather depressing, reading. There are, however, some shortcomings. Although the book is concerned about empowerment of women (and empowerment depends on access to information) the editors do not explore the difficulties of translating knowledge into action in a political climate where feminist politics are marginalised. There is too always a problem in such books about choice - of area, and of writer. Given the magnitude of the changes in the health field, for example, I would have appreciated some discussion of these changes for social policy and their impact on women rather than a re-visiting of some more familiar areas.

Wishing to avoid tokenism and cultural appropriation, the editors did not include Maori feminist writers. Cultural politics are not easily resolved but a number of decisions similar to the editors' one may result in Maori feminist issues not getting the visibility they deserve. Indeed the absence of any critique of recent social policy from a Maori perspective was all the more striking in light of the frequent references to Shipley's endorsement of 'core' families, the definition of which excludes family structures such as whanau. Responsibilities to whanau create financial and social obligations on Maori which are generally not experienced by pakeha. A discussion of the impact of these traditional and important obligations in a changing social environment and the tension created by these obligations and current social policy would have been helpful.

Finally, the quality of the contributions was uneven. I found Bunkle's and Lynch's and Hera's essays particularly unsatisfactory, so giving a somewhat off-putting beginning and end to the book. Hera's chapter sat somewhat awkwardly with the rest of the contributions in terms of its orientation and its content. In particular she tended to resort to overlarge historical generalisations. The exact parallels between witch burnings of the 16th century and the slow development of funeral parlours in New Zealand at the beginning of the 20th century need further elaboration, as does her argument on pp. 254-5 that grave robbing was an example of 'corruption and injustice of free market, laissez-faire economic policy, with the same reluctance to interfere with free trade by policy makers, that we are again facing today'.

My dissatisfaction with Bunkle and Lynch's essay was because it also presented too simplistic a view. Their argument is, confusingly, that there is more than one

interpretation to words, that Treasury has 'captured' the language, using it to promote policies injurious to women. This then requires that women reassert 'our' language - a position which then suggests that language after all has a single point of reference and that social reality is not constituted by multiple discourses, and further, that women can be read as constituting as a homogeneous, not heterogeneous group. These assumptions are now heavily critiqued in much feminist writing.

Another critical issue for women which this essay provokes is to do with tone. Is it helpful to feminism and to its political standing to depend on anger, rather than argument to make one's case? I am not asking women to deny or suppress their anger, but to address how that anger is most constructively used so that a more forceful analysis can be developed. In the discussion of monetarist beliefs (p. 33) it would have been more helpful not to have introduced the issue of New Zealanders' restraint in our use of free telephone directories but instead to have discussed the very real shortcomings of the monetarist position in the context of a major social policy issue. The recent health reforms were in part informed by the belief that the population uses health services indiscriminately. Measures were therefore required to reduce this 'overuse'. Taking this significant area of social policy, one can begin to tease out critical issues in the debate: who defines what is 'too much'; what statistical or other evidence is available to allow a 'too much' version to be passed; who are the major users of health services anyway (common sense would point to the more vulnerable groups, including women with pre-school children); and what are the implications both personally and in terms of public cost of not acting preventively and taking one's child to the doctor when it merely has ear ache? This type of analysis begins to clarify the importance of addressing what is absent in a text or policy, not just what is included.

While these are problem areas, the book's strength is in its reinforcement of the necessity for breadth and range of analyses. The major problem, though, is how to broaden the debate. In the current political climate how do women and ethnic minorities get their complementary but also conflicting and different voices heard? How do we as a society achieve social policies that recognise diversity and are not based on assumptions of homogeneity?

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Greg Newbold, **Deviance and Crime**. Auckland Oxford University Press, 1992.

Reviewed by Charles Crothers
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Crime Over Two Decades:

As a rhetorical device for the introduction and cover (but then quickly discarded), Greg Newbold poses his book as an update to the magisterial essay-review of crime in New Zealand written by Robson in 1968. As opposed to Robson's 'institutional criminology', Newbold takes a globally sociological approach to his criminological subject-matter. The monograph is well-written, anchored not just in appropriate sociological discussion, but also reaching back to classical philosophical thinkers, and redolent with themes of 'philosophical anthropology' ('what is the nature of criminality in humans?' etc), uncluttered with data-tables, and with an appealing lore of metaphoric images. The presentation of the two books, then, is much at variance, and I will use the purchase provided by this contrast to organise my review.

