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Border Crossing Between Sociology and Bioethics

Rhonda Shaw

Abstract

The refashioning, reconstruction, and redesign of the human body through the application of new scientific and medical technologies are now a familiar subject in the media and in contemporary culture. They are also a familiar subject for social analysis. In this rapidly expanding body of work, sociologists have been quick to note the appearance of a continuum of body transforming techniques from the aesthetic manipulation of the body's surface in body adornment and body sculpting, through to fundamental alterations and enhancements of the functioning of the inner body. But what, if anything, do sociologists say about the kinds of alterations that are designed to repair or enhance the bodies of future persons? This paper addresses these debates about ethics and the genetic body, and asks what the sociology of ethics can contribute to this discussion. In so doing, it calls for greater participation by sociologists in the field of bioethics.

Introduction

It is a commonplace assumption that bioethics and ethical issues to do with our bodies are the disciplinary preserve of medicine and philosophy. In contrast, the relation of sociology to ethics, and the convergence of ethics with the body in the discipline of sociology, is less clear cut. In this article I offer an alternative view to this understanding. I also suggest that misrecognition of the place of ethics in sociological analysis has as much to do with the dualistic legacy underpinning the discipline of sociology (i.e. mind vs. body; public vs. private; social vs. moral) as with the way in which Ethics (upper case) is historically conceptualised as a distinctly philosophical subject.

As I have said elsewhere (Shaw, 2004), some versions of modern sociology take ethics to be primarily concerned with the private sphere of intersubjective relationships and personal virtue. As a corollary, many

sociologists have held the view that when moral deliberation or ethical encounters do occur, they do so after the fact of identity constitution. In other words, the formation of subjectivity or agency is not considered coterminous with either the ethical relation or moral judgement itself. In this conception, ethics only appears in the public sphere in the reconfigured form of law and politics, or, as is the case latterly, in the workplace context where procedural codes and principles are designed to guide and regulate professional obligations and permissions.[1]

This position is not only problematic for sociologists who take a phenomenological or situationalist view of identity construction as intersubjective and context-dependent, but it is also inordinately unhelpful in the face of the new eugenics, where embodied identities are literally made (and manipulated) on the basis of someone else's ethical decisions. The kinds of decisions people make about pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, or whether to select for a saviour sibling embryo, for example, impact on identity construction not only for the individual or family concerned, but also at a group level, and these decisions ultimately have long-term social implications. While this predicament should be obvious to many sociologists from a variety of different perspectives, sociology has yet to be well and truly heard in the bioethics debate. This is true of sociology in New Zealand.[2]

Part of the reason for sociology's general silence in this arena has to do with the question of just who owns ethics. The answer is reflected in wider public perceptions about what constitutes the ethical domain and where the boundaries of Ethics, as a sub-discipline of philosophy, lie. The following discussion looks at received academic wisdom about the place of ethics in the discursive formations of sociology and philosophy. I also suggest the importance of greater sociological contribution to ethics, particularly bioethics, by examining debates around body modification and genetics in light of critiques of the new eugenics. In this part of the article I draw on

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1 In the context of post-Cartwright audit culture, research ethics is sometimes mistaken for ethics *per se*.

2 The Constructive Conversations/Whakaaetanga Korero project on genetic testing and public participation in decision-making about biotechnologies is one example of potential change in this respect. See www.conversations.canterbury.ac.nz/

work influenced by feminist social theory, Disability Studies, and postconventional ethics.

A word on methodology

Before turning to the subject matter of this discussion, it is worth making some brief methodological points. One of the aims of the article is to contribute to recent on-going conversations that connect contemporary philosophical issues in normative and applied ethics with sociological debate. There is already precedent for sociological insight within ethics debates, especially within bioethics (see DeVries & Subedi, 1998). This is usually based on the recognition that sociologists can enhance the study of ethics substantively because the nature of our empirical work is designed to account for, and interpret, the variety of moral dispositions that actually exist in a society at a given point in time. As other sociologists have observed (Fox & DeVries, 1998; Fox & Swazey, 2005; Haimes, 2002; Lopez, 2004), it is because this empirical work lies outside the scope of philosophical ethics that it can add something unique to bioethical debate.

However, it is not just our empirical and ethnographic work that is of significance in the bioethics arena. As Haimes (2002) maintains, sociologists also have something theoretical to say in debates about ethical issues insofar as they can illuminate "understanding of the social processes through which [...] issues become constituted as ethical concerns" (2002, p. 91). Section six of the article explores this assertion by way of a case study examining genetic screening and engineering technologies.

My aim, then, is to engage in dialogue with philosophers and bioethicists in the interests of facilitating more comprehensive analysis in the area of what has been loosely called body ethics.[3] Since I am a sociologist by training, this paper is primarily a call for greater sociological engagement in ethics talk, particularly in the field of bioethics. Despite my optimism, it should be noted that the relationship between the social sciences and bioethics has not always been an easy one. The insights of sociological analysis have

[3] For Shildrick (2005, p. 24), body ethics differs from conventional biomedical or bioethics approaches to the body. The latter purportedly take the body as the object of inquiry, whereas body ethics is an ethics *of* the body as it is lived, experienced, and made material.

sometimes been used, and undervalued, by other disciplines as illustrative examples or cases to aid formulation of principles and general theories in the field. In light of this, sociologists may rightly resent the appropriation of their painstaking substantive research to assist the work of armchair philosophers and biomedical ethicists.

Henceforth, if sociology is to have a place in this arena it needs to do more than serve bioethical or philosophical inquiry in a "handmaiden" role, as has arguably been the case for sociologists in the field of medicine (Haimes, 2002, p. 99). The problem is that not all bioethicists concur with interdisciplinary intervention, as evidenced by recent on-going debate across the Atlantic in periodicals and journals such as *Hastings Center Report*, *Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics*, and *Bioethics*. Although ecumenical characterisation of bioethics is not a consensus aim, some bioethicists are nonetheless supportive. For instance, while acknowledging the uneasy relation between the social sciences and bioethics, Jonsen defines bioethics as: "the systematic study of the moral dimensions of the life sciences and health care, employing a variety of ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting" (1998, p. vii).

Jonsen's perspective is encouraging, especially if we take the position that disciplines such as sociology and discursive constructs such as bioethics are constantly in flux and thus have no essential integrity. Rather than viewing the exchange of philosophical concepts and principles to enhance sociological insight, or vice versa, as a deficit, such border crossing may in fact facilitate interdisciplinary communication and understanding. This would appear to be the case where ethics and issues to do with bodies and bodily normalisation and enhancement converge.

Ethics, body modification and sociological analysis

The re/fashioning, re/construction, and re/design of the human body through the application of new scientific and medical technologies are now a familiar subject in the media and in contemporary culture. They are also a familiar subject for social analysis. In this rapidly expanding body of work, social and cultural theorists have been quick to note the appearance of a continuum of body transforming techniques from; "the aesthetic manipulation of the body's surface through cosmetic surgery, muscle grafts

and animal or human transplants", to "fundamental alterations and enhancements of the functioning of the inner body" (Featherstone & Burrows, 1996, p. 11). The question raised by these analysts is whether "the increasing acceptance by consumers of cosmetic surgery and other associated technological interventions to modify the body [...] will see ever more radical plastic surgery, computer-chip brain implants and gene splicing become routine" (Featherstone & Burrows, 1996, p. 4).

While sociologists of the body have identified and diligently documented accounts of these new body and genetic technologies as "life-enhancing and even lifesaving" (Balsamo, 1996, p. 5), several analysts have commented that there has been scant discussion in explicitly sociological literature as to the ways in which these new forms and experiences of embodiment intersect with moral and ethical matters (DeVries & Conrad, 1998; Russell, 2000; Smart, 1999).[4] There are a number of interrelated claims being made here. The first point to note is that while sociologists have generally engaged in meticulous descriptive-interpretive accounts of new body technologies, they have tended to shy away from addressing philosophical questions about whether these technologies should or should not be permitted.[5] This is certainly not the case for scholars working in Disability Studies, many of whom are ardent critics of genetic engineering and screening technologies (see Kerr & Shakespeare, 2002). But, as these scholars point out, such debate is not always included in the sociological mainstream. Chris Shilling's (2005, pp. 172-97) chapter entitled "Technological Bodies" in *The body in culture, technology and society*, for instance, contains no discussion of genetic enhancement technologies, bar one minor reference to genetic engineering in the concluding remarks (see p. 194).

Although social analysts have addressed the structural and institutional contexts that give rise to these new subjectivities and body projects, they have for the most part eschewed direct ethical engagement with the issues themselves. While well-aware of these complex issues, social scientists have tended to regard them beyond the scope of their brief (e.g. Williams, 1997,

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4 In contrast, the connection between ethics and corporeality has long been a feature of feminist scholarship, not to mention social science literature on genetics and reproduction.

5 A notable exception in social theory is Habermas's *The future of human nature* (2003).

p. 1048). Such reluctance to engage directly with philosophers over the ethical and political pros and cons of the new body technologies is lamentable. The failure of sociologists to enter into debate about the permissibility or impermissibility of body modification and technological enhancements in the context of wider socio-political discussion, while nonetheless faithfully documenting them, can tacitly condone these practices (Smart, 1999).

A second concern is that sociological discourses of the body have largely viewed the work imbued in body projects as work on the self for the self and as part of the accomplishment of an "*individual's* self-identity" (Shilling, 1994, p. 5). This focus often ignores various ways of refashioning and modifying the body that involve projects with others - if not *for* others - and not just the self. Gamete donation, organ donation, and preimplantation genetic diagnosis, are three such examples.

Finally, when people engage in these kinds of projects they are not merely using their bodies to convey meanings about intercorporeality, intersubjectivity, and identity. The personal choices these people deliberate as they find themselves at the forefront of technoscience and biomedicine also position them as "moral pioneers" (Rapp, 2000, p. 306), making novel ethical decisions for themselves as well as others to interpret and take into account.

Disciplinary propriety and problems of definition

Reticence to consider morally significant aspects of new body enhancements and technologies does more to frame what it is possible to say within the discipline itself, than it does to engage with the salient sociological question of how ethical identities are constructed and experienced in the activities and practices of our everyday lives. One reason for the marginalisation of ethics within the discipline of sociology has to do with how we define ethics. This definitional problem highlights a number of theoretical and disciplinary issues. The question of who gets to talk about ethical issues is partly political, and concerns the guardianship of imaginary institutional boundaries between perceived unified discursive entities – in this case sociology and philosophy (see Bauman, 1992, ch.5).

Historically, the intellectual division of labour that led to the formation of the social construction of disciplines is the result of the institutionalisation of knowledge within universities and in university departments. The emergence of sociology as a discipline in the nineteenth century in English and Scottish universities, as well as in American education, is partly attributable to the demise of a unified curriculum under the rubric of moral philosophy. It also marks the confluence of a number of other factors. According to Rosen and Caplan (1980, p. 2), the emergence of the social sciences in the late 1800s is a consequence of "undergraduate specialization, the proliferation of vocationalism and professional and graduate education, and increasing emphasis on research, particularly scientific and social science research."

While this newly emerging institutional framework may have made sense in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the question, to borrow from Wallerstein (2003, p. 454), is whether this disciplinary configuration has "outlived its usefulness"? Certainly it is the nature of ideas to travel, and the flow of these ideas within and between bodies of knowledge invariably contributes to the constant insecurity of disciplinary boundaries. In order to maintain these boundaries, ongoing disavowal of disciplinary others - much like the disavowal of the underside of subjectivity - is needed to accompany "discursive reiteration" (Longhurst, 2001, p. 1). While Longhurst (2001) has claimed that the process of creating bodies of knowledge that define disciplinary boundaries is akin to the process of abjection about which Kristeva writes, a notion I will return to in the final sections of the essay, I would suggest that discipline formation is primarily the result of structural differentiation within the university system. Nonetheless, we needn't dismiss Longhurst's claim out of hand. It is not as if emotion and affect are absent here.

As Wallerstein (2003, p. 456) suggests, the defence of disciplinary turf is "primarily generational" and it is those people with the "real power within disciplinary organizations", such as "full professors, chairs of departments, presidents of associations, members of national committees" etc., "who will fight to the death to defend those turfs" and who are most likely to be resistant to interdisciplinarity. Although Wallerstein's "generation" is probably political rather than chronological, the distaste for territorial

encroachment that underpins disciplinary border crossing may well have historical roots. Describing his first teaching job at the University of Aberdeen in the late sixties, Carter (2005, p. 3) remarks that first year Arts students "were compelled, most resentfully," to enrol in a moral philosophy paper. Noting this requirement as one dating back to the eighteenth century Scottish university system, Carter observes that in his "jaundiced students' accounts ... Aberdeen's moral philosophers still clung grimly to their jobs by forcing students to study a trivial subject obsessed with what one should do if one saw somebody else fall in a canal" (2005, p. 3).

If sociologists have been reticent to engage with the subject of ethics or to admit the analytical styles of moral philosophers into their discipline, philosophers have not been exempt from dismissing the kinds of projects sociologists of ethics or morality might pursue, as peripheral to their concerns. A frequent basic objection of primer philosophy texts is that sociological discussions of ethics are limited to causal accounts of moral phenomena and are thereby confined to descriptive analysis. Sociologists may provide useful background information about social mores and ethical beliefs for philosophical adjudication, but philosophers stipulate that this approach to ethics lacks a reasoned account of moral conduct and provides no guidelines for action. Carter is correct in other words – sociologists are not in the business of evaluating or solving ethical problems.

Rather, sociology deals mainly in what Bauman (1995, p. 10) says philosophers refer to as "ethno-ethics". That is, sociologists deal with what factually *is* the case; telling us what people say, do, and believe to be right and wrong. In contrast, moral philosophy pronounces upon properly ethical statements, thereby establishing what *ought* to be the case. Durkheim, in fact, distinguished his sociology of morals, as he called it, from ethics in this way. According to Durkheim, the sociology of morals was supposed to be about the "explanation" of morality, and ethics pertained to the "evaluation" of morality (Hall in Durkheim, 1993, p. 19). Although spurious, this is/ought disjunction between what Durkheim described as "explanation and evaluation" is reiterated in philosophy and biomedical ethics texts (see Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, cht. 1).[6]

[6] Many sociologists would argue that much social inquiry is underpinned by a vision of the good society. Sociology and social theory is thus implicitly normative regardless of whether or not social analysts make 'ethical statements' (Bauman, 1994, pp. 1-3).

In contemporary philosophical usage, ethics is normally divided into two parts, normative and non-normative ethics. This distinction is illuminating because it simplistically characterises a particular kind of sociology as representative of the discipline as a whole. Sociology, and its cousin, Anthropology, are grouped under the rubric of non-normative, descriptive ethics (see Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, Introduction). In contrast, Philosophical Ethics is normative, insofar as it attempts to establish which rules, norms, and principles should guide and regulate our conduct. Under the rubric of normative ethics fall various moral theories and approaches, but the main traditions follow Kant, Utilitarianism, and (latterly) Virtue ethics. These traditions provide models that are action-guiding, suggesting how we should live.

Defining ethics and morality

Debates about the relationship between sociology and philosophy, normative and non-normative ethics, and who has the right to talk about ethics, testify to the never-ending quest for disciplinary certainty and homogeneity. They also serve to circumscribe and conceal the meaning of ethics making it difficult to grasp. This lack of terminological clarity around the term "ethics" arises from its many different meanings, and these meanings are very slippery, even within the discipline of philosophy itself. Despite such slipperiness, ethics has begun to figure prominently in recent debates in the social sciences and humanities. This reappearance of ethics - in such unlikely places - has prompted the question "what is ethics?"

In lay and popular understandings, as well as in general moral theory, ethics is ordinarily conceptualised as the theoretical study or science of morals, or as principles, rules, or maxims that inform ethical conduct. According to this view, which enjoys considerable currency, moral agency and judgement are achieved by the exercise of universal cognitive faculties that guide our actions in a given situation. This perception of ethics still permeates academic and lay consciousness to some extent, although the recent flurry of writing on the topic of ethics and the body indicates the possible waning of this hegemonic definition.

Alternatives to mainstream conceptions of ethics have certainly proliferated over the course of the last two decades. These interventions have begun to impact on the interrelated fields of medicine and bioethics (see Diprose, 1994, 2002, 2005; Gatens, 1996; Grosz, 1989, 1994; Komesaroff, 1995, 1996; Price & Shildrick, 2002; Shildrick, 2005; Shildrick & Price, 1999; Wolf, 1996). Like the analysts working broadly within these traditions, I am primarily interested in generating an account of ethics from outside the accepted framework of moral theory *per se*. One point of difference from many of the scholars cited above is that my audience is principally comprised of sociologists. For this audience, ethics has reappeared on the analytical agenda in a number of different forms. On the one hand, the re-emergence of ethics occurs in the wake of widespread scepticism about providential reason and the loss of faith in the grand metanarratives of modernity. This horizon of scepticism is said to be accompanied by an ethos of individualism and the proliferation of increasing moral choice and responsibility (Bauman, 1992, p. xxii). On the other hand, the renascence of ethical debate has occurred at the level of general social relations and in relation to the rise of moral-existential questions, particularly in response to advances in the spheres of biological reproduction, genetic engineering, and medicine.

As stated in the introductory sections of this paper, a number of contemporary scholars firmly believe that sociology can contribute something unique to these debates. First, they argue, sociological insights can shed light on the social and cultural processes by which bodies and subjectivities are produced as normal and abnormal. Second, they maintain that it is not enough to research the body in isolation from its socio-cultural production. This means that debates about the permissibility or impermissibility of various technologies are relatively meaningless unless we take into account the conditions and power-knowledge relations that make those technologies possible in the first place. At the same time, this view holds that we cannot treat bodies as the raw matter or unacknowledged backdrop against which we debate ethical issues without considering the cultural production of bodily differences. This is because the processes through which subjectivities are constituted are complex, on-going ethical processes bound up with human embodiment.

In short, generating an account of ethics from outside the accepted framework of conventional moral theory, and bringing this to bear on discussions around body technologies and modifications, will not only "expand our repertoire of what counts as "ethical" ", it will also alert "us to the possibility of multiple perspectives on ethics" (Haimes, 2002, p.105), and to multiple perspectives on the experience of embodiment. The following case study is intended to show the kinds of theoretical contributions social scientists can make to bioethical debates from outside conventional philosophical and biomedical ethics.

Body ethics and the new eugenics

Feminist sociologist Susan Bordo has remarked that the body is both a text of culture and a *"practical,* direct locus of social control" (1993, p. 165). This insight is central to sociological research on body modification practices and enhancements such as dieting, body-sculpting, tattooing, cosmetic surgery, and silicon implants (see Pitts, 2003). Enhancement and modification technologies that people incorporate, say sociologists, can mediate symbolic values and express felt identity; thereby giving credence to the importance of body projects in the lives of contemporary western individuals.

Running parallel to these distinctly sociological accounts are debates about interior body modifications such as genetic screening and engineering. In these debates, a distinction is often drawn between the therapeutic and medical application of technologies and their use for non-therapeutic and enhancement purposes. This is analogous to the distinction that is often made between plastic and cosmetic surgery. In the biomedical ethics literature, genetic intervention on the basis of treatment, cure, or therapy (sometimes referred to as negative eugenics) is often viewed as acceptable, whereas intervention for enhancement purposes (sometimes referred to as positive eugenics) is deemed unacceptable. It is not within the scope of this article to debate the moral relevance of these distinctions, suffice to say that some ethicists think the distinction between so-called normalisation and enhancement technologies is specious. Others see no difference between social enhancement by education and genetic enhancement (Glover, 2001; Harris, 1999). These commentators make a case for genetic technologies as

an extension of individuals' reproductive freedoms (Agar, 1999, 2004; Gosden, 1999; Harris, 1999; Robertson, 1994). The extension of reproductive liberties in the domain of genetic technologies beyond the realm of therapy can thus be seen to approximate many of the body modifications (e.g. cosmetic surgery) sociologists have documented.

Although there may be similarities between these particular enhancement technologies, sociologists of the body also draw attention to the ways body projects define individuals and groups by inscribing particular aesthetic styles and identities as normal and desirable. In contrast, while biomedical ethicists focus on peoples' entitlements to therapy, they have been less likely to pay attention to the reproduction and regulation of normalcy and difference through genetic technologies. It is important to do so, however, because in addition to the fact that each body modification and genetic technology raises different kinds of moral and ethical questions, the conditions these technologies create establish particular kinds of psycho-social relations to the abject, embodiment, and the other. This means that different genetic technologies position what it is to be human and how we should live rather differently in each case. In order to discuss this point in more depth, this section of this paper will focus on modifications to the unborn body; namely pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, gene therapies, and prenatal diagnostic techniques.

Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is a procedure used to screen and select human embryos for inherited genetic conditions and chromosomal abnormalities.[7] It is a medically complex procedure used in conjunction with *in vitro* fertilisation (IVF), involving the separation of one or two cells from an early stage embryo in order to test for genetic defects. Only unaffected embryos are then implanted in the uterus for gestation. Gene therapy, which is illegal in New Zealand, is also designed to be used in conjunction with IVF. Gene therapy requires the insertion of new genes into "defective" or "faulty" somatic or germ cells (Rowland, 2001, p. 87). As a therapy it is frequently contrasted with enhancement engineering (see

[7] PGD has recently been made legal in New Zealand to screen embryos for serious genetic disorders. According to *The New Zealand Herald* (15 December, 2005), PGD procedures will cost approximately $NZ 12,000. Forty out of the 150 PGD/IVF cycles expected per year are to be government funded.

Mappe & DeGrazia, 2001), which requires the genetic modification of normal cells to enhance gene function. In theory, both procedures could "treat" the individual concerned (somatic cell therapy) or change the gene pool for subsequent generations (germ-line cell therapy).

What makes these technologies different from the kinds of body projects and corresponding life-plans sociologists routinely discuss, is that PGD and gene therapy are specifically designed to alter or eliminate the bodies of persons not yet born. As such they raise different kinds of ethical and political issues to self-initiated body projects because they have intergenerational consequences, not only on a genetic level but also in terms of identity constitution. They also raise different kinds of issues to those raised by prenatal genetic diagnosis techniques.

PGD is often wrongly grouped under the general category of prenatal testing or prenatal diagnosis (PND). As such it is sometimes confused with it. Clearly, PGD and PND are both reproductive technologies, and both are designed with the aim of "improving" the health and genetic characteristics of unborn infants. Medical decisions to use technologies such as prenatal testing and PGD are often motivated on the basis of claims to avoid future suffering, and these decisions are couched in terms of preventing disease or providing a cure for a particular ailment, disorder, or impairment. Although there are some similarities between PGD and prenatal testing, there are significant differences that mean these two procedures are not morally equivalent. PGD procedures occur at the early embryonic stage, whereas prenatal testing such as amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling are foetal tests.[8] PND is therefore a foetal monitoring technology designed to be used in conjunction with fertility control (i.e. the termination of pregnancy), whereas PGD occurs prior to embryo implantation in a woman's uterus and is used in conjunction with conceptive technologies that are intended to promote pregnancy. While both technologies are used to reject embryos or foetuses carrying specific genes or traits, PGD is also used to positively select for so-called desirable traits, as in cases of saviour siblings.

[8] Foetal tests occur at different times throughout a pregnancy, depending on the disorder. According to Cameron and Williamson (2003, p. 91), chorionic villus sampling occurs at 10 to 14 weeks, ultrasound and/or maternal serum screening occur at 10 to 20 weeks, and amniocentesis at 15 weeks plus.

PND is generally held by many people to be more contentious than PGD since the latter avoids the thorny issue of terminating the life of a foetus (Cameron & Williamson, 2003). Nevertheless, PGD raises additional eugenics-related concerns about the normalisation of future bodies.

Unlike PND techniques such as amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling, PGD and gene therapy have an effect on future generations in ways that PND does not. Although the decision to abort or terminate a pregnancy based on PND has a bearing on who is or is not born, the choice to select out embryos with particular traits or the choice to rectify genetic characteristics *in vitro* is not the same as the choice an individual agent makes on her own, or with family members, to terminate a pregnancy. With PGD and genetic therapy absolute judgements are made from the outset of conception about what kinds of bodies to control for, and thus exclude, as well as decisions about the types of human being that are allowed to be born. Although prenatal testing can and does place undue societal pressures on pregnant women to consider termination, PND is unlike PGD in that the former is unlikely to be a mechanism for eugenics. Whilst the decision to abort a foetus or baby in utero raises "questions about the right to life or the moral status of the foetus" (Scully, 2005, p. 52), pregnancy termination does not occur solely on the basis of unwanted abnormality. Decisions women make about whether or not to continue pregnancy are ecological insofar as they take into account multiple factors, including individual, familial, and environmental considerations. No matter how coerced women may feel by medical and health professionals about prenatal screening (see Black in Pattinson, 2002, p. 149; Rapp, 1998), it is always possible for women and their partners to resist the medicalisation of routine pregnancy monitoring and eugenics-type medical advice (see Tankard Reist, 2006).

As stated above, PND will never be a mechanism for eugenics in the same way that PGD and gene therapy might for the simple reason that "many people see aborting a fetus as "killing" " (Cameron & Williamson, 2003, p. 90). Indeed, Cameron and Williamson contend that it is psychologically less traumatising for people to discard unwanted embryos than it is to terminate a pregnancy. If this is so, as Cho predicts, the availability of PGD will force a demographic shift in the female population accessing

fertility clinic services. According to Cho, we will see younger women accessing these services, compared with a relatively older population accessing IVF services for fertility reasons.[9] In this scenario, decreasing costs for PGD cycles and increased success rates may lead to the perception that benefits will outweigh discomfort and risks. Increasingly, people will use this technology to select for traits as well as rejecting others.

Policing abjection

It is without doubt that abject, diseased, disabled, pregnant, and pre-pregnant bodies are the diagnostic objects of genetic research. In biomedical ethics, the value of PGD - in tandem with reproductive technologies - and the repair or correction of genetic defects, diseases, and disorders, is reasoned and justified within the medical model. Underpinning this model is the belief that the medical profession has a moral duty to alleviate suffering and prevent harm. In this model disability is synonymous with impairment, defect, disease, or flaw, and these flaws are located in individual bodies, which medicine and science have an obligation or responsibility to ameliorate or cure. Seen through a biomedical lens, the body is an object to be manipulated, and defective body parts are to be "added to, subtracted from, augmented, and supplemented" so that the body "can be improved and made productive" (Shaw & Sullivan, 2003, p. 10).

