New Zealand Sociology



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Contents

Winner of the 2005 Postgraduate Prize for Scholarship in Sociology [1]

Flat food: Food, Sociability and the Individual in the New Zealand Flat

Rebecca Williamson

Abstract

Food and sociality are enacted across a range of social settings and throughout a person's life. Food and its exchange shape and are shaped by social relations in the domestic sphere. Focusing on the New Zealand flat household this paper will examine how important the day to day organisation of "flat food" is to the creation, maintenance or dissolution of social relationships through the various food tasks of shopping, cooking and meal sharing. Focusing on the social construction of food and its role in systems of reciprocity, a fundamental tension is identified between the assertion of "individuality" and sociability within the flat environment.

Introduction

Food is integral to social life. Commensality – the practice of sharing food – can express social, economic and political relations ranging from the intimacy of the kitchen table to the most elaborate public feast. Within the domestic sphere food is shared and exchanged through the practices of cooking and feeding, which in turn create patterns of give and take and expectations of reciprocity. I will examine the role of these reciprocal relationships in the social and practical organization of food in the setting of the New Zealand flat – a type of household formed by a highly mobile age cohort of young, single, childless individuals.

Initial interest in the role of food in the flat for an Honours paper requirement has been extended into current research for my Masters degree on more general aspects of the flat household in New Zealand. This research

[1] At the 2005 SAANZ conference two students were jointly awarded the postgraduate prize for scholarship in Sociology. The second essay will appear in the next issue of *New Zealand Sociology*.

involved conducting semi-structured group interviews with seven flat households (a total of 31 participants). These interviews included discussion about the formation of the flat and how the flat operates on a daily basis. I then chose four flats from this sample and conducted more in-depth individual interviews with each member of these households, including discussion of their past and present flatting experiences. In this paper I will first briefly outline the structure and formation of flat households and their relevance to a certain life stage in sectors of society. I will then focus on the general organisation of food in flatting situations, how food is constructed as a shared or private property and how the meanings associated with such constructs can express ideas of sociability and independence. Finally, drawing on anthropological theories of exchange I will analyse flat food as a "total social phenomena" (Mauss, 1970). I will examine how flat food participates in a system of reciprocity and the integral role of these reciprocal relations in the creation, maintenance and dissolution of the flat household.

Flats and flatting

The flat has become a social and cultural institution in New Zealand society. The word flat in relation to a type of residence originally referred to several rooms on one floor of a building. Today, in popular New Zealand parlance "to flat" is more likely to mean to "...live in a flat; share accommodation (with)...go flatting *NZ* (of young people) leave home to live in shared accommodation with peers etc" (New Zealand Oxford Dictionary, 2005). According to the 2001 census, five percent of households in New Zealand were "other multi-person" households, defined as "a household containing two or more people usually living together, but not in couple or parent-child relationships with each other" (Statistics New Zealand, 2003). Of these households, 81 percent were composed of unrelated people. The word "flat" as both a noun and a verb has been elaborated to signify a specific social and cultural phenomenon. In social terms, the flat signifies 1) a physical dwelling, 2) a specific household composition or residence pattern, and 3) a certain mode of social interaction of people at a particular life cycle stage. "To go flatting" pertains to a whole cultural experience that is given various articulations in popular culture. From flatting handbooks and websites (for example, www.varsity.co.nz) to local films (*Scarfies*) and Edmonds

cookbooks (*Food for flatters*), flatting has become ingrained as part of the life passage of young New Zealanders – with its own set of norms and customs – since the mid 1960s (Wolfe and Barnett, 2001).

The flat is usually composed of unrelated, unmarried individuals without children, aged from their late teens to their early thirties. The stereotypical flat is composed of young adults often involved in tertiary study, however it may also include a range of ages and family backgrounds, full time workers, married couples and solo parents, and it appears that there is a trend for flatting to extend beyond student years (Kenyon and Heath, 2001). Leaving home and establishing an independent household at a relatively young age appears to be a predominantly Pakeha "middle-class" institution, although more research into the cultural and socio-economic factors underlying young people's housing choices in the New Zealand context is needed. Similar trends of shared living arrangements exist in other countries such as UK, North America and Australia where tertiary education may involve students residing in close proximity to a tertiary institution, away from the familial home (Heath and Cleaver, 2003).

Meyer Fortes (1971) noted that "residence patterns are the crystallization, at a given time, of the development process" (p. 3). The flat residence is a manifestation of a certain developmental stage for young adults. This move towards independence may begin while still living in the parental household – with teenagers having their own rooms and a certain degree of freedom. The period of flatting generally occurs after residence in the parental home and before the creation of a one's own family, and deviates from what in the past was (at least ideally) a more or less linear transition between the two domestic units. Heath and Cleaver (2003) describe this in-between stage as part of a "destandardisation of household formation" amongst young adults (p. 1). Getting married and having children have been superceded – or at least delayed - by a culturally re-imagined life trajectory that places greater emphasis on education, career and travel as important developmental stages of the "autonomous individual". It is a life stage in which the young adult moves into formal tertiary education or paid employment – the preparation for, or beginning of, financial independence. This period is also characterised by high mobility and often temporary, specialised and fragmented social relations. While the daily reality of flatting may not be experienced as

transitional and impermanent by those who live it, in comparison with the kin-based household the flat is seen as a temporary arrangement. It is essentially a non-corporate unit: it does not persist across time, has no clear rules of membership, and is not a named unit. Generally located in private rental sector housing and based on short term tenancy agreements, flat members are not committed to long term or trans-generational economic, social and reproductive investment in the household. Unlike a family household, flat residents are connected through bonds of friendship and degrees of acquaintance.

The methods by which a flat is formed vary greatly, and can be quite complex. At a purely social level, initially a flat group may pre-exist: a group of friends decide to flat together and then move into a physical place of residence. Alternatively, flat membership is organised around an actual dwelling, and membership is fluid and dependent upon an economic imperative to fill each vacant bedroom in the house, in order to cover the cost of rent. Membership varies along a continuum of social intimacy and in some cases there may be no connection – except cohabitation – between flat members. The strategies and criteria for recruiting new flatmates warrant a study unto themselves. They range from informal word-of-mouth methods through existing social networks to advertising for flatmates in the *"Flatmates Wanted"* section of the newspaper or putting up a flyer at the local dairy. In any case choosing new flatmates or finding a new flat is often an ad hoc affair in which the membership ideals of sociability and like-mindedness are worked around the need to pay the rent. The process of flat formation and the creation of social relations are ongoing both in terms of the high mobility of flatmates (people moving in and out of the flat), but also in terms of "making the flat work" on a day to day basis. Flat members often talk of "functional" or "good" flats as ones in which there is a high level of cooperation between flatmates in the daily social and practical operation of the household – a central aspect of which is food and its related activities of shopping, cooking, eating and cleaning.

The social and economic organization of flat food

Food and eating in the domestic sphere is at the foundation of all social life. At a basic level, it is within the social setting of hearth and home that the socialization and enculturation of human beings occur. As de Matos Vegas (2003) argues, feeding and being fed is integral to the processes of becoming "a being-in-the-world", and are seen as acts that essentially make and remake the very bonds of kinship and relatedness. Research has also found that eating together is central to the creation of social harmony and the negotiation of power, autonomy and status in the creation of new domestic units (Kemmer, Anderson and Marshall, 1998; Sobal, Bove and Rauschenbach, 2002). As an article in *The New Zealand Home and Garden* magazine notes, to "cook is to nurture. That's what makes a house a home. There's no better expression of care than cooking for your family or friends" (Moody, 2003).

Commensality (the sharing of food) in the home is a "social and communicative event" (Montanari, 1999, p. 69) and involves not only eating together, but also the domestic duties surrounding food preparation (for example, food choice, cooking, serving, cleaning up etc). These social practices entail patterns of actions and reactions. As I will expand on, preparing and receiving meals, and feeding and being fed, inevitably set up systems of exchange and reciprocity that act as "a delicate barometer...of social relations" (Sahlins, 1972, p. 215). How then is the essentially social nature of food translated into the domestic sphere of the flat? One way can be seen through tracing the role of food in the transition from the parental home and into independent living arrangements. This movement is often eased by a period of residence in university hostels (halls of residence). As part of the rite of passage marking the shift away from the perceived constraints of the parental home, hostel life is structured by a curious mix of rules, semi-dependence and regulated freedoms. It is a communal environment that simultaneously represents a break away from home while functioning as an institutional parent to young adults. An important aspect of this semi-dependence is that food needs, as they were in the parental home, are still largely catered for. Moving into a flatting situation however, signals greater control over food choice, purchasing, and consumption. Food in the flat is no longer directly provided by an institution or the family,

although maybe indirectly provided through continued financial assistance. Instead it is chosen, bought and consumed by the members of the new household, either individually or communally. Food thus becomes an important material signifier of the transition away from home toward perceived greater independence.

The arrangements surrounding food vary greatly between flat households. However, a general division can be made between flats that pool resources and share shopping and cooking – shared flat food – and flats in which food is bought, prepared and eaten independently by each household member – private or individual flat food. Variation in food organisation and commensality between flatting households may depend on degrees of friendship and social distance. Just as Sahlins' (1972) model of kinship distance and reciprocity proposes that the closer the kin ties, the greater the expectation of reciprocity, generally within the flat the greater the social connection between flat members, the more likely it is that the shared food system will be used, rather than the individual food arrangement. From initial research among flatters, this appeared to be the trend. Out of the seven flats studied, six flats shared food and were socially intimate in terms of being close knit groups in which the majority of members had been friends prior to living together. One person in a flat of three people reflected on her past experiences of not sharing food and stated that "it sort of disconnects you from the people" (Carrie, 19). Another flat (with seven members) did not share food and functioned well as a social group, but all flat members led relatively separate life styles and did not display the intimacy of the other flats – five of the flatmates had no social connection prior to living together. However, a multitude of other factors also affect food and eating arrangements such as differing schedules, food consumption outside the home, income restrictions or different dietary requirements (for example, vegetarian or non-vegetarian). For one flat who had recently changed to cooking communally, it just came down to practicality: "...well it's just about efficiency, I mean its like a factory...its inefficient to cook five meals in one night each individually" (James, 20).

Shared flat food

It is important to note that the six households that shared food each had slightly different modes of food organisation. However, more often than not communal flat food involved a system of pooling equal amounts of monies from each flatmate in order to purchase food to be later shared among the same contributing members. The pooling of resources for food may or may not be included in the basic financing of the flat, which includes costs such as telephone, power and rent. This basic sum is generally negotiated around rules of equality – that every member of the flat contributes and utilises resources in equal portions – or a user-pays system – each flatmate pays what they consume (often used for telephone bills). Both rationales may be used to organise finances, food, and the division of labour in the flat.

Sharing flat food involves regular purchasing of food, a responsibility generally shared between all contributing members. It can provide opportunities for cooperation, communication and flat bonding, and is often a situation in which the dynamics of the flat and its individual personalities come into play. It involves the negotiation of food preferences and budget constraints. As one informant noted "...when you buy food communally, there's a lot of selling to the other flatmates about how great the food is that you like, so its like...do we need the Kikkomen soy sauce, or the cheap soy sauce?" (Mark, 21). Supermarket shopping is often a significant event in the initial stages of flat formation, and for some may be an assertion of newfound freedom. As Kemmer *et al.* (1998) found among newly married/cohabiting couples, shopping was seen as a social marker of independence that allowed a degree of control over food choice that may not have existed in the familial home. The degree to which flat shopping signifies an enactment of independence varies amongst flatters, as there may have already been a degree of control over food choice in the home sphere (i.e., influencing parents to buy favorite foods, etc.). Also, this perceived independence must be contextualised within the actual communal organisation of flat food. Just like in the family home, the "autonomous" young flatter is still operating within a household system that involves cooperation, negotiation and reciprocity (not to mention financial constraints).

In the flat food system, meal preparation is a task that is shared among contributing members. Due to differing schedules, breakfast, lunch and snacks may be made and eaten separately – although can still be consumed from the shared store of food. The dinner meal is generally expected to be the central commensal meal, although again this depends on timetables of flatmates. Responsibility for the cooking the meal is organised by what is ideally an equal division of labour. Preparing, serving and cleaning up after the meal are activities taken in turns by each flatmate on an informal basis or according to an agreed roster. In the flats I researched, this ranged from flatmates casually deciding in the morning who would cook that night, to setting rosters assigning each flatmate a "cooking night". Meals may not be shared every night, but generally each flatmate will cook at least once a week. The expectation of dinner being provided by other flatmates is thus based on more immediate ideas of reciprocity. The practices of serving and eating the meal differ, and may be modelled on or contrasted with the more structured and elaborate sit down table dinners of the family home which are seen to demonstrate family solidarity and values (Kemmer et al., 1998). How often flat groups actually shared meals varied – some flats ate together regularly, others found their meal times to be more disjointed and informal as they catered to the individual schedules of flatmates.

Private food

In some flats food is bought and prepared separately from that of other flat members. This arrangement may be practiced by all flatmates or just one or two, while the others share food. In these cases food is financed and purchased separately by a flat member – it "belongs" to them and is for their exclusive consumption. It may be labeled with the owner's name and is often spatially separated from other's food. In one household for example, Tim (25) had separated his private food from the public space of the kitchen by investing in a small fridge for his bedroom where he stored most of his food. It is important to note however, that in some flat households of "independent eaters", basic foodstuffs (for example, milk, coffee, flour, oil) and grocery items (for example, toilet paper, cleaning products) may be shared, and the costs involved are generally divided between all flat members. Private food ("my food" as opposed to "our food") also exists in

flats in which pooling systems operate. It is generally constituted by snack food, luxury food and specific health food – types of foodstuffs that may be too expensive for the flat budget and cater to specifically individuated tastes, and thus exist outside the notion of shared food.

Flat food rules: exchange, reciprocity and balance

The social harmony of the flat depends to a great extent on maintaining a balance between how much is contributed and how much is consumed. The communal ethic surrounding the pooling of resources and the equal division of labour at times forms an uneasy partnership with the ideals of individualism and independence that pervade the whole notion of flatting. Breaking food rules and upsetting this balance was a recurrent theme with those I spoke to. Flat food issues were a familiar and often memorable experience across flats and common plots included the unequal ("unfair") consumption of food (sporty male flatmates were notorious over-consumers); flatmates consuming others' private food; the shirking of food duties (or the over-zealous administering of responsibilities by flatmates); and conflicts sparked by differences in food preferences. As one second-year flatter recounted:

> I used to buy things like Moritz Icecream and like treats like hummus and stuff...and I'd come home and find them all finished...' they were like "oh we ate it", and there was no remorse or anything like we'll replace it. Then the trigger was... I saw them eating my food, and I was like... why do you just have to go steal my food? and they didn't take me very seriously... then it turns into a pretty messy argument, and I just left that day and (laughs) went and flatted with my boyfriend. (Ngaire, 21).

In this example, the boundaries surrounding private treat food were transgressed. The flatmate's flagrant disregard for the food rules meant that not only did they eat her food without asking, they did not "show remorse" or offer to replace it, which in Ngaire's interpretation meant they were effectively "stealing" her food. These conflicting constructions of food led to the dissolution of flatmate relations. In another example of flat food

conflicts it was the system of shared food that was disrupted. Sarah (26) recounted an incident from one of her previous flats which she had shared with six other people:

> ...so we had two extra pieces of steak after everyone got one bit of steak each, and Philippa – the one who always had her boyfriend round, who never contributed and we didn't like – she dished him up both pieces of steak! and we all just kind of stared, and we all got one bit of steak – which was a treat for us – and we couldn't believe that this person that didn't live there got two pieces of our steak!...they organised me to confront her... and she ended up moving out.

In this case the female flatmate had repeatedly allowed her non-member (non-contributing) boyfriend to eat flat food, and no attempt was made to compensate for the additional consumption, or to seek approval from the other flatmates. The understanding among the six flatmates was that the meal was to be shared only among the individuals who had contributed economically and socially to the system of shared flat food, the incident thus impinged on their "rightful share" of the food and its portions.

Food in the flat – whether framed as shared food or private food – is thus embedded in a system of overt and covert rules based on ideas of equality, individual rights and a communal ethic. When conflict results from the transgression of these rules an important series of expectations and obligations are highlighted: a system of reciprocity. Sahlins (1972) described reciprocity as "a whole class of exchanges, a continuum of forms" (p. 191). Within the domestic sphere of the flat, these exchanges are constituted by the everyday enactment of food sharing: the pooling of resources, and the purchase, preparation, distribution and consumption of food. Mauss's (1970) theory of exchange was based on the idea that exchange was a "total social phenomena" that involved "people, objects and social relations, and the ways they are made and remade, understood and reunderstood in everyday transactions" (in Carrier, 1991, p. 121). The imperative of balance and equality that structures the organisation of food in the flat fits into Sahlins' (1972) model of balanced exchange. Following Mauss, he identifies exchange and reciprocity as existing along a continuum between two extremes, termed generalised and negative reciprocity (Sahlins, 1972) or "pure gift"

transactions and commodity transactions (Mauss, 1970). At one end, the pure gift/generalised model of reciprocity refers to those transactions characterised by mutual social obligation and the inalienability of goods and services from these social relations. Negative or commodity-based reciprocity refers to the more self-interested, impersonal, alienable form of exchange relations, unconstrained by social obligation (Carrier, 1991). Food in this context is not a neutral object. By translating flat food into the idea of balanced exchange, we see that food manifests both modes of reciprocity.

In flats where meals and foodstuffs are shared, food inevitably takes on a social aspect. The gift, described as "any object or service, utilitarian or superfluous, transacted as part of social, as distinct from purely monetary or material relations" (Carrier, 1991, p. 122), involves labour – the effort involved in preparing the meal – and the transformation of foodstuffs bought as commodities into shared flat food. The food becomes inextricably linked to the meal provider and the context in which it is given – and it becomes part of a reciprocal cycle of cooking and consuming. At this point food becomes a social act that feeds, nurtures and brings the group together. As one flatter commented, "It's the thing that holds the flat together, for me, because otherwise you've got pretty separate lives really.... just a constant succession of meals makes it home"(Bianca, 35). The social relationship and interdependence between flatmates is reaffirmed, as is the obligation of reciprocal action. The extent to which meals are a pure gift depends on the extent to which reciprocity is structured and explicitly negotiated. For some flat members it was based on an informal, unspoken agreement and expectation, other flats had rosters or a more formalised system of reciprocity that made the transactional nature of cooking more salient.

The social nature of food in the context of commensality in the flat is tempered however, by the economic imperatives underlying the flatting situation and the essentially non-corporate basis of membership, which are manifest in the system of pooling equal individual resources. From this perspective food moves closer to the other end of the exchange continuum, and is essentially a private good, based on commodity exchange relations. The clearest example of food as a private good is in flats where food is bought, cooked and eaten separately. In these households, daily consumption and commensality are constructed on the notion of food as a

private good, entailing individual rights and a separation from systems of social reciprocity and exchange. Food defined in terms of the individual however, is also present in the shared flat food situation. As in the steak incident example, where food rules and the system of reciprocity and equality are infringed, food can become framed in terms of individual rights, possessiveness, and a zealous portioning of communal food. From this perspective, the flat is constructed in terms of contract based relations – a collection of individuated, economically independent persons, who communally pool resources, but must get a return equivalent to their investment. In these flats members may also buy individual food in addition to shared flat food. Just as in flat households that do not share food, a flatmates "own food" is essentially non-communal, and is defined as either nutritional, utilitarian, or luxury food that does not fit the preferences or limited budgets of flat food. Thus within both flat households that pool food, and flats that cook separately, food can be understood in terms of private property, to the extent that people helping themselves to the food is labeled "stealing".

Shared food and individuated food therefore can coexist within the flat setting. Different contexts manifest seemingly contradictory meanings of food. As a type of gift transaction it is a marker of togetherness and reciprocal relationships; as a private commodity it communicates an ideal of individualism and independence. The ideal of equality – encompassed in Sahlins' idea of mutual balanced reciprocity – is built into these two modes of constructing food. When shared flat food rules are transgressed, and a flat member takes "more than their fair share", the system of reciprocity underpinning the relationships in the flat has been negated and creates social disharmony. Likewise, if an individual's private food is consumed by others in the flat the understanding of food as a private possession has been violated, and similarly impacts on flat relationships. As Carrier (1991) notes, following Maussian theory, food can be "employed instrumentally as a starting, a sustaining, or a destroying mechanism of sociability" (p. 215). The multifaceted constructions of food in flat foodways can maintain and enhance the social connectedness and interdependence in the flat household or lead to conflict and fission. We therefore find food and eating intertwined in daily process of the assertion of the individual and the negotiation of sociality involved in living, cooking and eating together.

Conclusion

Food and eating are fundamental vehicles through which sociality within the domestic sphere is continually created and performed. Food is not a neutral object; it is remade daily within a web of social relations and tensions, so that it is experienced a certain way in some transactions but not in others (Carrier, 1991, p. 121). I have argued that flat foodways can be understood along a continuum of exchange that permit a dialectical construction of food to coexist within flat environments. Whether these paradoxical meanings of food reaffirm bonds of interdependence and connectedness reminiscent of familial relationships, or assert ideals of individualism and independence, they reinforce the idea that "social relationships, people, objects and transactions form an interlocking whole" (Carrier, 1991, p. 122).

Flat food is continually reorganised and delineated within wider social, political and economic ideas of personhood. Going flatting involves a transition from familial identities associated with being a son/daughter to that of a young adult with its expectations of economic and social independence. Through idealised notions of individualism and autonomy, personhood is defined partly in opposition to the family which is often collapsed with the category "society", both of which are associated, on an ideological level, with social restriction and the denial of individual freedom. As Gellner noted, anonymity, mobility and atomization are salient features of modern society (Gellner, 1997, p. 28) in which time and sociality are framed as liminal and temporary. The high mobility of the age cohort that goes flatting creates a temporality that is orientated around short-term, non-corporate goals with a desire for immediate reciprocity, which intensifies social relations in the flat situation in terms of both solidarity and conflict. Just as a flatmate can be an anonymous "someone out of the newspaper", sought principally for the purpose of filling a vacant room, so social networks and bonds are increasingly contract based, superficial and fragmented. In their social world people ideally have the freedom to choose: from commodities (i.e., food) to selecting housemates. However, in the daily lived experience of the flat, and especially in relation to food, these ideals of autonomous personhood have to be carefully negotiated in a complex of reciprocal social obligations associated with the role of flatmate. While flatmate relationships are not kin-based, they are curiously familiar. Fortes

(1971) noted that "the domestic domain is the system of social relations through which the reproductive nucleus is integrated with the environment and with the structure of the total society" (p. 9). What is reproduced in the day to day domestic situation of the flat relates to patterns of exchange and interaction that, through the daily enactment of food rules and commensality, express the dynamic coexistence between the social and the individual.

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Taranaki Gothic and the Political Economy of New Zealand Narrative and Sensibility

David Craig

Abstract

Taranaki Gothic is arguably the most important narrative archetype in New Zealand cultural production and political economy. The basic Taranaki Gothic pattern – innocent, fast rising excitement, peaking early, seeing itself threatened, unravelling as wider realities tell, crashing and burning at the end – resonates widely through national experience and sensibility. It's discernable in crucial identity narrative experiences – Gallipoli, Flanders, Phar Lap, national development by import substitution, Think Big, the '87 sharemarket crash, the America's Cup – and in thematic obsessions of cultural production: innocence hypostatized or violated by trauma, slapstick adventure going wrong, apparently dissociated elements and protagonists coming together quick with explosive consequence. When cultural and political economic Taranaki Gothic moments run into each other, there's a standard repertoire of formal outcomes: the overwrought, the understated, the faux naïve, quirky, frenzied, grotesque, and doctrinaire. This, the essay argues, is a predictable experience for a small, distanced political and cultural economy in the semi-periphery of modern capitalism. But while the basic Taranaki Gothic narrative has remained archetypal, it has been differently engaged, and perversely instantiated, in different phases of New Zealand political-economic-cultural production.

Taranaki Gothic and the political economy of New Zealand narrative and sensibility

> Southerly winds and rain pelted Wellington for six months of the year. Winters were gargantuan and mythic. Some years guide-ropes were installed downtown so the city's lighter residents would not be swept away: thin people in oilskin parkas floating over cars in Taranaki St, drifting like balloons from the city to the harbour, clear

> across Cook Strait to the South Island above the Picton ferry. Every year or so an article by a distinguished cultural celebrity (a writer or broadcaster who'd traveled "overseas") would appear in the New Zealand Listener likening Wellington to London or Manhattan. The entire city was delusional.
> Chris Krauss, *I love Dick* (1997, pp. 230-1)

> At about the same time as Morrie abandoned himself to reproach and despair in the lane, but some hundred and fifty miles distant, two bright young sparks called Wesley Pennington and Cyril Kiddman, who may appear at this stage to have nothing whatsoever to do with Morrie Shapaleski's predicament, were counting out the spoils of a much more successful kind of gambling than his. They were sitting in the front seat of a cream-coloured Chevrolet sedan, a recent acquisition of which they were both very proud (only five years old, just run in, man). The automobile was parked in the yard of a hotel on the outskirts of a large inland town.
> Ronald Hugh Morrieson, *Came a hot Friday* (1964, p. 13)

Chris Krauss's thin, delusional Wellingtonians floating over Taranaki St caught up in the southerly squall, Wes Pennington and Cyril Kiddman driving the cream Chevrolet into the yard of the Settler's Hotel set on small town gambling fraud, while Morrie Shapaleski is incinerating Pop Simon in his debt-driven arson of Darkie Benson's South Taranaki billiard saloon: all are flimsy bit players in a much bigger story, one that resonates widely in Antipodean narrative. It's a story of provincial delusion and slapstick exhilaration getting itself caught up in things that turn out to be much bigger, shakier and more sinister than anyone had imagined, landing in serious trouble, barely living to tell the tale. Innocence and exuberance running to trauma and its sequelae. It's the *Goodbye pork pie* storyline, it's all through Frank Anthony's (early 1920s) *Me and Gus* slumpen Taranaki farming fiascoes, it's hobbits going on a long New Zealand landscape journey through someone else's monstrous, uncontainable wars. It's our premier national narrative, an effusion of dark, choked provincial experience, and of semi-peripheral, leaky-boat political economy. It's Taranaki Gothic.

The basic Taranaki Gothic (hereafter, TG) pattern, referenced say to Ronald Hugh Morrieson's literally Taranaki and Gothic novel *Came a hot Friday* (1964), is straightforward: innocence engaging and overreaching itself,

fast rising youthful exuberance and dumb hubris, peaking early and simultaneously realizing itself precariously exposed, things unravelling as wider realities start to tell, crashing and burning as partial catharsis, loss and trauma sequelae that persist to inform the next round. Or, in Nick Perry's description, "a slapstick style progressively undercut by a growing sense of desperation and a heightened sense of threat" (1994, p. 76). The associated narrative and formal elements are familiar from other regional Gothics, from Southern Gothic to Film Noir: innocence, intrusion, violence, shock, trauma, monsters, madness. The Manichean, the cryptic menacing shadow, the social and spatial claustrophobia. Apparently dissociated events and protagonists coming together quickly in explosive ways in dense, labyrinthine locations. Innocence as risk, sex as honeytrap, domesticity as flypaper, religion as menace, rivalry as ready violence, travel and outsiders as destabilizing threat, the futility of escape, cynicism as defense (Christopher, 1998; Craig, 2005; Williams, 1995).

In this essay I want to re-explore this list of apparently universal, borrowed elements of regional camps and Gothics, and show the variety of ways they have been inflected in New Zealand cultural and chronicled experience. But I also want to displace any sense that TG is just a regional variation on a borrowed international form- a traveling style with no structural roots. It is clear that TG has a marvelous range of uncanny relations and affinities to actual historical developments in New Zealand political and wider cultural economy. Especially on a structural-narrative dimension the affinities are seem especially easy to trace homegrown but hyped up assumptions and innocent slapstik adventures have run head on into darker wider realities in the mythic identity stories of early settler arcadia and disillusionment: Gallipoli, Flanders, Phar Lap, national development by import substitution, Think Big, the '87 sharemarket crash, the last America's Cup defense.

