NEW ZEALAND
SOCIOLOGY

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WHO GETS A CHOICE? SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE CULTURAL STUDIES IMPORTED FROM BIRMINGHAM

Roy Nash, Education Department
Massey University

My interests as a sociologist of education have become distinctly old-fashioned. The central problem for the sub-discipline in which we work is, I believe, to investigate, describe and if possible explain the reasons for differences in educational access and performance between social groups. In recent papers I have sketched a model in which class-located families are understood to utilize specific resources (monetary, cultural knowledge and social networks) in their interests of maintaining the social position of the heirs to those actual and symbolic resources. Families are thus theorized as collective actors engaged in long term strategic behaviour. The school is regarded as crucial to this process of reproduction in that it provides to a certain definite number of students the educational credentials used by employers to select applicants for a certain definite number of positions. All agency is necessarily structured within a complex social field but in the theoretical models I have outlined the constraining structures are these, at any given moment, fixed positions and places. Thus, if 40,000 young people leave school to seek work and employers make available 30,000 positions for school-leavers then one quarter of all these school-leavers will not succeed in finding work. I have suggested that the processes which determine which groups of school-leavers are largely successful in obtaining work (and which are largely not) should be understood as market processes where possession of formal credentials and informal qualifications are the currency and where the decisions of school-leavers and employers are rationally based and culturally shaped. In outline this model is no more than a conceptualized description of market processes which are not in any sense difficult to understand. However, although my account of cultural choice has been strongly influenced by recent work in cultural studies I have become increasingly dissatisfied with the political romanticism and theoretical idealism characteristic of this academic tendency. The approach of the influential Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (BCCCS) to culture and ideology is, I believe, marred by deep contradictions which severely limit its understanding of agency and structure. This paper is thus intended as a contribution to the problems of theorizing agency and cultural choice within an intellectual complex that rejects determinism and insists on the necessity to investigate how decision-making processes are positionally and culturally structured. First, then, I examine the contribution of the BCCCS; second, I offer some specific criticisms of recent studies of working class culture heavily influenced by that work (and here my criticisms have a dual focus for I am at once aggrieved by the politically disastrous attack on ordinary respectable values and intellectually disturbed by the incoherent conception of agency given by an idealist reading of culture and ideology); and, finally, I offer some brief remarks on the need to develop a more materialist conceptualization of cultural studies in New Zealand.

SHOP-FLOOR CULTURE, WORKING CLASS CULTURE AND POLITICS

It must be acknowleged that in the last decade the discussion of working class culture has been transformed by the remarkable work that has poured out of the Birmingham collective. In a most useful paper Johnson (1980) identifies the problematics of three influential theories of working class culture. First, working class people in Britain have traditionally lived, and to a great extent still do, in well-defined localities, in local communities, and share a common local and recreational culture sometimes structured

by a dominating industrial presence. The northern pit and mill towns are the classic examples, but the huge post-war housing estates serving a few large factories fit the model almost equally well. Second, working class people have created during their history a tradition of popular radicalism which, however weakened and fragmented by the impact of bourgeois hegemony, continues to be a power in the co-operative and trades union movements and can still be recognized in the popular support given to the national health service, non-selective schooling and other collectivist objectives. Third, working class people are definitively so because they have no structural alternative but to exchange their labour-power for capital - and then only when their labour-power is required - and so under these structural conditions the generative forms of paradigmatic working class culture are created at this site, on the shop-floor, where the struggle to impose the discipline of the capitalist economic order against the collective resistance of the working class is ultimately located.

Each of these approaches or selective problematics of class culture as community, class culture as radical politics, and class culture as shop-floor resistance, are elaborated and criticized by BCCCS writers. The vision of community has inspired a major genre in the study of working class people. Much of the BCCCS's own work is, in fact, influenced by this tradition and demonstrates marked sympathy towards that traditional, essentially northern, male-dominated, recreational culture with its, 'networks of small-scale organizations and supportive mechanisms (working men's clubs, mutual insurance schemes, co-operatives, public houses, trades unions) and a myriad of smaller leisure time groupings (pigeon fanciers, whippet trainers, amateur footballers and the rest).' (Critcher 1980:161) But although the BCCCS group are self-consciously critical of this interpretation and suspicious of its romanticism they do not altogether manage to escape its influence.

The conception of working class culture as a distinct cultural and political tradition has been a more central inspiration. In particular the BCCCS have been greatly stimulated by the recovery of the English working class by Marxist historians and literary critics in what has been a highly productive debate on the political and cultural traditions of working people. For Williams (1977),

> [t]he primary distinction between bourgeois and working class culture is to be sought in the whole way of life, ... [t]he crucial distinction is between alternative ideas of the nature of social relationship. (Quoted by Critcher 1980a:37)

Johnson, whose studies of early nineteenth century working class controlled educational movements have had a noticeable impact on recent histories of education, also - like Williams - argues that the radical and romantic tradition of Blake, Keats, Ruskin and Morris must be put at the centre of a genuinely popular common English (or English speaking) culture.

In Johnson's view working class radicals possessed 'a theory of economic exploitation, a theory of the class character of the state and a theory of social or cultural domination, understood as the formation of social character.' (Johnson 1980:88) Johnson recognizes that, 'the working class intellectual was (and is) a rare creation' (Ibid:80) but notes that certain structural features aided their formation:

> Perhaps the most important feature of nineteenth-century radicalism
> was its capacity to produce an indigenous leadership. It was not difficult

to understand why this was so, for working people with an inclination towards mental labour had to stay within their own class, or occupy positions of great social ambiguity like elementary or private school-mastering or journalism or lecturing. There were few roads open to co-option. (Ibid:93)

It is implicit in this passage that such a tradition is no longer evident and some of the reasons for its decline, loss of control over schooling, and increased opportunities for 'co-option' through social mobility, are evident in the text. The collapse of radical popular culture and indigenous leadership constitute the crisis of the working class culture. In Critcher's words:

Evidence of key elements of a culture may indeed be difficult to find where deprivation is common but responses fragmented. Economic and political powerlessness extends to cultural resources. ...what we have is evidence of a working class culture stripped of its formal institutions and informal networks, reliant on its reflexes, directing its hostility against those of its own members who do not conform to values imposed from outside: blacks, the work-shy, problem families. (Critcher 1980a:27)

Here one might, parenthetically, put certain critical questions to Critcher. At the level of detail, why should people turn against those who do not conform to values imposed from outside? In fact, these values are not imposed from outside. 'Problem families' is a term that belongs to the (dated) discourse of social work and, although perhaps now in common use, those who might fall within this official category are not a problem to ordinary working class people in quite the same way. Of course, they may be "rough", they may "let down" the neighbourhood, they may be a constant minor nuisance (banging car doors late at night, playing loud music, letting their rubbish spill everywhere, letting their dogs roam free), and, in as much as successful strategies of family reproduction in the ordinary respectable working class depend on maintaining a sharp distance from that casual way of life, they pose an actual threat to socialization.[1] Solid working class hostility to such a way of life and to those who live it has an entirely rational basis. But such doubts must be placed on a firmer foundation. At the level of theory, what must be treated as problematic is this strategy of searching for the 'key elements of a culture' in order to study the "lived" - that is the actually manifested and expressed culture of a working class community. It is clear that manifest working class culture is not so much being analysed here for its structural grammar as being interrogated for its match with some idealist template deemed to be the 'key elements' in some ideal concept of working class culture.

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1   Wallman (1980:186-7). 'Those [problems] most often cited are: faceless bureaucrats, ambitious politicians, people who ignore the council's skips and leave their large rubbish by the dustbins, council employees who will not take this large rubbish away, people who have noisy and frequent parties, and worse, are thought to charge a gate fee and so admit strangers to those parties. Also, a looser category, those newly arrived, perhaps eccentric, certainly without connections in "this part of London".' Admittedly, this is a random list derived from an atheoretical 'open' questionnaire.

The definitive contribution to the theorization of working class culture by the BCCCS writers is, in fact, their insistence that those 'key elements' must be found in the relationship of the working class to capital - working class culture must be grounded in the labour-capital relation. There is a general and broad agreement that,

> [t]he problem of working-class culture ... must be located in the problem of understanding the complex and contradictory forms within which the working class lives its subordination in capitalist societies. (Critcher 1980:253)

Here the political character of the collective's interest in working class culture is made explicit. The BCCCS with its committment to neo-Gramscian politics and its interest in structuralist forms of explanation has undoubtedly been fruitful in producing a large body of empirical work and yet, I shall argue, much of this work is deeply unsatisfactory in its politics and in its account of working class culture.

Willis's (1977) articulation of this thesis is well known. Working class culture is a culture of resistance generated by the relation between capital and labour, prototypically on the shop-floor, these forms of resistance give rise to certain crude but essentially correct perceptions, 'penetrations' of the real relations of capitalist exploitation, but, among disaffected youths, the forms of this resistance become a cultural celebration of their entry into manual labour and, through ethnic, sex, and age mediations, are produced with the "limitations" of sexism, racism and anti-intellectualism. The effects of this ineffectual and largely symbolic resistance to school authority are to reproduce the labour segmentations and the ideological structures of capitalism. Willis specifically identifies the shop-floor as 'the privileged site and generator of working class culture.' In this view culture is understood as lived, commonsensical, unreflected responses:

> Culture is not artifice and manners, the presence of Sunday best, rainy afternoons and concert halls. It is the very material of our daily lives, the bricks and mortar of our most commonplace understandings, feelings and responses. We rely on cultural patterns and symbols for the minute, and unconscious social reflexes that make us social and collective beings: we are therefore most *deeply* embedded in our culture when we are at our most natural and spontaneous: if you like when we are at our most work-a-day. As soon as we think, as soon as we see life as parts in a play, we are in a very important sense, already, one step away from our real and living culture. (Willis 1980:185-6)

Thus, although there is no tightly agreed BCCCS party line on working class culture, there is certainly a common understanding about what is problematic about working class life informing their collective work. The English working class was formed historically by a capitalist industrial revolution under conditions which led working people to create a popular tradition of political radicalism; the rise of state schooling helped to defeat this culture by crushing emergent popular educational movements and weakening its indigenous leadership by lowering the scholarship ladder; and as a result of sustained attack by the repressive and ideological apparatuses of capital and its state the working class has been fragmented by internal divisions, by the cleavages of race, sex, age and the divisions of labour in working class occupations. The apparent ease with which working class culture is penetrated and its organized solidarity broken by bourgeois ideology exposes a vulnerability that presents a demand for theoretical explanation and a challenge to political action.

Willis's project is clearly to rescue the study of working class culture from what he sees as the triviality of certain modes of analysis, '[c]ulture is not ... the presence of Sunday best.' (But compare Jones (1974:475), '[r]espectability ... meant the provision of a presentable Sunday suit and the ability to be seen wearing it.') The aim is to strip down culture to reveal its essential forms at their definitive locus of production. Within the neo-Gramscian political problematic favoured by the BCCCS the working class has an objective interest in collective production but continually reaffirms its consent to economic exploitation and cultural domination by private interests because the possibility of an attainable alternative does not exist in the commonsense of the working class. Working class life is thus lived under the hegemony of *capitalism as commonsense* and it follows that class specific commonsense must be the cultural ground on which political work (which must also therefore be cultural work) to transform it from commonsense to good sense must be located. Lived culture is also analysed in the terms of structuralist theory for identifiable relations of homology. The forms and patterns of culture are, once socially established as custom and internalized by individuals as the result of socialization, able to act as generative devices to create new, but by definition structured and in that sense determined, responses to situations. So the study of the lived culture of the working class is a theoretically and politically correct location for socialist activity.

Analyses of cultural production, no matter how fine-grained and literary their quality, often pay little attention to the importance of time and place. It is necessary to reject the idea that the forms of something called working class culture can be analysed from the discourse of everyday life and derived from a single generative relationship at a specific location. It is particularly wrong to argue that one site, be it the shop-floor, locus of production, or anywhere else, is the 'privileged site and generator of working-class culture.' (Willis 1980:187) In no sense is shop-floor resistance a new discovery, what is new is the argument that it is at this point, at the interface between capital and labour, that the central meanings of working class culture are created, '[w]orking-class culture is formed in the struggle between capital's demand for particular forms of labour power and the search for a secure location within this relation of dependency.' (Johnson 1980a:237) Understood in its broadest historical sense this interpretation has some force (although it distorts what has been gained by the concept of hegemony to regard the working class as living in a relationship of *dependency* to capital) but the tendency is to narrow rather than deepen and extend this insight. It is certainly possible to talk of shop-floor culture and when we do it becomes clear that the shop-floor is as much a site and space for cultural forms generated elsewhere as a site for the production of its own master forms. (Edwards 1979:147-8) If there is anything specific about the shop-floor as a generator of cultural forms and meanings that transcend other mediations like ethnicity, sex, age, and nationality, for example, then they do not have to do with the capital relationship but with the relationship to authority since, obviously, work-shops both ante-date and post-date capitalism. It makes more sense to see shop-floor culture in these terms, as responses to a more or less total institution in which formal authority is held by a distinct group of managers and supervisors. So far from the modern (capitalist) shop-floor creating "piss-takes" and other forms of petty resistance these are, in fact, forms which have existed for centuries and can certainly be documented in medieval trade practices. Some forms are recognizably initiation rituals suffered by generations of apprentices, others are ways of "cocking a snook", "getting one back", and are clearly practices which help to save face and preserve independence of mind and a kind of self-respect in the face of the sometimes resented imposition of superior authority.

There *are* ways specific to the working class of resisting capital and the state which derive from actual possession of labour power and the potential capacity to control the workplace. Workers can strike, go-slow and work to rule, they can sit-in, work-in and they can use collective strength to picket and demonstrate. These are all collective and formal means by which the power conferred by the possession of labour power and productive plant can be used. Then there are the practices of absenteeism, sabotage, "perks", "cabbage" which are more or less individually practised but, of course, socially recognized ways of resisting and living with any system of production that is not directly self-managed.[2] And working class resistance does call for, and when practised produces, typical emotional responses and attitudes of mind; a long strike demands a dogged stubbornness, standing on picket line calls requires a thick skin and an unflinching identification with the group, to shun by collective decision an individual seen every day in the enforcement of a communal sanction calls for a strong-minded and almost emotionless will. All of these are recognizable responses in the cultural repertoire of working class life.

But much working class resistance is not to capital or to its direct agents but to the official authority of the state (especially where that authority is perceived as illegitimately or arbitrarily exercised). The number of state authorities that confront working class people and make life difficult are legion. Dealing with them was, and largely still is, a task men hated and left to women; sick notes to be collected; forms to be filled; rent-collectors to be cajoled; housing officials to be faced down; headteachers to be impressed; social workers and social security agents to be conned. Many characteristically working class forms of resistance are generated in response to this massive official presence. It was the municipal socialists who largely created this system and perhaps what people respond to when Conservative politicians promise to cut back the number of state servants is the hope that it might be the Corporation housing manager. As I have argued above, the working class has been subjected to all kinds of co-ordinated and systematic attempts at control - the workhouse and the means test are still powerful folk memories and so still have their effects. Those forms of control correctly seen by neo-Gramscians as subaltern are especially resented.[3] Forms of resistance to such insults vary within the working class from open defiance to symbolic resistance - including, "keeping your head down", "soldiering on", "letting it go in one ear and out of the other", ("take no notice, dearie"). What working class school pupils expect of their teachers is almost exactly what their parents expect of managers. What people dislike above all is "being looked down on", "belittled", "treated like dirt", especially by people with a little authority who are "jumped-up", "no better than us". Officials and managers who forget this will, if there is no organized collective sanction, soon be the personal targets of individuals who decide to "get their own back". This is not truly collective resistance but it is not entirely personal either - an individual who has "had enough" and who decides to "show the bugger he can't treat me like that" may act alone but still within a frame of reference

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2   There is a substantial literature on the socialized East European economies which shows concern with work practices that might be thought evidence of symbolic resistance, petty sabotage, pilfering, and so on, to be a major one for those responsible for economic management. See Nove (1983).

3   A good analysis of subaltern control is provided by Taylor (1980).

understood and accepted by the collective. (Kirby and Mussen 1975) Such individuals may well be regarded as unstable, even as "nutters", but they are not held back if the action seems appropriate. Curiously, the only study that recognizes the 'hidden injuries of class' (Sennett and Cobb, 1982) and gives resistance to class insult and humiliation its rightful importance in structuring the oppositional cultural forms and responses of working class life, is located in the United States.

Yet what of the relationship between this resistance and socialism? Shop-floor culture itself has no necessary importance or significance whatever to socialism. Shop-floor resistances as such are typically intrinsically conservative and designed to defend traditional privileges by custom and practice. It has always been a matter of dismay to the left that when printers stop work they stop the socialist presses with fine equality of treatment. (Harrison 1974) Shop-floor restrictive practices also serve to maintain privileges of access to work which have been more effective in closing out women and non-white workers from skilled trades than any other practices. Tory politics has, in fact, always better been able to reach an accommodation with the more casual ordinary patterns of working class life than with the most strongly respectable (and where Methodism was involved puritanical) liberal-labour politics. And, of course, the near total domination that some factory-town capitalists imposed on their workers and the larger community did encourage two-faced forms of deferential behaviour and habits of mind and the greater the penetration of the employing class into every aspect of workers' lives the more ingrained and caricatured these patterns of response became. (See esp. Joyce 1980) There were always choices, some men became "bosses men", "crawlers", but most "took the rough with the smooth", "knuckled down", "kept themselves to themselves", "coped", "made do", "got by", "waited for something to turn up", "made the best of it", "managed" - there is an endless stock of such phrases in working class discourse. A few people, of course, struggled and fought back, "kept buggering on", as individuals and as collective leaders. Yet all collective resistance correctly analysed as such can be dealt with by the forces of order as resistance by individuals and the cost of leadership could be high.[4] Defeat is, indeed, the normal condition of the working class under capitalism and no one knew that better than the most thoughtful and politically active working men and women.[5] Labour historians are agreed that these traditions and practices developed within a relationship which took the forms of quasi-equal exchange between workmen and masters.

Dependency does not capture adequately the relationship of the organized working class with capital. The working class was forced to accept the rule of capital, the despotism of the factory, but it did so within the forms of equal exchange. Although socialist economists argued for the product of all labour to the labourers and although

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4   In time the labour movement itself came to provide a structure of opportunity for individual and family advancement but that is another matter.

5   Reid (1978:361), 'The process of containment of the working class does not then require 'special' explanation whether in the form of a labour aristocracy, social control or the cultural subordination of crucial strata, all of which tend to assume that, left to itself, the working class would be spontaneously united and revolutionary due to its economic position. On the contrary, defeat is the normal condition of the working class under capitalism, for in the absence of consistently formulated politics and carefully constructed alliances, it is only able spontaneously to sustain sectional revolt.'

Marx derided the slogan of equal exchange this became the true nature of the settlement with capital. In effect working people said, 'very well, then, on your terms - now we'll see you keep them.' Workers attempted to enforce their asserted rights within the discourse of, "a fair day's pay for a fair day's work"; they paraded on gala days with banners reading, 'Let us Work Together'; they appealed for civil and political rights on the grounds that they were "respectable" and no threat to order; when they were offended by high-handed arrogance the men stood with their hats on because they felt entitled to respect. They kept their part of the bargain and they expected the masters to keep theirs. This is not, in fact, resistance to capital but a communally, culturally, negotiated consent to capitalist relations of production. These are the forms of that consent. In one sense this must be acknowledged to be a culture of historical and strategic defeat, but for those who lived this culture it was a culture of pride, integrity and dignity. (Kirby and Mussen 1975; Joyce 1980) The real lived culture of defeat and demoralization they regarded as "soft", demeaning, and unmanly. Working class people living by the characteristic code of their culture settled for what they could get and made the best of it - with courage and dignity.

CRITICAL COMMENTS ON THREE CULTURALIST ACCOUNTS OF WORKING CLASS LIFE

Wigan Pier Revisited: Bea Campbell's (1984) pilgrimage in Orwell's (1937) footsteps has been rightly recognized as an acutely observed description of the condition of ordinary lives in Thatcher's England and as a significant contribution to contemporary socialist thought. Campbell, however, reproduces in a most uncritical fashion the central theses of the BCCCS collective. Her observations of working class "respectability" are particularly open to question. Campbell argues:

> The history of decency and respectability has been the subject of scrutiny among labour historians preoccupied by the ideological contours of class. From their debates it has become clear that decency and respectability were and are part of the ideological material of the upward-striving and self-improvers. They separate them from the raucous street life of their inebriate and indecent inferiors, the casual poor. Respectability and decency are rooted in an ideology of privacy and modesty which has never been universal among the working class but which has been instrumental in dividing strata of the class from each other. (Campbell 1984:220)

It is hard to know where to start. Are 'decency and respectability' to be lumped together as synomymous concepts? That seems unhelpful, to say the least. Is it true that the debates of historians have made this view clear? It is not clear to Barbara Taylor (1983) who explores with much greater sympathy and historical accuracy than Bea Campbell what she recognizes as a working-class culture 'fiercely independent, democratic, and class-conscious: a style of working-class respectability which soon became as detestable to its upper-class opponents as the cries of an angry rabble.' (Taylor 1983:233) Is it right to depict the well-paid skilled working-class as having borrowed 'its domestic ethics, sexual standards and economic aspirations from other classes'? (Campbell 1984:220) There are many working-class biographies and autobiographies which give direct testimony to the view that class-cultural and moral reform, the struggle against squalor, violence and drink, was successful only in so far as it was an internal project, which did not merely adopt bourgeois habits and mores but took them in a mediated form - where it did not develop its own in real independence. Jill Liddington's (1984) excellent biography of the northern working-

class feminist Selina Cooper is particularly interesting in this context. I know a little from personal experience about the conventionally respectable culture the slate mining communities created in north Wales, and they certainly did not copy it from the local bourgeoisie. That reform, it is true, had a high cost. It almost invariably pushed women into the home, consolidated traditions of "women's work," and led to the male "family wage" concept. But working-class people created that culture for themselves, within a Church and State regime that encouraged such developments, to be sure, but nevertheless for themselves. And not only in Britain but wherever there was an industrial working class. The German SDP women would barely give Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg a polite hearing whenever those revolutionaries presented the case for domestic feminism. It is not satisfactory to suppose that these women all lived in a state of false-consciousness, that they were not in some sense aware of how this cultural choice had come to be made or that they were ignorant of its costs. And, finally, are people who try to do the best for themselves and their children ("got out in order to get up") to be condemned for their lack of class solidarity as "upward-striving"? That view seems unlikely to attract much popular support. One of the most extraordinary qualities of Bea Campbell's book is that pride, dignity and the desire to the make the best of one's opportunities is actually a dominant theme in the words of the working class people she records. She relates at one point, 'my case was administered by a young black woman, the counter clerk in the dole office,' (Ibid) and had she, one wonders, got there without, self-help, pride, and dignity, without perhaps even a little "upward-striving"? Then again we meet a 21 year old woman who says, 'I'd wanted to be a nurse or a policewoman,' (Ibid:89) and are these not legitimate aspirations? It might be unfair to leave that as a rheorical question since it is clear that Bea Campbell *does* regard such aspirations as legitimate, indeed, regards such jobs - and her own - as working-class. But that only makes problematic where we draw the line. Are working-children to be encouraged to become teachers and nurses and journalists but not lawyers and accountants and doctors? Or is it just stock-brokers and company directors working class people should keep their children away from? The book cover reveals that Bea Campbell is a product of the ordinary respectable working-class; her father studied at evening classes to become first an engineer and then a teacher, and her mother was a nurse and a trade union activist. Most working class people now in the professions have backgrounds like that: respectable backgrounds where they were treated with decency and encouraged to make the best of their talents - as Bea Campbell undoubtedly has. There are ambiguities and contradictions here that need to be discussed.