Societal Change:

Society has changed over the intervening two and a half decades. Since then, there has been the collapse of economic good-times, the rendering occasioned by the Springbok Tour (and Vietnam conflict), and the explosions of a drug culture,

gangs, a sharply rising crime curve, and the increasing recognition of white collar crime. This changing societal framework and its effect on crime and deviance is explicitly posited by Greg Newbold as framing the key questions his book endeavours to research and explain. It is basic to assessing his book to critique the adequacy of his model of the changes to New Zealand society over this period: certainly he has identified some key social themes, but the inventory is surely partial and little attention is spent on providing a unifying framework which might hold these trends together into a single perspective.

Sociological Change:

What then is the shape of the theoretical apparatus he brings to bear on these key and highly challenging questions? Over this period the literature in criminology and the sociology of deviance has changed markedly: and Newbold has taken some note of this. Strangely, despite the challenge he has set himself, and therefore the pressing need for conceptual assistance in this task, Newbold's book is devoid of an explicit overall guiding theoretical framework that would hold his disparate material in place. Instead, he quickly works through the 'traditional' recitation of the historical development of the sociology of deviance, to arrive at the underwhelming conclusion that a pure Marxist approach is hardly adequate. Any further explanations are tied to specific issues and are cobbled together from materials appropriate to these. It might be possible to explicate some implicit underlying theoretical stance behind the range of more specific views he advances at different points: there is use of 'anomie-and-opportunity-structure' theory, and a conflict perspective, but little drawn from 'labelling' approaches.

I think that there is both a substantive and formal difficulty with this 'theoretical strategy'. Formally, there is a quest for simplistic explanations, rather than trying to pull complexities into order, with all the rhetorical difficulties this entails. Substantively, Newbold's strength lies in alluding to changing cultural emphases (I have listed these above), but social structure has largely dropped out of his accounts: there are few alive people in these pages, but there is an even larger silence on (what I take to be the sociologist's crucial contribution) the way people are constrained by their position in the social structure. This poverty of theory leaves far too much room for the reader to move between Newbold's points to construct his or her own 'reading': the sociology is too weak and scattered to

have an impelling effect (which accords the reader much in the way of 'democratic' rights while hardly being that effective in propounding a sociological viewpoint).

Change in Crime

The nature of crime and deviance has changed over this period. A main driving force in Greg Newbold's thinking is conflict sociology and working with this perspective allows him to carry out a bold preemptive strike: instead of the more expected review of trends in crime, Newbold opens his substantive chapters with an account of white-collar crime and then provocatively follows this up with material on female criminality and on drug use: themes that broaden attention away from a more traditional criminology. This wider casting of the scope of the book is particularly interesting. It provides room for Newbold to convincingly lard his account with a series of compelling thumb-nail sketches of property crime and to develop his perspective that indeed (middle-class) property malfeasance is more of a 'social problem' than the relative 'pilfering' of (working class) thieves. Perhaps this thrust could be extended to suggest that corporate 'symbolic violence' (cf. Bourdieu) has a wider impact than physical violence.

Although Greg Newbold sketches out his perspective, a further research task lies in actually assembling some appropriate evidence to back his assertions up. Perhaps this is not such a difficult task as might at first sight appear. For example, since Newbold's book was published, the Serious Fraud Office has estimated Corporate crime arising around the Stock Market crash to be in the order of 2.6 billion dollars. Other measures might be sought.

A further more general task might be to generate a useful theory-based typology of types of deviance that would examine the extent to which Newbold's coverage of corporate deviance is sufficient: for example, a Marxist might well argue not just that 'property is crime' but that exploitation of labour-power lies at the very heart of immoral capitalism. One can posit that many other forms of corporate and societal deviance are not covered: e.g. the whole history of 'institutionalised racism', not to mention 'institutionalised sexism' in New Zealand. The problem in counting up evil is where does one end? And why stop at any particular point? Is Newbold provocative enough?