That said, TG is of course only one side of the story: the dark "little country that couldn't" myth that stands in doubtful relief to the "little country that could" stories of achievement against the odds through perky pragmatism. But compared to Australian public sensibility, where the brightside "lucky country" myth is culturally compulsory for all but Indigenous Australians, New Zealand's dark myth seems to have a good

deal more social resonance. This is specially so when set alongside this place's indigenous (as opposed to settler) post-colonial experience of booms and busts, adventure and disaster. Here, there are strong resonances to initial Maori enthusiasm and embrace of pakeha-as-opportunity, an embrace which turned nasty when it became pakeha-as-avalanche in 40 short years after 1840. Here, if we were re-doing the wider pakeha project of appropriation of Maori myth to Nation-building purpose, we could see the Maui cycle as anticipatory: the little Potiki that could (outrageously snare the sun, steal fire, fish up half a nation), becoming the little Potiki in deadly, naïve overreach, ending up snipped in two in Hinenui o te po's obsidian vagina.

Narrative and political economy

Across the cultural and historical landscape, then, there are plenty of dark myths to carry on with. Certainly, applied (white) liberally, TG-based cultural analysis itself becomes an easy exercise in naively riding a metaphor well beyond sage bounds. To be sure, there's an element of this kind of metaphorical whale riding to this essay: anyone engaging national myths will find themselves in all sorts of flights of metaphorical and metonymic fancy, at the same time staring nationalist ideology right in its red eye. All the more reason then to try to push the arguments into a more substantive history: to describe some of the underpinning structural elements that repeatedly set the table for our provincial Gothic experience. From such a "critical realist" perspective, this essay aims to show how the surface elements resonate downwards, through metaphor and structural metonymy, into the political and economic problematics of a small, semi-dependant cultural, economic and sporting endeavour, operating in the semi-periphery of stormy globalizing capitalism.

In recent times, the status of traveling, imperious colonial narrative in shaping peripheral political economies has arguably been overstated in "lit-crit", post-colonial analysis, especially in the notion that discourse, including narrative story telling, was a necessary and material underpinning of imperialism. There are plenty of instances where the impact of other people's stories (and other representational conventions) on peripheral locations has typically been unsettling, violent, appropriative (Farrell, 1998). Here,

however, I mostly want to reverse the usual order of analysis, and work from the political economy to the point where it meets the traveling narrative, and the two grotesquely impact on each other.

With political economy currently resurgent across social and "lit theory", an enormous scope of analyses is currently opening out. This essay is deliberately eclectic, wanting to canvas the range of political economy rather than the singular depths of different constructs. But in general it follows two closely related strands: the Regulationism informing analyses of Fordism, post-Fordism and their attendant institutional and cultural formations (modernisms including post-, liberalisms including neo-) (Aglietta 1979; Jessop 2002; Peck & Tickell 2002), rudely joined to aspects of the longer-duree, cyclic and conjunctural analyses of Polanyi (1957), Jameson (1991), Arrighi (1994) and World Systems Theory (Wallerstein,1974). From the former are derived, for example, a sense of normative Fordism: what we aspired to, overreached, but failed to achieve (Craig, 2003; Roper, 2005; Sutch, 1972). From the latter, a sense of New Zealand's semi-peripherality to the hegemonic powers, the shallowness of New Zealand's regulation of markets, and its susceptibility to shocks and other epoch-cracking shifts resonating out from core political and cultural economies. Even more permissively defined here is a sense of bourgeois (middle/ "chattering" class, Eurocentric) culture as hegemonic, but nonetheless under considerable stress, and throwing up the kinds of cultural chimeras that in other places' Gothics have been more profoundly gendered towards the experience of those other semi-peripheral capitalist subjects, women.

From all this should emerge a sense that our national experience of Gothic elements is historically placeable, in both its grand arcs (bi-polarism, post-traumatic edginess), and in its peculiar stresses and inflections: its de-gendering, for example, or rather its imagined universalizing across everyone's provincial experience. In this essay, these general analyses are treated within a national historical-biographical frame, which heuristically suggests that different phases of New Zealand cultural political economy history best light up different exaggerations of the basic TG pattern. The task of registering all these modulations and variations would need a book, but for a first attempt, this essay offers a basic temporal frame, dividing our cultural history and its themes into five phases. In each phase, I describe

the exemplary TG foible, and risk some roundhouse commentary on cultural production I see as exemplifying or upsetting it. Exemplifying, upsetting, but not containing: all of the period foibles and strategies raised here are visible across the wider history.

The discussion starts from the TG obsession over childhood, innocence and its hypostatization, loosely synchronised to a discussion of the period 1840 -1940, and the little pre-WW2 quarry/grass economy that might never grow up. From there, we upscale to consider the awkward cultural adolescence described as the "provincial grotesque" economy of post WW2 wannabe Fordism (1940-1984), to the mid-life bi-polar mood swings and schizoid identity narratives of free market neo-liberalism (1984 to late 1990s). Finally, to now, post 1997, where a more "inclusive" neoliberal pluralism meets a tentative reemergence of aesthetic nationalism, and a new maturity in living closely with other people's fictions. Now, our repertoire has mutated almost beyond inbred family resemblance, and works all the way from re-telling other people's great grotesque stories here (Hobbits, again), to the easy embedding of history and heartland vernacular, to the marvelous efflorescence of recent diasporic us-there representation. All this, as I will argue, is a part of the shallow cultural re-embedding and supply-side boostering of economic endeavour entirely appropriate to a desperately open marginal economy.

1840-1940 Two-edged provincial pathology: Innocent dependence and its arrested development

> When I was seven my mother told me if I was ever playing on the hill or in the paddocks at the bottom I was to watch out for miners shafts hidden under the long grass and blackberries. I was awed, partly at the prospect of disappearing, as it seemed, without hope of recovery, twelve feet into the earth, but as well at the blandness with which a responsible adult could tolerate the continuance of such dangers.
> Bill Pearson, *Fretful sleepers* (1974, p.2)

> I don't wanna go to school, Toby said. I wanner go to the rubbish dump an' find things.
> Janet Frame, *Owls do cry* (1957, p.13)

Taranaki Gothic takes advantage of innocence. Daphne Moran's cut throat in Morrieson's (1976) *The scarecrow*, another Daphne singing from the dead room in Janet Frame's (1957) *Owls do cry*, Harry Baird's "summer on the edge of the world" in David Ballantyne's (1968) *Sydney bridge upside down*. There's a catalogue of juvenility meeting traumatic experience in New Zealand storytelling. The child-in- terror motif has plenty of political economic resonance: a small, young country growing up in the shadow of testy, inscrutable others, imagining itself an agent of its own destiny, yet repeatedly finding this not to be entirely the case. From such a territory, raw quarry-economy resource extraction and plucky grass-economy commodity-trading innocence has to go up against the global odds, despite gross vulnerability to shocks and fluctuations over distance. Sending frozen carcasses half way around the world was an out of this world achievement, yet this and subsequent overreaching bound New Zealand ever more closely and exclusively to a detached mother country (Belich, 2001).

For nearly 100 years, a long childhood by any measure, this dependence grew rather than dissipated. The economy built on kauri and its gum, gold, confiscated land, boomed and busted. The grass economy accounted for 95% of exports, and stapled New Zealand profoundly to both trauma and infantile abjection: on the one hand, debilitating agri-cultural cycles of boom and bust; on the other, rising cycles of debt and dependency undermining financial and commodity exchange security. Sending soldiers to World Wars, we were demonstrating both filial faithfulness and realpolitik dependence. In all this, security links, trade access and access to debt capital were worked towards Britain's interest in keeping us supplying commodities, and buying Britain's expiring manufactures. Here, the dependent peripheral economic formations of stunted, branch office economy subordination and stringy, runner bean growth in different economic sectors are two sides of the same peripherality.

Here, youthful innocence is a two- edged sword: it's both pride and alibi about rapid development and underdevelopment. As such it's also both something to be defended, and something to be gotten over as quickly as possible. Fear of being left behind or not developing has added a relentless edge. We hop between self-congratulatory and self-immolating comparisons against whatever international scales. If the New Zealand economy is fresh,

green, and Arcadian, it's because we remain, for all our historical bruising, innocent and untrammeled. If the New Zealand economy is a diminutive, stunted or retarded version of something else, the problem routinely suggests certain kinds of instantaneous, utopian fix: the magic bullet of Vogelian investment in infrastructure, Bill Sutch's post WW 2 vision of "Manufacturing in Depth" and import substitution industrialization, Muldoon's "Think Big", or Roger Douglas's deregulation, Bob Jones' 1980s vision of rentals on international property investment eclipsing dairying in the national accounts, the knowledge economy... Add this instant utopianism to the routines of early migrant colonial boom and bust – moas, timber, gold, sheep – and you've a ready recipe for trauma.

That trauma, expected or unexpected, is recognizable in retrospect as the dark and looming reality of a realpolitik world, a world where innocent amusements and larrikin adventure turn out to be all too real, at monstrous scales and repercussion. The shocks, as at Gallipoli or Passchendale, or in the 1880s and 1930s (colonial commodities), 1965 (wool) or 1987 (paper money) crashes, have often been frank and utterly uncontrollable, the grief dark and searing. Most traumatic of all were the Great Depressions (economic and psychic) of the 1880s and 1930s, the latter of which saw New Zealand suffer greater losses (44% decline in commodity prices (Belich, 2001)) because it clung *so* closely to colonial commodity apron-strings. Crucially, as Belich notes, the psychic depression (probably more than the economic) spread all the way up into the middle classes: their consumption plummeted, while banks foreclosed these emerging homeowners' mortgages with historically unmatched violence. Typical of trauma, the reaction was immediate (the first Labour government's balm of cradle-to-grave security through universal benefits), but the psychic sequelae of trauma persisted, underpinning political and policy hegemony for more than a generation.

The most important ongoing repercussions were pre- and post-war delusional cycles of trying to grow up and independent fast. The impulse to move beyond innocence as quickly as possible ramped up the stakes, making the initial moves in TG narrative all the more heady.... And this, shaky, desperate innocence is as frank now as it was for Vogel or Sutch. And with global financial markets as they are, New Zealand is once again an open, small, liberal economy. Worst of all, Peter Pan, you might never

grow up at all: the nightmare postponement of adulthood though the trauma- led hypostatisation of childhood, or its ultimate freezing in memory after death. Daphne, still singing from the dead room. In our cultural production, frozen childhood is there in adults exhibiting a child-like vulnerability when they shouldn't; Maui dies young/immortal; Firpo in Mason's (1962) *The end of the golden weather*; The Te Wakinga kid (sanitized for the movie to the Tainuia Kid) in *Came a hot Friday*; Chris Krauss anxiously skirting the fringes of French-theory and New-York-intellectual stardom, feeling she can never be a real intellectual like Dick. The notion of a nation of little boys, dwarfs who never grew up (Hobbits?), waiting on wizards with powers to point and direct progress... it's a recurring nightmare in the national political economy, against which reassurances are still relentlessly sought from any plausible visiting guru.

There are formal repercussions too. Ambivalence about growing up, wanting to stay innocent and yet register and protest the violence of wider ambits might explain some of New Zealand artists' resort to faux naïve or understated vernacular voice and technique. It's a versatile practice, and it's been worked for example to underline the hopeful no-hoper-ism of new chum Taranaki farmers in Frank Anthony's 1920s (1977) *Me and Gus* stories, and as a trim chrysalis for the metamorphosing innocence of Sargeson's narrator in *That summer* (Sargeson,1982). Sargeson's early, spare technique in fact ranges marvelously across the variety of effects gettable from faux naiveity: social protest, empathy for the marginal and inchoate, foreshadowing unknowable risk, suggesting everyday tragedy has wider, unknowable resonances. So in Sargeson, faux naiveity is paradoxically a trick for staying alert, of not falling into the trap of thinking you really know and can be safe when you don't and can't be. That said, Sargeson can be dark here too: look at *A good boy*, *I've lost my pal*, and *Sale day*, for starters.

But there's another wider pattern here, also worth noting. Ambivalence and duplicity around grown up forms is root and branch of what Terry Smith (1984) dubbed *The provincialism problem*: the double bind where provincial cultural economies are caught, as they find they must be readable through a mature core aesthetic fashion (but in doing so are dubbed provincial imitators), *and* show some fresh originality of their own (but

which is also judged provincial, precisely for their silliness in failing to realise core norms). In general, the provincialism problem is a tough but basic working problematic for peripheral artists, which the sharpest often deal with explicitly. At times, though, it can provide an important point of departure, especially from decadent core forms. In this way, nationalist modernism in both the economy and the arts became in the 1930s a productive double movement: reaction to imperious excess and formal decadence, and appropriation of the best, in this case the most modern. In this light, Allen Curnow's clear, frank nationalist modernism sits easily alongside the remarkable provincial clarities of Frank Sargeson.

1940-1974 Fordist noir and Trekkaist agility: Growing up in the provincial grotesque

> Big dunce that I was at school, my essays, if not my spelling, used to be thought quite good, and I was a keen reader, which is probably why I now presume to set myself up as the chronicler of Klynham's hour in the limelight
> Ronald Hugh Morrieson, *The scarecrow* (1976, p.1)

Ronald Hugh Morrieson's post war TG is New Zealand's own provincial film noir: camped up adventure and delusions of illicit power-tapping, followed by extremities of violence themselves grotesqued through dodgy, borrowed cinematic diction. As in fiction, so in national/political economy. But this time around, the undercutting phase was as much an effect of powerlessness (or of real power building elsewhere), as of nationalist-modern miscalculations and growing grotesqueries. Let me explain.

Post WW2, and in the wake of the 1930s collapse of liberal trade and currency, stability and security were powerfully felt necessities for an emerging national economy. The weakness of Britain in the immediate post war period gave New Zealand license to expand its own manufacturing base, and protect it against imports via license restrictions. Everywhere was a period of post colonial emergence from empire, and, in the Atlantic world and its commonwealths, the nation state within a broader cold war security bloc arrangement became the basic building block: an overwrought, densely layered geopolitical power container, and cultural boundary line (Jessop, 2002). International economic orthodoxy figured building stable and secure

national economies: political, economic and cultural. For left nationalists, only insulation could enable true socialism. For a time, and for socialist and right-leaning nationalists alike, it looked like a plausible exercise. Our mistake was arguably misreading structural nature of our position in what Wallerstein (1974) called the "semi-periphery" of the global economy, a position we share with Latin America and to an extent Australia, wherein scale and distance and commodity dependence rendered core economy Fordism hardly achievable. Still, we tried awfully hard to be Fordist economic nationalists, mass producing and mass consuming within complete integrated national frameworks of production, demand management and high wage consumption (see Craig, 2003; Easton, 1997; Jessop, 2002, Roper, 2005; Sutch, 1972) when bigger political economic realities meant we never could have been.

In some post–colonies, it worked better than others. As early *Landfall* shows on nearly every page, we did try to wear our nationalism lightly and knowingly, but in fact forging a New Zealand National art was in the end a heavy, crippling task. And when, in the seventies, we ultimately subsided into regionalist-nationalist grotesque, a lot of pent up apocalyptic energies were in fact vented. It's in fact telling that we didn't go Southern regionalist Gothic earlier. The clinical formal aspects of Curnow and Brasch-esque national "*Landfall* modernism" were a good, sharp inoculation: attention to the observed natural forms, not the horror-imagined; to the light, not the dark. The dark side of Southern Gothic fear, usually race and sex based, was for the main part glossed in 50s and 60s fiction and liberal ethnic sympathy (as for example in Hilliard's (1971) *Maori Girl*), and ignored in poetry pretty much altogether. Nostalgic images of moko-ed Kuia and modern, formal patterns are both appropriations of Maori style mixing sentimental and decorative effect with stealing from the undone, and they both occupy a good number of the plates in the Brasch-edited *Landfall country* (1947-62). In the productive economy, would-be Fordist nationalist endeavours seemed to offer Maori labour affluent worker status through the fifties and sixties, especially in infrastructure (road, rail, telecoms), forestry and import substitution manufacture. The economy was arguably a prime assimilationist mechanism, even as its own sustainability became less certain

with every demand and state sector sustaining loan and tariff. Meanwhile, Morrieson's tragic Maori mental patient cum arrested development case, the Te Wakinga kid, waited in the comic/neglected interstices.

Overall, such nationalism succumbed to the delusion that a Fordist national *modernity* was possible here, and to the derived delusion that a nationalist *modernism* or modernist cultural project could actually help make that happen. But for all this rational and reasonable intentionality, New Zealand's embedding in the post war cultural and political economy was a sublime experience, leaving us culturally overwhelmed yet alienated in ways we arguably never were before. It had started in the late 30s with a mild socialist/modernist adventure in social security and self-sufficiency, consensually agreed on by the major political parties, the FOL, and champion modernist bureaucrat industrializers (and aesthetes) like Bill Sutch. A generation of careful insulators tried to pick up the international codes and modes of production and make them work for us, but ended up figuring and caricaturing in a grotesque hybrid cringe. Finding an innocent, locally inflected yet now-more-knowing voice to tell these stories became a preoccupation, often resolved by having an innocent sensibility invaded by events and storytelling forms which are only partially under narrative control. In Morrieson's (1976) *The scarecrow*, Neddy Poindexter shuffles between scenes of just such an excited retelling of a Saturday night horror flick, using serial conventions of 50s Hollywood cinematic suture.

So, where early Landfall's considered nationalist modernism could yield an easy, trim realism, clear abstraction, and a well- (and endlessly) parsed debt to European sensibility, things could also be dark, especially in the blindspots. The net effect was a partially successful turning of the political and cultural economies in on themselves, which in turn resulted in a kind of failed Fordist noir modernity. In good noir Gothic form (Christopher, 1998), domestic economic scenarios became increasingly crowded and labyrinthine (see, for example, the Byzantine arrangements around obtaining import licenses or setting up major new industry), requiring a deep image focus that cut every one in on the action, but left observers feeling distinctly claustrophobic. Our moves towards standalone national development were distorted by pervasive, intractably conflictual "stability and security" issues, and what was done to address them: industrial relations, planning around

markets, big producer boards, military-industrial struggle. There was light and shadow: we were financially better off within a clean, masculinised, modern order permeated with American values, domesticating other desire into suburban neuroses, and noir sex beyond. Over all was the Industrial Policy (and Industrial Relations) shadow of the dirty deal, the sense of some hidden cabal dictating events, reaching rough, often violent industrial and political standoffs, and everyone else caught in the interstices of immense struggle.

Occasionally, this ramped up the fun and slapstick dimensions of TG, as in Nick Perry's (1994) account of Antipodean camp, especially in its Australian, larrikin formation. But often, like Morrieson's characters, many ended up talking like a bad provincial Bogart: a masculinised camp that turned grotesque and violent as a first point of respite. Sargeson, the clear, uncluttered and plausibly faux-naïve voice of our early youth, became more and more mannered. Over the period, our cultural and political economic formations got more and more bogged down in the domestic, regional and grotesque as the nation state drove deeper and deeper into crisis. But it's Muldoon who above all others references both the policy and the political economic bases of the growing grotesquery of the period. He famously deplored the influence of abstract economic theory and doctrine (Horrocks, 1984), casting himself as a creature of opportunistic pragmatism, even as he ironically followed Keynes' dictum that even those who don't know it are acting out the delusions and doctrines of some dead economist or other. In growing into a grotesque caricature of himself, and inflicting deluded Think-ing Big on the national infrastructure and debt, Muldoon was the political economic embodiment of TG's crisis phase, frantically building even as the ground is being cut away underneath by a long term secular decline in corporate profitability (Roper, 2005). From a market purist's perspective, New Zealand's economy was regarded as the most distorted in the OECD, and all by local control measures deigned to fend off the instabilities of the global economy.

In denying the theoretical provenance of his material (he thought he was just a common sense pragmatist), and thinking he could turn it whichever way worked to suit local conditions, Muldoon was simply doing what artists of the Fordist period did, taking core conventions and inflecting

them, tweaking and distorting them to fit our landscape. By the end, it was the language and image of the gross, the crisis-ridden, about-to-implode that we lived with. Aesthetically, by the end of the golden age of import-substitution art and high camp regionalist realism, we were world leaders in organic pottery, in adding wood veneer, dark woodstain and sheepskin trim to architecture, and in producing creamy beige inflected painting that apparently needed no international art discourse to bring home. Yes, as Colin McCahon underscored in his reaction to American modernism, the *Northland panels*, "it can be dark here". The whole thing culminated in the gross excesses of Think Big, and in the apocalyptic/redemptive regionalist art and writing (a New Zealand catalogue would need to include grotesquery and greenery, and rebellions left and right: Michael Illingworth, Don Binney, McCahon's dark landscape, Craig Harrison, films like Roger Donaldson's (1977) *Sleeping dogs*, Geoff Murphy's (1981) *Goodbye pork pie*, Vincent Ward's (1984) *Vigil*). In an extraordinary moment, it converged in the dark grotesque figure of Muldoon himself narrating the Rocky Horror Picture Show. So our cultural production joined other Regionalist art in raising grotesquery: the Southern Gothic of Flannery O'Connor, Sherwood Anderson, Faulkner, Thomas Hart Benton, David Lynch; and its Australian versions, Patrick White, Peter Carey, James Gleason, Russel Drysdale. And, like Muldoon, the grotesquery polarized: maybe the climactic contemporary literary reference being the much loved/ "ghastly" *The bone people* (Hulme, 1985).

The provincial grotesque of post war Fordist noir would have been worse, I reckon, had we actually had Fordism here. Which, outside aspects of agricultural industry, we didn't. What we did have, as has been said in reference to Mike Stevenson's 2003 Venice Biennale Trekka van display, was a knocked-down provincial version, plausibly dubbed Trekka-ism (Craig, 2003): a locally cobbled together, rangy and interstitial mode of practical and cultural production best exemplified not by a Ford, but by the explicitly not mass produced Trekka van (1968-72). Assembled from imported bits of Eastern bloc socialist machinery, and joined to a distinctly home grown, regionally beige superstructure, the Trekka was an exemplar of the sorts of cunning improvisation and innovation a semi-peripheral economy might in fact manage: quirky, not taking itself too seriously, ranging

naively but determinedly across the terrain. Grotesque, and simple/pragmatic in almost equal doses. Ah, but cheap, nasty and compromised. But for all that, the Trekka almost learnt the tick of standing upright: with a bit more class, and say a Western rather than an Eastern European chassis, it might have. In cultural production, we did have such Landrover-hybrid cobbled and agile class, yes way beyond Trekka-ism, much of it worthy Kiwi can-do: Baxter off-road around Jerusalem, the cross-country pragmatic dexterity of Owen Marshall, Maurice Gee, or later Maurice Shadbolt. Janet Frame escaping *Owls do cry* provincial grotesquery in a string of bright, sharp, here and there departures, especially in *Living in the Maniototo* (1979). Witi Ihimaera's (1986) *The matriarch* achieved stunning success by incorporating a really knowing borrowing of someone else's over the top (operatic) form, and packing it with potent High Maori form and politics, all while holding onto essentially local people, history and vernacular.

But the differences between what Douglas Davis (2005) would call our "stuck in sullen adolescence" and "chattering classes" malaise and an increasingly thrusting, Alpha-male-esque Australian larrikin triumph were by the early 80s already in evidence. Another bout of economic and cultural trauma, collective grief and loss would seal the deal.

1984-1997 Post Fordism, other people's fictions and their destabilising sequelae: Bipolar bungy swings and reactionary neo-liberalism

> The same week our fowls were stolen, Daphne Moran had her throat cut.
> Ronald Hugh Morrieson, *The scarecrow* (1976, p.1)

New Zealand sits at the flick end of international policy pendulums and sensibility swings, extraordinarily vulnerable to formal and doctrinal fashion. And, not unrelatedly, to other people's fictions. All this adds vertigo and scission to the dominant emotional landscape of TG, the mood swings, the bipolar bungy jumps (Perry, 2003), the desperate reactions that send folk into frenzies of obsession and expectation, and then, after reality has bitten, back to gloom. All this, I will argue, has many elements of classic post – traumatism, coming back to in early midlife to pick away at the seams of coherence, and raise the spectre of more cycles of trauma, binging, and

desperate discipline. This, maybe never more than in the heady 80s and hungover/climbing-back-on-the-wagon 90s. Then, failing Fordist stability was displaced by the Schumpeterian creative destruction and instability of Post-Fordist jungle law (Jessop, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002).

Of course such instability has long province in New Zealand, partly again because Fordist stability was never really realized. Rather, light and dark bi-polarism is the longstanding salient of New Zealand business confidence, the sharemarket, the exchange rate, net migration figures, and especially commodity prices. And with them has gone the national mood, and a lot of sensibility. As with Daphne Moran and the Poindexter chooks, unexpected economic events and autonomous cyclical features of various aspects can run together in a small economy, apparently conspiring to traumatize. Most recently in 2001, a record low exchange rate combined with record high commodity prices to produce a solid boom, the effects of which are still (late 2005) largely with us. But all the indicators can just as easily swing backwards, or, as now, be undercut by some other post-colonial insecurity. Look at any graph of business confidence in the paper.

Managing the booms and busts has been arguably the central feature of economic policy in New Zealand, but what makes it worse is that on significant occasions it's been the management itself that's made the swings more violent. In fact, the bi-polarism happens both in the economy, *and* in its management. Muldoon's grotesque version of Keynesianism involved both rough enactment of a theory, and its exacerbation to plural, pragmatic, even cynical ends, from full employment to winning elections. By 1984 the pent up reaction to Muldoon's deluded grotesquery meant a mood and policy swing of singular intensity and consequence. As ever, while other people's theory and its trim and travelled salvationist narratives (stabilize, liberalise, privatize: "get the prices right, practice good money, go home early") felt like an invasion of sovereignty, we were complicit: we imported/mainlined the theory in its purest formalisms, via texts and one-liner consultants, and without any contextual critical mass with which to resist. It was this purity and international allure of the traveling theory, that exacerbated the first exuberant phase of the 80s TG cycle, and made the downswing more violent. Economic governance went from do-it-yourself management to its opposite: predictability through doctrinaire adherence

to rigid codes. In turn, the reactive new right doctrine that permeated the country from the mid 80s set off secondary shock waves of its own, sending the sharemarket giddily up and gruesomely down.

But whereas other economies and sharemarkets bounced back after '87, ours flatlined, and we lived through a long, traumatized, depressive phase. As in the early thirties, Ruth Richardson's manic beneficiary slashing in a contracting economy amplified trends made the trough more gruesome. Meanwhile, in a post-traumatic funk, the economy was run on theory-automatic, government daring only to send clear and rational signals to markets. As contractualism hit service delivery, the disembedding process of self-regulating markets and their rationalities disrupting social and cultural formations described by Polanyi (1957) deepened. The market rational overlays were at once profoundly unpopular, evidently imported, and impossible to escape. The de-territorialising due to other people's theoretical fictions was registered in cultural productions from Wedde's (1986) *Symmes hole*, to the mid 1990s disjuncture/ early hybridisms of *Xena* and *Hercules*. In *Symmes hole*, interpenetrated storytelling arches over history, setting the arrival and (dis-) embedding of the early whalers against the rational overlays of Wakefield's settlement plans and Ray Kroc's hamburger marketing grids across the Pacific. The manic, lost madness is barely resolved on a personal level when it becomes clear the identity quest isn't realizable these days, in anything like the ways it was for Wedde's Worser Heberley.