Girls, Wives, Factory Lives: Feminists have complained about the presentation of a *male* working class culture as representing the fundamental characteristics of the culture of working people, but they have carried out their own research without questioning a more significant framework of assumptions established by the most influential writers within this field. The celebration of what is unmistakably a "rough" tradition within working class culture as working class culture *itself* should be a matter for dismay, and it is specifically feminist writers who are most emphatic in their dismissive contempt for the respectable values of ordinary people. Anna Pollert's (1981) study of women workers in a Bristol tobacco factory provides a representative study of the tendencies in cultural studies that I wish to criticize. Pollert is particularly interested in the expression of symbolic resistance which the BCCCS understand to have an important role in the formation of political opinion and potential for organized struggle. The management, however, is so confident of its efficient control that it can tolerate with indulgence a socialist-feminist research sociologist knowing that the only evidence of "resistance" she will find will be women snatching glances at popular

magazines while weighing with 'robotic dexterity' several dozen single ounce quantities of tobacco every minute. The male managers openly laugh at her while the women workers console her with advice to, 'take no notice, and write your book, dearie.'

Let's hope they enjoyed the book she wrote for it deserves to be a classic of its kind. What is problematic about working class life for working class people (getting a job, keeping the kids clothed, finding the money for the bills, having a bit of fun when you can) has nothing whatever to do with what socialist theoreticians of the radical left find problematic about working class culture. In fact, this tendency wants to maintain a rather large number of contradictory positions: that workers are more skilled and knowledgeable about their work than is properly credited *and* that working class jobs are undergoing a systematic transformation by de-skilling; that working class life is a hard physical and mental struggle *and* that young people who know this from experience and obtain educational qualifications so as to "better themselves" have taken the road of co-option and class collaboration; that working class culture is to be recognized and valued *and* that working class thought is riddled with labourism, corporatism, sectionalism, sexism, nationalistic chauvinism, racism, and that working class people should really be living with different heads. It is not surprising that ordinary working class people find this attitude unattractive. What this sort of analysis leads to is revealed in its starkest form by Pollert who can see that factory, shop-floor culture, including many elements of that shop-floor resistance (for which she searched assiduously and largely in vain) is an actual obstacle to the development of those forms of collective organization, for example trade unions, which have always been understood by socialists to constitute the core of working class political culture. Pollert even contrasts 'symbolic' culture and organization as if the forms of working class organization were not themselves products.[6] A movement which started out as an attack on the triviality of class culture in conventional analyses has narrowed the concept to an impossibly restricted set of meanings.

Typical Girls: Christine Griffin's (1985) research on young women leaving school is as typical a product of the BCCCS as the girls she studied are of their class. She appears to have carried out some of her work in the very district of Birmingham in which I grew up so I'm inclined to regard it with some affection. She has produced, however, an ambiguous and highly contradictory text. Griffin uncritically adopts the idealist interpretation of culture propounded by the BCCCS. The term "culture" is used, she says, to refer to 'shared principles of life, characteristics of particular classes, groups or shared social milieux. Cultures are produced as groups make sense of their social existence in the course of their everyday experience.' (Griffin 1985:202 n.6, quoting Education Group 1981:27) The consequences of this are especially apparent in Griffin's work.

Griffin declares herself to be interested in how the young women she studied fared in the sexual, marriage and labour markets and thus one would expect some analysis of the characteristics of those markets and of market behaviour. However, these prove to be "markets" in which (some?) people are said to have no choice. In other words, some

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6　　Pollert, (1981:157), 'resistance to control remained at the symbolic level of class culture without shop-floor organization.'

people must be sellers at the price set by the buyers - a compulsory buyers' market. But Griffin's analysis leads her into plain textual contradictions. Thus she informs us, 'Students felt trapped - the choice between the dole and "rubbish jobs" was no choice at all.' (Ibid:80) But a few pages later she tells a different story, '[t]hese young women were not prepared to take "shit jobs" simply for the sake of being employed.' (Ibid:96) So did they have a choice or didn't they? Of course, the girls *do* have a choice but Griffin's implicitly questioning inverted commas and the stressed qualification *real* choice are the marks of her unsatisfactory attempts to avoid the implications of what is, in fact, a cultural determinism of a particularly blatant kind. Distinct groups within a social formation produce not merely 'principles of life' but recognizable forms of speech, collective organizations, structures of feeling, unifying symbols, and the products of their skills. The extent to which such distinct groups do, in fact, produce and thus live within a well-defined and characteristic culture is highly variable and dependent on a multitude of structuring determinants. All this is missed by the restrictive idealist understanding of culture employed by Griffin.

Sometimes Griffin gives a straightforward account of rational choice. It is recognized that the young women possessed different financial and intellectual resources and made decisions within that context. As one girl is quoted: 'When I left school I thought, well its this or probably on the dole waiting, so I thought I'd better take this. It's better than sitting there on the dole taking the money, bored stiff.' (Ibid:141) That sounds like reasoned choice to me. To be sure the alternatives are pretty limited but then for many of us they often are. But in addition to this theory of limited options Griffin also offers an explanation of their decision in terms of distinctive class cultural values: 'Many preferred the support and "laughs" of working with other young women in traditionally female jobs. This was not a mark of their conservative views, but a pragmatic decision made in a situation of limited options: an affirmation of the value of female friendship groups.' (Ibid:191) Here, Griffin plainly suggests that this was not a choice made in a state of *false consciousness*, indicating that the women were the victims of an internalized dominant ideology, but a pragmatic, that is rationally based, decision. Again stressing the processes of rational choice Griffin identifies a mechanism by which objective statistical "fates" of a group are internalized and thus reproduced on which Bourdieu and Boltanski (1978) have placed a great deal of explanatory weight: These young women recognized that there would be even less space for them in tertiary education or higher status "careers" than their male peers. (Griffin 1985:117) In other words, the girls are said to have observed that more men than women entered tertiary education and that more men than women were managerially and professionally employed and decided for that reason that they had little chance of being successful in attempting to obtain such positions and so did not apply. It ought to be noted, however, that this mechanism is class specific for only working class girls reason like this - if they do - since middle class girls are, in fact, as likely as boys to enter higher education. Such thought processes are plausible and might well be important, but Griffin actually provides no direct evidence to demonstrate that the girls really did think like this. We ought to distinguish here between self-defeating decisions made on some false belief and decisions based on an accurate appraisal of the biases of employers which make the effort of application genuinely pointless. The prevalence of self-defeating ideas might point to a demoralization affecting the students' culture, whereas decisions of the latter sort should be admitted as fully rational and as a secondary effect of gatekeepers' bias.

Other areas of decision making are treated by Griffin in the same problematic and contradictory fashion: Marriage was hardly a positive choice, since no socially

acceptable alternatives were available. (Ibid:54) And: '...sexuality can never simply be a free choice or a natural behaviour, because of the numerous sanctions against supposedly deviant sexualities, and the extent of pressures to be heterosexual, preferably within marriage.' (Ibid:59) In this passage absence of normative pressure makes a choice a 'free choice'. This is a remarkable enough idea in itself, but in what culture is there no normative pressure? As I reconstruct the form of Griffin's argument it goes like this:

1   shared principles of life are produced by people as they make sense of their day to day experiences;
2   one principle produced by the class to which these girls belong is that girls look for a husband, get married, have children and take primary responsibility for looking after them;
3   there is thus constituted a sexual and marriage market;
4   because they 'live' within this 'ideology' the girls have 'no choice' but to compete in this market and take what they get.

This is *not* a coherent argument. Basically it is just an "oversocialized (wo)man" thesis of the sort that persuaded most sociologists to abandon Parsonian structural functionalism twenty years ago. This character of Griffin's theory is made particularly clear when she talks of 'social (i.e. cultural and ideological) pressures' (Ibid:49) : by an extraordinary irony this 'social pressure' theory comes from a woman working within a group renowned for its discovery of culture as resistance.

In my view the academic elite among school-leavers have a wide career choice and the rest a much narrower one, they are in fact presented with a most unattractive set of alternatives - to take what is left or do without. Educational qualifications are awarded only to a certain percentage of candidates and the labour market offers only so many positions. Within that structure what has to be explained are the mechanisms that create a socially differentiated distribution of qualifications and jobs. The causes of differential educational attainment are complex and various and cannot be discussed here and I can offer only a few comments on the mechanisms responsible for secondary effects. That is to say I shall attend only to those cases where students with the same level of educational attainment make different decisions about their employment destination. It is necessary to consider here (i) selective application and (ii) selective preference by employers. If the distribution is to some extent due to selective application then that may be motivated by (a) the belief (which may be true or not) that employers' bias makes application pointless, (b) lack of information (the reasons for which are open to empirical investigation) about alternative courses of action thus effectively denying the possibility of choice, and (c) a value preference formed in adequate knowledge of the alternatives and their costs and benefits (this includes both "cultural" values and decisions made within the different opportunity cost and benefit structures of students differentially located within the class structure).

"Ideology" is a notoriously difficult and inescapably contested concept. It seems most helpful in this context to adopt a tight rather than a loose definition of ideology (because the loose usage means no more than "socially related belief") and if we say that false or distorted beliefs which support the oppression of one social group by another are ideological beliefs, then we should ask to what extent the educational and employment opportunities of certain social groups are, in fact, limited by the false beliefs of (i) others and (ii) themselves. If some employers believe that some work is unsuitable work for girls and refuse to employ them on these grounds then we are

certainly dealing with an effective ideology from which women suffer. If some girls falsely believe that they are incapable of gaining educational qualifications or falsely believe that their application for certain sorts of employment will not be successful then this is self-oppressive, but it is not clear that we can identify the effects of ideology. A false or inadequate belief, the result perhaps of wishful thinking, ought not to be held to be sufficient evidence of ideology. Only where such beliefs can be shown to be ones maintained and propogated by a dominant group whose interests are thereby served ought we to recognize an effect of ideology. The mere expression of a preference to have and care for children, for example, is not in itself evidence of enthrallment within an oppressive ideology. It may be a personal preference which has been made and accepted with a full appreciation of the opportunity costs and expected rewards. The assertion that others are dominated by ideology and live in a state of false consciousness is one that should be made (if ever) with precise argument and within a context of respect for different ways of life. There is a real danger of ending up with an absurdly reductionist thesis that since all social action must be based on some social belief and all social beliefs are "ideological" that "everything comes down to ideology": one might as helpfully adopt a physical reductionism that "everything comes down to atoms". It is the actually effective formal mechanisms that structure what can be done at what cost that we need to make the centre of our work in this area.

BEYOND THE IDEALIST VISION OF CLASS CULTURE

Some of these difficulties, particularly those centred around the debate on respectability, are acknowledged by BCCCS writers. Clarke (1980:247), for example, says that respectability 'provided at times mechanisms for the division of the class and the insertion of its "respectable" elements into bourgeois political discourse and action'. Yet the question of ordinary respectability is never given the serious attention Hobsbawm's work on the duality of respectability suggests is necessary. Rather, those sections of the working class which have sought to retain certain signs of respectability - like Sunday best - are (where this sign is not simply arbitrarily mocked and devalued in a Bohemian spirit) seen as having adopted a corporatist position, in other words a position of cultural (ideological) and political accommodation to capitalist domination. It is obvious that the working class could never have successfully imposed its own hegemony, the Gramscian alternative, without a revolution, and a working class revolution has never been at any time a real political possibility in Britain. Lacking a revolution the BCCCS group are thrown back to the directly and spontaneously rebellious and insubordinate elements of working class practice that have always been regarded as characteristic of the "rough" or lumpenproletariat, and have actually asserted the theoretical primacy of this style of living as being the given nature of working class culture itself.

It is true that not all observers take this view. Seabrook (1980), for example, accepts what he sees as the contemporary domination of the "rough" tradition of working class life with much less enthusiasm for its potential as a ground for socialist cultural-political work and has directly reversed the conventional position of academic psychology on the culture of poverty. For Seabrook the experience of poverty created respectable, "coping", modes of behaviour and if the great strength of this culture is now waning the force that saps its strength is prosperity.[7] The dangers of this sort of

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7   Seabrook (1982:131), 'The end of poverty weakened the transmission of values that grew out of it.'

dark romanticism (and crude economism) are so obvious that most writers do make a conscious attempt to treat aspects of this working class culture critically, 'this is a culture of subordination which, in the process of resistance (of sabotage, of doing the bosses down, of absenteeism), continues to reproduce its own subordination (and the oppression of others - for example, women) through the particular valuations of masculinity'. (Clarke 1980:248) Even so, the problems created by making these responses the determining elements of working class culture, the cultural ground, are less easily resolved. In the attempt to analyse the assumptions of this resistant culture the BCCCS's account becomes all too close to the deprivation theories that have long been anathema to radical sociologists. To say that 'a disjunction between attitudes expressed in practical (class) activity and more generalized statements about the public world is a continuing feature of working class culture', (Critcher 1980a:31) is to take a position on working class culture curiously similar to that of the cultural deprivation theorists. It is not so much that this particular statement is obviously wrong, but it is not definitive of working class culture, not an observation related in any way to class position derivable from any definitive account of structural location, and not peculiar to working class life. Were it not offered as a description of working class thought it might well, in fact, have been taken for a cynical comment on the normal distance between political action and discourse. Discourse theorists, in fact, *do* argue for the necessary generality of this phenomenon.

How theory and practice are articulated is of vital importance to the theory of political praxis. However, to merely invert the relationship is quite inadequate. To argue that in a classless society the working class understanding of theory and practice would be rational will not help release us from this romanticism and the politics of wishful thinking it burdens the left with:

> The working-class view would be the rational one, were it not located in class society, i.e. that theory is only useful in so far as it really does help to do things, to accomplish practical tasks and change nature. Theory is asked to be in a close dialectic with the material world. For the middle-class, more aware of its position in a class society, however, theory is seen partly in its social guise of qualifications as the power to move up on the social scale. In this sense theory is well worth having even if it is never applied to nature. It serves its purpose as a ticket to travel. (Willis 1977:194-5)

Willis argues that the working class has a material and practical conception of knowledge that is antagonistic to the theoretical knowledge taught in schools. Whatever relationship may exist between theory and practice and social class relations it is unlikely to be as simple as that. It is undoubtedly the economic division of labour, and the slavish scholastic division of knowledge that mirrors it, which maintains the theory/practice distinction in all its forms - pure/applied, academic/practical, and so on. But it should be remembered that in the first decades of this century the grammar schools slowly modified their academic curriculum in response to *middle class pressure*, that is from middle class parents, for *practical* vocational courses in such subjects as commercial arithmetic, shorthand writing and modern languages. The middle class did this, moreover, not to enable their children to move up the social scale

but to stay where they were - that is the point of the credentialling thesis.[8] As for the working class, if Johnson's argument that the nineteenth century working class had a 'theory of economic exploitation, a theory of the character of social and cultural domination', is accepted then it cannot at the same time (without the help of "dialectical argument" at least) be maintained that to the working class theory is useful only in so far as it helps to 'do things, accomplish practical tasks and change nature.'

This conception of theory and practice in working class thought is quite wrong. In 1826 an apprentice hatter named James Burn wrote of his mind being opened to useful knowledge. Vincent (1980:140), in an analysis of this and other nineteenth century working class autobiographies, emphasizes that, '[b]y useful knowledge he meant, in any practical sense, useless knowledge.' This was the general response of working class people who studied for enlightenment. How can the attitude Willis believes is definitively working class be distinguished from that prototypically bourgeois philosophy - vulgar pragmatism? What of the minority who still think like James Burn (who was then in an even smaller minority): is theirs also not working class thought? These questions must be raised for they confront the essentialism that actually underpins the BCCCS group's approach to the study of lived culture. The grounds for deciding that a certain cultural practice (or complex of practices) can be identified as working class must be that it is produced by working class people and thus it is essential if circularity is to be avoided to establish some non-cultural criteria of working classness. The BCCCS have grounded working class culture in the struggle against exploitation, a struggle economically determined by the structural relationship of capital and labour, and a culture that in its particular forms is mediated by contingent phenomena including age, sex, race, religion, and so on. One obvious problem with this approach is that what is common to the lived culture of, say, late nineteenth century north Wales quarry villages and early twentieth century Hull fishing communities is much less interesting than what is different. Analyses of actual working class groups and communities carried out within the cultural studies framework are invariably illuminating but how much of this is due to the observational sensitivities and literary skills of the reporters (it clearly helps to be something of a poet when it comes to analysing forms, elements and mediations) and how much to the objective strengths of their theory, is an open question. Their theory is, when pressed, clearly idealist and economistic rather than truly *materialist*. If the working class is stipulatively defined by its relation to capital then its real and objective economic and political interests are theoretically given. So when working class people living as they do see their interests as Marxist theory does their perceptions are true 'penetrations', but when they do not their perceptions of reality must be blocked by 'limitations': there is a lurking, troll-like, Hegelianism underlying the BCCCS group's concept of working class culture. There is a true working class culture, a theoretically definitive working class culture, a magic fundamentalist moment when everything comes together. The ideal worker who labours physically and directly for capital and who lives the consciousness of the Marxian collective proletariat *defines* working class culture.

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8   It is not generally realized that before credentialling had become established as the central mechanism mediating the transition from school to work the chances of a middle class youth maintaining his status through suitable employment were much less certain than they are now.

For all their astuteness when it comes to criticizing the problematics of others the BCCCS group are less than explicit about their own. Is their work a eulogy for a class to which we must say farewell? Is it a programme of political praxis pointing the way towards new forms of class organization and allegiance? In fact it completely disregards as 'uninteresting' those who are the main force within the economically constituted working class: the so-called 'ear'oles', that is people who read and think and try to get to the bottom of things and not be taken in by fashionable nonsense. It further ignores the large now economically middle class group whose origins, and perhaps cultural habits and political allegiances are working class. And this despite the fact that in many Marxist formulations teachers, social workers, non-executive local state officials, journalists, nurses, and similar workers are, in any case, situated within the working class or given some "contradictory location". Whatever the possibilities may be of such workers giving their support to socialism it will not be on the basis of sympathy for the lived culture of the lumpenproletariat. Undisciplined responses from this class fraction constitutes a threat to the legitimate personal and political interests of ordinary respectable people who will always keep their distance from lumpen elements and, in all probability, from theory infatuated radical intellectuals who have decided to celebrate petty and symbolic 'resistance' as working class culture.

Cultural studies, as we have learned to understand it, has made a powerful impact and has, indeed, given us a greater understanding of how working class people live and think. We should, however, recognize the theoretical inadequacies and biases which I have subjected to critical attention. Students of culture should be concerned with the entire way of life of a social group or community. "Culture" needs to be defined not in idealist terms of beliefs (which are then treated as "ideologies") but in terms of the practices of a social group as it goes about its business of economic production, living its home life, bringing up its children, and managing its relations with other social groups. Systems of belief that motivate the individual and collective actions of a group must, of course, be an eventual object of investigation and need to be studied in all their aspects. An account of the propogation, distribution and effects of the characteristic social beliefs of a social group is useful - but it is unhelpful to identify such beliefs as being in themselves the "culture" of a community.

The entire question of the relationships between the dominant and subordinate classes within a social formation is enormously problematic. That working class people consented in some collective sense to capitalism is an historical thesis that can be seriously defended. It makes sense of much that happened. But "hegemony" is a word I have come to distrust. We have learned from Gramsci that the organization of mass consent to social, political and cultural domination maintained through the systematic dissemination of centrally important motivating beliefs and with the integral support of state force is crucially important to recognize and combat by all the means we have. Yet this dynamic concept is starting to loose its grip. It has come to mean the commonsense that holds people in sway, that keeps them from recognizing their collective power, and that revisionist meaning dematerializes, forces on to the plane of idealism, a very concrete and precise concept. The use of hegemony in this literature has become so all-embracing as to deny systematic analysis and demonstration. Confronted with such would be explanatory couplets as 'the constraints of hegemony/ideology' I prefer to remain silent.

CONCLUSION
I am clearly a long way from home. But the BCCCS's approach to cultural studies has not been uninfluential in New Zealand and the reasons for prefering to concentrate on

the theoretical fountainhead should be obvious. I'd like to encourage some quiet rethinking, and perhaps even a little self-criticism, which a frontal attack on indigenous work would certainly make impossible. It's downright odd to find such politically romantic and analytically sloppy thought coming out of a working class city like Birmingham and perhaps even odder that it should be taken up so readily in a country with mud on its boots. But I'm not going to be tempted into a sociology of cultural studies. We know that this approach - with all its *attitudes* - has been influential amongst us and in that sense I offer this paper as a contribution to New Zealand sociology.

It is important to study how people strive to "make the best" of their lives, how they try to get what they want with the resources they have. People possess different resources, and young people do so largely as a result of their families' location within the class system, and all of us necessarily act within what is at any one moment a given distribution of positions that constitute "opportunities". Perhaps different social groups do place different valuations on different kinds of work, or on the costs they are prepared to make to obtain it, and if so then left-wing students of cultural studies need to find a way out of the conceptual trap they are in. On the one hand they are constrained by cultural relativism (or simply courtesy) to acknowledge and respect the validity of different value systems and on the other they have their committment to take the "prisoners of dominant ideology" thesis seriously. The ten bucks each way solution to this dilemma is not a good bet. We should accept that choices are always structured in this sense, always subject to some degree of normative pressure, and that there are always opportunity costs associated with all courses of action. We should accept also that in certain areas of life making a choice is perhaps typically a complex and continuing process in which options are kept open and then let go often without much formal rational thought. An option may be dropped, making another more or less forced, for reasons that may remain unarticulated to oneself. The formation of class-cultural trajectories is an integral part of the decision-making processes at this point of school to work transition: to live within the culture or group subculture is how other choices are made.

When students form class-cultural trajectories they do this collectively and thus constitute continuing cultural formations of a distinctive kind within which individual students can locate themselves, and this should be understood as the way in which they make a broad choice about their future by pre-structuring the context of future decisions. We have started to think seriously about class cultural processes of decision-making and for that we have the pioneering work of those who have created the field of contemporary cultural studies to thank.

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RETRIEVAL AND RECONSTRUCTION: A SENSE OF PURPOSE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE 1980'S

Ian Taylor, Professor of Sociology Carleton University
Ottawa Canada

This article is a revised version of the Keynote Address given to the Social Sciences Section, ANZAAS Congress, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand, January 1987.

I am very grateful to the Organizing Committee of the ANZAAS Congress for the invitation to give today's keynote address. I feel flattered to be standing in for my celebrated sociological colleague Anthony Giddens. I am probably not the only sociological mortal to have been amused and reassured by Professor Laurie Taylor's observation in the recent **Times Higher Educational Supplement** that the word Giddens is, in fact, plural. The well kept secret is that there are several Tony Giddens working away in England: How else could one explain the constant flow of publications under that name? Few of us emulate the quite extraordinary depth and extent of Professor Giddens' scholarship. But I trust that I may still be able to raise some questions about the condition of social science in 1987 that will excite your interest.

Tony Giddens' earliest published work, notably **Capitalism and Social Theory** and **Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber,**(1971; 1972) was very much taken up with the task of "retrieving" the insight and wisdoms of classical social theorists for use in current sociological analysis of contemporary industrial capitalist societies. I want to engage in another act of retrieval today - only the retrieval I am concerned with is of a rather more recent and usually less celebrated body of literature than the classic works of nineteenth century social theory.

The suggestion I want to make - and I certainly don't want to be dogmatic about what is only a proposition to stimulate reflexion - is that social scientists in the last 1980s could find some inspiration - indeed, could regain a sense of direction - from close examination of the progressive applied social science of the period 1930-1950. I shall illustrate this argument more specifically in a moment, but, before I do, two points of clarification are required.

