NEW ZEALAND
SOCIOLOGY

Obj ... a refereed ... SEP 1996 ... and promote research
and ... MAY 1990 ... from ... development of
theo ... OCT 199 ... databases, ... a
pred ... chair ... Zealand.
Join
Edit ... G. Fraser, C. Mahar, M. O'Brien ... er;
P. S ...
Arti ... nators should consult the detailed instructions
insid ... the ... post to

... -9 JUN 1990 ...

2 ... 1990 ... *... al Sociology*
... ciology Department
... Massey University
Palmerston North, NZ

Book 2 ... SEP 1990 ...

... 1 AUG 1992

Issues
Subsc 2 6 FEB 1994

Mail s 1 5 APR 1995

Objective: To foster a refereed journal to disseminate and promote research and thought that has as its objective the clarification and development of theoretically informed research in Sociology and related disciplines, with a predominant, though not exclusive concern with New Zealand.

Joint editors: Dick Harker and Chris Wilkes

Editorial Board: N. Armstrong; G. Fraser; C. Mahar; M. O'Brien; R. Shuker; P. Spoonley.

Articles for publication: Contributors should consult the detailed instructions inside the back cover, and submit two copies to:

New Zealand Sociology
Sociology Department
Massey University
Palmerston North, N.Z.

Books for **review** and **advertising copy** should be sent to:

New Zealand Sociology (Reviews)
Sociology Department
Massey University
Palmerston North, N.Z.

Issues: 1 Volume per year, 2 issues per Volume.

Subscriptions: Rate for individuals   NZ$20.00 per Volume.
Institutional rate   NZ$30.00 per Volume.
Surcharge for overseas postage   NZ$5.00 per Volume.
Airmail delivery   P.O.A.

Mail subscriptions to:

New Zealand Sociology (subscriptions)
Sociology Department
Massey University
Palmerston North
New Zealand.

NEW ZEALAND SOCIOLOGY

CONTENTS

NEW ZEALAND CORPORATE CLASS NETWORKS

Georgina Murray
Sociology Department,
University of Auckland

Introduction

As background to this study of New Zealand's top corporate class fraction, this paper is introduced with a brief look at the 'whole' - the political and economic background of concentration and centralisation of top corporations in New Zealand today. The 'parts', that is the demographic, ideological and social characteristics of the corporate class, were collected by the means of a survey. This survey methodology is outlined. Then the key characteristics of the corporate class are described using data from interviews collected between June 1987 to March 1988. One hundred and seven complete in-depth interviews took place. The data are tested and evaluated using a variety of models in the literature - the bank hegemony model, the finance capital model, the class cohesion, the resource-dependency model, the managerial model and the coordination and control model. These models are outlined and in conclusion the direction of the research is shown. Suggestions for further work in this under - researched area are offered.

New Zealand's Political-Economic Class Background

Marx describes (1978a, vol.3, p.212) how the content of capitalist production necessitates the tendency for the rate of profit to fall (TRPF) i.e. the gradual growth of constant rather than variable capital so long as the rate of exploitation remains the same. This capitalist content results in the form of:

1 the concentration of capital into fewer hands;
2 the centralisation of production and the labour-force; and
3 the development of the world market.

The focus in this section is on evidence of centralisation and concentration amongst the top (by turnover see Scott et al 1985, p.15) thirty New Zealand companies. There are two reasons for this, first, because it is where the corporate sample (the empirical basis of the research) is drawn from and

second, because the empirical material provides a detailed background to the work that follows. How concentration and centralisation of top New Zealand corporations has developed is looked at in relation to employment, the concentration of capital, the pattern of overseas corporate investment in New Zealand and political centralisation.

The Centralisation of the New Zealand Workforce

Some of the effects of corporate centralisation can be seen in Table 1, which shows the concentration of the workforce into the top thirty companies in 1986 (the year in which my random sample was selected). The top thirty corporations are shown to control a sizable percentage of New Zealand labour power. Workforce numbers in the total full-time labour force in 1986 were 860,166 (see NZYB 1987-88, p.333). This total labour force figure is used to percentage the numbers employed in the top thirty firms (using figures from Jarden and Co. 1986, Share Registry). (Unfortunately there is no way of measuring the years before 1986 because there is no known available data.) Seventeen percent of the total workforce concentrated under the control of the top thirty boards and their executive, gives those top thirty companies significant control of labour power in New Zealand.

The centralization of seventeen percent of workers into the top thirty corporations parallels the large number of unemployed elsewhere. The figures on unemployment reflect the long wave centralisation patterns (cf. Mandel 1972, pp.130 - 132) which are that unemployment will be high at the bottom of recessionary long waves (i.e. 1894, 1940, 1987) and low at the long waves peak (i.e. 1914, 1967). (See Table 2) The rate of unemployment has been much worse than predicted. In March 1988 it was suggested that the unemployed would number 150,000 (Berle, New Zealand Herald, March 23rd, 1988, p.4, section 2). By January 1989 the published unemployed figure was 181,000 or 13.5 percent of the workforce (cf. Collins, New Zealand Herald, 1989, January 1st, p.3, section 1). This makes the depression of the middle 1980's greater (in the numeric terms of those suffering the degradation of unemployment) than that of the 1930's. Those who are left in employment are told that their demands for pay raises are amongst the "main factors contributing to the recession in New Zealand" (cf. the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Dr. Don Brash, New Zealand Herald, November 9th, 1988, p.1, section 3).

Concentration of Capital

By looking at the turnover (the monetary basis of sales) figures for the top thirty companies in New Zealand over the twenty year period 1966-1986, we can see evidence of massive increases in the capital accruing to these firms. Where figures are not printed in Table 3, (unless noted that the firm was not in existence) the information was not available from any known source, even on entreaty to the firm itself. The table shows that dominant control and ownership of the top thirty companies is not beyond the resources of people or groups in 1988. Remembering that a dominant owner can hold as little as five percent of the shareholding (cf. Bearden 1987, p. 48) this would include ninety-seven percent of the owners here as dominant. There are only eight companies (twenty-six percent) with fewer than twenty-five percent in the hands of one type of owner. Forty-three percent of the top thirty corporations have a New Zealand based dominant shareholder.

The 1988 location of the dominant ownership shows an even greater strengthening of the hold of the major 'indigenously based' trans-national - Fletchers (FCL). FCL has become New Zealand's top public company based on their net profit [$532,300,000], turnover [$9,170,000,000], market capitalisation [$5,068,531,000] and shareholders funds [$3,152,000,000] (cf. **Daroux, New Zealand Herald,** October 31st, 1988, p.6, section 3).

FCL at the top of the top thirty, made a $532 million dollar profit reported in September, 1988. Their empire now stretches, *domestically,* to Petrocorp (eighty-seven percent owned), Fletcher Fishing, Winstones (fifty percent owned), Place Maker Stores, Firth Industries, Fletcher Wood Panels, Golden Bay Cement (fifty percent owned), Fletcher Construction and Steel, Residential Inc. Beasley Homes, Challenge Properties, Pacific Steel Industries, Consolidated Metal, American Express, Group Rental and Visionhire, Selectrix Appliances, Wright Cars, Hertz Rent-A-Car, Wrightson Deer Stock/ Goats/ Wool/ Real Estate/ Blood Stock/ Horticulture, Challenge Meats, Tasman Pulp and Paper/ Lumber/ Forestry. Overseas it stretches around the American Western Pacific in the following companies - Crown Forest Industries, British Columbia Forest products (sixty-eight percent owned), Australian Newsprint Mills (twenty-five percent owned), Jennings Industries (thirty-six percent owned), Wright Schurbet (sixty-seven percent owned), Pacific Construction and other unnamed Chilean forestry interests (**Sunday Star,** February 20th, 1988, section D, p.1).

Concentrated (but not necessarily secure) ownership at the highest corporate level is paralleled by crumbling control at the bottom. In February 1989 it was reported that since the sharemarket crash in October 20th 1987 there had been a corporate death once every fifteen days (thirty-one in total) "As the list of casualties grows by the week, one commentator recently observed that the sharemarket crash is a little like the battle of the Somme. The true casualty lists are not posted immediately. But where will it all end?" (Sunday Star, February 12th, 1989, section A, p.11).

Overseas Ownership in New Zealand

Various economists (cf. Sutch 1972, p.12, Ward 1978, p.17) have pointed out that foreign capital permeates many seemingly indigenously controlled areas of the New Zealand economy and that overseas investment is expanding. Ward argues that not only has trans-national infiltration through subsidiary companies expanded considerably in the post war era but the average value of total output of overseas owned companies is far greater. Using 1975 figures (cf. Deane 1975, p.22) he shows that the total average output of overseas plant is over $1 million whilst the locally based companies average $161,000. The average size of the manufacturing surplus of overseas owned plants was $125,000 and $14,000 for domestic production. Ward concludes that foreign companies are on average larger and more productive than the local companies. Overseas companies have the advantage of being able to apply economies of scale to reduce unit costs and there is a commitment to new technologies. A commitment to new technologies presupposes the employment of the technocrats or professionals to handle them. Overseas companies employ forty-two percent of the 'professional and technical' persons within the manufacturing sector, although they are only twenty percent of all manufacturers.

Corporate leaders here and overseas are being exhorted to spend here because "New Zealand is a great buy" (Hugh Fletcher, quoted by Cave, New Zealand Listener, October 22nd, 1988) because the depreciating dollar ensures that foreign capital can come here and invest very cheaply. The interest rates are also very high which attracts investment. Since the share market crash the capitalist class (both domestic and foreign) have also had access to cheap bank credit. Unfortunately for the economy the in-pouring of overseas investment into New Zealand is paralleled by the flight of big New Zealand companies going off shore to Chile (e.g. Fletchers, Carter Holt Harvey and New Zealand

Dairy Corporation), Canada (e.g. Fletchers) Australia (e.g. Brierleys, Chase and Ceramco) Britain (e.g. Brierleys) and Hong Kong (e.g. Equiticorp).

The Labour government (1984-) has stressed its welcome to overseas investment. This has been manifest in a very liberal foreign investment policy applied by the Overseas Investment Commission (cf. NZYB 1986-7, p.513). The underlying rationale behind their liberalism is that the overseas companies are welcome because they are likely to invest in "new technologies and increase net foreign exchange earnings" (Ibid). (Whether these new technologies or capital are used to benefit the indigenous society is, of course, highly problematic).

Table 4 shows a very big increase in overseas investment in New Zealand since 1949. The strongest investment comes from Australia (mean $392,000,000) and the United Kingdom (mean $357,000,000). Trailing are the United States and Canada (mean $219,000,000) and the EEC (mean of $37,000,000).

United Kingdom investment in New Zealand, was beaten by Australia as the lead investor by 1971. It was at approximately this time that Britain expressed their interest in being part of the European rather than 'Common wealth' markets. Since 1983, New Zealand and Australia have formalised their economic relationship in a trade pact called The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA or CER as it is usually referred to). That CER is of growing significance to New Zealand business is reflected in the frequency with which it appears as a theme in business articles (cf. McPhee, **New Zealand Herald**, May 21st, 1988, p.4, section 4, King, **National Business Review**, October 14th, 1988, p.15, Wauchop, **National Business Review**, September 23rd, 1988, section w, p.11). Some of these reports detail impatience to speed the 'inevitable integration'. For example, Wauchop reports that the "manufacturers are kicking the government for dragging its feet in forming Closer Economic Relations (CER) with Australia." The New Zealand public are also increasingly favouring greater integration between the two economies - 44% of those polled in July 1988 wanted a common market between the two countries (**New Zealand Herald**, July 28th, 1988, p.2, section 1).

Centralisation of the corporate class has been shown to occurr here at the level of the corporation, the workforce and the increase of overseas capital. This is also reflected in the concentration of the political power of the corporate class.

Political Centralisation

The most powerful and vociferous political representation of corporate class interests in New Zealand is the New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR). The overlap with the top thirty companies by turnover is complete with the exception of Owens, Colonial Motors and Southland Frozen Meats (no longer in existence). Membership is by invitation to Chief Executive Officers (CEO's) of the top companies, but this is rather arbitrary as one dissatisfied ex-member stated:

> A self perpetuating thing - very much an 'old boy network' - you have to be invited. Select company. People like Bob Jones would turn it down because they are independent souls. (Respondent 19)

The membership, has changed dramatically since seven productive industrial corporations started the group in 1976.

> (The NZBR) has been hijacked by the high fliers - the paper shufflers. All the manufacturers have gone with the exception of Richard Carter. Only the Merchant bankers and the insurance people left... (Respondent 19)

Changing membership can be substantiated by looking at the sectorial patterns since the beginning of the NZBR (New Zealand Business Roundtable) in 1976. Table 5 shows a decreasing NZBR membership generally but particularly the loss of the disaffected executives from the productive sector (that is the part of the economy involved in commodity production). Although the Finance capital sector (the money shufflers) has not numerically increased since November 1986 the relative increase has been notable. In November 1986 financiers were twenty-three percent of the NZBR, in August 1987 they are thirty-two percent of the total.

A close reading of the NZBR literature (e.g. **New Zealand Labour Market Reform** (1986), **Fiscal Strategy: the next Stages** (1987a), **Better Value for Money** (1987b) and **Freedom in Employment** (1987c)) shows their ambit to be wide spread, fully reaching into the lives of most New Zealanders. The topics that these works feature are the entire remodeling of social policy expenditure including the restructuring of the welfare system (including most

benefits), restructuring health, restructuring education and scientific research, restructuring the Accident Compensation system, and restructuring other government departments; Justice and Police, Statistics, Defence, Environment, Foreign Affairs. The restructure of public sector pay structures, state debt servicing practices, state quangos and the fiscal policy, also must take place. These measures, advocated by the NZBR in articles written between 1986 to 1987, have been acted upon as shown in Table 6. Although it is impossible to argue that the government only made these changes because of the NZBR initiatives, their moves are all consistent with the NZBR's monetarist theoretical position. There is a high correlation between the state's actions (sixty-seven percent of the NZBR initiatives have been positively acted upon) and the NZBR's suggested actions for the state to take.

The formal and informal relations between the state and the NZBR are strong. Seventy-three percent of those who responded to the question (thirty percent of all the directors) about the NZBR's links with the state, saw the NZBR as a very good lobby, acting very successfully in the interests of big business upon the state. Only six percent of the directors saw the NZBR as a poor lobby. The directors were asked to describe the NZBR's relationship with government ministers; twenty-six percent thought that the NZBR 'had the ear' (so to speak), of government ministers. Some five percent of the directors even went as far as to say that the NZBR was an 'old boys club' that included politicians. Others mentioned that there was a lot of informal contact between ministers and NZBR members (this was twenty-six percent of the directors). Others mentioned that the executive had easy access to Treasury (ten percent of the directors) as an executive member was a former employee there. Others said that the NZBR pressured government who then pressured treasury (ten percent of the directors). As one reporter noted "When Manurewa MP Roger Douglas wore the finance mantle his relationship with the Roundtable was rumored to be so close you couldn't slide a treasury paper between them" (Managh 1989, Sunday Star, section A, p.11, February 12th).

Five percent of the directors said that it was because of the high quality research that the NZBR produced that it was able to be such an important influence on government ministers and act as an influence on their thinking. Five percent of the rest, of the sample, thought that Douglas and Lange were too shrewd to be overly influenced by the NZBR and a further five percent thought that the NZBR had only got government's 'ear' when their policies

were consistent with the government's interests. In the very recent past there have been public cracks in the tight state-NZBR relationship. The most public declamations made against this closeness are implied in reported statements of the Prime-Minister, although his occasional outbursts are tempered, as the quote following suggests:

> The Prime Minister, Mr. Lange yesterday spent 40 minutes happily "jousting with the knights of the Business Roundtable" only a week after saying that he would not be seen on the same bus as some of them. (Armstrong, New Zealand Herald, June 22, 1988, p.24, section 1).

This ambivalence may reflect a prosaic realization that there are more 'workers' than 'knights' (cf. Paynter, National Business Review, 1988, June 20th, p.8) when it comes to choices to be made at the polling booth. This new distancing is not necessarily true of David Caygill, the new finance minister. But the point is made by Roger Kerr, the chief executive of NZBR who perceptively noted that the philosophy and the policy enactment are larger than individual politicians "What matters I don't think is any particular individual. What matters is where policy generally gets taken. The concern has been to maintain constructive relationships with all politicians who are part of the process" (Managh, 1989, 12th February, op cit).

There was evidence that came through in the interviews that I had with directors that they were no longer being reactive to the state's decisions. On the contrary, they were making decisions of national importance and then telling the state.

> Before the deregulated economy we were always up and down to Wellington... When we made our deal with Country Z. I went to the Prime-minister and the Minister of Finance after the deal had been made but before it went to press. (Respondent 27)

These New Zealand based companies with NZBR members are often involved in international operations as large overseas transnational companies. There has been very little original research written about the people who run these top corporations, the exceptions to this can be found in the work of Jesson (1987 and 1980), Fogelberg and Greatorex (1979), Hines (1973), Fogelberg and Laurent (1974) and Inkson et al (1987). The focus of my research was different from the others in that (with the exception of Fogelberg and Laurent's studies) it has an empirical base and a sociological focus. The empirical base was greatly helped by our participation in an international project established

since 1979 and calling itself the **The Network Study on Inequalities in Social and Cultural Resources.** This is headed by Frans Stokman (Belgium) and John Scott (England). The New Zealand material, aims to contribute to a comparable base of information on corporate networks in Japan, England, Belgium, France and America.

Research Methodology
The Sample Design
The sampling procedures in this study were complex because they include both a saturated, a random and an added on sample (see Table 7). The saturated part of the sample came from directors drawn from the thirty top companies (by turnover as described by the Buttle, Wilson share registry material). From those thirty companies a saturated sample of thirty chairpersons were taken. This meant that every chairperson on all the top boards was automatically included. But the other two roles (non-executives and executives), with their greater numbers, allowed a random choice to be made of only one of each from each company. This was done on a random scale devised by Sina Greenwood (Auckland University Maths Department 1985). As the executive chosen was often not the CEO I tried to add on CEO's wherever possible. This was both because of their strategic importance to the corporation but also due to their NZBR connections. In total forty-six of these directors were added on to the saturated sample of chairpersons and the random selection of non-executives and executives because they had areas of 'expertise' (e.g. the director was a finance capitalist) or came from a rare group (e.g. the director was a woman). The total of interviews achieved was one hundred and seven directors. Schematically the overlapping sample is shown in Table 7.

The original sample was of eighty-six directors (not ninety) as there were four directors who were on two boards. This means that seventy-one percent of the original sample were covered. The other twenty-six were not interviewed because: fourteen could not be contacted; five arranged many meetings but always cancelled at the last possible moment; two refused to be interviewed; one died; and three live permanently overseas. This caused a twenty-nine percent loss of directors from the random and saturated part of the sample.

Administration of Interviews
The questionnaires were administered in the form of in-depth interviews. These directors had been sent a letter that included the name of the director

who had recommended them to me. (The network of directors recommended as 'experts' that I should talk to was very interesting in itself as a measure of popularity and respect.) Ninety two directors were interviewed between June and December 1987 and the other fifteen were interviewed between January and March 1988. Two other directors returned mail questionnaires in that latter period. The potential respondent was telephoned by the researcher to establish whether they would agree to take part in the research. Where the respondent was agreeable, a time and place for the interview was arranged.

The length of the interviews varied immensely from thirty minutes to five hours. The directors had no trouble at all with their roles as interviewees. Many of them spoke often to the press, at AGM's, Gallery openings and so forth, so they were used to some degree of public exposure and all were used to being in positions of verbal command and control. Therefore the interviews were viewed almost without exception as mutually satisfying - them giving me information and me listening intrigued by what I heard. More than half (fifty-six percent) were therefore 'extremely friendly': sharing lunches, drinks, teas and coffees with me. Not only did they share my enthusiasm for my topic but some said that they would be happy to comment on the draft of my work and told me to keep in touch. Another large percentage were 'helpful' (twenty-six percent), taking time and infinite patience to explore the ideas that I needed responses to: making quite sure that I understood their point of view. They willingly gave me the names of other people to talk to and were often very frank in their evaluation of themselves and their peers. The rest of the directors interviewed were either 'cool' (fifteen percent) or 'impatient' (two percent). These cool to impatient interviews occurred at the very beginning of the study when it was likely that the corporate community was still weighing up my legitimacy and the amount of interest that they were likely to get from the experience. I was also much less confident with the material and more likely to convey that insecurity. The last two percent were postal questionnaires.

Description of the Top Corporate Class Fraction
The majority of New Zealand sociological research on the New Zealand 'business élite' has described top business as 'relatively closed' (Fogelberg and Greatorex (1979, p.15-37)), 'descend(ents) from the nineteenth century oligarchy' (Bedggood 1980, p.65), 'elitist' (Simpson 1984, p.81), 'caste-like' (Jesson 1987, p.24) or our 'old boy network' (Venables 1988, p.35). There exists therefore, a hard core of New Zealand corporate theorists who espouse a

varying commitment to what could loosely be described as a class cohesive or marxist theory. There are many, however, (such as the following quoted director), who argue against this theoretical position. They suggest a much greater degree of egalitarianism in the New Zealand class structure. Some directors went as far as saying that there is no longer an 'old boy syndrome':

> The board, are much more aware today of cash flows, foreign currency, (since deregulation), and currency movements that affect the company. And capital expenditure, repairs, maintenance and they are continually reviewing margins. They are much more literate in terms of finance. Yes! yes! The board today in comparison with when I first came on, has a much greater emphasis on the financial side of operations and the improvement of our financial results. The old boys network is no longer applicable. I think that boards today realise that you have got to have the expertise, the know how, to be able to sit down at the board table and provide an overview of company operations. (Respondent 89: CEO)

Who is right? The ideologues who say corporate privilege is part of our protected past or the class cohesive theorists who argue that New Zealand's corporate class pivots on inter-generational wealth and privilege and express doubt as to the reality of social mobility into or out of this top corporate class fraction? To test this questions are asked, first, about whether social mobility into and out of this top corporate class is possible, and if it is, on what basis. The social and demographic variables (ethnicity, gender, class origin and education) are, where possible, cross-tabulated by age to highlight changing patterns. This section is centred on descriptions of the top directors' key demographic and social characteristics.

Demography
Demography refers to the important statistics of the Corporate class fraction. The variables looked at here are the director's age, their gender and their ethnicity.

Age. The median age of New Zealand's top directors is fifty-nine years. The youngest director amongst the respondents was thirty-five years of age and the oldest was eighty-eight years of age. Table 8 was based on an hypothesis that the director's age would determine their corporate status. Age and corporate status are very significantly related. The null hypothesis is unilaterally rejected. Most chairpersons are old - that is in the sixty years plus age group (eighty-two percent). The same is true for non-executives although this is not quite so pronounced, as there is not so many in this sixty plus group (sixty-five

percent). The 'young' executives are those still aspiring to high board status with twenty-one percent of their number in the oldest age-group, the majority still in the youngest thirty to fifty-nine age group (seventy-nine percent). The median time for appointment to a board as a director was seven years ago, in 1982.

Ethnicity. All the top New Zealand directors interviewed looked pakeha (that is European) and none of them identified themselves as anything other than that. The absence of Polynesians in top business positions was never raised by the directors as being problematic unlike the absence of women on boards. This was most probably because there were few polynesian shareholders at Annual General Meetings to question this pakeha corporate hegemony. Polynesians, unlike some women, are located almost entirely in the New Zealand working classes (see Macpherson 1977, pp.99-112).

Gender. Top directors are unashamedly male. They work, breathe and think in a male world. This androcentric environment is alleviated only by their female secretaries and a very few top women in management. Of those interviewed only five were women. None of these women were part of the 'random' sample of the top thirty company directors, although one woman was a potential candidate for the sample as she was on a couple of the top thirty boards. This absence of women on New Zealand's top corporate boards supports another New Zealand study that shows women to be just under two percent of all public company directors whilst being fifty percent of the shareholders (Zonta 1986, p.1).

The cause of this female scarcity on high ranking boards is not attitudinal, of course, but these attitudes interestingly reflect the social structures and as such are important. Only one older director came up with the old chestnut that women are not on boards because they have to have babies. This was a valid observation in the sense that there were no creche facilities available for women directors. Not only were there no such provisions but even amongst the women directors interviewed there seemed to be no expectation that childcare was a corporate responsibility:

> Child care? Certainly there is a very tolerant attitude. Our public relations and marketing manager, Christine, has a little girl of five and she comes in most nights after school and plays around. Which you wouldn't find in most companies. (Respondent 43)

Privately paid housekeepers are thought to be essential to a woman director (Respondent 44). This means that women in management and lower in the corporate hierarchy could be handicapped by the considerable cost that this entails. None of the directors acknowledged that the stress that corporate women are exposed to may be (at least partially) attributable to their dual domestic and corporate roles (documented by Martorella 1988).

The most usual response to the question of why there are not more women on boards was a structural one - women were not getting these top jobs because they were not qualified for them (twenty-four percent of all answers). No director suggested any sympathy or understanding of sexist socialisation through the family, the education system or the workplace, which may result in later low female self esteem, inadequate role models and lack of achievement for women, particularly non pakeha women. That these privileged male directors failed to recognise or at least comment on sexism as a barrier to recruitment is hardly surprising. Dr. Helen Place (1981, p.120) was still using blame-the-victim theory in 1981, when she wrote in her account of women in management, that it is the New Zealand woman's responsibility to 'make more effort' to get these qualifications than they 'have in the past.' Some directors said that they had 'no objection in principle' (nineteen percent) to seeing a woman on the board, but (like this male executive director) they see the dominance of major shareholders and the 'old boy network' as likely to keep women out of board rooms for some time.

> I was at an A.G.M. and a woman came up to me afterwards and said "When am I going to see a woman up there on the board?" I would say that women truly at board level is a long way off because of the dominance of the principal shareholders on boards and because of the (old boy) network also. It's different in the States because it is at a different point in the evolution. Women have not made it in vast numbers, but selectively they have made quite significant inroads into corporate management with reasonable representation on major boards. So it is different. Again you get to this philosophy when you evaluate the evolution of the corporate form. As long as .. the corporation is viewed to exist principally for the shareholders and the subgroup the major shareholders then I don't see women making any progress. That is the first thing that must go. Which it will. Once that you accept that the corporation exists for more than the shareholders, for them, the employees and the community then the role of women in the broader sense is the responsibility of management. They originally came in, in America in the third way through the community, so that accelerated their presence on major boards. As time went by they became more influential in management ranks and that opened it up to them. Then when the influential shareholders took on a broader perspective then that offered them the third entree. But until those things are accepted as what the corporation

really is - then women will be blocked. It will probably happen in the next ten years if New Zealand corporations continue to be successful. (Respondent 106)

Three percent of the directors suggested that other board members, (not themselves), would be uncomfortable with women on the board. Amongst the women I spoke to, were those who said that the traditional 'old boys' recruitment procedures were endangered by the new 'entrepreneurism' of the 1980's. These women said that what was now in existence was a different set of rules with a different social contact network and a different value system. They acknowledged that they themselves had benefited from the traditional contact network through their husbands' club membership.

> We have been unusual because our husbands belong to the _____ Club... and so we know most of those people socially and personally... and it has been a huge strength to (Company X) that we have had these contacts .. The old boy network, as it is spoken of, is difficult to overcome even though its now not the traditional old boy network at the _____ Club, the _____ Club, whatever, it will be there amongst the new breed in their thirties, who have largely shared their experiences and their failures and their business deals together. And of course if you can work one favour off another or one contra off another you can go to where you are going to get the favour or get the contra in return. And if it is a male, which it usually is, its going to take a long time to overcome. (Respondent 43)

With one exception the women were major shareholders in the company. They were either the spouse of the original owners (forty percent) or they had come into the company at its inception by providing a large proportion of the corporate capital (forty percent) or they were universally recognised as outstanding professional contributors, in academic, corporate and government related areas (twenty percent).

Social Background
This 'social' section looks at the directors' class background, that is the directors' father's relationship to the means of production and other less directly related factors such as their educational background.

Class Origin. There is high continuity between the class position of top directors and the class position of their fathers. The biggest percentage of directors' fathers (thirty-four percent) owned or were top directors in major companies. When these origins are compared with the New Zealand occupational averages in 1966 (the time when most of these fathers are likely to have been at the height of their employment), the comparison is stark as

shown in Table 9. The occupational distribution of the fathers of the present corporate class fraction is like a mirror image of the total New Zealand population: two percent of 'ordinary' New Zealanders fathers were the owners and directors of major New Zealand companies whereas within the sample, the directors' fathers are thirty-four percent of the large scale capitalist owners or controllers of major companies. In reverse, where the directors' fathers are scarce, at the blue collar level (ten percent), the general population is at its most plentiful (thirty-six percent). Chairpersons' are most likely to have fathers who are owners or directors of large corporations (thirty-six percent compared with twenty-two percent of non-executives and thirty-two percent of executives). The fathers of chairpersons were also more likely to be professionals or administrators (thirty-two percent compared with twenty-seven percent of non-executives and thirty percent of executives).