The effects were pervasive, yet fragmentary, even contradictory. Middle class "hollowing out" in favour of low wage service sector jobs increased class and national anxieties. The working class ride was even rougher, and more poignantly visited on Maori and Pacific economy and society. While rising Maori identity politics and demand for re-territorialised services provided the rock on which neo-liberal reform broke in areas like health, they also provided horror evidence of the sorts of social dislocation and inequality that was possible under simple market governance. In *Once Were Warriors*, you had a desperate call for cultural reintegration juxtaposed immediately to its antithesis. But post trauma, by the mid 90s everyone was having to come to terms with being fractured and brokenhearted. Searing trauma meant both polarity (tino rangatiratanga), and acceptance of radical hybridity. What was again realizable, as Xena and Hercules showed,

was the highly camped up/ grotesque telling of other people's stories, in a way that at best was at least knowing- at best satirical- about the cultural and place values underpinning them. There, essential identity claims were abandoned for the sheer fun and commercial rewards of fooling around with core narratives in a landscape that we- if no-one else- knew to be ours. It was a prescient sign that if there was an international cultural economy we could reverse-colonise, it was going to be on these kinds of terms.

Again, some established people managed to keep a pragmatic, unmannered, vernacular head, and became "kiwi writers that could": Manhire, Shadbolt, Gee, stuck largely to their crafted storytelling, keeping the ironies of the provinces small and under control, and not getting formally or theoretically carried away. Poet Robert Sullivan and painter Shane Cotton achieved much the same thing across cultural fractures. The vernacular was expanded too, mapping new pluralities of class and culture onto a de-centred canon, as in Sturm's (1991) *The Oxford history of New Zealand literature in english*, taking in pop fiction and a range of local prose.

Coda, 1997- 2004. Living with travelling stories: Hobbitism, reflexive diaspora, and re-embedding, "inclusive" neoliberalism

> They'd put John's '61 V-8 Holden on the road and take off on a drinking / driving/ whoring tour around New Zealand. They talked about the trip so much we all felt like we were going too. They left Pahiatua on Christmas Eve. But on Boxing Day the car got totaled in a drunken wreck. They spent all the shearing money they'd saved just paying off the bondsman. "The most important entitlement", I think you [Dick] said, "remains the right to speak from a position". Chris Krauss, *I love Dick* (1997, p. 227)

By the late 1990s, the disjunctures and fragmentations of neo-liberal and post- colonial provincial economies had become simply what New Zealanders had to live with. As Polanyi had noted, no-one can stand disembedding, market-driven fragmentations for that long. Rather, a second, Polanyian re-embedding phase sets in, as all sorts of "enlightened reactionaries" (Polanyi,1957) set about accommodating economic formations to social and cultural ones (and vice-versa). This time, as *Lord of the rings* shows, it's been a shallow re-embedding, a shallow re-territorialising where

we barely dare mentioning the really local, for fear of frightening the foreign buyers. Or virtually no re-embedding at all, with both *Lord of the rings* and *Last Samurai* readable as almost entirely de-territorialised (Turner & Kavka, 2004). But market logics and embeddings turn out to be full of surprises. As in Niki Caro's *The whalerider*, producers can marry a clear and simple sense of place and narrative to "world-class" technical cinematographic performance, and escape the formal need for camping things up altogether.

The Third Way as practiced by the fifth Labour government was itself a shallow re-embedding of market relations in a more "inclusive" and "sustainable" national narrative (Porter & Craig 2005, Craig & Porter, forthcoming), wherein a mildly nationalist government invested in children, who grew up into disciplined, savvy workers into the global economy, and who could ride out the shocks, and whether located here or diasporically, make a contribution to that greater national project called New Zealand. It's market, it's still ups and downs, but economically, we get some (enough?) stability through openness matched to flexible rates of exchange and widely traded productive diversification. The net result is not simply more market neo-liberalism, but a cultural- entrepreneurial liberalism which knowingly takes on whatever cultural and technical form, as it seeks to embed itself in the widest range of experience, formal elements, place, style, subjectivity.

The national sensibility and narrative store becomes a resource for the wider strengthening of Thirdway supplyside economic development strategy (Bevir, 2005), something *our* musicians, filmmakers and all are more or less morally expected to brand their oeuvre with. Here, everything can be joined up, whether loosely networked and sharply included. Stories certainly can be identity- owned and placed, but it's their telling in widely mediated settings that will really bring them home. As in recent New Zealand Hobbitism (*Lord of the rings, The lion, witch and wardrobe*), it's becoming increasingly important to both cultural and political economies that *other people's stories* can be made to feel right at home here. Yes it can still be dark here, as in Karen Walker's fashion, but as *Whalerider* and late Shadbolt proved, and Peter Robinson, Jacqueline Fraser and Mike Stevenson's early 00s Venice Biennales showed, presenting our stories with

a well traveled, reflexive diasporic ease can hold an international audience, even when they treat content-wise with raw post colonial and Fordist-grotesque sensibilities.

At the same time it has become much easier to see post-modernism as itself a mannered formalism you can find ways past. In political, as in cultural- economy, problematising totalised production and narrative felt analytically empowering, but really "linguistic turn" deconstructions were only skin deep: you could deconstruct narrative all you wanted, but it wouldn't disappear, or relinquish its everyday ideological job of naturalizing contradictions. The current return to political economy in social and literary theory is prepared to treat with meta-narrative, providing it be seen in appropriate contingency, and as embedded in particular conditions of cultural and wider production. In short, stories, both other peoples' and your own, became something to manage, and to secure a return against.

But New Zealand's cultural entrepreneurs are by no means restricted to our their national trove of myth here. In this post-PoMo, "Inclusive" neoliberal cultural economy, the traveled formalisms of *other people's* narratives and theory can be taken up, but best with purposeful embedding in the placed, the personal and their narratives. The struggle to carry all this off over epic physical and cultural distance is still palpable, as Chris Krauss' (1997) edgy negotiation of top end- New York intellectual/aesthetic crossovers (*I love Dick*) demonstrates. Krauss is almost post-place, diasporic, but from where, if not the New York intellectual fringe where she rubs shoulders with cult-culture-critical figures like (Dick) Hebdige. Krauss develops an acute, hyper-reflexive and increasingly undermined crush on "Dick" that was always going to burn *and* crash. But there's more: the source of the knowing shiftiness and insider-outsider insecurity in Krauss' faux-naïve "dumb cunt" writing seems purely a matter of gender, infatuation-vertigo and feeling out of her academic class, until she takes the story back to her youth in the Shaky Isles. Now all the falling-over-the-edge uncertainties find a place they can call home: Wellington! In the end, like the *Lord of the rings*, it's Dick (and Dick's cultural criticism) that ends up displaced, as the borrowed, shaky, camp and grotesque elements are laughed off in the context of a wider, unlikely triumph. Again here as elsewhere in

TG, what looked gendered in international perspective seems much more universal here, where all kinds of people turn out to be culturally a little hysterical.

Yet I don't think anyone in Landfall Country would have anticipated that by now, Xena and Hercules, Tolkein's hobbits and monsters, Shadbolt's (1990) Kimball Bent and (1993) Ferdinand Wildblood/Henry Youngman doppelganger, Chris Krauss' knowingly overly impressed/ unreliably disaffected experimental film grammar-ed feminism, and all would be so well placed in an Antipodean landscape. At least, without the claustrophobic noir grotesquing it all up too much. Or that we could send either a Trekka van or Whale Rider into top-end international contexts and be confident they could tell a familiar story there. But as it turns out, New Zealand is in fact a political and cultural economy of diasporating hobbits, monsters and Trekkas, so well versed in telling and moving other people's stories that we seem to be able to manage it with very little ambivalence. In a world of niche marketism (neo-Trekkaism?), dependant on both recognition and fine grained, placed/crafted differentiation, we should do alright.

TG, then, along with its antipodean camps and provincial grotesques, its hypostatized infants, noir claustrophobias and traumatic bipolarities, isn't something we have overcome, so much as something we have learned to stand up around.

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The End of Class? An Empirical Investigation into the Changing Composition of New Zealand's Class Structure, 1896–2001

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Abstract

This article presents the results of a Marxist empirical study of New Zealand's class structure from 1896 to 2001. Class structure estimations were calculated by classifying the working population using Census information relating to occupation and employment status: first into the initial Marxist class locations of proletariat, bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie; then into Erik Olin Wright's contradictory class locations of managers, supervisors and semiautonomous employees. The results of the empirical research demonstrate that at the national level clear trends are evident in the changing composition of the class structure from 1896 to 2001. The proletariat continues to constitute the majority of the working population, rather than being eroded by the emerging middle class. The lack of correlation between objective class structure and class-consciousness indicates that further research is required in this area. Overall, the results provide corroborative evidence for a Marxist interpretation, with particular respect to the overall configuration of the objective class structure.

Introduction

New Zealand society is characterised by class divisions. Although the post-war era has seen the emergence of a variety of responses to the class question, there has been a distinct paucity of class research in New Zealand. Surprisingly, this has worsened in the last two decades, despite the growth and persistence of widespread inequality since the economic crisis in the mid-seventies, and the response of business interests and the state, particularly since 1984. This has largely been the result of a shift in how academics have conceptualised class, in many cases culminating in a challenge to the relevance of class analysis in the advanced capitalist societies. Due to the "changing nature" of capitalism, some scholars have declared

the "end of class"; this is sometimes linked to the idea of "embourgeoisement", because of the increasing standard of living over time that capitalism can apparently sustain. Others argue that the rise of white-collar or non-manual occupations has made the category of working class less relevant, as a new "middle class" emerges. More recently, the emphasis on identity politics has led some academics to reject the notion of class altogether, in the light of low levels of political activity. This article presents the results of an empirical investigation into the composition of New Zealand's changing class structure, and consequently flatly rejects each of these three approaches, arguing that the concept of class continues to be not only relevant, but in fact central, to understanding both the source and persistence of the widespread inequality that characterises the advanced capitalist societies.

Sociologists have attempted to investigate the topic of class in New Zealand, adopting different theoretical approaches and various methodologies. To date, most of the work undertaken with respect to New Zealand has fallen within the broad confines of Weberian class theory (see e. g.Baldock, 1977, Jones & Davis, 1986, Olssen, 1977, Pearson & Thorns, 1983, and more recently, Fairburn & Haslett, 2005), although there are a few notable exceptions written from a Marxist perspective (see e.g., most notably Bedggood, 1977, 1980, Cronin, 2001, Roper, 1997, 2005, Pearce, 1986, Steven, 1978, Wilkes, et.al., 1985, Wilkes, 1994). Empirically, the most significant of these is the New Zealand Class Structure Project, carried out by a team of researchers at Massey University in the mid-1980s. In 1985, a working paper was published by this group, presenting the findings of a survey of one thousand New Zealand households (Wilkes et. al., 1985). The result is a presentation of a "class structural map" which estimates the relative size of Wright's (1979) contradictory class locations for New Zealand at the time of the survey.[1] The classification of managers and supervisors is an important limitation with the study. The size of the group of managers and supervisors, constituting 39.2 percent of the working population, seems

[1] There are important limitations with this study. Firstly, it provides a 'snapshot' of the class structure in 1984, which is an important first step. However, it would be extremely useful if it were possible to examine the changes in the relative size of the class categories over time, as this would enable the detailed examination of the relationship between class structure and the tendencies of capitalism. This would also allow for

extremely high, particularly in comparison to the proletariat of 34.7 percent (after all, why is it necessary to have more managers and supervisors than those proletariat needing to be managed and supervised?). The survey method may have been partly to blame for this result. It is quite possible that this high number is reflective of an element of "false consciousness" of some of the working class, who believe they have more authority in the workplace than they actually do. The result is quite different from that anticipated by Wright. Despite its limitations, the study has made an important contribution, particularly given the paucity of research in the field of class analysis in New Zealand. To date, there has been no systematic long run empirical testing of Marxist class theory conducted in the New Zealand context. This article reports on a project carried out in an attempt to fill this significant gap in the literature.

The primary objective of the research project has been to examine the composition of New Zealand's class structure over the period from 1896 to 2001: to estimate the relative size of each class location. The aim of this is two-fold. Firstly, it represents an attempt to practically apply neo-Marxist class theory to the New Zealand labour force, to furnish an empirical investigation into the phenomenon of class in New Zealand society. Secondly, the study of a long time frame enables us to observe trends in the class structure, and examine the relationship between the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production and the changing class structure. With this objective in mind, it would be ideal to place this material in broader historical perspective, and consider changes in the class structure in the context of economic performance, the balance of class forces and the response of the state (for a more detailed attempt at this see Hayes, 2002). For the purpose of this article, however, a lack of space confines the discussion to that of tracing changes in the class structure over time, and considering this in terms of Marx's projections for trends in the development of the capitalist mode of production.

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the more rigorous theoretical examination of Marx's theory of class. Secondly, there are concerns over the methodology used. The classification of small employers based on the number of employees was precisely advised against in Wright's initial theoretical exposition of contradictory class locations. The grounds for this rejection are that what distinguishes a small employer from the bourgeoisie is the source of the majority of surplus-value, and the number of employees an individual has is not sufficient information to base this estimation on, especially given the differences between industries.

To this end, the paper will work through the following sequence. The study is informed by classical Marxist theory, and the first step is to ascertain whether or not the available statistical data can be used as an approximation of the absolute and relative size of the initial classical Marxist class categories of bourgeoisie, proletariat and petit-bourgeoisie. To obtain a clearer picture of what has been happening with the class structure over time, it is necessary to extend the analysis to incorporate the range of occupations emerging in the advanced stages of capitalism. To this end, the neo-Marxist Erik Olin Wright's concept of contradictory class locations has been adopted. This further classifies occupations into class locations, and a brief section outlines the classification procedures used. Finally, the results of the research will be presented and their implications discussed, before concluding that some of the prevailing views of class and its central role in civil society in advanced capitalist economies are at the very least misguided. Furthermore, it is argued that Marxist class analysis continues to be of direct relevance to understanding class in the advanced capitalist societies.

Initial Marxist class locations

Classical Marxist class analysis identifies only three basic class locations: the proletariat, the bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeoisie. These initial class locations are straightforward to operationalise using labour force statistics collected through the Census. The employment status (ES) categories of wage and salary earner, employer and self employed roughly approximate to the three class locations, and are readily available in various editions of the New Zealand official yearbook, published by Satistics New Zealand. However, to control for the effects of considerable socio-demographic changes over the time period, it is most useful to consider these as percentages of those in the full-time labour force. This allows for each category to be considered in relation to the labour force as a whole, because what matters is the overall composition of those in the labour force (including, of course, the unemployed).

For most of this period, the ES category of wage and salary earners increased dramatically, from around 58 percent of the total labour force in 1896 to 86 percent in 1971, although it has since declined somewhat. Over the same period, the category of employers decreased from 11 percent in

1906 to 5.9 percent in 1981. The category of self-employed also experienced a significant relative decline, from 16.5 percent of the labour force in 1896, to 6.5 percent in 1971. These results are highly significant, as they confirm Marx's expectation that the working class would grow in size over time, and that the capitalist class would decrease in relative size as capital concentrated and centralised. The proletariat increased by 28 percent over the first 75 years of this time frame, while the bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie combined have gone from 26.9 percent of the labour force in 1896 to 12.6 percent in 1971 (Statistics New Zealand, various years).

These figures also show the considerable increase in unemployment since the late 1970s. In the last two Census years the percentage of unemployed in the labour force has matched the self employed category at around 10 percent. Significantly, there are two times over the 100 year period where the category of wage and salary earners has declined: in the 1930s and in this recent period. Each time, it is clear that the unemployment rate has correspondingly peaked, suggesting that the decline in the percentage of wage and salary earners is related to and (at least partially) offset by high unemployment. This is confirmed at least in the 1930s by the recovery of the wage and salary earner category, and to a certain extent during the more recent period, which will be explored more fully later on.

In order to create a more complete picture of New Zealand's class structure, the analysis was extended using the theory of Erik Olin Wright. This will be considered in the next section, but it is necessary to first make two points about the above data. Firstly, the above are official statistics – no subjective manipulation has been carried out to reconfigure them. There has been no opportunity for any bias in the theoretical perspective informing this research to have altered these initial results. Of course, the usual limitations in using official statistics for a purpose they were not designed for remain. Secondly, even within the data collection process, it seems there is little room for confusion. An individual filling in a census form would have been likely to find straightforward the process of identifying themselves using the above categories. The data has also been collected consistently over the time frame. These points are important, because the employment status trends alone are compelling evidence to support a Marxist explanation of changes in the class structure, and are relatively free of a charge of partiality.

Extending the analysis: Wright's contradictory class locations

Throughout the twentieth century, the growth of white-collar occupations has sparked a great deal of debate within the field of sociology (Ambercrombie & Urry, 1980, p 2). However, the relative economic and social stability of the 1950s and 1960s meant that little research was conducted into questions of class during this period. Since the late 1960s and through the 1970s, this has changed, with new interest sparked in the topic of class, in part the result of more difficult economic circumstances and the growing acuteness of both class and political struggle in the advanced capitalist countries.

Many theorists have argued that the growing numbers employed in white collar occupations constitute an emerging "middle class", presenting many further questions. If there is a new middle class, how do we identify who is in it? Some have considered that the middle class in particular has become increasingly heterogeneous, and no longer constitutes a distinctive class, or if they do, have such fragmented interests that they cannot be relied upon to be a decisive historical force.[2] Others have argued that there is a boundary problem, referring in particular to the conceptual difficulties in differentiating and demarcating the working class and the new middle class (Roberts, 1977, p 6). I reject this argument, as it relies on essentially arbitrary decisions about what it means to be part of a particular class location, often based on aesthetic qualities of work situations which are not theoretically grounded. Still others (such as Ambercrombie & Urry, 1983, p 6) argue that these random categories of classes "lack sociological meaning", demanding a more rigorous conceptual application of whichever intellectual tradition the theorist subscribes to, in order to facilitate the identification of less ambiguous class boundaries. As Meiksins puts it:

> These analyses represent significant advances in our understanding of contemporary social structure. It remains doubtful, however, whether any of them have solved 'the boundary question'. In

[2] For example, Roberts, et.al. (1977), *The fragmentary class structure*. Set in Britain, the authors argue that the middle class can be divided into a new middle mass, a white-collar proletariat, a traditional middle class (including the self-employed) and an upwardly mobile professional class. They each have a specific agenda when it comes to class-consciousness, with the focus turning to the incompatibility of the two-party system in Britain to accommodate the new divisions of interest they supposedly have.

> particular, if we examine the criteria they use in locating the barriers between the various classes (economic privilege, work conditions, function), many problems with their definitions of class remain. (Meiksins, 1986, p 104)

In light of this, a different approach has been taken in this study, as it adopts Erik Olin Wright's framework of contradictorary class locations to make sense of advanced capitalist societies, whilst continuing to utilise the Marxist analytical framework. For those readers familiar with Wright's work, it should be noted that the approach taken in this study relies on the first version of this theory, exposited in *Class structure and income determination* (Wright, 1979).

The three contradictory class locations are located within the intermediate positions of the three basic classes identified by Marx (the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the petit-bourgeoisie). This is probably most easily understood by considering figure 1 where the percentages represent Wright's estimations of the relative number of the population falling into each class location:

Figure 1: Wright's Contradictorary Class Locations



Source: Wright (1979), p 42.

In the case of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the familiar relations of control over the productive process are clear-cut, with all and no control respectively. For the petit-bourgeoisie, it is clear that they retain economic ownership and possesion over the physical means of production, but not over the labour power of others, because they are employed on their own account.

In the intermediary locations, while things become more complex, it is important to keep in mind the various elements of the capital-labour relationship from a Marxist perspective. For example, the small employer is located between the bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeoisie. Strictly speaking, small employers would fall into the Marxist category of bourgeoisie, because they are exploiters of labour-power. However, the small enterprise is often also in the position where the extraction of surplus-value, or profit, is largely dependent on the labour-power of the owner of the business, rather than on its employees. This might occur if, say, the employer was a specialist in a given field and was simply assisted by employees. For this reason they are not entirely aligned with the interests of the traditional bourgeoisie, the owner of a larger firm who can live largely off the profits of others. They are still exploiters of labour-power, but the profitability (and ultimately, survival) of the firm is also dependent on their labour power.

Between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are supervisors and managers, who can be defined as having a contradictory position between the three processes underlying class relations of the capitalist mode of production: relations of economic ownership and relations of possession (of the means of production and of labour-power (Wright, 1979, pp38-9)). This is complex, because those employed do have diverse levels of responsibility, but some general observations can be made. Supervisors exert very little (if any) control over the production process. Although they can have some degree of authority over the employment of labour in terms of hiring and firing, they have little or no control over decisions of how much labour is employed, and none over the employment of resources. Managers, on the other hand, technically fall into the broader category of employees but in some cases have considerable control over decisions of employment of labour and capital investment. At the higher level, managers can take on

some of the characteristics of the bourgeoisie, with at least partial control over the organisation of production, investment decisions and control over the labour power of others. In terms of surplus-value, they are undoubtedly still exploited (or they wouldn't remain employed), but they often have the capacity to appropriate some of the surplus back in the form of high salaries and perks. The proletariat, of course, can be distinguished from these two categories as they have very little effective control over their own labour power, let alone other means of production.

Located between the petit-bourgeoisie and the proletariat are semi-autonomous employees. As they are by definition employees, technically they share characteristics with the proletariat in that they are exploited labour power, but can sometimes exercise minimal control over some aspects of organising production, mainly with respect to qualitative details rather than large investment and production decisions. This is usually due to holding a particular set of skills that are quite specialised and exclusive. Wright uses the example of engineers to illustrate this point: typically they have responsibility for at least aspects of the design of the project they are working on (Wright, 1979, p 47). They retain no control over the labour power of others.

Since the development of the theory of contradictory class locations, Wright has reconsidered this position, and decided that his analysis is not theoretically consistent with a Marxist approach. The theory grew out of acceptance of the basic assumption on Wright's part that Marx's polarization of class interests has applications to both concrete and abstract societies. He has since come to question this assumption, leading to a reformulation of his class schema. Identifying exploitation as the basis of Marxian class relations, Wright began to rethink his position on domination versus exploitation, because to him it seemed that domination was more operational within the contradictory class locations than exploitation:

> Throughout the development of the concept of contradictory class locations, I insisted that this was a reformulation of a distinctly Marxist class concept. As part of the rhetoric of such an enterprise, I affirmed the relationship between class and exploitation. Nevertheless, in practice the concept of contradictory class locations within class relations rested almost exclusively on relations of domination rather than exploitation. Reference to exploitation

> functioned more as a background concept to the discussion of classes than as a constitutive element of the analysis of class structures. (Wright, 1985, p 56)

What emerged as a response to his own work was that in the process of identifying the intermediate class locations, Wright considered that he had been preoccupied with relations of domination rather than exploitation, and that he thereby marginalised the concept of exploitation (Wright, 1989, p 5). For him, this meant that he had abandoned the idea of intrinsically antagonistic class relationships. Quite rightly, he points out that domination in and of itself does not imply exploitation and opposing interests. This is not refuted. Rather, the point to be made here is that while each of his intermediate locations may be characterised by particular relations of domination, this is not the quality that is being considered when making a distinction between each class location. The definition originally drawn up requires considerable care to be implemented on any practical level, because there is a fine line between what is domination and what is the more relevant concept when considering exploitation and class interests: *control over the means of production.* The key to considering this in the case of managers for example, is being careful to be aware not of authority over workers (although this may also be characteristic of a manager) but over the manager's capacity to hire and fire, and ability to participate in investment decisions. Classifying according to exploitation is a complex but not impossible task, and requires clear guidelines rather than a preoccupation with hierarchy and authority, or any other characteristic. This paper adopts the original theoretical foundation of Wright's contradictory class locations as they are considered ultimately sound, and consistent with a classical Marxist approach, provided in any empirical investigation that classification is carried out with extreme care. In contrast, the result of theoretical reconsideration meant that Wright began to adopt the foundations of a framework developed by John Roemer and others, and this formed the basis of his subsequent empirical work, although he then abandoned it (see for example Wright 1985, 1989, 1997, 2005).

This schema is useful for two reasons. Firstly, it takes into account the "advanced" stage of the capitalist mode of production and its emerging occupations, as it has been argued that this represents the rise of a new

"middle" class, and that the classical Marxist framework cannot cope with the new occupations. The schema provides a way of addressing this problem whilst still maintaining the key elements of Marxist class analysis. Secondly, in doing so, when looking at trends over time, it helps us to identify how changes in the class structure are generated by the underlying tendencies of the capitalist mode of production.

Classification of ES categories and occupations

Employment status categories as they are provided in the Census data correspond considerably with the three basic classes identified by Marx: employers as the bourgeoisie, wage and salary earners as the proletariat and self employed with no employees as the petit bourgeoisie. To arrive at estimations of Wright's contradictory class locations (CCL), further classification of occupations is required within these employment status categories. The locations of supervisor, manager, semi-autonomous employees and proletariat (that is, Wright's proletariat as distinct from the CCLs) are all found within the employment status of wage and salary earner. By classifying the occupations of these wage and salary earners into these class locations, we can begin to interrogate the idea that the CCLs constitute a middle class that is substantial enough to challenge the working class majority.

Of course, Wright also identifies the category of small employers. Generally, this category presents a classification problem. Strictly speaking they would normally fall into the employer category, and need to be separated out from the Marxist category of bourgeoisie, as exploiters of labour power. When determining whether an employer is a small employer or a member of the bourgeoisie, the ultimate questions is the source of the majority of surplus-value (Wright, 1979, pp 45). If the majority of surplus-value is derived from the labour power of employees, then they are bourgeoisie, whereas if the majority is derived from their own labour power, then they are small employers. This presents a problem of classification, because of the lack of surplus-value data at the level of the individual enterprise. Some studies have classified according to number of employees. However, Wright advised against this method as unreliable, because surplus-value appropriation varies between occupations and industries (Wright,

1979, p 45-6). In any case, the relevant data for adopting this method was unavailable at this level of detail. For these reasons, this project was confined to the task of estimating the size of bourgeoisie and small employers combined, proletariat, supervisors, managers, semiautonomous employees and petit-bourgeoisie (classification criteria are detailed in the Appendix). Occupations as revealed in the Census data collections have been classified by Statistics New Zealand according to the New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (NZSCO), which was first adopted and published in 1968. The NZSCO consists of general job descriptions outlining the key tasks, required qualifications and experience for each occupation. With respect to this study, the main aim in the reclassification process is to identify the relations of production apparent in the description given in the appropriate version of the NZSCO.

This is quite straightforward, although there are gaps in the data for the part-time labour force. For Census years 1896, 1906, 1916, 1926, 1936, 1945, 1956, 1961 and 1966 labour force data were collected separately for males and females, and no distinction was made between those employed full-time and part-time. For census years 1971, 1976 and 1981, data was only published for the full-time labour force, and not with respect to gender. Full-time data were published for 1986, but for the last three Census years, sufficiently detailed data had to be sourced from Statistics New Zealand, and it was possible to also obtain part-time data for 1986 and subsequent Census years.[3] It should be noted that a) no distinction has been made in the study between males and females, and both have been combined throughout the period, even though they were listed separately in earlier Census volumes; b) to 1966, the data is for those employed at all ages, but from 1971, only those aged 15 years or over; and c) Maori were excluded until 1951. Additionally, it should be noted that this project is limited to those actually involved in paid work, and subsequently, doesn't cover the class locations of those not of working age, including children and those who have retired, as well of those who are of working age but have opted

[3] The definition of full-time work changed from 20 to 30 hours per week from 1986 Census.

out of employment but are not counted as unemployed. Further work that provides a more comprehensive picture of the whole of New Zealand society is still required.