For one representative of this view, genetic screening and testing "represents a biological approach to biological problems" (Gillot, 2001, p. 2). Yet for critics, these problems are not simply biological but incorporate ethical, political, and social factors. Since objections to the medical model are well known (see Sullivan, 1991; UPIAS, 1976), I will not rehearse them here, except to make a couple of brief comments. The first point worth noting is that the medical model ignores the mutual inherence of embodiment and subjectivity. By characterising disability as lack, genetic technologies like PGD often negate the possibility that people with (inherited or congenital) disabilities can have quality of life. Disability advocates argue

[9] Cho, from the Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, made this point at the 2006 New Zealand Bioethics Conference in Dunedin.

that the biomedical representation of disability as a burden or deficit demeans the self-image of disabled people, as well as diminishing the value of disabled people in society in general.

While people who believe certain disorders are undesirable do not necessarily hold the view that people with disabilities cannot lead good or fulfilling lives, procedures such as PGD or gene therapies do signal the acceptability of selecting out deleterious genes from the future gene pool. Beck (in Rowland, 2001, p. 93) points out that the abolition of future persons on the basis of a single genetic characteristic or specific disease reduces potential people to *that* characteristic or disease and selects identities accordingly (see also Kass, 2001). PGD thereby reinforces the importance of genes as defining desirable human life. In the field of assisted human reproduction this is sometimes concretised by western beliefs that making or building a family must be based on consanguinity.[10]

Whilst the diagnostic techniques of biomedicine have historically provided ways of revealing the abject body and objectifying impairment in individuals, the new eugenics promulgated by genetic intervention has magnified the capacity to seek out the minutiae of the broken or irregular body. For Disability scholars genetic screening and engineering techniques are attempts to control defect and disorder in human beings by screening out embryos with "deleterious" conditions.

Gene therapy, in addition, would enable the medical profession to make and manipulate new individuals whose future identities are defined without unruliness or corporeal "mistakes". In this scenario, the diseased, disabled, and defective body, which is examined and tested by genetics, is found wanting. As O'Connell (2005, p. 220) says, this is because it does not stack up against the quintessential "clean and proper body of the representative white male." In short, the unruly, disabled body is abject.

The notion of abjection is closely associated with Kristeva's work. In Kristeva's (1982) writing the abject is discussed in terms of aversion to certain sorts of foods, waste, and sexual difference (Grosz, 1989, p. 73). For Kristeva, the process of abjection is psycho-social and is a necessary condition of

[10] It could be possible for families to avoid some of the ethical considerations associated with PGD, for instance, if using donated gametes was considered as a viable alternative.

symbolic subjectivity, because in order to become a stable subject with a coherent identity, a child must come to define psycho-corporeal boundaries between what is proper to "me" and what is "not me". This entails the child separating itself from others and identifying the "not me" as out-of-bounds. In so doing, the subject designates what Kristeva calls the "self's clean and proper body". Objects such as breast milk, blood, sweat, tears, vomit, and seminal and vaginal fluids; as well as zones of the body, such as the mouth, anus, eyes and genitals, can be understood as abject.

According to feminist social theorist Iris Marion Young (1990), Kristeva's psychoanalytic account of abjection can be extended to include social, cultural, and historical factors and processes. In this view, even people and social groups can be identified with the abject (e.g. sick people, disabled people, and pregnant women). Since the abject is identified as that which is "not-me", abject objects, zones, and people, which exist at the borders of the embodied subject, present a danger to that subject's corporeal integrity, threatening to dissolve the border or boundary dividing and covering self and other. Despite efforts to control and regulate "clean and proper" bodies, abject objects, zones, and others are integral to the constitution of selves and can never really be expelled from existence. Indeed, according to Kristeva, who argued that the original psycho-social process of abjection occurs with subject formation, the undivided, unified, and bounded self can try as hard as it likes but it can never really expel the abject.

Ironically, twenty-first century genetic diagnosis can expose a multiplicity of flaws and imperfections at the level of the gene that were previously undetected, and thus had little or no effect on those who lived their lives unaware of them. O'Connell (2005) suggests that where the abject once hovered at the edges or the borders of the body it is now visible to the make-up and identities of all potential human beings. What is abject, then, is no longer simply located in bodies of others but in oneself. And this reveals the boundary - once and for all - between "able-bodied" and "disabled" to be a social construction (O'Connell, 2005, p. 231). In this way genetics has the potential to disrupt perception of the "clean and proper body" by turning the margins and the edges into the centre. Perhaps this potential is why so many people express apprehension and anxiety

about genetic intervention: because they fear discovering genetic secrets about themselves they would prefer not to know. Where we were once ignorant of the knowledge that we could carry a deleterious gene or were susceptible to a particular disorder, now "genetic science and technology promise us that we will know the details of our own present and future disability" (O'Connell, 2005, p. 228).

Reading genetics as disruptive of the process of abjection in this fashion, as O'Connell suggests we might, is reminiscent of the way some performance artists such as Stelarc or Orlan[11] engage in high-tech body modification projects. As genetics reveals the infinite variations of life itself, so the performance artists demonstrate the co-connected plasticity of their bodies in conjunction with technology, medicine, and science. As such, both enterprises push the boundaries of our human capacity to tolerate the incommensurable.

In the work of cultural theorists and sociologists, this tolerance is sometimes spoken of in terms of an ethics of welcome and hospitability. For Zylinska (2005), the co-connectedness of humanity and technology creates the conditions where "the self extends a prosthetic invite to the always already monstrous [...] other, and thus recognizes the necessary doubling – but also splitting – of identity" (2005, p. 129). This reading of abjection is potentially liberating for those who want to challenge conventional notions of selfhood and who use biomedicine and technology as resources to script their identities in positive, political, or pleasurable ways. But for those whose experience of non-normative identity is not always cause for celebration, genetic screening and genetic engineering in the form of PGD and gene therapy opens up the spectre of a new eugenics that produces more bodies to watch and examine, and further perpetuates the abjection and pathologisation of people with disabilities. It is thus not enough to simply document and describe these technologies; nor is it enough to debate their permissibility without taking into account the socio-political and techno-scientific contexts out of which they arise.

[11] See Pitts (2003) and Zylinska (2005) for discussions of the work of these artists.

Concluding remarks: Staking a claim for more sociology in bioethics

One of the effects of PND and PGD is that these technologies create new kinds of bodies, embryos, and foetuses for technoscience and medicine to monitor and observe. This process, based on assessment and evaluation, divides new subjects and objects into categories that separate healthy and desirable bodies from the sick and maligned. A sociological perspective would enable us to take into account the kinds of surveillance consequences PND and PGD technologies institute; and how the dividing practices inherent in them distinguish people, or potential persons, based on their perceived normality or abnormality. As the reader will be aware, the contention that technologies have constitutive effects on the identities they monitor (Foucault, 1984), is now relatively commonplace in contemporary sociological thinking. In line with this argument, genetic and reproductive technologies both produce and constrain new social subjects. By classifying particular bodily attributes as deleterious or defective and identifying particular kinds of subjects (e.g. genetically flawed embryos, pregnant women) as remiss, genetic and reproductive technologies bring into being these embodied identities.

This is not how the media and biomedical discourse typically frame what they see as the benefits of assisted reproductive screening and genetic technologies. Because they are likely to interpret these technologies through the lens of parental liberties, choices, and rights, these discourses often overlook aspects of bioethical debate social scientists would consider fundamental. The media and biomedicine tend to foreground the power of PND and PGD technologies to enable parents to make informed decisions about their reproductive options, such as helping them decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy or which embryo to select for implantation. By contrast, many sociologists would likely argue that these technologies, as well as public debates to do with these technologies, are more about regulating the kinds of bodies permitted in biotechnologically privileged societies than they are about expanding peoples' freedom of choice.

It is this sort of observation that the sociological imagination can offer bioethics. The idea is not to supplant philosophical analysis from its role in bioethical inquiry, but to supplement it with sociological insight that is sensitive to the fact that ethical decision making occurs in social contexts

that extend beyond the moral party of two – or beyond the bedside, as a bioethicist might put it. This requires bioethicists, social scientists and philosophers among them, to take into account the discourses, practices, and values that frame and inform such decisions.

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Rhonda Shaw teaches Sociology at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. Her research interests include the sociology of ethics and moral relationships, family studies, and bodily gift-exchange practices.

Believing in Protest: The Liberal Ideal of the Separation of Religion and Politics in Two Recent Religious Protests

Mike Mawson

Abstract

This article examines the liberal idea that religion and politics should remain separate and distinct from one another, and more specifically the role this idea has played in two recent religious protests: the 1998 Hikoi of Hope, and the 2004 Destiny rally against the Civil Unions Bill. My interest is in tracing the understanding of religion and politics displayed by participants and critics in both protests, and in examining how the various parties in both protests understood and negotiated the liberal idea of separation. This is pursued through an analysis of the media coverage of both events.

Introduction

In recent years in New Zealand there have been two prominent examples of religiously inspired political protests. In September 1998 the Anglican Church organized a month long "Hikoi of Hope", a nationwide march "in support of the unemployed and beneficiaries."[1] An estimated 40 000 people turned out to support the hikoi and to protest the policies and direction of the National government. Six years later, and in a markedly different political environment, the pentecostal church Destiny organized the "Enough is Enough" rally to protest the moral direction of New Zealand. Around 7000 protesters marched through Wellington to oppose forthcoming civil unions legislation and to uphold "the sanctity of marriage" (Tamaki, 2005).[2] Both protests received widespread attention and criticism, including the familiar criticism that religious groups had no business taking public political stances. My central interest in this article is in examining

1 The motion from the 1998 Anglican General Synod that initiated the Hikoi of Hope.

2 This quote comes from Brian Tamaki's speech at the 'Enough is Enough' rally on August 23rd 2004. A large portion of the speech is on a DVD released as part of the 'Nation Under Siege' political tour held in June and July 2005.

this criticism, and its role and influence in contemporary religious protest.[3] How did organizers and participants justify the character of the protests as religious events? How did they negotiate, and even utilize, prevalent liberal understandings of religion as private and apolitical?

Political space and religion

One of the clearest early articulations of the liberal idea that politics and religion should be separate is given by John Locke (1632-1704). The understandings of religion and politics displayed in Locke's work anticipates understandings underlying contemporary protests.

Locke's understanding of political space is outlined in his *Second treatise on government*. For Locke, political space, or "politic society", is primarily defined in opposition to the "state of nature" (Locke, 1689, 2).[4] For Locke, "all men are naturally in that state [nature] and remain so till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society" (Locke, 1689, 2:15). In contrast to politics, this natural state is a state of individual autonomy, "a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man" (Locke, 1689, 2:4). It was on this basis that Locke pursued, in Nathan Tarcov's words, a "limitation of government to the protection of individual rights" (Tarcov, 1984, p.9). For Locke, politics was framed as secondary to the natural status of individual rights and liberties.[5] Locke's politics might be described as a *liberal* politics insofar as it restricts the role of the sovereign centre to simply helping preserve and ensure those rights determined by nature—for Locke "liberty, life, and estate" (Locke 1689, 7:87).

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[3] Both these protests can also be located against the rise of neoliberal understandings of economics and morality—and the changing role notions such as 'family' and 'welfare beneficiary' come to play within neoliberal discourse (see Morris & Janiewski, 2005).

[4] Citations to Locke's *Second treatise on government* refer to chapter and section numbers.

[5] This is also the source of Locke's notion of tolerance. For a discussion of tolerance and its role within contemporary religious expression see Mawson (2006).

In a similar manner, Locke pursued an understanding of religion as something pre-political and pre-social. In his *Letter concerning toleration*, Locke displays an understanding of religion as primarily about beliefs and morality.[6] This understanding is further reflected in his proposals for separating religious and political authority:

> [I]f each of them would contain itself within its own bounds — the one attending to the worldly welfare of the commonwealth, the other to the salvation of souls — it is impossible that any discord should ever have happened between them. (Locke, 1689, p.29).

Locke's understanding of religion as being about "the salvation of souls" discharges it from any necessary role in politics and public life. Religion instead becomes the guardian of the private sphere: of family, personal morality, and conscience.

This differentiation also indicates what Emile Durkheim later described as the shift from:

> ... a religion handed down by tradition, formulated for a whole group and which it is obligatory to practice [then] a free, private, optional religion, fashioned according to one's own needs and understanding (quoted in Pickering, 1975, p.96).

It is this emerging conception of religion as somehow free, private and optional, that concomitantly allows public political space itself to be conceivably secular, or to exist as independent of religious concerns. John Milbank has described how this new ordering of political space "no longer in any way reflected divine order or cosmic hierarchy" (Milbank, 2004, p.289). It is partly as a result of this, Milbank continues, that "religion ceased to betoken specific patterns of individual participation in public practice... and became instead a private attitude." This shift in understanding also leads to an active reorganization of political and public institutions. Jóse Casanova has summarized this as a process of "secularization", or a "functional differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres—primarily the state, the economy, and science—from the

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[6] Locke writes: "Whosoever will list himself under the banner of Christ," Locke writes, "must ...above all things make war upon his own lusts and vices" (Locke, 1689, p.29).

religious sphere." This reorganization also entails, as Casanova notes, "the concomitant differentiation and specialization of religion within its own newly found religious sphere" (Casanova, 1994, p.19).

Locke's division between secular political space and religion anticipates these broader processes of secularization, and in this way anticipates contemporary interactions between religious protesters and their secular critics. Without proposing that this background is determinative (or that the form of these religious protests is somehow reducible to Locke and secularization) the liberal separation provides a reference point that religious protesters and critics alike find themselves invoking and negotiating. Prevalent liberal understandings of what religion is, and what its proper role should be in relation to public political space, are significant to how religious protests unfold.

Walking for a change: The 1998 Hikoi of Hope

From the seventies onwards the mainline churches in New Zealand have had a pivotal role in political protests. Individual clergy and prominent church members have been integral to organizing and supporting events such as the protests against the Springbok tour in 1981, the Hikoi ki Waitangi in 1985 (asserting Maori land rights), and anti-nuclear protests of the late eighties and early nineties. What was surprising about the Hikoi of Hope was the degree to which it was officially organized and carried by the Anglican Church.[7] At the time of the Hikoi, Gordon Campbell of the *Listener* noted:

> When even the Anglican Church [decides to take] to the streets in protest on behalf of the poor, the tide of dissent is running very high indeed. In Britain, the Anglicans are the Tory party at prayer. Here, we have no established Church of state, but Anglicans have been a spiritual cornerstone of conservative politics in New Zealand for most of this century. (Campbell, 1998).

[7] It should be mentioned that the Hikoi was not without precedent. In 1992 church leaders across the mainline denominations—including the Anglican church—released the combined Church leaders statement (see Boston, 1994).

This conservatism, and past reticence for political action, meant that when the Anglican Church did finally take to the streets, it took with it a certain legitimacy. Bishops and clergy led from the front—including former Governor General and Arch-Bishop Sir Paul Reeves—and from the sidelines, opposition MPs, councillors and several local mayors were quick to give their endorsements. Importantly, this support translated into media coverage. Over the month of the Hikoi, local and national reporters publicly conveyed the concerns and comments of organizers, and then also subsequent responses and condemnations of politicians and critics.

Foremost amongst the criticisms of the Hikoi, was that the churches, as religious institutions, had no mandate for involving themselves in politics. When the Hikoi set out, National MP for Whangarei John Banks was quick to claim that "he supported the principle of the march, but did not think the church, of which he was a member, should be involved in political activism." Echoing Lockean divisions he further suggested that the energies of march organizers would be better spent "getting people back into the church and encouraging young people to attend Sunday school" (Banks, 1998). Others wrote to newspapers suggesting Hikoi leaders would "do the country a great service if they would stick to the traditional role of the church and give greater support for the status of marriage" ("Back marriage ahead of hikoi", 1998). This stance was typical of a number of letters and editorials, including one in the Northern News (Kaikohe), where the writer suggested that "in this largely post-Christian society they [the churches]... need to search out the appropriate moral stand on key problems such as the breakdown of the family and abortion; to rebuke any dilution of that which Christ achieved on the cross...." ("Letter to the editor", *The Northern News*, 1998). In a vitriolic attack on the Hikoi and its organizers, Warwick Roger outlined the true causes of poverty as "single-parent families", or "irresponsible parenting." Roger questioned whether the Government was an effective vehicle of economic change. "It might be best", Roger suggested, "if the Anglicans came to understand the real causes of "poverty" in New Zealand and preached their Sunday sermons on the subject of personal responsibility. Do Anglicans still have sermons?" (Roger, 1998). This familiar

call for the churches to focus on the private spheres of personal responsibility and family reinscribes liberal divisions and assumptions. So, how did organizers overcome such criticisms?

The first point to note is that organizers and participants made little or no effort to downplay the religious nature of the Hikoi. At the outset, Bishop of Aotearoa Whakahuihui Vercoe asserted that church leaders had undertaken a journey which God had called for "us to take part in" (quoted in Snell, 1998). Some press releases employed the language of "spiritual pilgrimage", although these were careful to clarify that it was "a spiritual pilgrimage planned... to draw attention to the widening gap between rich and poor" ("Month-long hikoi of hope begins", 1998). Clergy and participants more generally tended to cite religious factors as motivating them. In a lengthy exposition on the virtues of hope, the Rev Alice Hill (St David's, Owhata) suggested that "[t]he Hikoi is not merely a protest march, but is a journey of expectation where we set out to find where God wants us to be" (quoted in "Put your faith in hope", 1998). South Island walker Jo Burnside claimed that "[t]he spirit called me...", and further clarified that "some people might call it conscience and other people may say it's God" (quoted in "Pain no deterrent", 1998). This comparison between conscience and God is revealing insofar as God or religion tended to be frequently invoked as a motivating factor. Partially reflecting liberal divisions, God here becomes an inward motivation (albeit for outward action). There was also a tendency by participants to draw inspiration from religious tradition, especially the prophetic tradition extending from the Old Testament to Jesus. The prophets, as one supporter summarized, "were scathing about those who... cared nothing for those less well off in the community" (Ladbrook, 1998). Tongue in cheek, Sir Paul Reeves directly compared Hikoi walkers to Jesus Christ: "Jesus did most of his work by walking and talking as he went. We'll do a bit of that" (quoted in Snell, 1998).

The way organizers and critics framed the political dimensions of the Hikoi was slightly more complex. On the one hand, Hikoi organizers maintained that the Hikoi was not party-political, or pro or anti any particular political party. As Anglican Social Justice Commisioner Stephanie MacIntyre put it, "This is not a protest march or an exercise in partisan politics. The Hikoi," she continued, "is a call to find strategies of change" ("Hikoi won't

rise to ", 1998). The success of the Hikoi in securing support in traditional National party strongholds such as Southland and North Canterbury is partly attributable to this non-partisan stance. However, this attempt to promote the Hikoi as outside party politics was often misconstrued. As G. H. Barker wrote to the *Waikato Times*, "The Hikoi of Hope may claim to be purely pastoral. It cannot possibly avoid being political, naïve and fatally divisive to nation and Church" (Barker, 1998). In spite of such misconceptions, the Hikoi did, in fact, have a clear and articulated political agenda. Organizers throughout called for "balance and alternatives to the politics of the extreme far right" ("Politicians blamed", 1998). It was this call that complicated attempts to distance the Hikoi from party politics, and implicitly situated it against the incumbent National government (and also against the right wing Act party). As MacIntyre suggested, the Hikoi was an "informal audit" of the Government's performance (quoted in "Health theme emerges", 1998). As the Hikoi progressed it became increasingly difficult to maintain this non-partisan stance. It received constant endorsement from opposition MPs, particularly those in the Alliance and Labour parties. Alliance leader Jim Anderton, for example, proclaimed that "poverty and hardship are political problems and they demand political solutions" (quoted in "Long walk to capital", 1998). Labour's Social Welfare spokesman Steve Maharey directly asserted that "the Hikoi showed the Government had no mandate to continue with its present social policies" (quoted in "Long walk to capital", 1998). When the Hikoi did finally arrive at Parliament on November 1st the address of the Social Service Minister Roger Sowry was received with derision, whereas opposition leader Helen Clark was spontaneously crowned with a garland of flowers.

Regarding liberal divisions between religion and political space, the political character of the Hikoi was justified in a variety of ways. Some organizers and supporters downplayed its religious character (at least as a public justification), and sought a more direct legitimacy for the Hikoi by citing the extensive network of agencies and parishes involved in delivering public community services. As the Dean of the Napier Cathedral Noel Hendery suggested, "We know first hand about the food banks that keep growing, rents that put good housing out of reach, deaths from poverty-related illnesses and communities where unemployment is the norm"

(quoted in "Walkers Hit the Streets", 1998). Alternatively, others sought a more theological basis for bypassing or minimizing divisions between religion and politics. As Nelson organizer Dr Peter Carrell asserted, "The church cannot separate itself from politics. What politics is concerned about, the Bible speaks about" (quoted in "Hikoi of hope", 1998). When queried over what place the Church had in politics, the Reverend Vicki Sykes (Manakau) likewise asserted that "Jesus was a political animal" who "actively fought against injustice and inequality." Sykes further suggested that "throughout history the state has tried to keep the Church out of politics, but it is often the only voice for the people" ("March of hope", 1998).

This idea that the Hikoi spoke "for the people", and in a way unmediated by politics proper, was frequently appealed to by Hikoi supporters. The Rev. Bruce Keeley of All Saints Church (Howick) claimed "the Hikoi will be drawing upon the wisdom of ordinary New Zealanders" (quoted in "Hikoi of Hope", *Howick & Pakuranga Times*, 1998). The Rev. Danny Te Hiko, in his column in the *Opotiki News*, similarly asserted that "[w]e must not allow the Hikoi to be hijacked in the name of religion or politics. The Hikoi," he continued, "is of the people, by the people, for the people" (Te Hiko, 1998). A related claim that was often put forward, was that the Hikoi was simply about "the facts." In opposition to Business Round Table criticisms of the "unrealistic demands of the Hikoi", R. Hoyte indignantly wrote to the *Greymouth Evening Star*, "they [organizers] are telling the facts as they are, collecting stories from those finding living intolerable, and making it clear many people are no longer prepared to leave it to politicians and economists to define 'hope' for us" (Hoyte, 1998).

This indicates a final way organizers justified the Hikoi in public space—by appealing to a higher vocabulary of "justice" or "hope". Kaikohe Minister Wiritai Toi articulated the Hikoi as speaking "out for the people who are blamed for not having a job, being sick, live in substandard housing. The church wants justice," he said. (quoted in *The Northern News*, 1998). Some organizers sought to place the emphasis "on hope, not criticism" (*East and Bays Courier*, 1998). Rev. Dr George Armstrong suggested the Hikoi was about finding a "hopefulness that we can get a better situation from this deteriorating economic situation" (*East and Bays Courier*, 1998). In this way "hope" became a way of disarming the neoliberal claims to "economic

necessity". Condemning the Hikoi, Act MP Muriel Newman had rehearsed the familiar arguments that "only the private sector can create wealth and jobs," and that all the Government can do is "provide an environment that encourages economic growth." She urged the churches to "take their heads out of the sand", and suggested "the energy of the marchers would best be directed at encouraging... changes at a personal level" (Newman, 1998). Against this pessimistic understanding of what politics might accomplish (reiterating Lockean understandings of property and its pursuit as private), Hikoi supporters were able to appeal to their higher concept of "hope". In response to what he described as the "sad and cynical" editorial of the *Daily Telegraph* (Napier), Waiapu Bishop Murray Mills invited critics to "come and walk with us and catch another spirit – the spirit of hope that rises up in New Zealanders when they glimpse a better way forward... when they share a compassion and faith and sense of justice that Jesus encourages in the human heart" (Mills, 1998). Again, the religious character of the Hikoi provided organisers with a vocabulary to combat neoliberal realism.

This tendency to talk in terms of hope and justice, and elsewhere to cite religious motivations, was complemented by the organisers' reticence from making specific policy proposals. One of the constant criticisms of the Hikoi was that organizers should be offering practical solutions rather than simply rallying against Government. When the Hikoi set out, Social Services Minister Roger Sowry had "challenged leaders to put forward their own solutions to the problems they were highlighting" ("Sowry Challenges Hikoi View", 1998). Jane White, writing to the *Dominion* (Wellington), felt "ashamed to be an Anglican" because of the way Hikoi protesters arrived at "Parliament with no constructive suggestions as to how we solve our social and economic problems" (White, 1998). Avoiding such calls, organizers, at least during the march itself, often reiterated their own role and responsibility as being distinct from that of politicians. As Greymouth coordinator Canon Robin Kingston put it, "We're not trying to come up with policy for the Government on this. That's left in the hands of the politicians" (quoted in "The Hikoi in review", 1998). No doubt this reticence was also out of desire to avoid debates that might detract from the march. As Julia Stuart responded to Sowry, "The aim of the Hikoi is to listen, and we have a firm concern to see change, rather than shrill confrontation" (quoted in "Hikoi

won't rise", 1998). The way organizers opted for an ethical language of hope and justice rather than for making specific proposals has been elsewhere labelled by Jonathan Boston as a "middle-axiom" approach. Such an approach draws on "middle-level ethical principles that fall between the 'universal truths' of theology, and the more specific and technical concerns of policy making" (Boston, 1994, p. 27). This approach, as Boston clarifies, placed the churches in an ambivalent position:

> If they [the churches] endorse concrete policy proposals, they expose themselves to accusations that they have strayed beyond their field of competence, that they have become too political, and, more simply, that they are wrong. If they fail to be specific, they can just as readily be accused of fudging the hard questions and of lacking the courage to take a stand. There is no simple solution to this conundrum. (Boston, 1994, p. 21)

Just over a month after the Hikoi, church leaders did meet with Prime Minister Jenny Shipley and members of cabinet to make specific policy recommendations relating to areas such as housing, welfare and biculturalism. On the basis of these, National politicians sought, with some success, to charge organizers both with incompetence and also with having had a secret agenda (insofar as the specificities of the recommendations differed from the broader language of the march).[8] Inevitably, many supporters likewise felt the organizers' recommendations failed to encapsulate their varied concerns. Many of the hopes and expectations raised by the Hikoi remained, at least during the immediate aftermath, unfulfilled.