The class origin of New Zealand directors is higher than that of directors from Japan (1960), Britain (1952) and the United States (1952). This international comparison of the class origin of directors can be seen clearly in Table 10, where the comparative figures from Scott et al (1985, p.250) are used. That the New Zealand figures relate to 1988, more than thirty-six years after the British or American figures, makes them even more significant. For in world terms capitalism has moved from 'entrepreneurial or family ' capitalism to 'late capitalism', where capitalists have dispersed share portfolios rather than having their money tied up in a 'family' firm. Logically the 1950's figures should be more class cohesive than later dates, reflecting this early bias toward the 'family firm' and the later surveyed firms should reflect dispersed ownership. This is true for Japan but not for New Zealand. The fact, that in New Zealand, class continuity is still so high in 1988, suggests a backwardness in relation to the world wide trend. If egalitarian access to top directorships is the aim of a meritocratic society then New Zealand is a long way behind its own stereo-typical image. Inter-generational continuity amongst the corporate class is alive and well. This is particularly apparent in the data, and is reinforced by another question the directors who had children (sixty-nine percent had three children) answered acknowledging that thirty-seven percent of them (from sixty-two valid cases) had children who followed them into business.

The directors' mothers also showed high status origins with twenty-two percent being in professional or administrative positions (see Table 11). That

these women were in a high status rather than in a high class position (e.g. owning a large corporation) like their male counter-parts, reflects sexist ownership patterns in New Zealand society. The large number of full-time mothers not in the paid workforce (sixty-one percent of directors' mothers compared with forty percent of the 1966 national workforce) would suggest either that these families have conservative attitudes to womens' place as being in the home, or more obviously just express their lack of financial, social or intellectual need to leave it.

Education. Education systems within a capitalist social structure, are commonly seen as mechanisms reproducing an occupational or class order (cf. Useem and Karabel 1986, pp.184-200). Amongst the top New Zealand directors there is definite support for this idea because the directors came from (largely) élite educational backgrounds and received a considerably higher level of education than the general population do.

Schools attended can be divided into four categories. These categories are *élite public, élite private, private* and *public.* The élite public school defines one in an expensive real estate area, with high state school prestige, (e.g. Auckland Boy's Grammar). The prestige is based upon a reputation for scholarship and discipline. The school therefore is known as 'desirable'. An élite private school refers to a protestant, privately funded school (e.g. King's College), which is reputedly 'desirable' to 'very desirable'. Non-élite schools are popularly perceived as low grade. The co-educational state school and the private catholic schools vie for low status. Table 12 was based on the hypothesis that patterns of schooling (as the basis of recruitment to top director status) have changed in the mercurial, finance dominated business world of the 1980's. A cross-tabulation of schooling by age should therefore show that there is a strong relationship between schooling and age. Young directors should be at public and non élite private schools if the supposedly new entrepreneurial age means that directors do not still come disproportionately from the traditional 'old boys' schools. There is a significant relationship between age and the school that the directors went to (.03), which means that the null hypothesis must be rejected. The younger directors are to be found in public élite education (forty-five percent of the youngest thirty to fifty-nine year olds) whilst the older directors are most likely to be found with a private élite education (thirty-nine percent). This means that the pattern of schooling amongst the corporate élite is changing and a shift in recruitment from élite private to élite public educational institutions is happening over-time.

The percentages show that this corporate class fraction enjoyed an élite education. They went predominantly to élite public schools (forty percent) and then to private élite schools (twenty-seven percent) although only eleven percent went to a private (rather than a private élite) school. This could reflect the protestant prejudice against Catholics (because most private education is administered by Catholic clerics) being more pronounced than that against ordinary state school recruits. Here is a quote from a director who suffered this prejudice:

> It's amazing to think about it now but I had been accepted for another position with a very welcome increase in salary but the appointment was canceled when the employer discovered that the college I attended was Catholic rather than Anglican, as he had thought. That attitude used to be quite widespread and included a large number of companies in Australia and New Zealand. (Respondent 79)

Twenty-two percent of the sample went to public schools which supports Sweezy's (1968, p.130) finding that the American corporate class 'cream off' the bright working-class youth and mobilize them into the ranks of the ruling classes (in America primarily through the sports scholarships). This served too defuse working class leadership and mute working class articulate opposition. The upward mobility of a few bright working class students was not regarded as any indication of widespread social mobility, however. As in this case they are the exceptions that proved the rule.

That more of the younger directors came from humble schooling (twenty five percent of the thirty to fifty-nine year olds) compared with the older directors (seventeen percent of the sixty to eighty-nine year olds) maybe a temporary reflection of the exceptional economic buoyancy that characterised this period. Most financial "whiz kids" who were showered with idolatry and fame in the speculative financial boom of the middle nineteen-eighties, have since plummeted into the disgrace of receiverships, bad debts, liquidations, or are now being pursued by serious fraud allegations. At their peak the public press noted the humble origins and working class educations (**Personal Investor**, 1988, pp. 43 - 63) of these men, further fueling the common belief that the 'rags to riches' career path is alive and well in New Zealand.

Hines's (1973) study of the New Zealand manager suggests that managers were educated on a par with the rest of the New Zealand workforce. The results of this study and the work of Fogelberg and Greatorex (1979) do not

support that. For both studies the findings are that New Zealand corporate executives are significantly better educated than their peers. Seventy-five percent of the Murray 1988, top director sample, had a tertiary qualification. The type of tertiary education that the directors had was predominantly one connected with Commerce - a Bachelor of Commerce or Master of Commerce (thirty percent), and was usually gained at a New Zealand University (seventy-two percent). When FCA or ACA's gained by correspondence or through technical Colleges were added to the university degrees - fifty-three percent of the sample had a tertiary accountancy credential. This points to the corporate class fraction being highly educated in the skills and language of capitalism; accountancy, managerial theory, commercial law etc. Other related disciplines are Law (eleven percent of all top directors with tertiary qualifications) and Engineering (seven percent).

Income. Table 13 shows the relationship between corporate status and the amount of shareholding that a director has within the company. The probability of 0.57 shows that there is no significant relationship between the director's corporate status and the amount of shares they own in their company. The null hypothesis must therefore be accepted. This shows that both executives and non-executives have similar ownership patterns of shares in their own company. This is damning evidence against the managerial model which suggested that executives were not involved in ownership of the company.

As the following chairperson's quote makes clear, ownership over-rides corporate status when decisions are being made.

> GM: Why were you chosen as Chairperson?
> *: Oh ..
> GM: No modesty.
> *: No the truth of the matter is that I probably said "I want to be the Chairman!" and since I had the shares they couldn't argue with me.
> GM: So no one nominated you.
> *: No it doesn't go like that - you have a chat to the directors on the matter and you agree on it. Normally when it comes to the formal businesses of the board then the last chairman nominates the new one and the CEO would second it. (Respondent 18)

There is also a definite mood in this period of recession for directors to be asked to prove their faith in the company by taking out a big shareholding.

> I believe that every director should have a significant stake in the company in which he is a director. To ask a person to be a director, pay them $20,000 a year

and say all they have to do is to have 500 shares- in my view is criminal. I believe if someone has got to be a director of a company then they have to have enough interest in that company to say look OK you are going to have to buy 20,000 shares. They will say "Christ - why would I want to do that?" So OK unless you want to get that involved don't bother. And I believe the same with senior executives. Because there are people out there investing their money on the basis that those people are directors or executives of the company. Now if those people are there pro rata, investing a percentage of their income in those people, then all of a sudden you have a situation where the guys got 500 shares which may have cost him $1500 bucks and he's contributing sure. (Respondent 101)

Managers (which includes executive directors) also have a large income stake in the company which again confounds the managerial theorists' idea of the non-profit maximizing motivation of management. Executive income is determined in a rather arbitrary fashion, as there is no standardised or fixed income scale, except when the executive is also a board member and then he or she gets that part of their income which is fixed by the AGM for all directors at a fixed rate. (The income paid to board members ranges from approximately $10,000-$150,000 per annum per board).

Executive income varies across sector, status and corporate profitability. When I asked one respondent how it was calculated, he said:

Income that executives get is normally part of the costs of production derived from the income that the company earns. It is a charge against the income derived by the company before profit is struck. Sometimes executive remuneration can have two components; one, a basic salary and secondly, it's related to the profits, on the basis that a percentage of the profits are shared for example, an executive is employed at $60,000 a year but if the profit is above a certain level he (the employer) shares the profit as a bonus. That becomes part of the expenses of running the business. If income is tied to bonuses then it comes directly from company profit.

It can vary widely depending on the circumstances. There is no general guideline. To make a bonus meaningful for example it may be given for achieving a given target of ten percent over the expected results and will be a twenty percent increase in salary. It is purely a matter of getting something within the resources of the company and of providing sufficient incentive to the executive. (Respondent 7)

This suggests that although the pattern of managerial income is diffuse and maybe 'struck' before profit is calculated it is ultimately tied to the 'resources of the company'. Profit, in a New Zealand company like those researched overseas (Larner 1970, Cox and Shauger 1973 and Smythe et al 1975, Useem

1984) would seem to be the bottom line in determining the size of executives' salary. To calculate a directors' income package provision needs to be made to cover the value of such considerations as perks associated with free travel, expense accounts, cars, etc. On 'inside' corporate advice, I estimated that a realistic range would be between under $100,000 to $200,000 plus. But I was told while interviewing that this range was 'too conservative' (Respondent 66: November 10th, 1987) and that it should have started and finished much higher. This is evidently so for a Wellington business consultant, Mr. Anthony Smith, is quoted as saying; "As many as 30 top private sector executives are earning more than $1 million a year - and more than 50 earn about $500,000 ... but we are tallking about the top people in organisations like Brierley's and Fletcher Challenge" (**New Zealand Herald**, March 25th, 1989, p.12).

The hypothesis on which Table 14 is based is that corporate status will determine the amount of income earned. The chi square probability of less than 0.01 shows that there is a strong relationship between corporate status and the amount of income that directors earn. The executives earn the big money from income not the non-executives. The percentages show that fifty one percent of all executives earned over $200,000 yearly which puts their earnings further ahead of those of other directors. Thirty nine percent of all directors earn over $200,000 which is approximately $176,984 more than the average New Zealander, (which for November 1986 was $23,016 (NZYB, p.344)).

With the general downturn in company profits directors are now experiencing new resistance to their requests for annual income increases, as this director noted:

> Shareholders are funny, they seem to feel that the increase in directors fees should not be allowed. That happened at Company Y at the AGM last Friday. I was chairing it and we put a motion through to increase the directors fees from $100,000 to $110,000, a ten percent increase that was in line with what had happened for the other previous senior executives. And we had one more director too and that has to be divided between x number of directors, there was a few rumbles and comments and statements "Should we be doing it?" It went through alright but they aren't keen, specially if they are not getting an increase. If the profit hasn't increased. (Respondent 18)

Executives have the large salaries and they also have the largest percentage of the number of shares owned (thirty-seven percent, chairpersons seventeen percent and non-executives eighteen percent). This large commitment to

ownership must cement their loyalties toward the profit motive at least as much if not more so than the other board members.

Professional associations. Studies of class cohesion (e.g. Scott et al 1985, pp.1-15) stress the importance of informal as well as formal channels of communication as central mechanisms for social integration and reproduction. The top directors in the sample belonged to a range of twenty-three Associations which 'interface' with the state on matters of their class fractional interests. The most ubiquitous, in print and subsequently the best known, is the New Zealand Business Roundtable, which had fifty-three of the directors in the sample as past or present members. The least commonly known was arguably the New Zealand Fertilizer Association which had only one of the top thirty directors as a member. The 'big four' are the Chamber of Commerce, the Employers Federation, the Manufacturers Association and the New Zealand Business Roundtable. They had members representing thirty-nine, forty-three, twenty-three and fifty percent (respectively) of the sample. An over-view of the characteristics of these big four Associations is presented in Table 15.

Views of the New Zealand Corporate Class
Looking at the ideological thought patterns of the top corporate class fraction, tests the pluralist resource dependency assumption (cf. Glasberg and Schwartz (1983, p.314) that there exists a diverse set of ideologies amongst this class fraction, so that a unified stance on any social or political issue would be too problematic for them to organise. The range of directors' ideologies examined crosses their religious commitment, their response to such issues as the role of the state (should it be more or less committed to interventionist social and economic policy) and their voting choices. Here the variables are cross-tabulated by the directors' region to see if diversity exists on this basis. (Because of the need to test for statistical significance region had to be reduced to two categories Auckland and 'the others').

Religion. Religion is not an enthusiasm shared by many of the top corporate directors as there were a high number (forty-six percent) of 'non believer' directors. This 'lack' is particularly obvious if it is compared to the low national non believing percentage of eighteen percent (New Zealand Year Book 1987-88, p.163). For those fifty-four percent of directors who did believe in some religion or were prepared to declare what it was, the distributions are shown in Table 16. The resource dependency based hypothesis, is that, there

will be regional diversity of religious belief. Unfortunately, the small cell frequency sizes makes this table unreadable for statistical significance, hence must be read with caution.

Role of the State. Table 17 relates to a general question that the directors answered on whether they thought that the state should be more or less involved with decision-making than it now is. This invited strong responses, mainly negative ones (forty-two percent) arguing for a reduced role of the state. Typical of this type of response was the following:

> I think that governments know nothing at all. I think that they should have nothing to do with it. They have screwed New Zealand up for the last thirty years. New Zealand would be a rich and prosperous place, we wouldn't have any poor people if it wasn't for government. They have done it. Now all they are doing is recognising a little bit how much they have screwed up and are backing off a tiny bit. But there is a hell of a lot more to go. The government still spends forty percent of the national income. And if it is bad as I say it is - you wouldn't want it to run a Milk Bar and of course no one would trust it to run a Milk Bar, would they? (Respondent 14)

The hypothesis used is that ideology is going to vary amongst directors based on the region that they come from. The relationship between the ideological decisions that directors make on the role of the state and the region that they come from is not significant (p=0.4). Acceptance of the null hypothesis is therefore necessary. On such an important issue as the role of the state there is no significant difference in the opinions of directors throughout the country. The idea that directors are going to be heterogeneous in their ideologies must therefore be subject to doubt.

When the ideologies regarding the state were cross-tabulated with the director's age (not included here), the strongest support for absolutely no state intervention came from the oldest directors who were possibly responding with recent memories of Muldoon's interventionist policies and personality -

> I wouldn't want Muldoon on a board - he would be awful....Political sources, we try to keep away from them..In this deregulated economy politicians they don't want lobbying the same. That sort of thing that happened for thirty to forty years is out. (Respondent 18)

Generally, though, when all the 'reduced role of the state' variables were calculated together, then it was the younger directors who were the most enthusiastic for a non interventionist state. Older directors were more likely to

express social concerns about the present government's non interventionist policies. Regionally, defined (as in Table 17) the directors that supported the present status quo, as against a very much stronger state role (thirty percent) expressed their reservations usually in terms of the social situation of people or the speed with which change has occurred. For example:

> I do think that it (Labour Government policy) is very positive. I do think (however) that it has gone too fast without sufficient sensitivity to people. Those are the criticisms that I have but the basic thrust I see is as a positive thing. It could have been done better. Well it could have been more sensitive to some of the people. But I am in constant admiration of their ability to convince everybody that they should take home less money and still re-elect them. I think that there are a number of factors; the traditional labour support (and here I am talking about an area that I don't know a lot about) of the labour party does not know what else to do. They have no place to go and the labour party have certainly bought in the conservative business man. I don't know of any business man in this country that doesn't support Roger Douglas. (Respondent 106)

A very small minority of directors, (included in the thirty percent but only one percent of the entire sample) felt extremely strongly about the low level of the state's present intervention in social and economic matters.

> I think that the state has a very important role to play particularly in a small remote economy like New Zealand. Generally I think the board is in favour of a relatively free market operating. In terms of our philosophy of having internationally competitive businesses I think that a free market is in our interests. Having said that, there is no such thing as a free market in terms of our international trade. It is all very well to be the most efficient farmers but if you can't sell your output to the most attractive markets because of tariff and quota restrictions then what's the point?
> Hugh Fletcher is very clearly of the view that the theories are great but the practice is ridiculous. That it is wrong to expose all New Zealand businesses to international competition without having New Zealand businesses with the access to the markets that they need. (Respondent 79)

Agreeing with the initial premise - that there should be more state intervention but for specifically right wing ends were a slightly larger percentage of the directors (thirty-one percent). The politically conservative ends that they envisaged were for such things as state intervention for disarming the labour movement to bring them into line with the other deregulated parts of the economy. As in the following response:

> I am not unsympathetic or uncaring about the individual but some people will not be able to have the same job that they have always had because the only way that you could keep them in that job was to protect their corner. And some

people will not get the same return for jobs that they got in the past because they have got them through protection and monopoly unions. The greatest restriction to change now is the industrial structure and the monopoly situation that you have got there resisting change. Some of the problems of finance and people going off shore and all those sorts of things are nothing to do with finance. Which you are writing of as a bogy - bankers and all those bad things. They are not bad at all they are just another service in the economy. It is the industrial relations situation that is not capable of changing because of the way that it is structured. That is one of the factors.....I think there is a proper role for the state it is a much smaller role. Quite clearly it is going this way, world wide. It is a very much smaller role than has been given it generally, in the developed world in the ... post war period. Where the state has burgeoned out and there was a genuine belief that we could do things better collectively. You have seen the results which have been very inadequate. Disastrous. (Respondent 50)

What do directors think that the state should do in Economic Matters? The percentages in Table 18 show that when the directors answered this question twenty-four percent of them expressed the opinion that the state should have no role in the economics of the country, slightly more (thirty-five percent) said that the state did have some role in furthering the interests of business ventures (as in C.E.R.). The largest percentage (forty-two percent) expressed the directors' doubts about the present policy of market forces in control. The resource dependency hypothesis again, was that regional variance would affect the range of responses from directors.

The distribution in Table 18 shows the Auckland directors to be more polarised in their views: the most conservative on the issue of the state and its economic policy, with thirty-one percent of their number holding that the state has no role in economic matters; at the other end of the range Auckland directors express the most fears about the unregulated market economy (fifty percent). The pattern of expressed unease was articulated in a way similar to the quote following, by a director who made the connections between market forces, a free economy, and extremes of poverty;

Well I suppose that is one of my basic concerns - when you free up the economy like they are, especially the money market, you are likely to get the extremes of wealth and poverty. And that does hurt my social conscience, having been brought up in a life time of virtual equality. And we have only seen these extremes in recent times. I suppose if one was in the real wealthy category then you wouldn't be talking like this but not being in that basis I think that this is one of my real concerns. As far as New Zealand today, you are always going to have a percentage of people that are going to have difficulty in being able to look after themselves and earn enough money to be able have a roof overhead, cloth themselves and feed themselves. (Respondent 89)

When this ideology measure was correlated by age, the most conservative response was dominated by the older directors. One explanation for this is that the older directors expressed a liking for what they saw as the new state's role - the deregulation of the economy - even though some had qualms about the brutality of its swiftness. But these older directors were confused by their allegiance to reactionary economic theories that held that these same results could be achieved through Keynesian politics and policies, (identifiable with the previous Muldoon political administration). This mixed response following does not entirely support that position for it is only censorious of the new monetarism;

> What both Chile and New Zealand suffer from is monetarist theory. That is the Chicago school. What we are suffering here, and Chile has moved away from, is a great deal of nonsense. I think it has been an awful mistake here in New Zealand. At awful cost. The world bank, 3-4 years ago, said that over emphasis on monetary policy and loose control of fiscal policy leads to, in the first place, to over high interest rates, and in the present situation with a floating currency to an over rated currency... What you really have got to have is harmonisation of policy. This is what we don't have here. You have got to have harmony between your monetary and fiscal policy. If you have got tight money control and a loose fiscal policy you have got the recipe for disaster, we have that tight money and loose fiscal policy - we've got disaster. We had that here in 1985 and it's still a great part of our problem... Roger Douglas says he is not a monetarist but indeed he is. It is this Milton Friedman's policies - they have got a point, but I don't think you can let the monetary situation get out of hand...There is a philosophy out there. I tend to be of the Keynesian school. (Respondent 97)

This equivocation about the role of the state was present to a much lesser degree when the directors gave their attitudes to their own and other corporations moving and perhaps staying offshore. The question the directors' were asked was "What did they think about the new corporate moves offshore?" The underlying hypothesis, illustrated in Table 19 is that the region that the director lives in will have a strong relationship to the ideology that she or he espouses. Acceptance of the null hypothesis, is again necessary, in this ideology question (p=0.08). Here the region makes little difference to the directors' opinion about whether corporations should move offshore or not. Whilst the percentages show the strongest thrust is for the directors' opinion in support of offshore investment (fifty-seven percent) and specifically highest support coming from non-Auckland resident directors (fifty-nine percent).

Thirty percent of the directors thought that our unstable economic climate made this offshore corporate investment trend a necessity. A very small

thirteen percent said that their firm was going to develop offshore, or was already there, but they had reservations about the national advantages of these moves. This CEO's comment express the general sentiment of this perspective:

> We are living in a world were there are no restrictions on either offshore investment (either coming in or going out) except for a few statutory requirements like O.E.C.D. improvements and so on. I would say that the government's objectives are clearly to allow for most economic decisions to be taken by a company whether they are here or not, in other words, it does not attempt to get in the way of those. I feel basically happy with that except I am a little doubtful at times about the capital flows out of this country - 'offshore. Whether that's any guarantee of a positive cash flow return that is bringing any benefit back to New Zealand? (Respondent 86)

Only a very few thought that corporate expenditure and offshore development was going to be disastrous for the New Zealand economy. This point was made emphatically by this much older director from a family based corporation in the productive sector:

> *: What those guys (from treasury) don't realise is that what they are recommending - lift the lid - you know, totally no protection, that sort of thing. We have only got to get a couple of container ships come here loaded with fridges and washing machines, into the port and they have all got to find a home. Our production - you would have six, eight, twelve hundred, thirteen, fourteen hundred workers with nothing to do. Then multiply that up with all the supporting staff. Multiply that again with all the sub-contractors, we use and people who make our different components and cartons and ...
>
> GM: It can't be that far off- that ship load?
>
> *: We've made more money out of importing micro wave ovens and video tape recorders and stuff like that from Japan than we have made out of our manufacturing, for the last few years. But we can easily turn around and just as easily bring in a container load of fridges and washers. We have got good contacts. We could bring them in from Japan. They take the duty off and you know we will bring them in and we will have (some). I suppose we will employ sales, distribution, service and spare parts staff - cut our staff from nearly three thousand to about, possibly six hundred. We would make more money. We could pay back half the capital to the shareholders because we wouldn't need all the investment in components or machinery. We wouldn't need to spend money on research and development. All those boys out of university that we take every year, they will be going somewhere else.
> (Respondent 102)

Social Inequality in New Zealand. The directors' answer to the question about the acceptability of the present state of social inequality in New Zealand, was more abbreviated - usually a yes or no response. Perhaps, this is because as the

director that I interviewed in his beach house at Pauanui said, there is "Not much social inequality at Pauanui" (Respondent 91). Directors of top corporations are not much exposed in their daily living in the suburbs of Remeura, Khandallah or Fendelton, to social inequity, therefore the idea of poverty must have something of an abstract - mythical quality about it. That is not to say that generally some directors did not express concern about social inequality (sixty-four percent of the directors expressed a concerned need for a safety net, through to worries about social polarization threatening social stability) just that they had little to say because poverty was outside their direct experience.

The data in Table 20 indicate that the ideology (relating specifically to social inequality) does not have a significant relationship to region. When this type of ideology was cross-tabulated with age the older directors were shown to be more aware of the problems of class polarization in New Zealand than the younger directors. Greater age often gave the director a paternal attitude to social inequality - poverty was considered an inevitability within a 'divine' order. Whereas the younger directors were more likely to express concern about social inequality as a threat to their own class reproduction and class polarization as a threat to the continuity of their privilege. The responsibility for this class polarisation was put squarely onto the shoulders of the new (lately demising) fast-buck entrepreneurial merchant-bankers who were felt to be without social consciences. An example of this type of concern expressed by a younger male director was as follows:

> I feel concerned about (social inequality) I think that in the last three-four years there has been a huge wealth creation that has been based on very little added value. And this has tended to concentrate the benefits in the hands of a few people who have done very little other than speculate and grow wealthy. This has accentuated social inequality and in fact created a new class of citizens. At the same time the economic pressure on government restructuring has created a difficult employment situation and I cannot see that that is going to get any better so we are now starting to get large urban concentrations of people and within those urban areas, concentrations of under privileged disadvantaged groups, some of which are ethnically based. Which again I feel is a bad thing.....This is because of the move toward the creation of fast bucks in a highly inflationary environment - speculative environment, where there is little real value creation.   (Respondent 86)

Voting. Theorists writing on New Zealand's political economy in the late eighties starkly note the amorphous grip of 'Free market politics' reflected in 'Rogernomics' or 'Caygillnomics' (economic policies named after the two

Ministers of Finance; Roger Douglas and David Caygill, respectively). For example, Jesson (1987, p.119) hypothesized that 'Free-market-political' infiltration has occurred 'through important sectors of society: the finance industry, the business commerce and economics courses in the universities, and business journalism..' (1987, p.119). Until this work, however, there has been no empirical testing of the voting patterns of this influential corporate sector.

What Jesson suggests is not quite what emerges. The pattern of top directors' voting shows some infiltration by Rogernomics but still no domination, for their vote is still a vote for tradition, which in New Zealand means a vote for the National Party - although confusion was often expressed by the directors about which party represented their interests. Directors, like the following one quoted, often expressed difficulty identifying the difference between the two parties:

> I was in Auckland and I didn't really like the candidate so I didn't vote for him. I don't agree with the labour party policies so I won't vote for them. I mean the Democratic party is a pain in the arse. What am I really voting for? I probably would have voted National if I was in Australia... I think both parties here are so parallel it doesn't matter. This present Labour government has shown more evidence of being right wing than anything else under the sun! I am just waiting for the day when they change back and say "Hey! we haven't changed our spots at all." (Respondent 23)

Table 21 shows voting by sector, and displays this vote for National by default - the party that used to encapsulate top directors' interests. The hypothesis is that regional variation will result in a diversity of voting patterns - a hypothesis that was not supported by the data. It would appear that directors everywhere in New Zealand are voting in similar ways. The percentages show that only twenty-nine percent are voting for labour - the new party of free market policies.

Amongst the missing cases (thirty-five percent) two percent of the total sample were non-voters who were other than New Zealand citizens. They were American or Australian 'trouble-shooting' executives who are part of a mobile international network. (They said that they had arrived in New Zealand through contacts established in international joint ventures.) Other directors refused to give me an answer on who they voted for because they told me it was none of my business (two percent). Other non-voters gave me their reason

for not voting because even though they approved of Labour's performance and policies they were the constituents of 'known radicals' (who incidentally were women candidates) on social issues such as homosexuality or a specific economic issue such as death duties, as happened with this director:

> No I didn't (vote labour) for a specific reason. I think that the most criminal thing that happens in New Zealand is Estate duties and Gift duties. I reckon that that is criminaly wrong. National came out just before the election and said that they would abolish it. I went and asked Roger Douglas if he would and he said "Not yet". So I said "Bugger you, I am not going to vote for you". Simple as that. So it was a silly little personal thing but I reckon that if I work hard and pay my taxes, and I have got $100 thousand and I want to give it to my mother to buy a better house, I don't see why I have to give the government forty percent tax over and above $27000. To me that's criminal. I might give it to you. I have paid my taxes earning it - why can't I give it to you? Why cannot I say - here is a $1,000,000. I think that you should have this... (Respondent 53)

Attitudes toward Rogernomics. After measuring the directors' reaction to the questions on the state and social inequality or some of their direct responses to Roger Douglas's economic stance, I was able to subjectively estimate how I thought the director stood in relation to 'Rogernomics'. The responses range from hostility to enthusiasm and the wish that Rogernomics could go further in de-regulation of the state. The results of this subjective estimate have been cross-tabulated with the directors' region of origin. The hypothesis is that the region will establish a strong relationship with attitudes and the varying results will reflect this difference. The hypothesis is that directors throughout the country will be radically divided on the issue of 'Rogernomics'.