When I speak of social science regaining some sense of direction, I am taking it as a given that there is some sense of *crisis* in social science in the late 1980s. I cannot possibly speak to the situation in all disciplines, but I certainly have a real sense of a profound crisis of purpose in the academic studies of social work and social policy. The discipline of economics also seems to me to be disorientated by the demise of orthodox Keynesianism and by the unexpected severity and depth of the 1980s recession. Psychology and geography seem to be unnerved by the challenge of a feminist problematic and, in the case of psychology, by the normative reality of competitive market individualism and what Christopher Lasch has dubbed the 'culture of narcissism.' (Lasch 1979) In terms of my own discipline of sociology, the crisis in part assumes the form that was anticipated in 1970 by my dear friend and inspiration, the late Alvin Gouldner, in **The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology,**(1970) in the

enormous gulf that exists between the complexity, speed and subtlety of ongoing changes in social and economic relations, on the one hand, and the simple-minded vocabulary and technique of empiricist sociology, on the other. But the sense of crisis is surely also a symptom of a disenchantment that is widely observable amongst those members of what Gouldner called the 'new class' - the vastly enlarged non-commercial middle class entering into the labour market in the 1960s and early 1970s - for whom the doing of sociology was, quite specifically, a part of a process of social transformation: an ingredient either in the making of political revolution or in the project of individual human liberation. The onset of the economic and associated political recession of the late 1970s to middle 1980s, and, in particular, the emergence of a self-confidently reactionary Right, has certainly had a disorienting and disorganizing effect on the sense of purpose of the new class involved in sociology: and, I suspect, in many other social science disciplines. And a similar crisis of purpose and of general understanding-of-the-world is also transparent, I think, among members of the new class employed in the "liberal professions" (in Government, education, social work, planning and so on). There is no longer in the new class a clear sense of the *rationale* for the work that it does; here is no clear idea of how that work relates to some larger societal project of reform, "liberation" or (certainly) of revolution. And associated with this ennui, one can observe a set of what we might see as morbid or pathological developments among social theorists and practical sociologists.

One of the most obvious and, I think, self-indulgent of developments in social theory in North America is the pre-occupation of analysis with the phenomenon of "postmodernism". On the understanding that the loss of purpose in political life or the dominant form of social relations is, in some sense, a product of the disconnected ideas and images that are now constantly thrown up on a 24-hour basis for consumption in the market-place, some social theorists have decided to surrender to, or even to embrace, this new social form for its creativity, dynamism and energy, looking sometimes for signs of rebelliousness at the margins (as in Marshall Berman's **All That Is Solid Melts into Air** (1982)), whilst others have taken up the stance of distanced moral critique, unable to speak of the conditions that might make for transformation in what is seen to be an all-embracing and seamless post-modernist world (as in Arthur Kroker and David Cook's angst-ridden indictment of what they call the 'excremental culture' of contemporary North America, in their recent collection of essays on **The Post Modern Scene** (1986)). In Britain, some of the same convolutions are also apparent, but in that country the election and then the re-election of the Thatcher Government, with the subsequent loss of power, influence and personal security of the "new class", has resulted in an other, distinctive sense of oppression, resentment and crisis. An equally pathological development, accentuated no doubt by the failure of the great Miners Strike of 1984-5, is a tendency on the part of some revisionist thinkers within the "new class" (like Michael Ignatieff) to visit the responsibility for the continuing dominance of Thatcherism on the British working-class and the sectoral, defensive demands of its trade union movement.[1]

I will not be offering out a detailed critique of these new post-modern or revisionist sociological stories today.[2] I want to mention their existence, however, and indeed

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1   For a review of the recent shift of progressive opinion in Britain away from the working class and trade union movement, especially away from the Mineworkers, see Samuel 1986.

2   However, for an exemplary essay on the new "designer socialism" in Britain, see Tonkin 1986.

their prevalence, as some measure of the sense of crisis I alluded to earlier (and to which, I want to argue, an act of retrieval might constitute some kind of answer). They are the most obvious expressions, for me, of a loss of direction and purpose in sociology, and, by extension, in other social science areas.

My second cautionary observation is intended to refine my own purpose in suggesting the retrieval of some elements of the social scientific project of the 1930-1950 period. I certainly do not believe that social, economic and political realities of the 1980s can profitably be "reduced" to - or even compared by analogy with - the realities of the 1930s and 1940s.[3] Not the least of objections to any such a straightforward reduction would be its reactionary accommodation to the silence of pre-war sociology on the existing oppression of women. Perhaps even more momentously, such a simple-minded visitation of the 1930-1950s would surely offer little to our understanding of the overwhelming issue now confronting the human race - the control of nuclear weaponry and the reversal of the political, economic, military and scientific developments which, taken together, E. P. Thompson (1980) has described as 'the logic of exterminism.' Nor either do I want to suggest that the enormous post-war development of social theory - beginning in the early 1960s from the sophisticated reworking of Marxism to the construction of a vast scholarship in feminism and theories of power - is not, in every sense, an advance on the sometimes rather limited theoretical imagination of the sociology of the 1930s to 1950s. Nor, either, I should insist, am I recommending the adoption in the late 1980s of the particular kind of social - democratic or liberal reformism which tended to characterise the social science of this period: my preference, in the absence of any real alternative to reformism, would be to try and creatively rework the particular projects of these earlier practically - minded scholars for the changed circumstances of the present - though others may be satisfied, I suppose, with the indictment of the work simply for being reformist as such. What I *do* want to suggest is that it is worth reflecting on the social role of the social scientist (and his/her relationship to the State, to civil society and the political life of the community) in this period, and understanding how the performance of this particular role informed the substance of the sociological work of the period.

I should explain, though, whom I'm thinking of. In most of the industrial-capitalist societies, the experience of the recession and mass unemployment of 1920-1933, followed then by the advances of fascism, the onset of war and then, above all, the problem of Social Reconstruction was the context for the development of what we may call a progressive social science. In Britain, this was the period in which the more philosophical reflexions of social democratic scholars like R. H. Tawney (1921; 1931) and Harold Laski (cf *inter alia* 1931; 1940; 1943; 1947; 1948) offered out a framework for the more empirically-minded sociological investigations of people like Max Grunhut (1947) and Hermann Mannheim (1946), working on problems of crime and law; John Barron Mays (1954) and in the later 1950s, the Institute of Community

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3   This use of a straightforward comparison between the 1980s and the 1930s, in particular, is particularly common in some recent psychological writing on the effects of unemployment. The "reduction" has the effect of downplaying the extent to which the unemployment of the 1980s is an experience, above all, of young people with no prior labour market involvement. It also fails to give recognition to the specifics of the 1980s unemployment experience for women and for blacks. See, for example Jahoda 1982.

Studies (Willmott and Young 1957) working on problems of housing and community; G.D.H. Cole, David Glass and others working on issues of economic organisation, class and stratification (Cole 1955; Glass 1954) and even, as I have argued elsewhere, the endeavours within psychology of John Bowlby and Anna Freud.[4] In the aftermath of the radicalisation of the population during the second world war, there developed a clear social-scientific commitment (centred, in particular, around the LSE) to the reconstruction of society around the generally-described objectives of Equality and Social Justice. The challenge of the Beveridge Report, and its commitment to a war against the five evils or 'giants' of want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness, was taken up, in particular, and extended in a more fundamentally egalitarian direction by T. H. Marshall (concerned to develop a concept of equality of citizenship,[5] as a vehicle for a reforming social policy directed at the inequities of the British class system) and by Richard Titmuss (1968; 1970) advancing the idea of altruism and of gift-giving to strangers in need as an integral element in a healthy social-democratic society.

In Canada, in the meantime, much of the scholarly and political debate was articulated around the agenda set by the work of the self-styled League for Social Reconstruction, which was formed in 1931 by a small group of academics and politically-active citizens (many of whom were, in fact, to play a major part in the reconstruction of Canada after the war). Frank Underhill, the chairman of the LSR, was a professor of history at the University of Toronto, whilst other founder members included Frank Scott, a famous, radically-minded professor of law and Eugene Forsey, then a lecturer in economics but now a celebrated member of the Canadian Senate. All of these scholars were to contribute to the production of a monograph published in 1935, **Social Planning for Canada** (The Research Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction 1935), a hard-nosed and detailed blueprint for the reconstruction of Canada into a society of much 'greater equality and social justice', which the authors self-consciously insisted would be an attempt to move Canada in the direction of a realistic but committed socialism. Another founding member of the League for Social Reconstruction, Leonard Marsh, was to produce, in 1940, a definitive and extensive study into the distribution of poverty and destitution in the aftermath of the Depression. (Marsh 1940) Both of these LSR initiatives had an enormous impact on the post-war expansion and growth of the first social democratic party in Canada, the Commonwealth Cooperative Federation (which was later to be reorganised as the New Democratic Party), but the LSR work is also widely regarded as having provided the reformist agenda which was appropriated by the post-war Liberal Government of William Lyon Mackenzie King.

In the United States, in the meantime, academics and scholars were quite heavily involved in giving support, encouragement and practical help to the Roosevelt Administration and the great range of programmes of public works and expenditure falling under the rubric of the "New Deal". In sociology, Robert Merton's work on the

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4   Cf. John Bowlby 1946 and 1947-9:39-49; Dorothy Burlingham and Anna Freud 1942 and 1944. For further discussion of the relationship between the work of these psychologists and the 1945-51 Labour Government's project of Social Reconstruction, see Ian Taylor 1981 c.2.

5   Cf. in particular, Marshall's lectures on "Citizenship and Social Class" delivered at Cambridge in 1949, reprinted as Chapter Five of **Class, Citizenship and Social Development** Westport, Connecticut: The Greenwood Press 1964.

anomic social consequences of a structured inequality of opportunity (in **Social Theory and Social Structure**, published in 1937) was just one of many scholarly interventions which legitimised and encouraged reforming Government initiatives in the support of the large public interests of Equality and Social Justice.

I cannot speak with any authority on developments occuring in Australia and New Zealand at this time, though I am aware of a fine and detailed analysis of the work of intellectuals, politicians and labour representatives in the development of the Australian welfare state during the period 1935-1945. (Watts forthcoming) I was also impressed, on a recent visit, by pioneering work that is being done at Massey University on the welfare state in New Zealand.

At one level, all I am doing here is to recall the well-known truth that the 1930-1950 period, in many of the industrial-capitalist societies, was a period of radicalisation within the intelligentsia. But I am also concerned to identify and perhaps to retrieve for our present purposes the *particular kind of radicalisation* that occurred within scholars and intellectuals in that period. At least three features of the radicalism of this period are worth more pointed discussion.

First - and probably most importantly - the scholars of the period were *embedded and engaged* in the broad society in a way that very few scholars of the 1980s, especially those employed within Universities or working directly for the State, can emulate. This is to say, if one likes, that the class position and the social and political role of the scholars of 1930-50 were quite different from the class position and social and political role of the "new class" which dominates education, the civil service and local government in the 1980's.

Scholars like Harold Laski, for example, although employed at the height of his career as Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics, would never have commanded an income that set him much above the lower middle class in Britain: other less fortunate scholars, like Hermann Mannheim and the other so-called "white emigres" from continental Europe,[6] finding it difficult to obtain full-time employment in wartime Britain or in the early post-war period, survived on a mix of part-time or evening teaching, journalism and scholarly writing engaged in, in part, for the money. Many of the scholars associated with the League for Social Reconstruction exhausted what salaries they did earn in subsidising the League's research and publishing activity and in travelling the enormous distances involved in attendance at the national or provincial meetings of the League. At least one of the most prominent members of the LSR, King Gordon, lost his teaching position, according to contemporary accounts, because of his LSR activity, and sustained himself on a LSR subsidy for the following three years and more. (Horn 1980:62-63)

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6   For further discussion of the role of the "white emigres" in British intellectual life during the
     1930-1950 period, see Perry Anderson 1968. Anderson gives particular attention to the
     successful expatriate intellectuals who voluntarily exiled themselves from continental Europe to
     Britain-Wittgenstein in philosophy, Malinowski (anthropology), Namier (History), Popper
     (Social Theory), Isaiah Berlin (Political Theory), Gombrich (Aesthetics), Eysenck (Psychology)
     and Melanie Klein (Psychoanalysis). He could quite reasonably have added the names of Leon
     Radzinowicz in Criminolgy and Karl Mannheim in Sociology.

With respect to Britain and Canada, at any rate, I think that we can conclude that the scholars of the 1930s and 1940s occupied a very similar social, and indeed, class position to that of the lower middle class of that period, and that they had therefore a much closer identification with the lived experience of the mass of the society than do many of the tenured professionals in these same societies in the 1980s who see themselves, overwhelmingly, as pursuing individual careers of self-advancement. Certainly, the scholarly work of this period was insistently taken up with the problems of *reconstructing* social and economic formations that were seen to have failed and, in particular, to have failed "the people". The literature, almost without exception, was informed by a keen awareness of the brute hardship of the 1929-33 recession, but also of the *uneven, unequal* experience of that recession. The costs of the recession were born, overwhelmingly, by the working class and the lower middle class: at this level of society, amongst "the people" at large, there were enormous personal hardships and costs, of an economic, social *and* psychological variety. In contrast, I would argue, to much of the social scientific, or at least the sociological, literature of the 1980s, the equivalent literature of the 1930s and 1940s - whatever other limitations it might now be thought to display - was at least *engaged* in the society and the problem of reconstructing that society in the universal interest.

The second distinctive feature of the scholars of the 1930-50 period which is worthy of emphasis, I think, is their close relationship with established political parties and, in particular, with political parties of the social democratic left. The examples are legion. In Britain, the prime example would be Harold Laski, whose academic work at the LSE was undertaken, consistently, alongside a heavy burden of work within the Labour Party - work which led eventually to Laski's election as Chairman both of the Fabian Society and of the Labour Party itself. But the great majority of scholars engaged in research and writing in the 1930s and 1940s in Britain, with the notable exceptions of Lord Beveridge and Keynes, would either have been members of the Labour Party, or (and here Beveridge and Keynes would have to be included) keen supporters of, and propagandists for, the social democratic project of Social Reconstruction. The leaders of the Canadian League for Social Reconstruction, most notably Frank Underhill and J. S. Woodsworth, were very shortly to play pivotal roles in the formation of the Commonwealth Cooperative Federation, the first organised socialist party in North America. And even in the United States, where a pragmatic liberalism continued to be the main political alternative to reaction, there was indication of a commitment, on the part of some progressive scholars, to theoretical and practical work on the left of American politics.[7] There was evidence, that is, not only of a commitment to a scholarship working in the general, popular interest: there was evidence, too, of a commitment to avowedly political activity within the most appropriate (that is to say, social democratic) of the established political parties. And we can add that such an involvement in politics was, at least in the British case, relatively uncontentious: in the aftermath of the recession (with its desperate consequences on the body of civil society) the involvement of scholars in debating and influencing the future direction of social and economic order was almost universally assumed to be a scholar's public responsibility. The contrast we want to draw, perhaps,

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7   The movement of American progressives to the left was particularly marked during the years of the Popular Front. Cf. Frank A. Warren III 1966; also his excellent 1974 book.

is between a situation where scholars and intellectuals worked, to a very significant extent, *in or through a political party* in the interests of 'the people' - and the situation in the late 1980s where a very large amount of what passes for social science is carried out by scholars working *at the behest of or in the interests of 'the state' or professionals who are directly in the State's employ.* [8]

The third, distinctive feature of this earlier social scientific scholarship I want to emphasise here is easily open to misinterpretation. The scholars of this period were certainly involved in what their left-wing critics have seen as an essentially reformist project, and there is still room for debate over the naivete of any such a project or, as others would have it, the "material" or "structural" limitations to the reformist project, especially of the kind conceived, for example, by R. J. Tawney or by the Canadian League for Social Reconstruction. But perhaps just as important to understand, for present purposes, is the essentially anti-Utopian or "realist" frame of reference which these reformist scholars brought to their work. Given their recent experience of the Great Depression, the rise of Fascism and, as it was then seen, a war fought for the survival of "democracy", the social-democratic scholars of the 1940s (and indeed, the citizens with whom they closely identified) were unlikely candidates for Revolutionary Utopianism. The overwhelming characteristic of the social scientific literature was its determination to be relevant, realistic and, thereby, to be *effective* in the proposals it made for social reconstruction. This commitment to realism and effectivity was well put by the League for Social Reconstruction's Research Committee in its preface to **Social Planning for Canada**: for them, the substance of their ideas *was* socialist, but in the particular and grounded sense that:

> Politically and economically, socialism simply represents the endeavour to put government *by the people* and *for the people* into modern terms, but the socialist case will be ineffective so long as it continues to be dismissed as "radical agitation" or "Utopian idealism" on the one hand, and confused with communism on the other...socialism means a definite system or body of proposals. (Research Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction, **op. cit.**:vi.)

This commitment to practicality did not mean that a "modern socialism" could be equated with the pragmatism of orthodox liberalism.

> (Socialism) also crystallises a protest - against gross inequality of income and economic power, against poverty and thwarted and repressed human lives, against waste and inefficiency, against the inhumanity and social stupidity of exploitation and war. (Ibid)

Even the most reluctant of collectivists, and most practically minded of reformists, Lord Beveridge, could avow in the introduction to his Report, without fear of being thought Utopian, or in any other way misunderstood, that

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8   This process of cooptation of intellectual workers by the State is more advanced in some countries than in others. As long ago as 1965, in his pioneering study of Canadian society, John Porter was arguing that the ongoing employment of academics - for example, on contract research - was one of the primary reasons for the absence of an independently - minded and critical intelligentsia in that country. Cf. Porter 1965.

a revolutionary moment in the world's history is a time for revolutions,
not for patching. (Beveridge 1944:6)

I am not concerned to develop any particular argument here about the concept of "revolutionary change" in the Beveridge Report or in the work of Harold Laski, although this would undoubtedly be the subject of an extremely interesting dissertation. But I *am* concerned to try and retrieve and to recommend for present conditions the idea of an intelligentsia that is engaged in society (rather than merely parasitical upon it); an intelligentsia that does not shrink from political involvement in pursuit of social interests, and an intelligentsia that does not avoid the practical, political and other problems involved in Social Reconstruction via the adoption of the privileged perspective of purely Utopian critique and analysis.

I have no illusions about the possibilities. The new class of career professionals continues, by the day, to carve up and manipulate expert, specialist knowledge, and, in particular, the new technology as commodities under its exclusive control, thereby ensuring the new class apparently unchallengeable power in the marketplace. Scholars working in universities and colleges, especially in North America, are increasingly drawn into this technical and essentially private and depoliticised discourse - doing contract research for government or private industry on problematic areas in the management of civil society or political economy. Not for the first time in the post-war period, there is an enormously powerful thrust towards the reduction of social and economic contradictions and issues to the status of merely technical or managerial problems, beyond the reach of political or democratic debate. It is a tendency, I should say, which is glimpsed by radical critics, especially those involved in social and political theory, but, as I have tried to suggest earlier, it is not a logic which is easily contradicted or opposed via the recitation of purely Utopian alternatives.

One of the effects of the current period of restraint and cuts in state education and in the public services generally, as I am sure all of us here are well aware, has been to delimit the access to the kinds of "new class careers". This has had uneven effects, in my observation, on students and would-be scholars, researchers and social commentators. But - certainly in Britain and to some extent, I think, in Australia - there is evidence of the emergence, almost by default, of an intelligentsia that *necessarily* is *not* tied into individual careers, but which works on an essentially part-time or periodic basis, or in overstretched polytechnics or other institutions of mass education, and which generally is much closer to popular experience of contemporary social conditions and social relations than are those members of the new class involved in the advancement of their careers, or the articulation of particular spheres of technical expertise, within government bureaucracies or universities. Certainly it is from these "marginal" or "part-time" intellectuals that some of the most illuminating and trenchant scholarly and practically-oriented work has emerged in recent years, on subjects like the development of the hidden economy (cf. Redclift and Mingione 1985), or the experiences of young women in a collapsing labour market,[9] on the uses

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9   Cf. **inter alia**, McRobbie and McCabe 1981; McRobbie and Nava 1984. See also the studies of unemployed young women in Adelaide by Mike Presdee, notably his 1982 paper; and Ann Shirley's ethnographic notes on girls in an Auckland secondary school, Shirley 1985.

of music and popular culture by unemployed or underemployed youth (cf. *inter alia* Straw 1984), or on the appropriation of videotape-recorders by women. (Gray 1986; Cubitt 1986) It is from this constituency of marginal scholars that the contemporary explosion of cultural studies and feminist scholarship has emerged.

I don't want to speculate here on the ways in which this kind of work might become more generalized. What is impressive about much of the contemporary work, however, especially in the current period of social disengagement and individual, narcissistic self-advancement, is its analytical commitment to speaking for those who might not otherwise be given a voice in contemporary social and political debate. Like the scholars of the 1930-1950 period, these scholars are *engaged* in social relations, they are unafraid of the *politicality* of the issues they embrace (and are often quite publically involved in pursuing them) and they are also *realistic*, rather than Utopian, in their presumptions about the obstacles that lie in the way of fundamental change.

There is no question, however, that these new sociological and culturalist enquiries involve a particular and important reconstruction of the earlier objectives of Equality and Social Reconstruction. It is not that the concerns of the scholars of the 1930s to the 1950s with substantive economic and social inequalities are now outdated or irrelevant in and of themselves: indeed, there are grounds for believing these problems have become even more pointed in very recent years, as the increasing pursuit by Western governments of free market economics has had its inevitably regressive effects on the distribution of wealth and the prevalence of poverty. Figures released in Britain in July 1986 showed that one in three people in that country (nearly 16 million people) were living on or just above the poverty line, as against the 11-1/2 million people living in such conditions in 1979, when the Thatcher government come in to power. (**The Guardian** 18 July 1986) In Canada, there was a 12.7 per cent increase between 1980 and 1985 in the number of individuals living below the poverty rate in the country: 15.9 per cent of Canadians (one person in every six) were officially poor in 1985. (National Council of Welfare 1986) In Britain, Canada and in many other Western countries, these increases in poverty were a measure, of course, of the unprecedented increases in unemployment that occurred during the recession of the early 1980s. The impact of unemployment, and indeed the effect of the recent reduction in the numbers of people unemployed, have been uneven in industrial societies. Canada's official unemployment rate declined to 10.5 per cent in 1985 (from 11.9 per cent in 1983) but is still considerably above the 7.5 per cent of 1980. And the International Monetary Fund is predicting slight increases of unemployment in Italy during 1987 (to 11.3 per cent) and very little significant reduction in unemployment in France or Germany (IMF 1986:Table A4). In the most severely affected economy of all, the United Kingdom, where the official definitions of unemployment have been subject to some eighteen changes since the election of the Thatcher government, unemployment in 1985 was measured at 13.5 per cent (in contrast to the 5.3 per cent of 1979), with the first, small reductions for seven years being reported at the end of 1986.

The new scholars of the 1980s are clearly aware, in the most fundamental and personal of ways, about the realities of unemployment, poverty and inequality within individual societies and I suspect they are also well aware of the larger and potentially even more explosive, increase in inequality in what we might call the global or international economy. But I sense that there is a real dissatisfaction amongst the new scholars with the vocabulary, the techniques and particular style of traditional social-democratic or reformist scholarship, on the one hand, and abstractly critical theory, on the other. In part, this is born of an awareness of the problem which, following Alvin Gouldner, I

spoke of earlier: the vast discrepancy between the formal and statistical (or indeed the abstractly theoretical) accounts of current social and economic conditions and the *lived reality*: a contradiction which is well evidenced in the chasm that separates the formal, statistical analysis of the 'social effects of unemployment' so widely marketed in North America by the extraordinarily positivistic Professor Harvey Brenner (cf. *inter alia* 1971; n.d.) from the subtle and nuanced account, for example, of the reactions of working-class women in Britain to the fact of long-term unemployment developed, *inter alia*, by Beatrix Campbell and Angela McRobbie. (Campbell 1984; McRobbie and Nava 1984) There is a commitment amongst the new scholars to speaking sociologically of their experienced reality rather than of a world expressed in purely statistical form or, for that matter, in an abstract theoreticism.

There is commitment, too, to recognising the changes that have occurred in social and class relations since the 1930s. To the overwhelming preoccupation of the earlier social-democratic, reformist scholars with the reality of *class inequality* has been added a keen awareness of the inequalities of race, gender and, unsurprisingly, of age, and the way in which these inequalities modify or amplify the effects of class position. The influence of the new political-economy in geographical work, and the actual experience of the unevenly distributed effects of the 1980s recession, have also generated, especially in places like the North of England and the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Newfoundland, a preoccupation with the importance of region and locality.