Enough is enough: The 2004 Destiny protest against civil unions

The Destiny rally on August 23rd 2004 provides a markedly different example of religion entering into public secular space. Rather than justice or hope, the rally's concern was the moral decline of New Zealand society. Destiny's

[8] These charges centred around the proposals of Professor Whatarangi Winiata for greater political autonomy for Maori. The content of Winiata's proposals arguably departed from the Hikoi's more general platform as being a march about poverty. Certainly Winiata proposals were more radical than the more moderate agenda of many of the Hikoi's supporters.

charismatic leader Brian Tamaki described the purpose the rally as to "uphold and protect the institution of marriage and the future of our children and grandchildren" (Tamaki, 2005). The private sphere of family was framed as being under attack by politics (and the Lockean division between public politics and private life as being under threat). Among Destiny and its supporters the Civil Unions Bill tended to be conceived as part of a broader secularizing agenda of the Labour Government. Tamaki elsewhere denounced Labour as controlled by "secular humanists, relativists, liberals and gays" (Tamaki, 2005). At the rally, the "God-ordained" institution of marriage was articulated as being under threat from secular civil unions. Interestingly, supporters of civil unions tended to display some broadly similar assumptions about what civil unions and marriages were. In January 2004, Prime Minister Helen Clark had commented that "marriage carries associations with religion and belief. My personal interest, Clark continued, "is in a secular society, and I think a civil unions bill is very important for heterosexual couples as well" (quoted in Hall, 2004). Like protesters, Clark here framed civil unions as innovative and secular, and as distinct from religious marriages. In the same interview, however, Clark lambasted the Destiny Church as holding a "very minority point of view." She further anticipated that "through continuing to set the tone of tolerance, acceptance and diversity such people will be "further marginalized. Hopefully one day nobody will think that way" (quoted in Hall, 2004).

Like the Hikoi, the Destiny rally received widespread media coverage. Indeed, the rally was the event that initiated an ongoing media interest in Destiny and its activities. As media analyst Ann Hardy has noted, the year from July 2004 to July 2005 saw more than 400 newspaper items dealing with Destiny—including features, letter-sections, editorials, and op-ed columns (Hardy, 2005). This attention is partly attributable to Destiny's strong views, and partly also to its careful presentation of these. Protesters were dressed uniformly in black tee-shirts and marched in unison punching the air chanting "enough is enough." This scene caused Labour's transsexual MP Georgina Beyer to comment: "Frankly, I feel like I'm at a Nuremburg rally." The Rev. Dr Margaret Mayman, spokesperson for Christians for Civil Unions, reiterated this:

> The 'enough is enough' message blamed gay and lesbian people for a whole range of social issues [...] Historically, in the rise of Nazi Germany, we've seen that kind of rhetoric before. I think it needs to be named and challenged. (quoted in Hardy, p. 45).

In contrast to the fairly mixed coverage of the Hikoi, media coverage of the Destiny rally was largely negative. Following the rally, media and critics recycled the comparison to the Nuremburg rallies, and more generally derided protesters as narrow, sectarian, and intolerant. Some described the rally as a "hate march" while others profiled Destiny and its charismatic leader as a "cult" (Mcloughlin, 2004). In a typical letter, Jeff Goldsbury asked how "we can prevent fanatical religious organizations, such as the Destiny Church, from attempting to interfere with politics?" (Goldsbury, 2004). Another warned that "allowing these people to force their morality and ideals on New Zealand as though it is a divine and irrefutable truth will lead to this country becoming an unsafe place for any minority these 'Christians' disagree with" (Buckley, 2004). As the *Sunday Star Times* (Auckland) summed up the situation, "Destiny wants to bring religion into politics and to turn political issues into black-and-white questions of morality" ("Irrelevance is Tamaki's Destiny, 2004). Despite continued claims by Tamaki and his supporters of media bias,[9] these accusations are not entirely baseless.

Like Hikoi organizers, Destiny's leaders questioned the possibility and desirability of entirely separating religion from public politics. In an interview Martin Daly, pastor of Destiny's Nelson branch, stated that it is "wrong to think we can separate church and state." Daly further suggested that "[i]f the church is a good church and for the betterment of society with the love and wisdom of God in its heart, that can't be a wrong thing" (quoted in Manning, 2004). Like Hikoi organizers, Destiny leadership sought to justify this approach by citing scripture. Daly discussed the Bible as the sole source of inspiration and guidance for Destiny and its actions. Tamaki has expressed similar sentiments in his sermon entitled "Secular humanism has had its day":

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[9] One of Tamaki's more extreme statements has been to refer to the secular media as "modern-day witchcraft." (See Tamaki, 2005).

> Every sphere of society must submit to the lordship of Jesus. Every institution, whether it be educational, economic, political, spiritual, religious, must come under the lordship of Jesus. And the word of God, this Bible here, must be the ruling, measuring, yardstick, plumbline, for every law, every principle, and everything about life itself.

This idea that secular institutions need to "submit to the yardstick of the Bible" certainly places Destiny against mainstream liberal media and politics. This situation was hardly helped when, in a TVNZ feature on Destiny, Tamaki was recorded as predicting that "by the time we [Destiny] hit our 10th anniversary... we will be ruling the nation. This will be the first nation", Tamaki continued, "to be under the governance of God" (*Sunday Program*, 2004).

The main way Destiny has pursued its theocratic vision is through forming a political party. The Destiny New Zealand party was launched in July 2003. While Destiny New Zealand is officially separate from the Destiny church, the party draws heavily upon the church for direction and support. As Daly summarized "the church [Destiny] promotes spiritual values, which are then channelled into the political arena through the Destiny New Zealand political party" (quoted in Manning, 2004). Destiny New Zealand builds its platform on its goal to "protect, empower and prosper New Zealand families." In the lead up to the 2005 election, Destiny New Zealand's Jason Thomson (the Nelson coordinator) claimed that "every single one of its policies is filtered through what we have called a family vision" ("Focusing on the Family", 2004). Thomson further defines this "family" as a "man and a woman legally married with their adopted or natural-born children living in unconditional love and acceptance, believing in success and empowerment." Following on from this, it hardly comes as a surprise that Destiny defines itself as "a 'centre-right' party with a strong emphasis on minimal Government (based on individual responsibility), lower taxes, uninhibited wealth creation and strong intergenerational families" (see www.destinynz.org.nz). What also differentiates Destiny New Zealand from other centre-right parties—including United Future (with a similar emphasis on families)—is its willingness to explicitly include religion within this vision. The platform of Destiny New Zealand includes the assertion that "there is

only one God" and that "the Holy Bible to be the Word of God... is infallible and the supreme authority in all matters of faith and morals." Again, it is on the basis of the Bible that "governing mandates should be founded and measured" (see www.destinynz.org.nz).

Part of Destiny's justification for subordinating public space to religion is its claim to embody and represent true Christianity. At the rally, Tamaki's directly claimed to speak on "behalf of the religious community of this nation" (Tamaki, 2005). While some Christian groups and organizations formally supported Destiny's rally—including the Christian Heritage political party and the right-wing Christian think-tank the Maxim Institute—most did not. The Anglican Church's media officer Julanne Clark-Morris distanced the church and further suggested, "Destiny's extremism had raised its public profile beyond its real significance or influence in mainstream Christianity" (quoted in Warren, 2004). Even groups sympathetic to Destiny's views expressed reservations. National leader of the Baptist Union Brian Winslade publicly expressed his concerns:

> Could it be that such public displays [i.e. the 'Enough is Enough' rally] are embarrassing the wider Christian Community and stigmatizing fellow Bible-believing Christians in an unhealthy way?... Are we to rally and 'rise up' and risk the miscommunication of public 'stunts', or are we to copy the model of Jesus and quietly transforms the world through loving ministry to hurting people? (Winslade, 2005).

While Destiny's main justifications for entering public space are religious, there were also broader attempts to justify the rally. "I am sure that I speak for a whole of lot of commonsense New Zealand families," Tamaki claimed, "who may not agree with my faith, but certainly do not agree with the legislation that is undermining the family and the institute of marriage" (Tamaki, 2005). Other supporters reiterated this, and Rebecca Southey (a Pastor from the Christian Family Assembly of God Church) suggested the protest was "not just about being a Christian. It's about having some commonsense" (quoted in Kavanagh, 2004). This claim is reminiscent of the Hikoi organizers' claims to be "for the people" or elsewhere simply "stating the facts".

It should be noted that Destiny's political ambition and public infamy have so far failed to translate into any significant political influence. In the 2005 general election Destiny NZ received 14210 votes, only 0.62% of the total vote. To win seats within the MMP system Destiny New Zealand would need to achieve 5% of the national vote. In addition, the tendency of Destiny to denounce mainstream politics limits its potential for less direct forms of political influence. As Ann Hardy has noted "there is undoubtedly... a larger gap between evangelical sub-cultures, traditional religious denominations and mainstream "secular" culture in New Zealand, than there is in America, or Australia" (Hardy, 2005, p. 45). Despite Tamaki's prophetic visions, and despite the concerns of their liberal detractors, it remains highly unlikely that Destiny will have any significant political impact in the near future.

Conclusion: Negotiations of separation

Hikoi marchers and Destiny protesters sit at opposite ends of the political and religious spectrums. Hikoi marchers sought economic and social justice, while Destiny and its supporters defended traditional family values. The Anglican Church, at least for the duration of the Hikoi, drew heavily on a social gospel tradition that emphasizes the prophets and the theological option for the poor, whereas Destiny displayed the concerns with personal piety and individual morality familiar to the evangelical right. Despite these divergent influences and agendas, both events stand together as examples of contemporary religious protest, and in this way are forced to negotiate a Lockean framework with its vision of a privatized religion. Both protests find a certain commonality through their rejection of the Lockean ideal of secular political space, and through their shared assumption that religion has an intrinsically public and political dimension.

However, the response of protesters to the liberal separation of religion and politics cannot solely be framed as rejection. Even while explicitly rejecting the liberal separation, both groups, in different ways, also partially assumed it. The effectiveness of the Hikoi at mobilizing support was at least partly due to its ability to maintain its distance from politics, either by emphasizing its character as a religious event, its non-partisan stance, or by pursuing a "middle-axiom" approach. This distance is what allowed organizers to present the Hikoi as an alternative to normal politics. In a

similar way, the liberal separation of religion and politics granted Destiny's political ambitions an immunity from secular political critique. Similarly, the articulation of Destiny NZ as a political party based on spiritual values relies on an understanding of religion and politics as somehow distinct. Secular critiques of Destiny NZ remain unconvincing to religious supporters precisely because of this separation (or because public political reason operates within a different register to belief). In both protests the way organizers deployed distinctly religious vocabularies—whether the "hope" of the Hikoi or the "moral values" invoked by Destiny—proved effective in locating their concerns as outside ordinary politics. For instance the very concern of Destiny protesters with the private sphere of family, and their insistence that the state had no business interfering with traditional families, likewise implicitly drew on a Lockean vision of family as private and pre-political. Finally, the occasional claim made by protesters, in both protests, to be simply "stating the facts" or "speaking for the people" indicates Locke's understanding of politics as something secondary and exterior to ordinary human experiences (and thus not as something pervasive to human reality). The ability of the protesters to partially present themselves as outside of politics relies upon a distinctly liberal understanding of what politics is.

What a comparison of religious protests has indicated, then, is a certain ambivalence inhabiting the function that the liberal idea of a separation between religion and politics has. On the one hand, we have seen that the idea is continually invoked in religious protests—whether in the accusations of critics, the language and negotiations of protesters, or the broader assumptions about what religion and politics are. On the other, however, it is difficult to find much consistency in its influence and effects. At the close of the Destiny rally, *The New Zealand Herald* observed:

> Adherence to the separation of church and state rather depends on the issue. When Christian clerics organised their 'Hikoi of Hope', members of the National Government were all for the separation principle but hardly a murmur was heard from the left. Now that a church is campaigning against what it sees as the moral decadence of liberal legislation, the conservative parties are quiet and the left is seeing demons where probably none exist. ("Our View ...", 2005)

The reasons for invoking the idea that religion and politics should be separate are as diverse as the agendas of religious protesters. What this ultimately suggests is that the liberal idea of separation, for all its presence, has a certain breadth and malleability that allows it to be used by divergent political and religious programs.

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Mike Mawson has an MA in Religious Studies from Victoria University of Wellington, and has recently moved to the United States to begin a PhD in Theology at the University of Notre Dame.

Interfacing with the West: Muslims, Multiculturalism and Radicalism in New Zealand

Erich Kolig

Abstract

New Zealand's Muslims, forming a strongly visible religious minority, create interfaces with the host society to negotiate officially conceded spaces so as to be able to manifest their religious and cultural identity. As in other secular liberal democracies, through guaranteed religious freedom and supported by the human rights agenda, Muslims in New Zealand tend to present a distinctive socio-cultural profile. This raises issues of their integration into the host society, the degree of expected adaptation, the effectiveness of political representation, but also the question of Islam's adjustment so as to achieve a non-conflictual coexistence with the host society. Because of global events, the presence of a Muslim minority also brings to the fore the fear of its radicalisation. Some of these issues are of world-wide relevance, others are characteristic for Muslims' embeddedness in New Zealand society.

Introduction

In recent years New Zealand has increasingly assumed a more liberal stance in matters of immigration and vis-à-vis resident cultural, ethnic and religious minorities. In embracing a human rights inspired ideology that emphasises freedom of religious belief and practice, and of cultural choice as of right, a practical, if officially undeclared, form of multiculturalism emerges which departs radically from traditional notions of national cultural homogenisation. Consequently, it places more emphasis on meaningful integration as opposed to assimilation. Policies and legal instruments guaranteeing cultural and religious freedom and safeguarding against discrimination provide a genial foil against which a plethora of ethnic, religious and cultural (and even so-called life-style) differences can profile itself. Traditional pressures have substantially eased on immigrants to

speedily adopt the customs and conventions of the host society and relegate adherence to different customs and beliefs strictly to the innermost private sphere.

One of the beneficiary groups of this departure from previous practice are New Zealand's Muslims. They are increasingly placed in a position in which they can assert their religious identity so as to meet their cultural and religious needs openly and with the support of legal instruments available to them (see Kolig, 2005). By using these legal instruments provided by legislation as well as by availing themselves of democratic-political institutions, Muslims begin to negotiate their place as a visible minority group in New Zealand society. Exploring the ideological, legal and political conditions, they, as their numbers grow, tentatively embark on a process openly to assert a space for their religious identity and in so doing explore the boundaries of multiculturalism. To manifest this identity in the social discourse it requires the liberty to adhere to some customs and espouse some religious observances that are unconventional in Western-type societies; and to follow values some of which are not shared by a majority of the 'host society' or by the dominant culture. In some cases this means to test dominant laws and conventions as to their flexibility and ability to accommodate alternative positions. The combined effect of this is to set in motion a process which in the long term is apt to change the national character from conservatively and monoculturally Anglo-Celtic into a more pluralistic, culturally and religiously heterogenous and multi-facetted one. An attendant issue to the assertion of a distinctly Islamic identity and the spectrum of initiatives that emerges, is the development of a radical Islamic discourse that not only opposes the flexibility that allows adjustment, but, in rejecting any dialogical process, is implacably hostile to the values and fundamental social and ideological characteristics of the host society. (Despite the increasing plurality and diversification of New Zealand society, both it as well as most Muslims have a more or less stereotyped notion of what such 'normative' features are.) Now often mistakenly identified with the spread of Saudi Wahhabism, such rejectionist-fundamentalist and radical Islamist discourses may have diverse ideological roots (for example in Qutb's

or Maududi's teaching), but may also be rooted in a 'home-grown' notion that adjustment to the West would corrupt the spirit of Islam or that global Western hegemony must be resisted.

Muslims in New Zealand

As in most Western-type societies, Muslims in New Zealand constitute primarily an immigrant group with cultural needs and expectations which differ from the de facto dominant Anglo-Celtic culture of the host society. Even New Zealand converts and second-generation immigrant Muslims face the problem of belonging to a 'cultural' minority of distinctive difference to the majority society and may feel pressured into a 'cultural other' category. Despite an advanced process of secularisation, the host society's values and laws are of Christian origin and in a broad sense are located in the Christian tradition. Now emphatically secularised, the host society creates paradoxical preconditions: secularisation of state and society may entail religious tolerance in the form of benign indifference, or neutrality, towards all religions, but it also has created an ideological and political climate uncongenial to some 'conservative' religious values. As a consequence, probably a majority of Muslims now find that in a broad moral sense they have more affinity with some 'fundamentalist' Christian groups than with the social majority.

Muslim migration to the country began more than a hundred years ago, but remained very small in numbers until very recently (see Shepard, 2002). Only in the last 10 to 15 years have numbers appreciably increased. According to the 2001 census there were about 23,500 Muslims living in New Zealand. In 2005, the figure is approximately 30,000 but probably closer to 35,000 or perhaps even 40,000[1]. In relation to the total population of 4 million New Zealand residents Muslims (still) constitute only a small minority of around 1%. Australia's Muslim population of 300,000, or 1.5 % of the total population (Humphrey, 2001, p.36), is comparatively speaking similar, but by being numerically ten times larger is more visible in the

[1] The census does not make it mandatory for respondents to declare their religious affiliation. Religious statistics are therefore only approximations. Some estimates put the number of Muslims in New Zealand as high as 45 to 50 000.

social, urban landscape. (It also shows features of sporadic radicalisation as yet absent from New Zealand.) In the European Union Islam has now risen to be the single most numerous minority religion and takes second place behind Christianity. In New Zealand Islam is still numerically eclipsed by several other minority religions, behind the dominant category 'Christianity'.

In New Zealand, most Muslim immigrants have settled in major urban centres, above all in Auckland (around 20 000), to some extent in Wellington, Hamilton, Christchurch and to a much lesser extent in Dunedin. Practical multiculturalism is partially already a social reality in such centres, especially in Auckland, hence there is no urgent need for basic tolerance to be secured by law to allow Muslim immigrants to exist in the host society. Immigrant communities, as they increase in size, have their own communication and support networks lessening the pressure towards conformity with, and cushioning individuals from the need of rapid assimilation to, the host society. In New Zealand despite the tendency of Muslims to favour certain suburbs of bigger cities, ghettoisation has not occurred (as yet).

Mainly through increased Muslim immigration in more recent years and especially through migration from the Middle East, the Maghreb and East Africa, a more assertive Muslim identity is gradually emerging which insists to a much stronger degree than before on the retention of cultural features in which it differs from the host society.

Ultimately, the greater degree of Muslim cultural and religious assertiveness may not only be caused by the numerical increase, but possibly is related to the increased immigration from the Arab world. Muslims from that part of the world are used to being culturally dominant, unlike South Asian (and Fiji Indian) Muslims who are more accustomed to a cultural/ religious minority position. A global revivalist spirit in the Islamic world provides an additional stimulus from which national Muslim minorities cannot stay aloof.

Through some cases in particular, the public's attention is being drawn to the unfolding of this identity in the midst of New Zealand society. The need for a laissez-faire tolerance toward an Islam that remains inconspicuous in the grey zone of public invisibility is gradually disappearing in the face of an increasingly publicly negotiated official space of recognition. Gradually, cultural interfaces are now being formed which allow Muslims to create

officially sanctioned spaces in which to show their religiously defined, specific identity – an identity that to some considerable extent represents a cultural novum imported from abroad, but to some extent is also shaped by the specific diasporic conditions prevailing in New Zealand. Both immigrant group and host society have to undergo reciprocal transformations, though to an unequal degree, to create such spaces. These spaces are being explored with the help of the legal instruments provided by a liberal democracy willing to entertain earnestly the idea of multiculturalism in which religious needs can not only be met in the social grey zone of inconspicuousness but are legitimately and openly manifested.

As the European example shows, concomitant with increasing numbers of Muslims, issues pertaining to 'Islam in the West', that is, the interface between two distinctly different cultures coexisting within nation-states, and mutual rapprochement gain in importance. Issues that consequently have strongly come to the fore, and are passionately debated in various forums, are matters of integration versus assimilation of Muslims, participation in democratic and secularist governance, the extent and degree of multiculturalism possible in a liberal democracy and its likely limitations of flexibility vis-à-vis the cultural other. Conversely, concerns arise about the emergence of so-called 'Islamic fundamentalism' that is adverse to any form of adaptation to dominant cultural conditions[2]. Another issue which surfaces, is the importation of Islamic radicalism that is not only hostile to the idea of Islamic accommodation to hegemonic Western conditions – including its world view and politics - but violently resists them.

Although the dominant society's perception is of one homogenous Muslim identity, this is not necessarily true 'on the ground'. Muslim immigration in New Zealand has reached a 'critical mass' in which internal differences and community divisions are becoming increasingly noticeable. Despite efforts of the Muslim umbrella organisation FIANZ (Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand) and regional associations to develop

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2 Here it is not possible to discuss the numerous forms of concern expressed by majority society over the increase of Muslim numbers in Europe, and the various expressions of Islamophobia. In New Zealand such expressions are much more muted, but are tangible in the form of television commentaries, letters to newspapers, politicians' comments, etc.

common forms of worship and a national Muslim identity based on a doctrinally relaxed, 'modernist' interpretation of Islam (see Kolig, 2003), differences are becoming noticeable now along sectarian, ethnic and ideological lines. Heterodoxy and ethnic heterogeneity appear as internal problems. A small minority of Shi'i is confronted and to some extent marginalised by the overwhelming majority of Sunni. Another doctrinal division separates Sufi from non-Sufi and Sunni *Miladists*, who celebrate the prophet Mohammed's birthday, from those who reject doing so as *bida* (illicit innovation or heresy). There are also 'fault lines' dividing the Muslim community into main ethnic blocs: South Asians (including Fijian Indians), Middle Eastern Muslims and Maghreb Arabs (mainly Arabic speakers), and African Muslims (mainly Somalis); with much smaller groupings of Southeast Asians, Iranian Shi'ites, Afghans (some Sunni, and some Shi'i), Turks, and European Muslims (Bosnians, Albanians). There are also emergent divisions in the perception of what responses are needed under diasporic conditions. In some events these divisions become critically apparent, even to outsiders, though worship does not seem to separate worshippers along ethnic lines as is often the case elsewhere. In other words, prayers at the mosques draw the faithful of all ethnic backgrounds and mosques do not tend to be monopolised by certain ethnic groups (as frequently seems to be the case in urban centres in Australia and Europe).

Considering intra-Muslim discourses about integration issues such as how to adapt Islamic doctrine, how to use *ijtihad* for this purpose (see Kolig, 2001), or whether to adhere to conservative principles, is of course significant. Normally, when points of contention arise among Muslims, which are important from their point of view, they do not affect the interface with the host society: such as for instance *Miladism* (celebrating the prophet's birthday) which seems to be popular mainly among South Asian immigrants, but is totally rejected by others (Humphrey and Shepard, 1999). In other issues, this may be different. For example, the attempt by some Muslims to involve a Middle Eastern based charity organisation in the affairs of their mosque went beyond being a debate among co-religionists. It soon touched on the interface with the host society, as one side in this conflict, who feared that al Qaida may thus gain a foothold, sought to enlist the help of local authorities and political agencies to lend gravity to their rejection of

this initiative. To involve the host society for the resolution of inner Muslim conflict is certainly an interesting aspect of the developing interface. Indeed, following this and other events, some political agencies have demanded that the Muslim community monitor itself to thwart hostile designs.

State provision: Multiculturalism and its legal instruments

More so than for other immigrant groups who make New Zealand their home, for a Muslim religio-cultural identity to be able more fully to unfold within the Western host society, more than just a laissez-faire cultural tolerance is necessary. It requires the active support by liberal legislation to create the parameters of cultural and religious freedom and to hold discrimination at bay.

New Zealand, though of a very strong Anglo-Celtic orientation in culture, tradition and law, is also tolerant and inclined towards a realistic recognition of the already existing cultural and religious plurality. The state no longer sees it as its primary function to supervise cultural homogenisation. In fostering the reality of practical multiculturalism, it certainly helps that the New Zealand state is emphatically secularist. Not being beholden to a particular faith, it makes it easier for the state to extend benevolent neutrality – perhaps indifference is a better word - to all religions (see Ahdar, 2004). More than that, the traditional absence of a state religion and agreements with any religion, Christian or otherwise, facilitates extending full and equal rights to adherents of minority religions or religions which were not involved in the foundation of the nation. State neutrality in matters of belief is clearly a very modern phenomenon linked with the rise of secularism in Western society.

For devout and practising Muslims living as immigrants in Western society, the balance between religious and cultural retention and meaningful integration conceivably is more difficult than for other immigrant ethnic groups and other non-Christian religionists[3]. In Islam orthopraxis, living in accord with divinely ordained rules of conduct, in daily life is as important as orthodoxy. But adhering to the correct ritual etiquette and social conduct

[3] Nominal or less committed Muslims are less likely to experience difficulties that arise from the difference in the normative social praxis demanded by Islam and that common in secularised Western society.

may be at odds with customary practices and conventions of the host society or may even result in open conflict with existing laws. Insofar as Islam is emphatically not an 'inner religion' or a religion of ritualistic expression only, but is very much bound to, and expressed in social everyday practice, the maintenance of a Muslim identity within a Western society demands the creation of an often very conspicuous autonomous social space, much more so than is the case with other religious minorities. Islamic canonical law, *shari'a*, prescribes not only ethical norms, but a wide range of empirically manifestable behaviour rules which vastly go beyond the ritual sphere and regulate and give a sacred, immutable tinge even to seemingly mundane social conduct. Some of that conduct is at odds with norms and conventions of a modern Western liberal democratic society. The question arises: should Muslims in such conflict situations reasonably be expected to make the adjustment to Western society or should the dominant society adjust to Islamic requirements by creating exemptive and supportive laws?[4] And what are Islamic requirements: should a difference be made between those clearly enshrined in scriptural law and those more grounded in regional cultural traditions and customs?