As Table 22 shows, directors are thinking alike in their attitude to the economics of Roger Douglas - on a regional basis at least. The percentages decidely show the uniformity of the response by region. By this subjective estimate most of the directors (sixty percent) are supportive (to a varying degree) of Rogernomics although as Table 21 on voting showed, this did not persuade them sufficiently to actively vote labour. When the cross-tabulation was done by sector it was shown that the directors most 'supportive' of Rogernomics came from the 'financial' sector. An expression of this finance sector enthusiasm for Rogernomics given by a director as follows:

> I think that Rogernomics has been good. But I think that with the total government spending, including Welfare, they have to be careful to deregulate the labour market. I think that they will have to do that. I may be not as right wing as a lot of people are because I believe there is a very important place for unions and they have done a good job and they must always exist. But you must

have a situation where neither side can have a totally dominating role in my view. And I think that if we are not careful then this country will have the problems that Australia has. That they have inherited from the UK. I think that this country could be in a similar situation. From a business point of view I think that it all depends what side of the fence that you are on. Whether you are manufacturing or not. I can see the government's point of view everyone that talks to them is involved in self interest. So it is pretty hard from their point of view. But on balance I think they are doing a damned good job and I think that what they did had to be done. (Respondent 101: January 22, 1988)

Whereas the extreme ambivalence that the productive sector feels about Rogernomics is articulated by this chairperson:

Well I think you look out this inner city window here and you see a lot of action. You have three cranes and all those buildings going up. These are not going to add one ounce of productivity to New Zealand. Look around all those businesses around Penrose and Christchurch and Dunedin. There is not a scarick of new machinery or building going on and then you hear as I did at Company Z this morning, you hear about the farming community which provides eighty percent of New Zealand's money if you like and you say isn't this wonderful in the last three years what have we produced? We have a non job making environment. We're closing down a saw mill, we are closing down a paper mill. We are doing that because if we build a new saw mill - one, it doesn't really fit into the new type of complex, two, we know if we try and build a saw mill, it's going to cost twice what we estimate now, three, our productivity is going to be no good and four, we cannot sell the damn timber. So we are not going to commit ninety million dollars for that. And I think that is the saddest thing. I give Rogernomics eight out of ten for theory and two out of ten for application. That's what's evil. My friends tell me that the financiers are saying "Oh this is the best that's ever happened, it's tremendous" I say "No, what do you really mean, you mean that the country is now better off?" Oh no, no, no we have a believable economy". I say "We haven't got a currency". I don't know what the money market is. Foreign exchange deals with probably 2 billion dollars a day? You're talking in 7000 billion dollars turnover. Now that is many many times the gross national product of New Zealand, what are they turning over that for. Because they are - because they are speculating on the currency. Little guys in green hats are working at it and it produces absolutely nothing. It screws up the exporters to nine points of a decimal. No manufacturer is going to order new machinery if he doesn't know that the interest rate is going to be stable, if he doesn't know that the exchange rate is going to be stable. You can order machinery now at say sixty-two cents United States by the time that you get it here it can be down to forty cents so you have a fifty percent automatic over-run in your machinery costs. Then you find that the interest rate is not nineteen percent but twenty-eight percent. I don't know who can do business like that? So we're off to a more stable environment, they've opened up the economy they've opened up the exchange rates so that we can send money out of the country so we are doing that. We can actually now commit New Zealand for offshore expansion and this is the sort of thing that I find difficult. I mean it's great for us. I think it's wonderful. I just don't think it's smart for the country. And I say to people, why do you think that we have had monetary

controls on? Because we cannot damn well afford to spend our money offshore. I have been in business for - God knows- thirty odd years say, in a meaningful way - we have always had monetary controls - that's purely because we cannot afford not to. (Respondent 23: September 7th, 1987)

Conclusion

The key characteristics of this study of corporate capitalism (only some of which) have just been described as being the socio-demographic characteristics, class linked factors (e.g. share ownership etc.) and ideology. In my doctoral thesis (Corporate Capitalism in New Zealand, 1989) these and the other variables have been ordered in relation to the range of models in the literature, that they test. As this article is constrained by limits of space I can only sketch the models in the form of a table. (A full review of these models can be found in Murray (1989), Scott et al (1985, pp.3-14), Schwartz and Glasberg (1983, pp.311-32)).

What Table 23 describes is six competing models, the range in years of the authors writing from that perspective, the unit of analysis that the model focuses upon, the basis of power in the model, the type of network and the type of questions that were put in the questionnaire to extrapolate an appropriate response to the model. All the models were used as the basis for empirical testing. As the description of the key characteristics that I have given suggests, the material did not support the managerial (cf. the dispersed ownership of corporate capital in the hands of a non-profit maximising managerial class) or the resource dependency model (cf. inter-dependendent but competing corporations working from a pluralistic social and political base). What the empirical data did support was the neo-Marxist class cohesive, bank hegemony and the finance capital models. The bank hegemony model was also tested in a paper that I completed with Robert Lum (1988) on interlocking directorates. We found the bank hegemony model to be very helpful in assessing the New Zealand data and we devised a different measure to look at centrality.

Directions for further critical research are multifarious for the area is badly under researched. The Stokman et al team would like to expand the corporate capitalist study to 290 respondents per country. Given sufficient finances we intend to do this. Specific areas that I would hope to see focused on by sociologists are:

1.   detailed critical analysis of the role of the corporate finance sector in New Zealand society;

2. a detailed analysis of causal explanations of why polynesian ethnic minorities are not getting into top business positions; and

3. greater attention to female under-achievement in business.

Acknowledgments

Bibliography

Aaronovitch, S. (1961) **The Ruling Class** London: Lawerence and Wishart.

Andrews, J.A.Y . (1982) 'The Interlocking Corporate Director: A Case Study in Conceptual Confusion', Dissertation for Masters of Arts, Illinois: University of Chicago. cited by J. Scott et al (1985).

Bedggood, David (1980) **Rich and Poor in New Zealand**, Wellington: Allen and Unwin.

Berle and Means (1934) **The Modern Corporation and Private Property**

Burt, R.S. (1980) 'Cooptive Corporate Actor Networks: A Reconsideration of Interlocking Directorates Involving American Manufacture', **Administrative Science Quarterly**, vol 25, pp.557 - 582.

Buttle Wilson, (1986) 'Ranked lists of New Zealand Companies Auckland', Sharebroker material available by inquiry or through shareholdings.

Copeman, G. H. (1955) **Leaders of British Industry**, London: Gee.

Cox, S. and D. Shauger (1973) **Executive compensation, firm Sales and Profitability, Intermountain Economic Review**, vol. 4, pp.29-39, cited in Useem (1984, p.224) op cit.

Department of Statistics (1966; 1976; 1987-88) **New Zealand Official Yearbook**, Wellington: New Zealand.

Easton, B. (1980) **Social Policy and and the Welfare State in New Zealand**, Auckland: George Allen and Unwin.

Fitch, R. and M. Oppenheimer (1970) 'Who Rules the Corporations?' Part 1 **Socialist Review 1** vol. 4, pp. 73-108, Part 2, **Socialist** Review 1, vol.5, pp. 61-114, Part 3, Socialist Review 1, vol.6, pp. 33-94.

Fogelberg, Graeme and D. Greatorex (1979) 'Occupational Origins and Career Paths of New Zealand's Managerial élite', New Zealand Journal of Businessx, vol. 1, pp. 15-39.

Glasberg, Davita and Michael Schwartz (1983) 'Ownership and Control of Corporations', **Annual Review of Sociology**, vol. x9, pp. 311-32.

Greenwood, Sina (1985) Provided the Random table from which the sample was organised, Auckland University, Mathematics Department.

Hilferding, Rudolf (1910) **Finance Capital**, London: Routledge Kegan and Paul.

Hines, George (1973) **The New Zealand Manager**, Wellington: Hicks Smith.
Jarden and Co (1986) 'Rankings of New Zealand Business Enterprises Wellington', Sharebroker material available by inquiry or through shareholdings.
Jesson, Bruce (1987) **Beyond the Mirror Glass: The growth of Wealth and Power in New Zealand in the Eighties**, Auckland: Penguin Books.
Larner, Robert (1970) **Management Control and the Large Corporations**, New York: Dunellen.
Lundberg, F. (1937) **America's Sixty Families**, New York: Vanquard Press.
Macpherson, Cluny (1977) 'Polynesians in New Zealand: an Emerging Eth Class?' In Pitt, D. **Social Class in New Zealand**, Auckland: Longman Paul.
Mannari, H. (1974) 'The Japanese Business Leaders', Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, (cited in Scott and Griff, 1985).
Martorella, Rosanne (1987) 'Banking on Art: The Role of Financial Institutions in Corporate Collecting', Paper presented at the Easton Sociological Society, Boston.
Murray, G. (1988) **Final Report** to the SSRFC on New Zealand Corporate Capitalists, Auckland: Department of Sociology, Auckland University.
Murray, G. (1989) **New Zealand Corporate Capitalism**, Auckland: Phd, Department of Sociology, Auckland University.
Myers, V. et al (1986/1987) 'The Richest People in New Zealand' **Personal Investment**, December/January, pp.21-41.
National Business Review (1976) **Guide to the Comparative Performance of New Zealand Public Companies**, An NBR Investors Services Publication: Wellington.
Pearce, Geof (1986) **Where is New Zealand Going?** PH.D. Thesis University of Canterbury.
Place, Helen (1981) **Women in Management**, Wellington: Times Commercial Printers.
Scott, John (1979) **Corporations, Classes and Capitalism**, London, Hutchinson.
Scott, John and Frans Stokman, and Rolf Zeigler (1985) **Networks of Corporate Power**, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Scott, John and Catherine Griff (1985) **Directors of Industry**, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Scwhartz, Micheal and Beth Mintz (1985) **The Structure of American Business**, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Simpson, Tony (1984) **A Vision Betrayed: The Decline of Democracy in New Zealand**, Auckland: Hodder and Stoughton.
Smith, Antony (1989) quoted in '30 Salaries Top $1m' in Business, New Zealand Herald, March 25, section1, p.12.
Sunday Star (1987) Post Peak Play, Auckland, May 31st, section M, p. 8.
Sweezy, Paul (1968) 'Power Élite or ruling class?' In C. **Wright Mills and the Power Élite**, (ed W. Domhoff and H. Ballard),Boston: Beacon Press.
Useem, Michael (1982) 'Class-wide rationality in the politics of managers and directors of large corporations in the United States and Great Britain', **Administrative Science Quarterly**, vol. 27, pp. 199 - 226.
Useem, Michael (1984) **The Inner Circle**, Oxford Press, Oxford.
Useem Michael and Jerome Karabel (1986) 'Pathways to corporate management', **American Sociological Review**, vol. 51, pp. 184-200.
Venables, David (1988) 'Our old boy network', **New Zealand Listener** April 16, pp. 35-37.
Vowles, Jack (1985) 'Business and labour: major organised interests in the political economy of New Zealand', in Hyram Gold (ed.) **New Zealand Politics in Perspective**, Wellington: Longman Paul.
Warner, W.L. and J.C. Abegglen (1955) **Big Business Leaders in America**, New York: Harper Bros (cited in Scott et al 1985).
Williamson, O.E. (1975) **Markets and Hierarchies**, New York: Free Press.
Winkler, J. (1976) 'Corporatism', **European Journal of Sociology**, vol. 17, pp. 100-136.

Zeitlin (1974) 'Corporate ownership and control: the large corporation and the capitalist class', American Journal of Sociology, vol. 79, number 5, pp. 1,073-1,119.

Zonta (1984) 'Women on Board' reseached and presented as a paper by the 'Status of Women' committee of the Zonta Club, Auckland

Table 1

Workers in the Top Thirty Firms - 1986

		numbers employed	% full-time w.force
1	Fletcher	23,400	2.7
2	Brierley	9,950	1.1
3	NZI	4,883	.5
4	NZFP	10,344	1.2
5	Nathans	10,252	1.1
6	Carter Holt Harvey	9,000	1.0
7	Watties	6,431	.7
8	Winstone	2,824	.3
9	Lion Corporation	7,741	.8
10	Magnum Corporation (Rothmans)	2,580	.2
11	Progressive	6,300	.7
12	Cable Price Downer	4,298	.4
13	Waitaki International	8,197	.9
14	Goodman-Fielder	2,500	.2
15	Feltrex	2,950	.3
16	Steel & Tube	2,934	.3
17	McConnell Dowell	3,500	.4
18	Mair Astley	655	.0
19	Dominion Breweries	3,000	.3
20	United Empire Box	3,850	.4
21	New Zealand Steel	1,600	.1
22	Fisher and Paykel	3,000	.3
23	Colonial Motors	980	.1
24	Owens	1,800	.2
25	I.C.I.	1,517	.1
26	Ceramco	2,124	.2
27	Newmans	2,111	.2
28	Fernz	634	.0
29	Southland Meat	3,200	.3
30	BNZ Finance	100	.0
	Totals	142,655	17.0

Key: TOTAL NUMBER IN THE PAID WORK FORCE 1986 = 860,166.
Sources:
1. NEW ZEALAND YEAR BOOK 1987-88, p.333 (w.force figures).
2. JARDEN CO., 1986, (stockbrokers figures including number of employees).

Table 2

UNEMPLOYMENT IN NEW ZEALAND - 1896-1988

Year	Number	% of wage and salary earners
1896	17,396	9.3
1906	9,561	3.6
1916	7,076	2.3
1926	13,128	3.2
1936	37,636	7.6
1945	6,913	1.7
1956	7,936	1.2
1966	9,107	1.0
1976	27,210	2.5
1989	181,000	13.5

Sources:
1. Rosenberg: from 1896-1976 in The Coming Depression 1978, p. 48. statistics from New Zealand Census returns.
2. Collins NZ Herald 1989, January 25th, p.3, section 1.

Table 3

THE TOP THIRTY NEW ZEALAND FIRMS 1986 - BY TURNOVER AND DOMINANT OWNERSHIP

		1986 [$000's] Turnover	1976 [$000's] Turnover	1966 [pounds 000's] Turnover	dominant ownership 1988	share % held	known national origin of dominant shareholder
1.	Fletcher	4,268,100	293,983	40,806	Employee Pension Scheme	19	NEW ZEALAND
2.	Brierley	3,332,186	-	-	Australian Mutual Provi.	5	AUSTRALIA
3.	NZI	1,304,892	23,016	1,184	General Accident	51	BRITAIN
	South British Insurance		56,639	6,340			
4.	NZFP	1,178,915	202,000	22,000	Elders Resources	61	AUSTRALIA
5.	Nathan	1,159,800	202,266	1,272	Lion	97.1	NEW ZEALAND
6.	Carter	1,154,247	77,379	4,893	National Mutual Life	20	AUSTRALIA
	H Harvey [AHI]		165,523				
7.	Wattie	801,155	227,435	1,318	Barcora Pty Ltd.	14	SYDNEY
8.	Winstone	697,877	7,886	3,125	Fletchers	100	NEW ZEALAND
9.	Lion Corporation	684,119	16,309	1,405	AD Myers	12	NEW ZEALAND
10.	Magnum Corporation	665,645	-	-	Brierley	67	AUSTRALIA
11.	Progressive	645,357	52,706	-	Coles Myers	87	AUSTRALIA
12.	Cable Price Downer	645,239	153,056	5,569	Brierley (20.4.88 H)	100	AUSTRALIA
13.	Waitaki International	645,199	-	-	Goodman F, FCL & Freesia	72	NEW ZEALAND
14.	Goodman-Feilder	623,591	D/E	D/E	Barcora Pty Ltd.	14	SYDNEY
15.	Feltex	623,176	-	-	BTR Nylex	80+	AUSTRALIA
16.	Steel & Tube	488,243	6,937	-	Tube Makers (Aust)	49	AUSTRALIA
17.	McConnell Dowell	451,220	-	-	Inter Pacific	100	AUSTRALIA
	Hawkins Holding		181,273	109,983			
18.	Mair Astley	418,865	77,300	-	NZI Properties	26	BRITAIN
19.	Dominion Breweries	396,263	3,540	1,391	Brierleys	51	AUSTRALIA
20.	United Empire Box	381,589	126,148	12,654	NZ Equities	100	NEW ZEALAND
21.	NZ Steel	344,872	65,992	3,544	Equiticorp (receivers)	80	NEW ZEALAND
22.	Fisher & Paykel	339,771	-	-	Equiticorp (receivers)	20	NEW ZEALAND
23.	Colonial Motors	333,800	-	-	no holding exceeds	5	NEW ZEALAND
24.	Owens	309,072	104,246	D/E	Owens Family trusts	36	NEW ZEALAND
25.	I.C.I.	297,000	10,141	847	Kingsgate International	43	SINGAPORE
26.	Ceramco	279,288	-	-	Bidwell/Gibbs	25	NEW ZEALAND
27.	Newmans	271,500			Corporate Investments	51	
	Transport Holdings		3,709	280	(P Masfen & Ass. 68%)		NEW ZEALAND
28.	Fernz	217,343	19,671	2	Rathbone/Hoggard	30	NEW ZEALAND
29.	Southland Meat	205,948	-	-	FCL	100	NEW ZEALAND
30.	BNZ Finance	196,072	66,040	8,577	BNZ	76	NEW ZEALAND

Table 4

CHANGES IN OVERSEAS DIRECT INVESTMENT IN NEW ZEALAND BY YEAR (million's)

YEAR	UNITED KINGDOM	EEC	USA & CANADA	AUSTRALIA	OTHER COUNTRIES	
1949	37	3	-	5	51	96
1950	105	11	-	-	-	116
1951	184	10	-	50	-	244
1952	96	0	76	21	0	193
1953	23	-2	10	-10	0	21
1954	175	12	35	28	0	250
1955	194	-2	30	35	0	257
1956	160	3	28	68	0	259
1957	90	19	17	71	-	197
1958	191	44	-18	36	-	253
1959	164	10	12	71	-	257
1960	207	7	24	93	12	343
1961	198	0	102	70	-8	362
1962	316	-7	107	133	4	553
1963	168	-7	96	102	22	381
1964	220	23	93	120	33	489
1965	228	14	151	258	-24	627
1966	7	1	133	149	-1	289
1967	167	26	-81	166	3	281
1968	208	152	28	-14	15	389
1969	182	14	166	315	85	762
1970	370	257	129	307	257	1320
1971	-72	30	676	381	70	1085
1972	520	35	256	421	19	1251
1973	-	-	-	-	-	-
1974	547	7	454	573	216	1797
1975	292	67	275	387	126	1147
1976	1006	45	636	921	181	2789
1977	978	-55	-136	754	51	1592
1978	2034	20	375	271	-61	2639
1979	1361	107	1015	995	-51	3427
1980	840	-92	733	344	220	2045
1981	690	106	430	1436	996	3658
1982	1434	153	-277	1886	445	3641
mean	392	30	164	307	78	971

Source: Modified from Crothers 1988, using a series of NZYB from 1949-1982.

Table 5

THE NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE MEMBERSHIP: 1976-1987

Members	RESPONDENT 1976	NBR 1983	NZBR April 1986	HERALD Nov 1986	SUNDAY TIMES Jan 1987	RESPONDENT Aug 1987	NBR July 1988
productive sector	7	17	27	25	24	16	
finance sector	0	1	4	8	8	8	
executive	0	0	0	1	1	1	2
Total	7	18	31	34	33	25	2

Sources:

RESPONDENTS	=	respondents information from survey - Murray, 1987-1988
NBR	=	1 Comie, C. National Business Review, October 3, 1983, pp. 1/12.
	=	2 Brook, P. National Business Review, July 15, 1988, pp. 6.
ROUNDTABLE	=	Roundtable report included at the back of their Industrial Relations Paper; New Zealand Market Reform, April 1986.
HERALD	=	Collins, S., The New Zealand Herald, November 12, 1986, p. 6.
SUNDAY TIMES	=	O'Sullivan, F. The New Zealand Sunday Times, January 18, 1987, p. 14.

Table 6

THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO INITIATIVES FROM THE NZBR BY 1989

area	recommendation	action	date
Industrial Relations	1 awards must go	No - still in place but under attack	-
	2 decentralized unions	Yes - started with the Nissan plant	1988
	3 deregulated unions	Yes - voluntary unionism	1987
	4 demise of arbitration courts	Yes - Labour Court & Arbitration Com. replaced Arbitration Court	1987
	5 altering terms of strikes	Yes - Labour Relations Act 1987 limits strikes	1987
Fiscal Strategy	1 reduce government social spending	Yes - cuts made in all sectors	1986-1989
	2 reduce subsidies to industry	Yes	1986
	3 reduce labour intensive industries	Yes	1985-1988
	4 taxation - reduced high income taxes	Yes	1987
	5 reduce Foreign Affairs Ministry	Yes	1986
	6 do away with Conservation Ministry	No	
	7 further reduction of SOE's	Yes - the airlines, forestry, etc.	1987-1989
	8 reduced role of the Labour Department	Yes	1987-1989
Social Expenditure	1 reduced health care - privatisation	Yes	1988-1989
	2 reduced accident compensation	Yes	
	3 reduced educational services	Yes	1987-1989
	4 reduced superannuation for the elderly	No	
	5 reduced access to unemployment benefit	Yes	1988
	6 reduced family support benefits	No	
State Quangos	1 re-examined as practicable-Securities Com.	Under review	1987-1989
	2 re-examined as practicable-Ports Authority	Yes - abolished	1988
	3 re-examined as practicable-Waterfront Commission	Yes - scheduled to go	
	4 disband - NZ Planning Council	No	
	5 disband - Pest Destruction Board	Yes	1987
	6 disband - the Film Commission	No	
	7 disband - the Alcohol Advisory Board	No	
	8 disband - the Urban Transport Council	Yes	1987

Source: NZYB 1988, 1987, 1986.

Table 7

THE TOTAL SAMPLE FOR THE SURVEY OF DIRECTORS OF TOP CORPORATIONS

Sample	Saturated	Random	Added On	Includes	
Chairpeople	22		10	finance capitalist private firms	17 3
non-executive directors		18	9	women finance capitalist private firms	3 12 1
executive directors		21	27	women finance capitalist private firms	2 12 5
Totals	22	39	46		

Table 8

AGE BY CORPORATE STATUS (GROUPED)

	chairperson	non executive	executive	row total
30-59 years	5 18%	8 35%	44 79%	57 53%
60-89 years	23 46%	15 30%	12 24%	50 47%
Column total	28 26%	23 21%	56 52%	107 100%

chi square significance <0.001
missing observations 0

Table 9

THE CLASS ORIGIN OF TOP DIRECTORS - FATHER'S ROLE

	Murray Sample 1988		New Zealand Workforce (1966)
	frequency	percentage	percentage
professional and administrative directors &/or owners of	29	31	3.5
large companies	31	34	2
landlords or farmers	7	8	3
small business people	15	16	3
tradespeople and labourers	9	10	36
others	0	0	53
Total	91	100	47

cases: 91
sources: The New Zealand Yearbook, pp. 957-959 labour force figures.

Table 10

SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF BUSINESS LEADERS IN BRITAIN, U.S.A., JAPAN AND NZ 1952-1988

| | percentages of country's directors | | | |
occupation of fathers	BRITAIN 1952	AMERICA 1952	JAPAN 1960	NEW ZEALAND 1988
executive, director or owner of large business	32	31	22	34
professional and administrative	26	16	21.5	31
small business men	19	18	21.5	16
landlord or farmer	5	9	24	8
Other	18	26	11	10

Source: Scott 1985, p. 250
[Scott's sources = Mannari (1974), Copeman (1955) and Warner and Abegglen (1955)]

Table 11

THE CLASS ORIGIN OF DIRECTORS - MOTHER'S ROLE

| | Murray Sample 1988 | | New Zealand female | |
	frequency	percentage	frequency	percentage
professional and administrative	19	22	85378	3
directors &/or owners of large companies	1	1	49878	2
landlords or farmers	1	1	74594	3
small business people	4	5	73449	3
tradespeople and labourers	9	10	864952	36
mother (or registered unemployed)	54	61	-976751	40
total	88	100	*2414984	87

missing cases: 19
*   based on the grand total employed 1966 NZYB pp. 957-959,
~   not actively engaged women in the paid workforce 1977 NZYB p. 955

Table 12

SECONDARY SCHOOL BY AGE (GROUPED)

School	Age		Row total
	30 - 59	60 - 89	
private elite	8 16%	18 39%	26 27%
private	7 14%	4 9%	11 11%
public	13 25%	8 17%	21 22%
public elite	23 45%	16 35%	39 40%
Total	51	46	97

cases: 97
chi square significance: = 0.03
gamma: .3

Table 13

SHAREHOLDING BY STATUS

percentage of shares owned in company	chairperson & non executive	executive	row total
none	3 8%	6 14%	9 11%
under 1% -9.99%	32 80%	30 71%	62 76%
> 10%	5 12%	6 14%	11 13%
column total	40 49%	42 51%	82 100%

missing cases: 25
chi square significance: = 0.57
gamma: .02

Table 14

INCOME PACKAGE BY STATUS IN THE COMPANY

corporate status

director's income	chairperson & non executive	executive	row total
under $100,000	11 34%	4 9%	15 19%
$100,000- $200,00	14 44%	18 40%	32 42%
over $200,000	7 22%	23 51%	30 39%
column total	32 41%	45 58%	77 100%

cases: 77
missing cases: 26 not given, 2 refused, 2 retired.
chi square significant at <0.01

Table 15

THE BIG FOUR CORPORATE-POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS OF THE CORPORATE CLASS, 1987-1988.

organised interest	founded	basis of membership	other organisation forms	numbers covered	coverage	conferences	annual budget	economic importance	SOE connections
New Zealand Chamber of Commerce	1921	39 local chambers	local affiliation of trade associations	9,000 businesses	8% of registered companies	annual policy subject to autonomy of regional chambers	$250,000		
Employers Federation	1902	4 provincial Employers Associations 43 national exec members	approx. 30 trade or employer groups	approx. 12,000 in excess of 600,000 workers	66% of employers	annual not policy making	un-available		
Manufacturers Association (formerly the Industrial Corporation of New Zealand)	1897	4 provincial Manufacturers Associations	70 Trade Groups	2,400 firms	85% of production in manu-facturing	Annual Conference policy-making	assets of $1 million (1986)	50% employment 25% exports	
Business Roundtable	1976	invitation to CEO's of large co.	employers Fed. member sits in at meetings	over 100 boards	148,036 workers (1986)	meets 2 monthly compulsory	sub. $25000 plus research	64% of market capitalisation of 1986	DFC, RAIL CORP, TELECOM. BNZ ELECTRICITY CORP, FORESTRY CORP.,

Sources: NZYB 1987, p. 380, VOWLES 1985, pp. 218-219, VENABLES 1988 & MURRAY 1988 (Respondent 9 and 19)

Table 16

RELIGIOUS ADHERENCE BY REGION (percentaged)

	region		
religion	Auckland	all others	row total
Church of England	14 67%	15 75%	29 71%
Catholic	5 24%	3 15%	8 19%
Jewish	1 5%	1 5%	2 5%
deals direct	1 5%	1 5%	2 5%
column total	21 51%	20 49%	41 100%

missing cases: 66 (does not include non believers)

Table 17

PRESENT LEVEL OF STATE INVOLVEMENT IN DECISION-MAKING BY SECTOR (GROUPED)

	region		
ideology	Auckland	all others	row total
less state involvement	11 31%	19 45%	30 39%
more state involvement (eg deregulate labour)	12 34%	12 29%	24 31%
the status quo to severe reservations	12 34%	11 26%	23 30%
column total	35 45%	42 54%	77 100%

missing cases: 30
chi square significance: = 0.4

Table 18

ROLE OF THE STATE IN ECONOMIC MATTERS BY REGION (percentaged)

ideology role in economics	region		
	Auckland	all others	row total
the state has no role in the economy	10 31%	7 17%	17 24%
role of state to support business (eg C.E.R.)	6 19%	19 47%	25 35%
general doubts about market forces	16 50%	14 35%	30 42%
column total	32 44%	40 56%	72 100%

missing cases: 35
chi square significance: = 0.03

Table 19

THE EVALUATION OF OFFSHORE INVESTMENT BY REGION (percentaged)

ideology	region		
	Auckland	all others	row total
excellent-profits come back to New Zealand	14 54%	22 59%	36 57%
necessary	11 42%	8 22%	19 30%
we do it but have grave doubts about national benefits	1 4%	7 19%	8 13%
column total	26 41%	37 59%	63 100%

missing cases: 46
chi square significance: = 0.08

Table 20

INEQUALITY IN NEW ZEALAND BY REGION (percentaged)

ideology	region Auckland	all others	row total
social inequality does not exist in New Zealand or it is inevitable	13 46%	11 27%	24 35%
you need a safety net	8 29%	12 30%	20 29%
social inequality is unacceptable	7 25%	17 42%	24 35%
column total	28 41%	40 59%	68 100%

missing cases: 39
chi square significance: = 0.21

Table 21

VOTES LAST ELECTION BY REGION

votes	region Auckland	all others	row total
national	26 70%	23 72%	49 71%
labour	11 30%	9 28%	20 29%
column total	37 54%	33 46%	70 100%

missing cases: 36 plus 2 directors who refused to answer and 1 democrat from outside Auckland.
chi square significance: = 0.8

161

Table 22

ROGERNOMICS BY REGION (GROUPED)

ideology	region		
	Auckland	all others	row total
hostile	6 14%	7 16%	13 15%
cautious	12 28%	9 21%	21 24%
enthusiasm	19 44%	20 46%	39 45%
could go further	6 14%	7 16%	13 15%
column total	43 50%	43 50%	86 .100%

missing cases: 21
chi square significance: = 0.8
gamma: .05

Table 23

A COMPARISON OF THE SIX COMPETING NETWORK MODELS

	range of dates of authors	unit of analysis	theoretical base	basis of power	network	focus of questions
the finance capital model	Hilferding (1910)- Azronovitch (1961)	sector	marxist	ownership of means of production	loose dominated by finance-capital	• types of multiple directors • continuous links industrial-finance capital
the resource-dependence model	Williamson (1975)- Burt (1980)	corporation	pluralist	corporate	no central-realization	• continuous links • decisions on resource allocation by sector
the class-cohesive model	Useem (1982)- Scott and Griff (1985)	class	marxist-pluralist	ownership and control of the means of production and information	relatively dense	• inner circle membership • background variables-education, parents occupation, associations-roundtable etc • political links and voting
the co-ordination and control models	Lundberg (1937)- Zeitlin (1974)	kinecon	marxist	ownership and control of the means of production	cliques and clusters cf families	• "expert" contacts • identity of multiple directors • family continuity
the bank hegemony model	Fitch & Oppenheimer (1970)- Schwartz & Mintz (1985)	capitalism	marxist	hegemony of capital flows from banks	loose with clusters cf. banks	• the role of the bank/ corporation • access to information by bank board members
the managerial model	Berle & Means (1934)- Andrews (1982)	corporations	pluralist	corporate/ individual	hierarchy big to small flexible	• ownership/control • income • who makes decisions

Source: cf. Scott (1985b, pp. 6-19)

THE "NONES" STORY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS NONALIGNMENT.