Newbold's treatment of gender and ethnic issues in relation to crime are sure to raise some definite reactions from both groups. Already, some of Newbold's comments on the latter has caused some ruction, as the publishing of the book caught up on the coattails over the early 1992 'moral panic' concerning violence, and ethnicity. Broadly speaking, Newbold takes quite opposite tacks on the two issues. Whereas he strongly underplays the official picture of the lower involvement of women in crime and suggests that women's real involvement might well be much higher, for Maori (Polynesian Pacific Islanders get little attention), the official picture is taken at face value despite obvious points (with research backing: e.g. the age and socio-economic differences) which he might have adduced to legitimately down-play the major ethnic differences portrayed in the official picture. In both cases, Newbold's approach seems courageously determined to cut at popular prejudices, but because of his unsophisticated handling of this material, poor sociology results.

Change in Legislation

A useful feature of the book are Greg Newbold's succinct summaries of the existing law relating to each of the various types of deviance or crime which he covers: this is good background. But Newbold is less sensitive to the **changing** nature of law over recent decades: he makes no attempt to provide an account of how law is changed. This in turn leads to an insensitivity to what should be a key concern of any analysis in this area: that law is made by parliamentarians but only as part of a complex but highly structured process. Attention to law-making is at least as central as law-breaking and there surely is case-study material available on this.

Change in Social Research

Another major change over the last few decades has been the growth of a minor New Zealand social research industry on crime, violence etc. (my recent bibliography on the topic yields over 200 studies: almost all from the intervening period Crothers, 1992). Newbold has only partially utilised this wealth of work. At best, the eyes of this literature are picked over for statistical titbits. But the key analytical thrust of several quite sophisticated studies are **not** communicated,

despite their direct and extreme relevance to several of the issues he discusses. For example, there are Fergusson's estimates of the 'socio-economic' component of ethnic differences in offending which Greg fails to report, but which are crucial for understanding the interactions of social class and ethnicity. Worse, almost none of the empirical material taken from these studies is updated despite the wide availability of the data through Department of Statistics 'Justice' data and the cheap opportunities to secure up-to-date information from the Police Department that would enable designer-fit research studies. This leaves much of his work severely out-of-date on many key points and 15-20 year old data is being cited. At least, these deficiencies should have been very clearly pointed out. (Newbold cites a poverty of available studies but I cannot see that this is true: again, see my bibliography). A more general methodological point is that while Newbold's eschewing of tables of data and substitution of in-text comments probably enhances reader appeal for many, it does mean that the reader is captured by Newbold's personal selection of 'facts', and that readers have limited room for manoeuvre in using a wider presentation of facts to build their own 'story'.

The Book's Contribution to New Zealand Criminology:

Over this period, as opposed to the 'traditional liberal' ambience of the Robson book, a range of interpretations of crime and violence in New Zealand have opened up. On one hand, 'sociological claptrap' has been dismissed, and on the other, some extreme critical viewpoints have been rehearsed. How is Newbold's contribution placed within this range of views?

While Newbold draws heavily on sophisticated sociological views, on the other hand, his text is very open to a blunt, conservative and racist 'reading'. To show how such a paradox is possible, a close textual criticism is necessary. The text of the book is constructed like a sandwich: commentary and empirical information are separate layers. Unlike a well-constructed sandwich, though, the layers do not hang together. This allows for quite different modes of consumption: red-necks can ignore the spongy commentary and get stuck into the real meat, while the inclusion of the sophisticated commentary shields Newbold from criticisms from colleagues. Better quality sociological work involving both

adequate theory and appropriate social research are necessary that will interrelate *both*.

The Book's Contribution to New Zealand Sociology

Over this period, too, New Zealand sociology has matured considerably. And, despite all my criticisms, Newbold's book is arguably the best monograph in New Zealand sociology we have seen for quite a long time: in fact, it is difficult to think of a clear rival. While Ian Pool's study of the New Zealand Maori population is at least as clearly researched, it does not have the sociological ambition of Newbold's book. No other study seems as concerned with broaching important sociological problematics of what recent changes in New Zealand society have been and what the consequences have been in a strategically important area of social activity (and deviance has always been centrally important for understanding the general nature of any society). His book is challenging and much work has gone into marshalling appropriate argumentation and evidence. Perhaps the gap between challenge and achievement lies in the lack of the development of acceptable sociological standards in both areas in the local context, which is particularly the case when book manuscripts are not subjected to sufficiently careful editing and peer review.

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James Richie, **Becoming Bicultural**, Wellington:
Huia Publishers & Daphne Brasell Associates Press, 1992.