In accord with a globally spreading human rights ideology, which has been of increasing significance especially in Western liberal democracies, New Zealand over the last 15 years has enacted statute, which is intended to safeguard the interests of minority groups, to prevent active discrimination against them as well as proactively to enshrine the rights of minorities in principle. The codification of civil liberties ensuring freedom of religion and culture, benefits primarily immigrant religious and ethnic groups who stand outside the dominant, culturally hegemonic tradition. Legal instruments are now providing relevant tools to assert minority rights. These are primarily the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990) and the Human Rights Act (1993). Both contain provisions assuring freedom of religious belief and practice, and adherence to culture. While the Human Rights Act focuses on the active prohibition of discrimination (and is actively supported in this by the Human Rights Commission), the Bill of Rights guarantees in principle free adherence to culture and religion including the manifestation

[4] For the range of juridical possibilities see Levy (1997).

of religious beliefs in actual conduct (see Kolig, 2005). In a practical sense, these acts also are instrumental in providing a mitigating effect on assimilation pressures to which immigrants with cultural backgrounds and religious beliefs that are traditionally very different from the host society's, are inevitably exposed. But especially the spirit of the Human Rights Act provides for the rule of law – one law – for all thus giving a juridical framework within which social conduct, be it religious or customary, has to exist. Religious conduct which falls outside the rule of (criminal) law is still subject to intense scrutiny and, if deemed necessary, punishment. All this facilitates the process of establishing an officially recognised Muslim identity, but within certain boundaries. There are also political institutions, which can be utilised by Muslims to represent and support their religious interests and thus create, and enlarge, the spaces in which Islam can unfold in the majority host society.

New Zealand distinguishes in statute and political praxis between the rights of the indigenous minority and immigrant minorities. Although it is thus not officially declared a multicultural, but a bicultural, nation, New Zealand has effectively taken an increasingly multicultural stance. By recognising the fact that its society's composition tends to become increasingly and conspicuously multi-religious and multi-ethnic, it has set itself on a course very much in line with the European Union and Canada. Multiculturalism in democratic, pluralistic societies of the Western type, in general, seeks a balance between cultures and lifestyles of diverse ethnic and religious groups, and a commitment to a set of shared principles and values which are distinctive of the society as a whole (Poulter, 1995; 1998). Although achieving this balance does imply a certain degree of adaptation by cultural minorities to the norms and standards of the dominant society, the ideology of multiculturalism is mainly based on the notion that the insistence on total assimilation is largely superfluous in favour of meaningful integration[5]. As commonly understood, this requires free participation and shared responsibility in the democratic and lawful functioning of society.

[5] Modood (2005) is veering in his view on the relationship between multiculturalism and integration between seeing them as mutually contradictory and calling them 'complementary ideas'. Liberal policy in most West-European countries seems to have little difficulty in combining them and declaring their successful combination as a desirable policy goal.

In a broad sense it is true that in the wake of the global human rights campaign modern Western liberal society has discarded assimilatory pressures in favour of a more liberal stance, which allows for cultural retention and complete religious freedom. However, it still does expect integration in terms of democratic participation, and acceptance of the legal system and core values. (For Muslims in particular developing a sense of citizenship involves also the acceptance of values such as respect and tolerance vis-à-vis other religionists and the secularity of state and governance.) In other words, the construction of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious polity can accommodate a degree of cultural retention but needs to be balanced by minorities fitting into the existing socio-political structures. The fine balance between necessary adaptation of immigrants – to secure a modicum of social unity and unity of purpose - and the liberty to adhere to their own beliefs, observances and values is not achieved ad hoc. In many instances compromises need to be worked out in a protracted process of testing the situation case by case.

While the guarantee and exercise of religious freedom in principle is no issue in liberal democracies, such as New Zealand's, it may be necessary for Muslims to invoke specific legal mechanisms, or testing their efficacy, to adhere to some doctrinal requirements of Islam[6]. In some cases adherence to Islamic canonical law, the *shari'a*, or what may be interpreted as such by some Muslim groups and individuals, may become test cases in exploring multiculturalism and its limits – in addition to testing the dominant society's sense of tolerance. In extreme cases, observances which Muslims may consider essential in being faithful to their religion, may turn out to sit uneasily or even be irreconcilable with democratic liberties of others or conflict with some values of modern Western society; or may indeed be in violation of clearly stated laws. Most Western democracies do not entertain the idea of legal pluralism for the sake of accommodating conservative Muslim juridical requirements. In the UK the Salman Rushdie affair of the 1980s pointed to a degree of irreconcilability between Western notions of freedom of expression and speech – epitomised in the conventional liberties and irreverence of the arts - on the one side and

[6] As, for instance, the *burqa* case has shown (see Kolig, forthcoming), or in some sense the sermon against homosexuality by a Muslim preacher on television.

religious sensitivities and the Islamic notion of blasphemy on the other. In France the centrality of the *laicité* of the state education system clashed powerfully with the Islamic sense of female propriety in the form of a divine ordinance to cover the head. In New Zealand the political, ideological and emotional climate precludes the possibility of Muslims expecting to receive special treatment of the kind accorded to the indigenous minority. While hurting Muslim sensitivities may lead to apologies[7], Muslims have little prospect that they will enjoy the kind of cocooning effect of supportive legislation and warm feelings the intellectual and political establishment seems to have for Maori.

However, adroit use of human rights based legislation may enable Muslims to effect outcomes in their favour in individual cases; or through their active participation in the democratic process, may in the long term even effect changes in the legal and social framework of the host society - as the European example begins to show. For instance, Muslim police women being allowed to wear the *hijab*; *halal* food being offered in the armed forces and recognition of *ramadan*; adjustment of the holiday act to recognise the *eids* and the requirement of *haj*; state support for teaching of Islam in the public education system and provision of Muslim army chaplains; officially recognised Muslim representation consulted by governments, creation of *shari'a* courts in matters of family law, and the like.

The legalisation of polygamous marriage or the creation of *shari'a* courts, to accommodate Muslim interests, do not appear to be a priority for the New Zealand government. Despite a subtle change in perception of marriage from a sacrament to a contractual arrangement (which is closer to the Islamic attitude), monogamy, after centuries of sanctifying it through Christianity, is too entrenched to allow for a sudden softening by legalising multi-partnership relations. (Even the new concept of civil union allowing same sex marriage does not deviate from the monogamous precept.) But there is now in principle recognition of marriage according to Islamic ritual (as long as the union is monogamous). *Imams* and Muslim leaders can register as

[7] Such as in the Danish cartoon affair, when in February 2006 two New Zealand newspapers published the offending cartoons, ostensibly to strike a blow for press freedom as well as to inform about the controversy.

marriage celebrants thus legalising weddings performed according to Islamic ritual. Successfully organising visas for *imams* from overseas, to cater to local communities' spiritual needs, seems to have become commonplace. Other items on the agenda are Islamic burials in graveyards, the establishment of Islamic schools offering an Islamic curriculum, Islamic welfare operations interlinking with the state welfare system, better representation on local government level where there is a sizeable local Islamic community, and the like. While these concerns are springing from the perceived need to preserve the integrity and identity of the national and international *umma*, to achieve this the interface with the host society has to be developed and utilised.

That interfacing is done with considerable and increasing success is demonstrated by the Hagley Community College incident in Christchurch. Through this case, New Zealand had its miniature head-scarf affair though the outcome was quite different from that in France. A politician thought he had to come to the protection of a secular education system but seemed to be ill-prepared to do so. The local Muslim community together with the College school board had managed to organise a grant from the Christchurch office of the Ministry of Education, to provide a prayer facility for the 130 Muslim students at this college. The school's reason was to be responsive to the needs of the immigrant Muslim community in Christchurch. When news broke (in September 2003), the Minister of Education stepped in to denounce the use of $120,000 of "taxpayer money" – a magic formula to garner public interest – for a religious purpose; clearly in defence of the government's secularist leanings. However, it quickly turned out that the funds had not been obtained under false pretences but specifically for this purpose and with the full approval of local education authorities. The school board had been asked by the Ministry of Education to enrol more refugee students and had acted legally in accordance with the Bill of Rights, The Human Rights Act and the Education Act in providing for the religious needs of its students – although perhaps acting inappropriately in another sense, namely under the secular provisions of the Education Act 1989. The College leadership threw its weight behind this project and rebuffed the ministerial interference, forcing the minister to apologise. As it was pointed out, Catholic schooling is also in receipt of

public moneys, so denying funds to support Islam would have looked like discrimination[8].

Political representation, democracy and sexual liberalisation

In New Zealand civil liberties are extended to Muslims enabling them (as citizens or residents) to participate freely, if they choose, in the democratic process. However, first attempts at political representation at the highest (i.e. parliamentary) level have failed. The support of certain bills which liberalise sexuality, by the Muslim MP who had been widely touted - and expected by Muslims - to represent Islamic viewpoints and interests, has led to some disenchantment. More broadly, there are attempts by Muslim representatives on other political levels to engage themselves more in the democratic political process so as to achieve outcomes congenial to Islamic values and Muslim interests. However, for the time being success seems to be elusive or patchy at best. Not surprisingly, this has to do with the fact that Muslims represent a small minority. In a participatory democracy numbers are of course of fundamental importance. I have heard Muslims overseas referring to this situation as the dictatorship of "50 per cent plus". Difficulties that Muslims may have with representative democracy and the electoral system have frequently been overstated in the literature and in the media. Muslims are often described as preferring a *shura* system of leadership (by the elite) based on doctrines of *akida* (accountability, responsibility) and *ijma* (consensus). (Other authoritative views are that Islam per see is neutral towards the form of governance as long as it is informed by a spirit of *shari'a*.) From a Western view point this is interpreted as Islam's difficulty with modern democracy (see Esposito, 1992, pp.184-189). I have not noticed an acute collective deficiency in this regard among

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[8] Rather confusingly, and adding yet another dimension to the debate, the minister also railed against the use of Maori *karakia* (prayers) in some schools while English language prayer was not permitted. He seemed to overlook that his government actively supports traditional Maori religion (or 'spirituality') in various ways, for instance by Maori rituals at official functions, including spiritual beliefs in legislation and the like (see Kolig, 2004). It could be argued that the Crown is under obligation to support Maori religion and culture under (the current interpretation of the) terms of the Waitangi Treaty. Alternatively, as seems to be the official line, Maori 'spirituality' is considered not 'religious', but 'cultural'.

New Zealand's Muslims. In fact, regional associations and FIANZ have repeatedly encouraged their membership to participate in the electoral process and to exercise their democratic right to vote, though abstaining from promoting a particular party. Ostensibly fearing that by cultivating too strong a political profile it may risk damaging Islam's or Muslims' public image, FIANZ is rather restrained in its political engagement. However, it is increasingly engaged in issuing public statements, ostensibly on behalf of the country's Muslims, on a range of political and legal issues. Matters of external politics as well as internal legal matters have led not only to statements to the press but also to demonstrations (e.g. in expressing views on New Zealand's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, treatment of Muslim refugees, the prophet Muhammad cartoon affair, etc.).

Lobbying the government in external political areas – such as non-participation in the intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq – had only limited success despite the fact that such utterances are usually coordinated with those of other religious and community groups. Of particular concern is the moral direction in which New Zealand's liberal society appears to be moving. Particularly traumatic for Muslims - as a failed attempt to engage themselves successfully in the democratic process to safeguard central Islamic values - seems to have been the passing of the Prostitution Law Reform Bill in 2003 and the Civil Union Bill in 2004. Muslims *en bloc* seem to have had the perception that their interests were represented by a Labour list MP, Dr Ashraf Choudhary, who entered the House in the 2002 elections. He was in fact acknowledged widely in the media as the first Muslim parliamentarian thus ostensibly supporting the Muslims' perception of possessing representation at parliamentary level. By happenstance his vote became the casting vote allowing the Prostitution bill to pass. His reasoning that it was an accident of the proxy voting procedure – perhaps a miscalculation – did not appear to appease Muslims. The adverse and, as it appears, partly abusive reaction of Muslims to what to them appeared as blatant misrepresentation if not treachery by "their" parliamentarian, led him to renounce his role as representative of the Islamic voice, thus robbing Muslims of any chance in the foreseeable future to have their views heard directly in parliament. Perhaps unfairly, some Muslims see this incident as a failure of the democratic system rather than

as an accident or temporary setback. A further clarification of the fronts occurred in the case of the Civil Union Bill allowing state registration of same sex marriages and affording them official recognition. Dr Choudhary voted in favour of the Bill. This caused wide-spread attention in the media and consternation among Muslims. His explanation (in a media statement) for the unexpected move was that as a religious minority Muslims should be tolerant vis-à-vis the civil liberties of other minorities and in a multicultural society should respect their human rights. It is debatable whether this indicates the emergent development of a minority ethos in Islam, which will allow it to show solidarity with others who are equally dependent on the sense of tolerance within the wider society. It might be premature to see in it the beginning of a new form of Islam more attuned to the multicultural reality in which Muslims occupy a minority position.

Muslims are stereotypically considered to be morally "conservative". But this is not necessarily the case. The relatively numerous Muslim presence in Labour party meetings[9] and the appearance of Muslim candidates on the Labour Party list, given this party's moral liberalisation agenda, is certainly an interesting development that contradicts the stereotype.

The absence of direct Muslim representation in parliament creates a tendency for new political alliances to be sought and sometimes offered. There are strong interfaith/interdenominational links on local and national level incurring the support of local authorities as well as the government's. Sometimes such alliances are of a somewhat unlikely and certainly opportunistic kind and therefore bound to be episodic and ephemeral - for instance with the minister of Ethnic Affairs and a local MP who seem to perceive taking a sympathetic stance towards Islam as their duty, but are known to support policies and ethics (on sexual liberalisation issues) which are anathema to devout Muslims. The Greens party was praised by Muslims because of its staunch opposition to the nation getting involved in any way in the US-Coalition intervention in the Islamic world. Assistance offered episodically by politicians, who otherwise represent very different viewpoints, is usually accepted and blurs ideological boundaries. Contrasting ethical stances notwithstanding, the solidarity of minority positions and

[9] Interview with Labour MP Tim Barnett.

interests in society seem at times to outweigh differences. The need to fight against culturally hegemonic forces to make political gains beyond just barely winning tolerance, seems to exert a considerable uniting force.

Not only matters of liberalisation of sexuality, but also so-called family values are a strong motivating factor for Muslims in which their interests may coincide with those of conservative (and strongly Christian influenced) politics, but at times may run foul of exactly that pervading sense of tolerance and liberalism which allows Islam to function largely unimpeded. In a TV programme called "Voice of Islam" in March of 2004 a Muslim preacher denounced homosexuality as abomination and went as far as defending the death penalty for homosexuals[10]. (Indeed in many countries of the Islamic world homosexuality is not only morally condemned but punished with heavy terms of imprisonment and even death.)[11] In the event, following a complaint to the broadcast standards authority, the television channel had to distance itself from the view and issue a retraction. This reflects very clearly the emergent conundrum of anti-liberal, intolerant utterances being freely expressed under the provisions of freedom of expression, and necessitating the liberal democracy and tolerance defending themselves against intolerance expressed by minorities[12].

As Islam is actively trying to create spaces for itself it runs the risk of offending the very liberalism that allows it to express itself to a greater degree than ever before. As Islam attempts to influence public social discourse - and in doing so may display in some instances a lack of tolerance vis-à-vis the social and moral composition of the host society-, such attempts may be easily construed by the host society as "an immigrant minority's arrogance" in trying to prescribe social and ethical rules.

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10 Sheikh Abdullah Hakim Quick, who according to Roy (2004, pp.150, 235) is well known for his stance on homosexuality, racism and secularism.

11 It was views like that which heightened Dutch unease about Islam's perceived intolerance and brought Pim Forteuyn, a self-professed homosexual, much popularity. It was not only his party's success in the general elections and its entering the government through a coalition arrangement, but a general groundswell of voters against the strengthening of Islam in the Netherlands, that led to the eviction of thousands of would-be immigrants and asylum seekers, mainly Muslims.

12 In a Dutch case, a court of law in Rotterdam decided that a Moroccan Imam who had publicly proclaimed that homosexuality was a threat to society, should not be convicted for inciting hatred. In the court's view he had only interpreted the Qur'an.

From integration and co-existence to the limitations of tolerance and Islamophobia

As two such different cultures as the Western and the Islamic meet, one emphatically secularist and with a particular concept of progressiveness; and the other theocentristically committed, difficulties are bound to arise. Given the fact that they are so very different, accommodation of the two cultures to each other for the sake of peaceful and productive coexistence is a complex process. It is fraught with numerous problems even under the most liberal of multicultural policies. Even though the dominant Western host society may no longer insist on assimilation, but prefer integration, there may still be difficulties. There is of course not a unitary and monolithic reality on either side (as Humphrey, 2001, p.33 with regard to the Australian situation observes). But as Islam negotiates its place in a non-Muslim, Western-type host society the two sides do tend to confront each other as two blocs. Also, conditions emerge which may be seen as generalities, which in turn allow international comparisons.

New Zealand dominant society shows to some extent phenomena of cultural closure, but only relatively weakly when compared with other countries. "Orientalist" attitudes in the past were directed towards Chinese, rather than Muslims who were inconspicuous due to their small numbers. Even shortly after 9/11 I could write of an "accord of cautious distance" (see Kolig, 2003), which presumably was facilitated by the fact that Muslims then by and large were still a relatively small and normally not very visible minority. In the public perception its inability to challenge cultural hegemony made it appear relatively harmless. This perception has certainly changed in the meantime through global events.

Although anti-Islamic sentiments have risen noticeably, "Islamophobia" does not at present seem to be a huge practical problem. Clearly, strong influences in the acceptance, or otherwise, of Muslims are political realities of global conflict and inter-cultural disharmonies overseas, rather than events that occurred in New Zealand. Occasionally hurled insults, hate mail campaigns, the odd graffiti and vandalism against Muslim property are probably just reminders of the limitations of public tolerance and the not uncommon residue of xenophobia existing in most societies. More serious is the fact that a negative image of Islam and Muslim immigrants makes a

more frequent appearance in the political discourse. Statements hostile to the rising Muslim immigration or towards Islam in general have cropped up more frequently in the political debate. Muslim immigration has been called "a risk" for the country. Islam has been vilified for what is seen as its intolerance towards other religions and life styles. Another politician in a radio interview lumped Islam together with terrorism – to name only a few incidents.

Such expressed negative views of Islam are not theologically inspired extremist Christian stances nor do they represent a feminist viewpoint (which condemns Islam as misogynist). They are the product of what seems to be a wide-spread popular - as well as uncritical - perception of Islam as religiously intolerant, implacably opposed to cultural otherness, hostile to the idea of parliamentary democracy, and – even more naively - of Muslims generally being hostile to the West. In the post September 11th era suspicions about Islam per se as having hostile, terrorist leanings have been awakened and were further strengthened through subsequent terrorist attacks. Thus negative stereotypes of Islam have undoubtedly hardened and as a political and juridical fallout are beginning to influence the exercise of civil liberties and their protection by the law. When an asylum seeker and known Islamist from Algeria entered the country he was detained, a "certificate of risk" issued against him by Secret Intelligence Service, and significantly the director of the SIS opined that he did not have to take human rights issues into account. Proposed anti-terrorist legislation stands to erode civil liberties for everybody.

The limits of multiculturalism and Muslim responses

Multiculturalist policies and their practical effects of prescribed tolerance, abrogation of enforced assimilation, and recognition of minority rights, do not take away the right of the state to put policies in place to exclude groups or individuals when they are seen to be unfit, unlikely or unwilling to integrate. Multiculturalism, as practised in the Western world today, does impose perimeters of cultural acceptance.

The limits of (British) multicultural tolerance have been summed up by Sebastian Poulter (1998, p.236) succinctly: "it is inevitable ... that [British Muslims] will have to accept that ...Islam can only be followed as a religious

faith and not pursued as an all-embracing way of life". For devout Muslims this demand very likely chafes against their aspirations of manifesting their beliefs more fully in social life. For them the notion of having to fit into the British or Western framework of what adherence to a religion may mean, shows perhaps all too clearly the flawed Western ethnocentric perception of multiculturalism as well as its narrowness of religious freedom.

Cultural coexistence within a modern nation-state, tolerant and liberal as it may be, is not just a matter for the host society to activate its reserves of tolerance vis-à-vis cultural otherness to achieve a degree of practical multiculturalism. Islam too is not exempt from the practical need, and the expectation by the host society, to articulate doctrinal and attitudinal changes. The experience for Muslims to be a minority within another cultural-religious context is not entirely new, and yet does seem to encompass some difficulties which have no precedent[13].

Roy takes an overly optimistic view in this matter: "Islam tends to adapt to the laws and traditions of its host countries, even for movements that pretend to ignore or reject westernisation" (2004, p.201). Muslims, he argues, tend to express their identity through Western models, even if they oppose integration or if Western paradigms contradict basic tenets of their beliefs (ibid.). This is probably quite true for the majority of Muslims in the West, but cannot be stated with such all-encompassing confidence. A certain degree of paradigmatic influence on thought is not identical with the adoption of Western viewpoints and a highly secularised, anthropocentric *Weltanschauung*.

Theoretically, Islamic doctrine may pose difficulties for rapprochement, at least in individual cases of extreme devotion. Islamic notions of supremacy doctrinally supported by Qu'ranic verses such as "you are the best community raised up for the benefit of mankind, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong" (Qur'an 3/110) may exceed normal devotional loyalty to the faith and subliminally pose a barrier to adaptation. For a small minority the Qu'ranic sentiments of belligerence and hostility

[13] Minority status of Muslims in the West is in several aspects different from the fact that Muslims traditionally have formed minorities in such countries as China, India, Thailand, Cambodia, Philippines, Russia, Bulgaria and the former Yugoslavia (until the 1990s), to name only the better known cases.

to "infidels", with which the Qur'an is interspersed, aggressive interpretations of the duty of *jihad*, especially when lifted out of context, may provide a false guiding beacon in developing antagonist tendencies. Similarly, the Qutbian tendency to equate the West with *jahiliya* (the religious concept for ignorance, chaos, immorality and evil) may prove to be unhelpful. While such doctrinal rules may not rise to a prominent dogmatic position in a diasporic situation, they may influence individual attitudes. Such doctrinal considerations may in particular play a role in the cases in which Islamic radicalism takes a hold in Western host countries.

A fundamental obstacle of a philosophical kind is the traditional dichotomous cosmology that distinguishes between the Abode of Islam (*dar al Islam*), or the Muslim world, and the Abode of War or Strife (*dar al harb*), the non-Muslim world. Some Muslim communities embedded in Western-type host countries have developed mediating concepts to mellow the contrast of the doctrinally conservative, antinomious categories of *dar al Islam* and *dar al harb* (or *dar al kufr* - realm of unbelief – Choueiri, 1997, p.11). Beyond being merely geographic categories, more importantly they are Manichean in their meaning, and as theological categories bear the connotation of good and evil. The need to provide ease of mind for devout Muslims living in the diaspora seems to have led some Muslim jurist-scholars to create an intermediary category that has neither of the two qualities, preserves the potential supremacy of the Islamic realm but removes the stigma of inferiority and evil from the "infidel" society. French Muslims have developed the traditional concept of *dar al ahd* (abode of covenant, realm of treaty; Kepel, 1997, p.151) to legitimate their presence and allow peaceful participation in French society and politics. Another similar possibility is offered by the traditional concept of *dar al sulh* (realm of truce; Esposito, 2002, p.35), which also recognises a form of peaceful coexistence between Islam and non-Islamic territories. Bernard Lewis (1994) argues that both concepts in their traditional meaning presuppose the supremacy of Islam in the respective political and social context – in other words they are based on the premise of Islam conceding some form of tolerance to unbelievers from a position of strength. The situation is of course reversed in the Muslim presence in Western society.

Islam potentially also implies a conflict with infidel governance, summed up in the saying "a bad Muslim ruler is better than a just infidel ruler". Theoretically, this requires the exercise of *hijra* (flight) to a truly Islamic country. In Europe, this condition is as yet explored only to some extent by Islamic jurists (for instance, Tariq Ramadan (2004) who argues that Western democracies meet the preconditions allowing Muslims to accept this rule; and Bassam Tibi (2005)[14]).

New Zealand Muslims do not seem to place much emphasis on these dichotomous categories and consequently there is little concern to develop mediating concepts in order to philosophically underpin the Muslim presence and its relationship with the host society. Some Muslims emphasised the inappropriateness of applying these traditional concepts to the New Zealand diaspora, as this country is not seen as in any way antagonistically contrasting with the Islamic world. Despite its secularist-Christian background and history, there is no reason to justify subsuming it under the label *dar al harb*. One Muslim labelled New Zealand *dar al aman*[15], but emphasised that it was not a philosophical problem for him. The freedom of worship New Zealand provides for Muslims is very much appreciated (see below on the issue of freedom) and seems to remove the stigma of antagonism from the discourse. Only one respondent to my enquiry conceded that he considers living in *dar al harb,* which theoretically would require him to do the *hijra* (flight)[16]. However, he preferred to rationalise his residence in the country in terms of *darura*, the necessity to live among infidels for the sake of refuge from persecution and poverty, and for economic and educational advancement for himself and his family. These are important concepts exercising the minds of scholar-jurists, but do not appear to have much traction among ordinary Muslims. A majority of respondents in fact professed total disinterest in these issues. It might be

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14 Tibi places heavier demands on Muslims such as the depoliticisation of Islam and rejection of the objective encapsulated in the slogan *din wa daulah* (belief and state) as a precondition for Muslims to be able to enjoy liberal Western rule.

15 Safety or safe conduct: Lewis (1994, p.7); *dar al amn* 'abode of safety',Ramadan, (2004, p.72).

16 *Hijra* after the prophet's classical example means to leave or flee a place, rather than stay among infidels, and to become a *muhajir* in search of a truly Islamic country.

said, however, that those to whom this may pose a philosophical ideological problem may have been too cautious to discuss this openly with an outsider, to avoid giving the impression of hostility towards the host society. But by and large, these ideological premises do not seem to provide stimuli for developing radical viewpoints in New Zealand Muslims.