Michael Hill
Department of Sociology, Victoria University of Wellington
and Wiebe Zwaga
Department of Sociology, Massey University. ·

Introduction

The study of religious nonalignment is a product of the broader secularisation debate which emerged in the late 1960s. At a theoretical and pastoral level one of the early landmarks was the Symposium on the Culture of Unbelief held in Rome in 1969 and sponsored in part by the University of California at Berkeley and the Vatican Secretariat for Non-Believers (Caporale and Grumelli, 1971). At this symposium - similar in many respects to those which would later be sponsored by the Unification Church (see, for example, Stark, 1985: 3-7) - an internationally prominent group of sociologists of religion engaged in discussions over such issues as the social scientific definitions of belief, unbelief, and disbelief. In a number of these discussions, unbelief was identified as the converse of belief: Thomas Luckmann, for instance, saw unbelief as being 'institutionally defined as the opposite of that which is defined in the institutionally specialized official models as belief' (Caporale and Grumelli, 1971: 135). Thus from the outset, unbelief came to be seen as a deviant category, as a 'problem' to be addressed.

Campbell (1971:28), working within the same Durkheimian framework as Luckmann, also sees irreligion as constituting social nonconformity and furthermore points to its relativistic nature:

> Irreligion, like crime, is a function of what society formulates as the norm, and there is no more possibility of constituting a universal concept of irreligion than there would be of gaining universal agreement on what constituted criminal acts. However, just as crime can be defined as a relationship to the norm (or law), so can irreligion be defined as a relationship to established religion.

From this perspective, one of the functions of irreligion is to define the boundaries or 'purify' the content of religion. The boundary-maintaining

function of irreligion for established religion was noticed by Budd whose research on nineteenth and twentieth century atheism and agnosticism was conducted around the same time as Campbell's. Her detailed focus on irreligion and on the ideas of its protagonists meant that, rather than defining irreligion in terms of religion, she found herself defining religion from an irreligious perspective (1977:6):

> This book is concerned with the views and experience of religion by a group who were outside it and largely opposed to it. In consequence, it treats of Christianity largely as if it were homogeneous and a public institution, ignoring the aspects which made it also a world of private meaning, a symbolic universe, a hope and consolation, or part of the pattern of life in a particular community.

From whatever perspective, it appears, that which is beyond the boundary tends to become a residual category, defined in terms of its lack of certain characteristics.

Vernon (1968) was the first to highlight these definitional problems in empirical research, pointing out that the religious "nones" - which he preferred to term "religious independents" - had been something of a neglected category. Pointing out that the "none" label tends to be the last category in a list of religious affiliations, he continued (1968:219): 'It provides a negative definition, specifying what a phenomenon is not, rather than what it is. Intentionally or not, such a use implies that only those affiliated with a formal group are religious'. In studies of political affiliation, the term 'independent' is used to designate those with no affiliation to a particular party: religious independent, he recommends, is a similarly neutral category.

While Vernon has very usefully drawn attention to the residual implications of the "none" label, its use has persisted, both in census and survey enquiries and in more interpretive journal discussions (see Condran and Tamney, 1985). Other suggested alternatives have been 'secularist' (Hogan, 1979) - which, however, carries implications of an anti-religious commitment that may or may not be present - and 'heathen' (Veevers and Cousineau, 1980) - which, once more, is a residual category, albeit one which was probably intended in a figurative sense. Because the data discussed in this paper is primarily drawn from quantitative sources which use the "none" label, we are also constrained to adopt it, though we are aware of its definitional limitations. The ways in

which census and survey respondents conceptualise 'Religion' is, of course, an area of great complexity: though it should be noted that even when religion is self-defined by respondents - as it was in the New Zealand census before 1986 - all but a small minority interpret this by offering an institutional label.

In our paper we will examine the religious "nones" in a comparative framework, looking both at empirical data - much of it derived from surveys and censuses - and at various interpretations of the backgrounds and careers of religious nonaligners. We will be primarily concerned with the period from the 1950s to the early 1980s - a period of major religious change, especially, as we have documented elsewhere, for the young adult age group (Hill and Zwaga, 1989: 84-85) - though we will occasionally introduce historical points of reference. First we will discuss research on United States data, turning respectively to Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In the latter case, detailed census data together with a study of census respondents who changed their religious adherence between 1976 and 1981 permit a more finely focussed analysis of the religious "nones". The degree of focus is dependent on available data from the societies listed above, and this availability also influences the range of comparability. It should not be overlooked that the cultural meaning of religion in the different societies clearly varies - as we have shown in depth in an earlier paper (Hill and Zwaga, 1987) - and that the comparative data derive from various sources and do not always permit detailed matching. Thus, for instance, while there is data on migration and the regional distribution of religiosity in Canada, we do not have specific data on education and religious nonalignment for that country. Similarly, there is more detailed data on occupation and income in the case of Australia and New Zealand. Furthermore, New Zealand censuses do not include the same series of questions, nor the same basis of categorisation, at each five-yearly census date, which makes internal comparability difficult; and a change in the format of the religion question between 1981 and 1986 (discussed below) substantially disrupts the data series.

United States

An early study based on survey data (Vernon, 1968) established that the parameters of the 'no religion' category are flexible and that those who eschew a religious identification may simultaneously combine such rejection with positive levels of religious commitment. The religious "nones" contained 17.7 percent of respondents who endorsed positive beliefs about religion (Vernon,

1968: 222). Such a finding confirms the argument that there is a level of popular religion, folk religion, common religion, or 'subterranean theology' which slips through the net of survey and census categories (Towler, 1984: 4). As Wilson, comparing British and American studies, notes: 'Religious practices clearly do not fit the neat and tidy official model of religion' (Wilson, 1978: 36). The point about common religion is that it provides resources not only for rites of passage and life-transitions but that it penetrates a variety of areas of life, even for those who might otherwise offer a religious disclaimer (Clark, 1982: 82). Tentative evidence is also provided in this early study that within the 'no religion' or 'no preference' grouping, those who explicitly adopt the labels 'atheist' or 'agnostic' are more likely to come from higher socio-economic groups. We must emphasise the importance of distinguishing the category 'no religion' from the more clearly focussed ones of 'atheist' and 'agnostic'.

In interpreting the phenomenon of religious nonalignment, a number of writers have pointed to the significance of the socialisation process. Wuthnow (1976; 1978), for example, has adopted Mannheim's concept of 'generation units' in order to explain the major shift in orientation towards religion which appears among those in the age group which reached adulthood and completed their period of primary socialisation during the 1960s. On a variety of indices such as church attendance, belief in God and other dimensions of religious commitment, this generation unit shows a more marked tendency towards religious nonalignment than preceding and succeeding age groups (Wuthnow, 1976: 858). Linking this with the countercultural movement of the period, Wuthnow emphasises the point that the religious trends revealed are not necessarily linear and might be reversed by subsequent generation units. It is possible, however, that the indices he quotes were too closely identified with official models of religion to tap the countercultural impact, since on international comparisons United States youth at that period did not seem unduly alienated from religious identification (see Table 1).

Other research emphasises the importance of social as against ideological influences on religious nonalignment. Mauss (1973), in examining the rather more specific process of religious defection, highlights its social dimension which he contrasts with its intellectual and emotional dimensions. As the obverse of research on religious joining and conversion, which emphasises the formation of social ties with group members as a key predisposing factor, he

suggests that lack of contact with other religious participants and unsatisfying social experiences are associated with religious disinvolvement. This interpretation is reinforced by Hoge and Roozen (Hoge and Roozen, 1979; Roozen, 1980), whose discussion of church dropouts highlights lack of social integration, together with such factors as illness or change in domestic/work schedules, as the principal causes of defection. Attempts have also been made to devise typologies of religious dropouts and apostates which identify the variety of social and ideological factors involved in disaffiliation (Hale, 1977; Caplovitz and Sherrow, 1977; Hoge, 1981). These conclusions infer that we would be mistaken in perceiving the religious "nones" as an ideologically homogeneous category. Perhaps a more plausible model of religious disinvolvement is that provided by Goddijn (1983: 417) who sees it as part of a process or career in which 'non-attendance at church services is a transitional phase to a more definite state of non-relatedness, in the sense that one declares oneself "unchurched" at the census.'

One recent attempt to set the religious "nones" within a broader framework using United States data is that of Condran and Tamney (1985). They review census and National Opinion Research Center surveys from 1957 - when 2.7 percent of the American population said they had no religious preference - to 1982, when the corresponding figure was 7.1 percent (see Table 2). Research in the 1970s confirmed the popular profile of a "none" as being a person with a higher than average level of education (though not for blacks), being young, single and mobile (Condran and Tamney, 1985: 416). In contrast, the 1957 data showed that none of the independent variables made a difference and that among male "nones" lower education and divorced or separated marital status were more typical, with age having little significance: age also had little relationship with church attendance in the 1950s. By 1963 the most striking change was the high proportion of young (20-24 year-old) female "nones". To explain these patterns of change, the authors suggest that until 1960 being a "none" was a structural feature of working class alienation and isolation from the churches, while from the sixties onwards the phenomenon was based on cultural opposition to established norms and values: the feminist movement rather than the counter-cultural (following Wuthnow) is seen to have had the most significant influence on women. It should be added that while a negative relationship between education and religious affiliation has been widely accepted, it has been questioned, for instance by Greeley (1979: 119-120).

Evidence which supports Wuthnow's contention that the level of religious nonalignment does not necessarily follow a linear progression has been drawn from U.S. national surveys between 1955 and 1984 (Glenn, 1987). These show that the percentage "No religion" response rose steadily from 2.1 percent of the adult population in 1955-59 to 7.3 percent in 1975-79, supporting the type of linear progression often suggested by secularisation theorists. But the percentage then levels off and remains at 7.3 in the 1980-84 period. Glenn (1987:302) concludes that in the U.S. there 'is fairly strong evidence for a cessation, if not an incipient reversal, of the intercohort trend toward higher percentages of young adults having no religion. This is consistent with the argument that by the mid 1970s the earlier countercultural influences had been replaced by a conservative reaction which - at least temporarily - may have halted some aspects of secularisation, though there is also evidence that the trend towards 'No religion' was relatively more persistent among women than among men. A study based on data obtained through the General Social Survey 1973-1985 explains religious nonalignment among women as being related to their increased involvement in the workforce: in other words, the *increased* rate of female participation in the workforce has - in marked contrast with their male counterparts - *decreased* women's religious involvement. Religion and work conversely correlate with gender so that 'among men, apostates show the lowest level of workforce participation, among women, apostates have the highest levels' (Hertel, 1988: 574) - similar findings were apparent in Australia to which reference is subsequently made.

Canada

Together with Australia and New Zealand, Canada has for many years included a question on religion on its five-yearly population census. However, a search for religious "nones" prior to 1971 is fruitless, since it was only in that year's census that the enumerators began to take 'No' for an answer (Veevers and Cousineau, 1980: 199). An analysis of the 1971 census data reveals the demographic correlates of the 'no religion' category: in terms of age, for example, there is an overrepresentation of persons in the 20- 35 year age groups, a lower percentage in the teenage years 15-19, and 'whether or not it is true that "there are no atheists in fox holes", it certainly seems true that there are very few in retirement homes' (*ibid.*: 204). Males predominate and rates of reporting 'no religion' are highest in the largest urban areas. A particular feature of religious disaffiliation in Canada is its increase from east (with an extreme low of 0.6 percent in Newfoundland) to west (13.8 percent in British

Columbia). This is associated with a Quebec-British Columbia polarity (Cohn, 1976: 90) and with higher rates of norm violation - as measured by such indices as abortion rates, illegitimacy, interfaith marriages, divorce, alcohol intake and general crime - and anomie in the 'wayward' west, which has elements of a 'frontier' society (Veevers and Cousineau, 1980: 211; Cohn, 1976: 90-91). Though the direction of causality is an open question, it is possible that the propensity to migrate is itself associated with being nonreligious. Thus, persons with 'no religion' tend to be overrepresented among those originating from Britain and Asia, while they are underrepresented among those of French origin. Table 3 summarises the data, with 1981 'no religion' percentages added to show the persistence of the Atlantic-Pacific polarity 1986 census data on religion is unobtainable, but a comparison of 1981 data with that of the 1985 General Social Survey shows an increase in the percentage of the population aged 15 and over reporting no religious preference from 7 percent in 1981 to 10 percent in 1985 (Mori, 1987: 14).

Bibby (1985: 295), interpreting the 4 percent increase in the Canadian 'no religion' category between 1971 and 1981, suggests that at the very least this indicates a culture in which people feel less compelled to offer a religious preference. The data, however, are open to different interpretations. Most of the non-affiliated were under the age of 40 and - using national panel data - within five years the majority ceased to be "nones" and adopted a Protestant or Catholic label. This, states Bibby, was particularly the case when people required rites of passage such as marriage or baptism. He continues (1985:295):

> For many and perhaps most of the Nones, then, non-affiliation is seemingly a temporary category adopted in early adulthood, yet foreign to one's past and future. Thus, permanent residence among the Religious Nones is not an option chosen by many Canadians.

In sum, the "none" category was transitional and when the category was discarded by census and survey respondents 'the affiliation direction was conventional religion' (Bibby and Weaver, 1985: 454). But on the other hand, Bibby has found clear evidence of the decline in religious socialisation. Of those who were under 18 in 1975, he shows, about one-third were experiencing pro-institutional religious socialisation through the home and/or church: of their parents, perhaps two-thirds experienced such socialisation. Bibby (1979:

113) is even prepared to project the situation forward by suggesting that of the children of these under 18 year olds, the proportion being socialised might possibly drop from one-third to one-sixth.

We can summarise Bibby's portrayal of Canadian religion as one of relative stability - or 'encasement' - in the mainline Protestant and Catholic faith groups. The religious "nones" are not a fast-growing constituency and represent a fairly volatile group of people who are likely to return to some form of mainline allegiance: in other words, rather than dropping out completely from religious participation they drop in occasionally. Religion in a consumer society is specialised and people select belief and practice "fragments" from the diverse religious menus offered by market- oriented religious organisations rather than committing a great deal of time to intense religious involvement. In this situation 'Few people switch affiliations or drop out, because increasingly it is not necessary or advantageous to do so' (Bibby and Posterski, 1985: 127).

Australia

As in the case of Canada, significant 'changes' in religious identification or lack of identification can be achieved by altering the wording of a census question. From 1933, when the census carried the advice in the religion section that there was no legal obligation to answer, 'the combined figure for the 'no religion' and 'not stated' categories remained stable until 1971 at around eleven to twelve percent' (Wilson, 1983: 24). In 1971 the instruction 'If no religion, write None' was added with the result that the "nones" were boosted from 0.8 percent in 1966 to 6.7 percent in 1971. As has been emphasised earlier, the category of response does not necessarily indicate a firm ideological component, as Price (1981: 5) has indicated:

> In short, the figures suggest that, though some persons in the Not Stated category genuinely and strongly feel that their religious beliefs, or lack of such, are entirely their own affair, others take a very slap-dash or bloody-minded view of the census and simply cannot be bothered to take much trouble with their answers. In this they are very different from persons in the No Religion category: these seem to be giving careful thought to the question and making responsible replies.

While agreeing with the general tone of Price's *caveat*, we are rather more sanguine about the probity of census "nones": Table 4 shows changes in these categories between 1966 and 1981.

Australian "nones" have the following general characteristics. They are predominantly male, though the male predominance has decreased in every census in the past twenty-five years except 1986, while the male proportion in the 'Not Stated' category has remained relatively constant (see Table 5). Compared both with the population as a whole and with other categories of religious adherents, those stating 'No Religion' are considerably more likely to have no children - 22.5 percent of ever-married women aged 15-49 years in the 'No Religion' category in 1981 had no children, compared with 13.0 percent for Australia as a whole and 12.3 percent for the 'Total Christian' category. Tentatively, this might suggest that the pool of recruits to the 'No Religion' category derives from other than the process of primary socialisation, a contention which will be examined later. Compared with the population as a whole, the age profile of religious "nones" is atypical: there is a major concentration of this category in the 20-35 age group. Furthermore, when age is examined in conjunction with sex, an interesting trend emerges. Adopting Harris's data base of the percentage of male and female 20-44 year-olds in different categories, there is a consistent increase in the proportion of females contributing to the 'No Religion' category compared with all other categories (see Table 6): it seems that the influences impinging on this generational unit have been experienced more markedly by women than by men.

Hogan has suggested a number of social and demographic characteristics of Australian "nones", though he bases his findings on the highly dubious procedure of aggregating the 'No religion', 'Not stated' and 'Indefinite' categories of the census (Hogan, 1979: 391). As well as a male predominance, a concentration in the 20-35 year age group and a higher than average education, Hogan finds support for the argument that "nones" are increasingly a product of social reproduction rather than of 'seepage' from major Christian denominations. The methodological inadequacy of the aggregation procedure, which as Table 5 shows, masks significant differences between the component categories, is compounded by his assumption that the breeding and socialisation patterns of secular parents will rapidly ensure a secular takeover in Australia (Hogan, 1979: 398). More suggestive is the data he derives from a 1977 Australian Social Barometer survey, which examines the 'psychographic' profiles of respondents. This data shows a strong liberal tendency among the 'No Religion' respondents, together with a favouring of government intervention in the economy and a lack of a strong 'protestant ethic'. The interesting possibility that public service bureaucrats (who figure prominently

in the New Christian Right's demonology) might indeed be contributing to the 'secular humanism' of contemporary western societies is one for which we will later find evidence in New Zealand.

The link between sex and occupation among Australian "nones" has been explored further by de Vaus (1985; de Vaus and McAllister, 1987) and McCallum (1987). Workforce participation is a key variable in conditioning religious involvement and non-involvement, as Luckmann (1967: 30) had proposed some twenty years ago. The lower proportion of female "nones", argues de Vaus, is entirely explicable by the lower rate of full-time participation in the workforce by women. When full-time male and female workers are compared, significant differences on a variety of measures of religiosity disappear, except for a greater tendency on the part of women to believe in heaven. The two factors which are proposed to explain this finding are the influence of male reference-groups in the workplace and the extent to which workforce participation reduces the time available for involvement in religious activities. On balance, it is argued that the latter are more likely to be negatively affected than are attitudes (de Vaus and McAllister, 1987: 480).

Another area of women's employment which contributes to religious disaffiliation has been examined by McCallum (1987). He shows that women were more likely than men to move to the 'No religion' category in the period 1971-81. He quotes the Professions in Australia Survey to show that professional women in particular have experienced changing expectations, among them a less traditional role and with this a tendency to disaffiliate from Christian denominations. We should recall the importance attached by Condran and Tamney (1985) to the impact of the feminist movement on the growth of religious "nones" in the United States. In interpreting these changes, McCallum (1987: 407) sees the socialisation process as differentiating the religious experience of men and women:

> The evidence supports an argument about changed childhood socialisation to religion and, for women only, competing socialisation in adult life.

In other words, the secondary socialisation of women adds religious nonaligners to the pool of males who are already "nones" through their primary socialisation.

A further ingenious explanation of the process is provided by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975). These economists use time-budget analysis to establish the relationship between household allocation of time and church attendance. They argue that women's more frequent participation in church-related activities is associated with their lack of paid employment or their lower wages. This would explain why, as women become involved in full-time paid employment and especially in better-paid professional occupations, they reduce their time investment in religion. Salvation, or what the authors prefer to call 'afterlife consumption', can be secured in either time-intensive or capital-intensive religion. The availability of market consumption alternatives for working women, coupled with their greater spending power, thus reduces the investment appeal of religious participation.

McCallum (1987: 411) records what he considers to be remarkable increases in the 'no religion' category for younger ages and a similar observation has been made by Hogan (1979: 395). While this might appear to contradict data already cited which show that the "nones" are less likely to have children (Harris, 1982: 266-7) and therefore experience smaller autogenous growth, the two sets of data can be reconciled by suggested that parents who may adopt a religious label themselves are increasingly reluctant to confer one on their children. This does not necessarily indicate an ideological rejection of religion but more a reluctance on the part of survey and census-responding parents to commit very young children to an institutional identification: the label 'Christian' has been similarly used by New Zealand census respondents to disavow specific denominational adherents (Hill and Bowman, 1985: 95). Some of the implications of the part played by socialisation can be further explored in a New Zealand context, to which we now turn.

New Zealand
Compared with the Australian and Canadian censuses, which combine all expressions of religious nonalignment ('Atheist'/'Agnostic'/'Humanist'/'No Religion') into a single, somewhat residual category, that of New Zealand reports fully the various shades of secularity. This may in itself reflect the more historically established tendency in New Zealand - in contrast with other commonwealth countries - to regard religious nonalignment as a legitimate option. At least, such was the impression gained by English Freethinkers who in the 1880s were speaking of New Zealand as a Mecca of secularity (Lineham, 1985: 62-63):

There is so much greater freedom for opinions in New Zealand than [in England], that what are called heterodox, do not stand as an insuperable obstacle to high office in the Chief Council of the Country.

The reference here is to Robert Stout, the Premier, and John Ballance, the Minister of Defence and of Lands. Against such a background it is not surprising that the census was prepared to take 'No' - or a variety of alternatives on the menu of secularity - for an answer. In the light of such a wealth of census material, a detailed scrutiny of New Zealand "nones" is justified. In the 1981 census the totals were as follows:

No religion	167,817
Agnostic	24,201
Atheist	21,528
Object	468,573
TOTAL POPULATION	3,175,737

Although the New Zealand census data series has not been interrupted by the kind of random factor represented by the 1971 decision in the Australian and Canadian censuses to admit 'No Religion' as a category, there is a significant change in the construction of the 1986 Religion question - for which only provisional figures are at present available. Until 1986 the question was open-ended with a reply written in by the respondent and including the instruction that there was a statutory right to object to stating a religion. In the 1986 census responses were pre-coded and consisted of the following categories: Anglican, Presbyterian, Catholic, Methodist, Baptist, No religion, Other religion (such as Ratana, Hindu. Please state) and Object to answering this question. Table 7 shows the post-war growth of the New Zealand "nones" in the three principal categories, 'No religion', 'Atheist', 'Agnostic': as will be seen, the 1986 figure has been markedly affected by the change in wording. Not only has the combined percentage of religious "nones" increased eighteenfold, it has largely absorbed the categories of Atheist and Agnostic as well as halving the 'Object to state' category and revealing the extent to which the latter was previously a refuge for nonaligners.

Turning to the sex composition of the New Zealand "nones" which are presented in Table 8, we find a remarkably close resemblance to the Australian pattern shown in Table 5. Males predominate in all categories of religious nonalignment, but women have increased their proportion consistently in the

Figure 1:

Age Profiles of No Religion Respondents
Canada, Australia, New Zealand — 1981 Censuses
Indexed Against Total Population


Figure 2:

Male Religious Nones
New Zealand, 1981

Figure 3:

Female Religious Nones
New Zealand, 1981

past 25 years, so that it can be stated that while the overall percentage of nonaligners is growing, the percentage growth of female "nones" is higher than that of males.

The age profile of New Zealand "nones" is also similar to that of Canada and Australia, as Figure 1 - which provides a divergence index (total population in each age group = 100) for the three countries reveals. There is an over-representation of children in the 0-14 age group, a substantial over-representation in the 20-35 age groups and a marked under-representation in the older age groups. Looking more closely at the younger age category in New Zealand (0-4 years old) we can comment more specifically on the origins of the religious "nones". Of New Zealand children born in the early 1960s (1961-66), only 1.6 percent were labelled as having 'No religion'. Twenty years later, of these born between 1981 and 1986, some 29 percent were so labelled. Like Australian parents, it appears that their New Zealand counterparts are inclined to avoid an ascribed religious label for their children. It is certainly true that the overall growth in size of the "none" category is not due to autogenous recruitment, since 0-4 year old "nones" have in fact declined as a percentage of total "nones" (17.7 percent in 1976; 13.1 percent in

1986). Therefore religious disaffiliation is less a product of social reproduction than of disengagement at a later stage in people's lives. Both primary and secondary socialisation contribute to the process.

A more finely-focussed view of age/sex characteristics of the New Zealand religious "nones" can be gained by indexing male and female Agnostics, Atheists and No religion respondents to the age distributions of the total male and female populations (Figures 2 and 3). This procedure reveals the extent to which 'No religion' is very significantly a category of parental labelling of very young children - with females proportionately more over-represented in the 0-4 age group than males. Thereafter there is something of an over-representation in the 20-29 age groups followed by consistent decline. 'No religion', the most neutral of the disaffiliate responses does not have the sharp age profile of 'Agnostic' and 'Atheist': the former is markedly concentrated in the young adult age groups, peaking for females in the 20-24 age group and for males in the 25-29 group, and thereafter declining to a similar level of under-representation in the oldest age groups as the 'No religion' respondents. 'Atheist' is even more markedly a response of the 15-29 groups, peaking for both males and females in the 20-24 group where it is highly concentrated, especially for females. It does seem appropriate to think of these categories as being more indicative of ideological alignment, and its impact on women may well have the feminist implications which other commentators, for instance, Condran and Tamney (1985) have suggested.

The availability of the more detailed breakdown of nonaligners in the New Zealand census makes it possible to identify the distinct patterns of parental labelling of children. Table 9 shows the child/woman ratios of 'Agnostic', 'Atheist' and 'No religion' categories compared with those of the total population. To these we have added 'Christian' to confirm our earlier observation that this category, like that of 'No religion' is used to avoid particular denominational identification for children. The Agnostic and Atheist categories show low proportions of children, which is consistent with the explanation that parents are as reluctant to offer a non-religious response for their children as they are to select a specific denomination, preferring instead the categories 'No Religion' or 'Christian'.

A distinct feature of the New Zealand population is its significant ethnic composition. In 1981 Maori made up 8.8 percent of the total census

population, but their proportions in the nonaligned categories were all less than that figure. They contributed only 6.5 percent of those in the total population stating 'No religion', 7.8 percent of the 'Atheist' category and a mere 2.5 percent of 'Agnostic' respondents. The minority ethnic contribution to the religious "nones" in New Zealand works in an opposite direction to that identified by Hogan (1979: 396) for the Australian Aborigine population.

Australian nonaligners have been shown to have higher income (Harris, 1982:268), education (Harris, 1982:276); Hogan, 1979:397) and level of occupation (Harris, 1982:271), and much the same characteristics are evident among their New Zealand counterparts. However, the availability in the New Zealand census until 1981 of nuances of nonalignment allows a more differentiated analysis of its socio-economic correlates. Table 10 shows that while males professing 'No religion' have a median income level slightly higher than that of the total male population (and much the same as that of Anglicans), Atheists have a lower than average median income while Agnostics have a substantially higher income; indeed, their index of 108.7 is only surpassed by that of Hebrews at 112.5. Using a somewhat different basis of calculation, Brosnan (1988: 251-52) found that female nonaligners had higher average income than other religiously affiliated women except Hebrews, and that Agnostic women were particularly likely to have higher incomes. This perhaps suggests that similar occupational patterns to those found by McCallum (1987) in Australia also operate for women in New Zealand. Educationally, the New Zealand "nones" show a higher than average tendency to have attended university. In the population as a whole aged 15 years and over, 5.2 percent give university as their highest level of education: for the 'No religion' group the comparable figure is 11.8 percent; for Atheists 15.2 percent and for Agnostics 20.4 percent.

Income and education are seen as the major components of socio-economic status and have been used in New Zealand as the basis of an objective SES scale (Elley and Irving, 1972). We can thus make a number of observations about the social environment of religious nonaligners. What is most evident is the tendency of the 'No religion' category to diverge least from the total population in terms of income but nevertheless to show a markedly higher than average level of university education. As we showed earlier, this is the nonaligned category which is also more evenly spread in terms of age distribution. Atheists have a proportionately higher level of university

education but an income level which is lower than the average for the total male population: this is almost certainly associated with the fact that they are clustered in the younger age groups, peaking in the 20-24 age group. Other suggestive evidence points to the possibility that many of the Atheists may indeed be at university and have thus not yet attained the higher financial rewards that are purported to follow a university education, since in all the main urban centres in New Zealand Atheists cluster in the inner-city areas and especially around universities.