So I would argue that the new sociological literature presents a much more subtle and differentiated analysis of the social relations than did earlier reformist scholarship. This awareness of the multi-faceted character of structured social inequality, and of the relatively independent importance of racial, gender and age inequalities, also expresses itself in the political involvements and allegiances of the new social scientists. There is a clear tendency to act politically around issues of region or issues of race, gender and age rather than around the classic issues of class.

I want to conclude this overview with three, only very loosely connected and possibly even rather speculative, observations about this new version of social scientific commitment and method.

First: it is important, I think, to celebrate the return of sociology in this work. By this, I mean to point to the commitment that is apparent in very much of this work to a scholarship that really is grounded in ongoing social developments - in actual social relations. Particularly obvious in the feminist scholarship, and in the work on young people's reactions to unemployment, is a sense of the sociological imagination engaged in the task of discovery, rather than merely in a project of *a priori* theoretical assertion. We are not witnessing here a return to mindless empiricism, however: we are seeing an elaborate and theoretically-sensitive reconstruction of our knowledge of "the social".

Second: we should register the enormous importance of this work in the context of the broader ideological and political struggle that is taking place in many countries over the status of sociology as such and, indeed, of social science generally. In Britain, and certainly in Australia, and I am sure elsewhere, powerful political and ideological forces are at work attempting to deny the validity of any kind of social explanation of human behaviour. The preference of these new organic intellectuals of the Radical Right is for explanations constructed neo-classically - in terms of the exercise of free

will and choice - or, residually, for explanations of an essentially biological or psychological kind. For Ferdinand Von Hayek, the doyen of Free Market economic philosophy, "social" is a 'weasel-word' which should find no place in the strategic thinking of Government or academic agencies. (Hayek 1983) This is part of the crazy theology that underpins the thinking, in particular, of pure market theorists (and which is increasingly discredited, for example, even within the Thatcher Government in Britain). But the truth is that the real effectivity of "the social" in 1987 cannot merely be assorted by reference to the brute logic of *class inequality* (such inequalities may have little relevance to the mass of citizens, and may indeed be less immediately consequential to many than the inequalities of race, gender, age or region). The new social scientific work I have discussed is concerned, quite specifically, to illuminate the lived realities of gender, of region and of age. It is, in this sense, involved in the reconstruction of sociology - in the revival of a Sociology that can speak to lived and experienced social relations.

This has sounded like an unstinting act of celebration. I should finish, then, with a note of caution. This work of reconstruction has been conducted, in part, in reaction to the formalism of social statistics but also, I have argued, in a reaction against the purely utopian visions of the critical social science that developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The new realism of the reformist social sciences has already become quite controversial, in areas like criminology and industrial relations policy, for the accommodations that some scholars seem to be prepared to make with some of the perspectives of the Right. The new realisms *do* need to find ways of remaining critical at the level of vision and at the level of policy and strategy. To recall the admonitions of the League for Social Reconstruction in 1935, an effective "socialist" programme - apart from being practical and realistic - must "crystallise a protest" against poverty, inhumanity and, above all, inequality. So, for example, the new sociologies ought surely to recognise that the effectivity of their analytical and descriptive endeavours will be substantially diminished if progressive forces prove unable to tackle one of the most crucial of contemporary inequalities: the massive inequality in people's access to the mass media, and, especially, to television. This problem is particularly acute in North America, where both private and public television channels have effectively removed current affairs and political programmes from their scheduling entirely, and have allowed the agenda of what are called "news shows", as such, to be set by a very narrow group of opinion leaders from Government, business and military circles.[10] Some democratisation of access to the mass media (of the kind that is evident on **Channel Four** television in Britain) is a prerequisite for broad, public debate over the complex changes in social and cultural relations that are discussed in the new scholarship and the proposals for reform they have generated.

I have a sense, too, that the new sociologies could usefully pursue analysis and critique not just of the effects of inequality on the dominated or the subordinate members of the society. In North America, in particular, there is evidence of a widespread alienation and disenchantment among career professionals, and the new class generally, over the enormous psychic and personal costs that are involved in an individualistic market society: there is particular resentment at the length and intensity of the average

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10   I have discussed this development, in respect of Canadian current affairs television elsewhere, see Taylor 1986.

working week and an increasing awareness of the irrationality of such working arrangements at a time of high unemployment in the broad society. (39) This acceleration in the demands of the work-place coincides, however, with a profound collapse in the understood sense of the larger purposes of such work, over and above the advancement of individual careers. The experience of 'success' in North America, particularly - and increasingly in Europe - is, indeed, increasingly ambiguous and contradictory. I have a sense that a sympathetic critique of the social organisation of work and leisure by progressively-minded social science could have enormous impact both among those without work *and* amongst those who are caught up in the competitive individualism of contemporary labour markets. The contemporary labour market ought surely to be the subject of an informed critique rather than of accommodation.

These are hard times both for social science and for progressive politics, and I certainly have no intention, after all that I said earlier, of appearing to lack realism in my concluding comments. I want only to say that the uphill struggles involved in the reactivation of contemporary social science and the redirection of contemporary political debate could retrieve a strong sense of commitment from the re-examination of some of the scholarly practice of the 1930s to 1950s, and draw considerable inspiration from the lively and engaged social and cultural scholarship of the 1980s that *is* being produced, albeit, quite frequently, outside and beyond the most well-known or respected of universities or public sector bureaucracies.

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THE CULT OF HUMANITY AND THE SECRET RELIGION OF THE EDUCATED CLASSES

Michael Hill
Department of Sociology and Social Work
Victoria University of Wellington

INTRODUCTION[1]

There is a perennial debate in sociology over the issue of relevance. What constitutes a "relevant" piece of research or teaching can become a hotly contested area, especially when resources are involved. While one faction views sociology as a basis for Instant Comment - a permanent hotline, as it were, to the media - another faction enshrines sociology as a body of Arcane Lore, their premise apparently being that so far sociologists have only tried to change the world; the point, however, is to make it incomprehensible. Into this debate John Lofland has injected some perceptive comments:

> Sociologists work between the competing pulls of being *timely* and *timeless*, as Everett Hughes has termed it ...To be timely is to study the enchantments and mysteries of the popular moment. To be timeless is to study what one believes to be the fundamental and enduring matters and questions of human group life irrespective of the collective clamor of the moment. Often, study of the timeless is thought to be study of the obscure and irrelevant, or worse. Logically, a social scientist could be both timely and timeless, but the fad-ridden character of modern society renders this a practical impossibility. Popular preoccupations change too fast. (Lofland, 1977:343)

He goes on to explain that the research on which his book **Doomsday Cult** was based was a product of a period in the late fifties and early sixties when social scientists, protected by government funding and university expansion, went about studying relatively timeless questions. Hence, his own research on recruitment to a small and obscure religious movement was ignored or belittled by relevance-mongers as being too timeless to merit concern. Before long, however, the disorders and disruptive social movements of the sixties made this study of conversion and belief-maintenance "hot" and timely. There was a double irony in the seventies, for the movement whose obscure origins Lofland had been studying (under a pseudonym, since its small size required anonymity) was Sun Myung Moon's Unification Church, and it became one of the most timely preoccupations of the seventies. As a result of these experiences, the second edition of **Doomsday Cult** - which, as Lofland wryly observes, would not have

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eventuated had 'his' movement not become timely - contains a defence of the timeless in social scientific research: or rather, it argues that research has much to gain from an incorporation of both elements:

> In the end, I would in fact suggest that the most profitable conception is one of a dynamic and never-resolved tension between the timely and the timeless. The former provides an immediate sense of urgency and importance and the latter provides dispassion and perspective. Each without the other is sterile and even dangerous. (Lofland, 1977:344)

Using an approach which acknowledges the competing demands of the timely and the timeless, I shall do three things in this paper. First, selecting one of the more timely preoccupations both in sociology and in the popular media, I shall look at the recent upsurge in - and likely expansion of - interest in minority and fringe religious phenomena. While much of the interest has focussed on North America and Europe, there has been a recent directing of attention towards these phenomena in New Zealand: several reasons for this are offered. Second, from a conceptual, more timeless perspective, it is possible to show that there are in the classical sociological literature two extremely perceptive predictions about the shape that Western religion will take in the future. Since they throw up valuable insights on aspects of today's minority religious scene, as well as proving an interpretative framework into which it can be fitted, they are worth examining afresh. One of these speaks of a 'cult of humanity' (Durkheim, 1960:382; see also Bellah, 1973:48-49), while the other prediction speaks of 'the secret religion of the educated classes'. (Troeltsch, 1931:794) Finally, a more detailed look is taken at selected features of New Zealand's 'cultic milieu' (Campbell, 1972:122-4), focussing in particular on the interlocking concerns of its membership - or clientele - as well as on its links with more "official" models of science and medical therapy.

MINORITY AND FRINGE RELIGIOUS GROUPS
A number of researchers who have examined the broad range of groups and movements which are the subject of this paper have noted the difficulty of devising an adequate terminology. Epithets such as "fringe" or "pseudo-" in relation to both religious and therapeutic groups may imply that a group is peripheral or inauthentic without establishing the criteria on which this might be claimed. Even the more neutral label "alternative", which has often been applied both to religions and to therapies, raises the question "alternative to what?" and has more recently been avoided. Sociologists confronted by the phethora of items in today's spiritual supermarket prefer to use the term 'new religious movements' (Beckford, 1985:Chap.1) and the term 'complementary therapies' has been devised to accommodate forms of treatment which are not part of conventional medicine (Fulder and Munro, 1985:542-5). Since I prefer to avoid definitional paralysis - and since in any case the parameters of what I am discussing will become clearer through the inclusion of specific groups - I will mainly use the terms *minority religious group* and *complementary therapy* to designate groups or practices within the "cultic milieu" or, as one of its recent protagonists has put it 'on the soft edges of science'. (Watson, 1985:1)

An analysis of this area of social life in New Zealand is timely for two main reasons. The first of these concerns the perception by outside observers of the extent of minority religious activity in New Zealand. According to some of these analysts New Zealand, far from being the conformist quarter-acre pavlova paradise of past mythology, comes high in - and sometimes top of - the league table for cult activity in

Western societies. In a major comparative review of cults and sects in Western societies, Stark and Bainbridge give the following assessment of New Zealand's situation. On the criterion of Indian and Eastern Cult centres and communities per million population New Zealand (5.2) is second only to Australia (5.3) and has four times the rate of the United States (1.3). The ratio of full-time Scientology staff members per million population places New Zealand (17.7) comparatively high in the league table (U.S.A. 17.9, Canada 18.3, Australia 13.9, with only Denmark, 50.0 above this group). On the criterion of Hare Krishna temples per million population, New Zealand heads the field with 0.65, Australia having 0.41, Canada 0.29 and the U.S.A. 0.15. On the sectarian front, New Zealand leads in the Mormon stakes with 11,725 per million population against the U.S.A.'s 11,001 - both figures more than three times ahead of the next highest Western contenders. New Zealand is, with Australia, a world leader in Seventh-day Adventists per million population (24.43 compared with the U.S.A.'s 16.46 and the U.K.'s 2.68) and though unplaced in the Jehovah's Witness' event, New Zealand is nevertheless respectably bunched in the middle as we hurtle towards Armageddon. (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985:482-492)

What do the authors conclude from these data? Specifically in relation to Australia and New Zealand they suggest '...that some nations have religious economies very receptive to religious novelty and innovation and that the spectrum of their receptivity is broad.' (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985: 490-1) By examining whole religious economies rather than a few "firms" in those economies, they state, it is possible to understand religious change. Where conventional religious firms do not hold a monopoly and are not especially vigorous, sectarian and cultic imports - as well as indigenous innovation - are a likely outcome. In short, New Zealand occupies a position of world prominence in current cultic geography.

The evidence on which this assessment is based has been strongly criticised by other sociologists. Bibby, for example, points out that in Stark and Bainbridge's study:

> The cult movement rates specifically are never compared to those of conventional churches, and are undoubtedly relatively minute ... Comparisons between countries lead to claims that a rate for the Hare Krishna cult in Australia, for example, is "very high" - when there are only six temples in the entire country; New Zealand with two temples - is described as having "the highest rate of all". (Bibby, 1985:449)

A calculation of cult centres per million population which disregards overall population size and numbers of adherents is meaningless: New Zealand groups almost certainly operate on a smaller *scale* than their equivalents in Europe and North America. The Mormon figures completely ignore the impact of missionary activity among the Maori, who made up almost 60 percent of Mormon numbers in 1971, and still contribute around 50 percent.

Wallis has also criticised the Stark and Bainbridge interpretation of cult receptivity, suggesting that not only does cult activity increase as church attendance declines but that in addition:

> Cult activity is also particularly high in Anglo-Saxon, Protestant dominated, immigrant based societies, despite continuing high rates of church attendance. (Wallis, 1986:499)

Recently-collated comparative data on weekly adult church attendance (Hill and Zwaga, forthcoming) suggest a continuum running from around 40 percent in the United States, through Canada (36 percent), Australia (20 percent) and New Zealand (16 percent) to England (10 percent) and Scandinavia (less than 5 percent). (Martin, 1978:35) With a lower level of weekly church attendance in New Zealand than in Canada and Australia and a smaller proportion of mainline adherents, especially Roman Catholics, it would be suprising if minority religious groups had not seized the market opportunity to set up a range of small, entrepreneurial alternatives. Pluralism has been a continuing feature of New Zealand religion since the nineteenth century: this feature, coupled with substantial amounts of nominalism among mainline adherents and a voluntaristic attitude to religious affiliation (as shown, for instance, in the disinclination of New Zealand parents to give their children a religious label: of children born between 1981 and 1986, 29 percent were reported in the 1986 census as having 'no religion') together create an ideal environment for spiritual salesmanship.

Nevertheless, some of this salesmanship does appear to take the form of inflated membership claims for specific cultic groups. Both Stark and Bainbridge and Wallis use the same source to estimate the membership and staffing of the Church of Scientology (Church of Scientology, 1978), producing results which rank New Zealand prominently in the international Scientology market. The Church's claim to a New Zealand membership of 42,000 in 1977 (Wallis, 1986:498) should be contrasted with the closest Census date of 1976, when total adherence was a mere 309.

A second and very recent element of timeliness is provided in a remarkable report published in August this year by the Health Services Research and Development Unit of the Department of Health. Titled **In Search of Well-Being. Exploratory Research into Complementary Therapies** (Leibrich, *et.al*, 1987) it represents the findings of a research project that aimed to identify the range of complementary therapies, the characteristics of practitioners and clients, the costs of therapy and sources of client information.

Official interest in alternative or complementary therapies is not, it should be emphasized, new. In New Zealand, the case of Milan Brych precipitated major controversy - and a new electoral group, the Citizens Reform Association - in the mid-1970s. In 1978 an official register of Osteopaths was established by legislation and a Chiropractors Act was passed in 1982. Acupuncturists are still engaged in negotiations with the Minister of Health about formal registration, while natural therapists have been advised by the Health Department that at present there is no thought of registering them. A list of the almost 100 complementary therapies covered by the recent research shows the range of available therapies: what I shall later argue is that there are links and parallels between a number of them and that they can be grouped in clusters. Before I can do this, however, I need to introduce the two sociological predictions about the shape of religion in a modern, complex society.

SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

If the previous remarks have emphasised the timely aspect of an interest in new religious movements and complementary therapies, the next section is more appropriately labelled timeless, since the first prediction was made exactly 90 years ago, in 1897. The French sociologist Emile Durkheim was confronted by the problem of how, in a complex society, it would be possible to retain a set of beliefs and practices that would bind society together. His solution was ingenious:

As societies become larger and more densely populated, they become more complex, labour is differentiated, individual differences multiply and one can foresee the moment when there will be nothing in common between all the members of the same human group except that they are all human beings. In these conditions, it is inevitable that collective feeling will attach itself very strongly to the single aim that it shares and to which it attributes by that very fact an incomparable value. Since the individual human being is the only entity which appeals without exception to all hearts, since its exaltation is the only goal which can be collectively pursued, it cannot but acquire an exceptional importance in all eyes. It thus rises far above all human objectives and takes on a religious character. (Durkheim, 1960:382, my translation)

The outcome was a 'cult of humanity', and in a subsequent paper published the following year (Bellah, 1973:43-57; Lukes, 1969) he depicted it in greater detail, setting it in an historical context.

It was Christianity, he maintained, which transferred the centre of the moral life from outside to within and in the process opened the way for the development of individualism and for the progress of scientific thought. The symbolic focus of belief and ritual in a modern society would become the idealized individual personality. Nor was this merely an egoistic pursuit since the idealized personality provided social integration through a common cause. In a real sense, humanity itself became sacred.

Further implications of Durkheim's prediction are that the "cult of humanity" will appeal especially to those who are most acutely aware of having "nothing in common", i.e. to those who occupy specialist roles in the occupational structure and lack primary group membership as a source of identity - the environment of the skilled and the mobile. There will be a variety of groups within the overall "cult of humanity", appealing to specific social constituencies through the special emphasis of their beliefs but united in their elevation of human personality to an absolute goal. Contemporary scientific thought, rather than being rejected, would be incorporated in the belief systems of such groups, though possibly in a transmuted form. A useful summary of these components is given by Westley:

...Durkheim's predictions concerning religion in the future allow for the possible coexistence of a variety of different religions (and certainly cover the possibility of an increasingly specialised and differentiated society). The theme running through these various movements will be the sacredness of the ideal human. People will still feel a need to join in groups to dramatize these beliefs and the social realities which underlie them, and to be empowered and "morally remade" by this group interaction. (Westley, 1983:9)

The second prediction about the future of religion was made a decade later. As far as is known, it was made independently and without awareness of Durkheim's prediction (see also Tiryakian, 1971), but it is remarkable in providing an almost identical scenario for the future of Western religion. In **The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches**, first published in 1911, Ernst Troeltsch was concerned to encapsulate the development of Christianity within a framework of competing models of organisation. On the one hand he identified the church - large, conservative, socially dominant and allied with the ruling class in any society - while on the other was the sect - small,

radical, socially marginal and representing a religion of the oppressed. Out of the conflict between these two types of organisation, which Troeltsch argued had characterized most of Christian history, he traced the emergence of a third, more recent type of religious response which he termed 'a foreshadowing of coming developments in this interplay of Church and Sect' (Troeltsch, 1931:381) - in other words, this is his prediction of the future of religion.

He labels the emergent form 'mysticism', and depicts it in terms of a growing individualism. Lacking the institutional authority of the church or the radicalism of the sect, this form of Western religion combines with modern scientific thought, though it does so in a flexible, free-floating way. Adherents to mystical forms of religion, he suggests, have little desire for organised fellowship and place more emphasis on the importance of freedom for the interchange of ideas. He continues:

> Gradually, in the modern world of educated people, the third type has come to predominate. This means, then, that all that is left is voluntary association with like-minded people...' (Troeltsch, 1931;381)

Mysticism would prosper at the expense of other forms of religion because its values were more resonant with those of a secular, scientific culture. 'The characteristics which give mystical religion its adaptive advantage in this sense are its monism, relativism, tolerance, syncretism, and above all, its individualism.' (Campbell, 1978:153) Troeltsch comes close to Durkheim's formulation when he argues that in this form of religion 'The isolated individual, and psychological abstraction and analysis become everything'. (Troeltsch, 1931:377) Self-perfection and self-deification are the ethical absolutes which emerge from modern individualism: coupled with a strong valuation on tolerance, these goals are highly congruent with the pluralist environment of a modern, complex society. Pluralism is also related to syncretism, whereby consumers of mystical religion "mix and match" their beliefs from a variety of sources, both secular and spiritual - the latter also involving non-Christian sources of beliefs. Finally, Troeltsch saw the appeal which Romanticism - both because of its idealization of the individual and its pantheistic notion of an all-pervasive spiritual quality within the world - might have for liberal, educated Protestants: 'This,' he said, 'is the secret religion of the educated classes'. (Troeltsch, 1931:794)

We can merge these two predictions into a single inventory and characterise the religion of modern, complex societies in the following six features:

1. it is *individualistic*. In a society with an increasing division of labour there is a demand for beliefs and lifestyles which permit individual choice and expression. There is considerable variety in religion of this sort, but a second feature provides its common thread;

2. it emphasizes an *idealized human personality*. The ideal personality takes on a sacred quality as adherents pursue the goal of self-perfection and a realization of their human potential. This will not lead to mere egoism, however, since an awareness of others in pursuit of similar goals will lead to a third feature;

3. it is *tolerant*. Though different elements in this humanized religion appeal to different social constituences, with a prevailing emphasis on occupational specialists lacking intense primary group membership, there is a free exchange of ideas and a relativistic acceptance of alternative views and versions (though see my following remarks). As a result;

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4. it is *syncretistic*. A range of ideas - from the thought of different world religions, philosophies, esoteric and scientific traditions - is shaped into a relatively plastic amalgam by adherents and adepts. As well as an emphasis on idealized human personality, this set of ideas has in common a fifth feature;

5. it is *monistic*. Humanized religion rejects the dichotomy of body and mind, matter and spirit in favour of a world-view which sees spiritual power as diffuse and all-pervasive. In therapeutic groups, the conception of the human being in relation to the natural environment is holistic. From this follows an important feature of the ritual of humanized religion;

6. it emphasizes a process whereby individuals are *"morally remade" or empowered*. Though ritual may be minimal in this associational milieu - sometimes involving only a guru/practitioner-client relationship - when it does exist it dramatizes the release of inner power from a newly-enabled personality.

An important implication of predictions about this future religion of humanity is that, far from being seen as a deviant and socially peripheral phenomenon, it will increasingly come to express aspects of the dominant culture. (Westley, 1978:139) This is because its beliefs and symbols are highly resonant with the life experience of mobile, educated individuals in a modern society. We should therefore expect to find a significant and growing proportion of the populations of Western societies having some contact with, or at the very least knowledge of the area of new religions and complementary therapies. As a means of putting this into an overall perspective, Beckford suggests that it is likely that Western participants in Human Potential groups outnumber those in the four more visible and "notorious" "youth cults", namely the Unification Church, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Scientology and the Children of God/Family of Love. (Beckford, 1985:74-5) The latter adopt a more monopolistic and authoritarian stance in relation to membership boundaries and practice than is common among groups of the Human Potential type.

The characteristic of *tolerance* deserves closer attention since it has occupied a central position in conceptual debates about the boundaries of sectarian and cultic groups (Hill, 1973b:81; 1985:122-124) as well as in competing theories of change in new religious movements (see especially Wallis and Bruce, 1984). In a variety of ways, sociologists have found it important to distinguish between those movements - traditionally labelled sects - which insist on some form of exclusive and monopolistic closure on the part of their members, and other movements - "cults" - which expect a more amorphous and free-floating association among their clientele. Movements of the second type, however, seem to embody a tendency to discard tolerance in favour of a more authoritarian demarcation of belief and membership boundaries: Scientology and Synanon have been seen as exemplifying this process. Wallis (1984:86-118) explains the tendency as a response to the basic precariousness of such movements. Because they are frequently offering techniques and services of a therapeutic kind they face market precariousness in the face of a range of competitors. Product diversification is one response to such competition, but a stricter insistence on the spiritual equivalent of service contracts and franchises is another. Similarly, charismatic leadership, which is often a feature of new religious movements, is inherently precarious and one of the strategies for handling the resulting instability is to amplify the leader's charismatic credentials in order to ensure compliance: this seems to have been a tactic of Jim Jones and the People's Temple. (Johnson, 1979) We might express this succinctly by

suggesting that the basic precariousness of such new religious movements also extends to their tolerance, which can give way to totalism.

NEW ZEALAND'S "CULTIC MILIEU"

For the principal section of this paper I transpose the discussion to the timely, once again turning to the New Zealand context. The six components of new religions outlined above will first of all be examined in relation to the range of complementary therapies detailed in the Health Department report. Then I look at two other groups which have been active in New Zealand in the past two decades - Transcendental Meditation and Centrepoint - before concluding with some broad interpretative remarks. I hope in this way to integrate the paper's timely and timeless concerns.