From 1968 there have been four versions of the New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (NZSCO). The first was NZSCO68, and it was subsequently updated in 1990 (to NZSCO90), 1995 (NZSCO95) and 1999 (NZSCO99). Therefore, the respective years are provided: 1971, 1976, 1981 and 1986 are available in NZSCO68, 1991 in NZSCO90, 1996 in NZSCO95 and 2001 in NZSCO99. This means that reclassification has to be carried out four times (for each version of NZSCO) in order to achieve comparability over time. Before the introduction of the first NZSCO, occupations are listed by employment status in Census data and are quite readily available. However, position titles change over time, so presenting two difficulties. Firstly, there is a lack of standardisation, and hence it is difficult to make direct comparisons over time. Secondly, without a clear classification of occupations, and a lack of description for the specific tasks of each occupation, classifying them into class locations becomes more problematic. However, it is still possible to make some general and valuable observations for the period from 1896 to 1966. These difficulties are less severe after 1966 because of the introduction of the new NZSCOs, and the detailed descriptions of each occupation that can be found within them. In addition, with the publication of each new version of the NZSCO, considerable efforts have been made to ensure that comparability over time is possible, while ensuring the NZSCO reflects the changing nature of the labour force.

Estimating New Zealand's changing class structure 1896 to 2001

Once classification of occupation by ES has taken place, it is possible to then aggregate the number in each category, and arrive at numerical estimations of the class structure for each Census year. Because the labour force expanded so rapidly over the period, class locations have been also been calculated as percentages of the overall class structure, because the relative size of each class location is more illuminating than simply the number falling into that class. This allows us to see how the class map has changed over time.

Most notably, the proletariat (not including the CCLs that also fall into the wage and salary earner category) expanded substantially over the period from 1896 to 1981. In absolute terms the category expanded by over 462 percent, from 165,185 in 1896 to 928,743 in 1981, with an average of 8,983 per year joining the ranks of the working class in a full time capacity. However, when controlling for demographic changes, in relative terms the persistent expansion of the proletariat was still remarkable but less dramatic, with 56.5 percent of the labour force classifiable as proletariat in 1896. By 1966, those in the category of the proletariat had reached 83.07 percent of the full-time labour force, after increasing consistently for a period of seventy years.

The utility of relative rather than absolute figures becomes clearer when examining the categories of bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie. Both categories increased in absolute terms over the period, with numbers in the category of the bourgeoisie expanding from 30,256 in 1896 to 115,605 in 2001, while those employed full-time as petit-bourgeoisie almost quadrupled over the period from 46,955 to 162,759 in 2001. However, both categories sustained a prolonged relative decrease over the same period. The bourgeosie comprised 10.35 percent of the full time labour force in 1896: over the next eighty-five years, this number declined to reach 5.88 percent by 1981. The petit-bourgeoisie sustained an even more dramatic reduction, comprising a substantial 16.06 percent in 1896, but ultimately declining relative to the rest of the full-time labour force until it reached less than half its original size, at just under 7 percent in 1981, when the trend was interrupted. Both the decline in these two categories and the increase in the size of the proletariat indicate strong verification of the tendencies that Marxist theory would predict. These results are highly significant, in that they make a strong case for the continued relevance of Marxist class analysis. For 80 years, Marx's prognosis of the proletarianisation of a growing proportion of the population is confirmed by the Census data. Following the logic of Marx's critique of the capitalist mode of production, it makes sense that as capital centralises and concentrates, the categories of bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie would decline relative to the proletariat. In terms of the post-war class debate, these results pose a significant

challenge to many of the basic assumptions that have been the starting point of many other investigations into the class structure of advanced capitalist societies.

However, some puzzling anomalies emerge from the data after 1981. The most significant result is the apparent reversal of the increasing proletarianisation of the labour force that has occurred from 1971 onwards. In relative terms the proletariat peaked in 1966 at 83.07 percent, and then fell dramatically until 1991, at a faster rate than the steady increase of seventy years. Although the rate of decline slowed significantly over the last three Census years, the percentage of the full-time labour force comprising the proletariat ultimately decreased to 55.7 percent in 2001, a level slightly lower than at the beginning of the period (this level was 58.8 percent when including the part-time labour force).

The first step in investigating this phenomenon is to look at the next two class locations that have demonstrated adherence to the Marxist expectation of their size over time. Clearly, the reversal in the expansion of the proletariat was not immediately offset by an increase in the bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie: in other words, it is not simply a case of the proletarianisation trend noted above simply reversing for the last thirty years. However, the most recent four Census years have seen a relative increase in both of these categories. The bourgeoisie has increased somewhat to numbers previously characteristic of the early sixties, hovering between 7.5 and 7.9 percent of the labour force for all years between 1986 and 2001. On the other hand, while the petit-bourgeoisie increased from around 6-7 percent between 1966 to 1981 to over 9 percent from 1986 onwards, the most recent Census years show that the petit-bourgeoisie is again on the increase, reaching just over 11 percent in 2001.

Interestingly, these figures have first appeared in the Census immediately after the election of the Fourth Labour Government in 1984. One explanation for the jump in petit-bourgeoisie figures is that during the neo-liberal reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were mass redundancies in the public and to a certain extent, private sectors, compensated by large redundancy payments. In a time of increasing unemployment, these were put to use by recipients in establishing small businesses to ensure their ongoing employment. Another likely factor in explaining this change is

that the ongoing process of the casualisation of work resulted in a number of workers becoming employed as contractors rather than as permanent workers. They may then have identified themselves as self-employed rather than wage and salary earners on the Census, even though they are essentially very similar to wage and salary earners, with even less job security.

Given that the categories of both the bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeoisie have increased in recent years after such a prolonged decline that seemed to go hand in hand with the proletarianisation thesis, on first glance it might seem appropriate to declare that this demonstrates the inadequacy of Marxist class theory as the expected trend appears to have simply reversed. Importantly, this is only part of the picture. The reversal of the proletariat could be said to be "complete" in the sense that by the end of the 105 year period covered by this study, it actually declined to reach the level it was at at the beginning of the period, at 55.7 percent by 2001. A first step in identifying the underlying cause of this phenomenon is to recognise that while the bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeoisie have recently increased in relative size, this has been only a partial reversal of their previous decline, in that they have not reverted back to their 1896 levels. In other words, the recent decline in the relative size of the proletariat is only partially explained by these two categories, and in fact a number of other factors play a role in explaining the apparent reversal of the proletarianisation thesis. Given the historically significant adherence to the proletarianisation thesis that continued for the first seventy years of the period in this study, the apparent reversal is puzzling, and requires further investigation. How does one explain firstly, a change in the direction of such a prolonged trend, and secondly, the enormity of the change in the case of the proletariat, a complete reversal of the previous trend?

The emergence of unemployment

If we widen the scope of analysis to include another key historic phenomenon of the period, we don't have to go far to notice that the reversal of the growth of the proletariat coincides with the appearance of unemployment. Unemployment increased significantly from 1971 onwards, peaking in 1991 at 12.45 percent of the labour force. The only other point in the time frame studied that the proletariat decreased in relative size was

the Great Depression of the 1930s, during which the rate of unemployment has been estimated as high as 16 to 20 percent (Sutch, 1941, p 278), and was recorded at 8.88 percent in the 1936 Census. Correspondingly, the proletariat shrunk from 71.68 percent in 1926 to 65.66 percent in 1936, but recovered completely by 1945, reaching 72.43 percent of the labour force, with the proletariat resuming its relative expansion from this point. In the later period of this last 30 years, unemployment has constituted a significant proportion of the labour force for a sustained period of time.

Directly including the unemployed in estimations of the proletariat could never be justified within a Marxist theoretical framework, because of the rather obvious point that the unemployed are not being exploited in the sense of producing exchange values for a non-producing employer, and are not directly involved in the appropriation of surplus-value. Having said this, though, it is clear that unemployment has a significant relationship to the proletariat, not as actual members of the class themselves, but having a corollary role. They are by definition a *potential* proletariat. They also function as a reserve army (see for example Marx, 1967, p. 632). Clearly, what we would expect is that the emergence of unemployment would at least partially offset the reduction in the relative size of the proletariat. Purely for the purposes of assessing the proletarianisation thesis, they have been aggregated below (data is for the full-time labour force only):

Table 1: Actual Number (rounded to thousands) in Each Class Location: Full-time Wage and Salary Earners and Proletariat, with and without the number Unemployed 1966 to 2001

	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991	1996	2001
Proletariat	852	841	918	929	864	758	781	818
Proletariat + U	861	857	944	989	927	883	918	958
WSE	871	959	1063	1089	1035	900	939	998
WSE + U	880	975	1090	1149	1098	1025	1076	1138
Unemployed	9	16	26	60	63	125	137	140

Table 2: Proletariat and Wage and Salary Earners as a Percentage of the Full-time Labour Force, with and without the Percentage Unemployed 1966 to 2001

	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991	1996	2001
Proletariat	83.1	75.1	72.2	69.7	64.5	57.7	56.3	55.7
Proletariat + U	84.0	76.6	74.2	74.2	69.1	67.2	66.1	65.2
WSE	84.9	85.7	83.6	81.8	77.2	68.4	67.6	67.9
WSE + U	85.8	87.1	85.6	86.3	81.9	77.9	77.4	77.5
Unemployed	0.9	1.5	2.1	4.5	4.7	9.5	9.8	9.5

Unemployment accounts for at least some of the relative decline in the proletariat as it is defined in this study, not including the categories of managers, supervisors and semi-autonomous employees. While the proletariat declined overall in relative terms by over twenty-seven percent over the last thirty-five years, from just over 83 percent in 1966 to 55.7 percent in 2001, the overall decline of the proletariat plus the unemployed was considerably slower, culminating in an overall decrease of under 19 percent, accounting for 31.6 percent of the decline in the proletariat.

When we consider the broader employment status category of wage and salary earners, a similar pattern is clear. Aggregated wage and salary earners are included in the above table, both with and without unemployment added. Wage and salary earners comprised 84.87 of the full-time labour force in 1966. For the first four Census years, this figure remains quite stable, at 86.27 percent by 1981. Significantly, this category only began to sustain a significant decrease in 1986, when it dropped to 81.89 percent, and dropped again by 1991, but in the subsequent ten year period from 1991 to 2001, the category remained at around 77 percent.

Importantly, while the proletariat as more narrowly defined has been decreasing, the category of wage and salary earners has been declining but at a slower rate, due to the ongoing increase of those fitting into the contradictory class locations.

The role of the contradictory class locations

As noted earlier, the category of wage and salary earners is broader than that of the category of proletariat, and this difference has accounted for 38 percent of the decline in the proletariat. The difference between the two

categories is made up of the contradictory class locations of managers, supervisors and semi-autonomous employees, as these were separated out of the wage and salary earner employment status category in the process of estimating the size of each of the class locations. Essentially, the increased relative size of these categories provides part of the explanation for the decline of the proletariat, which is important with respect to the overall conclusion of this paper that the process of proletarianisation has not simply reversed over the last 30 years. Quite apart from this objective, trends in the contradictory class locations prove illuminating in analysing the changing class structure as it reveals something about the underlying tendencies of capitalist production, and for this reason alone they would be worthy of examination.

Table 3: Long Term Trend in Classification of Managers, Supervisors and Semiautonomous Employees as a Percentage of the Labour Force

Census Year	Managers	Supervisors	Semi-autonomous Employees
1896	0.8	0.8	0.4
1906	1.5	0.0	0.5
1916	1.5	0.1	0.9
1926	1.5	0.6	0.3
1936	1.5	0.9	0.0
1945	3.4	3.7	0.6
1956	1.4	0.7	0.8
1961	0.4	0.1	0.9
1966	0.4	0.5	0.9
1971	6.0	2.8	1.8
1976	6.3	3.0	2.1
1981	7.0	2.9	2.1
1986	**7.2**	**3.2**	**2.3**
1991	**5.6**	**2.0**	**3.1**
1996	**6.3**	**1.6**	**3.5**
2001	**7.0**	**1.7**	**3.5**
Including Part-time Labour Force:			
1986	**6.3**	**2.8**	**2.1**
1991	**5.0**	**1.8**	**3.0**
1996	**5.3**	**1.4**	**3.1**
2001	**5.9**	**1.6**	**3.1**

The relative numbers employed in the contradictory class locations have clearly increased over the time period. This is particularly the case with the category of managers, and less so, semi-autonomous employees. It is important to note that all three of these categories became increasingly significant in the later stages of New Zealand's economic history, which makes sense as we expect them to be more characteristic of advanced capitalist societies. Managers, for example, were insignificant in number for much of the first half of the century, as we would expect, because of the smaller scale of enterprise. They were estimated at just under 1.5 percent for Census years 1916, 1926 and 1936, but in the last Census comprised 7 percent of the full-time labour force. Supervisors were estimated at under one percent for almost every Census year to 1966, and have only increased substantially in the last thirty years, and semi-autonomous employees followed a similar pattern. Crucially, the major change took place from 1966 to 1971, and can largely be attributed to the classification procedure. In 1968, the Department of Statistics introduced a new code for classifying occupations, the New Zealand Standard Classification of Occupations (NZSCO68). It has since been surpassed by three new versions, NZSCO90, NZSCO 95 and NZSCO 99, which were modeled on NZSCO68 and are comparable to it, because significant efforts were made to bridge the gap between the four versions. Previously, although a standard classification system was used, it was significantly different to the more recent versions, and while extreme care was taken to maintain comparability between the previous code and the new NZSCO68, the jump in numbers for all three of the CCL categories presented here is most likely largely attributable to the change in code, probably with respect to different use of language in describing occupations. Given the low numbers classified as managers, supervisors and semi-autonomous employees before NZSCO68, it seems most likely that the figures for contradictory class locations post 1968 are far more realistic than those before. In addition to the change in classification code, we can see that the estimations of supervisors, managers and semi-autonomous employees for the 1950s and 1960s are somewhat inconsistent with the earlier figures.

From 1896 to 1945, there seems to be an observable trend that each category is very gradually increasing in size, which is consistent with the expectation that they are more likely to be characteristic of the class structure present in advanced capitalist societies. From 1946 to 1966, the pattern is far less clear, with managers and supervisors dropping again, while semi-autonomous employees continued to remain stable, only fluctuating within their less than one percent of the labour force. The peak of managers and supervisors in 1945 to over three percent each could be explained by the effect of World War Two on the structure of the labour market, but it seems unlikely that figures for the 1950s and 1960s would drop quite as low as they did during this period, especially when they change so dramatically in 1971. It would seem more likely for at least the categories of managers and supervisors to continue to rise gradually up to the 1971 figure. For the census years 1961 and 1966 identical codes were used, but each position title was classified without the aid of detailed occupation descriptions, making the task difficult, although at least these two years are comparable. Classification of 1956 occupations was closely compared to the two later years in an attempt to maintain at least some consistency. The problem was limited to managers and supervisors: the category of semi-autonomous employees continued with the expected pattern of growth, more than doubling in size over the period, from 4,069 in 1945 to 9,577 in 1966. It seems most likely that despite the best efforts employed during the classification process to ensure consistency in classification of occupations, this discrepancy is attributable to the quite different codes for occupation classification, with the earlier version under-emphasizing the managerial and supervisory function of some positions.

Importantly, although historically high, in the most recent Census years, the categories of managers and supervisors do not appear to be "definitively" on the rise, with managers peaking at 7.24 percent in 1986 and in the last Census data available in 2001, equating to just over seven percent of the labour force. Supervisors follow a similar pattern, although the overall relative level of those employed as supervisors dropped to under two percent

from 1991 onwards, perhaps due at least partly to the rationalisation of the public sector. On the other hand, semi-autonomous employees appear to be slowly and steadily increasing over time.

The role of part-time work

The impact of these two different factors (unemployment, and the different category of proletariat versus wage and salary earners) is made even more clear if the data for the part-time labour force is included, as in the tables below, for Census years 1986, 1991, 1996 and 2001 (part-time data for previous Census years was unavailable).

Table 4: Actual Number (rounded to thousands) in Each Class Location: Wage and Salary Earners and Proletariat, with and without the number Unemployed 1966 to 2001*

	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991	1996	2001
Proletariat	852	841	918	929	*1,211*	*1,129*	*1,299*	*1,378*
Proletariat + U	861	857	944	989	*1,367*	*1,293*	*1,435*	*1,518*
WSE	871	959	1,063	1,089	*1,400*	*1,292*	*1,487*	*1,596*
WSE + U	880	975	1,090	1,149	*1,555*	*1,456*	*1,624*	*1,736*
Unemployed	911	16	26	60	*156*	*164*	*137*	*140*

*Numbers in italics include part-time labour force.

Table 5: Proletariat and Wage and Salary Earners as a Percentage of the Full-time Labour Force, with and without the Percentage Unemployed 1966 to 2001*

	1966	1971	1976	1981	1986	1991	1996	2001
Proletariat	83.1	75.1	72.2	69.7	*64.6*	*62.3*	*60.5*	*60.8*
Proletariat + U	84.0	76.6	74.2	74.2	*72.9*	*71.3*	*66.9*	*67.0*
WSE	84.9	85.7	83.6	81.8	*74.6*	*71.3*	*69.3*	*70.4*
WSE + U	85.8	87.1	85.6	86.3	*82.9*	*80.3*	*75.7*	*76.6*
Unemployed	0.9	1.5	2.1	4.5	*8.3*	*9.0*	*6.4*	*6.2*

*Numbers in italics include part-time labour force (and are calculated as a percentage of the total labour force).

It is important to consider data for the total labour force simply to get a more complete picture, but this has become even more crucial as the number employed part-time is on the increase. In terms of the class structure, it is particularly significant to note that part-time work is more proletarianised than full-time work. This is demonstrated in Table 6, as the relative size of the proletariat and wage and salary earner categories are somewhat higher than that of the full-time labour force on its own.[4]

Clearly, the lack of available data for the part-time labour force prior to 1986 prohibits a detailed overall analysis of the decline of the proletariat over the time frame. The important point to note from the above table is that the recent increase in those employed part-time and the higher level of proletarianisation that is characteristic of part-time work also play a part in offsetting some of the apparent decline in the proletariat, indicated in the overall figures for 1986 to 2001, providing a more complete picture.

What does this mean for class analysis?

Since World War Two, traditional class analysis has been subjected to a considerable amount of criticism and debate, and a variety of perspectives have emerged. A recurring theme manifest in many different forms is the idea that the term "class" has lost its relevance, although the basis of this assertion varies according to the theoretical approach adopted. It is possible to identify three broad categories of responses to the class question in the post-war era: those that declare the "end of class", those that emphasise a perceived changing composition of the class structure, usually with regard to the emergence of a "new middle class", and those that have emerged out of postmodernism, linked to identity politics and influenced by the observation of low levels of class consciousness.

The most simplistic version of the end of class thesis is the proposal that the economic context in which class is formed no longer represents capitalism – in fact, it has been transformed to something called "post-capitalism". The basis of this argument is that new conditions permeate the economic

[4] The figures with unemployment are relatively unchanged because in the Census data from 1991 onwards the number of part-time unemployed has been included in the figure for full-time unemployed.

order, deeming the application of capitalist class analysis irrelevant. An example of this can be found in Dahrendorf, who argues that industrialisation has changed capitalism so much that it no longer contains the basic seed of capitalist class relations (see for example Dahrendorf, 1959, pp 36-71).[5] This is rejected for obvious reasons: the fact remains that there is still a distinction between owners and non-owners of the means of production and labour power is still a commodity, which is clear in this empirical study when looking at the employment status categories adopted by Statistics New Zealand. Perhaps the most prolific recent example of this can be found in the work of Pakulski (see Pakulski & Waters , 1996 & Pakulski, 2005), arguing that the utility of the concept of class "...reached its peak in industrial society and has been declining while postindustrial and postmodern trends instensify" (Pakulski, 2005, p 154).

A related but slightly more sophisticated argument is that the advanced stages of capitalism do not reflect the traditional class divisions of earlier stages. Rather than simply asserting that capitalism and class no longer exist, its proponents attempt to argue that over time, some qualities of capitalism render Marxist (and other) class theories redundant. Some authors have suggested that capitalism is able to advance the basic living standards of the working class over time, both in terms of working conditions and wages (including a rejection of the immiseration thesis as real wages increase), and the fact that as technology progresses, more consumer goods have been made available to a wider group of people, due to capitalism's unprecedented productive capacity. This approach relies on an acceptance that the capitalist mode of production is sustainable over time. It gained some support during the period of the 1950s and 1960s because of the seemingly unchallenged capacity of capitalism to deliver positive outcomes in the form of profitability and stable growth. As this occurred, the redistribution of wealth in the growth of the welfare state

[5] According to Dahrendorf, Marx argued that the full separation of ownership and control would result in the increasing similarity of the role of managers and the working class, resulting finally with the establishment of a capitalist class as owners not controlling the process of production . Dahrendorf responds by pointing to the rise of public ownership and cooperative enterprise, arguing that the changing nature of industrial production means changing roles for workers, managers and capitalists, ultimately resulting in a transformation in the basic form of capitalism, which now represents industrial production rather than capitalism (which is simply a form of industrial production).

was considered possible and likely. In New Zealand (as in many other advanced capitalist economies), this has proved incorrect, as the post-1973 period has seen the onset of prolonged stagnation, combined with not only increasing income inequality over the last twenty or so years, but also the ongoing impoverishment of large sectors of New Zealand's population. This has been highlighted elsewhere in the literature (see for example, Hayes, 2002, Roper, 2005).

Another related argument which ultimately suggests that the concept of class is irrelevant in the post-war era is the perception that the working class has undergone the process known as embourgeoisement.[6] This is a rather complex argument but one of the key ideas is that the working class are becoming increasingly empowered in the labour process, with the emergence of occupations that reflect a greater degree of worker control as well as the improvement of working conditions to match or rival those of the so-called middle class, in other words, those employed in white-collar occupations. The idea has gained particular support during the post-war era because of the prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s, and the subsequent gains made by workers in the form of increasing real wages and the notion that the gains were being shared by all and passed down to the lower stratum. The emergence of those employed in "white-collar" occupations, often competing for promotion, eroded the image of the united working class found on the factory floor or in the mines, for example. It was also argued that occupational mobility was, while not perfectly fluid, at least more likely than it had been previously, or so it seemed (see Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1993). Importantly, the nature of class consciousness and struggle seemed to be also changing: rather than the traditional class ties of the working class united against the bosses, it was observed that people seemed to be shifting their attention away from the industrial front and defining their social identities in terms of status, reflected in consumption patterns rather than their location in the labour market or class structure (see for example, Packard, 1959). However, as Crompton points out: "classes may have changed, but they still count" (Crompton, 1998, p 226).

[6] At least in the British context, the key contributors to the embourgeoisement debate were David Lockwood and John Goldthorpe, completed by the work of Goldthrope, and colleagues on the 'Affluent Worker' project of 1969 (see Crompton & Scott, 2000, p 2). While the embourgeoisement thesis is less dominant than it was until the mid 1980s, it nonetheless remains a powerful idea.

The position taken in this paper is that class consciousness is irrelevant in identifying an individual's location in the class structure at a given point in time. That is, while class consciousness as it manifests in political action is important in determining the outcome of the class struggle, and has an overall broad historical impact on the dynamics of capitalism *at the concrete level,* there is no theoretical justification for arguing that a *class in itself* is defined by its collective consciousness or lack of it. Following from this, in estimating the class structure of New Zealand there has been no consideration afforded to individual self identification as such. Rather, class location is determined objectively with respect to the relations of production.

There is a clear lack of correlation between the objective class structure estimations and measures of class-consciousness, for example with respect to industrial action, as it has fluctuated considerably in New Zealand between 1896 and 2001. This reflects a weakness in the argument that class identity determines class membership. If that were so, we would have observed variances in the composition of the class structure that correlated with a changing level of observable class consciousness. Given the stability of the class structure composition over time, it seems far more reasonable to argue that if it is accepted that class exists, it is also clear that it has always existed as long as capitalist relations of production have existed in New Zealand. To argue that there has been a demise of class because in recent years industrial action has been low historically is to argue that class analysis was relevant at one time, but it is not now. The objective class structure data demonstrates that class has retained a basic composition that is consistent with the classical Marxist interpretation of capitalist class structure for the entire period covered by this study (from 1896 to 2001).

More directly relevant to the empirical evidence presented in this paper is that the emergence of white-collar occupations has had a "clouding" effect on class analysis, because it has provided a distraction from the essential core of the class struggle, for both academics trying to come to terms with definitions of "class", and those who are directly engaged in the struggle as workers and bosses. It involves an exploration of largely superficial qualities of white-collar occupations, which is highly misleading (see Edwards, 2000). It is argued that qualitatively, the "better" working conditions, the tendency to be employed on a more permanent basis giving more job security, the

opportunities for movement up the hierarchy, the higher skill levels required and proximity to management, mean that white-collar workers constitute a class in themselves. The framework adopted in this study flatly rejects this approach on the grounds that there is no clear distinction in production relations between the majority of white-collar workers and blue-collar workers. Many white-collar occupations are highly routinised and workers exert very little control over the labour process, as with blue-collar occupations, and as such have been classified accordingly.

The exception to this, of course, exists when there is a contradiction between the initial class location and the real functions of a particular occupation in relation to the traditional capital-labour divide, as in the case of Erik Olin Wright's contradictory class locations. As we have seen, rather than the emergence of a middle class that is located between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, there has been a clear increase in those employed in supervisory and managerial occupations, and an increase in autonomy for a minority of those employed in selected professional occupations. This should not be over-emphasised, however, considering that the categories of managers, supervisors and semiautonomous employees are relatively small, ranging from 1.57 percent to 5.94 percent of the total class structure in 2001. This in essence reflects the expected outcome that as capital centralises and concentrates, and the size of the productive entity (firm) increases, the creation of more supervisory and managerial positions is inevitable in order to coordinate larger scale production. The emergence of professionals with a degree of autonomy is the result of the advancement of technology typical of the capitalist mode of production.

The point of this is clear: that for all of the period, the working class has constituted a majority of the labour force, in all years over 56 percent of the working population. This quite clearly refutes the notion that the middle class has expanded in size so much that the working class has become insignificant, or even fundamentally undermined. It also provides a strong basis for rejecting the theory that capitalism has changed qualitatively over time, rendering the classical Marxist class theory "out of date". While some would argue that the class structure is increasingly fragmented and less coherent, as occupations in the advanced capitalist societies become

increasingly differentiated, this is rejected on the basis that they still share basic common elements when it comes to determining their place in class relations.

Conclusions

The results presented here have overwhelmingly supported the ongoing utility of the Marxist framework. This is evident when looking at the composition of the class structure for any one Census year. The working class comprise the majority of the labour force, whereas the bourgeoisie continues to be a minority. In other words, over fifty percent of the working population, but most often more, are subjected to the socioeconomic compulsion to sell their capacity to work on the labour market in any given year. The petit-bourgeoisie exist on the periphery in small numbers, and the contradictorary class locations are small but significant groups. This is quite different to most other estimations of New Zealand's class composition, which place the working class at (often considerably) less than fifty percent. In later years the class structure retains its basic form, demonstrating the continued relevance of the Marxist framework. If it is agreed that Marxist class analysis was useful in its estimations 100 years ago, it is clear that not much has changed. In other words, class continues to be relevant, and the Marxist framework continues to provide explanatory power that other theoretical perspectives cannot.

The figures presented in this paper have implications for classical Marxist class analysis of this period and subsequent years. Most notably, these results go a long way towards refuting the argument that there has been a fundamental change in the basic relations of production that have characterised civil society in New Zealand since the introduction of the capitalist mode of production. Despite the systematic increase in productive output since 1945, and the other strong macroeconomic indicators that lend voice to the argument that capitalism is sustainable in the long run, there has been no alteration made to the basic class structure present in New Zealand. We have witnessed the continued expression of tendencies that were in operation before the impact of the post-war long boom. The "end of class" thesis that was prominent during this period and has continued to be supported since the long boom, is essentially refuted within

the framework adopted by this study. Class interests are still polarised along the same lines of capital and labour, as suggested in the above empirical data. This in itself is a significant result.