The category of religious nonalignment with the highest educational and income levels is Agnostic. The peak age for males in this group is 25-29 (females acquire the label slightly earlier) and their level of university education (25 percent) is only exceeded by Humanists (28 percent) and Quakers (33 percent). Given the data presented in Table 9 showing the low child/woman ratio of Agnostics it is possible to infer that their lifestyles most closely approximate what has been typified as the 'dinky' (double income, no kids yet) pattern. Occupationally, religious disaffiliates show a higher than average propensity to work in the public sector, rather like their Australian counterparts. Table 11 shows the proportions of males and females in selected groups by sector of employment, and once again draws attention to the similar features of Agnostics, Quakers and Humanists. Given their educational level it is likely that members of these groups are employed as public sector professionals rather than in more routine manual work.

Census data, as this paper has several times emphasised contain tantalising gaps which result in tentative explanations. In New Zealand, however, the explanatory potential of census data is greatly enhanced not only by the publication of detailed categories of religious adherence but also by the further analysis of patterns of changed adherence in an intercensal consistency study. The 1976/81 study (which will be repeated with 1981/86 census returns) was based on a sample of 12,000 1981 returns (Nolan *et al*, 1986). These were individually matched with 1976 returns, giving a matching ratio of 85 percent or around 10,000 respondents. The purpose of this comparison was to check the degree to which respondents gave the same responses to various questions in the 1976 and 1981 censuses or gave a different response in 1981 to the one given in 1976. The comparison of responses to the religion question provides a unique picture of short- term changes in self-reported religious affiliation. A significant finding was that no fewer than 26 percent of census respondents

had changed their religious label between 1976 and 1981: the direction of change (shown in Table 12) is of considerable interest. The table shows the religious changes within the 10,000 respondents for selected categories of 'Religion'/'No religion' responses. As in Canada (see Bibby, 1985) there appears to be a pattern of 'encasement' which characterises the mainline religious groups, with religious nonaligned categories showing a high degree of volatility. Of those who in 1976 declared themselves to be Atheist or Agnostic, only 50 percent did so in 1981 (compared with, for instance, 82 percent of 1976 Anglicans), and the comparable figure for the 1976 'No religion' group was 49 percent.

The data do not permit a firm decision on the main direction of change - indeed, it would be prudent to await the 1981/86 intercensal consistency study, which will incorporate the effect of a changed question format - but there would seem to be two competing scenarios into which this data might fit. There is Goddijn's (1985) linear model of religious disaffiliation which, applied to the New Zealand data, would conform to the following sequence:

Mainline —————→ Object —————→ None

Bibby's (1985) model is transitional rather than linear and would translate as:

- with minority religious adherents being internally recruited or recycled (Bibby and Brinkerhoff, 1973). A clear inference from the intercensal consistency study is the porous nature of the 'No religion' and 'Object' categories: at least until 1981 these were the most volatile, and it is also of significance that the religious changers were concentrated in the 20-29 age group and among males - features of the religious nonaligned population which have already been identified.

Summary and conclusions
One of the main conclusions to emerge from this survey is the variegated nature of the religious "nones". Religious nonaligners range from those who maintain religious commitments while avoiding an institutional identification

to those who maintain a clear ideological rejection of religious belief and practice. Census and survey methodologies, however, do not always permit an identification of the finer shades of nonalignment and only exceptionally - such as in the New Zealand intercensal consistency study - throw light on the process or career of religious "nones". The feature which has been emphasised in this paper is the relatively unfocussed nature of the 'No religion' category. Although it shares certain socio-demographic features with the more distinct categories of 'Agnostic' and 'Atheist' - such as a concentration among young adult, more highly educated groups - it is also a label of convenience for parents who do not wish to assign a religion to their very young children, and it is notoriously prone to rapid jumps in numbers of respondents associated with changes in question structure.

In New Zealand, Agnostics and Atheists - who together might be classed as persons with no invisible means of support - are a much more tightly demarcated group. They are substantially concentrated among university educated young adults and their sharp social profile is suggestive evidence of the importance of secondary socialisation in the process of becoming a religious "none". The marked concentration of 20-24 year old females among New Zealand Atheists and Agnostics points to a definite ideological component in these identifications and most probably to the impact of feminism on this specific group. Perhaps there is also some support in the occupational data on Atheists and Agnostics in both Australia and New Zealand for Weber's contention that bureaucracy is the most rationalised sector of a modern society (Mommsen, 1974: 5): there certainly does appear to be a tendency for Atheists and Agnostics to seek careers in the demystified environment of the public sector. If this is indeed the case, the current political programme of privatisation might well be a way of preserving religion in a sense never intended by Luckmann (1967)!

Finally, in presenting this survey of the comparative social context of religious disaffiliation we are aware of the deficiencies in some of the data and of the tentative nature of some of our interpretations. Although this area of interest dates back at least to the late 1960s it is still a relatively uncharted one requiring further research in which 'No religion' is regarded as a response of intrinsic interest rather than a residual category in a question on denominational affiliation. In many respects, the investigation of the culture of religious nonalignment shares features of the search for common religion

embarked on by sociologists such as Clark (1982) and Towler (1984; Towler and Chamberlain, 1973). Just as the investigation of patterns of religious affiliation and belief has been constricted by the adoption of official categories of institutional adherence, so the study of religious nonalignment needs to avoid the shortcomings entailed in the use of formal labels which may obscure the subjective reality beneath. Having accepted 'No' for an answer, we must be sensitive to the variety of meanings contained in that response.

References

Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census of Population and Housing, 1981, 1986, Canberra.

Azzi, C. and Ehrenberg, R., 1975, 'Household Allocation of Time and Church Attendance', Journal of Political Economy, 83(1) :27-53.

Bibby, R.W., 1979, 'The Shape of Collective Religiosity in Canada: An Empirical Analysis', Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 16(1): 106-116.

Bibby, R.W., 1985, 'Religious Encasement in Canada: An Argument for Protestant and Catholic Entrenchment', Social Compass, 32(2-3): 287-303.

Bibby, R.W. and Brinkerhoff, M.B., 1973, 'The Circulation of the Saints: A Study of People who join Conservative Churches', Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 12: 273-283.

Bibby, R.W. and Prosterski, D.C., 1985, The Emerging Generation. An Inside Look at Canada's Teenagers, Toronto: Irwin Publishing.

Bibby, R.W. and Weaver, H.R., 1985, 'Cult Consumption in Canada: A Further Critique of Stark and Bainbridge', Sociological Analysis, 46(4): 445-460.

Brosnan, P., 1988, 'Religion and Income in New Zealand: An Examination of Data from the 1981 Census', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 24(2): 248-63.

Budd, S., 1977, Varieties of Unbelief. Atheists and Agnostics in English Society 1850-1960, London: Heinemann.

Campbell, C., 1971, Towards a Sociology of Irreligion, London: Macmillan.

Caplovitz, D. and Sherrow, F., 1977, The Religious Drop-Outs. Apostasy Among College Graduates, Beverly Hills, Sage.

Caporale, R. and Grumelli, A. (eds), 1971, The Culture of Unbelief, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Clark, D., 1982, Between Pulpit and Pew. Folk religion in a North Yorkshire fishing village, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohn, W., 1976, 'Jewish outmarriage and anomie: a study in the Canadian syndrome of polarities', Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 13(1):90-105.

Condran, J.G. and Tamney, J.B., 1985, 'Religious "Nones": 1957 to 1982', Sociological Analysis, 46(4): 415-423.

de Vaus, D., 1985, Work, Sex and Religion, Zadok Centre Institute for Christianity and Society, Canberra.

de Vaus, D. and McAllister, I., 1987, 'Gender Differences in Religion: A Test of the Structural Location Theory', American Sociological Review, 52: 72-81.

Elley, W.B. and Irving, J.C., 1972, 'A Socio-Economic Index for New Zealand based on Levels of Education and Income from the 1966 Census', New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies, 7(2): 153-167.

Glenn, N.D., 1987, 'The Trend in "No Religion" Respondents to U.S. National Surveys, Late 1950s to Early 1980s', Public Opinion Quarterly, 51: 293-314.

Goddijn, W., 1983, 'Some Religious Developments in the Netherlands (1947-1979) as Documented by a Few Surveys and Census Data', Social Compass, 30(4):409-424.

Greeley, A.M., 1979, 'Ethnic Variations in Religious Commitment', in Wuthnow, R. (ed), The Religious Dimension. New Directions in Quantitative Research, New York: Academic Press.

Hale, J.R., 1977, Who are the Unchurched? An Exploratory Study, Washington D.C., Glenmary Research Centre.

Harris, D., 1982, 'Counting Christians', in Harris, D., Hynd, D. and Millikan, D. (eds), The Shape of Belief. Christianity in Australia Today, Homebush, N.S.W., Lancer.

Hertel, B.R., 1988, 'Gender, Religious Identity and Workforce Participation, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 27(4): 574-592.

Hill, M. and Bowman, R., 1985, 'Religious Adherence and Religious Practice in Contemporary New Zealand: Census and Survey Evidence', Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions, 59(1): 91-105.

Hill, M. and Zwaga, W., 1987, 'Civil and Civic: Engineering a National Religious Consensus', New Zealand Sociology 2(1): 25-35.

Hill, M. and Zwaga, W., 1989, 'Religion in New Zealand: Change and Comparison, in Beckford, J. and Luckmann, T., The Changing Face of Religion, London, Sage.

Hogan, M., 1979, 'Australian Secularists: The Disavowal of Denominational Allegiance', Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 18(4): 390-404.

Hoge, D.R., 1981, Converts, Drop-Outs and Returnees, New York, The Pilgrim Press.

Hoge, D.R. and Roozen, D.A., 1979, Understanding Church Growth and Decline, 1950-1978, New York, The Pilgrim Press.

Hynd, D., 1984, Australian Christianity in Outline, Lancer, Homebush West.

Lineham, P.J., 1985, 'Freethinkers in Nineteenth-Century New Zealand', New Zealand Journal of History, 19: 61-81.

Luckmann, T., 1967, The Invisible Religion, New York: MacMillan.

Mauss, A.R., 1973, 'Dimensions of Religious Defection', in Glock, C.Y. (ed), Religion in Sociological Perspective. Essays in the Empirical Study of Religion, Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth.

McCallum, J., 1987, 'Secularization in Australia between 1966 and 1985. A Research Note', Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 23(3): 407-22.

Mommsen, W.J., 1974, The Age of Bureaucracy. Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Mori, G.A., 1987, 'Religious Affiliation in Canada', Canadian Social Trends, Autumn: 12-16.

New Zealand Department of Statistics, Census of Population and Dwellings, 1945-86, Wellington.

Nolan, F., Moore, T. and Yetman, S., 1986, The 1976/81 Intercensal Consistency Study, Christchurch, Mathematical Statistics Division, Department of Statistics.

Price, C., 1981, 'Religions and the Census', St. Mark's Review, September: 2-8.

Roozen, D.A., 1980, 'Church Drop-Outs: Changing Patterns of Disengagement and Re-entry', Review of Religious Research, 21(4): 427-450.

Stark, R. (ed), 1985, Religious Movements: Genesis, Exodus and Numbers, New York, Paragon House.

Stark, R. and Bainbridge, W.S., 1985, The Future of Religion, Berkeley, University of California Press.

Statistics Canada, 1981 Census of Canada, Population - Religion, Ottawa.

Towler, R., 1984, The Need for Certainty. A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Towler, R., and Chamberlain, A., 1973, 'Common Religion', in Hill, M. (ed), A Sociological Yearbook of Religion in Britain -6, London, SCM Press.

Veevers, J.E. and Cousineau, D.F., 1980, 'The Heathen Canadians. Demographic Correlates of Nonbelief', Pacific Sociological Review, 23(2): 139-216.

Vernon, G.M., 1968, 'The Religious "Nones": A Neglected Category' Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 7: 219-229.

Wilson, B., 1983, Can God Survive in Australia?, Sutherland, N.S.W.: Albatross.

Wilson, J., 1978, Religion in American Society. The Effective Presence, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Wuthnow, R., 1976, 'Recent Patterns of Secularization: A Problem of Generations?', American Sociological Review, 41: 850-867.

Wuthnow, R., 1978, Experimentation in American Religion. Berkeley, University of California Press.

TABLE 1: Religious Commitment of 18-24-year-old Respondents, 1973

	USA	SWIT-ZERLAND	GREAT BRITAIN	FRANCE	SWEDEN
Percent including church in weekend activities	35	18	11	8	6
Percent Not interested in religion	12	15	32	19	41

Source: Wuthnow (1978)

TABLE 2: Percentage of "nones" by age and sex, United States, 1957-82

	PERCENTAGE "NONE"		
	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE
1957	2.7	-	-
1963	3.8	5.3	2.3
1972	4.9	6.3	3.5
1973	6.3	8.9	4.2
1974	6.7	9.5	4.4
1975	7.5	10.1	5.4
1976	7.2	10.2	4.8
1977	6.1	8.6	4.0
1978	7.6	10.7	5.2
1980	7.0	9.8	4.7
1982	7.1	11.9	3.6

Source: Condran and Tamney (1985):415

TABLE 3: Regional Characteristics of Canadian Population, 1971, Percent (1981 'no religion' percentages in brackets)

	Canada	British Columbia	Prairie Provinces	Ontario	Quebec	Atlantic Provinces
No Religion	4.3 (7.4)	13.1 (20.9)	5.2 (9.4)	4.5 (7.2)	1.3 (2.1)	1.7 (2.8)
Migrant (1966-71)	23.9	34.6	24.1	25.0	20.3	18.6
Weekly Church	31	18	28	27	35	52

Source:Stark and Bainbridge (1985:459); 1981 Census of Canada, 'Population, Religion'

TABLE 4: 'No Religion' and 'Not Stated', Percentages, Australian Census, 1966-86

	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986
No Religion	0.8	6.7	8.3	10.8	12.7
Not Stated	10.0	6.1	11.8	10.9	11.9

Source: Wilson (1983): 25; Australian Bureau of Statistics (1986)

TABLE 5: Males per 100 Females in 'No Religion' and 'Not Stated' categories, Australian Census, 1961-86

	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986
No Religion	204	180	153	136	130	129
Not Stated	117	120	117	109	110	108

Source: Harris (1982):254; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census of Population and Housing (1981; 1986)

TABLE 6: Percentage of 20-44 year old persons in 'Total Christian', 'No Religion' and 'Total Australia' categories

	1961			1966			1971		
	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All
Total Christian	17.0	16.3	33.3	16.7	16.2	32.9	16.7	16.8	33.5
No Religion	32.4	13.5	45.9	31.7	15.6	47.3	26.2	14.8	41.0
TOTAL AUSTRALIA	17.4	16.3	33.7	17.1	16.1	33.2	17.6	16.6	34.2

	1976			1981			1986		
	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All
Total Christian	16.4	17.1	33.5	17.2	18.3	35.5	17.7	19.1	36.8
No Religion	26.3	17.6	43.9	27.4	19.6	47.0	28.0	20.5	48.5
TOTAL AUSTRALIA	17.7	17.2	34.9	18.8	18.4	37.2	19.5	19.2	38.7

Source: Harris (1982): 257; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Census of Population and Housing (1981; 1986)

TABLE 7: *'No Religion', 'Atheist' and 'Agnostic' as Percentage of Total Population, New Zealand 1945-1986*

	1945	1951	1956	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986
No Relig.	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.2	2.0	3.2	5.3	16.4
Atheist	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.7	-
Agnostic	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.8	0.1
TOTAL	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.6	2.6	4.2	6.8	16.5

Source: New Zealand, Department of Statistics, Census of Population and Dwellings (1945-86)

TABLE 8: *Males per 100 Females in 'No Religion', 'Atheist' and 'Agnostic' categories, New Zealand Census, 1961-1986*

	1961	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986
No Religion	198	180	160	144	135	132
Atheist	332	288	237	196	190	245
Agnostic	275	234	190	157	147	168

Source: New Zealand, Department of Statistics, Census of Population and Dwellings (1961-86)

TABLE 9: *Child/Woman Ratios (children 0-4 per thousand women aged 15-44), Selected Religions, New Zealand 1961, 1971, 1981*

	1961	1971	1981
Agnostic	153	82	114
Atheist	351	158	121
No Religion	1,061	882	805
Christian	592	406	516
Total population	627	522	358

TABLE 10: *Median male incomes of selected groups indexed to total median male income, New Zealand 1981*

Anglican	103.8
Presbyterian	102.4
Catholic	100.3
Methodist	98.5
Christian n.o.d.	102.6
Baptist	100.9
Mormon	91.0
Ratana	87.3
Brethren	95.2
Salvation Army	93.2
Jehovah's Witness	89.7
Seventh Day Adventist	86.4
Agnostic	108.7
Atheist	96.3
No religion	103.1

Source: Department of Statistics, Census of Population and Dwellings, 1981

TABLE 11: *Proportions* of Males/Females in Selected Religious Groups by Sector of Employment, New Zealand, 1981*

	PUBLIC SECTOR		PRIVATE SECTOR	
	M	F	M	F
Anglican	24.2	29.7	72.9	65.8
Presbyterian	22.0	29.7	75.7	66.3
Roman Catholic	25.4	30.8	70.3	63.2
Methodist	24.4	27.8	71.8	66.9
Baptist	26.3	33.0	70.5	62.7
Humanist	47.1	48.1	48.8	44.2
Quaker	46.6	54.1	50.0	39.3
Agnostic	36.6	43.2	59.6	50.2
Atheist	29.4	36.6	65.2	55.2
No religion	27.4	33.9	67.1	58.2
Sub-totals	24.2	29.4	67.3	62.1
TOTALS	26.0		68.9	

* Proportions do not total 100 percent because of small percentages of 'Not applicable'
Source: Department of Statistics, Census of Population and Dwellings, 1981

TABLE 12: *Intercensal Changes Between Selected Religious Groups, New Zealand, 1976-1981*

1976 \ 1981	Ang.	Presb.	Cath.	Meth.	Christ.	Ag./Ath.	No reli.	Object	Other	Total
Ang.	81.7	1.7	0.5	0.6	1.2	0.7	2.2	7.0	4.5	100.1
	2447	*51*	*15*	*17*	*36*	*20*	*67*	*209*	*134*	
Presb.	2.8	80.3	0.4	0.7	1.0	0.9	1.9	8.5	3.6	100.1
	56	*1590*	*7*	*14*	*20*	*17*	*37*	*168*	*71*	
Cath.	0.6	0.4	86.5	0.2	1.2	0.4	1.0	6.4	3.4	100.1
	10	*6*	*1367*	*3*	*19*	*6*	*16*	*101*	*53*	
Meth.	3.9	3.0	0.5	71.9	1.8	0.7	2.7	9.9	5.7	100.1
	22	*17*	*3*	*406*	*10*	*4*	*15*	*56*	*32*	
Christ.	10.0	11.9	1.9	1.9	47.8	0	1.9	8.2	16.4	100.0
	16	*19*	*3*	*3*	*76*	*0*	*3*	*13*	*26*	
Ag/Ath	4.5	2.3	2.3	1.1	3.4	50.0	13.6	17.0	5.7	99.9
	4	*2*	*2*	*1*	*3*	*44*	*12*	*15*	*5*	
No Reli.	7.7	4.9	1.5	0.6	5.2	3.4	48.6	17.5	10.5	99.9
	25	*16*	*5*	*2*	*17*	*11*	*158*	*57*	*34*	
Object	11.7	8.2	4.3	2.4	4.5	2.6	9.3	48.0	9.0	100.0
	139	*98*	*51*	*29*	*53*	*31*	*110*	*571*	*107*	
Other	3.8	4.6	1.0	1.5	3.7	0.7	2.8	11.7	70.3	100.1
	40	*48*	*10*	*16*	*38*	*7*	*29*	*122*	*730*	

Source: Nolan, F. et al., 1986: 64

THE ACCESS TRAINING PROGRAMME: ACCUMULATION, LEGITIMATION, SOCIAL CONTROL OR A TROJAN HORSE?

Liz Gordon
Education Department, Massey University

Abstract

Dominant sociological explanations for state policies of post-school training have generally been couched in terms of the state's assumed role in capital accumulation, legitimation of the existing mode and relations of production and the need to ensure social control during periods of high unemployment. This paper argues that none of these rationales in fact explain the development and implementation of the ACCESS Training Programme in New Zealand. Alternative explanations can be found in the concept of the 'trojan horse'. ACCESS has both masked the retreat of the state from intervention in unemployment and has brought with it a particular, Treasury-led, economic perspective that may, or may not, be in the long-term interests of capital.

The ACCESS Training Programme

The ACCESS Training programme was developed between 1984 and 1986, and implemented in 1987. This policy constitutes, in 1989, the single largest labour market intervention by the state. The process of policy development had involved a struggle over the control and direction of ACCESS, which was unequivocally won by those who advocated a labour market focus in transition training, over those who argued for a broader 'educative' approach. These differing approaches had become enshrined in the dominant discourses of the two state agencies of Labour and Education respectively (Gordon, forthcoming), and reflected much broader issues of what role the state should play in society (Lauder 1987). ACCESS became, according to a press release by the Minister of Employment, "oriented to labour market skills" (June 1986), and the objectives of the scheme focused on providing the mechanisms, competencies and vocational skills by which unemployed people would be able to enter or re-enter the labour market.

Earlier transition programmes in New Zealand (Korndorffer 1987, Khan 1986, Nash 1987), and similar programmes in Britain (Dale 1985, Cohen 1984,

Gleeson 1985) have broadly been described as state policies to serve accumulation, legitimation and social control functions for either capital or the state itself. These explanations tend to be based on the theoretical assumption that the state intervenes on behalf of capital in times of crisis, and that the state can know what the needs of capital are. The theoretical problems with such 'relative autonomy' accounts have been addressed elsewhere (Gordon 1989a; this paper will consider the validity of these assumptions for the ACCESS training programme.

The focus on labour market goals makes ACCESS appear, at first glance, as a policy that clearly supports capital's needs for accumulation and legitimation, whilst the focus on the individual superficially supports social control explanations. I will argue that, on the contrary, ACCESS fails to achieve any of these functions. A variety of reasons, relating to the state itself, the social and economic context within which the policy was implemented and the particular ideological forms that dominated state action during this period, are given for these conclusions. The final section re-conceptualises ACCESS as a trojan horse, playing two separate but distinct roles for the state.

ACCESS and unemployment (legitimation)
The focus of legitimation explanations of post-school training policies is on their ability to place the blame for unemployment on the individuals concerned, who are portrayed by the state as lacking the skills, training, education, qualifications or other characteristics needed for participation in the workplace:

> With *the legitimation of the capitalist economy being the primary concern of the state*, attention was drawn away from the purely structural economic causes of the problem, to the problems within the 'labour force', including the 'quality of the individual school leaver' (Khan 1986: 32, my emphasis).

This section will focus on the ability of the ACCESS training programme in practice to legitimate the capitalist economy, within the context of rising unemployment and the pursuit, by the state, of monetarist supply-side economic policies (Gordon, forthcoming).

The period during which the ACCESS training policy was developed, that is between mid-1984 and mid-1986, was one of relatively low, and apparently falling, unemployment. At the end of 1983, the numbers of registered

unemployed had peaked at over 80,000, but a year later that figure had dropped by about 25 percent. Throughout 1985, when the major part of the ACCESS policy was developed, unemployment stayed around the 50,000 mark. In June 1986, when the policy was announced, total registered unemployment was still less than 60,000. Although these figures were very high in historical terms (Khan 1986), they were very much lower than those that would prevail once ACCESS was implemented. Indeed, between the time that the policy was announced and its implementation nine months later, unemployment increased markedly (see Figure 1).

The rising unemployment rate meant that, essentially, there was more unemployment for the state to legitimate. It is my contention that the huge rise in registered unemployment, in itself, ensured that ACCESS could not be a legitimatory policy. The numbers of unemployed people continued to rise once the programme was implemented, placing unprecedented numbers of people on the unemployment register. Hitting nearly 106,000 in December 1987, the total number of registered unemployed was to reach 162,000 by December 1988 (see Figure 2).

In March 1988 the Department of Labour stated that "changes in employment and unemployment were the major issues external to the Department which arose over 1987/88" (Department of Labour, Annual Report 1988). By this stage, the ACCESS programme had been running for one year. At this point, ACCESS constituted the major state response to unemployment, as all fully subsidised job creation programmes had formally been abolished. By the end of 1987 the number of these had fallen away dramatically from previous years. In December 1985 there had been 16,054 people on such schemes; comparative figures for December 1986 and 1987 were 13,331 and 316 respectively.

Numbers involved in partially subsidised schemes had fallen dramatically, too, from 12662 in November 1985 to 6756 in 1986 and 5660 in 1987. Despite the promise of widespread training available to all unemployed people, government funding for ACCESS remained fairly constant from its implementation in April 1987. Furthermore, ACCESS offered less training places each month over the first two years than its predecessor, the Training Assistance Programme, had in its last month, when 17,688 places were made available. There was, therefore, a dramatic reduction in total Government

Figure 1   Numbers registered as unemployed between
   March 1986 and April 1987.

● reg unem

Source: Monthly Employment Operations, Department of Labour

Figure 2   Numbers of registered unemployed,
   June 1987 to December 1988.

● reg unem

Source: Monthly Employment Operations and New Zealand Employment Management
Information Systems (EMIS), Department of Labour.

Gordon

Figure 3   Numbers on ACCESS training programme,
            May 1987 to March 1989

Source: ACCESS Training Support, Wellington

Figure 4   Numbers on ACCESS and numbers of registered unemployed
            May 1987 to March 1989

Source: Monthly Employment Operations and EMIS, Department of Labour, and ACCESS
Training Support.

programmes for the unemployed, at just the time when unemployment was rising at unprecedented rates (see Figure 3).

It can be demonstrated that the rising levels of unemployment during the first two years of ACCESS had little or no effect on the numbers undertaking training during this period. There are two possible explanations for this. Either the level of unemployment made no difference to the demand for ACCESS (which is unlikely), or the programme itself was determined not by demand for the service but by the supply of resources. The ACCESS policy placed the responsibility for the funding of ACCESS with the Minister of Employment, who himself had to gain such funding from a Cabinet which was increasingly attracted to monetarist prescriptions for economic recovery. As such prescriptions held as a central tenet that state intervention should be kept at a minimum, in order that the 'free market' may determine its own levels (Lauder 1987; Codd, Gordon and Harker, forthcoming), it is not surprising that ACCESS participation was largely unaffected by the increase in unemployment.

Beyond the mere provision of ACCESS training, there are four reasons for the inability of the state to sustain an ideology of individual deficit in relation to unemployment. The first is that it is reasonably clear that the Government did not itself (at least to begin with) hold to such an ideology. Various policy proposals that emanated from inside Government (Scott et al 1985), and the Minister of Employment at the Employment Promotion Conference (1985), argued against such a view, claiming that training programmes aimed only to provide skills needed to meet the challenge of technological change, not that the unemployed were without work because they lacked skills.

The second reason that ACCESS could not legitimate unemployment was because of the changing patterns of unemployment during 1987 and 1988 where a major shift took place. Previously, unemployment had grown most substantially amongst the young; those entering the workforce for the first time. However, at this stage older workers began to be much more heavily affected by unemployment, largely through the high number of redundancies that took place. In December 1983, 62 percent of the total unemployed were under 25 years of age; by February 1989 this had fallen to just 42 percent (Monthly Employment Operations and EMIS, Department of Labour). The high number of relatively skilled workers who were now unemployed

mitigated against any 'individual deficit' explanations of unemployment; the older people who became newly unemployed were very clearly victims of structural economic factors.

The third reason that ACCESS failed to legitimate unemployment was inherent in the supply-side nature of the policy itself. ACCESS programmes were not allowed to increase along with unemployment. If they had done so, a case could have been made that unemployed people needed training; and that increased levels of unemployment required increased training input. The constant level of supply of funding for ACCESS programmes reinforced the reality that ACCESS was a small programme offering a few options to a decreasing percentage of unemployed people.

Table 1: Unsubsidised employment outcomes for each REAC April 1987 to April 1989

	N.	Percent
Northland	934	19.6
Auckland/Takapuna	1992	29.6
Manukau	1390	23.3
Waikato/Thames VL	1507	20.3
Bay of Plenty	1201	21.1
Tongariro	283	14.0
East Coast	311	18.6
Hawkes Bay	1560	33.2
Taranaki	758	18.5
Wanganui	238	17.0
Manawatu	629	23.9
Horowhenua	122	13.8
Wairarapa	215	17.7
Wellington	929	18.8
Marlborough	252	24.2
Nelson Bays	462	24.0
Canterbury	1846	28.6
West Coast	143	21.2
Aorangi	376	16.8
Otago	697	16.4
Southland	612	16.4
Total	16457	22.4

Source: Hansard supplement, questions and answers, 20.4.89 - 11.5.89 p. 593.