The Health Department report (Leibrich, *et.al*, 1987) on complementary therapies contains much impressive data. It shows that the level of usage of complementary therapies in Western society is increasing, along with public interest in and awareness of the therapies available. European estimates suggest that at least 10 percent of the population use such therapies and up to one third is interested in them. (ibid, 13) While there is no estimate of New Zealand provision and use, the regional survey of Wellington and Hutt Health Districts gives some extent of the variety available with 94 separately listed therapies. (ibid, 96-7) Questions about user motivation found some evidence of individualistic concerns - a dissatisfaction with the impersonality, discontinuity and brevity of consultation with orthodox practitioners and a search for fuller interaction with the therapist which would serve the individual needs of the patient. (ibid, 42-3) The theme of idealised human personality was especially well represented in advertisements for therapies, which contained such phrases as 'inner peace, sustained happiness', 'deepen self understanding in life purpose', 'increase your efficiency and productivity' and 'keep in touch with yourself on a deeper level'. (ibid 93-5) Patients themselves tended to place great importance on the goal of taking responsibility for oneself, gaining control over one's own life and future, and taking an active role in improving health. (ibid, 44) Tolerance was shown by the characteristic approach of "mixing and matching" or shopping around for suitable therapy, with a prevailing philosophy of 'No one has all the answers' (ibid, 33-4) while syncretism was shown by the common tendency of practitioners to offer more than one therapy and for therapies to appear in clusters. Examples of three such clusters were:

(a)   Massage, Touch for Health, Iridology, Nutrition, Naturopathy;

(b)   Naturopathy, Rebirthing, Bach Flower Remedies, Massage (Deep Tissues), Touch for Health, Herbalism, Homoeopathy, Nutrition (Allergies), Aura Therapy, Polarity Therapy;

(c)   Nutrition, Iridology, Orthobionomy, Massage, Tissue Salts Therapy, Bach Flower Remedies, Homoeopathy, Herbalism. (ibid, 99)

The monistic/holistic conception of therapy was strongly represented among practitioners and their clients. Evidence consistently suggests a higher than average educational level among users of complementary therapies (ibid, 29), who also tended to be well-informed about the variety of therapies available. They were frequently seeking a more "natural", drug-free form of therapy and tended to emphasize the need for overall well-being, including preventative aspects of health care. (ibid, 29;40) In the words of the report:

Concepts are changing - most significantly in the vision of health as total well-being rather than just the absence of disease. There are many different models of what well-being actually is, but most usually incorporate ideas of physical and emotional health and social and spiritual ease. (ibid, 39)

Finally, the response of users of complementary therapies was very much of the "morally remade" or "empowered" variety. Most clients felt that complementary therapy worked (ibid, 47) and, the report goes on, 'In the many anecdotes of successful experiences, people mentioned feeling more powerful after a therapy...' (ibid, 48) - or, in the words of one young woman who visited an astrologer:

> I went away feeling great. In the two year progression (the astronomer) talked about being happy in a relationship and things working out and so I felt there is no need to be really worried...He gave me a sense of me that I knew, that I felt was right and that maybe other people don't pick up. He could see I had potential in a lot of ways. So it was kind of personally affirming.

It was suggested earlier that where ritual elements were present in the religion of humanity, they would be of the empowering kind, dramatizing the inner potential of human personality. Analysing the complementary therapies offered, the report found that 270 individuals offered 376 different services, of which 126 were consultations, 201 courses or workshops and 49 public meetings. A wide variety of group activities was included in the set of services called 'courses and workshops' - class, course, workshop, retreat, experience, celebration and fair were some of the descriptions used by therapists. Selected titles emphasising the human potential aspect of complementary therapy were: 'Meditation's the Way', 'Delving into the Unknown', 'Everyone Has an Aura', 'Wellness Comes by Learning How to Transform Negative Feelings', 'Optimum Health Through Self Awareness' and 'Organics - Key to Health'. (ibid, 84) Thus, while the popular image of complementary therapy sees it as being centred on the dyad of practitioner-client, group participation plays a significant role. The individualistic milieu of contemporary therapy is clearly one in which, to echo a previous observation, people will still feel the need to join in groups.

Transcendental Meditation is a movement which is more commonly accorded the status of a minority religion. It has much in common with a number of complementary therapies, however; its self-presentation contains a large input of scientific ideas, and its meditation programme can sometimes be found advertised - for example, in management magazines - alongside those of more overtly "secular" organisations. Had Durkheim and Troeltsch been seeking a concrete (or, more accurately, plastic) example of their future religion, they would surely have been impressed by the beliefs and structure of T.M., for it meets all the features on the combined inventory. Its individualism is evident in the promised benefits for those who practice (in isolation) their two 15 to 20 minute daily sessions of meditation. The list of benefits is too long to give in a comprehensive form but includes: improvement in job performance and satisfaction, in athletic performance and in sensory-motor tasks; decrease in anxiety, neuroticism, depression and aggression. A more recent claim has been advanced that T.M. can actually reverse the ageing process. (Posner, 1985:101-2) The idealized human personality of T.M. can be described as a person who has 'enlightenment' and a 'higher state of consciousness', and egoism is avoided by the claim that the presence of a sufficient proportion of T.M. adepts in a population will lead to 'invincibility' for the whole society - the so-called 'Maharishi Effect'.

When the 'Ideal Wellington Campaign' was conducted by the T.M. organisation in 1978 as part of a 'global research programme' its purpose was to show that Wellington, with a claimed 0.98 percent of T.M. meditators (the "Maharishi Effect" is triggered at 1 percent) was enjoying many social effects not apparent in Auckland, where the percentage of meditators was 0.24 and a rival technique was popular. The improved quality of life in Wellington was measured by such indices as: fewer sickness and domestic purpose beneficiaries, less paternity orders and divorce, lower prices, better employment opportunities, fewer road deaths, hospital admissions and civil court cases. More cargo was moved in the port of Wellington and - accordingly to a T.M. representative - the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases was lower in Wellington than in Auckland. An emphasis on the social benefits of this individualistic technique has been strongly maintained through T.M.'s international organisation, which has been characterized as both utopian and millennial. (Posner, 1985)

Though tolerant to the extent of claiming that the practice of T.M. is compatible with membership of other religious bodies, the movement is certainly competitive and claims that its own form of meditation is superior to others - as was stated, Auckland's lack of 'invincibility' was attributed to rival meditation techniques. The movement is market-oriented, charging a graduated scale of fees as adepts progress through the T.M./Sidhi yoga programme, and seeking sponsors and credentials for its product: both the Psychology and Sociology Departments at Victoria University were approached for credentials during the Ideal Wellington campaign. Syncretism is most clearly evident in the combining of the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi's interpretation of the Bhagavad Gita with a range of scientific interpretation and support. The collected papers of scientific research on the Transcendental Meditation programme contain sections on physiology (metabolic change, electrophysiological and electroencephalographic change), psychology (intelligence, learning, academic performance and personality development), sociology (rehabilitation and crime prevention), quantum physics and neurophysiology. (Orme-Johnson et.al, 1977)

T.M. can be typified as a one-level, technical, monistic group. (Wallis, 1984:3) By this is meant that enlightenment is attained immediately or rapidly on adherence to the group, is based on standardized techniques rather than on veneration of a charismatic guru, and conveys a vision of the universe in which there is ultimate "oneness". The emphasis on this monistic conception has if anything strengthened with the development of T.M., particularly in its attempt to locate the meditation technique within the basic laws of physics. By use of the technique, adepts are empowered in an impressive variety of ways, a number of which have already been itemized. They may be summed up in the following account:

> Maharishi has described this state of [transcendental] consciousness as nothing less than the fundamental constituent of creation, unbounded in nature and functioning as the 'ground state of all the laws and nature'. He describes it as the source of all order and growth in the individual and his surrounding. (MERU, 1978:10-11)

An indigenous minority religion - though one with clear international links - is Centrepoint. Its origins lie in the Human Potential movement and especially in the growth centre known as Esalen in California, where in the late 1960s a group of innovative therapists including Fritz Perls and Bill Schutz were working. (Oakes, 1986:19-220) Centrepoint's guru, Bert Potter, who had earlier found success as a

businessman using Dale Carnegie principles, visited Esalen in 1971 and over a three month period underwent a personal transformation before returning to New Zealand. The change had been dramatic:

> The deep massage technique of Rolfing changed his posture so much that when he stepped off the plane at Auckland on his return, [his wife] hardly recognized him, so much had his walk changed. (Oakes, 1986:20)

At this stage he became involved in counselling, working with a group of sympathetic mental health professionals and gradually building up a reputation as a powerful if controversial therapist.

By 1977 several thousand people had experienced Bert Potter's groups and he had attracted a number of people who wanted to form a community: this was the nucleus of the present Albany community, which numbers over 100 people. In analysing the growth of the community against the inventory of characteristics of cultic religion there are some apparent parallels together with some points of divergence, the latter arising from the group's *communal* base.

It is first necessary to examine the extent to which Centrepoint is individualistic. On initial analysis, the community organisation would seem to run counter to this feature of contemporary religious groups, though a closer scrutiny identifies strongly individualistic themes. There are parallels between the development of Christian monasticism and that of Centrepoint. In its earliest stages, Christian monasticism was characterized by individualism and competition - or what I have elsewhere referred to as 'monksmanship' (Hill, 1973a:19) - in which monks perceived each other as 'athletes'. There is a bizarre parallel between the competitive austerities of the desert monks in fourth century Egypt, a group of whom lived in a part of the desert called Climax - and the following account of the early days of the Centrepoint community:

> In the early days, when you were fucking you had to really fuck at the top of your voice. So all night there would be these loud orgasmic screams echoing up and down the valley. Sexual pleasure was rated in terms of volume. It was pretty weird. (Oakes, 1986:37)

Just as in Christian monastic development - where individualistic goals were redefined as goals which were non-disruptive of community life - so Centrepoint gradually developed a set of conventions and expectations which allowed for a stablised community. But there is a further parallel between wider Christianity and Centrepoint which highlights the paradox of individualism. It has been pointed out that in places where religious sociation is individualistic and tangential - at shrines, in places of pilgrimage and, it might be added, on retreats - there is often a permanent community to service the needs of the temporary clientele. (Hill, 1973b:61) In exactly the same way, the community nucleus at Centrepoint offers services on a drop-in, workshop or weekend basis for individuals who will not become permanent members.

The range of therapeutic techniques employed by the group have as their goal the realisation of an idealized human personality in the sense already defined. As the authoritative account of Centrepoint puts it:

> The "technology" of the spiritual life is insight into process, the Delphic command to "know thyself". (Oakes, 1986:91)

By way of illustration, the brochure for a creativity workshop promises: 'In Creativity workshops, laughter and insight combine to open your senses and re-connect you with your spontaneous, ever creative child.' The ultimate purpose of therapy is seen as reaching the 'centre-point' or spiritual core of the client. (Oakes, 1986:103) Tolerance is shown in the response the group adopts towards new therapies, which tends to be open and experimental: members are seen as 'protean', constantly seeking new experiences. On the other hand, the central figure of Bert Potter as guru and charismatic focus gives the group a more authoritarian basis: personal accounts by members constantly refer to his wise - but controlling - influence. Thus Centrepoint has to date been more of a charismatic than a technical movement (Wallis, 1984:3), though a very recent Special Announcement in the community's brochure suggests that the group may be in the process of change:

> The August/September 7-Day Intensive with Bert (listed in our previous calendar) will be his final workshop. Bert has devoted many years to the training and development of our team of leaders, who will now be responsible for the Centrepoint Workshop Programme. (Centrepoint, 1987)

There may be significance in the fact that while Bert's photograph appears in the previous calendar referred to, the above announcement is superimposed on a photograph of a tree fern. One way of interpreting this change is to suggest that the community has gathered a group of therapists of sufficient experience, and has acquired a sufficiently stable economic base, to have obviated the precariousness which leads to charisma-amplification. It may well be heading in a more technical direction.

Syncretism is clearly evident in the range of sources from which Centrepoint's particular amalgam of beliefs and therapeutic techniques is drawn. A fruitful way of tracing these is provided by Wallis's 'map' of the Growth movement (Figure 1) on which the following Centrepoint influences (cited in Oakes, 1986) can be located: Psychodrama, Group dynamics and sensitivity training, Schutz, Encounter, Gestalt Psychology, Rogers, Gestalt Therapy, Jung, Reich (Orgonomy), Bio-energetics, Primal Therapy, Psychoanalysis, Transactional Analysis and Hypnotherapy. To this 'map' can be added the following: Dale Carnegie, Rajneesh, Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, Perls and Neuro-Linguistic Programming. On the one hand the range of inputs allows for a broad integration of the community around the theme of personal growth: on the other, it permits a degree of functional specialization through which different members can emphasize their particular therapeutic skills. In this respect, Centrepoint appears to be adapting in a similar way to other more traditional religious communities, in which a range of specialist activities and innovations can be accommodated, given a degree of consensus over expressive goals. (Campbell-Jones, 1979:esp. chap 7)

The monistic theme is constantly reiterated in the literature of and about the community. One quotation, from a Centrepoint therapist, will serve as an illustration:

> At Centrepoint we see the whole of a person's life, and it's amazing how often a person's sickness is linked to his emotional state. The average G.P. doesn't get to see their patients as we do, but after a while it becomes obvious how much sickness, perhaps all of it, is basically a product of stress. (Oakes, 1986:166)

Moreno
(Sociodrama;
Psychodrama)

Gestalt
Psychology

Jung

Psychoanalysis

Rank

Fringe Masonry

Theosophy

Alice
Bailey

Reich
(Orgonomy)

Group dynamics
and sensitivity
training

Gestalt
Therapy

Bio-
energetics

Nandor
Fodor

Assagioli
(Psychosynthesis)

Golden Dawn

OTO

Gurdjieff's
Work

Self-help
Counseling
e.g.,
Alcoholics
Anonymous

Schutz

Transactional
Analysis

Hypnotherapy

General
Semantics

Rogers

Dianetics

Africa

Synanon

Primal
Integration

Primal
Therapy

Scientology

Eckankar

Encounter

Re-evaluation
Counseling

Eductivism

Abilitism
(Enlightenment
Intensives)

known connection

New Thought/
Couéism

Co-Counseling

- - - - possible connection

Silva Mind
Control

Mind
Dynamics

est

Insight

numerous subsequent influences

Actualiza-
tions

Exegesis

Lifespring

Figure 1: Significant connections between some major elements
of the Growth movement and their sources. (Wallis, 1985:135)

And of course the purpose of this monistic approach to therapy is the "moral remaking" or empowering of community members and clients. In the calendar (or brochure) mentioned, a 'write-yourself weekend' is described as 'An empowering workshop that puts you firmly in charge of your life' and quotes the adage, 'The acorn knows how to grow its Oak Tree'. (Centrepoint, 1987)

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I noted at the beginning of this paper that one of the reasons for the vitality of minority religious groups in New Zealand was the market opportunity presented by the relative weakness of mainline, institutional religion. The pluralistic religious environment of New Zealand society fosters the emergence of new and experimental forms of belief in the absence of mainline religious monopoly. It is not surprising either that minority religions in New Zealand are therapeutic and consumer-oriented. There is considerable plausibility in Keith Sinclair's assessment of New Zealanders as being a not very religious people and as practising a simple materialism in which the pursuit of health and possessions takes precedence over thoughts of salvation. He continues:

> The most respected personage in the community is the doctor, who is often regarded as both aristocrat and priest. (Sinclair, 1969:288).

In the search for alternative meaning systems New Zealanders have not rejected this basic cultural trait, but have merely sought health and well-being of a more esoteric and individualistically atuned kind. And the consumer ethic - which Campbell has identified as the modern counterpart of the Protestant ethic - is strongly evident in the way that minority religions have created new needs and novel means of satisfying them. In line with the dominant culture of our society, these groups market services rather than products.[2]

Finally, there is value in Bibby's view of new religious movements as providing supplements for science. Since Spencer introduced the notion that religion's function was to plug the gaps left by science by postulating an "unknowable" area which it was religion's job to service (see Hill, 1973b:29-30) attention has been paid to groups which operate on the boundaries of science. Bibby calls this the area of 'a-science' and suggests that 'a-science' explanations are drawn upon either because scientific explanations are unavailable or because the questions asked are not amendable to scientific answers:

> It is this potential for people to supplement science which creates a market for a-science. (Bibby, 1985:450)

And, in line with the interpretation of such a-science products as an integral component of modern consumerism, he suggests that 'a-science advocates who can

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2   The contrast here is a fascinating one. The nineteenth century new religious movements often marketed a product, so that Seventh-day Adventists perfected the cornflake, the Oneida community silverware and the Shakers furniture. Today's new religions market specialist therapies, from T.M.'s electroencephalograph to Scientology's E-meter, a form of skin galvanometer which is similar to the polygraph or lie-detector. To the latter examples could be added a plethora of -punctures, -pressures and -bustions, together with a host of psychological and spiritual services.

read and create consumer demand, as well as publicize and deliver their products stand to know market gains'. (ibid:451) For these reasons, the cult of humanity or the secret religion of the educated classes, while changing and adapting to the prevailing lifestyles and preferences of its clientele, is likely to remain a resilient feature of modern societies.

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"SAVING THE WINDOWS": REACTIONS TO THE QUEEN STREET RIOT, 1984

Roger Openshaw, Education Department,
Massey University

Despite relatively short public memories, riots are not new to New Zealand. During the nineteenth century there were several riots in the more populated South, in which religion played an important part. Economic and social causes were more obvious in Twentieth Century rioting. The waterfront strike of 1913 saw several clashes in Wellington between mounted "specials" and strikers. In 1932 thousands took part in Depression marches in the main centres. In Auckland particularly, there were serious confrontations and hundreds of injuries. Details of the wartime "Battle of Manners Street" (1944), by contrast, remain obscure. Post-1945 saw prison riots in Auckland and Christchurch, the 1951 waterfront strike, the largely forgotten Hastings Blossom Festival affray and the later anti-Vietnam war protests provide some indication of social discord during a period many remember with nostalgia.

Like some of its predecessors, the Queen Street riot of 7 December 1984 received widespread publicity. Its aftermath witnessed angry recriminations, calls for punitive action against youth, and rival social diagnoses of society's ills. The Labour government, with the support of Opposition parties, hurriedly passed the Local Government Amendment Act. This Act gave local authorities greater discretionary powers in banning liquor from public venues, while the Police had their powers of search without warrant extended. Memories of the riot, the most serious since 1932 found expression in a popular movie, **Queen City Rocker**, and in some of the recommendations made by the Commission on Violent Crime (Roper Commission), 1987.

While the Queen Street riot should not be lightly dismissed as a non-event, it is argued here that the reaction to it on the part of the press, the politicians and the public was not only disproportionate to the incident, but that it was also an inappropriate one. Collectively, the strong condemnation, together with the attempt at explanation and the resultant legislation can be viewed as a "moral panic". Through its particular set of assumptions and style of reporting, the media amplified the riot, bequeathing in the process, a specific reconstruction of riot-reality. One result was the creation of folk-devils in a manner similar to that which followed the Mods and Rockers clashes in the United Kingdom during the 1960s, analysed by Cohen (1980).

Media amplification was also crucial in the case of society's control agents: the police; the courts; and legislators. These agencies cannot and do not operate in a social vacuum. As a major transmitter of moral panics, the media supplies them, as they do us, with the modes and models for explaining and reacting to deviance. Amplification is insidious in that the modes and models also can become part of apparently rival belief systems, both of which, in the aftermath of the riot, came to legitimate particular forms of social control through state action. The consequences, however, reach far beyond mere legislative reaction. What Hall *et.al* (1978) have termed, 'the British crisis', consists of successive stages. Moral panics and the extent to which these are seen to amalgamate, thereby giving rise to public perceptions of a growing, many-faceted, yet indivisible threat, indicate the distance Britain has already travelled

towards a "soft" law-and-order society. In New Zealand, the creation of the street kids as newsworthy items, the rising concern over violence and crime, increasing unease about social disharmony and "imported" modes of behaviour, the power of community myths of a socially untroubled past, all suggest that the Hall *et.al.* model may have some application here.

Not only public, but also subsequent official and legal reaction to the Queen Street riot was greatly influenced by media-based concepts. Here, newspapers are of particular significance both because of New Zealand's high consumption of newspapers, and because relevant overseas research on the way newspapers deal with violent crime, particularly riots, is available for comparison.

How then, did the press, particularly the Auckland press, portray the riot? The morning after the event, the **Auckland Herald** carried riot news with a front page headline that was to set the tone for much of the subsequent media coverage. 'THE BATTLE OF QUEEN STREET' typified a "war-dispatch" style of reporting which was continued in the story which followed it. The story claimed, 'Police and Youth fight pitched battles...after a bloody riot erupted during a free rock concert'. (8 Dec. 1984:1)

A second headline asserted, 'THANK GOD IT'S ALL OVER!' - a phrase borrowed from the original theme slogan for the abandoned concert. The covering story conveyed powerful images: glimpses of 'weary police officers', 'frightened staff' (of Queen Street shops), of 'maurauding groups of youths'. We are told how, 'A group of street youths sat in front of one store totally unconcerned about the large rubbish bin they had just thrown through the plate glass window', about a group of Christians who 'ambled into the melee... asking people to "turn to Jesus"'. We hear an incredulous young visitor from Melbourne asking, 'Does this happen all the time in Auckland?'

The way overseas visitors saw the riot, was a theme taken up elsewhere in the **Auckland Herald**. The American freelance writer Mike Field provided an eyewitness account. He stressed that as New Zealand lacked the ghettos common to many U.S. cities, an awareness of riot behaviour overseas constructed from media reports might have influenced youth behaviour. (Ibid:2) This concern to portray New Zealand as a country without major social problems, especially after violent confrontations have occurred, is of long standing, and was noted by Noonan (1969:83) in her study of the 1932 Depression riot in Auckland.

Despite such concerns, sensationalism was often utilised by the press, particularly in early reports on the riot. The evening paper, the **Auckland Star**, headlined; 'POLICE BATONS FACE GUN - TOTING RIOTERS', though the report which followed mentioned only that police had been rushed to a location, 'where a man carrying a rifle was seen... but could not find him'. Elsewhere the report stressed the menacing nature of the 'mob', and the essentially defensive nature of police operations, including an incident where police were forced to release some prisoners 'by a mob brandishing firebombs and handkerchiefs dipped in petrol'. (8 Dec. 1984:1) Our sympathies are drawn to the police, who are heavily outnumbered and are ill-equipped to face a 'gun-toting mob' who are in complete control. A similar emphasis on the mad fury of the rioters is evident in a TVNZ news bulletin run later that same evening in which it was claimed that police were attacked by scores of rioters. This bulletin stressed that the loud music detectable in the TV coverage of bottle-throwing youths lent support to police claims that the riot had actually begun prior to the police calling off the concert. (TVNZ News, 8 Dec. 1984) This point was to be contradicted, however, in the official report.

Early reports especially, concentrated on the numbers of police injured, and on damage done to police vehicles and inner city businesses. We learn that forty-two police were injured, but there were few references to non-police casualties. (Auckland Star, 8 Dec.:A3) In the **Auckland Star**, the alliterative headline; 'TEARS, TERROR AT CONCERT THAT MADE HISTORY' was followed by a report from Star reporter, Wendyl Nissen, whose eyewitness account provided evocative images - 'screaming children', 'bloody head wounds', 'protective strangers'. (Ibid) According to the **Sunday News** (9 Dec. 1984), Auckland hospital sources confirmed that seventy-five people had been treated in the hospital's Accident and Emergency Department by mid-day Saturday. There were no stretcher cases and everyone had apparently ' made it under their own steam'. The **Auckland Star** estimated that there was 'hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of damage'. This figure indeed seems to confirm the ferocity of the riot. In a later report on the aftermath, however, the **New Zealand Herald** (10 Dec. 1984:5) seemed to suggest that most of the damage was in the form of shattered windows, especially on Wakefeld Street. The same report quoted a Winston Glass Ltd estimate that, on average, a single broken pane would cost $400 to replace and that Winstons had received about sixty calls to replace glass by mid-Saturday morning.