Additionally, a long-run series of class structure data has proved useful in identifying long-term trends in the class structure that can then be used to indicate the overall success or failure of the theoretical framework. In this case, the data demonstrates that for almost all of the period, the proletarianisation thesis was proved correct. The proletariat continued to grow in relative size over most of the twentieth century. Although in the last thirty years this process appears to have reversed, on taking a slightly broader perspective of what it means to be part of the proletariat, it is clear that historically this trend reversal can be explained in terms of the theory, and the irrelevance of proletarianisation refuted. Other factors, including the emergence of historically high unemployment levels and the increasing (but not to be over-emphasised) significance of the contradictorary class locations, and the increase in those employed part-time do account for a considerable component of the decline in the percent classified as proletariat. Additionally, over the last three Census years covered in the study, there has been little movement in the size of the proletariat, and it is not at all clear that the decline will continue. For this reason, it is clear that as future Census results become available, the project needs to be extended to clarify exactly what is happening, in particular with respect to the proletariat. In addition, there is a distinct gap in the literature dealing with the relationship between class structure and class consciousness, which urgently needs to be addressed.

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APPENDIX: Reclassification Criteria for Employment Status Categories and NZSCO Categories into Marxian / Wright Contradictorary Class Locations:

Marxian Class Locations	*Wright's Contradictorary Class Locations*
Within the employment status of Self Employed with employees **Bourgeoisie**	**Bourgeoisie** - ownership and control of the physical means of production - control over investment and accumulation decisions (what to produce, how) - ownership and control of labour power **Small Employer:** - problematic to classify, so included in bourgeoisie
Within the employment status of Self Employed with no employees **Petit bourgeoisie**	**Petit bourgeoisie** Employment Status = Self employed with no employees
Within the employment status of Wage and Salary Earners **Proletariat**	**Semi-autonomous employees** - sellers of labour power (no retained possession) - some qualitative control over what is produced (design, etc.), method. - little or no control over means of production - no control over investment or accumulation decisions (what and how much to produce) - no control over labour power of other employees **Proletariat** - sellers of labour power (no retained possession) - no ownership / control of means of production - no control over investment or accumulation decisions (what and how much to produce) - no control over labour power of other employees **Supervisors** - sellers of labour power (no retained possession) - no ownership / control of means of production - no control over investment or accumulation decisions (what and how much to produce) - no control over labour employed (quantity), but some control over the activities of other workers, to achieve a narrowly defined outcome. **Managers** - sellers of labour power (no retained possession) - no ownership, but some control over the means of production - no control over investment or accumulation decisions (what and how much to produce) - some control over labour employed (quantity), hiring / firing, conditions of employment.

New Zealand Muslims: The Perimeters of Multiculturalism and its Legal Instruments

Erich Kolig

Abstract

This paper considers the conditions of multiculturalism allowing Muslims living as minorities in Western society and its liberal democracies to assert their religious identity. The New Zealand situation is discussed in a brief comparative perspective with the relevant conditions in Western Europe and the USA. Beyond laissez-faire tolerance, specific legal instruments, which underpin this nation's multicultural stance, are available to New Zealand Muslims. The paper analyses to what extent Muslims have made use of them at the present point in time and how effective they are in safeguarding the religious needs of Muslims. These legal instruments also form a test ground of the strength of multicultural freedoms insofar as they can be used to explore, and perhaps extend, the limits of legally grounded multiculturalism. The dialogical conditions lend themselves to considerable future dynamics, which may affect Western Islam as much as the host society.

Introduction

This paper endeavours to explore the conditions of multiculturalism in New Zealand with regard to the presence of a Muslim community. In order to gain a better understanding of the relationship and interface Muslims develop with the host society and state, and vice versa, the host society develops with the Muslim minority, a brief comparison will be made with similar minority Muslim communities in other parts of the Western world. An important factor in multiculturalism is what kind of legal and political instruments are being developed and brought to bear to accommodate a culturally and religiously significantly different minority within the dominant cultural and political system. As Muslims negotiate their place and assert the right to their identity within the host society, Western liberal

democracies react in a more or less accommodating manner. The legal and political instruments developed to define the minority's religio-cultural space are formed and negotiated to some extent in a dialogical manner as befits liberal democracies, but to some extent are superimposed circumscribing expressions of religious freedom.

While these ideas are explored here only in a preliminary manner, they do suggest the complex interplay of three significant ideological poles which shape the development of Muslim minority communities and their engagement in Western countries in general: the host countries' cultural systems, including political and legal systems, and the way these attempt to relate to minorities under the more or less well defined policies of multiculturalism; the cultural particularities of various Muslim minority communities and groups, and their response to being immersed in a host society; and the force of globalised Human Rights ideologies dealing with Islamic universalisms (Lubeck, 2002, pp. 70,77), which also engages in this relationship. These three factors shape highly complex discourses, which can only be described here rather cursorily and with a considerable loss of detail and subtle nuance.

Muslims in the West

In the literature there appears to be agreement that there is a significant difference between Muslim communities in the US and those in the European Union. In the US there is a clearer distinction between ethnicity and religion. There is little in the way of a cohesive Muslim community and a strong Islamic identity by which Muslim Americans are set apart from the mainstream. This to some extent is the result of the First Amendment which separates state and religion and prohibits any formal recognition or official approach to a particular religious community. Religious influences in matters of state and politics occur on an informal, non-articulated basis and if it does come to the fore and is openly expressed in the political discourse (during presidential elections, for instance) it has to be of a Christian, often fundamentalist, kind. Practically, there are relatively clearly defined ethnic communities, often geographically concentrated in particular cities or neighbourhoods. In this way the US Muslim community can be seen as a microcosm of the international Muslim community,

preserving the ethnic and national boundaries found within the Muslim world (Akbar, 1995, p. 166). Islam tends to be just another factor of wider systems of ethnic identification, and there seems to be little social or political action across ethnic boundaries based on common adherence to Islam (Muqtedar Khan, 2000, pp. 91-93). "Muslim" is not a primary social identity, merely an aspect of a collection of separate ethnic identities (Akbar, 1995, p. 175). The US government and mainstream US society in general seem to have very little interest in formalised policies on multiculturalism and instead deal with ethnic minorities (such as the indigenous people) on a fairly ad-hoc basis (Smith, 1999, pp. 55-60). It can be assumed that this informal approach is the result of a country formed from diverse immigrant groups, with an implicit policy of assimilation or at least an expectation of a laissez-faire and formally unguided process towards assimilation, relying on the strength and attractiveness of the dominant culture to drive this process.

By contrast, in Western Europe there is, generally, a far more formalised approach to multiculturalism and a more formalised relationship between Muslim communities (or their representatives) and the host state. There is generally a greater degree of recognition of the presence of a distinct Muslim community defined in religious terms rather than in various and diverse ethnic ones. Liberal ideologies of human rights and multiculturalism resist tendencies towards assimilation, creating new social and political action based around the mobilisation of cultural particularism and universalist ideologies (by both migrant and "indigenous" groups) in this changing environment (Sander & Larsson, 2002, pp. 93-94). Social change brought about by massive immigration is attempted to be managed by mainstream society in a formalised manner exemplified by the buzzwords of "diversity", "pluralism" and a "multi-cultural" vision of society (Alwall, 2002, p. 81).

This approach, by and large, values integration over assimilation. The interface between Islam and Muslims on the one side and the state and wider society on the other is more evident and channelled into formalised avenues, and is designed to strike a balance between reasonable and limited assimilation and adaptation and a useful and productive integration that makes allowance for cultural retention. The proportionality between expected assimilation and lose integration under conditions of cultural

retention though varies from country to country. France probably places the strongest emphasis among European Union countries on the primacy of a national cultural identity over ethnic and religious minority identities and thus is perhaps the most assimilationist country in Western Europe (Entzinger, 1994; Michalak & Saeed, 2002, pp. 155-6). As the so-called *affaire du foulard* shows quite clearly the requirements of maintaining a national French identity and culture may even lead to Human Rights infringements. The official reaction (banning the head scarf as well as other ostentatious religious expressions from the public education system so as to preserve its *"laicite"*) is certainly widely perceived as a restriction on religious freedom. (But paradoxically, also positive discrimination, for instance in Britain, to serve the idea of practical justice may be seen as a human rights violation (Modood, 2002, pp. 115-6).)

The European Union is composed of countries traditionally dominated by large mono-ethnic dominant cultures with few culturally distinct minority groups. These were traditionally for the most part disadvantaged (in terms of cultural recognition) or were even discriminated against (for the most part inofficially so, but at times backed by legislation; such minorities are the Roma and Jews, and "indigenous" minorities like the Saami, Basques, Celtic groups, etc.).[1]

The situation has changed dramatically over the last two or three decades as these societies have become more complex through sudden and massive immigration and the resultant cultural and religious diversification. An important factor is the political project of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (embodied in the Human Rights charter, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (see, for example, Poulter, 1998, pp. 68-91; Renteln, 2002, p. 198), the European Convention on Human Rights and related clauses in individual countries' constitutions which now, whether as a response to internal issues or following globalising legislative trends, form a wide legal framework guiding the political and ideological transformation and cultural diversification of these societies (Ferrari, 2002, pp. 7-8)).

[1] This is not to ignore the fact that even in traditionally migrant countries, such as the US or Australia, being less culturally monolithic from early on, there was discrimination towards some, mainly non-Western, minorities (indigenous people, Chinese, Afro-Americans, etc.).

Globalisation is driving immigration, bringing new flows of economic migrants and refugees, while liberal ideologies of human rights and the right to (multi-)cultural recognition resist tendencies towards abrupt or enforced assimilation and at the same time emphasise rights to enfranchisement and democratic participation. This interplay creates new social and political action based around the mobilisation of cultural particularism and universalist ideologies (by both migrant and "indigenous" groups). This changing environment has created a more formalised multiculturalism of a kind that has led various European states to blur the distinctions between ethnic and religious groups to a far greater extent than in the US; as well as leading them to deal with Islamic communities as a whole on a more formal level under the rubric of new-found official and more explicit policy forms of multiculturalism. While ethnic and cultural dominance of the host society is far from irrelevant, it is accompanied – in relation to the Muslim presence – by the perceived necessity to acknowledge the presence of a distinctly different, comparatively large, as well as increasingly vociferous, religious minority.

Muslim populations in European countries have developed under quite distinct historical processes, and are frequently dominated by Muslims from one particular ethnic background. Continued engagement with former imperial possessions has given Islam in Britain and France, for instance, a distinct South Asian and North African connection respectively (Kepel, 1997, p. 85; Lewis, 2002, p. 134). Large-scale Turkish immigration in Germany has led to a Turkish dominance in that country (Jonker, 2002, pp. 44-45), and in Spain "Muslim" has been described as virtually synonymous with Moroccan (Moreras, 2002, pp. 53-55). However, in all these countries there is also a degree of ethnic diversity in the composition of the respective Muslim communities, which however is largely ignored by a tendency in both government and mainstream society to deal with Muslims as if they were a coherent group. Instead of dealing with them as a conglomerate of component ethnic communities, au par with a variety of other (non-Muslim) ethnic minority groups, Muslims are acknowledged as a cohesive religious community with special needs, which are quite different from the needs of traditionally extant religious communities. This is seen to require appropriate "policies of recognition". Underlying this, there is of course a tension

between Muslim ethnic particularism and a common Muslim identity. Such inner tensions, however, are usually downplayed by Muslim leadership, as much as by the state in policy matters, for obvious reasons of convenience.

New Zealand Muslims

New Zealand appears to be closer to the European case than the US. There is a tendency to acknowledge the meaning of Muslims as a specific religious community rather than as a subsidiary identity among a diversity of ethnicities. The presence of Muslims is recognised by and dealt within a lose framework of practical multiculturalism aided by some legislation. There is a related tendency by society at large to look on Muslims as a distinct group in society with certain religious needs in which they differ noticeably from non-Muslims. (There is also of course vague popular awareness of ethnic differences in the way that some Muslims of certain ethnic origin are better adjusted and hence less conspicuous than others – for example, Balkanese versus Somalis. This is reinforced of course by physical habitus.) From an official point of view this recognition (of a practical kind and as yet not specifically enshrined in law) of Muslims as a "special-needs" religious group is perhaps somewhat surprising given that at least under the present government New Zealand is considered an emphatically secularised society and state which does not officially acknowledge any particular religion or recognise an obligation towards it.[2]

On another level, New Zealand's stated secularism makes it easier to approach the existence of Islam from an angle of a-priori tolerance (or better, indifference or benevolent neutrality). In the US, which has a strong Christian undercurrent, this does not seem to be the case. There, strong Christian commitment creates a social climate uncongenial to the existence, or overt appearance, of non-Christian minority religions, while on the other hand the First Amendment separates religion emphatically from state and politics/policies and guarantees religious freedom. This circumstance obviates the need for formalised policies towards the sizeable American Muslim minority (of about 15 million). Europe with a tradition in which

[2] The exception is Maori "spirituality", which as part of indigenous culture, is protected under the (current interpretation of the) terms of the Waitangi Treaty, and enjoys legislative and practical support and recognition. See Kolig (2004).

Christianity as "state-religions" exercised (until very recently) a privileged influence (often formalised by compacts putting in place an influential socio-political position of a particular church, be it Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, or Protestant), despite a more recent development towards emphatic secularisation, required more formalised approaches to allow it to acknowledge the presence of Muslims (numbering now between 25 and 30 million) and their religious needs.[3]

In New Zealand there is also the tension, found now within the awareness of the Muslim community, government and society at large, between a pan-Muslim identity and particular ethnic identities. While in the past there has been a dominant ethnic form of Muslim, creating a fairly homomorphic community of South Asian Muslims, including Fijian Indians, their relatively small number has meant that recent immigration of Muslims of other ethnic backgrounds has led to a significant diversification of the Muslim community (Shepard, 2002). Both new migrants and refugees, while small in number, have had a major demographic effect on the Muslim community in New Zealand. Especially, Somalis form a conspicuous and easily identifiable component of today's Muslim community. In some ways the resultant Muslim community now is somewhat similar to that of Sweden and Norway, with very diverse, ethnically fragmented Muslim minorities that contain large refugee components (Somali and Balkan Muslims in the Swedish case), rather than to other European Union countries with a single ethnic group dominating Muslim identity (Alwall, 2002, pp. 77-87).

Internally, recent immigration to New Zealand has brought about signs of a division between, on the one hand, South Asian and Fijian Indian Muslims, who had formed the core of the older, now more established Muslim population, and, on the other, recent immigrants (from the Middle East and Maghreb, Africa and the Balkans). (To some extent this division is underlined and even exacerbated by "sectarian" differences that divide Miladis from anti-Miladis, Sunni from Shi'i, Sufis from non-Sufis, etc.)

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[3] In Western Europe, historically, only Imperial Austria officially embraced Islam as a recognised "church" next to Catholicism (as state religion), Lutheran Protestantism and Judaism. This seems to go back to a pact with the Ottoman Empire that adjoined Austria and that at one point ceded Muslim-Christian mixed provinces of Bosnia-Herzogowina and Montenegro to it.

While we may see in New Zealand some parallels with Western European countries, we should also be aware that Islam in New Zealand is in a very different position vis-à-vis Europe. Historically one could argue that for centuries Islam has fulfilled the role of the definitive "other" for Europeans (in a very strong Saidian-Orientalist sense), which has influenced the historical development of modern attitudes towards Islam in Europe to a far greater extent than in New Zealand (Kumar, 2002, p. 55; Moreras, 2002, pp. 53, 61-62). Some go as far to suggest that even now, Islam serves as the "anti-Europe" (Zemni & Parker, 2002, p. 233).[4]

In terms of numbers and political impact, Muslims in Europe are the immediate and radical focus for the debate over multiculturalism (for example, in Italy see Schmidt di Frieberg, 2002, pp. 88-89), while this is not the case in New Zealand where the proposition of multiculturalism is not only ranged against the Maori-driven concept of biculturalism, but centres more around the presence of Pacific islanders than other ethnic minority groups. Islam is the second largest religion in the EU and the second or third largest religion in most component countries. And Muslims are the most visible (this goes even for Balkan Muslims) cultural minority in most of these countries (Hunter and Serfaty, 2002, p. xiii). The role of Muslims in society and issues relating to Islam and its adaptability to the circumstances of a modern liberal democracy are among the most contentious issues relating to multiculturalism (Zemni, 2002, p. 158).

In New Zealand, both in terms of visibility and the ability to focus the multiculturalism debate, the Muslim minority is not as significant. The issue of multiculturalism is far more dominated by indigenous/Maori issues and to a lesser extent those pertaining to the presence of Pacific islander communities. (Even though Maori reject multiculturalism as a distraction from their bicultural claims, the expression of their cultural concerns has the side effect of focusing on, and adding to, the multiculturalism debate.) The Muslim community is numerically small (some 40 000 persons), and the debate over multiculturalism not surprisingly – and underlining New Zealand's Pacific focus – is centred on the numerically much more prominent "Polynesian" presence (Maori and Pacific islanders). The far less visible

[4] This image seems to be responsible for the considerable popular unease now about admitting Turkey to the European Union.

Muslim community, relatively recently only grown to a size where it enters public awareness (no doubt, also September 11 helped to bring the presence of Muslims in New Zealand to public notice), is forced to adapt to the framework these central Polynesian-dominated, "multi-cultural" relationships generate. The debate over *taonga* in schools overshadows the *hijab*, one might say.

The issues raised by Maori and Pacific minorities in their relationship with the state create a framework of legislation, practices etc. which Muslims can take advantage of in their relationship with institutions in New Zealand, which they themselves are probably too small a pressure group to achieve by themselves. Interestingly, probably by recognising the fact of their relative impotency, Muslims seek to enlist, and form alliances (of convenience, one presumes), not with Maori or Pacific islanders, but with Christian – and sometimes even Jewish – interest and lobby groups and inter-faith dialogue organisations to achieve certain socio-political purposes. Thus, more indirectly, it could be argued that Muslims manage sometimes to enable themselves multiculturally as a byproduct of the provision of the ideological framework of multiculturalism developed as part of assertions of indigenous cultural rights by Maori and sometimes through the influence, however limited, larger or more experienced religious minorities can exert.[5]

Although multiculturalism is differently focused in New Zealand, Muslims can make use of it, in order to secure some rights and privileges. This is something of a double-edged sword, however, as it leaves them vulnerable to the vicissitudes in the relationship between Maori and non-Maori, and they may suffer as a result of conflict in this relationship. Trevor Mallard's attack on the Muslim prayer room at Hagley high school in Christchurch, for instance, can be seen as a response to the political traction gained by the National Party, following Don Brash's Orewa speech attacking Maori privilege.[6]

Muslims are not the most significant religious minority group in New Zealand. According to recent census data Islam is not the second or third largest religion, but the fourth, after Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism

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[5] Other rather unlikely contenders for alliances, though temporarily only, are figures expounding secularist (i.e., Labour) ideology.

[6] See for instance TV One News 4/3/2004 for details of Mallard's criticism: http://onenews.nzoom.com/onenews_detail/0,1227,259436-1-8,00.html.

(Table 22 Religious Affiliation, of *Census usually resident population count 2001* Statistics New Zealand). It is also interesting to note that despite this, Islam seems to be more in the news than either Hinduism and Buddhism, possibly due to the more flexible and adaptable nature of these religions. Partly this may be due to the post-September 11 focus falling on Muslims world-wide. (Partially at least, this is the outcome of a campaign to demonise Islam, now occasionally perpetrated by the New Zealand media and a few politicians.)

Religious authority and representation

There are interesting parallels, as well as significant differences between the legal situation concerning religion, religious organisations, and the state between New Zealand and various European Union countries. Historically there is a wide range of different relationships between religion (both in general and particular religious organisations) and the state in various European countries. In recent years human rights legislation at both the national and European Union level has set out a common framework for the status of religion and rights of belief and worship (a framework which is similar to that in New Zealand) leading to a degree of convergence between these countries, but raising a host of particular issues depending on the historical situation in each nation. Islam presents European countries with a religion which obliges its followers to undertake significant differences in patterns of life than the non-Muslim mainstream, follows organisational principles quite different from the Christian churches European nations are used to dealing with, and presents an internally complex community divided along social, ethnic and political lines. As such it is playing a major role in pushing the envelope of this new, rather vague, legal framework which Western European societies are using to create a new order of relations between religion and the state; a role it will probably play to some extent in New Zealand as the Muslim community continues to grow.

New migrants and their descendents are seen as forming ethnic or religious communities which are expected (indeed encouraged) to generate organisations which represent the interests of these communities, and with which government and mainstream society should engage (Kepel, 1997, pp. 97-98). This formalised multiculturalism has led various European states

to blur the distinctions between ethnic and religious groups to a far greater extent than in the US, and to deal with Islamic communities as a whole on a more formal level under the rubric of multiculturalism (Alwall, 2002, p. 87).

The formal interfacing between Muslims as a religious community and the host state poses certain problems as Europe experiences. One of these is the issue of formal religious authorities in Islamic communities in the European Union. Islam has not generated the same organisational structures and relatively firm hierarchies of authority and clearly delineated groups of believers as traditional Christian churches, and is unlikely to do so in New Zealand.

The diverse Muslim population of New Zealand, consisting of at least 35 different ethnic origins according to Shepard (2002, p. 241), is represented at the national level by the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ). Its objectives are to establish and maintain the highest standard of Islamic practice; to undertake *da'wah* (spreading of Islam), education, welfare and other Islamic activities; to strengthen Islamic unity and assist Islamic community development; and to establish and foster good relationships with Muslim countries, organisations and institutions (Shepard, 2002, p. 241). Given FIANZ's asserted position to speak and act on behalf of all New Zealand's Muslims, there is a conspicuous absence among these objectives of any intention to define, foster and negotiate relationships with state and wider host society – unless by some stretch of the imagination this was intended to be subsumed under education and *da'wah*.

FIANZ 's *shura* council and its *uluma* board seems to have obtained some official recognition as the legitimate authority on Islamic issues in New Zealand, but may not retain this position as the community grows and becomes more diversified and more grounded in New Zealand. Dr Ashraf Choudhary (a list Labour member of parliament who was widely considered to represent Muslim interests), in defending his vote on the prostitution law reform and civil union bill, has disputed FIANZ's role as mouthpiece for the entire Muslim community ("Muslim MP explains his no-vote to community", *New Zealand Herald* 09/07/04). A very recent dispute between MAC (Muslim Association of Canterbury) and FIANZ (about the

correctness of *halal* slaughter procedures)[7] is also indicative of the fact of rival organisations emerging and claiming to represent Muslim interests and speaking on behalf of Islam. These two examples show fairly clearly that the ideological and spiritual leadership FIANZ seeks to exercise is under attack, at times, from both a very liberalised Muslim position and a conservative one.

We see many examples of the diffuse, contested nature of Islamic religious authority in Europe. In Sweden Muslim representative organisations are divided (fairly amicably it would appear) along very diverse ethnic lines (Alwall, 2002). In France and Germany there appears to exist a deep split between an adaptation-friendly leadership and a more Islamist opposition that refuses to make concessions to the host society. In Spain two different organisations have vied for the role as official representatives of the Muslim community to the Spanish government. (After a government mandated merger the dispute appears to be continuing as different factions of the new organisation, and both organisations' links to the majority of Muslims in Spain seem somewhat tenuous (Moreras, 2002, pp. 56, 60-61).) In both Germany and Belgium Islam's inability to form clearly delineated hierarchical religious communities along the lines of historically dominant church organisations (the Lutheran Church and the Roman Catholic Church) (Foblets, 2002, pp. 114-115; Jonker, 2002, pp. 40-46;) becomes obvious. This has been a major barrier to formalise more precisely relationships between the Islamic community and the state. In an attempt to overcome this the Belgium government has gone as far as organising and funding national elections for an Islamic council to formally represent Muslims in Belgium (Foblets, 2002, pp. 119-121). In Germany there seems to be a desire by elements within mainstream politics to use this organisational difference to exclude Muslim organisations from the benefits the formal recognition as a religious community would bring (Jonker, 2002, pp. 45, 49-50). In New Zealand the stakes seem considerably lower given the relative lack of state support for religions in general, but potential for conflict exists. Indeed as the Muslim community grows, it seems almost inevitable (for instance, as a result of the ongoing *halal* dispute and the

[7] See *The Press*, 15/9/04, p. A15 "Mosque and meat divided Muslims".

ejection of the head of MAC from the FIANZ *shura* council), that some sections are attempting to organise their own autonomous organisation in competition with the national umbrella organisation.

Thus differing ethnically based approaches to Islam threaten to become the basis for political conflict and the contestation of control of Islamic institutions and of Islam itself, and to influence the interface with the host society's political mechanisms. But there is also of course the possibility of some form of revised New Zealand Islam arising from the engagement of different ethnically based forms of the religion within the framework of New Zealand society. In Europe a vigorous debate has arisen over the nature of Islam and what it means to be Muslim in the cultural context of Western Europe (Ramadan, 1999; Sander & Larsson, 2002, p. 95). Similarly it has been noted that Islam in France is in the process of transformation from an implicit feature of various ethnic identities associated with migrant communities towards a politically charged voluntary identity embedded within modern French society (Leveau & Hunter, 2002). Islam has become a political force transcending different ethnic groups, which is mobilised to engage with mainstream French society (Leveau & Hunter, 2002, p.20). This new form of Islam is seen as a synthesis between Islam and French values, a local variant of an emergent pan-European Islam (Leveau & Hunter, 2002, pp. 24-26).

Multiculturalism from an Islamic point of view

In Europe the acceptance of non-Muslim rule seems to be an issue for some sections of the Muslim community. Historically seen, it is not an entirely new phenomenon that Muslims reside as a minority in a non-Muslim majority country. While some Islamic jurists have claimed that "a just infidel is preferable to an unjust Muslim ruler" others assert that "even the worst Muslim is preferable to the best of infidels" (Lewis, 1994, p. 4). This points to the highly contested nature of the legal, moral and philosophical nature of Muslims forming minority enclaves. A related precedence is the *dhimma*-system by which tolerated minorities of monotheists (*dhimmi*) were embedded in a majority-Muslim context under guarantees of religious freedom. However, they were not granted equal rights with Muslims and had to accept certain restrictions and disadvantages. It is doubtful that

Muslims living now in the West would be satisfied with a reversed *dhimmi* status, nor is it conceivable that modern democracies would want to foist such a position on them, even if it were not in breach of Human Rights conventions.

The traditional Islamic world view divides the world into *Dar al Islam* and *Dar al Harb* (the realms of Islam and Strife). Theoretically and from a very conservative viewpoint, Muslims living in the West are residents in the House of Strife under "hostile" infidel domination. For French Muslim scholar-jurists this seems to have been enough of a serious issue to proclaim that France holds an intermediary position: it constitutes *Dar al Ahd* (the realm of Treaty, Pact) (Kepel, 1997, p. 151). Philosophical tendencies among Muslim thinkers developing a concept of Euro-Islam also seek to incorporate a concept of the legitimacy of non-Muslim authority over Muslims (for instance, Ramadan, 2004; Tibi, 2002;).

The related legal concepts of classical Islam *Dar al Sulh* (realm of Truce) and *Dar al Aman* (realm of Peace) also offer themselves to rationalise a peaceful and integrative role of Muslims in the West (Lewis, 1994, pp. 6-17); or *Dar al Amn* or *Dar al Dawa* (Ramadan, 2004, pp. 72-3). This however does not seem to pose a strong philosophical challenge for New Zealand Muslims, underlining a dominant sense of pragmatism in their self-awareness. If the need for self-definition and philosophical self-orientation is felt at all, it seems to be adequately covered by the trope of *darura* (necessity), which seems to extend to a condition of exile motivated by the desire to be free from persecution or for purposes of economic and educational improvement.