Finally, in order to uphold the legitimation ideology the state would have needed to demonstrate a high level of success in placing ACCESS graduates into work. The actual figures for the first year of the programme are laid out in

Table 1. On average over the whole country, the 'success' rate of ACCESS was only just over 20 percent, and was usually worse in those areas experiencing the highest levels of unemployment. Such an outcome merely reinforced the structural nature of the unemployment situation and argued against any 'individual deficit' in gaining work.

The other side of legitimation is whether the state legitimated its own actions over unemployment by introducing an ACCESS training programme. This is rather a complex issue. On the one hand, the Minister of Employment clearly upheld the view that unemployment could only be solved through an economic recovery, which required that the state minimise its own spending (Press Release, Minister of Employment, 20 July 1988). On the other hand, the unemployment situation became so bad in 1987 and 1988 that politically, the Government was required to do something; and ACCESS was frequently held up as something productive for the state to do to overcome the problem. However, ACCESS did not adequately address the high rate of unemployment at all. Therefore, although this policy would probably not have harmed the Government, it did little to place any faith in the state either.

Where the policy clearly failed to legitimate state actions was in its outcomes. In terms of the Government's criteria, stated in the policy document, the assessment of ACCESS "will focus on outcomes of training". The policy stated that:

> This will be measured on the basis of:
> - an individual trainee's readiness for referral to employment or his/her readiness to undertake further training;
> - the ability of a trainee to undertake additional education; or
> - the ability of a trainee to obtain and keep employment both in the short term and the longer term (Minister of Employment 1986).

The only unequivocal measure of these qualities is the third factor; the ability to get and keep a job. It was further noted that "assessment of the quality of training given will be based on results". According to the results presented in Table 1, the ACCESS programme must clearly be seen to have failed.

This section has concluded that ACCESS cannot be understood as a form of legitimation for either capital or the state itself. In terms of capital, the material conditions exposed any ideological intent in the ACCESS programme as clearly false, as more and more skilled people registered as unemployed and those trained on ACCESS programmes failed to get work. The ACCESS

programme, too, failed by its own criteria, thus undermining any ideological impetus by the state to legitimate its own role.

ACCESS, jobs and employers' needs (accumulation)
There is some evidence that the aim of the ACCESS training policy was to assist capital accumulation during a period in which this was becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. The bulk of the evidence, however, suggests that ACCESS was totally unable to achieve this aim, due to a number of factors that will be discussed below.

The announcement of ACCESS as a vocational training scheme included a number of references to the need to increase capital accumulation:

> Training today is more than just a worthwhile objective, it has become an essential requirement if we are to compete on equal terms with our trading partners and keep up with the increasing rate of change that is occurring in the workplace (Minister of Employment 1986).

In order to remedy this problem, what was needed was good quality training, aimed at and suited to the "clearly identified needs of the local labour market". People were to be trained to fit into those industries that needed trained staff; the role of Regional Employment Advisory Committees (REACs) would be to identify what, in each area, those needs were, and to see them fulfilled.

The notion of the state attempting to fulfil the needs of capitalism is one of the most common Marxist claims (e.g. Althusser 1972; Bowles and Gintis 1976; Freeman-Moir 1981, 1982). It has been argued against in a number of ways within sociology, one of the most common lines of argument being the inability of the state (or capital itself) to know, at a given historical conjuncture, what those needs are:

> In any specific historical situation industry's needs for labour power are themselves extremely complex: these are not so much a question of the 'requirements of capital' as the needs of different, coexisting capitals... There is therefore a problem, of satisfying or approximating to different demands, which is resolved only by political means. State agencies, where these conflicts are condensed, become a site of struggles between different sections of capital (Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1981: 21).

In other words, any specification of the needs of capital by a state agency is a political strategy to maintain that agency's position, and may not be an accurate assessment of capital's position; indeed, given the complexities of

capital and the conflicts of interest that exist within that sphere (for example between small local businesses and multi-national corporations), such an assessment may not ever be possible. Claims for accumulation strategies may owe more, then, to the needs of the state agency making that claim, or to the way the agency perceives capital's needs, than to any actual and unified 'needs' that capital may have.

There is little evidence that the ACCESS training programme in any way assisted capital's need to keep abreast of technological and industrial development on a worldwide basis. Given the duration of the courses, which were mostly between 6 and 26 weeks long, and the low level of skills taught in such courses, most of which had no pre-requisites and required no prior experience, it is difficult to imagine how ACCESS could assist in the 'technology explosion' mentioned by the Minister. As well, the kinds of skills that were in demand were not the same as those that could be taught in ACCESS courses. Catherwood (1985) argues that labour force expansion was needed particularly in the skilled trades area and those industries associated with new technology, whether these be in the manufacturing or the service sectors. He notes:

> The impact of the information revolution has had a very significant effect on employment, both with reference to the work content of specific jobs, and in relation to the pattern of employment... It is in the information sector that new jobs are being created, and where existing jobs are being transformed. These changes are a direct result of the impact of new technology upon the workplace (1985: 42).

The need for training in skilled work underpins Catherwood's arguments; this contrasts greatly with the form of ACCESS as it was implemented, which was unable to offer such skills training. Indeed, post-school training courses have tended to focus on behavioural and attitudinal factors rather than work skills (Raffe 1984; Korndorffer 1987). Further, as Dale notes (1985), the notion of skill is itself a political conception, used more frequently to maintain differentiation within the workforce than to delineate particular individual qualities.

It is likely, then, that the 'needs of capital' arguments put forward in the ACCESS documents owed little or nothing to the real needs of diverse capitals and a lot to the need to provide an attractive political rationale for the ACCESS programme. There is another reason, too, why the Government was unlikely to

Gordon

support real technological development, which lies in the dominant economic approach that was being promoted by Treasury and the Minister of Finance and supported by the Minister of Labour.

The accumulation strategy adopted by the Labour Government, and put into place throughout the state and civil society, was a strict adherence to free-market monetarism. This involved removing all subsidies and other forms of industrial intervention, minimising as far as possible state intervention and expenditure on the state, and relying on the forces of the free market to develop an efficient and productive industrial sector (Treasury 1984,1987; Lauder 1987).

The state strategy put in place to complement this broad approach was, as noted above, a 'structural' supply side approach to state services. Whilst on the one hand aiding this broader vision of capitalist expansion, the same policy ensured that the actual training demands of capital and/or civil society could not be met; as structural policy responds only to supply signals, not demand signals. That is, ACCESS in practice was predicated on state priorities and what the state allowed to be spent, not at all on 'needs'. Thus the policy of ACCESS cannot be considered as an accumulation strategy in itself.

The particular definition of accumulation within monetarist theory thus meant that the less state action or intervention took place, the more likely it would be that an increase in capital accumulation would take place. In ensuring that ACCESS could not, in fact, be an accumulative strategy, the larger state strove to achieve those conditions defined by monetarist theory for a broader increase in capital accumulation, through a reduction in both state services and controls on the 'market'.

The capacity of the state to promote capital accumulation thus depended, according to this theory, on its own inverse development into a minimal interventionist unit. State capacity, defined under Keynesian theory as the ability of the state to intervene in the other sectors of society and to shape needs, becomes redefined under monetarism as the ability to retract from these other spheres.

In a significant reversal of neo-Marxist theory, monetarism sees the state superstructures not as enabling capitalist development but as a heavy load that

capital cannot bear and which must limit its development. This view of the state received some support from various sections of capital; most notably from the NZ Business Roundtable (1987) who represented large-scale, multinational, capital.

It must be concluded that ACCESS cannot be viewed as a policy to aid capital accumulation. Whichever way it is viewed, ACCESS did not achieve this goal. The claims of the Minister that a central aim of ACCESS was to aid such accumulation must be seen as a strategy to gain support for the policy, rather than an expression of the actual or achievable goals of ACCESS.

ACCESS and society (social control and ideology)
The third claim for post-school training programmes in the literature of the sociology of education is that they act as a form of social control. There are two sub-arguments attached to this claim. The first is that the aim of such programmes is to keep unemployed people 'off the streets'; the assumption being that 'on the streets' they could disrupt social order in some way. Thus Dale (1985) states that a post-school training programme in Britain was a political response to the Brixton riots. The second argument relates to the provision of conventional attitudes towards work, which are seen as necessary (it is claimed) whether or not people actually have work. Thus, in the absence of work, individuals must continue to be kept 'work-ready'. This section deals with each of these arguments in turn.

The first meaning of social control is clearly spelled out by Nash (1987: 34):

> Young people in this new transition education are there because they are not wanted by employers and because school has finished with them and because they have finished with school. They would like to be in work but it is cheaper for the state to provide these programmes than it is to provide work. *Some provision has to be made if only because thousands of unemployed young adults cannot possibly be allowed to become an uncontrollable and potentially riotous group.* The essential reason why there is this transition provision at all is thus not the technical necessity of training (still less a commitment to education) but the imperative of social control (my emphasis).

The view that such programmes exist essentially for this purpose appears to be widespread, not only among academics but also among practitioners and young people themselves. Robinson (1987: 59), a transition tutor, remarks:

> I think the real reason behind the courses was to keep a few kids off the streets. Although they weren't on the streets. Maybe the real reason was a genuine wish by the Government; I really don't know.

In fact, there is little evidence at all that social control in the 'keeping them off the streets' sense was considered as either necessary or desirable during the process of the formation of the ACCESS training programme, nor in its implementation. Although the effects of unemployment on crime rates and levels of mental illness (Furnham 1988: 134) was well-documented and well-accepted, it was left to the 'agents of coercion', the police and the courts, to deal with criminal behaviour arising from unemployment. Neither the Government nor the media seemed terribly concerned that unemployment would bring a revolution. As Robinson notes, the kids, on the whole, were not in great evidence 'on the streets' anyway.

As well, at the structural level the ACCESS training programme was incapable in practice of fulfilling this function. The programme, simply, was not big enough to accommodate all potential troublemakers, were these to be defined as all the unemployed or even all the young unemployed. Most of the time, particularly as unemployment rose, only between 10 and 15 percent of the unemployed at any one point attended an ACCESS course (for example, in October 1988, there were 151,803 persons registered as unemployed or on training or work schemes, and 14,156 on ACCESS schemes; (Department of Labour), and, as attendance was voluntary, there was little of the 'coercive' social control apparatus in evidence. Further, there is doubt that the ACCESS courses were long enough (in either hours per day, days per week or number of weeks) or effective enough to prevent 'trouble', should this arise.

There is some evidence to support the claim of social control in the second sense described above; that of teaching young people work attitudes in the absence of work. Korndorffer (1987: 217) outlines clearly the logic behind this view:

> It is claimed that, by promoting the acquisition by students of personal attributes such as discipline, reliability and adaptability, tutors in social and life skills programmes are... ensuring that young people accept uncritically the definitions of how they should live and what they should value.

Certainly, in relation to the vocationally-oriented ACCESS course, there is evidence of this approach:

> ACCESS will provide a wide range of both work related skills and personal skills including basic literacy and numeracy, job search techniques, life skills, self confidence, etc. (Minister of Employment 1986).

All of which, as Korndorffer notes, basically reinforces a view of the jobless young person as deficient in skills. However, she goes on to note that this kind of social control strategy is subverted at the level of practice, in the tutorial room, where the reality of unemployment comes into collision with the official discourse:

> Unless the Department of Labour placed an officer in every social and life skills training classroom, there is no way that they could completely control what goes on in that classroom. The tutors in these classrooms are not 'structural dopes' who simply reproduce a given official curriculum of social and life skills. They are agents who are able to challenge official discourse that defines the students as lacking the attributes and attitudes that will get them jobs, and are able to construct a curriculum in practice that enables the students to gain some control over their lives (1987: 226).

In other words the state is limited in its ability to construct a hegemony and project it downwards into civil society. Civil society has its own sets of common sense, and its own understandings of material conditions, and the state is often unable to alter these. A central reason for this is that the state is clearly not united in its ideologies; the agents at the periphery may challenge the dominant understandings, what Korndorffer calls the 'official discourse', stemming from the centre.

Korndorffer's work was based on a study of the Young Person's Training Programme. By the time ACCESS was instituted, it was already plain that post-school training could not, and did not, turn out lots of well-motivated, work-ready, skilled young people. It is hard to see, then, that this could be the central reason for the ACCESS training programme.

Although the provision of work related attitudes and basic skills was a strong official argument for the ACCESS training programme, there is much evidence that state policy-makers were aware that, under the limited conditions in which ACCESS would operate, this form of social control was unlikely to be very effective. Therefore, as with the notions of accumulation and legitimation, social control is not a convincing argument for state support of the ACCESS training programme.

ACCESS - a trojan horse?

The rejection of these dominant explanations leaves unsolved the reasons why the ACCESS Training Programme was developed and implemented. The

singular lack of success of the policy hardly justifies its continuation, particularly since it now costs around $300 million per year to operate, and yet has seemingly few obvious benefits for either participants or the state. In this section I want to suggest that ACCESS has, in effect, acted as a trojan horse, serving two distinct purposes.

The first sense in which ACCESS acted as a trojan horse was its opportunist role. It replaced the large structure of fully subsidised (and most partially subsidised) job creation programmes, offering not only a new focus for state intervention in unemployment but also a new rationale. The Minister of Employment led a scathing ideological attack on what he called 'make-work' schemes, attacking them as propping up inefficient industries, putting 'real' workers out of work and being far too expensive. The replacement of these schemes by ACCESS would, it was claimed, address the real causes of unemployment; a lack of skills in the workforce. Whether or not ACCESS was able to play its assigned role, then, it certainly fulfilled the political purpose of helping to demolish the ideological basis of the State's traditional interventionist role of creating jobs at times of high unemployment.

As an opportunist vehicle ACCESS was mildly successful. Although opposition to the rationale for the training scheme was widespread amongst community groups and the unemployed, this became focused on the form that state provision would take, rather than the existence (or not) of state intervention. Had no alternative to job creation programmes been developed, with the state blatantly retreating from civil society, the opposition would have been much worse.

ACCESS thus helped to defuse mass opposition to what was, in effect, a huge withdrawal of resources by the state from the area of employment policies, put into place at a time when unemployment was the most pressing political concern of New Zealanders. In 1989 the Minister of Employment noted that:

> Total spending in real terms, in the areas covered by [the employment] strategy... has been falling lately. Indeed, between 1984-85 and 1987-88 real expenditure dropped 34 percent (Minister of Employment 1989).

Under such conditions, the success of ACCESS in appearing to replace previous job schemes was something of an ideological coup. However, this use of ACCESS, although very important in terms of importing and legitimating a

particular policy stance, is not enough to explain the continued adherence to the policy.

ACCESS as a trojan horse did not merely hide the retreat of the state. It also smuggled in a vision of a free market society along the lines developed by Treasury (1984, 1987). Although the state has no major role to play in the free market of monetarism, it can be seen to be useful in helping to foster economic efficiency and economic growth in a deregulated economy, at a time when such growth is in the initial stages. In other words, ACCESS does have a minor role to play in the achievement of Treasury's ideal society, relating to the positioning of ACCESS within particular economic circumstances. Treasury argues that the timing of the implementation of employment and training schemes is crucial to their success:

> If expenditure is made too much in advance of an upturn then the improvements in human capital will have eroded again by the time of the upturn. If expenditure is made too late, then the Government reinforces the cycle of demand for labour, possibly largely wasting public funds (Treasury 1988).

The assumptions about the cyclical, as opposed to the structural, nature of unemployment implied in this passage should be noted. But putting that aside, Treasury then goes on to spell out its analysis of the role of the ACCESS training programme:

> In New Zealand's circumstances, this suggests that the expansion in ACCESS may not have been optimally timed but that the programme may now be coming more into its own as employment opportunities start to open out again (ibid).

So, according to Treasury, the use of ACCESS lies in promoting job skills at a period in which jobs are beginning to once again be created as a result of a broader economic upturn. Its use over the past two years, concomitantly, has been of virtually no value because the economic conditions did not exist by which the programme could have been taken advantage of. As a result, skills learned on ACCESS were wasted and were, over time, depleted. In other words, Treasury believes that ACCESS training did not serve any useful purpose for the state but, given the projected economic upturn, ACCESS may in the future prove useful in providing job skills in an expanding economy. Future ACCESS schemes may serve some accumulation function, it is conjectured, in ways that they have been unable to in the first two years. All this, of course, depends on the correctness of both Treasury's analysis of the

causes of unemployment, and of the predictions that the new, deregulated, economy will provide the conditions for economic recovery.

The arguments used by Treasury contain a number of contradictions relating to the nature of unemployment, the usefulness of ACCESS as a labour market intervention, the transferability of skills from training course to workplace and a number of other factors. It is not my purpose to challenge these here. The central point is that within the dominant monetarist economic philosophy, ACCESS is seen as having a 'labour market' role to play, and that therefore it has some imputed value for the Government (and the state as a whole). It is a trojan horse, employed for purposes other than those it appears to play, and aimed at helping to achieve the kind of social and economic structures that must create precisely the kinds of inequalities which ACCESS was claimed to overcome.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper has been to evaluate the concepts of accumulation, legitimation and social control as an explanation for state action in the development of the ACCESS training programme. Although there is evidence that some accumulation and legitimation functions may be indirectly served through this programme, it can also be argued that these concepts ignore the complexity, contradictions and broad inadequacies of the policy process. Tested against the evidence, it has been shown that these functions have not been well served by the ACCESS training programme, although other benefits may have accrued from the programme which, indirectly, benefit the state, and even more indirectly may, in the future, benefit capital.

The concepts themselves are imprecise and have, in the literature (e.g. Khan 1986), been used far too freely with little regard for the evidence. In particular, the ideological and material struggles within state agencies, and between the central state and its periphery, have often been ignored. The concepts infer some intentional action by the state on behalf of capital, whereas I have argued that such benefit that did accrue under ACCESS has largely been beyond the boundaries of the policy as conceived, and thus can been seen as unintentional. Further, the concepts assume a largely unproblematic relationship between policy development and implementation, which, I have argued, cannot always be upheld within the diverse and dispersed state structures.

Although Treasury has found a way to include ACCESS in its blueprint for a future economy, then, and given that this blueprint argues for the unrestrained forces of capitalism to reign unhindered, it does not follow that ACCESS, particularly in its present form, is a good servant of capitalism. It can be seen, located as it is on the boundaries of the state and civil society, as a continued site of struggle and contestation. The Maori ACCESS programmes, in particular, demonstrate the possibilities for ACCESS to be far more than an accumulatory and legitimatory tool for the dominant economic structures of society. The complexity of the programme, including its regional and ethnic diversity, denies that it has merely one, monetarist, master. Its very failure in terms of job placements emphasises that ACCESS does do other things than get people jobs under conditions of structural unemployment. These factors are not merely offshoots of the policy process; they are built into its structures. It is essential that the theoretical concepts we employ actually intersect with the experiences we seek, as sociologists, to analyse. I have argued in this paper that the concepts of accumulation, legitimation and social control do not adequately explain the ACCESS training programme as a state intervention, and that more complex theoretical tools are needed in our examination of state interventions.

References

Althusser, Louis. 1972. 'Ideology and ideological state apparatuses' in Ben Cosin (ed) Education: Structure and Society. Harmondsworth, Penguin Books.

Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert. 1976. Schooling in Capitalist America. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Business Roundtable (N.Z.). 1987. Better Value for Public Money Wellington, NZ Business Roundtable.

Catherwood, Vince. 1985. Young People, Education and Employment. Wellington, New Zealand Planning Council.

Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. 1981. Unpopular Education. London, Hutchinson and Co.

Codd, John, Gordon, Liz and Harker, Richard. forthcoming. 'Education and the role of the state: devolution and control post-Picot' in Hugh Lauder and Cathy Wylie (eds) Towards Successful Schooling. Falmer Press.

Cohen, Philip. 1984. 'Against the new vocationalism' in Inge Bates et al (eds) Schooling for the Dole? The New Vocationalism. London, MacMillan.

Dale, Roger (ed) 1985. Education, Training and Employment: Towards A New Vocationalism? Oxford and Milton Keynes, Pergamon Press/Open University.

Department of Labour. 1988. Annual Report. Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, G1.

Employment Promotion Conference. 1985. Conference Report. Wellington, Government Printer.

Freeman-Moir, John. 1981. 'Education and work in a capitalist society' PPTA Journal 16,1: 17-21.

Freeman-Moir, John. 1982. 'Capitalist crisis and education in New Zealand'. Paper presented at NZARE Conference, December.

Furnham, Adrian. 1987. 'Youth unemployment: a review of the literature' in David Corson (ed) Education for Work. Palmerston North, Dunmore Press.

Gleeson, Denis. 1985. 'Privatization of industry and nationalization of youth' in Roger Dale (ed) Education, Training and Employment: Towards A New Vocationalism? Oxford and Milton Keynes, Pergamon Press/Open University.

Gordon, Liz. 1989. 'Beyond relative autonomy theories of the state in education'. British Journal of Sociology of Education 10,4.

Gordon, Liz. forthcoming. 'The right way to work'. in Sue Middleton, Alison Jones and John Codd (eds) New Directions in New Zealand's Education Policy. Wellington, Allen and Unwin.

Khan, G.I.A.R. 1986. 'Transition from School to Work'. Delta Research Monograph No. 8.

Korndorffer, Wanda. 1987. 'Social and life skills training in transition education; confidence tricks or really useful knowledge?'. in Wanda Korndorffer (ed) Transition: Perspectives on School to Work in New Zealand. Palmerston North, Dunmore Press: 217-236.

Lauder, Hugh. 1987. 'The New Right and educational policy in New Zealand' New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies, 22,1: 3-23.

Minister of Employment (1986) ACCESS transition and training: The right way to work. Pamphlet.

Minister of Employment (1989) 'The employment strategy'. Wellington, Cabinet Social Equity Committee.

Nash, Roy. 1987. 'Education between school and work' in Wanda Korndorffer (ed) Transition: Perspectives on School to Work in New Zealand. Palmerston North, Dunmore Press: 29-42.

Raffe, David. 1984. 'Youth unemployment and the Manpower Services Commission: 1977-1983' in D. McCrone (ed) Scottish Government Yearbook. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh.

Robinson, Philippa. 1987. 'Sugaring the pill' in Wanda Korndorffer (ed) Transition: Perspectives on School to Work in New Zealand. Palmerston North, Dunmore Press: 45 -62.

Scott, Noel; Austin, Margaret and Mallard, Trevor. 1985. Interim Report of the Government Transition Education Committee. Wellington, NZ Government.

Treasury, The. 1984. Economic Management. Wellington, Government Print.

Treasury, The (1987) Government Management: Brief to the Incoming Government 1987. (Two volumes) Wellington, Government Printer.

Treasury, The (1988) 'Government expenditure and employment'. Unpublished paper.

REVIEW SYMPOSIUM ON:

Miles Fairburn, *The Ideal Society and its Enemies: The Foundations of Modern New Zealand Society 1850-1900* (Auckland University Press, 1989) ISBN 186940 028 3

David Pearson,
Sociology Department, Victoria University

This is a splendidly provocative book fully in keeping with the character of its author! Unlike many social histories of nineteenth century New Zealand which force the reader, if they be so inclined, to distill largely implicit theories from the rich description of the narrative form; Fairburn organises his book within a sternly regimented logic of hypothesis and counter-hypothesis. This has the merit of making arguments explicit and open to counter-factual response, but it also, in my view, imposes a rigidity of form that the author is often unwilling to depart from, even in the face of scanty evidence and contradictions within his arguments.

The breadth and depth of scholarship in this book defy brief outline and critique but, for the benefit of those who have not read the book, let me first attempt a sketchy overview of the book's structure, and secondly, critically respond to some selected aspects of it. The Ideal Society is divided into three sections. In the first, Fairburn considers the ideologies and imagery of mainly male, and wholly Pakeha, commentary on nineteenth century New Zealand, particularly between the 1850s and 1880s. The 'Insiders' view as he calls it, perceives New Zealand as a land of natural plenty, individual virtue, social justice and harmony, prosperity, contentment, purity and autonomy. Such autonomy is conceived in a very individualistic sense, for this Arcadian image of New Zealand reflexively shapes and is shaped by what Fairburn describes as a minimally organised society - an atomised emergent nation-state with limited associational ties and imperfectly forged forms of social control - in sum, a new kind of society wherein external and internal forces combine to promote a departure from the Old World.

That break, Fairburn concedes, was only partial, and also ephemeral in the light of moves towards a more 'settled' social and geographical environment.

Nonetheless, the author contends, the 'Insider' view, must be examined within its own logic and not summarily dismissed as mythical or utopian. This contention, he argues, flies in the face of those historians who have sought to undermine the 'insider' view, depicting it as ideological or just plain wrong.

Attacks on the 'Insider View', Fairburn argues, have taken a variety of forms, Sutch and Eldred-Grigg, for example, are taken to task for imposing a hierarchical model on New Zealand. Viewing it as a society where wealth was in the hands of the few, and economic control underpinned social constraints to the point where elites held paternalistic sway over the masses. Olssen's model of a class-divided New Zealand society within which, admittedly regionally specific, working class communities fostered a degree of solidarity and political action is also caught within Fairburn's critical gaze, as is Jock Phillips' work on male mateship, which Fairburn considers, promotes a (false) view of proletarian camaraderie. Finally, Arnold and Oliver, amongst others, are criticised for their picture of New Zealand as a mosaic of cohesive local communities wherein class lines are crossed or confused and status conformity promotes its own repressive anxieties.

These alternative interpretations are clearly antagonistic on some points but intertwined on others. Most notably, for Fairburn, in terms of their agreement on a continuity of experience from Old to New World - so the insider view fails to recognise or studiously ignores the replication of the evils of 'Home' - and their shared assumption that New Zealand was an 'organised' society. This assumption is the most damning in Fairburn's view, so he sets out to refute it within the terms of the variant models just described. I will return to some aspects of this refutation in a moment. Suffice to say that Fairburn concludes that the 'insider view' is basically correct. Why? Primarily because rapid, sizable, and socially attenuated patterns of immigration between the 1850s and 1880s produced an atomised society. The swift expansion of the frontier, the lack of kinship ties, the dearth of social association amongst scattered, remote and privatised households; above all the high degree of social and geographical mobility and an attendant ideology of individual achievement, undermined hierarchy, displaced class divisions and delayed the eventual emergence of community.

If Arcadian views are essentially correct this is not to say they are unflawed. If New Zealand was a land of material abundance where men and women

frequently managed to shrug off the social and economic fetters of the past, their new lives were hardly idyllic. A highly individualised freedom, Fairburn suggests, had its own rewards but these were often achieved at a price. Loneliness, drunkenness and interpersonal violence were the penalties many paid for social isolation. So the Arcadian ideology had its own in-built contradictions that had to be uneasily confronted, ignored or repressed.

Fairburn provides a provocative and powerful thesis that deserves to be taken very seriously, not least because of the impressive amount of qualitative and quantitative evidence he complies and the assiduous manner with which he displays his arguments. But is the thesis ultimately compelling? Let us have a closer look at two of the 'alternative' models - the class divided and local community variants - before passing judgement.

Fairburn's critique of Erik Olssen and Steven Eldred-Grigg's work is penetrating and persuasive, although it must be said that his conceptualisation of class is as idiosyncratic as the fellow historians he criticises. Sociologists are rightly accused of spending an inordinate amount of time debating the finer points of Marx and Weber, but Fairburn is rather cavalier in my view about even the rudiments of class theory. For example, in an over-brief and sketchy discussion we are told that there are basically three alternative ways of viewing class; through objective measures of material inequity (stratification), the formation or otherwise of class based sub-cultures or communities, and the collective use of power, namely class action. This has echoes of Weber (although I think Lenski is the immediate influence?) but Fairburn does not seem to appreciate the important distinctions between class, social class and status that underpin Weber's work. Indeed, within this genre what Fairburn depicts as alternative conceptions of class are actually different facets of linked processes - class situation, class formation and political action. Marx's model of class is barely mentioned, so students will remain unaware of the importance of debates about distributive and/or productive bases for the conceptualisation of class and the forces that cement or fragment political consciousness and solidarity. This is a very great pity because Fairburn's work would have been enhanced, in my view, if he had drawn on a more rigorous appraisal of interdisciplinary class debates.

Olssen and Eldred-Grigg are both accused, rightly in my opinion, of building a picture of 19th. century New Zealand on fragmentary evidence and essentially

regionally specific vignettes. The dismantling of Olssen's (and Angus's) work on Dunedin is particularly telling. Fairburn convincingly shows that the street directory and electoral roll evidence Olssen draws upon is impressionistic, hence claims of class differentiated residential patterns are only suggestive. Olssen's assertion of working class close-knit associational patterns is shown to be just that - an assertion' whilst the degree of influence of a radical press as a measure of working class radicalism is deemed suspect without any yardstick of its readership.

As Fairburn says, the question historians and sociologists should be asking of class politics in the nineteenth century is not why collective class protest arises but why so little of it even occurred and why its scale was so small? So what are the answers to these pertinent questions? Fairburn puts his money on the extension of the franchise, relative levels of material success, the lack of large conurbations and hence a limited 'critical mass' for class formation, and, of course, transience. Fairburn could have added high rates of occupational mobility, up and down, and the small size of work situations to this list. At this point one expected a balanced appraisal of these factors but Fairburn is intent on pursuing his 'master variable' so much of the remaining chapter is exclusively concerned with transience and the lack of associational life among the itinerant. At this point Jock Phillip's recent work on mateship is subject to critical scrutiny.