The social praxis shows that among New Zealand Muslims a "modernist" and pragmatist conception of Islam prevails that is not confrontational but dialogical with modernity and Western culture. Quite possibly there is a sense of liberation from *taqlid* (traditional authority) and greater use of personal responsibility in *ijtihad* (interpretation) so as to make life comfortable (see Kolig, 2001). Such notions may further be aided by the concept of *darura* , necessity (Lewis, 2004, p.12; An-na'im, 1996, p.346), *maslaha* (best interest) and the *hadith* that religion should not pose any hardship.

The rise of so-called Islamic "Fundamentalism" and the radicalisation of Muslims

The spectre of certain more radical features of Islam emerging in New Zealand, has recently been a matter of concern to some. A television programme (Sixty Minutes on TV3, on 4/7/05) portrayed – in an exaggerated and alarmist manner – ideological features of so-called fundamentalism spreading among Muslims, leading to unpleasant and unacceptable attitudes and moral stances, such as advocating a lesser status for women and dealing with homosexuality harshly according to conservative Islamic standards. Aggravating in this is the fact that implied in the label "fundamentalism", as commonly understood, is an image of extremism and radicalism that easily merges with terrorism, thus adding to the acuteness of this hyperbole[17].

[17] Fundamentalism, or neo-fundamentalism (see Roy, 2004) is a very vague concept. It may connote simply the fervent wish to apply Islamic principles to personal daily life, seeing life as a kind of ritual and fulfilling doctrinal obligations in all aspects of personal life; or more encompassing it may refer to the wish to influence society at large to live more in accord with such dogmatic principles especially in the moral sphere. It could also refer to what I would call Islamism, i.e. a kind of political Islam that rejects the Western-type separation between church and state (expressed in the slogan *din wa daulah*, religion and state being coterminous), and refutes the secularist distinction between politics and religious belief. Another sub-category, Salafism aims specifically to implement a social reality identical with (a perception of) the original *umma*'s example.

Such concerns have their origin in the situation overseas. While apparently a majority of Muslims living in the West seems to embrace – and perhaps in the new environment develop - a "modernist" and "relaxed" perception of Islam which facilitates integration with Western host societies, there are also, as the European (and incipiently also the Australian) example shows, noticeable reactionary phenomena: attitudes that national Islamic community status should not be negotiated with an infidel state. Indeed, it would be surprising if in New Zealand similar phenomena would not emerge over time.

The literature has produced several hypotheses about the reasons for the global rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the concomitant radicalisation of Muslimhood; such as that they are motivated by resistance to West-hegemony, or to globalisation, or motivated by an Islamic identity crisis and the like. Muslim minorities living in the West have not been unaffected by such global phenomena. Some social scientists have described a strengthening of an ostentatious Islamic identity in Europe, especially among younger, second-generation immigrants (e.g., see Afshar, 1998; Timmermans, 2000). While with many this may express itself solely in embracing conspicuous Islamic cultural signals (such as the head scarf and regular mosque attendance), some may tend towards more radical views of Islam and perhaps embrace a violent *jihadist* and antagonistic attitude toward the host society. On the extreme end of this spectrum are militant expressions such as the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam, and the public transport bombings in London carried out by young Muslims seemingly enculturated in the host society, and the Madrid bombing perpetrated by seemingly well adjusted immigrants. While in some cases economic disenfranchisement and alienation from the economic infrastructure may have played some role, it does not appear to have been the strongest motive. Such motives were contributive factors in the French youth riots of 2005, but seem to be relatively unimportant in drawing young Muslims to radical ideological causes and to follow the call to *jihad*. It would be overly simplistic though to look for just one overarching motivating factor.

The appearance of "fundamentalism" in Western society signals a statement of demarcation – an identity of separatism - made by immigrant

Developing not only an interface, but also an identity as New Zealand Muslims

In New Zealand the two sides, the host society and the Muslim community, are undoubtedly beginning to engage with each other, though tentatively only, as the reality of increasing Muslim numbers and the expectation that they integrate begins to play itself out. As this is happening, concurrently, the emerging interface of two cultures within one nation rises in importance. At the moment, a Muslim identity is almost counterpoised to a New Zealand identity: New Zealander and Muslim appear as mutually exclusive and contradictory categories.

The concerns of Muslims begin to exceed introspective considerations and focus on the need to negotiate their Muslimness with the host society. While the objective still is the maintenance of a distinctly separate Islamic identity, and to exert some modest pressure on the host society for recognition, initiatives will no doubt increasingly contain a momentum towards a change in the Muslim identity. While there will be some resistance, by and large it is to be expected that "Muslims in New Zealand" will become "Muslims of New Zealand"; concomitant with an adapted form of Islam. The definition of concepts of belonging to citizenship and country, solidarity with the host society, commitment to civic participation and the like is beyond the scope of this paper. Here the expression to be "of New Zealand", as distinct from simply living in New Zealand, refers to at least a modicum of belongingness and is summed up in an identity that may be hyphenated – such as Muslim-New Zealander – but incorporates a sense of being a New Zealander as a vital ingredient.

Western society exerts a strong integrative and assimilationist force. For Muslims however significant obstacles remain. Islam contains a strong moral commitment in a very detailed and uncompromising fashion. The usual perception is that Muslims are morally conservative subscribing to ethical values reminiscent of conservative Christianity, which has retreated to a minority position within modern Western society. Not only do those Muslims coming from rural areas face the change from community-law to state law, devout Muslims in general face the reality of a disjuncture of law and morality; a disjuncture brought about by the change from divine law to secular law. In a secular state morality is not defined by law and remains

by and large a private affair (see Hallaq 2003-4).

In Europe, sporadically initiatives are taken by Muslims to reach an approximation through a process of engagement with the host society that aims beyond acceptance by the dominant society of a multiculturally informed minority position; instead it aims at changing the majority position – the moral fibre of the society at large - incrementally. Hence we see "marriages of convenience" with other religious minority groups who are also in somewhat of a moral oppositional position to the secularism and anthropocentrism of the dominant society. *Prima facie* paradoxical situations arise when Jewish and fundamentalist Christian positions are merged with Muslim interests to combine efforts.

Apart from real or imagined discrimination and sensing rejection by the host society providing a major barrier to developing a sentiment of attachment, a Muslim identity in itself exerts a strong trans-nationalist pull. Solidarity with a global moral community is an essential part of being Muslim. For Muslim migrants more so than for others this is a reason to remain transnational and to retain strong emotional links with the world-wide *umma*. This impedes shifting the focus of solidarity and commitment to the host society. In order to move from a notion of belonging to global Muslimhood to a sense of commitment to the host society, a rapprochement of moral position is necessary. The Western secularised position does not make this easy and the acquisition of a completely shared moral position is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. Equally, a total adjustment of Muslims to the anthropocentric, human-needs based, morally opportunistic position of the West, without some diminution of belief is unlikely in the near future. The concept of "secular Muslim" from an Islamic viewpoint for the time being remains a *contridictio in se*.

As recent experience clearly shows, the aspect of transnationality in a Muslim identity is one of the potentially strongest stimuli towards radicalisation. Identification with a global *umma* and its fate contains the seeds for extremist positions. That is to say, solidarity with Muslims seen as oppressed and mistreated by Western hegemony – particularly expressed by US politics vis-à-vis the Middle East, its military interventionism and support for Israel's treatment of Palestinians and other Arabs – is apt to act as recruitment stimuli for militant and extremist causes directed at Western

host nations[19]. New Zealand is globally perceived by Muslims to be Islam- and Muslim-friendly, and importantly steering politically and internationally an independentist course and therefore escapes the stigmatisation as anti-Muslim other Western nations may suffer despite domestic policies of tolerance and religious acceptance.

In Europe the emergence of Western forms of Islam is much debated - either a pan-European (Islam as propagated by e.g. Tariq Ramadan and Mohammed Arkoun); or European national Islamic forms such as Dutch Islam (Entzinger, 1994; Jansen, 1994), Norwegian Islam, or Australian Islam for that matter (see e.g. Humphrey, 2001). Adaptive moves are seen as a priority by the Muslim intelligentsia in Europe. There does not seem to be an equivalent concerted effort among New Zealand's Muslim scholars, after the European model, to revise Islamic doctrine, but a diffuse process in this direction may still be discerned in the way FIANZ signals its priorities. It is too early to say whether this will decisively influence the discourse within New Zealand's Muslim community as a whole and bring about a diminution of a more conservative discourse.[20]

Publications by Islamic authors only a few years ago seemed to emphasise the need to hedge a conservative identity by strict adherence to the *hijab*, preserving language and educational values, and emphatically rejecting those of the host society. Demonstrating a culture closure posture, these authors extol the virtues of *umma* solidarity and the priority of closing ranks against an alien environment, thus minimising the development of an interface. (see Adam, 1999; Rahman, 1996). In the same vein is the rejection of participation, even acknowledgement, of the host society's festivities. An issue of a Muslim electronic newsletter entitled "Dawa " (4/12/2003) exhorted its readership at length to abstain from the slightest token of interest, let alone participation in non-Islamic celebrations and festivities, which were labelled *kuffaar* [sic] (unbelief) and *al-zoor* [sic] (falsehood). Presumably in view of the social importance of Christmas in New Zealand society, such festivities would constitute *bida* (error, abomination). Muslims

[19] As the recent British terrorist examples of 7/7 and subsequent events have demonstrated and possibly also cases in Australia show.

[20] A study of the curriculum of Islamic schools and courses would be a very timely enterprise.

were admonished not to respond to greetings and congratulations and should not imitate unbelievers (labelled *mushrikun, kaffirs*) in doing so. Only two celebrations, *eids*, are permitted: *eid al Adha* and *eid al Fitr*. Thus the possibility of the Muslim community to make a show of solidarity with the host society – through partaking in the festivities surrounding ANZAC day, Christmas, Waitangi day, New Years' eve, etc. - would be severely limited. Even though no insult may be intended and the reason simply may be to reject all celebrations, without exception, other than the two prescribed *eids*, a disadvantageous perception of Muslim rejectionism may be created in the host society.

With the growing awareness of diasporic permanency, however, a more pragmatic tendency within Islam is likely to prevail: a growing discourse of a national Islam seeking to reform and renew itself so as to fit more easily into secularised Western society. Given the high probability that the essential character of Western society will not fundamentally change in the foreseeable future, the question arises whether Islam will develop a strong and perhaps universal version that allows it to blend more easily in with Western secularism and liberal democracies. This question has exercised the minds of Western scholars as much as Muslim thinkers. A genuine reform of Islam would aim at a condition in which Islam no longer has to exist in the grey zone of perhaps a majority of devout Muslims being uncomfortable with many features of the West; and the West turning a blind eye to alien customs as long as these are conducted in private or do not openly conflict with Western laws; or where Islam is dependent on protective legislation to carve out enclaves of tolerance. Are such ethnic and cultural enclaves sufficient in the long run? From some Muslims' point of view, it may not be enough to have their own cultural spaces and to develop enough indifference towards the traditions of the host society. The responsibility as citizens by and large may require of them a sense of fundamental values and perceptions they share with the host society.

Will Islam *per se* reform itself by abandoning the concept of the rigid canonicity of the *shari'a;* eliminating entirely such traditions and laws as the uncompromising gender-separation, renounce ingrained notions of the nature of honour that, in extreme interpretations, would require the practice of *izzat* (so-called honour killing), reject uncompromising views on

homosexuality, blasphemy and apostasy (see Saeed and Saeed, 2004) and take a theologically more accommodating attitude vis-à-vis secularism - so that for instance the expression of hate, illiberalism and intolerance of the kind peddled by Dr Quick become as rare and unusual phenomena as in Christianity where such features are relegated now to fringe movements and sects? And will it develop a religiosity that is largely uncoupled of political notions? Will the impulse to reform itself come from pressures exerted by Western society and from the practical need for Muslims to adjust, or more indirectly, through the independent initiatives of Muslim scholars; and will they be widely recognised? And will so-called fundamentalist phenomena, which so spectacularly have come to the fore in recent years and rightly or wrongly are frequently labelled Wahhabism, become marginalised and eventually disappear? There are many discourses within Islam espousing different attitudes towards *shari'a*; it remains to be seen which will come to prove the most influential in New Zealand.

A cautious vision of the future of New Zealand society can discount the possibility that Islam may become the dominant religion or that the Muslim presence may increase in such numbers so as to decisively influence the development of laws, customs, ethics, and political views through the democratic political process. New Zealand can be expected to follow – with some delay – the pattern set by Western Europe and Australia, i.e. a greater and more noticeable bifurcation of the national Muslim community and the crystallisation of various Islamic discourses into two opposing streams. In New Zealand it is not the lack of enfranchisement, of religious tolerance, or of interface opportunities, nor can it be a national political course that would be perceived by Muslims as seriously Islamophobic, that may generate radical and hostile discourses among them. Even though Muslims are not directly represented in parliament, they have a political voice – politely listened to by much of the political establishment – through their various organisations thus leaving no void that may be filled by violence, be it random or of the religious kind. At the moment it seems unlikely that New Zealand breeds its own home-grown *jihadists*. But in the global free-flow of information and viewpoints a particular reading of Islamic duties could always come from abroad. One can only hope that the most extreme forms of reactionary religious fervour will not take hold.

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Erich Kolig has been teaching Social Anthropology at Otago University. Beyond New Zealand and its Muslims, his interest in Islamic issues has led to research in Europe, Indonesia and Afghanistan. He has also been acquainted with life in the Muslim world in Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India and Malaysia. Email: erich.kolig@stonebow.otago.ac.nz

Kō wai ratou? Managing Multiple Identities in Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual New Zealand Māori

Mark Henrickson

Abstract

Lavender Islands: Portrait of the Whole Family is the first national strengths-based multidisciplinary study of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) people in Aotearoa New Zealand This article presents data from 169 Māori (8.3% of the sample) and 2,100 (91.7%) non-Māori (tauiwi) respondents to the survey. Methodological challenges are outlined, and results relating to education and income, the coming-out process, adjustment to identity, the management of sexual and cultural identities, social conformity, family support, spirituality and relationships are presented. This study identifies ways in which a "gay" "lesbian" and "bisexual" identity is different in Māori and tauiwi and suggests that Māori fuse salient differences into an integrated whole during their life courses. The article examines key features of an integrated identity, including developmental milestones, relationships, family, spirituality and the influence of culture. Although there are limitations to the study, it provides a background for developing some next steps, and identifies areas for further exploration. All members of sexual minority groups who live in cultures where an LGB identity is stigmatised must negotiate cultural presses. Māori and other cultural minority groups must manage multiple, and sometimes competing, cultural presses, the negotiation of which shapes individual identity.

Introduction

Lavender Islands: Portrait of the Whole Family is the first national strengths - based multidisciplinary study of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) people in Aotearoa New Zealand. Previous studies have drawn attention to some of the fundamental, and in some cases life-threatening, challenges of living as a vulnerable sexual minority in New Zealand and elsewhere. However, we have found no studies that develop a comprehensive, strengths-based profile

of LGB communities in New Zealand. Such research can and must be used both to inform public policy, and to help social scientists understand an array of important issues such as identity, relationships and family structures, economic choices, voting patterns, education and employment experiences. Perhaps even more importantly, such research can help people understand themselves. That is one of the principal interests that drive the present research: to help the LGB community understand itself. The primary research question that the community advisory group formed was quite basic: "What do LGB communities in New Zealand look like?" This is the question that this exploratory project was designed to answer.

In the present paper which addresses responses from Māori participants in the *Lavender Islands* study, we are faced with additional and more complex challenges, such as applying language and identity constructs such as "lesbian" "gay" or "bisexual" to a population where such constructs are not necessarily indigenous. The question of applying such binary constructions of sexual identity to non-European cultures is fraught, and in most cases inappropriate, an argument developed by Murray (2002). Although a full anthropological exploration of the historical development of sexual identity is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important at the outset to identify the complexity of this issue. It could be argued that the essentialist idea that a culture has a binary of two sexual identities—same-sex identified and opposite-sex identified—emerged only in the later part of the nineteenth century (a period that coincides neatly with the peak of the influx of British and European migration in New Zealand's colonial history). Studies showing that individuals may arrange themselves along a continuum between the two poles of identity—heterosexual and homosexual—are a more recent development (most familiarly in Kinsey, Pomeroy and Martin, 1948, and Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin & Gebhard, 1953). More recently, identity theorists and researchers have posited a further array of axes on which sexual identity can be described, including but not limited to sexual behaviour, sexual attraction, fantasy, and emotional attraction (summarised by Coleman, in Coleman, 1988; see also Laumann et al., 1994; and Sell Wells & Wypij, 1995). Much of the research on human sexual identity in the last 25 years has focused necessarily on sexual behaviour in order to identify risk reduction

strategies in the age of HIV; it is through the lens of behaviour that contemporary views of sexuality have been constructed, and led to binary constructs of identity.

However sexual identity is clearly a more complex construct. The essentialist-social constructionist debate has been well-traversed elsewhere (e.g., Blumenfeld & Raymond, 1988; Greenberg, 1988; DeLamater & Hyde, 1998). Hammack (2005) notes that the essentialist perspective is a better "fit" with research on males, and constructionism a more appropriate model to describe the experience of females, suggesting that the genders may in fact have quite different experiences of sexual identity. Hammack has proposed a "life course" model of human sexuality, that takes into account the social ecology of an individual, and integrates not only the essentialist and social constructionist perspectives, but also biology, culture, person and society. His model defines sexual orientation as "the biologically based affective disposition of sexual desire which motivates behavior and assumption of identity" (2005, p. 276). One of his propositions is that a subjective understanding of desire in the context of a specific cultural model of human sexuality leads to behavioural practice and identity assumption. Hammack introduces the concept of a cultural press, which is "an internalised ideologically based *system* of identity categories" (p. 280; emphasis in original).

Challenges to the theoretically dichotomous essentialist vs. constructionist approach to sexual identity have been raised not only by Hammack, but also by researchers of and from ethnic, racial and cultural minorities (see below). Murray (2002) has developed a typology of male homosexuality drawn from Polynesian and Asian cultures around the Pacific; the implications of the European construction of some of these identities is developed by Wallace (2003). Language of (mostly male) same-sex relationships and transgendered identities in Polynesia societies includes the *aikāne* of Hawai'i, the *māhū* of Tahiti, the *fa'afafine* of Samoa, the *fakaleiti* of Tonga and the *takatāpui* of Māori in Aotearoa New Zealand (Aspin 2005; Te Awekotuku 1991). In the māhū and some other various roles in Polynesian cultures, some of these roles are performative or religious, some transitional, some are lived transgendered identities, and some are egalitarian; some exclude the possibilities of formalised opposite-sex relationships, and some

allow that possibility. Wallace writes that "European and Polynesian sexual identities are not the same, neither are they utterly distinct, but what is of continued importance are the changing terms by which they are counterpoised" (2003, p. 2). There are probably at least as many different ways of conceptualising sexual identity around the Pacific as there are distinct cultures, although in the early twenty-first century many of these identities are being translated into the westernised constructs of "gay" "lesbian" and "bisexual".

Gluckman (1973) has claimed that, although "clinically homosexuality is common in the modern Māori" (p. 121), both male and female "homosexuality" as constructed in European terms did not exist in pre-colonised Aotearoa. (Claims that homosexuality is a European phenomenon are made by other researchers in other cultures; see, for instance, Ho, and Asthana & Oostvogels, cited in Hammack, 2005). He makes this claim based on the absence of homosexual situations in Māori mythology and theogony, the dearth of reports from British colonising missionaries, and the omission of such terms from early editions of nineteenth century missionary dictionaries of *te reo*.

However, Arboleda and Murray (1985) challenge Gluckman, cautioning that the absence of linguistic expression does not necessarily imply the absence of a social phenomenon. They note that the position of missionaries on language about "sodomy" was reliant upon an intimate knowledge of Biblical terms and concepts, many of which have only recently been re-translated and re-interpreted. Further, they propose that whilst the apparent absence of vocabulary may imply a possible absence of a homosexual *role*, it does not imply the absence of homosexual *behaviour*. Finally they note that pre-migration "homosexual" identity (i.e., māhū) is well-documented in the Society Islands in the mid-fourteenth century, which is the likely source-culture for New Zealand Māori.

Te Awekotuku (1991), in her benchmark work on women and sexuality in Māori society, finds the exact opposite of Gluckman. She asserts that sexuality was enjoyed in many forms in traditional Māori culture, and writes in a frequently cited passage that in pre-colonial Aotearoa, "People chose partners of either sex for pleasure, and same-sex love was not condemned or vilified" (1996, p. 32), although since colonisation much of homosexuality,

"and certainly the lesbian" has become invisible (1991, p. 38). She revisits the Te Arawa story of an independent Hinemoa (in Laurie, 2001) and draws out the hoa takatāpui [beloved friend] of Tutanekai. Aspin (in Worth Paris & Allen, 2002) notes the increasing re-emergence of the concept of takatāpui. Refuting Gluckman, he writes that "takatāpui" was noted in *Williams dictionary of the Māori language* of 1834. "Takatāpui" as a self-descriptor is being increasingly "embraced by gay men, lesbian women and transgendered people who also identify as Māori" (p. 93), although Herewini and Sheridan (cited by Aspin, in Worth Paris & Allen, 2002) note that the word encompasses something more than the modern word "gay".

Other national studies on sexuality that include Māori have been carried out. Rankine (2001), in her 1992 "Great Late Lesbian and Bisexual Women's Discrimination Survey", found that more than three-quarters of all her survey participants had been verbally abused because of their sexuality at least once, and that 31 percent of lesbians and 42 percent of bisexual women had been threatened with physical violence. "Māori women reported higher rates of assault, threats of violence and verbal abuse" (p. 137) than the already high rates in Pakeha or immigrant European women. In the *Male Call/ Waea Mai, Tāne Mā* study, Aspin et al. (1998) report on 170 male Māori respondents (9.1 percent of their sample). The study was specifically related to activities which may put the male participants at risk for HIV infection, and is therefore behaviourally-focussed. Māori respondents were younger than non-Māori, more likely to leave school without a formal qualification, were significantly less likely than non-Māori to be in professional or semi-professional work, and to be on incomes under $30,000. Māori men were more likely than non-Māori to identify as bisexual, and 90.6 percent had disclosed their identity to someone, mostly friends and immediate family members. They also found that Māori were less likely than non-Māori to be "attached" to the gay community.

Frable (1997) notes that the research literature often examines the personal meanings of social identity categories in a fragmented way, and thus excludes particular populations who manage multiple identities. Nevertheless, there is an emerging literature that examines identity in societies where ethnic or racial groups must manage dual (or multiple) identities. Audrey Lorde, an African-American lesbian author, has written

of "constantly being encouraged to pluck out some one aspect of [her]self and present this as the meaningful whole, eclipsing or denying the other parts of self" (cited in Loiacano, 1989, p. 21). Myrick (1999) writes that the identity of gay African American men is often characterised by ambiguity, with men identifying with African Americans "in terms of history, family and church, and with gays on the basis of sexual desire" (p. 160). He notes that black gay men who publicly disclose their identities can be perceived as a threat to the stability of families and the strength of black men. Parks (2005) proposes that it is therefore not surprising that ethnic minority men who have sex with men choose to negotiate a relationship between their sexual and cultural identity that allows them to remain in good standing with their ethnic community. Crawford et al. (2002) assert that African American gay and bisexual men must contend with the challenges of managing dual minority status, and that "the fusion of ethnic and sexual identity into an integrated whole that is characterized by holding positive attitudes towards one's ethnic group, homosexuals and homosexuality, and engaging in social participation and cultural practice in the African-American and gay subcultures appears key" to overcoming the social pressure to view identity as a singular construct that requires the devaluing of either race/ethnicity or sexuality (p. 186). They found that the more such men are able to integrate and hold positive self-attitudes toward both racial-ethnic *and* sexual identities, the more likely they are to value themselves, protect their health, and experience greater levels of personal contentment. Chan's (1989) study of Asian American lesbians and gay men found that "most Asian lesbians and gay men feel most complete when they can be accepted as being both lesbian-gay and Asian American" (p. 18). Finally, Brant writes eloquently about the tension of the "music of life affirmation and the disharmony of life-despising" (1993, p. 944) that is a source of creative life of Native American lesbians.

As Māori have moved from rural areas to the urban centres with their larger concentrations of LGBs, it is possible that, to the naive observer, what may have previously been constructed as takatāpui identity is now taking on more of the characteristics and construction of Westernised "gay" and "lesbian" identities, although these constructions may be different for men and women. In this way, Māori may be in a sense replicating the same

process that may have taken place over the last century in Europe and North America when young people moved from the country to the cities, found more people like themselves, and began to construct their lives (or developed parallel identities) that looked more like contemporary Western "lesbian", "gay" and "bisexual" identities. It is in this sense, perhaps, that constructing one's identity as gay, lesbian or bisexual may be understood as postcolonial. Further, Māori, like other minority cultural groups living under cultural hegemony, must undertake the management of multiple identities as they participate in many aspects of a social life, yet negotiate a way to live those identities that preserves core ethnic cultural values. "Gay in the city, straight on the marae" is the way one takatāpui Māori community professional described this process.

Methodology

The overall methodology of the project is set out elsewhere (Henrickson, Neville, Donaghey & Jordan, in press). Mindful of the modernist-postmodernist debates about the efficacy of survey research, particularly on historically disempowered groups, *Lavender Islands* was conceived as a quantitative, apparently traditional survey study that would serve as a platform on which to base future studies. A 133-item instrument was developed by a community advisory group made up of members of the LGB communities of New Zealand. The instrument included questions about sexual identity, relationships, disclosure, parenting, education and income, politics, community connections, migration and immigration, well-being and spirituality. Hard copies of the instrument were made available through LGB venues. In addition, promotion of the study and a hot link to the website were sent out electronically through the community advisory group contacts. By the termination of the data collection phase on 15 July, we had received 2,269 unduplicated responses, the majority (almost 84 percent) received through the website.

Participants were invited to write their ethnicity into a blank data field. Respondents who indicated some or all Māori identity were grouped together, and for this analysis all others were grouped together as "tauiwi". Transgendered responses are not included in any gendered analysis that follows, although they are included in all non-gendered analyses; this same

practice was applied to the eight respondents who did not indicate gender. Differences between men and women have been reported elsewhere (Henrickson, Neville, Donaghey & Jordan, in press, and are available on the project website, http://lavenderislans.massey.ac.nz).