Both the **Auckland Herald** and the **Auckland Star** utilised a device employed subsequently by other papers; namely reporting the riot from several different angles over a number of pages, maximising the riot's impact on readers. The **Auckland Star** promised, 'more riot pictures and stories, A3, A15,' while the **Auckland Herald** advertised 'More reports, more pictures, pp.2-3 and back'.

Although several Auckland papers were affected by a strike on Saturday, headlines on Monday were, if anything, even more dramatic. The **Auckland Herald** (10 Dec 1984:1) captured a quote, allegedly from Auckland Mayor Cath Tizard; 'People Dancing like Dervishes in an Inferno'. Even at this stage, few newspaper reports gave any logical indication of sequence - the mob looted, burned and attacked police at the same time. As early as the 1960s, however, Graham and Gurr (1969:420) concluded that United States commodity riots had a 'natural history', where the attention of rioters shifted from police, to window smashing, then, to selective, rather than 'mindless' looting. It was also postulated that United States urban riots developed in the context of a disturbed social atmosphere in which, typically, a series of tension heightening incidents over a period of weeks or months became linked with a shared network of underlying grievances on the part of rioters. (NACCD, 1968:110) As Cohen (1980:249) puts it, riots are only 'mindless' if one accepts that one cannot think about the police - that the police can only be supported.

The Queen Street riot was acutely perceived as a threat to cherished ideals of social harmony; as a dislocation of the social structure in a manner reminiscent of the perception of Mods and Rocker violence in Britain. (Ibid:49) In both instances, there were attempts to make sense of what had happened, not only on the part of the press, but also on the part of prominent local and national politicians and administrators. In the aftermath of the Queen Street riot, two types of explanations were offered, one of which will be labelled here "conservative", the other, "liberal". While these were to an extent, rival social analyses, leading to rather different remedies, they also shared some common characteristics.

The liberal explanation attempted to place the riot in a limited social context, rather than simply focus on the behaviour of the rioters as "criminal". Although liberals did

not necessarily share the same political beliefs, they nevertheless shared a conviction that New Zealand society had only deteriorated within the last decade, with social harmony being replaced by social discord. There was little or no attempt to critically examine economic and social structures from a historical perspective. Instead, the catalysts which had finally brought on the Queen Street riot were identified, variously, as being the 1981 Springbok tour, the introduction of centralised policing, and the alienation of youth, particularly Maori and Pacific Island youth. Likewise, after the Brixton riots, British liberals saw the violence as a collective demonstration of social despair in the face of racism, unemployment and police harassment, rather than as an act of criminality, or as a reflection of economic and political marginalisation of the inner city. (Lea and Young, 1982:6-7)

Some two months after the riot, the two liberal periodicals, the **New Zealand Listener** and **Metro** sought alternative views on the causes of the riot. Psychotherapist Kathie Torpie claimed that only ten years ago New Zealand had no unemployment and little violent crime; 'Before it was us New Zealanders together in an egalitarian society'. 'Now its us against them'. (Listener, 19 Jan. 1985:10) Lesley Marx, a **Metro** contributing writer believed that within living memory, there had been unison, harmony, and togetherness. He hoped for a reassertion of 'middle New Zealand' rather than let things 'be shared between the political malcontents of the radical left with their questionable agenda, and the ultra-conservatives pining for a return to God, Queen and Lash'. (Metro, Feb. 1985:72)

Like their British counterparts in 1981, many New Zealand liberals were critical of changes in policing since the 1970s. This view found some support from the Secretary of the Police Association, Bob Moodie. (Auckland Herald, 10 Dec. 1984) **Metro's** regular political columnist, Bruce Jesson suggested that 'Maybe the police are the wrong age, the wrong sex and often the wrong race for day to day work among young people'. (Metro, *Op.cit.*:70) Tim Shadbolt, the Mayor of Waitemata, claimed that it would have been considered outrageous for a policeman to even threaten to hit a young person with a baton during the 1960s. (Ibid:66)

Generally, liberal solutions looked to the state to investigate and solve the social problems they themselves had defined. Bruce Hucker, **Metro's** 'Arena' columnist wanted an inquiry similar to those overseas which had produced the Kerner Report (1967) and the Scarman Report (1981) which would examine key issues such as deteriorating polic-community relationships, the Springbok tour "trauma", racial insensitivity, youth harassment, and unemployment. (Ibid:70)

Although liberal explanations were to remain minority opinion, they did have some effect on at least the public statements of politicians. The Prime Minister, the Right Hon. David Lange, speaking after an emergency cabinet meeting, declared that the Springbok tour legacy and the future of centralised policing would be appropriate topics for any future commission on cities or on youth, adding that current government policy was to put the police back into the community. This phrase was interpreted by the **Dominion** to imply a return to 'beat policeman'. (11 Dec. 1984:1)

The conservative explanation, which became the dominant view, saw the riot as a break down in law and order. The rioters were regarded as an aberrant phenomenon in a homogenous law-abiding society. Given this context, heroes and villains could be identified and blame apportioned. An early press heroine was Mrs Hine Grindlay, a Maori warden who had attempted to calm down rioters in the face of flying missiles. In

itself undeniably courageous, her act was given the "High Noon" treatment by several newspapers. Under the headline 'WELL DONE HINE GRINDLAY', the **Auckland Herald** (10 Dec. 1984:1) described how the forty year old Maori warden had 'faced the rioters and said "enough"'. The **Dominion** (10 Dec. 1984:1) also noted Mrs Grindlay's courage, and entitled its story 'A WOMAN'S HEROISM IN NO MAN'S LAND'. Analysing coverage of the Bristol and Brixton riots in the United Kingdom, several commentators highlighted the participation of blacks in confrontations with police, while implicitly denying they were race riots. (Joshua and Wallace, 1983:104) Conservative explanations of the Queen Street riot left this dilemma unstated, but despite this, the fact that some Maoris had been actively involved in attempting to stop the violence, either as wardens or, more forcefully, as police, appears to have been utilised as evidence that New Zealanders were, after all, one people.

Conservative explanations, like those of the liberals, nevertheless differed widely from each other. Arguably the most extreme conservative reaction came from the weekly tabloid newspapers. These left readers in no doubt as to who was to blame. 'SHAME! A BLOODY DISGRACE!' shrieked the **Sunday News**. The **Sunday News** (9 Dec. 1984:1) quoted a colourful phrase by Dave Dobbyn, lead singer of "DD Smash" which castigated rioters as 'animals and beasts', though the report went on to mention that Dobbyn had himself been questioned by police concerning allegations that he had urged the crowd to "take on" the police. Elsewhere the **Sunday News** utilised the beastial imagery in headlines such as 'MONSTER ON THE STREETS!' a quotation allegedly from an injured policeman. (Ibid:5) For **New Zealand Truth**, the solution was stark and simple; '**BIRCH THE LOUTS**' in 7cm underlined black capitals:

> the blame for Friday night's unforgivable situation must be laid squarely at the feet of the do-gooders, bleeding heart liberals and soft judges who have shown nothing but leniency for these lawbreakers, the thugs and hooligans who have no respect for authority, people or property. (Truth, 11 Dec. 1984:1)

Elsewhere **Truth** quoted the views of "Robbie" Robinson, ex Mayor of Auckland city, who blamed mayors and local bodies for letting the trouble begin, and Gideon Tate, the former 'tough clean-up cop', who advocated arming the police. (Ibid:4)

While not all conservative views were so extreme, the focus was on the rioters and their unacceptable behaviour, rather than on "society". According to the **New Zealand Herald** (Editorial, 10 Dec. 1984), the rioters deserve 'not a moment's sympathy'. It was 'plain bad behaviour beyond any acceptance', rather than some 'obscure fault of society'. The **Dominion**, even whilst conceding the existence of a fragile social fabric, blamed many parents for losing control of their children, roundly condemning 'what is mistakenly represented as a liberal tolerance but which in fact is cynical neglect'. (Editorial, 11 Dec. 1984)

Conservative views emphasised the central role of under-age drinking in fanning the riot, thus focussing on "mob" behaviour, rather than on any previous police behaviour. On 8 December, a TVNZ newscast began by citing the police as having blamed liquor for much of the trouble. Drunkeness was singled out by Opposition Leader, Jim McLay, who called for tougher laws to control public drinking. The Minister of Police, the Hon. Ann Hercus, even despite her apparent belief that there had been important underlying causes in the riot, identified drunkeness as the major factor. As Minister of Police, Mrs. Hercus was no doubt under some pressure to defend police actions and

she claimed that 'It was nonsense to say that the riot was precipitated by the presence of police in riot gear'. (Auckland Herald, 10 Dec. 1984:1) Similar reactions came from senior police officers, including Deputy Assistant Commissioner Graham Perry, and Police Commissioner Thompson. (Auckland Herald, 8 Dec 1984:1; Dominion, 10 Dec. 1984:1)

Given the dominance of the conservative view, it was logical that the political focus would be on legislation. The Local Government Amendment Bill was drafted in just three days and hurriedly inserted ahead of other business at the top of the Parliamentary order paper. On 11 December, only four days after the riot, the Bill was introduced by the Minister of Local Government, the Hon. Michael Bassett. The Bill sought to remove the legislative restrictions on local authorities seeking to prevent the consumption of liquor in public venues. In addition it aimed to streamline the process by which a local authority could close a public venue in the event of impending trouble. Taken together, the proposed changes were quite comprehensive. First, the amendments to the existing Local Government Amendment Act extended the Act's terms to 'all public places under the control of a council', rather than simply to 'roads', although Bassett conceded that the earlier term was capable of quite wide interpretation. (N.Z. Statutes, 1984:149-153)

Second, in addition to the territorial authorities, united councils and regional authorities such as the Auckland Regional Authority were to be given the right to utilise the new powers allowed under the proposed amendment. Third, existing provisions which required a council, after a duly constituted meeting to "resolve" to advertise three times in the press during the preceding twenty-one days of any intention to close a public place, was to be drastically simplified. Instead, councils were to be permitted to act as late as one day before any event was to take place, and to delegate its authority at this time to a third party even without a full council meeting on the basis, for example, of police intelligence establishing the likelihood of trouble occurring. (NZPD, 1984-5:2500) Finally by allowing any constable, without warrant the right to search parcels or cases in possession of any person entering a specified public place where liquor was prohibited, police powers of search were extended. (N.Z. Statutes, op.cit.)

Superficially, the debate over the Bill's first reading represents a curious mixture of quasi-sociological blandness and traditional Party acrimony. In reality it merely underlined the continuing dominance of conservative views on the cause of the riot. Parliamentary condemnation matched that of the Press. Like the eyewitness reporters who had earlier given their impressions of events, those MPs who had been present in Queen Street expressed themselves in terms of images, complaining of 'drunken louts', of 'wading through a fog of beer'. (NZPD, 1984-5:2499) The riot was simply, 'stupid, wanton, mindless acts of violence and destruction'. (Ibid:2504) Its perpetrators were a mob (Ibid:2509) who demonstrated ' a contempt for the law', (Ibid:2501) requiring Parliament to give ' more strength to the arm of the law'. (Ibid:2505)

All three political parties supported the Bill. Bassett claimed that it had the full support of Auckland's mayor and the Police. For its part, the opposition National Party was prepared to facilitate the Bill's passage as, according to the Hon. Jim McClay, the present law was deficient and 'Alcohol in the hands of young people was the lubricant of the problem.' (Ibid:2501) The Government for its part was particularly anxious that the Bill be passed before the next weekend, because according to Prebble, 'the Government (did) not want such an incident to occur in other parts of New Zealand'.

As far as Prebble was concerned, 'The problem arose when people - some of whom were in (McClay's) electorate - came into (his own) electorate drinking bottles of beer and smashed the place up, the Government having... inherited the "wishy-washy" laws of the Leader of the Opposition'. (Ibid:2502-3)

Very few of those who spoke during the debate advanced more reflective views. P. Northey, the Labour member for Eden cited T.V. violence, problems in schools and unemployment as representing part of the problem but added that 'None of these is an excuse for absolutely unacceptable behaviour that must be stopped', and that, 'access to alcohol by young people (was) too easy' (Ibid:2507) G.F. Gair, National member for North Shore, by asking the question 'why did it happen?' went further than the majority of his Parliamentary colleagues, though he too singled out the well-worn explanations: media-portrayed violence, the school system and home background. (Ibid:2509) Likewise the Minister of Housing, the Hon P.B. Goff, though he did point out that 'more than one-third of those arrested were unemployed', nevertheless did not believe that the disorder was directly caused by social problems in the way that, for example, the Queen Street riot in 1932 was directly associated with unemployment. (Ibid) Only G Knapp, Social Democratic member for East Coast Bays believed Auckland's problems to be of long standing, being 'related to socio-economic matters - the relationship between the haves and the have-nots... (and) to deeper seated causes such as the relationship between the different cultural groups in Auckland.' (Ibid:2510)

This was the liberal view, but Bassett's dismissal of even this limited analysis ('the less said about that speech the better'), epitomised the predominant belief in the House that, while there might be underlying problems revealed by the riot, the bill being hurriedly debated was not 'a window dressing bill' but a 'window saving bill', as Bassett maintained. (Ibid:2511) The Local Government Amendment Bill had its final reading on 13 December, the sole change being some limitation to a council's right to delegate its powers, this being requested by some National MPs. (N.Z. Statutes, *op.cit.* clause 709A (2)) Even as the Local Government Amendment Bill was being introduced, the promised committee of inquiry appointed by cabinet convened in Auckland. The Committee's brief was, from the outset, a severely limited one. It was 'To ascertain... the sequence of events (on 7 December), to inquire into the immediate causes of the riot, and to make recommendations on the lessons to be learned' including the avoidance of a recurrence and 'whether any changes to existing law was needed'. (Committee of Enquiry, 1984:3) In addition, it was obliged to have its report completed by 24 December, a time span of only twelve days.

Sections Four and Five of the report meticulously described the events leading up to the riot, from its early planning stages laying particular stress on the sequence of events from 1.00 pm until about 10.30 pm on 7 December. Section Six dealt with the immediate causes of the riot. The committee pointed out that while the riot itself was not predictable, a degree of disorder should have been forseen, particularly the certainty 'that patrons at the concert... would include a very large number of young people carrying bottles of liquor'. (Ibid:23) According to the committee, 'There was one basic fact which was central to the creation of (the riot), and that was the presence of hundreds of beer bottles, full or empty, which were available at the scene to troublemakers intent on causing serious disorder'. (Ibid:24) Turning to the question of responsibility, the committee criticised both the promoters and the city council for lack of adequate liaison. It described police planning as 'markedly deficient'. While it found no fault with the issue of riot gear, it suggested that the stopping of the concert had unfortunate results as '95% of the crowd,.... would have stayed exactly where they

were and concentrated their attention on the "DD Smash" band'. (Ibid:32)

During its deliberations the committee had received many submissions concerning poor relations between mobile police patrols and young people, the legacy of the Springbok tour, and the effects of unemployment. On one hand, it claimed to fully appreciate the claims of experienced social workers that 'there were underlying sociological problems of the kind to which we were so frequently referred.' (Ibid:32-3) On the other, it reiterated its brief to identify only immediate causes, asserting, 'it is clear beyond doubt that this was a riot without racial or social motivation... It was started, maintained and motivated by lawless elements who saw the Police in retreat, and seized the opportunity for violence and destruction'. (Ibid:33)

This latter view greatly influenced the committee's recommendations. It supported the creation of liquor free zones within the boundaries of future public venues, advocated that the community policing concept of non-intervention be superseded by policing supervision to ensure the maintenance of liquor free restrictions, supported closer liaison between police and the Police Control centre and recommended that the Hotel Association of New Zealand be required to display in bottle stores 'boldly printed notices that it is an offence to supply minors with liquor'. While the committee expressed concern in section 7.10 about 'numerous allegations of random, indiscriminate harassment by Police', and at the 'frequent references to mistrust and hatred of the Police by many young people', it felt compelled to assert that police had made 'valuable progress in this area', through restoring community constables and developing youth aid programmes, recommending that police contact with young people be expanded to provide opportunities for ' Police and the community to be associated in other than conflict situations'. (Ibid:36) As with the Scarman report, any notion of more radical solutions such as the implementation of democratic police accountability, or even of more moderate community policing solutions advocated within the Police, was rejected. (Lea and Young, 1982:19) Finally, the committee advocated the reintroduction of Section 112 of the Crimes Act 1908; 'Causing an Affray', deleted from the 1961 Crimes Act under which it would be only necessary for the prosecution to prove that fighting in a public place had occurred in circumstances causing alarm to the public. (Committee of Enquiry, op.cit:38) Clearly, the report reflected the limited theories on the riot dominant in the press and in the House. It accepted the conservative thesis, but with hints that some aspects of a liberal agenda should be addressed at another time and place. Thus, the legislation soon to be set in place, was the culmination of both an over-reaction to a perceived threat to stability, and an inappropriate response to urban youth violence.

CONCLUSION

Reactions to the Queen Street riot constituted a moral panic, but the implications of this conclusion reach beyond the sum of media, legal and legislative responses to the event itself. Hall et.al. (1978:317-320) explain how their study of a moral panic about mugging is not simply a study of mugging, but is about a society (Britain), slipping into a certain kind of crisis. According to them, 'the British crisis' is real and multi-layered: a crisis of and for capitalism, for 'the relations of social forces', for 'the state', for political legitimacy. Moral panics provide crucial indicators as to the direction and extent of public reaction to crisis. Initially, public anxiety comes to focus on specific concerns, including crime and the anti-social nature of youth behaviour. According to Hall et.al, as the crisis deepens, anxiety becomes 'political', the interests of the public and the state seemingly converge, and 'the state comes to provide just that sense of direction which the lay public feels society has lost'. (Ibid:321) As a result, social

controls can be legitimately imposed by the state on behalf of "moderate" people, against what are perceived to be extremes.

Hall *et.al.* argue that it is important 'to analyse precisely, the mechanisms through which the tilt in the crisis of hegemony from consent to coercion, is publicly signified'. (Ibid:133) Moral panics are the first phenomenal form which the experience of social crisis assumes in public consciousness. The crisis has reached an advanced stage when particular moral panics converge, the threats to society and state become one, and consensus favours strong, law-and-order government.

Hall *et.al*'s model allows for some historical contextualisation of the Queen Street riot and subsequent reactions. A study by Kelsey and Young suggests that, as early as 1979, declining economic conditions, increasing racial and social instability and falling public confidence provided the context for a short-lived moral panic over youth gangs. (1982:140 *passim*)

The recent warnings of retiring Auckland Assistant Police Commissioner, Jim Glynn, of an approaching police state helped into existence by public fear over crime indicates the model's continuing relevance. (Sunday Times, 10 Oct. 1987) Spoonley (1987) has described a deepening political and economic crisis of the 1980s, characterised by a breakdown of established ties between representative political organisations and their respective class bases. Pearson and Thorns (1983:257) have claimed that the country is now experiencing 'a series of tensions between contradictory social processes, ideologies and images, including economic restructuring, regional imbalances, divisive social and moral issues', although they do not necessarily see this as constituting an insoluble crisis. One response to all these pressures has been the utilisation of the state by both National and Labour governments in order to foster the illusion of national consensus, but with arguably limited success.[1]

Whether one accepts the notion of a New Zealand crisis or not, ambiguity and strain in New Zealand society do appear to have produced a "boundary crisis", a period in which a society's uncertainty about itself is frequently resolved in ritualistic confrontations between the deviants (in this case, the rioters) and the official agents of society (police, magistrates, local bodies). Cohen has demonstrated that newspapers play a major role in boundary crises in that they provide information about societal norms, especially through their focus on violent crime and deviant behaviour. Press reaction to the Queen Street riot does not support either a Market analysis of the media, or a Mass Manipulative analysis. Rather it confirms Cohen and Young's (1981) dynamic model of news being socially constructed during and prior to the news gathering process. The ideological foundations for the Queen Street riot were laid well prior to the event itself. During the early 1980s violent crime, especially urban street crime, received considerable media attention, particularly in the Auckland press. As early as January 1983 the **Auckland Star** reported that Aotea Square was often tense as 'street kids claimed their "patch"'. "Bus hooliganism" often received sensationalist treatment and in the issue of 4 September 1984, the **New Zealand Herald** claimed,

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1   Thus the National government approved the re-activation of regulations for flag-honouring in schools (1984), whilst the newly elected Labour government promoted the notion of national consensus through the so-called "economic summit".

'Glue, drink, wreck bus terror'. Media interest and public concern prompted **New Zealand Listener** correspondent Frank Stark to ride "the last 305" to Mangere on Saturday night. 'The word is out - big strife on the last bus, gang warfare, firebombs, urban terror. If all this adds up, someone in here must be looking to cause trouble. Trouble is, who?' After an eventless journey he concluded, 'Don't know what all the fuss is about'. (Listener, 1 Dec. 1984:16-17)

Whatever the reality, however, some key elements in the later reporting of the riot were already present. While exaggeration was one of these elements it is important to realise that this was not simply due to misinterpretation of often confused initial reports as in the case of the Edgecumbe earthquake.[2] What some media theorists term, "the inventory" is significant. As Cohen puts it, putative deviation had been assigned 'from which further stereotyping, myth-making and labelling could proceed'. (Cohen, 1980:44fn)

Only days before the Queen Street riot, the **Auckland Star** (1 Dec. 1984:A4) was reporting, '2,000 against police outside Mangan's Deep Purple Concert at Western Springs', with 30 police injured and 78 arrests. The focus was on unprovoked mob violence against police and property - the issue was one of law and order, with the ever present threat of recurrence unless something was done to stop it.

Once the riot had taken place, New Zealand newspapers displayed similarities to the way their British counterparts had reported the riots in Bristol and in Brixton. In each case, initial reports were characterised by a general inaccuracy of detail, a concentration on isolated images rather than on sequential analysis, and a heavy reliance on "accredited" official sources. In order of importance, newspapers stressed the violent behaviour of mob against police and property, the difficulties of police, described superficially the immediate origins of the violence and finally noted how the police had restored the situation. (Joshua and Wallace, 1983:94)

Such inadequacies were not confined to newspapers. In both Britain and New Zealand, conservatives and liberals sought explanations for urban violence. Kettle and Hodges (1982:250) conclude that British riot theories reflect the assumptions of those propounding them, in that they take little account of the rioters themselves their background and choice of targets. In New Zealand, the existing assumptions of liberals and conservatives helped to structure the moral panic. In its most extreme form, the conservative view reduced the riot to a simple question of law and order, enforcing the stark choice of 'who was running the city - a bunch of thugs or decent people?'[3] Like their counterparts in Britain, liberals focused on an imprecise and mechanistic set of general social or economic conditions, thus the rioters were 'victims of a system - unemployment, racism, economic discrimination'.[4] In each case the state was to provide solutions. The liberals and conservatives envisaged different solutions, tending to confirm Spoonley's contention that new and old petty bourgeois have different

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2   Reports in several overseas newspapers that 20,000 people had been rendered homeless by the Edgecumbe quake (1987) prompted a flood of anxious calls from relatives overseas.