Fairburn acknowledges the difficulty of measuring patterns of association amongst a group that left few written illustrations of their activities, and he concedes that Phillips recognises the importance of transience. What concerns Fairburn is Phillips' contention that mateship co-existed with an image of 'men on the move'. Once again imaginative use of quantitative data is drawn upon to refute counter positions. Criminal records, death certificates, Department of Labour surveys are combined with the diaries of casual, transient workers to build up a picture of men divorced from their kin and fellow workers. If mateship existed it was an ephemeral meeting in the pub or shearing shed, not a lasting set of intimate social bonds. But is Fairburn's evidence any more telling than Phillips' - I wonder. Much of Fairburn's statistical evidence is regionally specific, his sample sizes are small and possibly skewed because he does not or cannot provide a reasonable estimate of the population from which they are drawn, and the representativeness of the diaries is open to debate.

All of this sounds carping. Surely we should be applauding an imaginative use of acknowledged fragmentary sources? Quite so, but Fairburn is very assertive in dismissing alternative views based on similarly flimsy evidence. What we are presented with is a suggestive thesis that makes a strong case for recognising the existence of a sizable, transient and only intermittently associative group of men. But is this group so large and influential that it dictates a pattern of nineteenth century New Zealand male mores and society *tout court*? Let us turn to Fairburn's thoughts on the cohesion of local communities before we reach a final verdict.

In the chapter on 'a society of cohesive local communities' Fairburn sets about demolishing the idea that New Zealand in mid to late nineteenth century was made up in Tönniesesque style of a plethora of gemeinschaftlich settlements. Communities whose size, isolation and similitude of aspirations and values supposedly provided a familiar mix of the warmth of primary group support and the rigidity of harsh conformity. And whose egalitarianism, as cause and/or consequence of uniformity, provoked a New Zealand lower middle class status anxiety about not conforming of similar magnitude to the British petit bourgeoisie's angst about not 'getting on'.

Fairburn, not surprisingly by now, is unconvinced by these arguments. In an atomised society close-knit communities must be aberrations not the norm. And so it proves if Fairburn's evidence and arguments are accepted. Community festivals are deemed to be 'too diffuse, fleeting and infrequent' to provide social bonding. The, to quote the author, 'causative evidence of kinlessness' of a predominantly young, single, male, itinerant immigrant population is hardly conductive to communal bonding. An excellent discussion of the available statistics on population clusters and levels of (non) participation in a variety of voluntary associations underpins his argument that neighbourliness is at a premium among social and geographical isolates too concerned with their individualised lives to worry about establishing cohesive and lasting formal associations.

I found this chapter broadly convincing, not least because it squares with my Johnsonville study and Franklin's work on Wellington province. Curiously, however, Fairburn does not allude to either of these sources (other than brief reference to my transience figures) to support his overall thesis. And yet perhaps this omission is not so surprising because Fairburn is intent on carving

out a picture of the non-settler population. He does enter the city and suburbs occasionally, but he is far more at home in the rural back blocks. This is at one and the same time the greatest strength and weakness of his book. On the one hand we are presented with a forceful and ultimately persuasive thesis, in my view, that a significant proportion of New Zealand society was so fluid and fragmented that it had major ramifications for the social organisation and values of an emergent nation-state. We enter a world that some have certainly portrayed before but not in such detail and with such attention to explicit theorisation of an important feature of a formative period of New Zealand history. On the other hand the question remains begging as to whether Fairburn has not fallen into the trap of some of his adversaries. By an over forceful use of one thread of argument the tapestry of social variation becomes over-simplified. The broad sweeps of colour used to full in an under-explored part of the canvas overpowers the delicate shadings required to gain a sensitive impression of the whole picture.

Fairburn demonstrates that between a third and a half of the Pakeha population lived in semi or complete isolation and were constantly on the move during the period of his study. But this, of course, equally suggests, that between two thirds and a half of this population did not. We cannot assume that those who were 'settled' in boroughs, townships or villages up to the 1880s lived in solitary communities - the 'Johnsonville' model with all its limitations still attests to that. But there is a process of incipient settlement visible which fits, I would assert, rather better with the *post*-1880s period.

Fairburn acknowledges that the later we get in the nineteenth century the more likely it is that social cohesion is found. But how do we move from a picture of extreme atomism to community in such a short time?

Fairburn acknowledges that there were limits to chaos. The very fluidity of society inhibited collective conflict. A strong state, reflecting both the beneficent and repressive actions of government maintained control, whilst the very presence of the 'rough' reinforced the boundaries and normative influence of the 'respectable'. This argument is convincing but merely underlines by unease about the possibility that Fairburn has overstressed the degree of atomism in society. The author contends that a small group of wealthy landowners had sufficient leisure to manage the country in the early days of colonisation and this set the scene for the eventual establishment of a

centralised state. But how was state control administered? The image of a small, leisured class ruling over a chaotic society that swiftly transforms itself in a matter of decades into a set of cohesive communities, stretches the imagination. Is it more plausible that amidst the transience was settlement. Did not the small cities and townships contain sufficient small landowners and petty proprietors to establish local institutions that once in place persisted despite the consistency of high levels of transience. Cannot one see the establishment of social structural positions amidst changes in the personnel that flows through them? For example, if Fairburn had looked more closely at the transience figures in Johnsonville he would have seen that the highest levels were certainly in the late nineteenth century, but the overall level of transience hardly dipped below 50% right through to the 1960s. Voluntary associations came and went, players and officials were constantly changing, but there is also a consistent pattern of individuals who remain in the district, who dominate associational life, who provide the consistency of membership to keep institutions going. Many families move, but some establish generational ties to the land, to small businesses, to the district, and promote a real or imagined sense of local community. It only requires a core of such families, I would argue, to create and recreate a semblance of association and identity. Fairburn hints at the importance of this core, he acknowledges that all was not in flux, but in order to establish his position he devalues the presence of incipient social order that played a vital part in finally promoting the very society that Fairburn describes after the 1880s. This society only moved through a transitory stage of 'community' before reaching, in its own limited and relative terms, the mass society of other capitalist formations. And here, of course, we need to be very wary about over looking the importance of regionalism and urban/rural differences. Fairburn is much attracted to the 'Littledene' exemplar of community change, but this study for all its elegance of local portraiture provides few insights into the historical processes that produced Somerset's exclusively rural township snapshot of the 1930s (Hall et al.).

Fairburn's book, in my view, is most valuable in providing a corrective to some over-simple conceptualisations of the *interaction* between different social forms. It is not that he has replaced one vision of New Zealand society with another; it is that he demonstrates, although I suspect partly unwittingly, that settler societies are social amalgams that arise out of the contradictions between competing social formations that are in dynamic co-existence within

the same time frame. We do not have a simple model of colonial replication, nor do we have any sense of a unique society. What we find is a complex dissonance between Old and New Worlds and the construction and reconstruction of many fronts, some of which Fairburn understandably leaves aside, of an original synthesis. The major question that Fairburn leaves us with, although it is one that I infer rather than he directly implies, is - what is society? Sociologists, not surprisingly given their origins and the industrial milieu from which their discipline is derived, have tended to devote most attention to questions of social order and conflict in what Fairburn would presumably describe as maximally organised societies. Perhaps it is time for those in societies with more minimalist ancestries to stake a theoretical claim in this debate. If so, the cross-fertilisation of ideas that spring from historical and sociological work will be an essential part of this endeavour. Miles Fairburn has made a splendid contribution to the task ahead.

****

Colin Davis
History Department, Massey University

History might be defined as the pathological dimension of social enquiry. Its concern is with worlds we have lost, their morbidity and demise. It raises life in order, eventually, to explain the causes of death and - if all goes well - of renewal, rebirth, renaissance. The pathologist's final verdict, if authoritative, lays ghosts to rest though our sense of self and society continues to be haunted by the shades of our predecessors.

This is a magnificent exercise in historical pathology; one of the most important and exciting books of New Zealand social history. It teems with ideas, is fertile in explanatory hypotheses, innovative in methodology and resourceful in the testing of argument and hypothesis. It embraces an extraordinary range of historical documentation and of current, international historical literature. Mercifully, given the breadth of its subject and the drive of its author, it is tautly constructed; a short book for the range of matter it covers; crisp and direct in its writing. It is an attempt to turn the foundations of modern New Zealand inside out; a work of deep irony. Undoubtedly, it took nerve to write.

As an outsider is in a position to observe, assessment of the book will not be easy. Partly, (and it is an important part) this is because New Zealanders recognise key elements of their social identity in the book, but are disconcerted by its juxtapositions and resist its subsumption of their local, specific, even familial, backgrounds in its sweeping generalisations. Like all good, ambitious history, it is an unsettling work. Secondly, assessment will not be easy because the book is simultaneously about *what* the content and contours of colonial pakeha society were and also a statement about *how* that social substance may be discovered. Form and substance are of equal importance. Again, Fairburn has had the intellectual honesty to put his methodological cards and prior assumptions on the table and he has the right to expect the same from his critics, even those in a profession often smug in its claim to narrative pragmatism. Whether he will get his critical entitlement is another matter. Finally, the public pathologist's proof depends on a forensic art and Fairburn, in Popperian manner, is insistent on social history's forensic responsibilities, clarity about categories and scrupulous tests of falsification and demonstration. One aspect of the book is a polite but cumulative and dreadful warning against the sin of untested assumption. Eldred-Grigg, Oliver, Gardner, Arnold, Olssen and Phillips are all amongst those called to this penitential stool. Fairburn, in other words, sets a high standard for himself and for others, including his critics.

In one of the most influential social histories of the last twenty years, entitled simply *France 1848-1945* (2 vols., 1973-77), Theodore Zeldin rejected the history of those features of French social life which divided or differentiated people in favour of the pursuit of their "common beliefs, attitudes and values". (Zeldin I, 2) Zeldin wanted to discover the essence of Frenchness. His method was what was once called the resoluto-compositive method. "I have tried", he wrote, "to disentangle the different elements and aspects of French life, and to study each independently and in its interrelationships. I hope that in this way the generalisations made about France will as it were come loose, that it will be possible to see how they were invented, and by whom, and what they represent and what conceal". (I, 78) Fairburn's object of enquiry is a parallel one: "the special collection of factors which are the ingredients of national character". (Fairburn, 11) It is important to be clear that his aim is not a comprehensive history of even pakeha colonial society in New Zealand 1850-1900, but the discovery of what was *distinctive* about that society and its experience. We may, of course, reject the whole enterprise but, *once we*

accept his terms of reference, it is no good pointing to the omission of this or that unless the critic so doing can show that what is omitted contributed to national *distinctiveness* in ways which Fairburn does not recognise.

While his objectives may be parallel to Zeldin's, Fairburn's method is radically different. Like many of the classical sociologists and some contemporary social historians (for example Stone, Cannon, Beckett on aristocratic society), Fairburn seeks the key to a nation's distinctiveness in the "governing category" of its social life. "... a governing category in social history must be able to discern characteristics in a society which were both fundamental and distinctive." (12) What the protestant ethic was to Max Weber's vision of the foundations of industrial society in the West, so social atomisation is to Fairburn's vision of the foundations of modern New Zealand society. "Bondlessness was central to colonial life." (11) But this is not the whole story, for, set against the reality of atomisation, isolation, bondlessness and social desolation is the colonists' vision of New Zealand as a Land of Goshen, a happy place of light and plenty; in the terms Fairburn uses, an Arcadia. It is in the ironic counterpoint of reality and image running through the period of colonial society's foundation that he claims New Zealand distinctiveness can be found and, with its discovery, a large cluster of peculiarly New Zealand institutions be explained: the combination of social disorder and political stability; the New Zealand family; the precocious welfare state; kiwi self-repression; the espousal of a petit-bourgeois egalitarianism. Those who dismiss the notion of kiwi distinctiveness can, of course, at this point dismiss the whole argument. Those who do not will have to wrestle with this book's categories, methods and arguments, and if they reject them come up with better. In that sense, Fairburn has set the agenda for the nationalist history of white New Zealand.

In his hands, it is a markedly revisionist agenda. Whereas other historians have found colonial society rapidly reproducing constricting and conformist social patterns of hierarchy, class or community, Fairburn sweeps these orthodoxies aside to uncover a minimally articulated society. The informing vision of its dislocated members was of a natural abundance of opportunity requiring only people of moderate appetite and sturdy virtue to realise its social potential. It was a context in which possessive individualism could achieve a competency, 'get on', without acquiring obligations to social superiors, extensive commitments to social equals or indebtedness to a sustaining and

enabling community. Historians who have seen in Victorian New Zealand the emergence of vertical social bonding (hierarchy, paternalism and deference), or horizontal social bonding (class and class conflict, or mateship and macho culture) or homogeneous regional conformity (community) have, Fairburn argues with considerable force and penetration, got it wrong. Pakeha colonial society was minimally articulated. Beyond the family, unattainable by many, there was little if anything. Man alone (in a society preponderantly masculine) enjoyed freedom from deference, status anxiety, self repression, dependence and conformity. But at a price. The price was loneliness, drunkenness, high rates of crime, violence and litigation; a natural Hobbesian world of atoms in collision, the logical outcome of which would be the artifice and centralised authority of Leviathan.

Early critics have bemoaned the book's lack of extended treatment of Maori and women in later nineteenth century New Zealand. This is to miss the point and to fail to recognise how Fairburn has pre-empted such criticism. First, he is not attempting a comprehensive social history of New Zealand 1850-1900. Maori society stood in antithesis to the social atomisation of pakeha society. It is hard to see how its study could contribute to an understanding of European bondlessness. The use of imperial troops in the Anglo-Maori wars may even have obviated the need for greater social cohesion amongst the settlers. Tribal society in its diverse manifestations was anything but minimally articulated. There obviously is an interesting history of the interplay between atomised and integrated cultures to be written, but Fairburn justifiably has not attempted it here and it may be doubted whether anyone is capable of meeting its bicultural demands at this point in time. Those who feel that Fairburn has unjustifiably ignored gender as an explanatory category may reasonably be asked to show how the gender category might enhance the explanation of colonial society's distinctiveness and its bondlessness. As far as I am aware, that analysis has yet to be attempted. On the other hand, women do feature recurrently in the analysis and Fairburn has constructive things to say about single women and the workforce, women and the virtuous family, deserted wives, violence against women, wives as household managers, the absence of women in kinship groups, women and associational networks, women and loneliness, women and alcohol, and gender ratios and social disorder. It is hardly a neglected subject.

If we accept, as serious historians and social scientists must, Fairburn's preference for focussed empiricism over unfocussed empiricism, the tests of

his achievement must be the validity and explanatory force of the focus and the quality of the empiricism. Others, better qualified than I, can more adequately comment on the latter. In the rest of this review I want to assess each of the parts of Fairburn's book in terms of the appropriateness of the focus, or categories, and the types of evidence he used in relation to it.

Part One is a depiction of the contemporary social perception of later nineteenth century New Zealand, what Fairburn calls "a comprehensive mental picture" (11) of what the prospect of colonisation offered. From promotional literature, journals, correspondence, guidebooks, newspapers and pseudo-scientific accounts of the colony he builds an image of a land of abundant natural opportunities for material independence to be achieved by those with a will and persistence. These opportunities were perceived as coming from the hand of nature, not culture. Accordingly their recipients did not consider themselves as beholden to either a beneficent hierarchy, a magnanimous class or community. Independent and equal in the opportunity the new land bestowed, their only dependence was on the bounty of nature and their own virtu. For migrants without property it was the countryside which offered readiest access to such opportunities and the rural apprenticeship of the rapidly moving frontier the surest path to a competency and "getting on". For the propertied newcomer what Fairburn calls the "middle class paradise" offered a virtually crimeless society, minimal social obligations and organisation, freedom from the status anxieties of the old world and a natural bounty which allowed the newcomer to pursue his economic self-interest without conflict with his neighbours.

The picture thus derived from the contemporary literature is overall a compelling one and most New Zealanders will recognise traces of it persisting down into the public rhetoric of our own day. With the culling of evidence from diverse contemporary accounts inevitably the essence of these exercises . in reconstructing *mentalité*, there can never be final proof. Exceptions will invariably be found. The historian has to rely on an act of recognition by the informed reader and a sense of congruence between this part of the historiographical design and the rest of it. There are, however, three unresolved problems with Fairburn's focus here. One is that he presents a complex, interlocking and integrated ideology of an idealised colony. The parts may be well documented but is the whole? Does any one contemporary expression embrace it as a total system? How pervasive was the system of

thought *in toto*? While the colonial reality of the partial perceptions is documented, Fairburn uses the ideology as an integrated system throughout his book and his adoption of the Arcadian template encourages this usage. The justification for this in the observable perceptions of colonial settlers is never made clear. Secondly, from someone who inveighs against the aptness of the category of class in the colonial context, it is startling to see the bifurcation of the Arcadian myth into the 'Labourer's Paradise' and the *Middle-Class Paradise*'. This seems an unnecessary and confusing retreat to semantic orthodoxies by someone who otherwise has a ruthless way with linguistic imprecision and categoric anachronism. Fairburn's defence might be that here he is dealing with perceptions, elsewhere, in denying the significance of class in colonial New Zealand, he is dealing with reality. But there are substantial problems with the perception as presented in Chapter III. Can the notion of a middle class social ideal - as a class ideal - be reduced solely to the absence of status anxiety, conflict and snobbery? Behind the struggle over forms are also middle class values of substance relating to education, culture, civilisation, however socially self-serving we might see those values to be. The problem with the middle class paradise in Fairburn's depiction is that what it offers the middle class is the ultimate extinction of middle class identity. It is intriguing that the 'Labourer's Paradise' offered something which Fairburn continues to see as reflecting truths about colonial society: opportunity, apprenticeship and success for the striver after material independence. The 'Middle Class Paradise' by contrast offered what he goes on to show as chimaeras - absence of crime, natural harmony and an absence of anxiety. The difficulty in developing the description of the 'Labourer's Paradise' is, as he acknowledges (44-5), that of dependence on middle-class voices. He promises to overcome this by considering the behavioural evidence of the labourers' ideal in the following chapter but this never materialises there. Perhaps the problem is that the behavioural evidence which Fairburn does eventually adduce in plenty is evidence not of Eden but of the Fall.

Part Two presents (only to overthrow) those interpretations of New Zealand colonial history which see the evils of the New World as arising from the serpent imported from the Old. Fairburn concedes that, to set against equality of opportunity, there may have been an inequality of resource distribution and an absence of welfare institutions which might be seen as amongst the preconditions of the hierarchical social order. But where, he asks, were the other underpinnings of such an order: mass deprivation; blocked mobility;

underemployment; over-population; a code of rank; conspicuous employment of surplus labour; a bloated population of able, adult paupers; and illiberal ideologies and political institutions? The notions of W.B. Sutch, John Martin and Stevan Eldred-Grigg, that blocked mobility and economic dependence produced vertical bonding, are shattered. Even hostile contemporary observers noted the colonials' brusque and determined rejection of the menial and obsequious. Fairburn argues, to some effect, that domestic service was much less frequent and on a smaller scale than was the case in comparable and Old World societies. But this hardly, as it were, deals adequately with the servant problem. The categories and quantifications can be illuminated with much more sophisticated treatment as they are, for example, in Ann Kussmaul's *Servants in Husbandry in Early Modern England*. Much more convincing is Fairburn's demonstration of the comparatively high incidence and wide dispersion of real property ownership in the colony. A competency, the *sine qua non* of independence, was accessible and remained so into the so-called 'Long Depression'. Abundant opportunities for 'penny capitalism', a sex-ratio which strengthened women's position on the marriage market, and a strong demand for labour through to the 1890s bolstered the sense of independent masterlessness, of possessive individualism.

Against the views of Erik Olssen and others that these individuals formed horizontal bonds in class affiliations, Fairburn offers four objections in what cumulatively amounts to a telling challenge. He casts substantial doubt on the view that spatial differentiation of urban residence on a class basis had reached significant proportions in this period. He points to low and ephemeral union participation, strong vertical social mobility and high rates of transience as indicators of low class cohesion. The nineteenth century colonial labourer realistically espoused a culture of individualism rather than one of class consciousness. Class division may have existed but Kiwi possessive individualism conceded little to class loyalty (124).

Another form of horizontal bonding in rural colonial society has been suggested in J.O.C. Phillips' vision of 'mateship' amongst male colonists, a mateship comparable to that elaborated by Russel Ward in *The Australian Legend*. Against this Fairburn begins to set the evidence of solitariness, of bondlessness, which is to be the main theme of the book from this point. The comparative rarity of complicity in offending, the absence of informed

associates of dead bachelors, the anonymity of the drowned, the fragility of rural unionism, the weakness of informal support structures for single males in difficulty are all evoked in a section typical of the author's evidential resourcefulness. He suggests that 'mate' in the colonial New Zealand lexicon was a far more neutral term than those who see it as having an associational mystique have urged. Why, he asks in concluding this argument, should patterns of male violence decline so sharply in the late nineteenth century if an enduring male culture of machoism had been established as securely as Phillips suggests? Work and transience, in their patterns of solitariness, undermined the bonds of mateship just as they jeopardised all other associational patterns.

This brings us to the final obstacle to Fairburn's minimally articulated colonial society, the view that nineteenth century pakeha New Zealand rapidly became a society of 'cohesive local communities'. We should look for the evidence of such communities, he suggests, in what we would anticipate to be their associational underpinnings: ritual affirmations of community solidarity; kinship networks; a strong sense of neighbourhood and neighbourliness; and high rates of participation in voluntary organisations. All are found wanting in colonial society. Proving the negative in these cases is never easy nor conclusive. Of course, there were communal festivals, neighbours and kin did relate to one another, voluntary organisations were founded and some persisted. What is at issue is the significance of community as a "governing category" for a full understanding of colonial New Zealand. Fairburn has made a *prima facie* case for the tenuousness of the sense of community in these years, for its marginality in terms of the experience of most colonists. Those who wish to rebut his case will have to establish the tests and marshal the evidence by which their assertions can be verified.

In Part Three of the book Fairburn attempts to show that, as the colonial vision promised, New Zealand was indeed a realm of freedom, opportunity and self-reliance but that its idealisation was flawed by the dark side, the costs of its minimalisation of associational frameworks. In one of the most moving and skillfully constructed sections of the book (195-206) he evokes the loneliness of colonial life, the significance of the Old World "home" as a surrogate community and the stratagems of colonists seeking to subdue the demons of solitude. It is a striking reminder that in our quest for the social we always do well to reflect on its antithesis, the solitary. Alcohol consumption, rates of

conviction for drunkenness, interpersonal violence and civil litigation jointly reinforce the impression of a society deficient in mutually understood and accepted codes and lacking in mediatory networks. A convincing case is made for bondlessness, atomisation as a significant feature of the colonial social landscape. Not content with this, Fairburn next turns to ask what were the constraints on this fragmentation. He finds them first ironically in social atomisation itself. The footloose solitaries of colonial New Zealand were too transient to "settle" for sustained conflict, too bondless to engage in collective disorder. Government action to defuse and to repress also had its effect, and in what I regard as one of the least satisfactory sections of the book (possibly because it assumes familiarity with an article of his published in *Historical Studies* 21: 1985) Fairburn argues for a growing self-repression reinforced by the rising evocation of the "folk devil" of the vagrant.

Between the 1890s and the 1920s New Zealand settled down. Demographically, the population became more mature, normalised; frontier expansion slowed; population densities increased; work and leisure became standardised; and all of this facilitated more various and intense participation in social organisations and networks.

There can be no doubt that Fairburn has forcefully reminded New Zealanders of the costs and difficulties of integrating a new colonial society, costs and difficulties which other historians have treated too lightly. Like Bernard Bailyn, he charts the disintegration of civilisation at the periphery of Empire. But, as he would be the first to acknowledge, questions remain. Are the foundations of modern New Zealand society to be found in a minimally articulated frontier society where the rootless, single, adult male looms large, or in the settling of a social pattern that Fairburn prefigures for the 1890s to 1920s? To put it another way, is it in his *arriviste* "man alone" or in Sir Keith Sinclair's "native born" that we should look for the builders of the familiar social pattern of modern New Zealand? To what extent, as David Thomson has asked, are the drunkenness, violence and conflict of colonial society the product of a demographic sub-group - the single, young, adult male - and reflective of that group's statistical significance, rather than of society as a whole and its broader interrelationships? In other words, we come back to the problem of the governing category and the question as to whether, small and fluid as it was, pakeha colonial society still had the capacity for a more pluralistic social experience than may usefully be subsumed under one governing category.

Miles Fairburn has written a powerful, a gripping and above all an ambitious work which should be welcomed by all those who believe that a dynamic sense of history has much to contribute to a mature national consciousness. Without such ambition, vision and challenging rigour, the work of historians is all too readily condemned as too arid and anaemic to matter. He has located the sources of some of the powerful contradictions which have gripped New Zealand society and politics in the last forty years as well as in its colonial crucible. That others are beyond his scope or elude his grasp is hardly to be wondered at in a society of such rich ambivalences and manifold confusions. For what we have been given - social scientists and historians alike - we should be truly thankful.

****

Kwen Fee Lian.
Sociology Department, Victoria University

Fairburn begins by examining what he describes as the insider's view of the social organisation of New Zealand in the 19th. century. The insider's view is the idealised picture European colonists had of their new society and consists of two views - the conception of the labourer's paradise and the middle-class paradise. In painting the two pictures of paradise the author relies on the same group of writers - Cooper, Hursthouse, Paul, Bathgate, Buller, Clayden and Simmons, presumably middle-class colonial idealists. We are not told whether they were travellers to New Zealand, lived here for a short duration or settled permanently.

Not surprisingly, the picture painted is an idyllic one. It was a very middle class perception of what New Zealand had to offer for intending British migrants. For the labouring class, Arcadia offered them the opportunity to free themselves of the paternal ties of a hierarchical society. Anyone from this class who possessed the qualities of hard work and thrift could get on in the new world. It was the stereotypical middle class expectation of what the labouring class should be doing with their lives. For the middle class the new world was a society free of crime, free from status anxiety and it offered the freedom to pursue one's natural inclinations. In sum, the perception of paradise in New Zealand was a middle-class reaction to the negative features of the old world.

The use of the insider's view in this book is questionable for several reasons. Firstly, the author does not make it clear that this was a very select middle class view. There is a weak attempt to argue that this view was supported by the labouring class in New Zealand. The evidence is scanty and unconvincing. Secondly, the case for making the distinction between the labouring class and the middle class is not made. Who are the labouring classes and who are the middle classes in 19th. century New Zealand - a society, which the author himself argues was characterised by rapid geographical and social mobility? The distinction existed only in the minds of this same group of people who saw New Zealand from the vantage of Victorian discontent. Hence the distinction between the labourers and middle class paradise is meaningless when it is derived from the same source. Thirdly, the so-called insider's view is misleading. It was in fact the outsiders' view of New Zealand, who may or may not have stayed long and wrote because they were fired by the promises of colonization in the 19th. century. For me, the more interesting issues are - what were the social backgrounds of these people who painted this idyllic vision of New Zealand? Why did they paint such a vision? Were they influential in encouraging British settlement in New Zealand?

In part III, Fairburn sets up three models of 19th. century colonial society which modern historians have been responsible for perpetuating. His use of models in this book creates conceptual confusion and methodological difficulties. The first model is the hierarchal society - a society based on paternalistic ties, master-servant relations and patron-client obligations all of which underpin the vertical bonding of such a social organisation. He cites Sutch and Eldred-Grigg as the propagators of this model. The straw man is nicely set up for Fairburn to demolish. It is difficult to consider seriously the proposition that 19th. century colonial society bore some resemblance of a patron-client society. Even if the case was made, Sutch and Eldred-Grigg are weak and unconvincing representatives of such a model. Having set up the illusion, it does not take much for the author to demolish it - New Zealand's demography, high rate of land-ownership, opportunities for petty enterprise, the resourceful and mobile character of wage workers, low population pressure on resources and rising level of national income combined to work against the emergence of such a hierarchical society.

In outlining the second model, a class-divided society, Fairburn takes a Marxist conception of class. Class divisions exist -

a.   in a situation where people who have the same economic power
      associate among themselves and forge a sub-culture of its own - a class
      in itself.
b.   when those with greater economic power exercise control and use of
      resources for their own interests (presumably owners of capital) as
      opposed to manual workers - a class for itself.

The author's understanding of class division is a dichotomous model and the
relationship between the two classes is one of antagonism and conflict.

In contrast to a hierarchical social organisation which encourages vertical
bonding or interaction, a class-divided society engenders horizontal bonding.
There are two objections to the use of the model. Firstly, the criterion used by
the author to distinguish between the two models is the nature of association or
bonding. There is no rationale for using this criterion. For example, it is
possible to distinguish the two models if one wants to highlight the argument
that a hierarchical society is based on status, whereas a class-divided society is
based on ownership or property relations (as the author suggests in his
conception of a class-divided society). This is not the intention of the author.
Instead the two models are conflated causing conceptual confusion.