We acknowledge that Māori participation in the study was contended by some Māori researchers. We are mindful that our design and sampling strategy will in no way satisfy those who maintain that homosexuality among Māori is a post-colonial construction, or that a positivist survey methodology for this group is fatally flawed. The question may well be raised at this point why data from Māori participants should be published at all; indeed, the project leader initially stipulated that data would not be analysed separately by ethnic identity. Nevertheless, after additional *post hoc* consultation with senior Māori researchers, we propose that the case can also be made that to withhold these data would be to perpetuate the silence and oppression that surrounds sexual identity in non-dominant cultures, particularly among tangata whenua who participated in the study with the full expectation that they would be heard. Our intention in this paper, as nga kaitiaki [guardians] of the data, is to allow the voices of the 169 courageous and generous Māori participants to be heard, and to provide a framework for describing the complex negotiations of their identities, mindful of all the limitations inherent within a self-selecting sampling strategy.

Results[1]

As noted above, 2,269 unduplicated responses were received (see Table 1); 253 respondents (11.1 percent) did not specify any ethnicity. There were no differences in respondent medium (website or paper) by ethnicity. Of Māori responses, 92 (54.7 percent) were from women, and 76 (45.3 percent) from men. The mean age of all respondents was 38.5 years (range 12-80 years); the mean ages of tauiwi and Māori male responses differed significantly, but was remarkably similar to that of the *Male Cale/Waea Mai, Tāne Mā* study (Aspin, et al., 1998).

[1] All the tables mentioned in this section are found at the end of the article.

There were differences between Māori and tauiwi men and women by education and income. The profiles of highest educational qualification and income are summarised in Tables 2 and 3. These data show that both Māori and tauiwi respondents hold degrees at four to five times the proportion of New Zealanders in general. This high level of education is reflected in income. Approximately 49.5 percent of Māori women respondents earn incomes over $40,000, compared with 51.5 percent of tauiwi women. In men, 56.6 percent of Māori earned over $40,000, compared with 58.6 percent of tauiwi.

Identity

Identity milestones were markedly different for Māori men and women in *Lavender Islands*. These differences are summarised in Table 4. The profile of Māori women looks more like that of men than it does tauiwi women; there were no significant differences between Māori and tauiwi men in these identity milestones. We constructed a four axis matrix of sexual identity (sexual behaviour, sexual attraction, fantasy and emotional attraction) and asked respondents to locate themselves on each axis both for the last 12 months and over their lifetimes. This resulted in eight different variables to describe sexual identity (see Henrickson et al., in press). Categorical responses options were:

1 Only with women
2 More often with women
3 About equally with women and men
4 More often with men
5 Only with men.

Two additional response options, "I am not (or have not been) sexually active" and "other", have been removed from this analysis.

Chi square analysis found that Māori women are significantly less likely to be exclusively sexually active with women in the previous 12 months than tauiwi women ($p = .014$). However, there were no significant differences between the two groups of women on lifetime sexual behaviour, attraction in the previous 12 months, lifetime attraction, lifetime fantasy, current or lifetime emotional attraction. Māori women were significantly more likely

to report a wider range of current sexual fantasy (p= .023), where 27.1 percent said that they fantasise "about equally", "mostly" or "only" about men, compared with only 19.7 percent of tauiwi women.

Similarly, Māori men were significantly less likely to be exclusively sexually active with men than were tauiwi men in the last 12 months (p=.036). Not surprisingly, then, there were significant differences between tauiwi and Māori men on lifetime sexual behaviour (p=.003), with Māori men less likely to have been sexually active exclusively with men. There were no significant differences in sexual attraction in the last 12 months, emotional attraction in the last 12 months, or lifetime emotional attraction. However, tauiwi men were significantly more likely to report a lifetime attracted to men than Māori men (p=.007). There were also significant differences in current fantasy (p=.003), where 6.9 percent of Māori men said that they currently fantasized "about equally" about men and women, compared with only 2.1 percent of tauiwi men, (although no Māori men reported fantasising only or mostly about women). This significant difference was repeated in the lifetime sexual fantasy item (p=.034), where 9.5 percent of Māori men fantasised "mostly" or "about equally" about women, compared with 3.4 percent of tauiwi.

Given these differences, it may not be surprising that tauiwi men were significantly more likely than Māori men to agree with the statement that people are born gay, although both agreed with the statement. On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), Māori men scored a mean of 5.72 (s.d.=1.55) on the statement "I believe lesbian/gay/bisexual people are born that way", compared with a mean of 6.15 (s.d.=1.22, p=.004) in tauiwi men. Similarly, Māori men disagreed significantly less strongly with the statement "I believe lesbian/gay/bisexual people choose to be that way" (M=2.61, s.d.=1.98) than tauiwi men (M=2.00, s.d.=1.54, p=.001), although both groups of men disagreed with the statement that sexual identity is a choice. There were no significant differences between the two groups of women, although there was a trend similar to that in the two men's groups.

Māori respondents reported being happier with their current sexual identity (M= 5.96 on a scale of 1 to 7, where 7 was happiest) than tauiwi (M=5.51), although the differences between the groups by gender or ethnicity were not significant. However, when asked if they would choose

to be lesbian/gay if given a choice (regardless of whether they believe such identity is a choice) tauiwi women were most likely to say they would choose to be lesbian (M=5.34 on a scale of 1-7 where 1 is least likely and 7 is most likely to choose to be lesbian/gay), followed by Māori women (M=5.91), then Māori men (M=4.93) and finally tauiwi men (M=4.64). There was a significant difference between the male and female tauiwi responses on this item ($p<.001$), but not between male and female Māori.

The *Lavender Islands* data also confirm the findings of Rankine's 1992 study of violence against Māori women. Māori women are significantly more likely ($p<.001$) to have been physically assaulted at some time in their lives because of their sexuality (20.7 percent have been assaulted) than tauiwi women (8.0 percent). This compares with 16.0 percent of Māori men and 18.3 percent of tauiwi men having been physically assaulted. It is not possible from our data to determine who is doing the assaulting or why Māori women are assaulted at such high rates. One approach to this issue may be to consider whether the high rates of assault in Māori women respondents are because 54.3 percent say that they believe other people perceive them as lesbian (or that they "don't care" how others perceive them), compared with 41.3 percent of Māori men who believe that others perceive them as gay (or that they don't care). There were no significant differences on verbal assaults, where 65.8 percent of women and 76.6 percent of men have been verbally assaulted because of their sexual identity. This is an area that requires further exploration.

Relationships

Although there were no significant differences between Māori and tauiwi women on the number of same-sex primary relationships (of 12 months or longer) they had had in their lives, Māori men were significantly more likely than tauiwi men to report that they had had none (44.0 percent, compared with 30.5 percent). Māori women were significantly more likely to report ever having had sex with someone whose name they did not know than tauiwi women (29.7 percent and 15.2 percent respectively), although it is not possible to know whether the anonymous partners were female or male. There were no differences between Māori and tauiwi men on this item (67.6 percent). There were no differences between the two groups in the

mean lengths of either the longest opposite- sex relationship (M=44.1 months) or longest same-sex relationship (M=76.8 months). There were some interesting differences among groups in the number of relationships reported by participants with both same- and opposite-sex, over the course of their lives. These data are summarised in Table 5. There were no differences between the groups on current relationship status (see Table 6)

Disclosure is an indicator of self-acceptance and openness about one's sexual minority status (e.g. Aspin et al. 1998). The differences we have seen between Māori women and men above also appear in disclosure data. The survey instrument included a multiple response question "Who have you told about your sexual identity?" This question related to the respondent's entire lifetime. Respondents were given fourteen options. If respondents chose the first option, "I have told everyone in my life; there is no one I would not tell", they were then asked to skip the remaining choices and go on to the next question. Other options included specific family members, either a few trusted friends or "most or all of my friends", organisations and clubs, and employer. Respondents were also able to indicate that they had told no one and did not plan to do so, that they would be willing to tell someone they trusted if asked, and that they had been "outed" without their permission. Selected responses to these items are summarised in Table 7. These results indicate that Māori women are the most likely group to have disclosed their identity to everyone in their lives, and that Māori men are least likely to have disclosed to everyone. Māori men appear to disclose selectively to members of their family. Less than a total of four percent of either Māori or tauiwi had not disclosed to anyone, or would disclose only if asked. Māori are more likely to report having been outed than tauiwi, with 14.0 percent of both Māori groups and 10.7 percent of both tauiwi groups report being outed without their permission.

Culture

One of the most important differences between Māori and tauiwi respondents was in the importance of culture in making decisions about sexual identity. Participants were asked to rate the importance of ethnicity in making decisions about their sexual identity (1= very unimportant, 7= very important). Māori respondents rated ethnic culture significantly higher

(M= 3.98, s.d.=1.95) than tauiwi respondents (M=2.95, s.d.=1.82, p<.001). When asked to rate on a 7-point scale the balance of the importance of ethnic culture (1) against sexual identity (7), there were significant differences between Māori and tauiwi respondents (p<.001), although both sets of responses tended to the "sexual identity" end of the scale. The mean for Māori respondents was 4.37 (s.d.=1.34) and for tauiwi 4.96 (s.d.=1.26). These significant differences held in analyses by gender. These responses suggest that whilst sexual identity is of primary importance to both groups of respondents, culture plays a more important role for Māori than it does for tauiwi in both their decisions about their sexual identity and in the balance of their lives. On both these items Māori responses were very near the midpoint of the scale, balancing culture and sexual identities.

Another key cultural aspect of Māori life is whanaungatanga. We asked respondents to rate how much support they experienced from their families of origin (1=low, 7=high). There were no differences between Māori and tauiwi respondents on three family support questions: both groups reported strong levels of support generally (M=5.06), and said that their families were very likely to include them in important family occasions (M=6.14), although families were slightly less likely to include a same-sex partner (M=5.32) on such occasions.

Using the four-item Kohn and Schooler scale of Cultural Estrangement (Seeman, 1991), where responses ranged from 1 (rarely) to 5 (frequently), respondents were asked to rate to what extent their ideas and opinions differed from their relatives, their friends, others of their religious or cultural background, and from most people in New Zealand. These responses are summarised in Table 8. Māori women are significantly more likely to have ideas and opinions that differ from their families and relatives than Māori men. Māori women are also significantly less likely to differ from others of their cultural background than are tauiwi women. Tauiwi men and women differed significantly from each other on each item (p<.001), except "differ from friends"; this suggests that tauiwi men and women may be more likely than Māori men and women to choose friends whose ideas and values conform more closely to theirs. It also suggests that sexual identity may be more of a determining part of tauiwi identity than Māori identity, although clearly this complex area needs further clarification.

Differences between cultures also appeared in spirituality. Māori women respondents rated spirituality as significantly more important than tauiwi women, although Māori men rated spirituality more important on only one of the two indicators. We asked respondents to rate the importance of spirituality in their lives, and to what extent they had thought about spirituality. These data are summarised in Table 9. Women rated each of the spirituality items higher than did the men, and Māori women rated each item significantly higher than tauiwi women.

Discussion

What emerges from the data is a group portrait of Māori who are negotiating their sexual identities, identities that are more clearly informed by multiple cultures than those of tauiwi.

- While there are some noteworthy differences, all four groups were markedly more educationally qualified than New Zealanders in general; this is reflected also in the relatively high proportion in each group that are earning more than $40,000 per year.
- The differences in identity milestones between Māori and tauiwi women is not only statistically significant, but developmentally remarkable. Data show that tauiwi women experience themselves as different and come out a mean of three years later than do Māori women, and that the developmental milestones of Māori women are more consistent with those of both Māori and tauiwi men than tauiwi women. (There appears to be an expectable generational effect in age of coming out in all groups, although not in the experience of difference.) The sexual identity of the women respondents is more fluid generally than that of men, and this is consistent with the literature. Māori women were significantly more likely to be recently sexually active with men, and to fantasise about men, than tauiwi women. This was mirrored by the sexual activity of Māori men, who were significantly more likely than tauiwi men to be recently sexually active with women, and who were more likely to fantasise about women than tauiwi men.

- Women were more likely than men to be in a current long-term relationship; this is also consistent with the literature. Relationship data also show that during their lives women are more likely than men to have been in relationships with both women and men. However, although 40.6 percent of Māori men reported being in a long-term same-sex relationship, they are the least likely of the four groups to report being in a long-term same-sex relationship, and the most likely to report never having been in a long-term same-sex relationship. The *Male Call/Waea Mai, Tāne Mā* study reported regular sexual relationships (>6 months), and found that 33.5 percent of their male respondents were in such a relationship. The meaning of long-term relationships for Māori men and its implications for the negotiation of multiple identities is clearly an area for further research.
- Māori women were most likely to have disclosed their identities to everyone in their lives, and Māori men appear to disclose frequently, but selectively, to members of their immediate families.
- Unsurprisingly, cultural affiliation is significantly stronger among Māori than for tauiwi; importantly, however, culture and spirituality play a more important role for Māori respondents as they negotiate their identities. Tauiwi appear to be more defined by their sexual identities than are Māori. Māori balance ethnic and sexual culture in a "both/and" way, something that tauiwi do not, or do not need to do. Māori also appear to maintain a complex, somewhat contested but close relationship with others of their cultural background as they negotiate their identies. That these negotiations have been reasonably successful is suggested by the high scores of satisfaction with current sexual identity and willingness to choose an LGB sexual identity.

This study makes visible again a Māori "lesbian" "gay" and "bisexual" identity in Aotearoa New Zealand, identifies ways in which Māori and tauiwi identities are differently constructed for LGBs, and suggests that those salient differences are fused into an integrated whole in some way by Māori during their life courses. It has identified some key features of an integrated identity that includes a number of different domains and characteristics, including

developmental milestones, relationships, family, spirituality and the influence of culture. The study methodology is not the best one for soliciting detailed, grounded cultural information, and the limitations of this study precluded some basic cultural questions. Nevertheless, the study provides a background for developing some next steps, and identifies areas for further exploration. All members of sexual minority groups who live in cultures where an LGB identity is stigmatised must negotiate cultural presses. Māori and other cultural minority groups must manage multiple, and sometimes competing, cultural presses, the negotiation of which shapes individual identity. Colonisation in New Zealand has created a situation where initially same-sex Māori sexuality was misunderstood, suppressed or ignored, then reconstructed according to Western models in order to conform to contemporary Western identity constructs. This study makes no attempt to attribute meanings to those differences or identities for Māori; that is beyond the scope of a quantitative study or tauiwi researchers, and other initiatives by indigenous researchers are in process to carry forward that process appropriately. This study has proposed that these historic identities are a complex constellation of sexual desire, behaviour, as well as ethnic and cultural identities, which Māori women and men negotiate and live in different ways.

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Mark Henrickson is a Senior Lecturer in Social Work in the School of Social and Cultural Studies at Massey University-Auckland. He is the project leader of the *Lavender Islands: Portrait of the Whole Family* research project.
Email: m.henrickson@massey.ac.nz

Table 1
Self-Reported Ethnicity (N=2016)*

Ethnicity	Frequency	%
NZ Māori	84	4.2
Māori/Euro	83	4.1
Māori/Asian	2	0.1
NZ Euro/Pakeha	1672	82.9
Other Euro	67	3.3
All Pacific Island	32	1.5
Pacific/Euro	6	0.3
Chinese	30	1.6
Indian/South Asian	13	0.6
Southeast Asian	4	0.2
Asian-Other	19	1.0
Asia/Euro	4	0.2
Total	2016	100.0

*253 participants (11.1% of the total sample) did not enter an ethnicity

Table 2
Highest Educational Qualification by Gender and Ethnicity

	Female Māori Number	(%)	Female Tauiwi Number	(%)
Primary	3	(3.3)	6	(0.7)
Pre-secondary Certificate or diploma	8	(8.7)	16	(2.0)
Any secondary	13	(14.1)	122	(15.0)
Post-secondary certificate or diploma	27	(29.3)	180	(22.1)
Undergraduate degree	28	(30.4)	277	(34.1)
Postgraduate degree	13	(14.1)	212	(26.1)
	92		813	
	Male Māori Number	**(%)**	**Male Tauiwi Number**	**(%)**
Primary	0	(0)	12	(1.2)
Pre-secondary Certificate or diploma	2	(2.6)	33	(3.2)
Any secondary	20	(26.3)	251	(24.6)
Post-secondary certificate or diploma	19	(25.0)	225	(22.0)
Undergraduate degree	23	(30.3)	301	(29.5)
Postgraduate degree	12	(15.8)	200	(19.6)
	76		1022	

Table 3
Income Profile of Respondents by Gender and Ethnicity

	Female Māori Number (%)	Female Tauiwi Number (%)
0-$20,000	26 (28.6)	185 (22.9)
$20,001-$40,000	20 (22.0)	207 (25.6)
$40.001-$70,000	38 (41.8)	297 (36.7)
>$70,000	7 (7.7)	120 (14.8)
	91	809
	Male Māori Number (%)	**Male Tauiwi Number (%)**
0-$20,000	13 (17.1)	214 (21.2)
$20,001-$40,000	20 (26.3)	203 (20.1)
$40.001-$70,000	27 (35.5)	348 (34.5)
>$70,000	16 (21.1)	243 (24.1)
	76	1008

Table 4
Identity Milestones by Gender and Ethnicity

	Female Māori Mean age (s.d., no.)	Female Tauiwi Mean age (s.d., no.)
First felt different	11.7* (6.25, 36)	14.6* (7.74, 345)
Came out to self	20.0** (8.09, 40)	23.4** (9.15, 417)
	Male Māori Mean age (s.d., no.)	**Male Tauiwi Mean age (s.d.,no.)**
First felt different	10.2 (3.69, 36)	11.1 (4.96, 457)
Came out to self	17.8 (7.57, 41)	18.7 (7.36, 524)

*p=034 **p=.027

Table 5
Number of Lifetime Relationships Greater Than One Year, by Gender, Ethnicity and Sex of Partner
(Percentage only)

Female	Same Sex		Opposite Sex	
	Māori	Tauiwi	Māori	Tauiwi
0	12.1	16.2	39.6	43.6
1-2	47.3	54.7	42.9	44.6
3-4	31.9	21.4	12.1	9.1
5-6	5.5	5.6	3.3	1.6
>6	3.3	2.2	2.2	1.1
Male	**Same Sex**		**Opposite Sex**	
	Māori	Tauiwi	Māori	Tauiwi
0	44.0	31.1	64.0	69.2
1-2	37.3	48.6	26.7	26.7
3-4	13.3	17.0	6.7	3.2
5-6	5.3	2.2	0	0.4
>6	0	1.2	2.7	0.4

Table 6
Current Relationship Status by Gender and Ethnicity

Female (n=894)	Māori Number (%)		Tauiwi Number (%)	
In relationship/Living with person of same-sex	42	(47.2)	420	(52.2)
In relationship/Not living with person of same-sex	14	(15.8)	133	(16.5)
Married/Living with person of opposite sex	6	(6.7)	18	(2.2)
Married/In relationship with person of opposite sex, not living together	1	(1.1)	16	(2.0)
Single and dating	7	(7.9)	44	(5.5)
Single	19	(21.3)	174	(21.6)
	89		805	

Table 6 continued

Male (n=1072)	Māori Number (%)	Tauiwi Number (%)
In relationship/Living with person of same-sex	23 (31.1)	416 (41.7)
In relationship/Not living with person of same-sex	7 (9.5)	11 (11.1)
Married/Living with person of opposite sex	3 (4.1)	20 (2.0)
Married/In relationship with person of opposite sex, not living together	0 (0.0)	2 (0.2)
Single and dating	11 (14.9)	162 (16.2)
Single	30 (40.5)	287 (28.8)
	74	998

Table 7
Selected Disclosure by Gender and Ethnicity

Female (n=960)	Māori Number (%)	Tauiwi Number (%)
Everyone in my life	45 (52.3)	317 (36.3)
Siblings	32 (37.2)	417 (47.7)
Mother	31 (36.0)	412 (47.1)
Father	25 (29.1)	300 (34.3)
Extended family	22 (25.6)	301 (34.4)
Male (n=1132)	**Māori Number (%)**	**Tauiwi Number (%)**
Everyone in my life	20 (28.2)	350 (33.0)
Siblings	39 (54.9)	481 (45.3)
Mother	39 (54.9)	448 (42.2)
Father	28 (39.4)	351 (33.1)
Extended family	31 (43.7)	355 (33.5)

Table 8
Cultural Estrangement/Conformity by Gender and Ethnicity
(1=Rarely to 5= Frequently)

How often do your ideas...	**Female Māori Mean (s.d., no.)**	**Female Tauiwi Mean (s.d., no.)**
Differ from family/relatives	3.69† (1.08, 77)	3.66**(1.01, 786)
Differ from friends	3.01 (0.89, 78)	2.81 (0.91, 785)
Differ from others of your cultural background	3.33* (1.00, 77)	3.60*††(1.04, 765)
Differ from most other people in NZ	3.65 (0.77, 78)	3.50**(0.87, 768)
How often do your ideas...	**Male Māori Mean (s.d., no.)**	**Male Tauiwi Mean (s.d., no.)**
Differ from relatives	3.24† (1.09, 76)	3.38** (0.99, 1149)
Differ from friends	2.83 (0.90, 76)	2.80 (0.85, 1151)
Differ from others of your cultural background	3.32 (1.11, 76)	3.41†† (0.984, 1132)
Differ from most other people in NZ	3.47 (0.92, 74)	3.30** (0.836, 1138)

*p=.016 **p<.001 †p=.011 ††p<.001

Table 9
Spirituality by Gender and Ethnicity
(1=Low to 7=High)

Female	**Māori Mean (s.d., no.)**	**Tauiwi Mean (s.d., no.)**
Importance of spirituality	5.57* (1.71, 92)	4.51 (1.97, 811)
Thought about spirituality	6.09* (1.22, 92)	5.18 (1.76, 807)
Male	**Māori Mean (s.d., no.)**	**Tauiwi Mean (s.d., no.)**
Importance of spirituality	4.30 (1.84, 76)	3.85 (2.07, 1022)
Thought about spirituality	5.13 (1.75, 76)	4.71 (1.88, 1018)

*p<.001

Shifting Practices in New Zealand Sociology

Ruth McManus

Abstract

There is a widespread sense of unease in New Zealand sociology. This disquiet emerges in the day to day as hushed concerns over student numbers, furrowed brows at budget balances, and squeamish stomachs over research outputs. General and pervasive, this sense of unease is linked to profound changes in the organization, provision and practice of an academic sociology radically re-shaped by neoliberal policies in New Zealand higher education (Olssen, 2002). There is an apprehension that under current conditions, sociology is unable to maintain itself as an academic discipline in New Zealand (Crothers, 1999). Yet still, people continue to be employed as sociologists in academic institutions, and new sociology programmes continue to emerge (Spoonley, 2005). Discomfit between a pervading sense of unease about sociology and life on the ground for academic sociologists merits further investigation. This article seeks to embark on such an investigation. Using a variety of information gathering strategies, this paper identifies key trends in the recent disciplinary practices of New Zealand sociology – to assess whether this unease is symptomatic of a discipline in demise or not – and concludes that sociology is maintaining itself as an academic discipline, but in new ways.

Introduction

Few academic sociologists publicly discuss the impact of recent changes on their everyday practices and working environments as sociologists. Take for instance the "Symposium on The State of New Zealand Sociology" in volume 14 of the *New Zealand Sociology* (Beatson & Ojeili, 1999).

The various contributions to this volume focus overwhelmingly on sociology's merit as an intellectual endeavour. These accounts are silent on the impact that changing academic realities have on everyday practices that constitute sociology as an academic discipline. This issue is under intense scrutiny by scholars examining the impact of neoliberalism and globalization

on higher education,[1] and there is a significant pool of edited collections and monographs dedicated to the impact on New Zealand in particular (these include Curtis and Matthewman, 2005; Germov and McGee, 2005; Larner and Le Heron, 2003; Olssen, 2002, 2004; Olssen and Peters, 2005; Peters, 1999; Peters and Roberts, 1999). Although not dealing with sociology directly, this literature is enlightening and productive: these interrogations of neoliberalism and globalization reveal the contingency of current institutional and disciplinary practices in New Zealand higher education.

Much higher education writing rightly locates recent shifts in higher education policy perspectives and practices to the rise in neoliberal discourses (Olssen, 2002). There is widespread debate in the education literature, as elsewhere, over the best way to understand the impact of this turn to neoliberalism, its character, its relationship with globalization, and ultimately the ways in which it can be questioned (Slaughter, 1998). Michael Peters and Wendy Larner have made a significant contribution to post-structuralist discussions of these issues in various sole authored and collaborative works over the last decade. In their challenges to globalization and neoliberal rhetoric, Peters and Roberts (1999) and Larner and Le Heron (2003) make particularly useful contributions to the discussion about the academic realities of sociology.

Peters and Roberts' (1999) analysis and critique of neoliberal policies in higher education operates at the macro level of policy domains. Employing their own term of "multiple globalisations" (p. 58), they regard neoliberalism as a very specific policy discourse that has come to dominate government responses to the processes of globalization. As the neoliberal free market approach represents only one paradigm among a range of possibilities, when applied to sociology, their account raises the possibility of multiple and potentially cross-cutting policy discourses informing academic institutional practices.

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[1] For instance much debate is conducted in key sociology, political economy and higher education journals including the *Journal of Education Policy*, *Continuum: Journal of Media and Communication Studies*, *New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations*, *Studies in Political Economy*, *McGill Journal of Education*, *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, *Current Sociology* and the *Electronic Journal of Sociology* to name but a few.

Larner and Le Heron's (2003) strategy is to focus on the contingency of these policy strategies. In their view, neoliberal policies are not a coherent political response to the exigencies of the global economy but a particular moment where diverse political projects get tied together as "an ad hoc, post facto rationalisation in which connections are made across political projects that were initially quite discrete and even contradictory" (Larner, Le Heron, and Lewis, in press), involving diverse actors who, significantly, can traverse the field in new and creative ways (Larner and Le Heron, 2003, p. 103).