Legal instruments

No doubt as a consequence of a strong process of secularisation, New Zealand, especially under the present government, proclaims an avowed indifference towards religion in any form (see Ahdar, 2004; Ahdar and Stenhouse, 2000). State as well as society at large show a conspicuous disinterest in religious engagement thus promoting a laissez-faire sense of tolerance vis-à-vis all religious beliefs. This is aided by an official tendency to see religion as "culture" and thus a tendency to accede to religious freedom under an implicit heading of multiculturalism. However, P. Rishworth (2003,

pp. 280-1) sees the decline of the official position of religion (i.e., Christianity) in New Zealand as a (potential) source of conflict over religious freedom. The source as envisaged by him seems to be the increased assertiveness of minority religions and the legal instruments they have at their disposal (see also Rishworth, 1995b, p. 226.). In Europe Islam has become involved in legal debates over a number of areas of daily life where what are considered to be important Islamic practices conflict with the pre-existing social norms, primarily in such matters as the construction of mosques, holidays, dietary laws and dress codes (for example, Ferrari, 2002, pp. 12-16).

Looking at the legal framework in New Zealand supporting religious freedom and multiculturalism we find legislation based heavily on secular liberal universalist values of the kind which also inspires much of the legislation in the EU. It is primarily designed to protect the rights of all minorities from oppression by the dominant culture. Key pieces of the relevant legislation are the Human Rights Act (1993) and the Bill of Rights Act (1990).

The Human Rights Act essentially seeks to prevent unlawful discrimination (part II section 21) in areas such as employment, education, residence etc. against individuals, based on ethnicity, race, religion, nationality, gender etc.[8] Human Rights conventions and legislation are internationally probably the best instrument for Muslim minorities to assert religious freedom and recognition (Bielefeldt, 1995, p. 589). These conventions and relevant legislation have much traction in Western society, even though they are impinged upon nowadays by anti-terrorist legislation.[9]

Conversely, it can be seen as somewhat paradoxical when Human Rights are invoked by Muslims in view of the fact that in many majority-Muslim countries the *shari'a* and legal codes based on it have legal primacy over Human Rights in cases where there is a juridical conflict.

Potentially there could be issues over the pragmatic effects of religious practice: for example, refusal to employ a Muslim if they insisted on taking Friday midday off to attend *jumma* (Friday noon prayer), refusal to allow a

[8] See the Human Rights Commission website for a summary http://www.hrc.co.nz/index.php?p=308.

[9] In New Zealand the "security risk certificate" seems to allow human rights to be set aside. Earlier in 2004, the SIS Inspector General, Mr Laurie Grieg, in reviewing the Ahmed Zaoui case, claimed that he did not have to take Mr Zaoui's human rights into account.

Muslim employee to celebrate the *eids* (the two fundamental holidays of *eid-al-Adha* and *eid-al-Fitr*), or to undertake the *haj* (pilgrimage to Mecca) – all fundamentally required expressions of Islamic piety – or in case of state sponsored bias against Muslims in the education system (such as forbidding Islamic dress). However, few concerns have been raised in connection with Islam so far. Among the actual cases brought before the Human Rights Commission under the act, there seem to have been very few involving Islam.

An older examination (pre-dating the current Human Rights Act) of the legality of employing only Muslim slaughter men for *halal* killing chains, found the practice to be legal. (Compare that with a case in which a Christchurch service station tried to advertise for active Christian employees, citing the Muslim slaughter men as a precedent, but was rejected (Lineham, 2000, pp. 56-57).)

A dispute over school uniforms, initially involving a number of pupils, including girls who wished to wear the *hijab* (perhaps echoing the controversies in some EU countries and Turkey). For reasons not detailed, the complainants and the Human Rights Commission decided to pursue just one complaint as test case, involving a 13 year old boy who wanted to wear long trousers rather than shorts, and found in his favour (C149/94 Human Rights Commission 17 August 1994).

A landlord in dispute with Muslim tenants erected a sign advertising a (fictional) supplier of pork products, complete with a picture of a pig, in order to put pressure on the tenants. The commission found that this was a breach of the act and ordered the sign removed, though the tenants had already done this by that time. The landlord was a Croatian immigrant, and in his submission to the commission made reference to understanding the true nature of Muslims from experience in the Balkan conflicts (C232/92 Human Rights Commission 22 March 1993). The fact of conflicts on the other side of the world sparking test cases for New Zealand legislation may illustrate the influence of events far beyond New Zealand's control over the ongoing development of multiculturalism and testing its efficacy in this country. September 11 and the subsequent demonisation of Islam will presumably also have long-range effects on the development of multculturalism with regard to Islam claiming its recognised cultural space in New Zealand.

One interesting aspect of the Human Rights Act is that it allows for exemptions to the act for individuals and groups on religious grounds: for example, the Catholic Church in New Zealand cannot be prosecuted for gender discrimination – for instance, in its refusal to ordain women – as this is deemed to be an integral aspect of the religious creed. It will be interesting to see whether Islam will make similar claims with regard to gender-discriminatory issues.[10]

The Human Rights Commission decides on such exemptions in consultation with "the appropriate religious authorities", which for Islam at present appears to be FIANZ (more specifically, its *uluma* board) and its affiliated regional associations. (Somewhat incongruously, in the current debate over whether two Afghan women can appear fully veiled in court to give evidence, the judge seems to have formally sought the opinion of a professor of religious studies rather than Islamic authorities. Doing so seems to fly in the face of multilcultural recognition (see Kolig, 2005).)

It does not appear that other cases concerning Islam have come before the HRC, though some scenarios are certainly imaginable (for example, a Muslim employer insisting on all-male or all-female staff to prevent gender mixing, or insisting on appropriate clothing of female staff or an employer objecting to the Islamic veil of a female employee).

Related issues have been raised in the past by some fringe religious movements in New Zealand. A book-binder, described as "almost certainly a member of the exclusive brethren" had a complaint laid before the commission for refusing to accept work he regarded as blasphemous, a complaint that was upheld: his refusal to accept the work amounted to illegal discrimination rather than a legitimate exercise of his religious beliefs (Lineham, 2000, pp. 56-57; C230/94 Complaints Division 29 September 1994). Another exclusive brethren who bought a business which employed a married female employee eventually dismissed her as he did not believe it was right for married women to work. Taken to the employment court his religious values defence was rejected. Generally the Human Rights Commission and the courts have taken a dim view of employers/business owners who on religious grounds attempt to limit the freedom of staff or

[10] To my knowledge Muslims have not sought exemption from the Crimes Amendment Bill (1994) to perform female circumcision. See McDonald (2004).

customers (Rishworth, 1995b, p. 249). There are some exceptions: for instance, exclusive brethren employers have been able to gain exemptions from union access requirements under the employment act on religious grounds.

While employers have generally fared poorly, employees have had a more sympathetic hearing. The Human Rights Commission ruled in favour of two Seventh Day Adventists who were being forced to work the Sabbath, a Friday evening shift at a bakery (C206, 207/90 Human Rights Commission 13 December 1990). It also ruled in favour of a teacher who was denied unpaid leave to attend a Worldwide Church of God event (C193/93 Human Rights Commission 3 November 1993). A Seventh Day Adventist student who had to take part in a weekend fast as part of a polytechnic course, which she saw as violating the Sabbath, also obtained a judgment against the polytechnic (despite a very unclear opinion on the part of her religious authority whether this would actually violate the Sabbath (see C271/93 Complaints Division 12 August 1993)). In general both the Human Rights Commission and the courts seem to be quite aggressive in upholding the rights of individuals to manifest religious belief, while being generally unsympathetic to employers/businesses owners who make the same argument in their dealings with employees or the public.

It is worth noting that most of these cases involve fringe movements outside the mainstream of society that are unlikely to grow into large minorities strong enough to decisively influence legislation in the forseeable future. They appear to be precisely the groups that religious provisions in the Bill of Rights/Human Rights Act were designed to protect. While Islam is in the same position in New Zealand at the moment, it will not necessarily remain so. Indeed given European, US, and Australian examples, it is likely to grow into a far more significant community in the future. This raises the point that Islam may at some future time challenge the current legislative framework, raising issues beyond the scope of the context in which it was envisaged and quite possibly contrary to the purpose envisioned by the secular humanists who largely inspired and shaped this legislation. Thus the potential for conflict may arise between liberal secular values and a politically active Muslim minority using the multicultural framework established by these values to contest their universal validity. Perhaps a

hint of this was foreshadowed in the case of a Muslim preacher advocating the killing of homosexuals in a lecture on TV in September 2003. While the reaction was that he is entitled to hold his religious views, the TV station was found in breach of broadcasting standards (The New Zealand Herald website 8/3/04; The Broadcasting Standards Authority decision no. 2004-001 26/2/04). Thus freedom of religion may eventually be seen to have to be tempered more decisively with the right of the state to defend itself and to preserve the peace and the civil liberties of others (cf. Dickson, 1995, p 329).

The New Zealand Bill of Rights is a statement of high-sounding ideals written in brief, straightforward language. It seems largely modelled on the well-established Canadian Bill of Rights, since Canada has a similar (English derived) legal system and thus the body of legal debate surrounding the bill in Canada is generally applicable to New Zealand. A very important, indeed crucial, difference is section four of the New Zealand Bill, which in effect gives both pre-existing and new legislation passed by parliament precedence over the Bill of Rights. Bills of Rights are generally designed to provide a fundament of basic rights to protect individuals from persecution by the state, including the possibility of the "tyranny of the majority" by a democratically elected legislature. This is not the case with the New Zealand Bill of Rights, in which parliament reserves the right to pass legislation which violates the bill at will (Rishworth, 1995a, p. 22). State bureaucracy, the legal system etc. are bound to follow the bill only to the extent that specific legislation does not exist countermanding this.

The Bill contains two sections relating to religion. The relatively unproblematic Section 13 relates to *Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion* – which guarantees also the right to freedom of belief, including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without interference. (However, seeing a necessity to limit freedom of expression for "hate speech", as in the TV case above, may in future cause problems here.) And the more contentious section 15, refers to *Manifestation of religion and belief.* Every person has the right to manifest their religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either individually or in community with others, and either in public or in private. This clause has been used to try to claim the right not to work on religious holidays, the right to refuse

customers or dismiss employees and recently the right to give evidence in court while totally veiled (i.e., wearing the Islamic *burqa* (see Kolig, 2005)). There are also sections 19 (Freedom from discrimination, for instance, on the ground of religious belief) and section 20 (Rights of minorities who as communities shall not be deprived to profess and practise their religion) which with some redundancy underpin the above sections.

Virtually identical sections appear in the Canadian Bill of Rights, and indeed virtually identical positions on religion are found in a host of other documents such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the constitutional provisions of many EU member states. In this respect New Zealand is very much in line with other Western liberal democracies. There is an important difference with regard to the Canadian model and religion however. The Canadian courts have ruled that the religious provisions of their Bill of Rights amount to an implicit "anti-establishment" clause, prohibiting the state from establishing any official religion. This may be explicit, i.e., declaring a state religion, or implicit, by favouring any particular religion over another. The second case is far more contentious, and this opinion has been used to prohibit any form of religious education in schools, prevent state funding to religious schools (except a number of Catholic schools as part of a "historic tradition" rather than a precedent for any religion) and religious displays on state property (Rishworth, 1995b, pp. 237-243).

New Zealand courts have never been asked to rule on whether the New Zealand Bill of Rights similarly contains an implicit "anti-establishment" clause (Ahdar, 2000, pp. 73-75), largely because the legislative override enjoyed by the parliament has rendered many of these contentious issues moot. The education act specifically provides for limited religious education in state schools, and for the funding of the state curriculum component of religious schools (Lynch, 2000, pp. 98-99). This legislation would effectively prevent any objections to religious bias in state education based on the Bill of Rights (Rishworth, 1995b, p. 239). The Muslim community has been able to take advantage of these provisions, allowing for the establishment of at least one state funded Islamic school in Auckland, and the temporarily contentious Muslim prayer room at Hagley High school. We can then say that in New Zealand the Bill of Rights allows for more flexibility in the

relationship between the state and various religions including Islam, limiting the transfer of power from the legislature to the judiciary which has often been the effect of Bills of Rights in other countries. At the same time it fails to provide a floor of rights in the event of a mainstream backlash against multiculturalism, theoretically allowing for persecution of religious minorities by a "tyranny of the majority".

Both the New Zealand and Canadian Bill of Rights were written by highly secular liberal interests with the intention of protecting the rights of minorities with different values to mainstream society. This may be relatively unproblematic when such minorities form a very small part of the population, but when they become larger there is the possibility that they use this legislation to contest the cultural dominance as well as the secular liberal values of the host society (as has happened occasionally in the Netherlands or the UK for instance with regard to blasphemy laws, homosexuality, etc. (see, for instance, Jansen, 1994; King, 1995, p. 5)). It is to be expected that Islam will engage itself ever more vigorously in controversial moral issues (such as blasphemy, homosexuality, abortion, etc.).

Conclusion

It would appear that the two major pieces of legislation described above provide, at least for the time being, a framework which makes sufficient allowance for practical multiculturalism, or more properly described, religious pluralism, to unfold. Given the relatively small numbers of Muslims and the prevalent general desire among them to uphold Islamic doctrine without challenging the dominant system, for the moment a reasonable compromise between adaptation and religious freedom seems assured. If and when a more assertive form of Islam should emerge – which in the European experience seems to be linked with steeply rising numbers – the need for further negotiation of social space for the Islamic identity may become necessary.

As the Muslim community in New Zealand grows in numbers and influence, some issues are becoming of increasing interest: to analyse forms of reformulations of ideological systems associated with Muslim minorities in the West; the possible need of adaptation of Western legal systems to

Muslims demands (see for instance S. Poulter, 1995); the impetus towards formal or informal reinterpretations of Islam to achieve a better fit within a Western cultural context (for example, the creation of Euro-Islam as proposed by Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan) and to adapt to Western legal and political frameworks; or alternatively, the use of a secular liberal legal framework by Muslim minorities to promote ideological positions which conflict with these values (on homosexuality, capital punishment, blasphemy, apostasy, gender equality, the right to preach an aggressive form of *jihad*, etc.). Alternatively, all-too vociferous challenges to Western liberalism may lead to the reformulations of secular Human Rights based policies and, faced with the force of numerically strong and politically powerful internal minorities, or menacing groups, with distinctly different values, may lead to restrictive initiatives so as to contain this influence while at the same time struggling to remain faithful to the values of liberty (for example, in anti-terrorist legislation); the use of liberal legislation by members of Muslim communities to attack, and enforce changes in, Islamic doctrine (for example, by Muslim feminists against Islamic gender-discrimination and perceived misogyny, or by Muslim homosexuals against traditional attitudes to homosexuality). These social and ideological forces, which already make their presence felt in Western Europe will direct and shape the forms of multiculturalism in the medium term.

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National Identity and Immigration: Contemporary Discourses

Peter Skilling

Abstract

In an era where the practices of globalisation are raising questions regarding the relevance and status of national borders, immigration policy is one area where states seek to re-assert such borders. Control over immigration is a central component of state sovereignty; moreover, immigration policy is intimately connected to questions of national interests, values and identity. It is a site of contestation where a nation's interests (security and prosperity) and values (openness, tolerance and respect for international human rights laws) may come into conflict. In this process, questions may be raised as to how a nation's interests and values are formed and confirmed. This study takes the view that these elements derive from a more fundamental debate over the nation's identity. Thus it seeks to explore competing discourses of national identity that have emerged through contemporary debates over immigration policy.

Introduction

This article examines the various constructions of national identity that have generated - and been generated by - different approaches to immigration policy in New Zealand. It is argued that a changing global context demands that national identity and immigration controls be re-imagined and re-formulated. As such, this examination will be situated within current globalisation debates. Especially salient here are the following questions: Is globalisation undermining or enhancing the relevance and authority of nation-states? (Pratt, 2004; Shulman, 2000; Walby, 2003). Is it undermining or enhancing the political power of citizens? (Giddens, 1998; Lewandowski, 2003; Tully, 2001; True & Mintrom, 2001). And, most pertinently, is it undermining or enhancing the notion of national identity? (Goff, 2000). It is necessary, obviously, to qualify these questions by noting that

"globalisation" is not some cohesive entity, nor an external, impersonal force. To employ Justin Rosenberg's distinction, globalisation must be studied as *explanandum* and not just as some reified *explanans* (see Morton, 2004).

Still, globalisation has effects as well as causes. For the purposes of this article, globalisation is understood as a short-hand label for a conglomeration of factors. It covers more or less tangible things – the technologies, for instance, of transportation and technology that make international travel and trade possible, and phenomena such as pollution that pay no respect to national borders. But it also encompasses changes in consciousness – an understanding the entire planet as a "community of fate", or an awareness of the need to find solutions to supra-national issues at an appropriate level. The purpose here, however, is not to present a coherent theory of globalisation but to attend to one particular instance in which its effects are being felt. This attempt is in line with Larner and Walter's project of greater "superficiality" in the study of globalisation; an "empiricism of the surface" in Rose's phrase (Larner & Walters, 2004).

The debate surrounding the relationship between the nation-state, globalisation and sovereignty ranges between two poles. On the one hand, it has become a commonplace to say that the globalisations of communication, technology, trade, migration and culture have displaced sovereignty from the level of the nation-state. This argument rests on the definition of sovereignty as legitimate authority exercised over a *bounded and recognised territory*, and the view that globalisation's very nature is to call into question or ignore the boundaries between nation-states. On the other hand, others argue that nation-states are not the passive victims of globalisation but rather its primary architects, mediators and regulators. On this view, globalisation is not a threat to states' sovereignty but a manifestation of it. A third view, argues that states remain influential actors, but that their ability to act autonomously has to be re-negotiated in the new context where corporations and civil society are increasingly global in reach.

The foundational text on globalisation is taken here to be Held et al. (1999). This work serves as a useful counterbalance to the more extreme claims made for and against globalisation. It presents globalisation neither as an historically unprecedented, omnipotent force destined to obliterate

existing institutions (the *hyperglobaliser* position), nor as a meaningless buzzword referring to nothing particularly new or important (the *sceptical* thesis). It also suggests that nation-states cannot be understood simply as globalisation's passive victims, nor as its active architects. Other actors – primarily large corporations, financial interests and civil society – are involved, and there is huge variance among various nation-states' ability to construct and resist the terms of globalisation.

Globalisation and immigration

This paper focuses on the impact of globalisation on immigration flows. In this area, technological advances combine with new patterns of global socio-economic inequality and international human rights norms to place considerable pressure on nation-states' traditionally accepted right to control immigration. This is occurring at the same time as developed nations face the issue of aging populations (MED, MSD, and DOL, 2003). As these states position themselves to compete in the global economy, competition for value-adding talent, or human capital, becomes fierce. Conversely, unskilled immigrants who may not integrate into the culture and society of the host country represent a potential burden in that environment. Thus, the global free-market can be characterised as a place where "goods, capital and ideas – *but only selected people* – move freely around the world" (Kelsey, 1999, p. 121, my emphasis; see also Sassen, 1996; 1998). Significant for this paper is the challenge that changing migration patterns and economic circumstances pose to traditional understandings of national identity. In a globalising world, it may no longer be tenable to consider national identity as marked by internal coherence and external differentiation.

Yet sovereignty's legitimacy is based on representing "a political community with some sense of shared national identity" (Doty, 1996, p. 122). Given that the transnational flows of globalisation tend to undermine the relevance of physical, territorial borders, we might expect governments to respond with an increased focus on the construction and perpetuation of *invisible, conceptual* borders that seek to define and promote a unified political community at the nation-state level (Goff, 2000, my emphasis). With Doty, this study contends that the "inside/outside boundary" of the state – the articulation of who belongs and who does not – is not natural

and pre-given but actively constructed. It is the site of contestation, a "function of the state's discursive authority, ... its ability, in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty, to impose fixed and stable meanings about who belongs and who does not belong to the nation" (Doty, 1996, p. 122). Although this view emphasises its contingent nature, national identity is yet of central importance to a society. As the question "who am I?" is a crucial one for the individual, the collective form, "who are we?" is similarly central for a society. Its resolution has serious implications for that society's values, actions and dealings with others.

Globalisation, then, accords an increasing salience to states' capacity to define an "inside" and an "outside" for the political community, an "us" and a "them", a "self" and an "other". Immigration control plays an obvious and important part in this process. It is one area where states are forced to be explicit about what qualities and characteristics of prospective citizens mark them for admission or rejection. The challenge for governments is to reconcile the economic necessity of attracting talent with a re-articulated – yet still convincing – rendering of national identity, as well as with considerations of ethics and human rights. Immigration policy, then, is about more than just numbers and bureaucratic mechanisms: equally important are its subjective, emotive aspects. Representations of immigration – and of immigrants – must resonate with popular categories of thought. This study seeks to identify and analyse the major discourses that have emerged through the debate over immigration policy in New Zealand. It is interested in identifying and evaluating the different ways in which political actors represent "New Zealand" and "New Zealandness". Its working assumption is that these different constructions imply different approaches to, and representations of, immigration. The notion of national identity as actively constructed implies serious questions: By whom is it constructed? for whom? in whose image?

Discourse and immigration

Norman Fairclough (2000, pp. 14, 21) describes a discourse as a particular representation of the political world. Other writers (notably Foucault) understand discourse as the production of knowledge on a subject, where knowledge is inextricably linked with power. The implication is that different

discourses of national identity and immigration are attempts to represent these fields in certain ways for certain purposes rather than objective renderings of the "facts". Discourses will compete to be accepted as plausible and compelling, and this competition both reflects and constitutes relations of power within a society. As Fairclough (2000, p. 13) notes, "[o]ne aspect of power is the capacity to impose and maintain a particular structuring of some domain". A political discourse posits divisions on the world: a particular discourse of immigration, for instance, can divide immigrants into "human capital" and "simple labour" (Sassen, 1996) and a certain discourse of the nation divides the world into people like us on the one hand, and threatening foreigners on the other.

Rather than focussing on the technical, economic and bureaucratic aspects of population policy, an examination of the discourses involved asks how the nation and immigration are represented. This is in line with Stephanie Taylor's understanding (1996, p. 44) of the terms "nation" and "national" as

> discursive constructions. [They] are ideological, because they are implicated with power; they are constitutive, they legitimate or exclude, they set up subject positions which place the individuals who occupy them in certain relationships to each other and to resources.

This paper is concerned to ask what qualities of prospective citizens are valued and privileged, which disdained and marginalised. This line of questioning lends this study a broader significance. In their construction of national identity, the various discourses construct a range of subject positions for existing as well as prospective citizens. If immigrants are valued for certain traits (their ability to conform to the dominant culture, or to contribute to economic growth, for instance), then so are existing citizens.

Identity and immigration in New Zealand

New Zealand had a profoundly ambivalent start in terms of forging an autonomous national identity. Wilmott (1989, p. 4) claims that for "a long time ... the dominant segments of Pakeha society in New Zealand considered themselves British and looked with disdain on anything 'New Zealand' as

inferior". In the absence of a compelling myth of independent origin, the fledgling colony was unsure where to look for pointers on the path to nationhood. The social elite, meanwhile, found in maintaining their "identity with English culture" a means by which to assert their status (Willmott, 1989, p. 5). The areas that might be expected to foster a sense of national independence and pride – economic interests, myths of origin, distinctive language, military history and sporting and cultural prowess, for example – served instead to strengthen New Zealand's ties to the motherland. It remained an outpost, a place imagined not on its own terms, but as a "Better Britain", to employ Belich's oft-used term. These matters are far from mere historical curiosities. They continue into the present, where it is argued that "the task of constructing a nation that could form the basis for a modern state has remained incomplete" (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p. x).

New Zealand's orientation towards Britain can be seen in histories of immigration policy. Although New Zealand never formally adopted an explicit "White New Zealand" policy, various exclusionary clauses and the use of ministerial discretion in application decisions combined with New Zealand's low targets (in absolute terms) amounted to much the same thing in practice (see, for example, O'Connor, 2001). At the very least, there was a narrow expectation of where immigrants would come from. Discussing post-war migration to New Zealand, Ongley and Pearson (1995, p. 773) note that "[a]s well as the exclusion of Asian immigrants, a strong preference was maintained for British migrants over continental Europeans and for Northern or Western Europeans over Southern Europeans". They state (1995, p. 774) that as late as the 1974 review, a preference for "traditional source countries" and the "potentially discriminatory ministerial discretion system" were reaffirmed. Pacific Islanders were a notable exception to the homogenous nature of immigration to New Zealand, although this was a simple expediency on the part of policymakers. Pacific Islanders filled a gap in the local labour force, and were unwanted again as soon as the gap closed. Migration flows, even at their highest levels, might well have been seen as culturally neutral, given the high proportion of those flows coming from "Home". National identity, from a British settler point of view, was unchanged – there was simply more of "us" out "here".

The seismic disruptions in New Zealand's economic policy during the mid-1980s had their counterpart in immigration policy. The 1986 Immigration Review marked a significant departure in policy, both in terms of what immigrants were valued for, and where they might be expected to come from. Immigration Minister Kerry Burke (1986, p. 9) stated in the review that "New Zealand is a country of immigration", and that this fact has "moulded our national characteristics as a Pacific country and given our community richness and cultural diversity". This is a fairly solid piece of historical revisionism, given that New Zealand's immigration policies had little to do historically with its geographical location in the Pacific, and even less to do with its physical proximity to Asia. Policy had, rather, steadfastly valued homogeneity over diversity. The experience of Pacific Island labour in the 1970s attested to the fact that New Zealand was not a "Pacific country" so much as a country able to use the resources of the Pacific. The liberalisation of immigration policy – notable in the Review and the Immigration Act of 1987 – at a time of high unemployment also marked a significant departure from earlier, labour market-focussed approaches.

The argument here is not that changes to immigration policy were motivated by a radically new understanding of national identity. To the contrary, as Augie Fleras and Paul Spoonley (1999) argue, they must be understood as a response to a set of issues – labour market shortages that could not be filled from traditional source countries and the need to engage with a broader range of trading partners, for example. Moreover, as Andrew Trlin (1997) notes, it was not until the early 1990s that immigration policy was seen primarily as a means to economic growth and prosperity. The 1987 reforms established the Occupation Priorities List (OPL) that kept immigration coupled with labour market needs. However, the 1986 report introduced a strikingly new language to immigration debates. It not only rejected national origin as a relevant factor, but went further and embraced immigration's ability "to enrich the multicultural social fabric of New Zealand society" (Burke, 1986). This construction, significantly, allows for the positioning of opponents of expansive immigration policies as xenophobic. Equally salient here is the Review's attempt to flatten out distinctions between immigrations. In declaring New Zealand a "country

of immigration", it allows for no difference between tangata whenua and the first settlers, or between these groups and more recent immigrations, including short-term and business immigration.

But if the changes were not necessarily motivated by a new understanding of national identity, they certainly facilitated and encouraged one. In earlier stages of its history, encouraging diversity within New Zealand society would have been understood and portrayed as diminishing and endangering, not enhancing national identity. The representation of immigration in the 1986 Review then, is not simply a refinement of policy; it is a change in how New Zealand national identity might be constructed. The liberalisation of policy was "*indicative of a new national identity*" (my emphasis) no longer predicated on the "cultural homogeneity" of society (Ongley & Pearson,1995, p. 788). National identity was now to be based on diversity, openness and tolerance. While immigration remained – in official documents at least – an instrument of labour market policy, the economic growth argument for liberalised immigration policies enjoyed increasing support and, by 1990, a bi-partisan political consensus had emerged on the economic benefits of increased immigration, particularly for highly skilled, entrepreneurial and wealthy migrants (Trlin, 1997).

The National Government from 1990 was "equally, if not more, persuaded than Labour by this argument" and unlike Labour, found no need to include any "multiculturalism rhetoric" in their support for more expansive policies (McMillan, 2001, pp. 163, 166). If, however, identity was no longer predicated on uniformity (Fleras & Spoonley, 1999) or "cultural homogeneity", what was it now based on? McMillan (2001, p. 177) concludes that the "economic rationalism of the National Government had led them to construe New Zealanders as without any genuine identity of their own, simply economic interests".