Reviewed by Lindsay Cox
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This account of James Ritchie's participation in Māori communities is both scholarly and insightful, as one would expect from an academic and an educator of his experience and character. From the outset, one is aware of the sensitivity and depth of perception that Ritchie brings to issues of biculturalism: a perception and sensitivity which should be shared.

As this is, in part, a history of the development of his personal philosophy of biculturalism, his use of personal pronouns is both apt and engaging. His world view, shaped as it was in the first instance to accord to the predominant norms of New Zealand society, is altered through contact with the people of Ngàti Pòneke: an urban Māori culture group active since its establishment in 1935. His perception of biculturalism is further developed as a result of contact as a school teacher with rural Māori resident in their traditional tribal areas. His subsequent research among various Māori groups premised by these earlier contacts allowed him to refine his thinking on how best to interact with Māori as a researcher.

Importantly, as the narrative develops, the reader is subtly introduced to many ways of thinking, interacting and living that are fundamentally Māori, and the question what is Pàkahà culture soon emerges. This is a valuable process for those undertaking cross cultural studies as the subconscious bias of the researcher is all too often either ignored or given scant regard in conducting a study. This in turn has in the past seen complex social systems trivialised by social scientists and subtle peoples crudely portrayed. Ritchie's treatment of the topic causes one to consider one's own inherent predispositions and creates the possibility that these issues will be given some thought at least.

Ritchie is the first to admit that the major thrust of his book is to raise significant issues facing Pàkehà academics and as such is of limited value to Māori. Indeed, his appropriation of Māori terms runs all the risks of creating a glossary in the reader's mind of cultural concepts that reflect western rather than Māori concepts.

For all that, *Becoming Bicultural* is of value to Māori researchers and planners. Ritchie highlights areas of concern for Pàkehà and suggests a possible strategy by which these concerns might be addressed. In so doing, he provides an opportunity for Māori to understand Pàkehà research philosophies and methods. This insight may create an environment whereby Māori might ensure that the benefits of research are harnessed for Māori purposes or at least that any untoward results for Māori are minimised. Certainly, if Ritchie's approach is adopted broadly, then the resultant cadre of European researchers will be less likely to undertake inappropriate work and more likely to ensure that the outcomes of their endeavours are of value in Māori eyes.

Perhaps a more fundamental issue is whether Pàkehà should continue to conduct studies in Māori situations. Increasingly Māori research to be conducted by Māori and for Māori is gaining recognition, particularly among Māori academics. It is a call that must be balanced by the fact that there is a dearth of suitably qualified Māori in some areas of research and expertise. This however need not preclude the possibility of research in those areas. Researchers who, like Ritchie, adopt and develop suitable techniques will continue to be needed. That they ought to work for and alongside Māori must be emphasised. Research is fundamentally about power and in Aotearoa today, the climate is right for power to be shared.

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Rosemary du Plessis, Phillida Bunkle, Katherine Irwin, Alison Laurie and Sue Middleton (Eds) **Feminist Voices. Women's Studies Texts for Aotearoa/New Zealand.** Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Reviewed by Christine Cheyne
Department of Social Policy and Social Work
Massey University.

If one of the tasks of a reviewer is to evaluate whether or not a text achieves what it sets out to achieve, then I should commend *Feminist Voices* for the

consistency between the description set out in the Preface and the subsequent chapters. In the Preface, on behalf of the five editors, Rosemary du Plessis describes *Feminist Voices* as

> not 'a text', but a space in which many different feminist voices speak their understandings of peace and war, ecology, joint custody, economics and the politics of knowledge. It is a *pot-pourri of texts* produced by women whose everyday lives have shaped what they have to say and the voices they bring to the telling' (p.xi, my emphasis).

Accordingly, *Feminist Voices* comprises twenty-four diverse chapters. The authors or 'voices' in these chapters are women who are, in the main, teachers of women's studies and occasionally students of women's studies 'both inside and outside universities'. (In true post-structuralist fashion with its emphasis on multiple subjectivity, some of course are both teacher and student). In keeping with the feminist dictum 'the personal is political' there is a autobiographical, herstorical element to all of the contributions.

The collection provides some interesting pieces of feminist reflection on women's experiences and the position of women in contemporary Aotearoa-New Zealand. But this is not the substance of women's/feminist studies - a point implicitly acknowledged by the editors. I am disappointed that the **original** intention (alluded to in the Preface) of providing a text for use in women's studies/feminist studies (the editors seem unable to decide which it is to be because the two are always referred to jointly) courses was abandoned.