Secondly, if as Olssen argues, there is an urban working class sub-culture
which has spawned a strong sense of class identity, what is the other class (in
the two classes which Fairburn assumes in his model)? Is the other class the
middle class or a small group of owners of capital? Or is colonial society a
theoretically distinguishable but empirically indistinguishable working
class/middle class society whose lines are blurred by the transience of the
labouring population and social/geographical mobility, for which the author
marshals an impressive amount of evidence.

In the third model, Fairburn postulates that the colony produced cohesive local
communities - tightly knit, interlocking ties which cut across boundaries of
wealth and income, breeding a life of oppressive status conformity. I have two
objections to Fairburn's conceptualisation of the local community. Firstly, it is
extreme and simplistic. Does the emergence of strong local communities
necessarily preclude the formation of divisions in society? In the 1880's and
1890's, as Hamer argues, a significant part of colonial and Liberal politics
revolved around town and country divisions - whether the town was dependent

on the country or vice-versa. Local communities are not, as the author suggests, monolithic units which produced a uniform conformity in colonial society. Local communities are significant sites of interaction and association but cannot be viewed in isolation from their economic interests and regional/national considerations. They are far more heterogeneous than we are led to believe.

Secondly, if we accept the flow of interaction as the criterion for distinguishing the three models, what is the nature of social interaction/bonding in local communities which make it distinct? Does vertical bonding not exist in local communities? Does horizontal bonding not exist in local communities? Are there no elements of hierarchy or class divisions in local communities?

The author's use of the three models not only lacks conceptual clarity but creates serious methodological difficulties. Firstly, they are treated as if they are mutually exclusive models. In reality there are elements of all three in the way in which Pakeha New Zealand lived their lives. Secondly, in the best Weberian tradition, Fairburn has admirably used the ideal type in his models to accentuate one-sidedly certain characteristics. This is done for the purpose of comparing the model with the empirical evidence to establish its similarities or divergences and thereby its validity. But ideal types or models, to be useful, must be 'objectively possible' i.e. they must approximate reality. The author's use of models is too far removed from reality and exaggerated to serve such a purpose.

Thirdly, the selection and accentuation of certain characteristics in models should not be done arbitrarily but must form a coherent intellectual construction based on a clear rationale. In the absence of such a rationale for each of the models developed, the use of models in examining the work of the modern historians is misdirected. The attribution of such models to these historians can arguably misrepresent their work. What Fairburn has done is to question the assumptions of the historians' work, not the models they were supposedly working with. I hasten to add that the author's use of the model of atomization in analysing 19th. century colonial society is more in spirit with the original purpose in which the use of models or the ideal type in the socio-historical sciences was conceived.

Having made what he thinks is a successful assault on the three interpretations of colonial history by modern historians, Fairburn in the final section attempts

to provide evidence of a society that is atomized. Colonial society in the 19th. century is a gravely deficient social organisation. Loose and transient relations are widespread. Manifestations of an atomized society appear in pathological disorders - the extent of loneliness, drunkenness, interpersonal violence and civil litigation.

What, you may well ask, is unique about such phenomena? Are not loneliness, drunkenness and interpersonal violence found in all societies in frontier circumstances? How does the author come to the startling conclusion that such disorders are pathological and significantly so in New Zealand? He does this by comparing the conviction rates for drunkenness, rates of homicide charges and rates of charges for wounding and common assault between New Zealand and Britain. He found all the rates consistently higher in New Zealand than in Britain for the same period.

The issue which Fairburn fails to address is why does he consider Britain to be the yardstick for determining whether a society has abnormal or pathological rates of drunkenness and interpersonal violence. Was Britain a settler society between 1850 and 1890? Is there not better justification to use Australia or Canada or South Africa which were settler societies with some degree of comparability?

Readers are then faced with the question - when are rates of convictions for drunkenness, homicide charges and charges for wounding and common assault normal and when are they pathological? It is difficult to resist Durkheim's pronouncements on this subject. He argues that when a social phenomenon is to be found within all or the majority of societies of the same type, then it can be treated as normal. I do not want to understate the difficulties of classifying societies in the way that Durkheim recommends. Notwithstanding this difficulty, it is possible to argue that if all or the majority of colonial societies of the settler type show a decline in the rates of convictions and charges for the offences discussed whilst New Zealand show an increase, then the incidence of drunkenness and interpersonal violence is a pathological condition in this society and a manifestation of a deficient social organisation. In the absence of such a methodological justification, Fairburn's argument that 19th. century Pakeha society was atomized and pathological must remain a hypothesis.
I want, however, to end on a positive note. All historians work within an implicit or explicit model which also contains assumptions they make about a

particular society, culture and period. Fairburn has challenged the assumptions that modern historians make about Pakeha society in the 19th century. Such assumptions, if left unquestioned, become interwoven into the process of historical writing and become the baseline of subsequent scholarship. In this sense, the book is a valuable contribution to colonial historiography.

Secondly, Fairburn has made some bold and creative interpretive leaps in his work. He has unashamedly identified his assumptions about colonial society and unashamedly produced his interpretive model. In doing so, he has laid himself open to attacks. New Zealand history is richer and more exciting for it. Notwithstanding the conceptual and methodological difficulties in the work, his book is a contribution to New Zealand historical sociology.

****

The Ideal Society and Its Enemies - A Reply To The Critics

Miles Fairburn
History Department, Victoria University

At the outset I must express my gratitude to Lian, Pearson and Davis for the time and trouble they have obviously taken to read the book, and to respond seriously to its arguments whether favourably or unfavourably. The spirit of criticism is poorly developed in New Zealand intellectual life and Davis, Pearson, and Lian represent some of the few bright lights in the darkness. It is a token of my respect for the critics that I will react to their frequently tough-minded comments in an equally robust fashion.

To start with there is the critique by Professor Davis. This is in a different category than the critiques by the two sociologists in part because it is exceedingly generous, it puts the book's purpose and framework in a larger context, and has disposed of the criticisms made by many reviewers in other places that the book neglects women and Maoris.

But it is also different because the nature of the questions it asks are different. Firstly he asks whether all the parts of the 'insiders view' were known by the 'average' colonial. I think this is possible given that all the parts were contained in the enormously popular emigrant-advice books written by the

professional propagandist, Charles Hursthouse. Between 1858 and 1883 his *The New Zealand Handbook* (a precursor to his *New Zealand - the Britain of the South*) went through fifteen reprints and new editions (often with slight changes of title), including a German and Welsh translations, and sold some 40,000 copies.

Secondly, Davis asks whether my construct of the contemporary notion of New Zealand as a 'middle class paradise' is 'the ultimate extinction of middle-class identity', and he suggests that a middle class ideal cannot be 'reduced solely to the absence of status anxiety, conflict and snobbery'. My response to this is to say that in my reading of the idealisations of New Zealand these were portrayed as the elements in the middle class ideal. Another person interpreting the same texts may come to a different conclusion but until they do Davis' point, although an interesting counter-hypothesis, is unsubstantiated. Besides, he overlooks in my interpretation of the idealisations the point that according to these idealisations the central defining characteristic of middle-class standing was the possession of a 'competency' or 'independency', that is, sufficient capital to enable the possessor to be free of the necessity to live in the wage-market. What made New Zealand supposedly a wondrous place was that a 'competency' would always be acquired by the virtuous, and would invariably grow in proportion to the growth of virtue, without generating the injurious side-effects of status anxiety, conflict, and snobbery which were part of the corruptions of capitalism in the Old World.

Davis also asks whether the drunkenness, violence, and conflict of colonial society were the product of a demographic subcategory (young single man) and reflective of this category's significance rather than of society as a whole and its broader interrelationships. My reply is that detailed statistical analysis by Steve Haslett and myself shows that although the demographic sub-category can account for some of the record levels of interpersonal conflict and drunkenness before the late 1870s it can only account for a minor portion of it. To put this another way, we have found that of the nine provincial districts from 1854 to 1930, Wellington had one of the lowest average levels of yearly proportions of men aged 21-40 in its population, and yet had the highest average annual rate of violence and drunkenness rates of convictions per 100,000 population, the second highest average rate of civil suits per 100,000 population, and the third highest average rate of spirits consumption per capita.

Perhaps the most useful question of all that Davis has asked is whether the foundations of modern New Zealand were in fact laid before 1900. What Davis has in mind here, I think, is the idea that since the book claims that atomisation was at the heart of the reality of settler society, and since atomisation had virtually disappeared by the late 1920s, it could be argued that it was not atomisation that laid the foundations but the immediate post-atomisation phase in New Zealand's history. What Davis says is true of atomisation, but it is not true of the idealisations which helped to cause atomisation. As I see it, the very high expectations of New Zealand created by the 19th. century idealisations had a strong and enduring influence on modern New Zealand history long after atomisation had disappeared, for they became part of modern ideology and the standard against which gains and losses in the standard of living were measured. To take a salient example, the image of New Zealand as a place where they were abundant opportunities for the ownership of real property was set in place by the idealisations and became the touchstone for mass electoral demands and State action from the Liberals onwards.

Of the two sociologists, Pearson is more inclined to agree with the argument in the book. Even so he makes a number of sharp criticisms, and the one I take most seriously is his claim that I have overstated the amount of atomisation in society. 'The image of a small, leisured class ruling over a chaotic society that swiftly transforms itself in a matter of decades into a set of cohesive communities, stretches the imagination.' Surely, he says (echoing some other reviews), what I have missed out here is the role played by the 'settled core' in each locality. They provided some semblance of stability and control right through the period. Now the book never denies this and I do not think it is at odds in any way with my theory; indeed it is implicit in all the data I presented on the rates of transience for household heads and on the rates of membership of voluntary organisations. Without doubt there were always some local associations and some very settled people. But the difference between Pearson and myself is that I do not think his concept of the local settled core has much explanatory power. What defining characteristics of colonial New Zealand can it account for, characteristics that were distinctive and fundamental? All frontier societies seem to have local settled cores; what was so special about New Zealand's? Pearson and other reviewers who have made the same criticism never address these questions. By contrast, I think my concept of atomisation does possess explanatory power and the book spells out the things that it seems to explain. Indeed, amongst the things it seems to be able to

explain is the special nature in New Zealand of the typical local settled core itself. The book implies that what made it special was that it was probably smaller and weaker than in other frontier societies, especially at the height of atomisation from the 1850s to the 1870s.

To be fair to Pearson, however, he does intimate that there is one thing his concept of the core might explain, and it is a point of some insight. The intimation is that the settled core in each locality which existed before the late 1870s aided and abetted the rapid demise of atomisation after the late 1870s. This is quite consistent with my own argument and it is a possibility I do not dispute. However, it does not help to explain the characteristics of New Zealand that were fundamental and distinctive. Moreover, although Pearson apparently is unpersuaded by my reasons for the rapid decline of atomisation, he does not demonstrate why this is the case nor does he demonstrate why the reason he prefers is a better one.

As a more general criticism, Pearson maintains that my atomisation thesis it is too rigid. I have fallen into the trap of some of my adversaries: 'By an over forceful use of one thread of argument the tapestry of social variation becomes oversimplified. The broad sweeps of colour used to fill in an under-explored part of the canvas overpowers the delicate shadings required to gain a sensitive impression of the whole picture.' This is an odd criticism coming from a sociologist since the objective of the book was to establish a model of settler society and Pearson as a good sociologist knows full well that models by their very nature oversimplify reality and are not replicas of it. Besides what does 'the tapestry of social variation' mean? Does Pearson want a book that details every possible qualification and exception to is generalisations? Would he have preferred a book that covered all the nuances of regional and local variations? If so, and had I written such a book, I am sure he would have criticised me (quite rightly) for not being able to see the wood for the trees, for failing to make an intelligible case. Hence the Catch-22; if one makes generalisations one is accused of oversimplification; if one does not generalize one is inevitably criticised for lacking a coherent argument.

Apart from imposing upon me this particular Catch-22, Pearson throws up a red herring when he criticises my refutation of J.O.C. Phillips' work on mateship. Pearson suggests that the evidence I use to refute the Phillips thesis on 19th. century mateship is as poor as the evidence Phillips uses to confirm

the thesis. Apart from the obvious fact that Pearson has not carefully assessed the evidence in Phillips' book in relation to the evidence in mine, the criticism Pearson makes is irrelevant. For Pearson by implication agrees that the Phillips' thesis is intrinsically implausible, which means that it does not really matter that my refutation is as poorly supported as Pearson thinks it is.

With the chapter on class, Pearson rightly criticises me for failing to weight the various reasons I advance for the lack of collective working class protest in settler society. But he misreads the text by supposing that I regard transience as the crucial reason (other reviewers have gone even further by attributing to me the notion that transience was the only reason). When sign-posting all the reasons on page 125 I wrote: 'The fourth is that manual workers enjoyed comparatively little propinquity; as the next chapter will demonstrate, they played a minimal part in the colony's informal and formal groupings.' Pearson ignores this sentence, and therefore does not see that in the context of atomisation it was not simply transience that prevented collective protest but transience interacting with the other facets of atomisation specified in that next chapter, namely, a shortage of kinship ties, geographical isolation, and the lack of opportunities for organized leisure - all of which, the chapter makes perfectly plain, had a disproportionately large effect on manual workers. I cannot understand why this evades him (and other reviewers) since I basically repeated the argument when talking about the lack of all types of collective protest (and not just the working class variety) from page 236 to 240.

Another example of misreading occurs with Pearson's complaint about my crude conceptualisation of class in Chapter Five. What he misunderstands is the whole book's framework of argumentation. Its stated intention was to establish the 'insiders view' and to evaluate this view in its own terms. In Part II of the book I deliberately and explicitly juxtapose the 'insiders view' with the contrasting positions of three different sets of historians. Thus it was never my intention to evaluate the 'insiders view' according to my own criteria. Rather the criteria were those of the 'insiders view' itself. Pearson, however, mistakenly thinks I was employing self-made criteria of my own and accordingly he comes to the wrong conclusion that my notion of class lacks sociological sophistication. His conclusion is wrong because the notion of class is not mine but that which contemporaries used.

Lian is clearly the toughest reviewer of the three. But like Pearson he does indulge in Catch-22 arguments. The most salient example of this comes with

his criticism of my claim in Chapter Four that, contrary to the notions of one set of historians, New Zealand was not a hierarchical society. Lian says that I cite Sutch and Eldred-Grigg as the propagators of this hierarchical model and he objects to my demolition of them on the ground that:

> The straw-man is nicely set up for Fairburn to demolish. It is difficult to consider seriously the proposition that 19th century society bore some resemblance of a patron-client society. Even if the case were made, Sutch and Eldred-Grigg are weak and unconvincing representatives of such a model. Having set up the illusions, it does not take much for the author to demolish it...

Here it seems to me that Lian is wise after the event. A straw man is not a straw man unless it has been shown to be a straw man. The reason Lian has such confidence that Sutch and Eldred-Grigg are weak and unconvincing is that the chapter demonstrated to him that they were weak and unconvincing they are. In addition to this, Lian constructs the argument so that I cannot win either way. If I had failed to demolish Sutch and Eldred-Grigg effectively he would have had every justification to maintain that my case against them was feeble and that I had not demonstrated convincingly that the hierarchical model is inferior to the 'insiders view'.

Lian finds a great deal wrong with my methodology and use of models in the second part of the book. He says as a concluding comment that 'ideal types or models, to be useful must be "objectively possible" i.e. they must approximate reality. The author's use of models is too far removed from reality and exaggerated to serve such a purpose'. The basis of this general criticism is derived from particular criticisms he levels at 'my' models of hierarchy, class, and local community. The problems he find with these models is that they are conceptually confused, they have no rationale, the first two are conflated, the last is extreme and simplistic and so on and so forth. However, like Pearson, Lian misunderstands the framework of the book. In the prologue to Part 1, the book indicates quite clearly that its intention was to establish the structure of images colonists had of their own society, and that an 'Assessment of how far the "insider's view" squared with reality is deferred until Part 11.' (p.27) In Part 1 the book then shows that central to these images was the notion that the colony happily lacked the associative capacities to reproduce the key evils of the Old World, and that there were three such evils: hierarchy, class divisions, and oppressive status conformity. Immediately following this, I carefully sign-posted in the Prologue to Part 11 (p.77) the procedure which I was going to use to assess these images: 'The "insider's view" has been described at some

length and it is now time to assess it in its own terms so as to prepare the way for the eventual formulation of the author's own model...Part 11 discusses the implicit attacks modern historians have launched on it...' I went on to say that the major distinction between the 'insider's view' and the implicit attacks upon it by the modern historians is that the 'insider's view' assumes that the society lacked the associative capacities to generate the three evils whereas the historians assume that the society did have these associative capacities. Thereafter on four separate occasions I repeated the point that the book is structured so as to assess the 'insider's view' of the social organisation within the meaning of the 'insider's view' and to determine how far within this meaning the historians present a more accurate picture of the social organisation. (pp.81, 155, 158, 235).

To a sociologist my approach may seem unconventional. Why take as the framework of reference a past society's consciousness of itself? Why analyse settler society in relation to its own assumptions? But for historians there is nothing odd about this approach; on the contrary it is an essential part of the methodology. The reason why historians are so concerned to examine the past within its own terms is that they believe they cannot know the past until they understand how it understands itself. This does not mean that they accept that contemporary rhetoric represents the truth, that it depicts what the past was really like. Rather they assume that the relationship between contemporary ideology and reality is highly problematic.

Lian, however, does not understand that Part II of the book was attempting to apply this methodology, that it was endeavouring to test the 'insider's view' within the meaning of its own categories. Thus his criticisms of 'my' definitions and models - of hierarchy, class divisions, and the social pressures inducing status conformity in the undifferentiated local community - are totally misplaced. They are not my definitions and models but those of contemporaries. Of course my act of interpreting the contemporary meaning of these categories could be faulty. But that is not Lian's argument.

The same confusion arises when Lian objects to 'my' labelling of the social problems of colonial society as 'pathological'. He asks, 'How does the author come to the startling conclusion that such disorders are pathological and significantly so in New Zealand?' He does not like 'me' using Britain as 'the yardstick for determining whether a society has abnormal or pathological rates

of drunkenness and interpersonal violence. Was Britain a settler society between 1850 and 1890?' Surely, he insists, it would have been better to use Australia or Canada or South Africa 'which were settler societies with some degree of comparability.' But again he misconstrues the whole framework of reference. The claim that New Zealand as an ideal society was devoid of such Old World problems was one that colonists made. I did not make it. What I was trying to do was to show that colonists were wrong in saying that New Zealand lacked Britain's social problems. My intention was very clearly stated in the first few sentences on p.217.

The last substantive criticism Lian comes up with is rather similar to a question raised by Davis. Lian maintains that my construct of the 'insider's view' is 'a very select middle class view'. There is a weak attempt, he complains, 'to argue that this view was supported by the labouring class in New Zealand. The evidence is scanty and unconvincing ...the distinction between the labourers and middle class paradise is meaningless when it is derived from the same source.' In a sense Lian is correct. The book offers but little direct empirical support for the contention that the labourer's paradise theme in the 'insider's view' was integral· to the normative system of the majority of immigrant labourers or manual workers. Indeed it would have been an impossible task to attempt to do so. Working class immigrants wrote comparatively little about New Zealand and there is no way of telling if the few surviving letters and literary materials they did write were in any way typical of the sentiments of the hundreds of thousands of manuals who migrated to New Zealand.

But the book does offer circumstantial support for the contention and this indirect evidence indicates that the contention is not at all implausible. The evidence, presented in Chapter Four, consists of a test which may be called the logic of the situation. It takes the realities of 'working class' life in New Zealand and deduces from it the most likely effect and the least likely effect these realities had on the 'working class' perception of New Zealand. Ironically, Lian himself has applied the test in his review. It will be remembered that when castigating me for setting up the hierarchical model as a 'straw man', he states:

> It is difficult to consider seriously the proposition that 19th century colonial society bore some resemblance of a patron-client society. Even if the case was made, Sutch and Eldred-Grigg are weak and unconvincing representatives of such a model. Having set up the illusion, it does not take much for the author to

> demolish it - *New Zealand's demography, high rates of land-ownership, opportunities for petty enterprise, the resourceful and mobile character of wage workers, low population pressure on resources and rising level of national income combined to work against the emergence of such a hierarchical society.*
> [my stress]

Given that Lian accepts that in reality the rates of land ownership were high (much higher in fact than in the Old World) is it not plausible that labouring people would have perceived New Zealand as a labourer's paradise in the way I extrapolate from the rhetoric? Given that Lian agrees that there were myriad opportunities for the manual worker to engage in petty enterprise would he not agree that it is likely that they would have thought that it was an opportunity-filled society, just as my reconstruction of the 'Labourer's paradise, notion claimed? Given the resourceful and mobile character of wage workers would not Lian concede the probability that they would have seen that 'hard-work' was the instrument of success in the society just as my reconstruction of their *mentalité* proposes? Given that he acknowledges that the pressure of population on resources was low does he think it likely that wage earners would have a pessimistic picture of material life in the colony? Given his recognition that the level of national income rose (and was perhaps the highest per capita in the world) why does he think that my attempt to argue that the 'insider's view' was shared by the labouring class is weak? In short, one of the Lian's key criticisms provides an effective response to another major criticism. My straw-man has become Lian's boomerang.

REVIEW REJOINDER

A comment on Nick Perry's review of 'People and Enterprises' by Roy McLennan and others. ('Educating Hilda', Volume 4 number 1: 100-103.)

Kerr Inkson, Department of Management Studies and Labour Relations, University of Auckland

While I agree with much of Nick Perry's review of our textbook "People and Enterprises" (*New Zealand Sociology*, May 1989, 100-103), I would also argue that one needs to consider textbooks in relation not only to what they say, but also to who they say it, in what context, programme, or process, and in competition or collaboration with which other texts. Seen in its total context, our book may go further than Perry believes in the direction of questioning the use of popular scientific-humanistic ideas in defence of corporate power elites.

Each year some 3,000 - 4,000 students in New Zealand undertake elementary courses in organisational behaviour as part of a tertiary education usually focussed on accountancy, marketing, or management. These students tend to have relatively straightforward unitary frames of reference which go largely unquestioned in their other courses (though they all undergo study in economics). Since they are destined to become influential decision-makers in the commercial sector, the decision "Which textbook?" is important. And, as Perry recognises, the decision is made by the course tutor rather than the student.

If Perry believes that "People and Enterprises" seeks to impose a hegemonic orthodoxy on all these students (as his review implies), he should consider the hegemony existing prior to publication of our book. The market is dominated by indistinguishable Tweedledum-Tweedledee glossies with identical chapter formats ("motivation", "attitudes", "leadership", etc.), a critical eye only for methodological detail, an unquestioning acceptance of the status quo concerning power distribution, and no reference to the special problems of women and ethnic minorities. These are books substantially more technocratic than ours, and of course filled to overflowing with *American* research, *American* cases about *American* businesses, IBM, Pepsi and the rest: books, in short, quite inappropriate to our students.

American research in organisational behaviour has in recent years gone down what I hope will eventually be seen as a philosophical and methodological blind alley. There is an emphasis on detailed formulation of abstract theories about work motivation, job satisfaction, group dynamics, leadership style and the like, but little recognition of the wider social forces that shape these. There is plenty of rigour, of a statistical-scientific kind, but the elaborate research process of measurement-and-analysis tends to obscure both the authentic experiences of working people and the power relationships within which they work. The individual in the organisation comes to be viewed rather like a pigeon in the operant-conditioning laboratory, pecking responses unseen on to a recording-counter/questionnaire, while the social scientists build paradigms from the resulting computer-printouts. This represents organisational behaviour's own degradation of the person (both the research subject and the researcher) in its own version of labour process. The shallowness and artifactuality of resulting explanatory frameworks might surprise sociologists who took the trouble to investigate them. Such material, unfortunately, forms the stable basis of much modern organisational behaviour education.

People and Enterprises was firstly an attempt to provide an alternative to this kind of perversion; secondly, it was an attempt to develop a text properly grounded in local experience and local research in New Zealand (Inkson, 1987, 1988); thirdly, it aimed to tell its story in clear simple language accessible to its readers. Other reviewers suggest we succeeded in these objectives (e.g. Couchman, 1988). The price paid was, first, what Perry calls the "folksy" tone, and, second, the impression (false in my view) that the book was not rigorous. Because so much of the American orthodoxy had been discarded, many of our academic colleagues felt that the book was lightweight and did not address the range of issues in their conventional syllabi; they bought it for reference, but did not prescribe it. For example, conventional organisation behaviour courses do not include sections, as *People and Enterprises* does, on local historical and social issues bearing on organisations, or on womens' or ethnic minorities' issues in organisations, or on Taylorism and deskilling. I would contend that the book, though clearly less radical than Perry would have liked, was more radical than other organisational behaviour texts, and, as it turned out, too radical for its conservative market.

Paul Couchman, in his review of the book in the *New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations*, agrees with Perry's statement that we "fudge questions of

power and inequality", and calls for a more critical analysis of "the nature of contemporary organisations and the structures of power and interest that exists within society". While the focus of organisational behaviour properly lies *within* organisations, I would tend to have some sympathy with this view, which may be addressed in a subsequent edition of *People and Enterprises*.

There are, however, more ways than one to skin a cat. Like any other textbook, *People and Enterprises* should be viewed not as a programme of indoctrination but as a tool of pedagogy. In my department we will introduce a new course in 1990, Organisation and Management, which will be compulsory for all B. Com. students and available to many others. One of our texts will be *People and Enterprises*, but the other will be Gareth Morgan's *Images of Organisation* (1986), a series of illuminating organisational metaphors which includes chapters on "Organisations as Political Systems" and "Organisations as Instruments of Domination". Lecture content will include conventional introductions to management and organisational behaviour, but also sessions such as "managerial ideology in business organisations" and "the lethal nature of multinationals". A fifth of the course will be devoted to labour relations, including radical critiques. The aim is to present a variety of alternative viewpoints, and, in Perry's terms, "to get students to think for themselves." In this way we hope that even if the book which Perry reviews does not resolve the dilemmas which he identifies - for example preparing students to function in the corporate world while at the same time enabling them to question it - then perhaps the programmes to which the book contributes may do so.

References

Couchman, P. Review of 'R. McLennan *et.al.*, *People and Enterprises : Human Behaviour in New Zealand Organisations* Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1987.' *New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations*, 1988, *13*, 2, 198-200.

Inkson, K. 'Organisational behaviour: a review of New Zealand research'. *New Zealand Journal of Psychology*, 1987, *16*, 9-27.

Inkson, K. 'Challenging hegemony in organisational behaviour'. *The Organizational Behaviour Teaching Review*, 1988 *13*, 1-9.

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS:

1. Two copies of manuscripts for consideration should be sent to the editors. Authors should retain a third copy for their own reference during proofreading. Copies submitted will not normally be returned. To facilitate "blind" reviewing, the title and name(s) of its authors should be given on a separate sheet, and the title only should appear on the first page of the article.

2. While articles should not normally exceed 4500-5000 words, longer articles may be accepted in special circumstances.

3. Manuscripts should be accompanied by a short abstract (about 100 words) typed on a separate sheet of paper.

4. Manuscripts should be typed double spaced throughout on one side of A4 paper with reasonable margins all round (2 cms. approx.).

5. Authors should consult articles in current issues of this Journal for general indications of style - conventions on: capitalizing titles, headings, sub-headings; paragraphing; quotations, and so on.

6. Do not underline any words in the text unless they are to be printed in italics.

7. Type each table on a separate sheet with as few lines as possible, and indicate the placing of the table in the text with a pencil note. Use wide spacing in tables and rule all lines in pencil. Tables should be numbered in arabic figures with a clear legend to identify the table.

8. Drawings (graphs, figures, etc.) should be on good quality white paper in indian ink and on separate sheets.

9. References should normally be indicated by citing in parentheses the author's surname and the year of publication (together with page numbers where relevant), as given in the list of references or the bibliography at the end of the article. For example: 'it has been argued (Baker, 1948:26) that...' etc. The full list of references at the end of the article should be arranged alphabetically by author's surname. The following examples should be used as a guide, paying particular attention to the sequence of the items in the reference and to punctuation.

    Able, P. and Collins, S. 1961. 'Structuralism and the concept of class.' Journal of Social Class, 24(3), 138-159.

    Baker, R.S. 1948. Sociology and Social Change. London, Charles Publishing Co.

    Note that in the first example the words in the title are not capitalized (as they are for the title of a book, as in the second example).

10. Footnotes are to be reserved for substantive commentary. Number them from 1 upwards. The location of each footnote in the text must be indicated by the appropriate superscript numeral. Type the complete, numbered set of footnotes on a separate sheet and attach to the end of the manuscript. Footnotes will appear at the foot of the page where they are located.

11. The typescript submitted should be in the form in which the author wishes the paper to appear. Preliminary consultation with the editors about the suitability of an article does not necessarily guarantee its publication. Authors are encouraged to seek comments from colleagues before submitting a paper for publication.

12. The editors reserve the right to make minor editorial alterations or deletions to articles without consulting the author(s), so long as such changes do not affect the substance of the article.

13. Authors will receive 2 copies of the issue in which their article appears.