Although Peters and Roberts' macro account stresses multiplicity and potentially cross-cutting institutional and disciplinary practices while Larner and Le Heron's account draws attention to the contingency of current academic practices, when combined, their accounts characterize the contemporary New Zealand academic environment as multiple, contested, and contingent fields of academic practice. This insight offers a particularly fruitful point of departure when extended to the constitutive practices of everyday domains of academic disciplines such as sociology. Their approaches allow for the possibility that current unease and disjuncture within academic sociology is an articulation of the complexity, multiplicity, and emergent possibilities of contemporary New Zealand higher education as a whole. Moreover, this uneasiness and disjuncture may point to a re-configuration and re-scaling rather than disintegration of academic practices. Still, the difficulty is knowing the tenor of everyday practices and whether they signal a disintegration or a re-configuration of academic sociology. Currently, the available literature is unable to shed much light, as even the productive work of Peters, Larner and Le Heron does no more than offer tentative implications about the effect of the current context upon the constitution of academic disciplines.

The re-calibration of academia is linked in profound ways to trans- and inter-disciplinary studies that Peters (1999) understands as "a kind of unravelling of the disciplinary purposes of the modern university" (p. 6). In a similar, yet perhaps less pessimistic tone, Larner and Le Heron (2003) focus on the emergence of benchmarking as particular kinds of calculative practices that are "giving rise to new views of the university world and altering staff and student behaviours" (p. 103), which, while remaining

firmly linked to an overall reliance on calculative practices, is giving rise to a more "process orientated approach and *eroding disciplinary orientations*" (emphasis added, p. 112).

Given the radical transformation in the context of academic practice, and in accord with scholars elsewhere (for instance Bullen, Robb, and Kenway, 2004), Peters and Larner and Le Heron imply that that the future for academic disciplines such as sociology is decidedly shaky.

Despite an extensive literature search, it has not been possible to corroborate their assertion in relation to sociology. This warranted a deeper look into the messy actualities of sociology to gauge if these fears about academic disciplines' futures are justified. This necessitates an evaluation of past and current sociological practices in relation to a workable definition of sociology as a bona fide academic discipline.

According to Peters (1999), an academic discipline has three core characteristics: it has a sense of disciplinary identity that is articulated and replicated through teaching and research that focuses on the discipline; it has a distinct institutional location; and it has external recognition as a distinct and autonomous body of knowledge and practices. Combined, these disciplinary markers constitute academic subjectivities as a synthesis of autonomy and responsibility over teaching and research practices that advance the discipline.

When considered this way, the discipline of sociology can be usefully characterized as the pursuit of sociological imagination through ongoing disputations over perspectives and thorough examinations of lived reality (McLennan, 1998, p. 62; Timms, 1970, p. 51). Accordingly, for sociology to be a bona fide academic discipline, sociologists should be engaging in everyday practices that advance the discipline through teaching and research which foster disciplinary identity, academic autonomy, and garner external recognition. If Peters and Larner and Le Heron's fears are valid then an examination of past and current sociology practices should reveal a slide away from teaching practices that replicate disciplinary identity, and a loss of institutional location and external recognition.

I have therefore attempted an account of the messy actualities of everyday academic sociology around the country. The aim was to use a range of information sources to allow a composite picture of the multiple

practices and different strategies in place. Material was gathered in various ways. I consulted academic journals, books, and conference papers that discuss the practices of New Zealand sociology, along with historical and current course outlines from personal teaching files. The internet was used to source University Calendar entries for the eight universities that offer programmes and courses in sociology. These are University of Auckland (Auckland), Auckland University of Technology (AUT), University of Canterbury (Canterbury), University of Lincoln (Lincoln), Massey University (Massey), University of Otago (Otago), Victoria University Wellington (Victoria) and University of Waikato (Waikato). Departmental and individual course descriptions were also accessed virtually. Past and present Heads of School or Department were contacted via email and asked about current practices and contextual reasons for change. A number of conversations were had with past and current academic sociologists around the country, either face to face or by telephone. This information was gathered over an 18 month period up to July 2006.

I am not claiming that the material gathered represents a full documentation of practices in sociology. Such an exercise would demand a more extensive research project. However, it is possible to at least discern distinct trends in the ways in which sociology articulates its disciplinary practice over the last twenty years.

Current trends in sociology

What follows is an account of the everyday strategies that constitute the disciplinary practices of NZA sociology. The first issue examined is the pedagogical approach in undergraduate and postgraduate named social theory courses. Social theory pedagogy was examined because, as Harley (2005, p. 346) among others notes, social theory papers are a distinctive and crucial pedagogical site where students are taught about the history and disputes of sociology; it is a site where disciplinary identity gets coherently and explicitly articulated.

Disciplinary identity

Drawing from the various course prescriptions available in university calendars and websites, it is possible to discern a range of ways that disciplinary identity gets articulated in named social theory papers. This spans a focus on historical commentary, thematic disputes, and current social issues and concerns.

At undergraduate 200 and 300 level papers, some, for instance, Canterbury, Massey, Waikato, and Otago, articulate disciplinary identity in the form of commentaries that focus on the continuities and discontinuities in the historical development of sociological theory. Canterbury's "Sociological Theory" (Soci 240) traces sociological ideas from the Enlightenment to the present day, and uses the writings of key social theorists to explore and understand the linkages between their ideas and their social/historical context. Massey (Turitea Campus) also articulates the disciplinary identity by way of historical commentary. The course "Classical Social Thought" (176.201) explores the work of founding theorists Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel, using recurrent themes of sociological methodology, social change, and democracy and domination. Waikato's "History of Sociological Thought" (SOCY 204) provides a commentary on sociological thought from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth centuries, in the context of historical and intellectual change, with special reference to Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Otago's "Sociological Theory" (SOCI 202) demonstrates the enduring relevance of concepts developed by key classical thinkers through links to key issues in contemporary social theory. Meanwhile Victoria uses the theme of society to introduce a range of theoretical approaches. "Interpreting Society" (Sosc 211) considers both classical and contemporary theories and their implications for researching and understanding social life. In addition, Victoria offers a stage one theory paper (SOSC111 "Sociology: Foundations and Concepts") that focuses on the work of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber.

Other institutions, such as Auckland, AUT, and Lincoln, articulate disciplinary identity by applying a combination of classical and contemporary theorists to current social issues. For instance, Auckland's "Theory and Society" (Sociol 200) takes a practical and applied approach to show how a range of classical and contemporary theoretical approaches

are being used to analyse and explain a range of contemporary social issues, from World Bank approaches to poverty reduction to New Zealand social policy and everyday health practices. AUT's "Applied Social Theory" (287-202) draws upon a range of theorists to examine and analyse current issues in New Zealand and internationally – particularly in relation to Asian and Pacific issues. And Lincoln's "Social Theory" (SOCI 202) provides a detailed coverage of sociological concepts and theories and explores their application to New Zealand society within a global context.

Although Waikato, Otago, and Lincoln do not offer graduate level named social theory papers, the others offer a diverse selection of approaches. Auckland's "Advanced Problems in Sociological Theory" addresses contemporary developments and debates in the field of social theory using the theme "After neoliberalism". AUT's "Advanced Social Theory" analyzes contemporary global political economy and the contemporary character of societies, groups and selves. "Current Issues and Theory" offered through Massey (Turitea) takes sociological theory as a topic in its own right, while "Rethinking the Social" at Victoria develops an analysis of key themes and paradigms in sociological analysis. Canterbury's "Social theory and the City" takes the historical transformation in the city as a means to assess a range of social theories about the city.

The multiplicity of pedagogical strategies outlined above suggests a central characteristic of taught social theory papers in sociology is their heterogeneity. What may be surprising is that this is not new. As long ago as 1970, D.W.G. Timms noted the considerable differences in teaching styles and content across sociology programmes. Timms' summary of the sociology programmes existent at the time (Victoria, Canterbury, Waikato, and Auckland) stressed the divergence across courses at first, second, and third level. To glance briefly at second and third year courses, all institutions offered a "practical series on research methods where the emphasis is on techniques rather than on the more general question of the nature of sociological enquiry" (Timms, 1970, p. 40). The substantive courses diverged markedly. Although Timms does not give details of Auckland's offerings, Canterbury focused on General Sociology and Social Problems, while Victoria focused on Social Institutions and Population studies, with Waikato offering Sociological Theory and Social Organisation. Given this longstanding

diversity, there has been a radical transformation in the way that social theory gets taught. Timms (1970) drew attention to what he saw as a significant gap in the sociology curriculum:

> It is perhaps inevitable that there should be notable gaps in the sociology programmes available in New Zealand. Probably the most serious substantive gap consists in the paucity of material on New Zealand society itself. With the exception of a handful of studies, concerned with small communities and demographic phenomena there is little local material available for incorporation into teaching programmes. (p. 52)

In the review of current social theory papers there is a trend toward social theory courses focussed on and taught through contemporary issues in New Zealand society. It has become more important than ever to highlight the significance of social theory through current and local lenses, be those Pacific, Asian, or New Zealand. The perceived need for locally orientated approaches was reiterated (in emails) by all departments.

A current academic at Otago pointed out that "the two theory papers are well supported, especially as our pedagogical approach is always to teach theory by integrating each theoretical approach within a case study from New Zealand society (e.g., Springbok tour, student loan scheme)". Another academic from Waikato repeats the same point – that students like and want locally orientated critical theorizing: "A lot depends on how the theory course is taught, for example the third year Modern Social Theory paper has inter alia a weekly workshop where students get to use theory to unpack current issues – this through group work, role play etc. This is seen as making theory work – instantiation – and is also enjoyed by the class".

With the shift to local problem orientation comes an increased emphasis on social theory as process rather than social theory as canon. This is best illustrated through an example – the Springbok Tour as a local issue wrought through social theory concepts. The Springbok Tour is a crucial moment in the socio-political construction of contemporary New Zealand national identity as "Springbok tour protesters represented a challenge to (and reincorporation of) traditional male values" (Phillips, 1987, p. 263), and as such it is still very much alive in the national consciousness. As an event it was uniquely divisive of New Zealand society and is crucial to understanding

New Zealand's recent socio-political history, particularly in relation to post-colonialism and indigenous politics (McLean, 2000; Phillips, 1987, p. 115). This means that it is a crucial site through which to demonstrate key analytical techniques and concepts (such as ethnicity, gender and social conflict and national identity), and through which the contemporary social terrain of New Zealand might be analyzed. By using the tour to demonstrate and apply key themes and concepts, there is no guaranteed learning output in the form of detailed facts or information. Instead, students are given the tools and the problem to come up with their own synthesis and solution and, in doing so, demonstrate their skills in self-directed learning.

Significant for sociology is the increasing attention to local issues and process orientated accounts of social theory. Acknowledgement of theoretical disputes is demonstrated by approaching social theory through current and local issues, as is the importance of sustained attention to the disciplined examination of contemporary lived realities of New Zealand. Disputes over competing explanations and an abiding concern to examine lived realities remain central characteristics of the current mix of social theory pedagogy. Taken nationally, sociology has the demonstrable capacity to communicate the core tenets of sociology's disciplinary identity albeit through markedly different pedagogical styles. From this it can be said that sociology has retained its capacity to replicate its disciplinary identity.

Institutional location

The continued capacity for social theory pedagogy to communicate disciplinary identity to students is not enough to get a sense of whether sociology has the capacity to maintain itself as an academic discipline throughout recent institutional transformations. Following Peters (1999), it is also necessary to gauge the ability of sociology to claim a distinct institutional location through these tumultuous times. This can be translated into two aspects – one is the generic location of sociology within the tertiary education system and involves charting any significant relocation or disassembly of the discipline through recent decades. The second is autonomy over the organisation of the majors. Given their broad institutional

location, do sociologists have the academic autonomy to set the conditions of their major? How have they done this and have the infrastructural changes had an adverse effect on this autonomy?

The first task is to identify where in the tertiary education system sociology first emerged. Sociology, since its first appearance in NZ, has been located within the university system. The first sociology papers were offered as part of a Diploma in Social Science through the federally constituted University of New Zealand in 1922 (Timms, 1970, p. 33). However, the status of sociology as an academically recognized discipline within the university system was hard won. Although the first sociology courses were available, it was only in the late 1960s and early 1970s that sociology achieved a more permanent footing within the academic world and appeared "en route to academic respectability" (Timms, 1970, p. 33). Six sociology departments were set up in the early 1970s (Auckland, Victoria, Canterbury, Massey, Lincoln, Waikato). The slow expansion of the discipline within the national university curriculum continues. Currently eight institutions present courses in the named discipline of sociology. Of these eight, five offer majors in Sociology (Auckland, Canterbury, Massey, Otago, Victoria), while the balance (AUT, Lincoln, Waikato) offer sociology papers as part of a Social Science major. Over the last decade there has been an expansion in the academic recognition of sociology as a bona fide academic discipline – Otago and AUT have recently begun to offer sociology papers and Otago established a major in sociology as recently as 2002.

Even though the recent deregulation of tertiary provision has led to an expansion in the type of education providers (Scott and Scott, 2005), no sociology majors are offered by any of the other non-university tertiary education providers that can tender degrees and certificates. Yet, there is at least a visible presence of sociological concerns within the broad array of offerings. For instance, sociology concerns are incorporated in the Certificate in Social Services at UNITEC; the Certificate in Social Services and Diploma in Social work (Manukau Institute of Technology); the Foundation Certificates in Nursing, Recreation and Sport, Applied Social Science, the B.A. in Nursing, and a Bachelor of Applied Social Science at EIT; Whitireia's the Community Services Certificate, Foundation in Education and Introduction to Health Sciences; the BA Social Sciences Major at the Open

Polytechnic; and finally the Southern Institute of Technology's National Certificate in Social Services and Certificate in Health and Childcare. Sociology is also present as a minor in many other academic programmes within the university system. For instance, at Canterbury, many students are able to take sociology papers toward a major in most other disciplines offered in the College of Arts. These currently include but are not exhausted by majors in Anthropology, Gender Studies, Cultural Studies, History, Maori Studies, Social Work, Political Science and Religious Studies (University of Canterbury Registrar, 2006).

Despite the teaching of some sociology in a broad array of Certificate and Diploma courses and many other university degree offerings, this does not represent a significant shift in sociology's institutional location. The spread of this influence is in a minor register. This is because sociology remains subaltern to other pedagogical agendas of alternative academic and professional practice curricula.

In brief, sociology gained a distinct institutional location within the New Zealand university system in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and has experienced slow growth though stable institutional location. This signals the continued consolidation of sociology as a discipline within the New Zealand university system, as distinct from either interdisciplinary dilution or dissemination into the broader system of tertiary education providers.

Academics have long experienced a high degree of autonomy in their university careers. A means to gauge distinct institutional location is through the autonomy of sociologists to constitute majors in sociology within the specific universities. This can be gauged through institutional permission to have autonomy over the curriculum progression in their majors.

Sociologists, alongside other academics, have experienced a transformation in the practice of autonomy over recent decades. Although a mix of major and minor offerings in sociology has existed since its inception in the 1920s, what has changed is the ways in which individual sociology degree programmes have constituted their majors. This point is corroborated through an account of the fortunes of social theory papers within the sociology curriculum.

My logic for following the fortunes of social theory papers within the curriculum is that it is important to know the status of social theory papers within this modular system. This is because knowing whether they are compulsory or not is a way to gauge whether disciplinary identity is being actively addressed in and through the official, institutionally recognized curriculum associated with the named sociology degree. The autonomy to set the major requirements at departmental level means that academics are able to build progression across their whole degree curriculum. This autonomy is significant because the modular degree system (which all New Zealand universities use) does not require it. There are examples, especially in Australian and American degree majors, where all papers are interchangeable and there is no curriculum progression.

When we compare which majors are cored and de-cored (i.e., which social theory papers are compulsory or not) we get a sense that there are different ways to make up a sociology major in New Zealand. As suggested in table # 1 below, social theory is offered in a mix of ways – at second, third and graduate, at second and graduate, or only at undergraduate levels.

Figure 1. Table of institutions offering names social theory papers, at what level, whether under compulsion for a major in sociology ands when semesterized.

Institution/named Social theory papers	200	300	Graduate	Compulsory for major	Compulsion removed	Semesterized
Auckland	"		"		2002	1982
AUT	"		"	"		2000
Canterbury	"	"	"		2000	2000
Lincoln	"			"		1980
Massey	"	"	"	"		1996
Otago	"	"		"		2002
Victoria	"		"		2001	2001
Waikato	"	"		"		2000

Compiled by Ruth McManus May 2006.

Some institutions (Victoria, Canterbury, and Auckland) have removed compulsory courses in the major, while others (AUT, Lincoln, Massey, Otago, and Waikato) retain social theory (and usually social methods) as compulsory components of a sociology major. When asked to recall reasons for de-coring majors, what emerges is a mix of strategies in response to localized contexts

within which the degrees are offered. According to an email received from a former lecturer at Auckland, "one reason that the sociology programme de-cored was because of competition for sociology students from education, population health, and management and employment relations – all of whom were teaching sociology. Because we made them do theory (which they found hard) they just voted with their feet. They wanted to do sociology but on their own terms". A former Head of School from the same institution remarked "We 'de-cored' in stages from the late eighties, in response to student grumbling and EFTS competition. The last bastion (a pass in SOCIOL 200 required for Sociology major) fell around 2002".

In contrast, a current member of Massey sociology recounted how, under the same external pressures, their departmental decision-making took a different direction: "Teaching social theory? As I see it the play off is between depth and extent. At Massey, we kept the major cored and built the compulsory courses around authorial accounts of classic schools of thought rather than personalities. We went for depth - for preparing students to do sociology well – the courses were a cumulative archive of insights, strategies and different ways to unpack problems through authorial accounts rather than problem orientated courses. But this kind of structure is difficult to maintain. I think most others have removed compulsion – they've gone for choice in the major, you might get the numbers but they're light on preparation for doing sociology well. But, really, the biggest impact for teaching social theory was semesterization. That made it really difficult to maintain the depth of engagement and time for writing to make our approach work well".

The diversified fate of social theory papers in the various sociology majors demonstrates that academic sociologists have managed to maintain a high degree of academic autonomy over how majors are constituted. However, decisions to modify or not are made on the back of intense pressure to deal with the effects of a user pays system in tertiary education.

Sociologists' autonomy unfolds in an environment that has transformed the terms of responsibility. Academics are increasingly expected to apply managerial demands (predicated on market driven policies) to workaday practices. Market orientated policies have intensified academic work. The growing focus on budgetary management has seen the emergence of just-

in-time education. Work that can be contracted out is contracted out. Teaching responsibilities traditionally linked to an academic position are casualized as tutorial staff are called in to work on piecemeal (hourly) rates at the beginning of each course on an as needed basis, with no security of employment or security of facility use (like a library card, etc.). De-regulating tutorial staff means departments can trim costs to match their budgets and respond seemingly quickly and effectively to unpredictable fluctuations in student numbers. Budgetary management has also seen the emergence of rapidly escalating student:lecturer ratios. New Zealand universities have undergone radical restructuring that has entailed a significant loss of permanent academic and general staff. Accordingly, staff-student ratios have increased from 1:12.5 in 1979 to 1:20 by the late 1990s (Crozier, 2002, p. 4).

Sociology has managed to retain a distinct disciplinary location: the influence of sociological approaches has spread through cognate disciplines within the university and (though subaltern) into the non-university tertiary education sector. The ways in which majors are constructed and the contours of sociology's presence in the tertiary education system suggests that even as distinct institutional locations are being maintained, the manner in which this is done has transformed in direct response to recent changes to the broader higher education sector. Academic sociologists are being responsibilized in unfamiliar ways.

Academic recognition

Academic recognition, the last of Peters' conditions for disciplinary viability, remains to be examined. While sociology achieves a degree of academic recognition through its capacity to teach at university level, recognition of sociology in the national research culture and supporting agencies is also vital.

There are no think tanks and a scant handful of private social science research companies in New Zealand: the New Zealand state dominates tertiary education and research funding (Thorns, 2003, p. 692). This means that as a discipline, sociology gains recognition through its relationships with government funding agencies and government Ministries.

Historically, support for sociologically orientated research has been minimal, particularly when compared to the sciences (Thorns, 2003, pp.

693-694). Yet recently, sociological research has gained academic currency. Social research is now shaped through a social policy environment that is (potentially) post-neoliberal. Defined by Larner and Craig (2005, p. 402) as a "new era of joined up, inclusive governance characterised by relationships of collaboration, trust and above all partnership", it is associated with the growing significance of evidence based policy. This is the core strategy to develop accurate and effective policies that will foster inclusion in the knowledge society and assure New Zealand's performance on the global market (Maharey, 2003). Furthermore, this approach relies on placing evidence based evaluation methods at the centre of policy activity and implementation. Funding bodies are eager to support collaborative projects and sociologists have been keen to reciprocate. Examples include the "Local Partnerships and Governance" Research Group based in the Department of Sociology in Auckland, and "Constructive Conversations Korero Whakaaetanga: Biotechnologies, dialogue, and informed decision-making" based in Canterbury's School of Sociology and Anthropology. As Thorns (2003, p.694) notes, the centrality of an evidence base to inclusion orientated policies marks a reawakening of interest in long term social analysis and, with that, a re-recognition of sociologically orientated research.

While at the vanguard of collaborative and evidence based research, sociology is hamstrung by severely depleted education funding. "The research underpinning our discipline comes mostly from the vote education funding" (which is research connected to a lecturing position rather than research funded over and above an academic salary), and remains meagre "relative to both other countries and other areas of scientific research" (Thorns, 2003, pp. 699, 696). Sociology is experiencing a surge of recognition based on the collaborative and evidence based government policy agendas of the day, while at the same time the vast majority of sociological projects are undertaken in the straightened environment of vote research.

In summary, this section has sought to identify longstanding and newly emerging trends in the everyday practices of academic sociologists in Aotearoa-New Zealand. It has become apparent that there have been significant changes to the ways in which everyday sociology gets done. There is increasing attention to local issues and process orientated accounts of social theory; there has been a significant transformation in the

responsibilities of academic autonomy; there is a surge in sociology's academic recognition albeit in a strictly defined form. Now that there is some sense of what the trends are in current academic practice, some comments on Peters, Larner and Le Herons premonitions can be offered.

Peters' (1999) prognosis for current times is that the underlying market logic does effectively shape academic practice and that this links to an "unravelling of disciplinary purposes" (p. 6). Agreeing with the profound impact of recent transformations, Larner and Le Heron (2003) presage new sites of intervention, re-designed curriculum and new forms of collaboration that are "eroding disciplinary orientations" (p. 112). Market logic does effectively shape academic practice, and new sites of intervention, re-designed curricula, and new forms of research collaboration abound. This has been seen in the increasing need for academic practitioners to recognize and respond to student numbers as they rework the courses that emplace sociology's disciplinary identity in emergent scholars, construct cored or de-cored majors, and develop new collaboratively defined research projects. Yet, given its undeniable re-orientation, it is still legitimate to claim that sociology is sustained as a bona fide academic discipline. It continues to demonstrate disciplinary identity, independent institutional location and academic recognition. How then to respond to Peters and Larner and Le Hood's projections? One way is to examine the new academic subjectivities that are wrought. The striking feature is that the tenets of academic life – of autonomy over and responsibility for one's discipline – remain. What has changed is the ways in which this autonomy and responsibility is achieved. Academic autonomy and responsibility for sociology is demonstrated through rather than eroded by the turn to locally orientated teaching, multiple curriculum strategies, and collaborative research. On sociology's account, rather than being unravelled and eroded, disciplinary orientation and purpose are being re-calibrated as they are linked to everyday experiences of tension, conflict and incompatible demands. More importantly, the sense of unease within the discipline can be taken to articulate multiple and newly emerging strategies of disciplinary replication. Sociology practitioners have been and continue to be constructive and inventive in the ways they traverse the field of academic sociology.

Conclusion

There has been significant change in the institutional environment within which academic sociology exists in New Zealand. However, it is possible to suggest that sociology's response to these changes gives a clear sense of continuing practices that foster disciplinary identity, that sociology's distinctive institutional location is being maintained, and that it is experiencing a moment in the sun of academic recognition. These trends are significant because they indicate the specific ways in which the shift to neoliberal policies in higher education has impacted upon the discipline of sociology. Current unease may by symptomatic of re-calibrations rather than the demise of academic sociology in New Zealand. Current times in sociology suggest higher education in New Zealand is a highly contested terrain where critically effective permutations of and alternatives to neoliberal projects are emerging.

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Ruth McManus is a lecturer in Sociology at the University of Canterbury. Her research interests include, the sociology of death, dying and bereavement; teaching social theory; globalization, poverty and provision. She is currently researching the project "death in a global age". Contact details: ruth.mcmanus@canterbury.ac.nz

The monstrous and the dead: Burke, Marx, fascism
Neocleous, M. (2005). Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Reviewed by Steve Matthewman

Spectres now haunt the sociological imagination (Derrida, 1994; Gordon, 1997), which is only fitting for as Marshall Berman (1982) notes, under conditions of modernity we are all haunted. He writes:

> This atmosphere – of agitation and turbulence, psychic dizziness and drunkenness, expansion of experiential possibilities, and destruction of moral boundaries and personal bonds, self-enlargement and self-derangement, phantoms in the street and in the soul – is the atmosphere in which the modern sensibility is born. (1982: 18)

Since political movements are formed within this sensibility it follows that ghosts haunt them too. Besides, power has always used the dead. In Mark Neocleous' project they figure as "the litmus test of politics" (p. 2). He considers their political power in the major western traditions of conservatism, socialism and fascism. The first two are seen through the figures of Edmund Burke and Karl Marx respectively, two men of notable literary flair, while the latter is viewed through the movement more broadly, presumably because fascism failed to spawn a single great thinker. All three traditions "understood the importance of imagination, language, allusion, and metaphor to political writing" (p. 7), and all three have a strong relationship with the dead. But the relationships, Neocleous argues, are quite distinct. The point of divergence is memory. How are the dead to be remembered *politically?* Neocleous shows their discrepancies with his own version of the "Three R's". For Burke it is reconciliation; for Marx redemption; for fascists resurrection.