The immigration debate: A spectrum of sorts

There are obvious difficulties involved in constructing a coherent and compelling rendering of national identity and membership in a nation of immigrants. A sense of national unity might either be built on ethnic considerations – a construction which cannot accommodate the reality of a composite population – or on a civic nationalism of legal rights, protections

and duties – one that affords little basis for a subjective, emotive sense of loyalty and belonging. Political actors however, whether they be emphasising the rights of New Zealanders to determine who should be allowed to come to their country, or stressing shared values of openness and tolerance to immigrants, ignore such problems and proceed on the assumption that their audience shares their understanding of what it means to be a New Zealander. Although these discourses are rarely articulated explicitly, it is possible to identify three distinct discourses of immigration: an *organic community* discourse, which posits New Zealand as a unique and unified national society analogous to biological organism, a *civic rights* discourse, which replaces the emotive concept *nation* with that of a *state* based on citizenship rights and duties; and a mediating discourse, which seeks to reconcile and utilise the previous two. This is an obviously artificial taxonomy, but one that serves as a useful frame for contemporary political discourse in New Zealand.

The first category is justified on the grounds of its public prominence, through the vehicle of New Zealand First. The assertion of New Zealand's homogenous cultural identity is a necessary prerequisite for the marginalisation of prospective immigrants. The position is not, of course, restricted to New Zealand First; neither is New Zealand First's position the most extreme voice possible in this category. Foreigners, on New Zealand First's view, are more or less welcome, on the proviso that they be - or become - like "us". The difficulties of describing New Zealand, a postcolonial, multicultural country of four million, as a "community" are obvious enough (see Berlin 1997, p. 342), but the point of this discourse is to represent the nation as such. This discourse is not so concerned with defending the nation's invisible *borders* (Goff, 2000), as with strengthening its invisible *sinews* (The term is Andrew Sharp's). Despite difficulties with its underpinning logic, this discourse holds some emotive appeal and remains a potent one in New Zealand politics.

The second, *civic nationalism* discourse tends towards denying the relevance of nations and nationality. At its most extreme, this discourse would proclaim, or hope for, the death of the nation. It is informed by a neoliberal ideology focussed on individuals' aspirations and suspicious of group claims and group identity. The nation could only be justified – and

then only tenuously - if it served individual interests better than local, regional or global collectives. The extreme version of this discourse is not widely compelling in the New Zealand political landscape. I will argue, however, that the position of the National Party under the leadership of Don Brash represents a mild version of the "nation is dead" thesis. I am well aware that this is a controversial claim. The apogee of Brash's position – the famed Orewa speech of 2004 - was, after all, entitled "Nationhood". His argument in that speech was grounded in an appeal to "traditional kiwi values" and in the effort to preserve "very essence of what it means to be a New Zealander". His call for unity ("one people ... one country ... one sovereign nation") was based on "the essential notion of one rule for all" (Brash, 2004). Surely this cannot be seen as a call for an end to the nation.

Indeed, Brash's language – his embrace of "one nation" as well as his attacks on the "treaty grievance industry" draws heavily on the vocabulary of New Zealand First. I take it that this similarity illustrates the porosity of the boundaries between the first two discourses – which, according to my taxonomy are polar opposites – rather than rendering them invalid. While Brash clearly appeals to the concept of the nation, the argument here is that his vision of the nation bears no resemblance to Peters' notion of an organic community. Rather, the nation is understood simply as the arrangement that best allows individuals to pursue their ambitions. A sense of national identity – if it exists at all – is the *effect*, rather than the *cause*, of living together under a shared system of rights and duties (Hume, 1994, p. 82). In a television interview following this speech, Brash could offer no answer when asked what he thought it meant to be a New Zealander (see NZ Herald, 2004). His discomfort was understandable - to deny the relevance of the nation is politically risky. But one is left with the impression that Brash views the nation as something closer to a fictitious – if useful - construction than to an organic and inevitable necessity.

Taken to extremes – and neither Peters nor Brash are at these extremes - the first two discourses are mutually exclusive. The former insists on the primacy of national identity, while the latter downplays its relevance. It is possible, however, to articulate some of their elements together in a third discourse. In its project of articulation, this *mediating* discourse stresses what New Zealand shares: a history, a culture, a shared vision for the future, and

a need to engage with the global marketplace. The nation is imagined here as an economic entity, but also as a unified and unique society. Immigration is promoted as a vital way of building up the asset base of the New Zealand economy, but also as fostering cultural diversity and dynamism. In its rejection of an ethnic understanding of the nation as illogical and untenable, and its simultaneous recognition of the need for a pre-political source of national unity, this articulation represents itself as a happy compromise between the first two discourses. I will argue that Labour claims this status for its position. Any mediating discourse has considerable ideological work to do. Nations cannot be *both* of primary importance *and* meaningless. Citizens cannot be *both* patriotic national citizens *and* atomised human capital. Relations between citizens cannot be fundamentally based *both* on a sense of shared belonging and destiny *and* on stark individual economic interests. It is necessary to apply the critiques that may be levelled against the first two discourses to these compromises: are they, in any way, the worst of both worlds?

Again, the argument here is not that these three positions, or the positions of New Zealand First, National and Labour, represent three coherent and distinct propositions. Rather than focussing on the differences between them, it would have been possible to construct an argument asserting their similarities: all three, for example, adopt what Habermas (1992, p. 15) calls the "instrumental ethnocentrism of utilitarianism", which implies an "immigration policy allowing foreigners to enter a country only when it could be justifiably guaranteed that the existing balance of performances and claims, and thus the expectations of all, would not be disturbed by them". As such, they are all vulnerable to the argument developed by Joseph Carens (2001, p. 28) that this "good of the nation" assumption is incompatible with a fundamental belief that "all individuals [including prospective immigrants] are of equal moral worth".

The organic community discourse (The nation is vital)

New Zealand First contested the 2002 general election on the basis of three key policies, immortalised by Winston Peters' three-fingered salute. Peters saw these policies as united by the common theme of "our" rights as New Zealanders. New Zealanders, according to Peters, are a people distinguished

by shared values, goals and culture, who hold collective rights to determine the future shape of the community that they form. With regard to immigration - the issue that Peters presented as the centrepiece of New Zealand First's campaign - these rights must include the right to decide who else gets to join the club. Peters' key argument is that current immigrant flows are having adverse effects on New Zealand, both economically and socially. Immigrants are held to be putting pressure on our living standards, to be drawing on our welfare state entitlements without making any contribution, and to be demanding government assistance desperately needed by "genuine" New Zealanders. Immigration also provides a continuous supply of cheap labour, which acts as a disincentive to companies investing and up-skilling, as demanded by the knowledge economy.

Even more prominent in the language of New Zealand First is the detrimental effect of immigration on the fabric of New Zealand society. Immigration, Peters claims (2002a), goes to the "heart of who we are as New Zealanders". It changes the "New Zealand we value" (2002a), diminishes the "value of our birthright" (2002d), and turns our country into a place that we don't even recognise (Young, 2002). Implicit in all of these charges is an assumption that "we" all know and agree on the shape and character of "our" New Zealand. Fundamentally, Peters speaks to the fear of the loss of identity in an era marked by external globalisation and internal multiculturalism. He invokes (2002d) the "stark reality" that there are "only four million of us in a dangerous world of six billion". Immigration, from this perspective, willingly invites the threat in. During the election campaign, Peters promised that "above all, we'll put a wall around this country to ensure that we do not have a flood of immigrants competing with us with respect to social services, education and health" (TV One, 2002a). This conception of the outside world as threatening and dangerous is, as we shall see, fundamentally at odds with dominant constructions of the world as offering opportunities vital to New Zealand's development. As the only possible antidote against the inexorable slide towards "divided and mutually exclusive societies" within New Zealand valuing "loyalty to their own "community" above loyalty to their country", Peters demands that immigrants "become real New Zealanders" (2002c).

The question of at what point in the history of a nation of immigrants those immigrants become nationals who are able to assert their rights against new immigrants is never explicitly posed. Peters' conception of our cultural identity is vague to say the least. He seldom, if ever, addresses the question of the appropriate point at which to declare a certain group the definitive New Zealand people. His assertions as to the economic damage wreaked by immigration are often at odds with academic work, which asserts the generally salutary, if uneven, economic impacts of immigration. His arguments appeal to a higher court than statistics: the "common sense" and experiences of "ordinary New Zealanders". His warnings of the "Balkanisation" of New Zealand, meanwhile, conveniently overlook the role of inflammatory speeches of nationalist politicians in fomenting that tragedy. Peters' rhetoric stresses the rights of New Zealanders to determine the shape of their country. In applying this to immigration, he does not place this policy area in the wider context of the contemporary world, preferring instead to employ a traditional narrative of immigration that emphasises border control and individual decisions.

The civic nationalism discourse (The nation is dead)

If constructing the nation as an organic community is historically problematic and easily construed as the divisive "politics of the fringe", then the outright denial of the relevance of the nation is even more of a marginal position in New Zealand politics. The New Zealand Libertarianz Party, very much a minority concern, is almost alone in planning (2002) to run "a completely open immigration policy subject only to a requirment [sic] that immigrants waive any calm [sic] to on [sic] remaining elements of the welfare state". While the ACT Party, moderate and mainstream by comparison, asserts (2002a) that "individuals are the rightful owners of their own lives", this freedom does not extend to the right to freely immigrate to New Zealand. Rather, ACT advocates policies (2002b) that "promote the prosperity of New Zealanders at large, and attract New Zealanders to return home" holding that these will "best achieve a stable net migration inflow".

It has been a common complaint about the National Party in recent years that it has survived politically on high-profile speeches, and has not been much concerned with developing its policy platform. The most explicit

indication of its approach to immigration policy is contained in a discussion paper (National, 2004) which criticises existing policy settings for stating "a wide range of goals for our immigration programme". National proposes instead that "a more direct focus on economic benefit to New Zealand should be developed". Thus, in National's view, the "Skilled/Business" category should be lifted from 60% to "above 70%" of New Zealand's intake, with the "Family Sponsored" and "International/Humanitarian" categories reducing. This narrower focus seems to be a return to the sort of thinking outlined in a 1990 Business Roundtable paper on immigration (Kasper, 1990) which made no mention at all of national identity beyond the observation that immigration policy in New Zealand "has been highly selective and exclusivist and has ultimately contributed to an insular social atmosphere". It is worth noting Trlin's point (1997, p. 1) that the 1991 amendments needed to be re-worked in 1995 because "economic objectives could not be pursued indefinitely without due reference to the maintenance of social cohesion". National's approach to immigration, as articulated here, shows signs of pursuing a similar path to these policies of the early 1990s.

The nation is dead ... long live the nation!

It is clear that the current Labour government draws from both the organic community and the civic nationalist discourses. On the one hand, the government has adopted the "strengthening of national identity" as one of its key goals, and Helen Clark has recently taken to using the phrase "ordinary kiwis" with alarming regularity. On the other, it accepts the need, articulated in National's position on immigration, to develop a population and skill base capable of competing in a competitive global economy. While the strengthening of national identity has been a major priority for this government, its understanding of the content of this identity is difficult to pin down.

The challenge of the government's *mediating* discourse of immigration and national identity is to champion both the importance of the nation and the integration of the national into the global economy. In Labour's 2002 election campaign, the notion of New Zealanders "sharing a vision" was consistently stressed. This assertion of New Zealanders' shared purpose and direction invokes New Zealand First's belief in the unity of the New Zealand

people. But this unity is marked not by homogeneity, but by diversity: "Labour's vision for New Zealand is for a society that is outward looking, tolerant, accepting, interesting and dynamic" (Labour, 2002b). Further, the prominence of New Zealand as an autonomous actor diminishes in this account vis-à-vis Peters', as the constraints under which government policy is formulated and implemented are emphasised. Specifically, the demands of the global economy and of international human rights norms shape the field of possible policy options (see Sassen, 1998).

In parliament, Helen Clark portrays New Zealand as involved in a "race to the future", and as having to accept and adapt to the reality of globalisation. In her assertion (Hansard, 13/02/01) that "[l]ove it or loathe it, globalisation is here to stay", Clark echoes the sentiments of Tony Blair, who likewise advocates a policy of embracing its challenges and opportunities. These arguments ignore the possibility of seeing nation-states as the primary architects of globalisation, who would thus retain the capacity to alter its structures. The choice presented by Clark and Blair is not between accepting or rejecting globalisation's current form, but between succeeding or failing within its current framework. Alternative visions, such as that advanced in Parliament by Rod Donald, where globalisation in practice means a world of "corporate governance and alienation", and where "localisation, rather than globalisation" is the key to "truly sustainable development" (Hansard, 13/02/01) are barely acknowledged by Labour. Rather than seeking to alter the terms of the global economy, national identity is posited by Labour as a sort of panacea to the homogenising forces of globalisation. In both broadcasting and arts and culture policy, a strong sense of national identity is held to be of increased importance in a globalised world.

Labour's vision for New Zealand can be summarised as seeing "New Zealanders as innovators to the world, turning great ideas into great ventures". The ideas have always been there, Helen Clark asserts. In the competitive global environment, the current task is to "commercialise more of the output, and to modernise a production-based economy into the new economy" (Hansard, 13/02/01). The need is constantly invoked to "develop and promote a contemporary and future focussed Brand New Zealand, which projects New Zealand as a great place to invest in, live in, and visit"

(Office of the PM, 2002, p.48). Such explicit mention of New Zealand as a brand raises the question of whether "New Zealand" is understood here as a viable economic entity, as a marketing label for a collection of individual interests, or as a political placebo to obscure the loss of national sovereignty.

A report commissioned by the Government in 2001 recommended that government policy should "foster "free trade" in talent by becoming blind to national boundaries and redefining New Zealand as a *global community of talented people*" (LEK, 2001, p.26, my emphasis). The context for this proposition is partly to do with forging links with "talented" New Zealanders residing overseas, although the report is substantially about recruiting talent from overseas. Within this sort of discourse, citizens are represented as self-responsible, self-driven individuals, accepting personal responsibility and reaping the rewards according to the value they add. Although they are spoken of as working for the benefit of the nation, citizens are fundamentally interpellated as individuals, and specifically as innovative and entrepreneurial individuals. Those who are not successful are no longer "unfortunates" but "untalented individuals", with the implication that the blame lies entirely with them, and not with society and its structures. Human dignity and an individual's worth to their community are reduced on this view to their value-adding capacity. Under this conception, alternative visions of "the good life" become personal indulgences in a competitive world.

Yet, for all its focus on individual aspirations, this position remains distinct from the *nation is dead* thesis. National interests, characteristics, visions and dreams all feature prominently. Such language might construct the nation as an economic more than a political or cultural entity, but it remains an entity nonetheless. While government involvement in the global talent hunt is held to be necessary, a wider social change is also required. New Zealanders have to change their attitudes towards success, towards "tall poppies" and towards risk, and, crucially, New Zealand as a nation has to celebrate success and "choose to compete" (see Clark, 2005; LEK, 2001). To succeed in the "race to the future", a certain sort of nation is required. As Helen Clark put it in her 2005 "State of the Nation" address, "[t]he more skilled, the more innovative, the more enterprising, and the more market and brand focused we are, the more progress we will make towards that future" (Clark, 2005).

While in earlier stages of New Zealand history, qualitative distinctions between immigrants were contingent on cultural background, those distinctions are now also based on economic value-adding capacity. It is necessary to ask, then, how "talent" and "quality" are defined and measured. Although the LEK report accepts the definition of talented individuals as "meaningful contributors to the life of the nation" (p. 14) and acknowledges the importance of maintaining cultural institutions and a vibrant community (p. 3), talent is identified in practice by a narrower set of criteria: knowledge workers, highly skilled workers and degree qualified people (p. 14). This narrower understanding is also implied in the following: "some occupations have a greater prevalence of talented people contributing their ideas and innovation which leads to increased wealth. For example, knowledge workers ... generate substantial economic value" (p.3). Beyond this, it might also be asked what constitutes a "knowledge worker".

If this mediating discourse can be seen as a reconciliation of the two more extreme discourses of the nation, it also attempts to expand and defend the reconciliation, observed in the 1986 immigration review, of immigration's economic and social impacts. Against the view, even accepted in some government documents (MED et al., 2003, p. 7) that immigration carries economic benefits and socio-cultural costs, against Brash's argument that it is economically beneficial and socio-culturally irrelevant, and against Peters' contention that it is dangerous on both counts, Clark presents it as beneficial both economically and socially. Immigrants, with their attendant diversity of skills, backgrounds and perspectives are both human capital, who will "pay for our pensions" and "generate economic growth" (Clark, on TV One, 2002a) as required by Labour Party policy, also bring the "ethnic and cultural diversity [that] enriches New Zealand society" (Labour, 2002a). Obviously there are no mechanisms built into immigration procedures to maximise this cultural diversity. The existing points system is designed to ensure economic benefit, with a socio-cultural dividend seen as the inevitable by-product.

It is a rare Labour Party speech or policy document that focuses solely on immigration's economic benefits. New Zealand's national identity is held to be not just capable of adjusting to new immigrants, but fundamentally based on such adjustment through its history (see Clark, 2002). Labour

politicians commonly link New Zealand's national identity with the adjustments required by a history of immigration. Government ministers envisage New Zealand as a "land where diversity will be valued and reflected in our national identity" and warn against the direction "where some [read, Winston Peters] would still to drive us, [where] that very diversity is used to promote prejudice, fear and intolerance" (Liane Dalziel & Mark Burton in Hansard, 12/02/01 and 13/02/01). Simultaneously, insisting on the socio-cultural benefits of immigration differentiates Labour's position from National's. Presumably considerations of "ethnic and cultural diversity", and adherence to international humanitarian norms are the "wide range of goals for our immigration programme" criticised by National.

Under this third discourse, New Zealand is presented not only as an economy competing in a competitive world, but also as a unique, vibrant and confident nation aware of itself and its place in the world. The reconciling of economic and cultural objectives, seen in both cultural and immigration policy invites the question of whether the reconciliation is achieved in reality or merely rhetorically. A fundamental objective of the current consensus is the increasing of New Zealand's "global connectedness" (Burton in Hansard, 12/02/01). It is worth asking what implications this carries for the construction of national identity. If, as Hall (1992, p. 277) asserts, identity is "formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems that surround us" then the processes of globalisation might be expected to impact on New Zealand's national identity. If the nation is addressed in political discourse as a competitor in global markets, this has implications for national identity. Presenting the nation as a competitive unit may obscure the erosion of the relevance of national economies and the power of private interests and global capital. Further, this construction marginalises the possibility of international co-operation. "Choosing to compete" precludes the possibility of questioning or altering the rules of the game.

Conclusion: The state of the debate

My concern in this paper has not been to critique immigration policy settings but to examine the discourses of national identity that underpin policy options. This approach assumes that discursive constructions of immigrants

and immigration can be very influential over time if they succeed in dictating the terms in which policy debate is conducted. The discourses outlined above can be understood as different responses to questions raised in contemporary globalisation debates. The organic community discourse would argue that the hostile forces of globalisation are set against national sovereignty, the political power of citizens and a sense of national identity, but that these forces can and should be resisted, through policies that insist on the centrality of the nation in the lives of its citizens. Thus the organic community discourse would charge that existing settings represent an abdication of the responsibilities of government to protect the nation and its citizens. Thus, Peters accuses his political opponents (2002d) of being blind to what any "sane New Zealander" can see "as plain as day": that the current "flood" of immigrants is irreparably harming the social and economic fabric of our nation. He constructs their promotion of the globalisation of capital and labour markets as complicity with big business; as placing the interests of their foreign masters over those of "ordinary New Zealanders".

It has been argued that the emotive nature of national identity and immigration tends to disturb tidy political boundaries. In a bizarre expression of this, New Zealand First and the Greens share an uneasy coalition, united by their opposition to the global economy, and their commitment to investing in New Zealanders rather than relying on mass immigration. Labour and National, conversely, are joined by an acceptance of the need to participate in the global economy. They disagree, however, over the best way to do this – Labour consistently accentuates the need to retain a strong national identity, even if this is re-imagined as a marketing "brand". Again, Labour and New Zealand First share a view of the nation as necessary, while disagreeing over the basis for inclusion in the nation.

The mediating discourse, however, represents something of a broad political consensus at present: it is generally accepted that New Zealand needs immigrants. Within this consensus, anti-immigration politics are routinely and effectively marginalised as xenophobic, illogical, and as the "politics of the fringe". Peters is decried as racist, and his politics as those of division. His policy prescriptions are held to be not only morally repugnant,

but statistically wrong as well. His figure of 10,000 immigrants per year, Clark counters, would drive New Zealand back into "population decline, and all the problems associated with that" (TV One, 2002a).

Labels such as "racist" are effective tools for marginalising other positions and Peters does not always help himself: his references to "Ying Tongs and Osamas" do tend to undermine his claims to value immigrants' contributions. Shutting down debate through the application of labels such as "racist" and "redneck", while politically expedient, is dangerous for society in the long term. Marginalising and ostracising positions in this way seriously endangers the possibility of an intelligent, informed debate. Constructions of the nation either as an organic community or as a fictitious irrelevance may be philosophically or practically problematic, but they provide a context within which actual policy settings may be better understood. That is to say, explicit identification of problems contained in certain discourses – rather than personal attacks - facilitates an analysis of whether those problems have been overcome in eventually accepted positions.

A critique of the *organic community* discourse, for instance, may raise questions regarding the basis for inclusion in that community, and regarding the oppressive potential of nation-building projects. Such questions may also be applied to any mediating discourse. Exactly who is it that is "sharing a vision" for New Zealand? If – as surely must be the case – there exist in wider society divergent visions for New Zealand, then whose vision becomes accepted and promulgated? If New Zealand is conceptualised on the basis of talent, then what grounds do "untalented" citizens (or, non-"knowledge workers") have for their continued inclusion in the nation? Likewise, a critical approach to the *nation is dead* discourse reveals the widely felt need for a sense of collective identity. These concepts can also fruitfully be applied to a mediating discourse. Does the existing consensus on immigration disguise a vision for New Zealand based on sectoral interests as the shared

interests of a newly re-articulated nation? Conversely, can this new construction of New Zealand as a competitive economic entity offer a compelling basis for a sense of national belonging?

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Review Article

Risky Maps for Contested Territories

Book reviewed: *Reassembling the social: An introduction to Actor-Network Theory.* Latour, B. (2005). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Robert McGrail

> You know what would be real nice? Since no one around here seems to understand what ANT is, you should write an introduction to it. That would assure that our teachers know what it is and then, if I may say without being rude, they might not try to push us too hard into it .... (Latour, 2005, p.156)

The sociology of Bruno Latour is an unusual and exciting one. Entertaining, challenging, occasionally infuriating, it presents a refreshingly empirical orientation and an intriguing set of conceptual tools. And most importantly perhaps, like the networks which Latour seems so eager to distance himself from (worknet or rhizome anyone?) missing a node can cause blackouts down the line. This is not to say that one needs all - or any - of the concepts in this book to do this type of social science, but rather that importing fragmented "Latourisms" divorced of ANT's wider methodological and philosophical commitments is an easy route to absurdities. The fact that the various tools and insights of this idiosyncratic sociology have tended to be haphazardly dispersed throughout periodicals and edited collections has of course aggravated this problem. This makes *Reassembling the social* (hereafter, RTS), a coherent and self-contained presentation of the ANT approach to social studies, such a timely and welcome work (not to mention a welcome departure from the self-conscious hand wringings of previous ANT self-appraisals (e.g., Law & Hassard, 1999)). Like it or not, there is now an ANT monster roaming the collective. No matter how terrifying, misappropriated, and reified this beast has become it is still better brought into the light - even if only to be dismissed once and for all.

As well as a long overdue chance for interested parties to get a coherent picture of Latour's thought, it seems also to present a chance for Latour to consolidate the gradual drift in his own thinking: to give that picture a careful touch-up. For instance, RTS seems to suggest a continuation of a general movement away from the more radical and critical aspects of Latour's constructivism (the youthful indiscretion of *Laboratory life* (1979) or even the *Irreductions* (1988b)). It is difficult to shake the impression of a self-conscious contortion in RTS's assurances that it was merely anglo-american quaintness which allowed anyone to take the claim, for instance, that the laws of physics are as contingent as the export patterns of French cheese as some sort of "critique" of science. Either way, when the issue of science is raised in RTS it is the realist half of ANT's epistemological coin which lands most often.

Equally Latour's somewhat disorientating Leibnizesque metaphysics[1] - whereby proximity, priority, progress, size, substance, all owe their existence to the pricey networking of elements from an infinite multiplicity of world-reflecting singularities - also appears to be taking a back-seat to the comparable, but less wild, thinking of Whitehead and Tarde[2]. Indeed a central maneuver of RTS is that of presenting ANT as the alternative of two venerable sociological paths, which, we are told, split off from each other in Durkheim's theoretical "victory" over the latter. ANT is presented as not so much a radical challenge to social theory but as a means of reconnecting with the central intuitions and original uncertainties of sociological inquiry.

The elaboration of these uncertainties - controversies which must be deployed rather than legislated upon by the analyst - form the first section of RTS. Essentially these relate to the nature of groups, actions, objects, facts, and accounts. The types, scales, and boundaries of groupings - of sociological units - must be elaborated as the contested productions of actors. When action occurs the sources of, and participants in, that agency must be taken as uncertain and explored in tandem with those involved. Beyond this the "types" of participants must also not be decided prematurely as the

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1 The link is made all but explicit in the *Irreductions* (1988b), but see also, for instance, Latour (1991) "Technology is society made durable".

2 For statements on the two thinkers respectively, see Latour (2005) "What is given in experience" and Latour (2002) "Gabriel Tarde and the end of the social".

involvement of various "non-social" elements is likely. Beyond that ontology, facts, and realities must be explored as more or less unstable "matters of concern" - risky mediating fabrications. And finally, sociological accounts must be treated, themselves, as risky mediating fabrications - at their very best completely artificial and supremely objective.

The terrain covered in this first section will probably be the most familiar to those who have followed Latour's writings. The second introduces some novel concepts (the closest precursor probably being Latour & Hermant, 2004) as it attempts to outline the manner in which the social should be conceived in order to follow the performance and stabilisation of the first section's controversies: a "flat" sociological topography where "no place dominates enough to be global and no place is self-contained enough to be local" (p.204).

The basic three-step prescription is to "localise the global, redistribute the local, and connect what's left". For instance, as there is uncertainty as to the sources of agency and the cast of participants in action, to account for any "local" act requires us to set out in search of various distant elements - this, I think rightly, is claimed as the central founding intuition of the social sciences. But the trip "out there" only leads to "structure", "context", the "macro", or the "global", if we make the fatal error of confusing tenuous associations with the phantom public - the modern performance of a political whole. Rather than making this leap, analysts should simply follow the constantly local pathways which lead between sites (occasionally meeting up in "oligopticons" or "panoramas"). And if the big fish of the "macro" are local performances the local "micro" setting itself is still no more concrete. Even the most personal cognition is a "composite assemblage" (p.208) of circulating elements, no less dependent on distant participants - possessing a boundary no less fluid - than a corporation, a laboratory, or a bush-pump. In these brief discussions of "face-to-face" interactions, everyday practices, and subjectivities, lie the possibility of some intriguing, if fairly conventional, deployments of ANT. It is here too, in these discussions of subjectifying "plugins" and "structuring templates", that Latour comes surprisingly close to Foucault.

In its final section RTS attempts to answer the question of political relevancy - a field on which ANT has been repeatedly attacked (for being apolitical, all-political or both). It seems unlikely that those who have opposed

ANT on these grounds before will find anything in this final chapter to change their minds, it being the same basic refrain as that presented in the *Irreductions* (1988b): questions of power and domination can only be addressed when the machinations which sustain those asymmetries are laid bare. Or in more liberal parlance, we must present an accurate picture of our common world - our ever expanding collective in constant need of reassembly, reperformance, and recirculation - for the concerned public to act upon. Even at its Machiavellian worst, we are told, ANT is still more politically useful than critical sociologies which mystify injustice by way of oppressive all-purpose and all-pervasive evils over which there is little chance of victory. "One's own actions 'make a difference' *only in a world made of differences*" (p.253).