In the space of a relatively brief review I cannot hope to do justice to the total number of contributions, nor even to the *range* of voices and subjects. Some are rather conventional analyses, albeit with reference to local experience and events, of familiar themes - the state, law, unpaid and paid work, feminist managerial styles, and so on. There are within the total collection some contributions which do serve the original purpose. What follows here is a brief comment on a few texts which I consider to be particularly authoritative and innovative attempts at feminist theorising, which I think need to be affirmed as scholarly works and which should, I believe, serve as models for feminist theorists.

Lynne Star's text, 'Undying Love, Resisting Pleasures: Women Watch Telerugby', is an impressive contribution to feminist studies. I say this as one

who has no interest in rugby, I derive no pleasure from it - I do not even know the rules of the game. The experiences of televised rugby of different groups of women (heterosexuals, lesbians, Máori) are comprehensively and rigorously explored. Star attempts to articulate and document the different frameworks of understanding that these women bring to their 'readings' of telerugby. She concludes with an important challenge to feminist theorists - and also a more oblique reference to the connection between telerugby and libertarian philosophy which leaves me keenly awaiting further publications on this theme:

> ...we need to move beyond a simple rejection of rugby as patriarchal and sexist. There is a need instead for an understanding of the complex and often contradictory responses of women to this sport, including the responses of feminists and non-feminists to the telerugby texts which are increasingly important as vehicles for New Right philosophies in the 1990s.

Jan Jordan's chapter, 'Feminism and Sex Work: Connections and Contradictions', is similarly rigorously researched. Unlike some feminist theorists in the same field, Jan Jordan takes seriously the feminist methodological principle that the 'object' of research is also the knower. Empirical data and theoretical discussion are effectively connected. Like Lynn Star, Jan Jordan argues for contextual analysis in order to more adequately understand women's (in this case, sex workers') experiences. To some extent, however, there are contradictions, or at least tensions, in her own analysis where she argues, on the one hand, that all women are forced to trade on their sexuality for rewards in a patriarchal society and, on the other, that women, including sex workers, exercise choice, albeit within constraints.

Kathie Irwin's chapter, 'Towards Theories of Máori Feminisms', confidently and in a culturally distinctive manner, grapples with the techniques involved in the development of Máori feminist theories. This text is a model of the theory development process as well as a guide. It is as challenging, I imagine, to Máori readers as it is to Pakeha. Kathie Irwin courageously analyses some recent and contemporary events in academic/women's studies settings and seeks to develop a more critical feminist theory and practice by expanding the parameters of the debates taking place. The events she recounts underscore the struggle that lies behind the development of good theory. 'The search for knowledge', she says, 'becomes very problematic, at times openly dangerous to one's physical, cultural and spiritual health' (p.11). While she speaks as a Máori feminist theorist, facing

specific challenges, nevertheless the experience she describes is one common to many theorists.

The struggle associated with the development of adequate feminist theories is alluded to by Alison Jones and Camille Guy in their text, 'Radical Feminism in New Zealand: from Piha to Newtown'. Again this is a text which successfully incorporates and interrogates experience and modifies theory in the light of that analysis of experience. The authors explore feminist theorising and political practice in this country since the late 1970s and describe the risks and dilemmas for them in fostering criticism of conventional feminist theoretical positions. In seeking to understand the factors behind the absence of feminist theoretical debate in New Zealand, they identify a wider cultural pattern of 'anti-intellectualism, a mistrust of "theory", and - ironically - a moralistic dislike of those who challenge accepted beliefs' (p.301).

Having acknowledged earlier that this publication has remained true to its own self-description as a pot-pourri of texts, nevertheless I would argue that it is appropriate for a reviewer to comment on the overall project. Rosemary du Plessis, on behalf of the editors, writes in the Preface that the original project of writing a text for use in women's/feminist studies was abandoned because it was 'inappropriate':

> 'a text' implies some authoritative piece of writing which gives the reader access to what she needs to know if she is to be competent in a particular subject. Feminism challenges the view that anyone can or should produce such authoritative texts. Its purpose is to subvert such attempts at asserting definitive understandings, including attempts at definitive feminisms.