One of the motivations for the book was to break theology's intellectual monopoly of the dead: "the intention is to consider what happens when the dead are liberated from religion and thrust into the political limelight" (p. 2) - as if religion and politics were mutually exclusive realms. The dispute with theology goes no further, but a second front is opened up against cultural studies. While this campaign is hardly sustained, here Neocleous

may claim victory. Once more the stakes are political. Neocleous is in no doubt that cultural studies impoverished itself in abandoning Marx. Distance has not afforded comprehension. Marx frequently used visceral and vampiric imagery in his writings – "capital is dead labour which, vampire-like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks" – but they have been interpreted in metaphorical and culturalist ways. Neocleous argues that the correct interpretation is literal and political: capitalism is predicated on destruction and exploitation. "As Marx knew full well, the only thing capital fears is the "monster" that it has conjured up – the proletariat; everything else, cultural studies included, is a source of profit" (p. 129).

The engagement with sociology never happens. Jacques Derrida is only a spectral presence (3 mentions), while Avery Gordon never appears. This is a shame for several reasons. First, it would have helped to take the book beyond its modest proportions (only 115 pages). Second, and related, it would have fleshed out its contents without recourse to padding. For instance chapter one seems like it contains every sentence in which Burke mentioned the word "monster", and a single paragraph (p. 11) records Burke's astonishment seven times. Finally, it would have helped to draw out the theoretical import of all of this, though it would be unfair to suggest that this is a thinly descriptive work devoid of any analysis (the book is followed by 35 pages of notes). There is plenty here to interest the reader.

The first chapter looks at the place of the monster in Burke's political thought. Monstrosity is invoked to mark fear of the masses, a newly emerging historical grouping that would come to be known as the proletariat. Monsters trouble our taxonomies, they threaten the established order. They cause Burke anxiety. In his view political authority springs from tradition. "In Burkean terms we might say that to be a monster is to also break the bonds of obligation to the past and thus the dead" (p. 35). The rhetorical strategies first found in Burke have run through conservative discourse ever since. Therefore Neocleous' analysis "extends our understanding of the way conservative ideology conceptualizes order and the threats to that order" (pp. 10-11).

The second chapter studies Marx. Earlier Marxist scholarship identified two forms of horror in *Capital*: bloody legislation whipping vagabonds into

wage slaves, and the exportation of these capitalist social relations to the colonies. Neocleous adds a third – bourgeois lust for working class blood. Consideration of the vampire takes us to the very core of Marx's critique of political economy. The ruling class sucks the labour (and sometimes the very life) out of workers. Marx elucidated the distinction between sensuous human beings (living labour) and capital (dead labour). This difference relates to a general concern within Marx's work "to create a society founded on the *living* of full and creative lives rather than one founded on the *rule of the dead*" (p. 55). The proletariat, as heirs to generations of exploitation and oppression, are to redeem the dead by building society anew.

The third chapter confronts fascism and its politics of the dead. Fascism seeks to make everyone a hero. The highest heroic deed is sacrifice of one's life in the cause, thus springs fascism's cult of the dead. Neocleous unpicks the fascist slogan "Long Live Death!" favoured in Spain and Italy, though German equivalents can be found. All regimes identified with death in its most politicized and aesthetized forms. Many theorists have tried to make sense of this. Erich Fromm found fascism to be a necrophiliac phenomenon, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari talked about Nazism's suicidal state to which Michel Foucault added: and racist and murderous. Neocleous argues that the embrace of death means something more than sacrifice: the conversion of "blood myth into blood bath" (p. 104) speaks to immortalization, the belief that the dead are not really dead. They will be resurrected as part of a greater future. There is no doubting which side Neocleous is on. At the book's close he writes: "until Marxism wins the battle against fascism – which is no more than saying it must win the battle against capitalism – not even the dead will be safe" (p. 115).

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Second opinion: An introduction to health sociology (3rd ed) Germov, J. (Ed.) (2005). Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Reviewed by Kevin Dew

In the Australian market there are a number of very good textbooks on sociology of health that one could choose from. Obviously successful in that market has been *Second Opinion* edited by John Germov, which is now in its third edition. This is a very attractively presented textbook, nicely laid out and with some extra features befitting a contemporary text – notably a sibling website with supplementary material. The book is organised in three main sections: the social production and distribution of health and illness; the social construction of health and illness; the social organisation of health care. This works well. The book includes extra chapters from previous editions: one on research by Doug Ezzy; one on community health by Fran Baum and one on food and nutrition co-written by Lauren Williams and John Germov. An unusual feature of this book is the strong presence of the editor. Five of the twenty-one chapters are sole authored by Germov and two are co-written by him. He does have a very accessible style of writing, frequently drawing on references to film, television programmes and common sayings to get his point across.

As with any edited book the chapters are quite variable. Most chapters address issues of sociological interest, but one or two are largely descriptive, in particular Fran Baum's chapter on "Community health services in Australia" which is mainly about health service philosophy and delivery with no obvious sociological content. This is not particularly a problem though as the philosophy may well be of interest to those the book targets – which no doubt includes students of health as well as students of sociology.

The opening chapter kicks off an introduction to health sociology superbly well. Life expectancy tables with comparisons over time and between countries are presented and act as powerful devices to demonstrate the social origins of health and illness in contrast to other possible explanations for the patterns observed – in particular genetic explanations but also by implication lifestyle and technological development explanations.

This manages to combine quite complex issues with a very introductory and accessible feel.

Any reader will have particular criticisms in relation to specific chapters and what has been included or left out of the book – that is the nature of such enterprises. I found the new chapter on "Researching health" by Doug Ezzy slightly disappointing. The chapter challenges the dominance of positivism and focuses on qualitative approaches to uncovering meaning, which it does well, but the chapter does not provide a sense of what I think are the exciting range of approaches used in health sociology. There is nothing here on observational research or approaches to the analysis of naturally occurring talk, discourse generally or interaction. The "Health promotion" chapter by Katy Richmond and Germov is very uncritical of public health approaches to health promotion. That is, it does not problematise campaigns related to smoking, diet and the workplace. For example, in a discussion of structural-collectivist approaches to health promotion (which is advocated in the chapter) the authors support the idea of vaccinating workers against Q fever as opposed to a more in-depth sociological critique focusing on the conditions of work and the role of particular technologies (like vaccinations, or to take a different example, genetic tests of chemical sensitivity) in undermining efforts to change workplace organisation. The occupational health problem becomes unvaccinated workers and not the places and conditions of work. This is particularly ironic as the health promotion chapter is sandwiched between a chapter by Deborah Lupton titled "The body, medicine and society", which critiques medical surveillance and the disciplining of bodies, and Evan Willis's chapter on "The human genome project", which critiques the individualising and surveillance tendencies of genetic technology. However these are minor points in what is an excellent introductory text – very readable and no doubt thought provoking and insightful for the novice health sociologist.

From a New Zealand perspective it was interesting to see that in an edited book of this nature the chapter on indigenous health was not written by an indigene. There are no edited introductions to sociology of health in New Zealand, the nearest to that being the book I co-edited with Peter Davis which was really a combination of sociology, health policy and public

health. However, if there were such a book it would look decidedly odd if a Maori academic did not write the Maori health chapter. The chapter on indigenous health is well written, although its opening vignette of Mary does have a slightly patronising tone. This vignette is a depiction of struggle and misery, but the perpetrators of the misery are conspicuously absent in the vignette. There is also a chapter on multiculturalism – which might not make it on a shortlist of chapters in a New Zealand context at this time.

It is also notable that there are no chapters explicitly on mental health and disabilities. This contrasts with other introductory texts in Australia (e.g.,Gray, 2006; Grbich, 2004). However, there is quite a focus on practitioners and professionals, with separate chapters on allied professionals, on alternative medicine, on nursing and on community services. This might make this text particular apt for those teaching sociology in health settings.

For New Zealand students this book might particularly appeal if they are interested in comparisons with Australia. Helen Belcher's chapter titled "Power, politics and health care" provides a good overview of the Australian health care system with its federal and state structures. The various chapters on the professions also have useful information on the organisation of health care. Deidre Wicks goes further in her chapter titled "Nursing and sociology: an uneasy relationship" where she criticises sociology for placing nursing in a negative light as a profession. She suggests that sociologists have represented nursing as passively responding to the gendered nature of medical dominance, and as such has devalued nursing work.

In sum, there is a great deal of material that would be of interest to a New Zealand health sociology audience in this well presented text.

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Jürgen Habermas: Democracy and the public sphere
Goode, L. (2005). London: Pluto Press.

Reviewed by Lincoln Dahlberg

Should Habermas still be taught, read, and drawn upon in sociology and the social sciences? Is there any place for this "modernist" social-political philosopher in the twenty first century neo-corporatist university? Is Habermas of any relevance to the digitally attuned/embedded student? Luke Goode's recently published book on Habermas convincingly demonstrates why the answer to these questions is an emphatic YES. Goode has produced a book that not only demonstrates "old" Habermas' relevance for present social thought but shows his importance for thinking about our common futures. Goode brings Habermas' public sphere and democratic theory alive by relating it to contemporary substantive issues, particularly those relating to our mediated realities. Goode's critical considerations of Habermas' political thought are both insightful and lucid, not an easy thing to achieve given the density of much of Habermas' writing. As such, I consider this book a major achievement, one of the most useful introductions to Habermas' social and political thought available.

Goode aims for a critical but sympathetic reading of Habermas' political theory in relation to contemporary mediations, dealing with critics who share a not-too-dissimilar normative and theoretical tradition (e.g. Giddens, Beck, Thompson) and avoiding Habermas' post-structuralist opponents. Goode undertakes this reading by examining first Habermas' *Structural transformation of the public sphere* (STPS) thesis, and second Habermas' latter more philosophical work and political-legal theory. Goode explicitly favours the earlier STPS writing, arguing that it is more historically grounded and does more "to energise and stimulate our thinking about democracy" than the latter work, which is characterised by Goode as a "drift into abstraction" (pp. 3-4).

The first chapter provides an excellent summary and critical consideration of STPS. Goode eloquently overviews the main arguments and thoughtfully relates them to contemporary issues. The second chapter

offers a succinct discussion of three of the major areas where left-critics see STPS as failing: a lack of historical accuracy, a failure to provide a convincing normative vision of equality and emancipation, and an overemphasis on rationality and neglect of embodiment. Obviously, as Goode notes, this is a selective account. However, Goode manages to cover the major questions that have been raised by left-critics of STPS and to provide a very clear outline and fair appraisal of the work of both Habermas and his critics.

Chapter three considers Habermas' post-STPS work as it informs public sphere theory. Goode's preference for STPS is re-emphasised here, giving just one chapter over to a summary of Habermas' voluminous writings spanning some 35 years from after STPS until the present (bar Habermas' intervention in the genetics debates discussed at the end of the book). However, in this single chapter Goode does a superb job of pulling out and discussing the arguments most relevant to a substantive consideration of the public sphere, democracy, and the media.

Goode focuses particularly on Habermas' recent work on constitutional patriotism and post-national sovereignty as the basis for democracy in a globalizing world. I want to pause for a moment to consider Goode's discussion here as it is where he develops his strongest objections to Habermas, and also because the debate around this latter social-political work may be less familiar to the reader of this journal. Goode represents Habermas' theorizing of constitutional patriotism as work that embraces a concern for advancing democracy globally while also more fully (than Habermas has done before) recognizing the cultural-ethical basis of politics. Goode's general critique is that this work suffers from a bias towards formal political and legislative processes and institutions. Goode argues that Habermas' writing has become aloof from the grassroots concerns of the social and political movements appealed to in his earlier work, and represents a retreat into a state-oriented model of centred, territorially anchored citizenship, missing the de-centred, differentiated micro-public sphere clusterings of power that currently make up a significant aspect of everyday politics (p. 72, 84).

Goode argues that Habermas is now well "behind the game", underestimating the extent of the "disconnection between most citizens in Western democracies and the official political and legislative processes" (p.

82). He argues that we must look at how to re-connect citizens to communicative reason without necessarily reforming those "remote" structures that many have lost faith in. Critical theory must stay connected to "the everyday concerns and aspirations of many, many citizens who have given up on the hope of changing mainstream political culture and have scattered elsewhere to pursue more tangible projects" (p. 82). Goode sees these projects as operating at the level of "micro-publics", articulated through "tactical", "network" type politics that Habermas seems largely unaware of – "the chaotic assemblage of alternative, grass roots networks, alliances, single issue campaigns, online forums, community, and self-help groups and so forth" (p. 82). Goode sees such tactical networks as possibly more relevant to fostering a critical citizenry then the more situated strategic operations of civil society organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace that Habermas has in the past placed some hope in.

I generally agree with Goode's argument here. However, I want to add some minor comments and points of emphasis. First, with the increasing colonization of life by capitalist globalization, post-national if not global systems of justice seem more than ever necessary to ensure democracy. Democratic institutions and practices, including the development of juridical systems that can restrain capitalist colonization, are needed to guarantee tactical level freedoms and actions, and to foster linkages between the micro-publics that Goode speaks of and the formal political system. As Goode momentarily acknowledges, it is "important to remember that a civil society *without* constitutive and legal guarantees is an impoverished and Darwinian one, so those large-scale constitution issues can scarcely be dismissed as irrelevant" (p. 83). Habermas' global cosmopolitan constitutionalism is an important contribution to thinking post-national democratic futures within a global order, even if, as Goode shows, it is a project that currently needs much further development.

Second, in *Between facts and norms*, Habermas' "two-track model" of democracy does provide the conceptual space if not the detail for theorizing the diverse webs of micro-public struggle. My problem with Habermas here is not the need to further detail the existence of such networked politics and their importance to democracy. Rather, it is that Habermas downplays the normative role of everyday politics and civil society networks, reducing

them to "weak publics" that act as "sensors" of public opinion for "strong publics" (i.e. formal democratic decision making processes). I believe that Habermas has limited the democratic role of informal politics as a result of pressure to produce "realist" accounts. The result is a weakening of the democratic vision of critical theory. In other words, unlike Goode's critique, it is not at the empirical but at the normative level that I have problems with Habermas' latter work. Having said this, it is also understandable why, given the huge forces that presently stand against democracy, Habermas would turn to some existing, if troubled, post-national institutions such as the European Parliament to find some hope for democracy. Is this now the best way forward for progressive politics? My response is that it is a compromised vision. Habermas and his close critics provide some useful resources, but they need help! I believe it would be fruitful, if not now necessary, for the development of radical democratic thought to seriously consider a critical articulation of Habermas' work and that of some of his post-structuralist critics, whom Goode explicitly avoids. At one point Goode (p. 77) mentions Laclau and Mouffe's work as being not "quite so far removed" from Habermas'. However, the possibility of a productive articulation of these historically antagonistic traditions is not identified.

Third, Habermas cannot be asked to do everything in the development of this project, even if at times it seems that he may be trying to! The necessary further attention to the amorphous bottom-up tactical politics that Goode importantly calls for must be the contribution of those critical researchers focusing on this area. Here Goode's own work on digital networks, some of which is briefly discussed later in the book, can be seen as a useful contribution to the development of critical theory.

Chapter four shifts to an exploration of the public sphere and mass mediated communication, but continues the questioning of the sociological/substantive adequacy of Habermas' work. The chapter begins with a review of John Thompson's early 1990s celebrated critique of Habermas' public sphere theory for biasing dialogic over broadcast communication. More specifically, Habermas is seen as failing to adequately theorize broadcast communication, what Thompson refers to as mediated quasi-interaction in order to emphasis the role of mass media forms in fostering interaction

and lifeworld connectivities. Indeed, it is a common argument of media sociologists that Habermas neglects to identify the variety and distinctiveness of mediated forms, and largely ignores the positive role of mass media in fostering the public sphere. Habermas largely refers to the mass media as a negative influence supporting the refeudalization of power rather than the development of a deliberative public sphere.

Goode's overview of Thompson's argument is comprehensive. However, I want to discuss a particular reservation that I have with Thompson's critique of Habermas. I agree that Thompson's work has helped to develop a more adequate, and more positive, account of the role of the broadcast media in social and political life. My concern is that in making his critique and building his theory, Thompson's distinction between direct face-to-face and in-direct mass media forms of communication draw on an untenable non-mediated/mediated, authored/non-authored binary. In contrast to such an opposition, co-present communication is always already an act of communication within a larger time-space distanciated community. Face-to-face interaction always relies on larger cultural mediating sign systems (language). In fact, Habermas' post-STPS linguistic turn to a theory of communicative action and inter-subjectivity helps towards understanding the public sphere as wholly constituted through always-already mediated discourses and interaction within imagined communities. It is true that Habermas' theory of communication draws from the analysis of speech acts. However, these "speech acts" should not be thought of as unmediated, co-present communication, in the way Thompson's distinction between unmediated and quasi-mediated interaction tends to suggest.

To be fair, Goode is largely summarising Thompson here, and is likely to agree with my reservation. Earlier in the book, Goode made a similar point in relation to Habermas: "what he fails to emphasise is just how precarious these distinctions [between mediated communication forms] are" (p. 21). Moreover, the general problem that Goode is drawing from Thompson is correct: Habermas' work does not pay close attention to contemporary mediated communicative forms and how they play out in terms of constituting the public sphere and society at large. Moreover, while we must be careful not to reify abstract distinctions between forms of mediation, it is also important to heed Goode's warning, inspired by

Thompson's work, that we must not treat, "as Habermas tends to do, the condensations, aestheticisations, ellipses, spectacles, and intensities of mediated communication as creases that can be progressively ironed out instead of seeing in them the very texture and fabric of contemporary public life" (p. 95).

Goode also notes that Thompson, in turn, fails to go beyond broadcast media to examine digital media. However, as Goode submits, Thompson, writing in the early 1990s, should not be blamed for neglecting such emergent media forms. Again, this is sociological work that needs to be taken up by others. In fact, recent work on deliberation and digital networks has been acknowledged as very important by Habermas (2004). In the second half of the chapter, Goode himself undertakes a brief theorization of the role of the mass media and the digitized mediascape in relation to global and local public spheres. Goode's most interesting contribution here is a short reflection on mobile phones and how they may offer more than simply an instrumental technology. Thus, Goode takes up his own earlier challenge to theorize micro-political, everyday networks. In Goode's words, he offers a "few fragmented illustrations" of the various ways mobile phones may work at the boundary or "fault-lines" between system and lifeworld, with the goal of "stimulating further inquiry" into the digital technologies as both text and context, shaping the way we live and communicate in the world (p. 114).

Of particular interest to me is the suggestion "that digital culture *may* contribute to the enrichment of discourse ethics by foregrounding an "ethic of unfinish", which involves learning to "better appreciate the provisional nature of our views such that we become better listeners when we encounter difference and dissent" (p. 112). However, Goode quickly draws back from the post-structuralism that such a suggestion might remind us of, arguing instead that, "A realistic assessment cautions strongly against the Deleuzian vision of the infinite concatenations of the digital "rhizome."" However, earlier Goode himself refers to the rhizomic nature of new forms of mediated communication. As noted earlier, I would be interested in Goode taking this further and suggesting, if not developing, articulations between Habermas and his post-structuralist critics, with the help of reflections on digital mediation. This to me seems a more productive avenue

to explore then the re-consideration of Thompson's reflections. No doubt, there are severe resource limitations on producing a short critical introduction to Habermas, and as noted earlier, Goode has explicitly limited this project to the staging of "encounters with thinkers whose disputes with Habermas could be described as internal (though by no means trivial)" (p. 121).

In the final short chapter, Goode discusses the risk society theories of Giddens and Beck. For much of the chapter Habermas actually disappears. However, in the second half Goode leads nicely from the risk society into an interesting discussion of Habermas' recent foray into the genetic engineering debates. Goode's main point here is that whatever decisions are made regarding the technology involved, they must be based on a generalized debate that makes Habermas' theory of the public sphere more relevant than ever, even if we must reframe communicative ethics in a more unruly and conflictual form than Habermas suggests. The book thus concludes where it began, demonstrating with lucidity the relevance of Habermas' ongoing work to those debating, theorizing, teaching, and researching contemporary social problems in the "digital age".

Reference

Habermas, J. (2005). Concluding comments on empirical approaches to deliberative politics. *Acta Politica,* 40(3), 384-392.

Global social problems
George, V., & Page, R.M. (Eds.) (2004). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Reviewed by Christine Cheyne

This edited collection comprises ten chapters (and an introduction) that examine global social policy through the lens of a range of global social problems. As described in the opening paragraph, the book has two major themes: first, the influence of globalisation on a series of global social problems, and second, the policy response at the global level.

An initial task is to define globalisation. To this end, in the first chapter Vic George outlines four distinct positions in relation to globalisation: technological enthusiasts (who are predominantly neo-liberals), Marxist pessimists, pluralist pragmatists, and sceptics who dispute the claim that national economies and business have become transnational or global. The latter point to ways in which multi-national corporations are not free to roam the globe and nation-states retain sovereignty. George argues that pluralists offer the most comprehensive analysis of globalisation, which they regard as a "long-standing process of global interconnectedness with economic, political, social and cultural effects" (p. 2). The beginnings of globalisation are acknowledged as being much earlier than the advent of information technology, indeed, they lie as far back as the emergence of civilisation, with globalisation and migration reinforcing each other.

The editors' avowed pragmatism notwithstanding, they occasionally slide into scepticism. For example, in response to claims of convergence they assert:

> While globalisation may have changed the parameters in which governments must now operate, there is no reason to think that diverse policy responses based on the historic institutional patterns and processes of individual nation-states will diminish in importance in the foreseeable future. (pp. 282-83)

Elsewhere, though, when discussing the social panic in many western countries in response to recent the growth of migration, they suggest that "Globalisation pressures appear to be stronger than government containment measures" (p. 7).

A global social problem is defined as one which displays the following four characteristics: (i) the cause of the problem lies in global rather than national processes; (ii) such problems transcend national borders despite the efforts of sovereign states; (iii) national level responses are increasingly inadequate; and (iv) supra-national bodies have been established to address the problem (p.2).

With that definition in mind, the editors recognise a number of difficulties when it comes to classifying a social problem as "global" (for example, some problems are more thoroughly global than others). They then select nine social problems (social welfare, the environment, poverty, crime, drugs, AIDs, family violence, racism, and migration and asylum), acknowledging that their selection is subjective, and likely to be contested. Their aim in making this selection is to have a sufficiently broad range of social problems to encompass the diversity of issues that need to be considered when addressing the book's two major themes. The chapters themselves are largely discrete contributions, and varied in terms of their approach, analysis and wider application. A particularly incisive chapter is that of Andrew Dobson on the environment. Dobson presents two contrasting views of globalisation – the "inkblot" view in which globalisation gradually spreads evenly in all directions and the "asymmetrical" view according to which the experience of globalisation and its fruits is unbalanced and unequal. The chapter by Norman Ginsburg on racism provides a coherent treatment of a potentially unwieldy subject. While focusing predominantly on "white" racism or racisms of wealthy Western nations, he also acknowledges the existence of racism in other societies. Regrettably, space precludes a more extensive discussion of ethnic inequalities in poor and middle-income nations, and of the link between economic globalisation and such inequalities.

Global social problems will be of value to students in undergraduate social/public policy and sociology courses on globalisation. Individual chapters will also be utilised by researchers and teachers in the particular field that is the focus of the chapter. As well as providing information on the extent of the problem, as per the aim of the book, the chapters provide information on global - and, sometimes, regional - responses. Thus, there is a wealth of descriptive information on the characteristics of global social problems, and the institutions and other mechanisms for international and

global interventions to address these problems. The detailed empirical data in the individual chapters is a strength of the text; a weakness is the lack of a sustained theoretical critique.

The book concludes with a three-page Epilogue in which the future prospects for global social policy are considered. According to the editors, these prospects are hampered by the fact that, although there may be acceptance of the global nature of social problems, agreement regarding the causes of such problems is lacking. The editors argue that nation-states will seek to act in their own interests; however, this begs the question: what are the interests of the nation-state? Does the nation-state have interests that are distinct from the interests of powerful groups within the society concerned? Arguably this conclusion reflects the pluralist underpinnings of the analysis in the book. If by nation-state is meant the national government, then it is clear that at different points in time a nation-state will have different views about globalisation. Certain administrations, such as New Zealand's current Labour-led government, may regard globalisation as fundamentally benign and necessary. At other points in time, globalisation may be viewed in less sanguine terms by a government. While technology has significantly enhanced New Zealand's global inter-connectedness we are yet to find out whether peak oil will have deleterious consequences for New Zealand's export industries, based heavily as they are on transporting goods, and (in the case of tourism) people, across very large distances to and from the rest of the world.

In response to optimism about cosmopolitan democracy, the editors inject an important reality check in the Epilogue when they query whether there is a public appetite for such a democratic ideal and the concomitant institutions and processes. A critical perspective is well-founded; indeed, a similarly reflexive approach is needed throughout their analysis and in particular at points where there is slippage into scepticism:

> ...there is limited evidence to suggest that the so-called Washington consensus based on neo-liberal principles is currently in retreat. If anything, its tentacles appear to be stretching still further. It is, of course, possible that this neo-liberal variant of globalisation will eventually be replaced by a more 'progressive' ideology. Certainly, globalisation and 'welfarism' have 'co-existed' in earlier periods.

> However, the assault upon collectivism in this current stage of globalisation may prove more effective thereby making the re-establishment of a pro-welfare climate less likely in the near future. (p. 262)

In contrast, and in conclusion, is a somewhat more optimistic assessment by a local scholar and commentator:

> Global connectedness is a large topic, and many of the issues have to be worked out. But the Left need not be anti-globalisation. Rather than parallel Proudhonian nostalgia or uncritically promote globalisation as did nineteenth century capitalism, they may, like the progressive socialists of that era, aim to harness globalisation for the common welfare. (Easton, 2004)

Reference

Easton, B. (2004). After neoliberalism? The growth and innovation framework. Paper presented at *After neoliberalism? New forms of governance in Aotearoa New Zealand,* Symposium, Auckland University, December 13, 2004.

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Thesis: McMillan, K.A. (2001). *Citizenship under neo-liberalism: Immigrant minorities in New Zealand 1990-1999.* Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Auckland.

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