Sociological accounting and the "social" explanation

A simple way to sum up RTS would be to say that it is a book about how to produce a certain type of sociological account. This is, I think, why so many find ANT such an attractive and refreshing approach to the subject - it makes very few positive claims as to what the world is like but rather offers it up for study in all its richness and complexity. The message is clear: the world is much more interesting than sociologists, and it's open for business. Much better to study it and let it elaborate its own ways and means than crush it with frameworks, theories, critiques, reflexions... or whatever other guises are employed to return the author to center-stage. The focus on accounting itself can be seen in the emphasis placed on writing - "not teaching social science doctoral students to *write* their PhDs is like not teaching chemists to do laboratory experiments" (p.149). Sociological texts are presented as settings for risky experiments, and so must be complex, attentive, alive, detailed. And most importantly, like any good experiment, they must be able to fail. The written account is presented as the shared product of a common world which it is then able to preform with varying degrees of success.

In this focus on "infra-reflexive" (Latour, 1988c) accounting - the respectful elaboration of actors' metaphysics, metalanguages, and social theories through painstaking description - there is a definite moral hue. And if description is the hero of this story, then the "social" explanation is

the villain. Couched in the ANT distinction between intermediaries and mediators (the former faithfully transports and is thus ignorable, the latter is a complex, noisy, parasite-entity which, crucially, makes a difference to some happening) the "social" explanation is presented as a premature and unjust closure of RTS's uncertainties premised on a belief in "social" stuff or "social" forces: autonomous and largely unaccounted for containers and agencies for which so much of the world can be presented as meaningless reflectors or carriers. At the heart of ANT lies the claim that these forces, rather than being employed to explain (or even explain away) varied happenings, must themselves be explained: they must be treated as the *consequences* rather than the *causes* of collective action[3].

More generally than this alleged confusion of cause and consequence the target of Latour's criticism is formalism. Sociological trips from the general to the particular are presented as redundant: "if something is merely an "instance of" some state of affairs, go study this state of affairs instead" (p.143). Trips in the opposite direction are presented as somewhat megalomanic, condescending, and ultimately dull. If generalisation is done at all, it will be done by those under study, not through the totalising whim of the analyst. And if an account seems in need of an "explanation" then that simply means the description requires extension. "Much like 'safe sex', sticking to description protects against the transmission of explanations" (p.137).

Forms and complexities

However taking these prescriptions at face value would seem to rob the analyst of, to take sympathetic cases, the connecting and synthesising gestures of Serres or the "imaginative generalisation" of Whitehead (1929:6-8) (his analysis of the intertwined movements of "formal" and "selective" abstraction in social concern seem of particular import (Hall, 1973:112-135)). Even if we take the line, glimpsed in Mol (2002), that such abstracting, generalising, and connecting movements on the part of the analyst take one across the boundary from sociology to "practical philosophy" the

[3] The best, and clearest, summary of this specific point remains "The powers of association" (Latour, 1986).

movement still appears much too valuable to expel it from our sociological accounts. In either case it is difficult to ignore the prevalence of generalisation, categorisation - and yes even explanation - in the works of Latour and other ANT writers: these go well beyond "a social scientists tiny interpretation" (p.139). It would be equally difficult to take as credible the claim that these were all elaborated by the actors at hand.

I think it must be clear that RTS's attacks on explanation, and its constant calls to description, are facets of a war-machine directed at over-zealous formalisms, second-guessing critiques, and the worst excesses of the "sociology of the social". Indeed the type of "description" RTS advocates mirrors fairly closely what many would simply consider a *good* explanation: all the relevant actors and agencies which made a difference to some occurrence have been faithfully rendered, and their relations well traced with all the sensitivity that the original setting's complexity demanded. The *problem* is that the rhetoric of description and "following the actors" - excellent weapons against heavy handed theoreticians or witch-hunting critics - can obscure real practical difficulties facing those engaged in ANT-style social studies.

In a *New Zealand Sociology* issue dedicated to ANT, Lloyd (2002) noted the problem of "granularity" which faces those engaged in "simply" following and describing. What do we describe? Who do we follow? How far do we follow them? A key feature of *explanation* is its ability to discard as much of an original setting as possible (or at least present it as irrelevant) as its goal is to demonstrate that a particular outcome (a pyramid's height, the onset of a disease, a person's occupation...) was largely *insensitive* to various features - generally the more the better - of a particular situation[4]. With as much of the situated detail as possible discarded one is then free to travel light, "acting at a distance": applying the remainder to distant pyramids, patients, or social divisions. Explanation, in this sense, is an exercise in leaving

[4] This particular formulation is taken from Sterelny's distinction between "actual-sequence" and "robust-process" explanations (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999, p. 84). Whilst Latour rightly points to the importance of a one to many mapping from explanans to explanada in explanation (Latour, 1988c) - emphasising the *plurality* of connections established between elements - this is the result of a more primitive abstracting movement in explanation whereby connections are drastically *reduced* in order to divorce as many elements as possible from the wider causal "ensemble".

things behind. By attempting to abstain from this movement, through "mere" description (as RTS repeatedly advises), we are faced with the full, infinite, interconnected complexity of the world - and the questions above become immediately perplexing. As Whitehead once said (1926:235): "if this is the case, we cannot know about anything till we equally know about everything else. Apparently, therefore, we are under the necessity of saying everything at once".

Of course we can't say, or for that matter perceive, everything at once. As RTS points out "interactions are not synoptic" (p.201), and so decisions are inevitably going to be made as to what elements of a setting we consider relevant, the grains at which they are best described, and the length to which it is worth following their connections. With these decisions made we will inevitably be presenting the assertion that a certain state of affairs was less sensitive to the things we have excluded than to the things we have included. To put it another way, *some* gradient of explanation is the inevitable outcome of a finite description[5]. The key then is for the analyst to leave out the *right* things, and unfortunately RTS provides few clues as to how this might be achieved. We know that actors, in an ANT account, must *act*, must make a difference (and so we should be content to leave behind inconsequential intermediaries), but this in itself begs the central question. We are also told that actors will often be doing this work for us, fabricating their own lists of relevant entities. But the applicability of this logic to non-humans - no matter how far we are willing to wander into the pan-psychic jungle - can often appear dubious (a point seized upon in Collins and Yearly's (1992) critique of ANT) and left defaulted to human accounts we have

[5] To labour the point, nowhere in *The pasteurization of France* (1988a) do we find Pasteur's beard. Presumably Latour would say that it left no "trace", that it was not performative in the success of his microbiology, and I doubt many would disagree with him. This is tantamount to saying that Pasteur having a beard was a feature of the actual world which is not necessarily a feature of many possible worlds in which his microbiology succeeds. Its absence is an implicit modal statement - it was excluded because it was irrelevant. This is not a denial of the utility of interesting side-notes, epitomes, glosses, etc. or an attempt to wed us to any particular conception of causality (assuming a conception which admits that "things might have been otherwise" - Whitehead's notion of degrees of relevance in the processes of concrescence or transition, for instance, being just as compatible with this point as the analytic "possible worlds talk" above). It is simply to point out that the manner in which the practical limits of description are managed carry a certain explanatory, causal, and modal "weight".

strayed little further than Ethnomethodology or Winch (1958). To solve this problem would be asking a lot - especially from an "introduction" - but to not obscure it behind a rhetoric of "mere description" seems a reasonable request.

Mapping

What RTS is striving for is an approach to sociology which does not attempt to replace complexity with catch-all "social" pass-keys or strip away everything but a few easily transportable forms in the interests of "empire building" and "action at a distance". To take the solution that RTS traces - a renewed and uncertain attentiveness to the world, an open ear to its metalanguages and judgments, a focus on producing risky, living and breathing, faithful and performative accounts - is to be heading in the best possible direction. At the same time however such an approach must not deny its inevitable explanatory weight. It must be sensitive to the importance of presences and absences - abstractions - in accounts through which "explanations", even of a local, provisional, and uniquely adequate sort, are inevitably fashioned.

McLennan, in a useful discussion of similar issues, has suggested that the *map* may be such a recurring methodological metaphor "just because of its ambivalent siting between the registers of explanation and description" (2002:640). As it happens cartography is evoked repeatedly in RTS and various other ANT texts[6], and I find it hard to shake the feeling that in it may lie something very close to the model required. A good map makes no secret of the fact that it has left behind a near-infinite amount of the detail and complexity of the original terrain, but at the same time it can never be divorced from it - can never relax its empirical grasp. Once abstracted from

[6] Perhaps most notably in one of the founding collections of the school, *Mapping the dynamics of science and technology* (Callon et al., 1986). The less pleasing notion of mapping as the creation of inflexible overviews which prevent us from grasping complexity and multiplicity (Law & Mol, 2002, pp. 16-17) presents the other side of the metaphor. Either way there always comes a time when, to some extent, the complexity must end and the accounting must begin - I think it enough to reiterate that we can only ever take so much with us in the journey from x to x' and so good decisions about what to leave behind are vastly superior to the illusion of having made none. In other words the usage of the mapping metaphor here is simply another means of imagining, with Law and Mol, "alternatives to the simplifying overview and its other: chaos".

a particular terrain, in other words, the map is *not* a general rule for which many other terrains are mere occasions (or rather if it is made to appear so that is the result of some other *nth+1* order operation on the part of a third party employing other maps (Latour, 1987)). A map is stubbornly situated - a map of Wellington will never explain away Paris - but at the same time it is built upon a rigorous, intelligent, pragmatic, abstraction. In other words a good map performs its terrain well for some purpose *without* becoming a general model waiting to swallow up distant settings *or* implying undue relevance to "Cleopatra's nose" by blindly and unselectively following actors.

The cartographic metaphor also points us towards the purposeful nature of accounts. This is something that Latour is well aware of, but for all the attention paid to the production of accounts in RTS this key issue feels prematurely closed. We create accounts in order to assemble a common world and occasionally, if certain interests align, these may become politically relevant to some third party. This cosmopolitical (Latour, 2004) orientation is quite appealing, but the suspicion lingers that there must be many more varied and complicated reasons, with more subtle internal distinctions, for undertaking studies than this - many more valid "concerns" which animate sociology. And once again these will bear heavily upon how the limits of description are managed - on how we solve the problem of granularity. There are multiple equally objective, equally complete, ways of describing any occurrence (or there are multiple occurrences awaiting performance) just as there are many different, accurate, ways of mapping Wellington (or multiple Wellingtons awaiting assembly). The enactment of one or the other of these will be the outcome of a pragmatic tangle of analyst and analysed. These translations are the bread and butter of ANT, the subject of a whole chapter of RTS, but are never satisfyingly applied to the sociologist who is presented as having (or as requiring) vastly more unified aims and concerns than anyone else we might hope to encounter.

Reassembling the social

Like so much of Latour's work, RTS is a pleasure to read. It offers up one of the most interesting recent movements in social theory in an approachable and entertaining form whilst maintaining varied links with a wider philosophical and sociological corpus. Even if at times one gets the impression

of a wishful oversimplification of some very old and very thorny problems - in particular the relation between, and relative status of, knower and known and of course those varied and ancient problems surrounding the general and particular - there is much here of great value. RTS's treatment of the "local" and "global" seems to me to give much more clear and rigorous expression to the fluid and circulating "not here but neither there" which many contemporary theorists appear to be tracing. Likewise his focus on uncertainty, performance, and most of all the short-comings of "social" explanations remind one of what it could mean for sociology to consider itself an "objective science" - not a discipline couched in a mind-numbing scientistic literary style or one where accounts are judged solely by way of the epistemological squint of the falsificationalist, but rather where events and relations are approached every time afresh with a sensitive and open empiricism.

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Art and social theory
Harrington, A. (2004). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Reviewed by David Craig

As Austin Harrington quotes Bourdieu (1980, p. 207), "Sociology and art make an odd couple". Sociology's love of taming the exceptional through incisive rational analysis seems at fundamental odds with what has become an increasingly plural artistic practice, generally determined to avoid reductionisms of all epistemological, hermeneutic and representational kinds. This odd coupling can be either productive or pointillist. Recently, for example, art's turn to critical assemblage- beyond post modernism and back to respecting political economy (Enwezor, 2002) - has brought it into heavy sociological territory. Moreover trying to think sociologically about anything aesthetic quickly draws sociology out of a blunt-end descriptive/ explanatory shop-work, and into the intrigues of high theory and art. Sociology can mix and mingle these intrigues with its own penchant for social differentiation, playing on class/ gender/ cultural difference, and suggesting potent underpinnings to top-end efflorescence.

Art and social theory makes it clear just how broad such opportunities are. Harrington from the outset makes it clear he is going to avoid any and all reductionist paths, where aesthetic production is seen as an appendage to wider political economy or social process. In fact his method soon renders any such approach impossible. Harrington is clearly determined to take the reader on a tour of all of what he considers important (aesthetic, philosophical, and often social) theory, and this means engaging nimbly across an incredibly disparate range of thinkers, all within 200 or so pages.

Harrington's most significant unifying proposal, developed in the introduction and returned to at various points before the conclusion, is a Weberian perspectival deployment, which sees social theory as a mediating modality between social science's "value distanciation" and "humanistic practices" of "value appraisal and value affirmation" presumably more often found in the arts (Harrington, 2004, p.4).

What emerges is a wide-ranging account of art and social theory: a dialogical world of "equal partners" where the pluralities of each are given full play. Chapters are organised either historically or thematically (or both),

proceed with lengthy lists of theorists to be considered in each, and then into sharply drawn, selective accounts of multiple (and familiar) thinkers, important periods, influences and institutions. Breadth wise, Harrington's range here is maximal, pushing at the feasible limits of every point. You can imagine him pruning and re-refining what is here word by word to meet text length constraints. Yet what emerges most strongly is the sense of possibility: reaching widely out beyond most folks' definition of social theory, and into aesthetic philosophy and beyond, he effectively roadmaps most of the important territory, with some short but equally lucid excursions into less well known material. The book functions as an overview and a potential introduction: readers familiar with the Frankfurt school, or "long duree" accounts of aesthetics in relation to changing forms of capitalism (Jameson (1990); Harvey 1990), will find a brief, clear, and generally helpful summation set in a very broad framework, but not a lot more. On the other hand, Harrington's sheer scope means there will surely be something new for everyone.

Harrington does gesture at bringing aspects of this back into his Weberian "value" frames, he has at best schematic success. The book suffers a little from a whole and parts problem, which might perhaps have been better solved by leaving out unifying attempts altogether, and relying more on the author's considerable précis-introduction skills, and extraordinarily broad engagement with the field. A more substantively unified approach, as seen in Terry Eagleton's (1990) *The ideology of the aesthetic*, would have meant greatly thinning the crowds of theorists, and then holding each up to some more singular critical framework. But it is still fine for the reader to simply enjoy the grand tour presented here, the diversity, the simple pleasure of the guide's sharp observations, and consider at leisure where to take any of these aspects further.

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Understanding lifestyle sports: Consumption, identity and difference
Wheaton, B. (Ed.) (2004). London: Routledge.

Reviewed by Camilla Obel

Scholarly publications on the topic of extreme, alternative or lifestyle sport have grown following both the prolific growth in the participation in these activities and the popularisation of associated media products, clothing and equipment since the 1990s. *Understanding lifestyle sports*, a collection of ten essays edited by Belinda Wheaton, herself a participant, occasional magazine story writer and researcher of surfing, windsurfing and snowboarding cultures, offers insights into the worlds of skateboarding, adventure tourism/ sports, climbing, surfing, windsurfing and ultimate frisbee. Collectively the essays also contribute to debates in sport sociology including youth participation, commercialisation, media, technology, risk, mobility and masculinities.

The collection is introduced by Wheaton who makes the case for defining this cluster of new (and older) physical activities as "lifestyle sport" in contrast to the more commercial (and earlier scholarly) labels including "whiz", "alternative" and "extreme". Her use of the term lifestyle sport is an attempt to move beyond the subculture concept used by cultural studies to emphasise rebellious and potentially resistant identities and meanings employed in earlier accounts of these activities (see Beal, 1995). Wheaton provides a nine-point list of features central to these sports including activities "that focus on the consumption of new objects including technologies", that are experienced by participants as being "expressive, creative, aesthetic and hedonistic" and that are performed in "outdoor unbounded or liminal zones" (2004, pp.11-12).

The theme of consumption is taken up in the essay by Beal and Wilson, in which they critically reflect on their earlier publication on skateboarding (Beal, 1995). While their earlier research emphasised subcultural resistance, Beal and Wilson avoid their earlier authentic/commercial distinction and instead focus on how skateboarders make use of mass and specialist media in their identity construction. They show how skateboarders negotiate and make use of media to construct their identities and the ambiguities faced in constructing distinction.

Palmer investigates the themes of risk and danger in the selling of the adventure tourism sports of mountain climbing and river canyonning. The essay presents case studies of the disasters on Mt Everest in 1996 and at Interlaken in 1999. Palmer deconstructs the discursive media accounts of these two events noting how the marketing of these activities, in the one instance to wealthy executives and in the other to young Contiki travellers, encourages participants to externalise the real risks involved. She argues that, in the first instance, commercial pressures and competitiveness between climbing companies produce a situation whereby a successful climb is paramount, effectively reducing attention to usual risk management strategies. In the second instance, the construction of the authority expert guide encourages the novice adventurers to place their lives in the hands of strangers.

Extending the theme of risk and safety, Lewis' essay presents a comparative analysis of the different attitudes and uses of technologies by sports climbers and traditional or adventure climbers (see Donnelley (2003) for a similar comparative discussion of climbing). This involves a contrast between (pre)fixed bolts that provide added protection and predetermine the climber's ascent, against the individual placement of removable karabiners that challenge the adventure climber's ability to judge and plan the climb. While this is a contrast between the use of different kinds of climbing technology, it also highlights the construction of the rock face as a recreational, enjoyable "standing reserve" for sports climbers, in which the rock is permanently marked, and a use of the natural topographical fissure as a "falling-off" mountain environment requiring courage and boldness of the adventure climber.

Booth accounts for some of the more familiar sides to the surfing culture and fraternity. He argues that, despite the increase in female surfers since the 1990s, the gender order of the surfing culture remains masculine. The essay also touches on the use of technology, noting the recent debate about the use of jet-skis to tow surfers to and from big waves. "Tow-in surfing" exponents proclaim its benefits to be efficiency, safety and performance enhancement, much like Lewis' sports climbers' choice of bolts. While the use of jet-skis has altered the practice of surfing, Booth argues that the extreme surfing culture remains entrenched in status hierarchy and the importance of prestige tied to the surfer's ability to "dance" large waves.

The essays in the second section investigate gender relations in lifestyle sports and, in particular, the establishment of status hierarchies, sporting prowess and competitiveness. In contrast to Lewis' focus on the meanings of climbing styles and technologies, Robinson explores male climbers' changing perspectives of their gendered identities as climbers through the life course, emphasising how risk and the mundane take on different meanings depend on the climbers' other and shifting identities outside the sporting context.

Wheaton's study of windsurfing notes that, although male dominance is evident in both numbers and the discourses of male surfers, an "ambivalent masculinity" is the prevalent masculinity. This masculinity is less exclusive of women and gains its most significant meaning in the construction of difference from mainstream sports culture and its emphasis on winning and competition.

In contrast to the other essays in this section, Kay and Laberge focus on the experiences of female adventure racing participants. In addition, and in contrast to the general focus on non-competitive lifestyle cultures, their essay explores mixed gender team sports competition. Kay and Laberge show that there is a dissonance between the "discourse" of adventure racing in which teaming capital, constructed as female expertise, is presented as valuable and the "practice" of adventure racing in which physical prowess, traditionally constructed as masculine, is the most important capital. The analysis identifies female racers' "conservation" and "subversion" strategies for pursuing and potentially re-defining symbolic capital in the field of adventure racing.

Thornton's essay on the sport of ultimate frisbee includes discussion of the gendered construction of throwing and catching moves. Not unlike Wheaton and Booth who show how windsurfers and surfers use the ability to perform certain moves as a key means of constructing status hierarchies, Thornton shows how ultimate players use the mastery of a "forehand" flick and "laying out" as a means of identifying insider and outsider status. Thornton's essay is also noteworthy because it pays attention to team sport leagues in lifestyle sports. Unlike Kay and Laberge's essay on adventure racing competitions, Thornton argues that ultimate participants go to great

pains to construct their sports as distinct from other competitive sports. The critical feature of ultimate is the requirement on players to invoke the "spirit of the game" ethic specifically by calling their own fouls.

Kusz's discussion of the construction of extreme sport in the USA media post-1995 completes the collection. He argues that North American media constructed representations of extreme sports as the solution to the perceived white male crisis of masculinity. In these representations extreme sports are juxtaposed against the perceived feminised America and the participants are seen as extending the foundational American white male mythology of conquering the frontier.

I agree with the Routledge Cultural Studies series editors that the collection is timely and that it will provide a valuable resource for students. However, I was disappointed to find that I was familiar with a number of the essays (e.g. Palmer, 2002). Additionally, there is some overlap between *Understanding lifestyle sport* and *To the extreme* (Rinehart & Sydnor, 2003). Overall, I thought the essays worked well as a collection, but preferred the broader framing around the question "What is sport?" in *To the extreme* over Wheaton's attempt to define lifestyle sports. She notes that the practitioners themselves embrace the "lifestyle sport" label, but I have some reservations with the assumed distinction between these newer sports activities and so-called traditional sports. We are presented with a definition of lifestyle sports that adopts the voices of its participants by endorsing their discourses of distinction, rather than taking as its object the very thing that is taken for granted.

Having said this, the strength of the collection is in the accounts of the complex workings of the lifestyle sports cultures provided in the case studies. Each case study provides up-to-date research on the worlds constructed by the mostly young white middleclass Western males that adopt these new sports. According to the book, the numbers involved far outstrip participation in so-called traditional sports. While I whole-heartedly agree with the significance of these consumption figures, I would add a cautionary note. Participation numbers in so-called traditional sports are said to have been dropping for over a decade, yet commercial sports products and, in particular, media sports products have grown phenomenally. While the escalation in the cost of media sports products is partly a result of the price-

bidding wars between global media corporations, the consumption of media sports products also suggest that the mainstream sports spectator market shows no signs of shrinking. What this does point to, however, as is highlighted in the book, is that lifestyle sports consumption is tied up with the use of equipment more so than the predominantly media sports consumption of so-called traditional sports.

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The sociology of gender: An introduction to theory and research.
Wharton, S. (2005). Blackwell: Oxford

Reviewed by Maxine Campbell

This volume is a contribution towards Blackwell's *Key themes in sociology* series, which are intended as introductory texts for a range of topics in sociology. Like other books in the series, this publication presents a range of theoretical perspectives and key concepts within a specified discipline - sociology of gender - and augments these with discussion of their attendant debates. Wharton provides readers with the benefits and insights gained from almost thirty years experience in researching and teaching gender. Her chief objective in the book is "to provide a relatively concise, theoretically sophisticated introduction" (p. ix) to the sociology of gender. By and large, she achieves this.

Wharton's writing style provides for a comfortable introduction to the field for students of gender. Her presentation of complex theoretical material is interspersed with first person anecdotes and statements of position which serve to give practical expression to the relevant concept or debate, while also assisting in the production of a deceptively easy fluency of discussion around some inherently complex topics. Each chapter begins by stating its objectives and concludes with a summary of key points and suggestions for further reading. Of particular note are the sections entitled "a closer look" provided at the end of each chapter. Fundamentally designed to stimulate and provoke, each of these think pieces is followed by questions that require the reader to reflect and analyse. If used as a course text, these aspects of the book can ensure that assessment tasks remain relevant to the readings.

The introductory chapter clearly sets out what the book hopes to achieve and how, while also acknowledging that the nature of the field of study is such that she cannot hope for a comprehensive or definitive account within the confines of an introductory reader. Wharton introduces the reader to

three basic frameworks, offered as useful and common, though not all-encompassing, approaches to the study of gender. One or more of these frameworks (individual, institutional or interactionist) is then applied to the analysis of a variety of issues. She notes that her discussion of the definition of gender, for example, adopts an individualist approach, while an institutional framework is applied to her initial explorations of work and family. Although this is a useful delineation in a broad sense, her analyses frequently apply more than one framework and she notes the interplay between the frameworks.

The basic premise of the book is that gender is "a multilayered system of practices and relations" which cannot be understood through a single framework. Accordingly, her discussions of socialization and cognitive theory in relation to development of gender identity, for example, present the reader with analyses which are to a greater or lesser degree inherently interactional or institutional, despite her description of the chapter as adopting an individualist framework. These two contextual frameworks are not explicitly introduced until chapter three, but the nuances within and contrasts between the different frameworks are usefully drawn out here. Rather than view the frameworks as competing, contradictory or fragmentary, Wharton treats them as complementary, offering the opportunity for a richness of understanding not possible by strict adherence to a single perspective.

The volume covers a useful range of topics, beginning in the second chapter with the development of an understanding of key approaches to the notion of the gendered person and extending this in the following chapter to incorporate the institutional and interactional dimensions. These first three chapters then provide a good platform from which to explore issues which are essential elements in any introductory text on gender. Chapter 4 situates work and family within the wider social context, provides an historical background to changes in work and family organization and examines the gendered implications of these changes. The two subsequent chapters each undertake a more detailed analysis of family (chapter 5) and work (chapter 6). The former canvasses issues such as the construction of gender in childhood and the gendered consequences of marriage and childbearing. The latter provides an elementary introduction to gender at

work, addressing matters including occupational segregation, the gender pay gap and gender bias in job evaluations. The Epilogue (chapter 7) seeks to encourage continuing change through challenges to gender inequality, while at the same time outlining for students the factors which inherently slow the pace of change. Returning to her initial premise – the complex, multi-layered system of practices and relations that constitute gender – Wharton again uses concrete examples to demonstrate the unevenness of change and relates this to differences at the individual, interactional and institutional levels.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are augmented with a number of graphs and tables, which are somewhat disappointing. While some are useful for demonstrating historical trends, none contain data relating to the years since 2000 and in most instances the graphics are less than elegant. As is the case with many introductory texts, some prior knowledge is assumed, particularly in regard to some basic concepts which are integral to specific discussions, but never explicitly defined. "Hegemonic masculinity" is one such example. A competent reader may well be able to infer the meaning from the context of the discussion, but the problems associated with assuming familiarity with such key terms could be largely overcome by the inclusion of a glossary. Certainly, some key terms are emboldened within the text and subsequently defined, but a more comprehensive listing is surely a fundamental requirement of an introductory text.

Any attempt to incorporate a multiple framework approach in an introductory text has the potential to foster confusion and contradiction. Wharton avoids this. Her fluid writing style and clear indications of the parameters and use of the different approaches ultimately achieves what she originally intended – a richer, more comprehensive understanding of the topic.

Instructions for Contributors

Submission of manuscripts: All manuscripts submitted will be considered for publication, on the understanding that they are original material and are not being considered for publication elsewhere. Please submit only finished manuscripts.

Manuscripts should not exceed 8,000 words, and files should be submitted to the managing editor, Mike Lloyd (mike.lloyd@vuw.ac.nz) as an attachment, preferably in Microsoft Word rich text format. If you are unable to attach a file to an e-mail message, please contact the managing editor to find another means of transmission.

The author's name(s), departmental or institutional affiliations, snail-mail and e-mail addresses, and a short biography of each author should appear on the first page of the paper. A short (100 word) abstract of the paper should be included.

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Conference Paper: Wood, B. (2004). The cloning of hybridity and the imperial significance of the United States in New Zealand television. Paper presented at the Cultural Studies Association (USA) annual conference, 6 May, Northeastern University, Boston, USA.

Internet reference: Tanczos, N. (2000, February 10). Maiden speech to parliament. Retrieved June 24, 2003, from the World Wide Web: http://www.greens.org.nz/docs/speeches/000210nt-maiden.htm

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