This is a shaky assertion for two reasons. First, despite being an assertion about the relativism of knowledge, it falls into the very trap it is denouncing: it is making an authoritative statement about feminist theorising. That is, it is an assertion that feminism and authoritative texts are mutually exclusive. Second, to say that no writing or theorising about a subject can be authoritative renders feminist theorising completely ineffectual. Feminist theory and politics need texts which seek to be authoritative; feminists will benefit from the writing of others and dialogue with others about the subject of women's oppression and the strategies for overcoming that oppression. Definitive feminisms are not entirely to be avoided *per se*. Lack of dialogue between, and the absence of criticism of,

definitive feminisms is what is dangerous for feminists, teachers and students of women's studies. It was disappointing to read some excellent theoretical pieces and to find no editorial or other engagement with the theory in *Feminist Voices.*

While it has been very important for feminist theorists to critique their own practice - and particularly the tendency towards universalism and ethnocentrism - and appropriate to adopt a concern with particularism - the danger has been the avoidance of authoritative statements about the nature of women's oppression and of the nature of strategies for addressing women's subordination. *Feminist Voices,* in my view, succumbs to this danger, and thus gives weight to the concern expressed, somewhat ironically, by two of the contributors, Jones and Guy: 'a theory sensitive to the complexity and contradictions of gender relations may not provide enough commitment to challenge those relations' (p.314).

This kind of theoretical impasse or stand-off feminists can ill-afford. I look forward now to a publication that boldly, assertively and unapologetically develops feminist theories and analyses of gender oppression based on social and cultural relations in contemporary Aotearoa-New Zealand.

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Dennis Smith, **The Rise of Historical Sociology**
Cambridge. Cambridge : Polity Press, 1991

Reviewed by Gregor McLennan,
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Massey University.

The growth in volume and status of historical sociology in recent years is a signal development in the discipline, calling for an account not only of its principal practitioners and models, but also for an explanation of the 'rise' of the field itself to new heights of achievement and interest. These are the important tasks of Dennis Smith's book, and although he has produced a rather unsatisfactory

work in terms of the depth of account offered, it is a valuable one nonetheless, being the first thorough, reliable and readable survey of the area.

The strengths of the book lie in its charting of the growth of historical sociology and in its summaries of the contributions of individual writers. Smith identifies two 'long waves' of his subject. The first begins in the Enlightenment and ends with Weber, 'finally crashing', in Smith's words, 'against the wall of totalitarianism, right and left, in the late 1920s' (p.2). The second long wave, beginning after World War II and continuing to the present, contains three sub-phases, essentially being shaped, respectively, by the influence of the Cold War, the dissensus of the Sixties, and the situation of historical and theoretical open-endedness in which we now find ourselves. The first sub-phase is dominated by American neo-functionalism, and its key figures (Parsons, Smelser, Eisenstadt, Marshall) adopted a kind of liberal or social-democratic evolutionism. Smith is, thankfully, not as scathingly critical of this tradition as standard hack commentaries. Nevertheless, during this period figures such as Marc Bloch and Norbert Elias were rediscovered, and this, together with the general move into conflict theory and Sixties politicization, heralded a new and more interesting sub-phase of historical sociology focusing on inequality and resistance movements. The central figures here were E. P. Thompson and Barrington Moore, with younger scholars such as Charles Tilly and Theda Skocpol lining up to lead the field into the third phase.

Smith envisages this latest stage as one in which the heritage of historical sociology has been firmly established (the *Annales* school, certain forms of Marxist historiography), and as an intellectual project it is now deemed to be 'soaring high'. Anderson, Wallerstein, Tilly and Skocpol remain in the forefront, but they have been joined by a whole stream of theorists-turned-historians (Collins, Giddens, Mann, Gellner, John Hall, the followers of Elias), and by feminist social historians too. This diverse but impressive generation has not only produced a notable pile of individual studies, it has also established historical sociology itself as the central dynamic 'paradigm' within sociology, and within social theory more widely understood. Indeed, Smith maintains that historical sociology is now in a position to influence not only academic debates, but the character of democratic citizen consciousness generally, given the surprising and growing popularity of certain kinds of politically-relevant accounts

of the significant past. (cf. the success of works such as Ladurie's **Montaillou** and Schama's **Citizens**).