3   Northcote Mayor Jean Simpson, quoted in the **New Zealand Herald**, 10 December 1984.

4   Bill Anderson, Auckland Trades Council President, quoted in the **Sunday News**, 9 December 1984, p.4.

views on political and social issues. (Spoonley, 1987:23-29) On the other hand, assuming that liberals had not simply decided to avoid overly embarrassing the new Labour Government by being "difficult", the tendency of liberalism to give way in the face of public concern over what was by world standards, a rather small riot, could be seen as supportive of Hall *et.al*'s rather pessimistic conclusions about liberalism. (1978:323)

Anxiety about public order, whether expressed by conservatives or liberals, rapidly became intertwined with other longstanding community concerns. Attempts to link rioting with movie and video violence, and alleged media encouragement of deviant behaviour provide a particularly illuminating example. Soon after the Queen Street riot, film Censor, Arthur Everard hypothesised that 'Young people may have been copying what they saw in films when they smashed windows', citing the Spielberg film, **Gremlins**, then showing in a Queen Street cinema, where a plate glass window had been smashed by a boy trying to get a gremlin. (Dominion, 10 Dec. 1984:3) The next day in the same paper, Dr. Jane Ritchie, Chairperson of the Regional Committee on Broadcasting, claimed that the Queen Street violence should lend weight to the argument for less violence on television. The Committee of Inquiry seems to have been sufficiently influenced by such testimony to assert that movies and videos, 'depicting scenes of violence, without doubt precipitated some of the anti-police and anti-social response observed by members of the public'. (1984:35) In Britain, the Scarman report went even further in suggesting that the media bore a responsibility for the escalation of the disorders through the 'encouraging presence of the T.V. camera and the reporter'. (Scarman Report, 1981:133) A number of British researchers, however, believe that the arguments for such imitative behaviour on the part of rioters places too much attention on the supposed direct effects of the media on the deviants (imitation, attention), and too little on the way the media actually portrays deviance, or the way in which deviant behaviour itself is shaped by the normative expectations of how people in a particular deviant roles should act. (See Cohen, 1980:162-164; P.Cohen, 1982:15)

Finally there are indications that the "folk-devils" of Queen Street, 1984, have become at least partially mythologised for middle-class consumption in the late 1980s. The violent rock movie, **Queen City Rocker**, features an "up-market" Queen Street riot as its climactic set piece. This has led one reviewer to perceptively observe that the movie portrays how the street kids might look 'if they had ten times the usual level of self-esteem, no glue and a few months at a good gymnasium'. (Hegan, 1987:39) Community fears and media amplification, however, remain high. The **Auckland Star**'s use of a headline such as 'CONCERT SEIGE-POLICE ARREST HUNDREDS IN ZZ TOP CRUSH' to describe what one contemporary commentator had claimed was the smooth removal by the police, of Black Power members from a potential confrontation with the Mongrel Mob, together with the unrelated arrest of 239 people for drunkenness outside the gates prior to the beginning of the concert, is a sobering case in point. Another is provided by some of the recommendations of the Commission on Violent Crime (the Roper Commission), 1987, during a crucial election year in which law and order issues have assumed a high profile. Moral panics, it seems, can cast long shadows.

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REVIEW ESSAYS

QUESTIONS OF MOBILITY

Monica Boyd *et al.* Ascription and Achievement: Studies in Mobility and Status Attainment in Canada. Ottawa, Carleton University Press. 1985.

Frank L. Jones and Peter Davis. Models of Society. Sydney, Croom Helm. 1986.

Review by David Pearson, Sociology Department,
Victoria University of Wellington.

Social mobility studies have become a central preoccupation of many social scientists but they are still the focus of considerable controversy. Debate ranges across disciplines, continents, and most pertinently, ideological fronts. Historians and sociologists often tend to approach mobility studies from different perspectives using different methods and data sets. North American studies frequently seek to trace the openness of their societies in true Horatio Alger fashion, whilst European, particularly British, researchers, assume inequality of opportunity but seek measurement of its degree. Looming above these differences are questions about the usefulness or otherwise of social mobility studies *per se*. Are such studies nothing more than a conservative defence of the status quo, or do they offer evidence of the very impediments to equality that radicals seek to attain? Students of mobility, and the two studies under review are no exception, adhere to the view that family origins, occupational attainment and education performance are important indicators of the openness or otherwise of contemporary societies and their relatively recent past. **Ascription And Achievement** and **Models of Society** report on relatively recent (1973) Canadian and (1973-76) Australian and New Zealand mobility surveys. Both books share many common assumptions, they cover some of the same ground, and their conclusions often concur. But they differ in the range of topics addressed and the general tone of the display of their findings. Both texts are basically reference books, chock full of data, and not recommended for bedtime reading! My own acquaintance with each of these countries convinces me of the rewards of comparison, not least because they are all "new nations" and share the experience of being white settler colonies.

The Canadian mobility study
Blau and Duncan's (1967) pathbreaking study of occupational mobility in the United States set the foundations for many subsequent mobility surveys and **Ascription And Achievement** is no exception. There are a clear set of theoretical and methodological agendas in the genre and these are well described in the opening chapters. The authors set out ideal-typical alternative sets of assumptions that also serve as benchmarks for the Australasian research described below. On the one hand there is the post-industrial thesis. This argues that industrial societies (and note industrial rather than capitalist is the watchword), particularly of the "advanced" variety, have undergone significant linked technological and occupational change, the expansion of the tertiary sector of the workforce being a major illustration. Concomitant with these changes there has

been a marked diminution in family size, an expansion in public education and a consequent rise in the average level of education attainment. This has prompted the rise of credentialism in the labour market and provoked the assumption that universalism gradually replaces, albeit imperfectly, particularism in the system of job allocation. All these factors combined have led to increases in occupational mobility, and much of this increase is upward mobility. All these processes, or so it is argued, are common to advanced industrial societies so that the question of a convergence in patterns of social change, at least along the above lines of change, is mooted.

Clearly the above model is not undisputed and the Canadian team are well aware of this. In theories of class as opposed to socio-economic status, the pattern of change in advanced capitalist (rather than industrial) societies is viewed somewhat differently. Educational possibilities may have expanded for much of the populace but education is not "open". The expansion of white collar work is viewed in terms of the occupational degradation of non-manual work rather than a simple upgrading of possibilities as more and more workers from blue collar backgrounds choose or are forced into similarly unskilled or semi-skilled clerical jobs. Significantly, many of the persons filling these proletarianised white collar jobs are female. With this reinterpretation of similar "facts", conclusions fundamentally differ. Critics of occupational mobility studies, and they are by no means exclusively Marxist in persuasion, argue that mobility is therefore an illusion. What we are seeing is persons moving around within a class structure that remains unchanged - and that structure is fundamentally exploitative.

So what solutions to this debate are offered by the Canadian researchers? They adopt an eminently sensible position. On the one hand they acknowledge that the "divide" between the above positions is theoretically irreconcilable on certain major points. But on the other hand, they argue, mobility studies can and do provide useful data for all students of social inequality. Educational credentials are important in Canada for workers, employers and trade unionists alike. The world of occupations does have a status hierarchy. So estimations of human achievement (and the latter word in itself begs important questions), in terms of educational and occupational attainment, are important aspects of social mores. Whether one chooses to see such mores in terms of collective societal values or class hegemony the question of mobility is a vital one. If mobility is "real" then one should ask how is it patterned, for to study mobility is not to accept inequality *per se*. If mobility is a chimera created by the haves in order to delude the have nots, then the degree of mobility is a crucial aspect of ideological control and thus draws one in to major questions of how that control can be resisted.

Commendably, the Canadian study states explicitly that their results will not shed much light on class location, the relations between classes, the role of the state, and the structure of the economic and educational systems. Moreover, they are quick to point out problems of periodisation and cultural uniqueness. Post-industrial societies may be convergent in some respects but the Canadian "reality" contains a mix of the generalisable and the particular. This point is well demonstrated in John Porter's excellent introductory sketch of the major transformations of Canadian society this century, particularly post-Second World War. Many of the contours in his portrait are familiar to New Zealanders but some of the shadings are less pertinent to the local scene. Key processes of social change for Porter are rural to urban transition, the changing nature of the occupational structure, demographic changes embracing natural increase and net migration, ethnic pluralism, sex differentiation and the constancy of "inequalities of condition" graphically illustrated through the class structure. In sum,

Canadians live in a society where income, assets and educational possibilities are far from equally shared, ethnic and sex divisions are crucially important in shaping life chances, and all these features of inequality have to be set against the peculiarities of Canadian geography and history. The book then moves through a series of chapters that seek to map different aspects of this "reality" in relation to patterns of status attainment.

McRoberts reports on male occupational inheritance using conventional techniques of statistical manipulation to explore father to son relationships. The highest rates of inheritance are to be found in the upper reaches of the 10 point occupational status scale used, and amongst farmers, although the level of self-recruitment in agriculture is highly constrained by the availability of jobs in an occupational sector that has experienced a world wide process of labour shedding. Semi-and unskilled manual workers show relatively high levels of movement out of their rapidly shrinking occupational niches, whilst skilled manual workers are far more likely to remain in blue collars. Nevertheless, the middle ranges of the occupational scale show high levels of "mobility" over the generations, both up and down. These are trends observable in many societies, but what explains them? McRoberts suggests that statistically three fifths of the pattern of mobility is explained by different levels of educational attainment.

This explanation is perused further in subsequent chapters by Jones (Frank E.) and Goyder respectively. Jones suggests that education is the crucial variable in explaining first and subsequent jobs and this pattern is confirmed in Goyder's retrospective study that follows. His cautious remarks are illustrative of the commendable balance displayed in this book. The problems of periodisation, counter-trends induced by sharp economic changes and the position of sub-groups are all clearly acknowledged. Nevertheless, Goyder still expresses confidence in the findings of an overall upgrading of occupational status over the present century. The additional importance of family size is also illustrated in a subsequent chapter by Pineo.

Up to this point analyses have been exclusive to men, but women's attainments are also fully explored. Boyd concludes that educational attainment is more crucial to first job attainment for women than men, that male career upward mobility is twice as high as for females, and that there is clear evidence of sex segregation in the Canadian labour market. She suggests that being married, as opposed to having children, has little impact on individual occupational attainment, and this is exemplified in Goyder's chapter on part-time female paid employment. His figures confirm conventional wisdom to the effect that women end up disproportionately in dead end jobs, men are clearly favoured in promotion and career terms, and women who are successful must bear greater social costs than men.

Unsuprisingly, ethnicity and migration loom large in the Canadian study. Canada has a multiplicity of ethnic groups, a history of migration and immigration, and the English and French influences give a distinctive flavour to societal and regional variations. McRoberts addresses the sensitive question of language and mobility (in Chapter 9) and comes up with some interesting conclusions. In Quebec anglophones do better than francophones in terms of status attainment, but, he argues, this is because the English in Quebec are a special privileged group whose overall attainment is at least partly explained by migration of high status English persons from outside the province. If one compares the relative mobility chances of the French in Quebec and the English in the rest of Canada there is little difference between the groups.

When ethnic origin and occupational attainment are looked at across all groups (a task conducted by Pineo and Porter) there is suprisingly little relationship between them. Admittedly there are considerable problems attached to definitions of ethnicity, (fully 86% of the overall sample defined themselves as Canadian when asked for their ethnic affiliation) but even allowing for this, the authors conclude that mass education may have broken down the "vertical mosaic" that existed in the early 1900s at a time of mass immigration. At least that seems to be the case for most ethnic groups, with some glaring exceptions. The Native Indian and Inuit experience provide a sharp illustration of immobility linked to ethnicity that deserved more prominence in the book.

Not only is there little difference in the status attainments of most ethnic groups there are also, with some important qualifications, limited distinctions between native and foreign born Canadians. Boy's chapter on immigration and occupational attainment, and Jones' subsequent discussion of the influences of nativity, show that foreign migrants in the large urban centres do less well than others, most notably compared with the high attainments of United States and United Kingdom men, and non-U.S. and U.K. foreign born women do worst of all. But occupational attainments are broadly the same irrespective of birthplace. Moreover, Jones concludes, birthplace and generational status are largely neutral influences on educational and occupational placement. There appears to be little advantage in being a second or third generation Canadian, although foreign born males, as a rule, do not go as far up the career ladder as native born men.

And what of internal migration? The Mobility Survey found a high level of mobility within provinces but rather less between them. Generally speaking Pineo finds little relationship between geographical and occupational mobility.

Pulling all these conclusions together a number of themes emerge. The authors of the Canadian Mobility Study argue that their results mirror similar findings in other post-industrial societies. There has been more mobility than stability in Canada in the twentieth century and more upward than downward movement over time. Overall there is more circulation (exchange) mobility than structural mobility. The first entry into the labour market is closely related to level of education which is certainly influenced by family origins and family size. With some notable exceptions, ethnic stratification is diminishing in Canada. Women, foreign born in particular and in part-time paid work generally, are the ones who face the greatest barriers to equal opportunity.

Mobility in New Zealand and Australia
Ascription and Achievement is a large book (over 500 pages) covering one society. In contrast, the slim volume authored by Frank L. Jones and Peter Davis seeks to explore social mobility in Australia and New Zealand. Quantity is never a good indicator of quality but it means in this case that Jones and Davis have greater ambitions with a smaller data base. The opening chapters in **Models of Society** set out a by-now familiar agenda; although, unlike the Canadian volume which is admirably balanced and generally well aware of its limitations, Jones and Davis are rather more combative in defending their perspective. This is partly because the Australasian study is placed firmly within debates about class formation as well as status attainment.

Jones and Davis's aim is 'to define the main social classes, to analyse their recruitment patterns, and to specify the nature and extent of social closure between them'. (Jones and Davis 1986:10) They are far more influenced by British theoretical preoccupations

than their North American counterparts in this endeavour. Drawing heavily on the work of Goldthorpe's Social Mobility Group at Oxford (see Goldthorpe 1980) they set out to ascertain class boundaries in New Zealand and Australia, in particular, to investigate the distribution between working and "service" classes and the fate of what they call intermediate groupings. They also lay stress on the economic role of women in the formal economy and look at the impact of marriage on the class structure. Overall, and here the interests of the two books converge again, **Models of Society**, is also enamoured with the idea of the convergence of post-industrial societies and thus attempts to measure this in relation to Australia and New Zealand.

The tools Jones and Davis use to advance their project are, with one or two exceptions, familiar, although much use is made of the somewhat controversial Benini index of association. The authors initially carried out separate surveys in their respective abodes. The Jones survey was explicitly designed for mobility research, Davis's was not. In the latter case we have a survey on dental care which incorporated items which could be used later to measure mobility possibilities of the respondents. Both surveys, like the Canadian one, were carried out in the mid-1970s. This blending of survey data seems to have met with few problems of coding comparability, but adjustments had to be made for the different age ranges surveyed. More significantly, in order to achieve comparable sample sizes the New Zealand study used proxy information about employment status to bring the numbers up to the Australian study. In effect this means that the New Zealand sample is a mix of male respondent's reports on their employment status and that of their father, and wives' reports on their husbands' employment status. Jones and Davis claim that this was not a major problem but in my view it certainly weakens retrospective cohort analysis of the New Zealand data since the subjective statement of occupational status are twice removed in many cases.

The class scheme adopted by the authors was adapted from Goldthorpe's scale. Their use of the term class is justified, in Jones and Davis's view, by survey data on employment status, size of firm, and the duties of employer/employees to set beside occupational status. The authors also adhere, albeit with considerable ambivalence, to the Goldthorpe position regarding the unit of analysis to be used in measuring class. They opt for a family-based study in which the male "head" of household is used. The defence of this strategy is cursory and I for one am unconvinced, despite Goldthorpe's (see Goldthorpe 1984) spirited reply to his critics. Admittedly in many cases, particularly in historical studies, researchers have little choice but to rely on male occupational status, but methodological expedience is not a justifiable excuse in contemporary surveys.

For much of the book a seven point scale is used, running the familiar gamut from professional, through managerial and routine white collar (what Goldthorpe and the authors call the service class) to skilled, semi and unskilled manual work. Contentiously, they place small proprietors below lower white collar workers. Moreover, and here I am thoroughly unpersuaded by their strategy, they collapse all agricultural categories into a general Class 4 farming "class". They argue that there were few farm labourers in their sample, and that it can be generally assumed that most of these would go on to be farmers anyway. If there were so few farm labourers why did they not simply leave them out of their deliberations? Concern about the size of cells seems to have overridden conceptual rigour here. More to the point, is it wise to lump all farmers together in an intermediate "class"? Admittedly, the placement of farmers in occupational scales does become somewhat less hazardous the nearer we get to the present. Such a general category would be nonsensical in the nineteenth century.

But surely the heterogeneity of farming life chances, to use the authors terminology, is sufficiently great to debar not only a general farming "class" but also its intermediate placement in their social class scale. The large run-holders of Australia and New Zealand will not be amused at their demotion, whilst the struggling smallholders will be bemused by their elevation!

Jones and Davis are careful to point out that overall mobility chances are fundamentally effected by the number of classes in their models. For obvious reasons there is an expected marked drop in mobility possibilities if the number of "classes" is reduced from 6 or more to 3. Indeed, almost three quarters of their sample are mobile in a six category schema whereas only a half or less are if the categories are collapsed to three.

So what are the findings? The overall parameters of mobility follow those found in the Canadian study. Farmers and those in the upper echelons of the class structure (in Jones and Davis's terms, the upper service class) show the highest levels of occupational self recruitment. Looking at simple outflow figures, 80% of sons of fathers' in the service class remain in this class. Between 60 and 70% of routine non-manual workers are immobile, and much the same figure is given for small proprietors, although their origins are more diverse. In contrast, only 40% of skilled manual workers and 50% of semi and unskilled blue collar employees inherit their class placement. Clearly there is more upward mobility from the working class than the reverse for white collar workers. Interestingly, between 60 and 70% of the sons of farmers move into manual work. Can it be said that all these men will be in a position to inherit farms or make it into self-employed agricultural work?

Jones and Davis, as their Canadian counterparts do, move from descriptive to analytic statistical manipulation. In Chapter 3 they look at the influence of structural change in the occupational hierarchy on mobility chances by "fitting' various social mobility models to the data. This process entails theoretical assumptions as well as numerical techniques. For example, they assume that the upper service class have high access to property and the lower service class to credentials. Farmers have disproportionate claims to physical capital (land). These hypotheses seem unstartling but the authors also contend that farming sons (no mention of daughters) face strong barriers to non-manual occupations because of the poorer quality of rural education. This, at least in New Zealand terms, seems suspect. Jones and Davis also assume that there are no serious barriers to self employment. The diverse origins of the small proprietors in their sample seems to bear this out but the vital question would seem to be the ability to stay self employed rather than making the attempt in the first place. The history of the petit bourgeoisie is an uneasy one not simply because of the ambiguities of their class placement but their peculiar susceptibility to market fortunes.

The result of considerable statistical manipulation are findings (in Chapter 3) very similar to those revealed by the percentage tables in Chapter 2. This leads the authors to ponder further on the question of convergence between New Zealand and Australia. Certainly the overall patterns of occupational mobility are similar. Moreover, using retrospective cohort analysis this similitude appears to hold true over time. Familiar arguments are brought forth to support the contention, namely, the move from ascription to achievement, and the similarity of New Zealand and Australian occupational profiles over the present century. The consistency of relatively high levels of occupational inheritance at the pinnacle of the class structure, the large degree of class closure in farming, the apparent openness of lower middle class occupations,

and the relative weakness of working class inheritance as the service classes expanded rapidly since the Second World War, are all patterns common to both societies. This adds up to a convincing case within the author's theoretical parameters, and these are heavily influenced by assumptions about the relationship between class analysis and occupational structures.

However, they do not leave their deliberations at this point but move on to another, far more neglected area in Australasian historical and sociological study. Patterns of class endogamy and exogamy and broader questions about the links between status attainment, gender and the division of labour have received little attention in New Zealand or Australia to date. Given my own modest efforts in this area (see Pearson 1987) I was most interested in Jones and Davis's study of marriage patterns. Their results broadly bear out my own findings, although the latter cover a much longer time span and are drawn from marriage registers as opposed to survey responses. The highest rates of class endogamy reported in **Models of Society** are found among the upper service class and farmers. Marriage between partners from the top and bottom of the class structure are relatively rare but there is considerable inter-mixing in the middle ranges. Marriages between persons from farming and non-farming backgrounds are also relatively uncommon. Overall, and the authors beg caution because of the small cell sizes in certain instances, barriers to intermarriage seem somewhat weaker than barriers to occupational mobility in Australia, and to a somewhat lesser extent in New Zealand. Additional information is provided on homogamy patterns but this is restricted to Australia and uses a six point status attainment model. Paradoxically, farmers and farm workers are spread throughout the scale in this instance on the basis of the relative social standing of different kinds of farm work!

Once again, on balance, the results are unexpected. The general picture is one of a tendency to homogamy with the most striking patterns evident at the top and bottom of the "class" structure. So drawing the results from the two parts of the book together, the authors conclude that in both the societies studied there is a dynamic relationship between 'processes of social mobility (that) serve to break down the fixed character of social classes over time, and how tendencies towards status homogamy tend to reconstitute them.' (Jones & Davis 1986:111)

In their penultimate chapter Jones and Davis come closer to the Canadian study once again. They too find little difference in status attainment of men and women in full-time employment at mid-career, but beyond this, sex differentiation is marked. In the long run men experience far greater career advancement than women. Consequently they dominate authority positions in the workforce. Moreover, again no suprises, there is considerable job segregation on the basis of gender and substantial inequalities in the occupational earnings of men and women respectively. Why do Australian women earn less than men? The linked or alternative hypotheses of straight out discrimination, the workings of a segregated labour market, and what they call the 'weak labour force attachment' of women, are explored through a useful and extensive analysis of census figures from 1911 to 1981 and conventional status attainment models. The census analysis fully confirms sex segregation of the labour market throughout the period investigated, whilst the modelling bears out the Canadian results noted above on the relationship between family origins, educational attainment and first job placement.

Conclusions

On the whole the Canadian study is noteworthy for the modesty of its claims and the cautiousness of its conclusions. Jones and Davis vacillate between temperance and

intemperance in their remarks. I fully concur with the view, and this holds for both texts under review, that the study of occupational and social mobility raises central questions for class analysis. Within Weberian perspectives the relative closure of classes and social classes (and these are not the same thing![1]) and the inheritability or otherwise of life chances in the labour market are vital considerations for a whole array of questions, including for example, the central preoccupation with the relationship between economic forces and political change. As Jones and Davis rightly point out, class consciousness is likely to be inhibited if actors (or agents?) are socially mobile within or across generations. The fact that the class structure may remain fundamentally unchanged does not invalidate the overall conjecture that a movement of personnel within it will influence their perceptions and actions, political or otherwise. But conjecture is the right word here, for the information supplied in mobility studies is demonstrably incomplete and partial. So, of course, is any argument about class hegemony. The debate between Weberian and Marxist inspired analyses is an important one but it is bedevilled by tired ideological wrangling. Status attainment and social mobility modelling will never resolve this debate and the Canadian Group recognise this. Jones and Davis, whilst rightly ambivalent about the relative merits of mobility or hegemonic explanations cannot resist seeking to score a few points for their side - although whose side they are on is a moot point.

I, for one, as a Weberian, can agree with much of what they say but part company on many of the essentials of their argument, not least because of their inability to look at the central importance of property relations. And one should remember that the divisions of property and non-property ownership are at the heart of both Marxist and Weberian approaches to class analysis. Whilst acknowledging the centrality of occupational change and educational attainment, social mobility is as much a history of the family, of the structures of business enterprise, of migration, of individual life crises, of the rise of the welfare state and of government policies, as it is a history of occupations and the labour force. (Kaelble 1985:143) The concept of post-industrial society is a contested one, and if any claim to universalism can be made, periodisation is crucial. It appears to be the case that during the 1950s and 1960s the general buoyancy of capitalist economies prompted similar patterns of social change. What we saw in North America, Europe, New Zealand and Australia, for example, was rapid sectoral changes in employment, the rise of the professions being a graphic illustration. These changes, seen alongside the rise of the welfare state and social democratic governments prepared to pay at least lip service to egalitarian policies, opened up the possibility of upward occupational mobility for much of the labour force. Demographic changes were also crucial as a reduction in family size of the middle classes left further opportunities for the movement (mobility is a debateable word in many instances here) of working class persons into the middle strata. Migration, internal and international, also had a decisive influence in many societies. But this overall pattern of change within so-called "open" societies was disrupted, as it has been in the past and no doubt will be in the future, by wars, recessions and revolutions.