Smith takes us through the development of the field informatively, discussing the works, authors and themes. On the way he highlights the importance of some key, occasionally neglected individuals (such as Bloch and Reinhard Bendix); and he ties the intellectual influences closely to their historical and political context - something, of course, that we might expect in a book praising historical sociology. A current and profound paradox he usefully dwells on is that the predominantly radical and leftish complexion of the main scholars dealt with stands in marked contrast to the rightward-moving political climate of the post-1970s period in which historical sociology comes of age.

The central problem with the text is that Smith does not spend much time on the very idea of historical sociology, either as a historical-political tradition or as a form of concretised theoretical explanation. Thus, for example, the long first 'phase' of the discipline is more or less a discursive construction; and serious questions of explanatory logic are by-passed almost totally. This problem becomes a real flaw in the author's approach when one comes to realise that the avoidance of epistemic questions is a deliberate decision by the author: almost as if the great thing about historical sociology is that matters of context and substance have decisively displaced misty questions of epistemology. Accordingly, Smith chooses precisely to offer a **periodization** of his subject rather than a logical delineation, and he brushes over the considerable conceptual differences amongst his key authors in favour of stressing their common concern to root theory and politics in substantive investigations rather than engage in abstract philosophizing. In short: Smith, even in this basic overview of the field, strives to practice what he believes to be a cardinal feature and strength of the historical sociological tradition.

It could be argued that this strategy of Smith's is both coherent and correct; coherent because it fits the paradigm being set up, and correct because sociology must return to substantive rather than epistemic issues. The latter point is being made in a number of quarters, with the general cry ringing out, 'enough philosophy - back to sociological theory'. But whilst I have some sympathy with this climate of opinion, a general anti-philosophy line simply cannot cope with the central questions of why sociological theory should be *historical*-sociological,

or why history needs theory. Not least amongst such issues is the very question: what kind of explanatory format is periodization itself? Smith never really tackles this, in spite of Skocpol and Anderson, to cite only two of the new paradigmatics, themselves raising and attempting to resolve it (in strikingly different ways, it should be noted).

Now, if Smith's own periodization of historical sociology as a field were relatively descriptive and unproblematic, or if it revealed major new insights, we could perhaps let the matter pass. But his supposition and account of the two major phases of the subject and his three sub-phases of the post-war scene are somewhat impressionistic in terms of their unifying principles and their membership. For example, the nature of the precedents which establish the field (Bloch, Braudel, Marxism) are never clearly set out; the distinctions between the content and personnel of sub-phases two and three are not convincing; and within sub-phase three (the present one) absolutely fundamental debates such as the validity of evolutionary perspectives - debates which explicitly divide John Hall, W.G. Runciman and some Marxists from Giddens, Mann and other Marxists - are glossed over in favour of a bland reiteration of the fact that these writers are all historical sociologists who know something about the world and who prefer to put their theoretical preferences in that context.

When Smith does go beyond periodization of his field into theoretical construction, the result is once again rather impressionistic. For example, each author is placed according to whether their style and politics fits one of four ideal types: the examining magistrate, the advocate, the scientist, and the partisan witness. The metaphorical character of these tropes is obvious, and Smith is almost certainly not trying to pass these off as much more than useful handles. Even so, there is a clear problem here: if you treat your material as 'cases' which are then made to fall under theoretically general categories for descriptive and analytical purposes - and Smith certainly takes this approach to his authors - one is either adopting a familiar instrumentalist/empiricist methodological stance, or a discursive one which must accept the risk of standing or falling by the quality of the metaphors chosen, and openly accept too their intrinsic inability to capture the 'real' essence of the subject. Whether or not Smith's categories stand or fall in this sense is not my immediate point here; it is rather to insist that any coherent approach to the material will inevitably embody epistemic preferences of some kind, and the approach will consequently benefit, not lose, by

recognising this and taking time to explicitly elaborate the organising principles behind the preferred categorization. Because Smith's categories lack that precise justification, due to his wish to firmly relegate quasi-philosophical matters within the discipline, they come across at times as both arbitrary and questionable.

Let me repeat that Smith's book is a very clear and informed guide for most purposes, and I hope it is widely read, as I share the author's enthusiasm for his subject. Indeed, I too think that many of the key issues and scholarly goals of sociology today lie in this body of work. My main critical point is that Smith's deliberate failure to address some of the most interesting, though certainly taxing, 'meta-' questions in the area simply ensures that such issues will keep returning.

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