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1   In my view, Jones and Davis are not only guilty of continually confusing classes as abstract categories and social classes as communities throughout their text, but they also seem to assume that Giddens' work on class structuration and Parkin's on class closure are indisputably complementary. I very much doubt if these two theorists would see it this way, despite the obvious influences of Weber in both their writings.

But is the word 'disruption' correct here? Surely the flow and ebb of economic possibilities are equally pertinent if we look at a longer time frame? Once historical analysis is brought to centre stage the rewards of a more expansive theoretical and research framework are apparent, at least to this reviewer.

Unfortunately, Jones and Davis seem less than sympathetic to what they call historical and literary analyses in their over-strident defence of survey methods. One can sympathise with their stance to some degree for many of their detractors are undoubtedly one eyed. But to rebut one blinkered view with another hardly broadens our overall vision of past or present. It is high time that sociologists and historians pooled their complementary methodological skills, and the history of social mobility is as good a starting point as any. Kaelble's recent remarks about the regrettable divisions between historical and sociological research on social mobility provide a productive endpoint to this essay in may view. And bear in mind his conclusions are just as pertinent to the divisions within as between our respective disciplines.

'These two theatres of the history of social mobility have none of their actors and very few of their spectators in common. Sociologists mostly do not know the historical studies since they often regard them as too limited, too crude in their statistical methods, too narrow-minded in their analytical approach, too far removed from the long-term view of present trends. Historians usually take little interest in sociological studies since they are regarded as not taking account of social history in its entirety, as being too difficult to interpret because of the quantitative techniques employed, as remaining too general and vague in their conclusions. Historians are often mistrustful of attempts to reconstruct the past from recent surveys. There is no doubt that historical and sociological studies deal with different periods. They are, however, often interested in the same basic questions, so that it is a pity that there is no bridge, no debate, no division of labour' (Kaelble, 1985. 119-20).

Hear! Hear!

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REVIEW ESSAY

POSITIVISM AND ENLIGHTENMENT AS PROJECTS

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Peter Halfpenny. **Positivism and Sociology: Explaining Social Life**. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982. 141 pp.

Frank Hearn. **Reason and Freedom in Sociological Thought**. Boston, Allen and Unwin, 1985. 220 pp.

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Review by Paul F. Green, Department of Sociology
Massey University

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The contrast between Frank Hearn's passionate commitment to the restoration of reason and freedom and Peter Halfpenny's scholarly review of the rise and fall of positivism couldn't be sharper. Yet these two histories provide complimentary perspectives on the development of sociological thought, largely because their juxtaposition reflects conflicts so typical of the field. More rewarding perhaps was the discovery that two such different schools of sociology could make contact at so many junctures. Though their theoretical goals and styles of presentation are very different, their modes of discourse are often compatible, allowing the reader the luxury of comparatively evaluating and perhaps synthesizing conflicting arguments. The modern debate between sociological positivists and critical social theorists is a part of the long standing debate between sociologists committed to natural scientific models of theory and research, and those committed to a humanistic reconstruction of modern society.

Positivism and Sociology (1982) is by far the more academic or scholarly account. Halfpenny does an intriguing and, as far as it goes, a convincing job of weaving the history of sociological positivism into the larger fabric of scientific empiricism. His task was to catalogue and identify the varieties of positivism that emerged, to understand and join the controversies from the viewpoints of their proponents and finally to evaluate their beneficial or malign influence on sociology. He places Comte's very considerable influence in the tradition of scientific empiricism but shows that the development of logical positivism, as the received wisdom in the natural sciences, came at a critical time in the development of sociology as an academic discipline. Thoroughly cognizant with the history of these larger philosophical debates, Halfpenny does an admirable job of staying on target with the development of sociology. While reconstructing the debates we are introduced to the members of the various schools, the Vienna Circle, the Berlin Association and the influence of these developments on sociology through people like Otto Neurath and Paul Lazarsfeld. A characteristic of this entire account is that we are reviewing streams of ideas and interpersonal influences as if they occurred in intellectual isolation from the world of revolutionary upheavals. Rarely do we see any connection to the social struggles of the nineteenth or twentieth centuries among economic interest groups with rival political ideologies.

Halfpenny identifies twelve distinguishable strains of positivism some of which, like Comte's historicist theory of progress and his religion of humanity, are either dead or near dead. Comte's other two forms of positivism incorporated traditional empiricism, the theory of knowledge based on observational experience, and the unity of science theory that all sciences can be integrated into a single natural system. What Halfpenny

shows is that logical positivism was an extension of the empiricist epistemology which incorporated analytic truths in the body of scientific knowledge. By combining phenomenological interpretations of natural laws as empirical regularities with analytic statements of them in the form of mathematical logic, the logical positivists believed they had established a means for distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless statements. The continuing quest for an appropriate and valid criterion of demarcation has characterised several of the subsequent variations in positivism from Carnap through Hempel to Popper.

If there is a thesis developed by Halfpenny (1982:11) however, it is that "the positivism of the positivists differs from the positivism of the anti-positivists". He might have added the observation that not only do the critics of positivism, like the Frankfurt school, disagree on how to interpret positivism, so too does a philosopher like Popper, who denies that he is a positivist. The approaches of Popper and Hempel, however, are seen here as alternative attempts to develop and amplify an empiricist epistemology.

Even sociologists like Max Weber, who denies the possibility of a natural science of society, nonetheless incorporated a variant of positivism that relied on establishing empirical antecedent causes to supplement *verstehen* approaches to human actions. Halfpenny concludes that Durkheim's statistical variant of positivism has not only a limited potential but it is by no means a necessary form of sociological empiricism. Positivists relying on analytic induction and some symbolic interactionists propose non-statistical specifications for testing hypotheses, and insist that exceptions to the rule constitute falsifications of their theories. There are a number of interesting sideshows explored by the author to show that it is not only qualitative sociologists or dialectical materialists that oppose the programme of wedding sociology to the natural sciences. Teleological functionalists (Parsons?) for example are seen to oppose a theory of knowledge based on an interrelated set of universal laws due to the distinctive role played by goals in human action.

In more general terms he argues that twentieth century philosophies of science incorporating either conventional (e.g. I. Lakatos) or realist (e.g. T. Benton) options are in fact continuous with the programme formulated by logical positivists. Positivism, he concludes may be dead in the sense that 'there is no longer an identifiable community of philosophers... [to support it] but it lives on philosophically, developed until it transmutes into conventionalism or realism'. (Halfpenny, 1982:120) Most of the critics of "simplistic positivism" forget that the critique itself was first developed by logical positivists. At one extreme he sees a group of sociologists living in a dream world where the obstacles to developing a natural science of society are seen as merely technical problems, and at the other extreme a group who have totally rejected positivism and make anti-positivist programmes for sociological analysis and research their central focus. For the enemies of positivism it is as if the defeat of positivism were a sufficient goal in its own right. To this Halfpenny's (1982:119) reply is:

> The temptation to abandon positivism entirely because
> thorough and detailed analyses have revealed its flaws,
> and adopt instead relatively unanalysed alternatives
> which might in the end turn out to be no less seriously
> flawed, should perhaps be resisted.

To avoid the historic alignment of a value free factually oriented positivism with the status quo in politics, positivists are encouraged to return to their roots. The limitations of the epistemological programme detected by critical theorists like Marcuse should lead not to the abandonment of positive science, says Halfpenny (1982:119), but to 'recapture Comte's first formulation: improvements in knowledge must be made to serve mankind'.

If it weren't for the fact that **Positivism and Sociology** was published three years before Frank Hearn's **Reason and Freedom**, we might suspect they were written to counter one another. Hearn's thesis is that the instrumental rationality of science has displaced reason and has therefore become the single most important enemy of freedom.

It is of course to the influence of positivism and in particular the influence of theorists like Comte that Hearn directs his fire. Sociology, he claims, was formulated as a conservative reaction to the enlightenment programme of individual freedom. What was feared by Comte and others was that the Enlightenment spirit of reason had not only destroyed the theological basis of authority, it had created a vacuum in which revolutionary instability would continue to flourish and destroy the bonds of order that give society its stability. The quest for order then entailed a strategy for social reconstruction that would reduce the threat of anarchic freedom. The scientisation of politics based on the growth of a positive science of society was intended to provide the logical and sufficient basis for the establishment of such an order in modern society. The habit of submission would then be restored. When 'the development of Positive thought has proceeded far enough to bring this [religiously motivated] involuntary submission into due prominence, it creates a spirit of true humility, and thus becomes consciously to ourselves a most valuable agent of moral discipline'. (Comte in Hearn, 1985:43) The argument is of course one that Durkheim developed further, but it is clear that Comte saw the authority of positive thought based on science as the ultimate basis of good order. Unlike Durkheim, Comte saw that limitations on freedom of speech and conscience would likewise be justified by the fact that so few persons would be fit to judge the complexity of the ideas, conceptions and operations that a science of nature and society would entail. This then is the problem, according to Hearn (1985:44): 'In the form of [Positive] science, reason becomes an instrument of adaptation to the factual order and, as such, an opponent of human freedom'.

The problematic for Hearn is not merely an attack on positivism, but an affirmation of the sociological project formulated by C. Wright Mills which is then expanded and enriched by critical theory. Critical theory is seen to emerge from a synthesis of Max Weber's pessimistic view of the role of instrumental rationality or bureaucracy in modern industrial societies and Karl Marx's optimistic view that the rationalisation of productive forces would reduce the domain of necessity and expand the domain of human freedom. Hearn's task was to begin with Mills' view of reason and freedom and then to move backward and trace its roots among Enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau and then forward to critical theory and the work of theorists like Habermas.

The fact that sociology is regarded as a product of industrial capitalism and in particular as a quest for some principle of order that would legitimise and stablise that system, meant that sociology was initially associated with dissolving the alliance of reason and freedom. The freedom promoted by the Enlightenment required equality of ranks as well as of life conditions and the critical means of achieving that state of

humanity was open public enquiry. Free individuals and autonomous groups exercising their capacity to reason would thereby satisfy their common human needs. Whereas freedom was thus seen as an ally of reason, there were underlying dilemmas and contradictions that led eventually to alternative formulations and developments. The basis on which human rights were to be established remained in question. Reason was to be disciplined by experience, but this attracted many to science which in turn could subordinate reason. The most popular response was that of the liberals who saw happiness and individual liberty based on the right to private property.

Though Durkheim was never so sanguine as Comte about the potential of positive science, in the end he came to a view not unlike Weber's. He lost faith in the curative powers of instrumental reason to mitigate against the moral crises of anomie and egoism. Instead, transcending the pathological problems of industrial capitalism was seen to depend on religious experience that would spontaneously arise in a 'collective effervescence'.

The first part of **Reason and Freedom** ends with the Marx/Weber debate and the critical relation of values and facts in establishing scientific objectivity. Here Marx stood alone and in diametric opposition to Weber in making a commitment to the liberating interests of the proletariat. And thus Marx developed a view of practical rationality which presupposed a knowledge of the potentialities for liberating humanity as well as of the existing structures that denied those potentials.

Part two traces the continuing development of social theory in the relation to the decline of democratic participation and of the modernist faith in freedom without reason. Nietzsche and Freud are seen to find freedom in impulse and spontaneity and the works of Daniel Bell and Christopher Lasch are contrasted to show that such modernists' views 'are as much the products as they are negations of instrumental reason'. (Hearn, 1985:95)

Finally Hearn (1985:165) comes to the public sphere which "is the ground of the sociological imagination, the social basis of what Habermas calls the interest in emancipation, a safeguard against the rationalisation of discourse and interaction". Both Mills and Habermas see the restoration of public life, of participatory democracy, by public groups engaged in open debate as essential to reason and freedom. To Habermas it is the creation of authentic public opinion under conditions of non-distorted communication, whereas to Mills the sociologist must become a liberal educator translating personal troubles into public issues and thereby using the sociological imagination to promote the values of a democratic society. Both theorists have struggled to reverse the trend to privatisation that they attribute to the rationalisation of public life. The substitution of opinion polls for public opinion in the absence of publics and debates is symptomatic of how public life itself has been undermined, as individual atomised members of society become dependent on experts to tell them what 'the public opinion' is.

Frank Hearn's enthusiasm for the sociologist as critic, engaged in the production of emancipatory knowledge is quite likely the sort of 'unanalysed alternative' that might in the end turn out to be flawed, according to Peter Halfpenny. Among critical theorists the relation between sociological theory and political practice is tenuous and dependent on the production of authentic insights. It puts the sociologist in the position of a political historian, analyst and advisor, but such inquiry "does not have the capacity to justify what is to be done" (Habermas in Hearn, 1985:195). Absent from Habermas'

scheme is any world historical mission or positive theory of history with which to justify taking action or calling for sacrifices. The role of the critical theorist is that of a restrained participant: a non-partisan specialist whose political interventions aim at sustaining the public sphere in which political movements operate, without becoming a partisan activist. In the 'critique' there is no trace of Weber's ethical neutrality or the disengagement of logical positivists who feared reason as "a source of unreason, of bias and prejudice when uncontrolled by experience" (Halfpenny, 1982:77) but the commitment to emancipation is nonetheless constrained by critical exigencies and political experience (Hearn, 1985:190-203).

Perhaps, ultimately, a positivism transmuted into realism might promote those improvements in knowledge made to serve the emancipation of humankind. But Hearn like Habermas and Gouldner have clearly rejected the elitist role of Comtean sociologists, and their resistance to a synthesis of positivism and critical theory would involve much more than that. Modern positivists and critical theorists have never agreed on the substance of science much less on the scope of reason. These disagreements stem from a conflict over values for the good society, with positivists favouring a stable orderly system and critical theorists opting for a dynamic conflict system of relations.

To treat all positivistic forms of modern science as the enemies of freedom, as does Hearn however, is a gross distortion of scientific rationality. If logical positivists can be accused of making science an instrument of adaptation to the factual order of capitalist societies, it does not follow that they have always been or will always be so inclined. Nor for that matter does the generalisation hold for 'positivists' like Carl Rogers and Karl Popper, who are committed to humanism, science and individualism. The problem with scientific rationality is no different than the problem with theological rationality or historical materialism. Once you've got 'the theory' and 'the method' locked into the state apparatus and harnessed to the politics of holding power, exploiting and oppressing the masses is always a strong possibility. I'm nonetheless inclined to favour the new Enlightenment project that Hearn is promoting - just so long as it doesn't reconstitute itself into some new orthodoxy.

REVIEWS

Corson, D. **The Lexical Bar**. London, Pergamon. 1985.

Review by Roy Nash, Education Department, Massey University

'Sir, what's this word - "lithographic"?' I was taking the Fifth Form Commercial class for a library period - the high spot of the week. 'Ah', I began, 'this is from the Greek "lithos" which means "stone" and "graphos" which means...' 'Sir,' the student broke in, 'I only want to know what it means now.' So much for my post-graduate training in English, I thought, as I skipped the etymology and gave her the information she wanted. But David Corson's book makes me think that I should have insisted. In a sentence, Corson says that the specialist Graeco-Latin lexicon of English operates as an effective socio-linguistic bar which prevents working-class English speakers from gaining access to the abstract conceptual meanings of the educational system and thus obstructs their educational progress. Corson offers us, in a rather slim book, a complex, double aspect theory - the lexical bar of Corson's title refers both to a property of English and to a specific quality of the competence English speakers display with their language. First, there is a socio-linguistic thesis, which states roughly that: specialist areas of knowledge have distinct lexicons; that these lexicons are largely of Graeco-Latin derivation; that such words are generally acquired while at secondary school; that some ethnic and class youth sub-cultures reject such words as strange and difficult; and that this rejection effectively blocks their further educational progress. Second, there is a cognitive-linguistic thesis which speculates on the possibility that possession of a specialist lexicon facilitates (or is even necessary to) cognition, and explores some implications of the hypothesis that mental access to the meanings of words might be through their stems or roots.

After introducing us to the post-Bernsteinian era in educational linguistics Corson turns to the history of English and reminds us of the impact of the Norman interruption and of the tradition of Latin scholarship on the development of English, circumstances which determined that our language would emerge in the thirteenth century and continue to develop, quite unlike Dutch or German, by building its specialist lexicon from non-native roots. The lexical bar was erected, Corson argues, in the Renaissance period when words of Latin and Greek derivation were imported wholesale into literary English. With this background established he goes on to report empirical investigations of the written and spoken language of working-class and middle-class school pupils in England and Australia and concludes that there is, indeed, some empirical support for the reality of a lexical bar, with marked consequences for education, in contemporary English. The final chapters then discuss, in an admittedly more speculative fashion, the relevance of research in cognitive-linguistics to the general theory. The whole thing is certainly an interesting set of ideas - and one with a down-to-earth common sense core after the structuralist flights of linguistic codes - but although the book is welcome I think that most of us will require a little more convincing.

I have a number of questions to raise. Even before we go any further I think it will be necessary to support the thesis of a lexical bar established in English during the period 1450-1650 with a great deal more evidence and argument than Corson's brief survey provides. Most scholars are able to trace an unbroken development from early modern English in the thirteenth century through Chaucer, Spenser, Wyclif, Shakespeare, the

Authorised Version, Bunyan, Defoe and so to modern times. Any educated English speaker can see that while eleventh century Anglo-Saxon is a foreign language, thirteenth century English written in the eventually successful dialect is just archaic English. Corson supports his argument with Thomas Browne's mid-sixteenth century comment that, 'we shall within few years be fain to learn Latin to understand English, and a work will prove of equal facility in either'. (Corson 1985:35) Thomas Browne, however, was in the middle of a dispute between "purists" and "Latinisers" and a central figure in the latter camp. For Browne to make such a complaint was ironic. Mulcaster, a "purist" whom Corson represents as "isolated", was, in fact, but one of a large number of writers of this period who railed against the introduction of what they called "inkhorn terms" lifted from the classical languages. Many words that entered the language during this period were not, in fact, introduced as specialist terms for concepts that could not be precisely expressed in English and came to have their present narrow meaning as the result of their failure to compete with existing words. Among many examples are, "metaphysical", originally used to mean "supernatural", and "advertisment" with the meaning "inform" or "warn". English certainly absorbed at this time a large number of Latin words (as much as a quarter of the entire Latin vocabulary has been taken into English since Roman times) as well as a good many words of Greek derivation and, in truth, some people did get rather muddled by it all. Dogberry, one of Shakespeare's 'gentlemen of the watch', was one of them, 'our watch, Sir, have comprehended two auspicious persons', he says in **Much Ado About Nothing** (1598); but the introduction of these "hard" words is not evidence for a "lexical bar". There is something important about the class-marked lexicon of English, and it has been noted before, by Raymond Williams (1982) among others, but that we should think in terms of a "bar" is to overstate the case. Writers varied greatly in the extent to which they used this new vocabulary. The translators of the Authorised Version kept their use of Graeco-Latin words down to 6 per cent, Shakespeare worked with 10 per cent, but at the other end of this spectrum Johnson managed to include 28 per cent Graeco-Latin words in his writing and Gibbon fully 30 per cent. (These frequencies from Barber 1976). Moreover, it seems to be stylistic preference rather than content that determines the proportion of Graeco-Latin words. Most scientists wrote in Latin at this time but some works were written in English (Robert Norman's (1581) treatise on magnetism **The New Attractive** is a notable example) and there were many practical craft and navigation manuals with a wide readership. There is no evidence that these works could not be understood by readers unlearned in the classical languages and the thesis of a technically necessary "lexical apartheid" at this time is thus hard to sustain. Browne's comment on the new words must be set against those of his contemporary Blount, 'a few late years have rendred them familiar even to vulgar capacities.' (quoted in Barber 1976:90)

Corson reports fewer Graeco-Latin words in the school writing and speech of working-class children compared with middle-class children, even when matched on a non-verbal test of reasoning, and this is not hard to believe. But I think the institutional and semantic context in which these samples of spoken and written language were obtained is more important than Corson is willing to acknowledge. If young people becoming socialised into certain sub-cultural patterns of response are asked by a school-based researcher, 'When is it not wrong to tell lies?', the first quick mental reply might be, 'When you won't be found out.' But that thought must be supressed. I think it likely that this might have an inhibiting effect on the production of fluent responses from pupils we can locate at a particular class-cultural position. Then again, if questions that assume a dominant social position, 'What laws would you change?', are put to young people who are just beginning to understand the nature of their subordinate and

powerless position in the social order, the effect might be almost that of an insult. At any rate one could understand an inhibited and indifferent response. I think it very likely that many working class English speakers do find it more natural to talk about "bringing in" and "throwing out" laws rather than "introducing" and "abolishing" (still less "repealing") them - but I'm far from convinced that this is anything more than a matter of class style. Corson is right to draw attention to this largely neglected issue of social class lexes, but we need much more work before any sound conclusions are possible.

Corson provides no extensive documentation of either written or spoken language and we are given only "typical" (I suspect chosen as close to ideal-typical) illustrations. This is not unusual in such work, in fact, although there is an extensive literature on language and class, it is hard to find lengthy transcripts of speech by school pupils identified by social class. One book, though, comes to mind at once - and it provides a considerable surprise. I've gone through only the first chapter of **Learning to Labour** and examined the words of only one speaker (but the most quoted) and from Joey we get the following Graeco-Latin words (and there will undoubtedly be more that are not obvious to me): establishment, resent, authority, intelligent, subject, special, submissive, actually, realm, pleasures, displeasures, frustrations, emotions, experience, developed, certain, situation, convincingly, occupation, discrete, excitement, defying, supposed, chivalry, savage, completely, according, trivial, exhilarating, co-ordinate, individual, enjoyable, opportunity, and immediately. (Willis 1977) An impressive list for a 300 level essay - but this is from the speech of a fifteen-year-old "lad" deep in the very peer group culture which on Corson's thesis is engaged in actively resisting this vocabulary and the concepts it expresses. I don't doubt that Joey is particularly intelligent but we should note that his identification with the male counter-school youth sub-culture does not affect his command of the non-popular linguistic code displayed in his conversations with Willis. A little more work seems needed before we accept the generality of this notion of a lexical bar in English or in working-class speech.

These objections are to the socio-linguistic aspect of Corson's work but it is, I suspect, the cognitive-linguistic aspects in which he is more interested. I don't read Corson in the Sapir-Whorf tradition arguing a "language determines thought" thesis, but his position seems plain enough in this sentence, 'for those to whom some words seem anomolous or bizarre in form, an expectation follows that the meanings associated with such forms are unusual, exotic and rather irrelevant' (p.49) 'An expectation follows...' Does it? Thomas Elyot, a sixteenth century "Latiniser", argued thus, 'I intended to augment our English tongue, wherby men shulde as well expresse more abundantly the thynge that they conceyved in theyr hartis', but Corson seems to argue that without the terms the 'thynge that they conceyved', the concepts of thought, are not there to be expressed. (Baugh 1951:260) In this respect, at least, I have more sympathy for Elyot's psychology than Corson's (or Wittgenstein's whose thought is presumably influential here). Corson mentions the words and the concepts of "compromise" and "preparatory", and they will suit the discussion as well as any. Is it really to be supposed that speakers who do not demonstrate in their active vocabulary the word "compromise" do not know that one way to settle disputes is by "give and take"? Or that those who do not readily use the word "preparatory" do not well understand that "first things must be done first"? Conversely, is it not also entirely possible to know how to use certain words and yet to have no really firm idea of the concept they stand for? (I think I have this problem myself with words like "dialectic" and "emancipation.") If we want to study the development of such complex social concepts

we must approach the question as Vygotsky suggested, not through studies of language use but through direct investigation. How do children settle disputes and how do they form and seek to communicate their desire to resolve an argument by ways that we would be willing to count as compromise? Privileging language in the study of cognitive development gets things backwards.

Corson, despite certain disclaimers, is a little too sympathetic, I believe, to the idea that what he calls the specialist vocabulary of English is a finer and more precise lexical collection just because it is of Graeco-Latin origin. This is not what he says - but some such notion seems to lurk beneath the surface. Thus, of the following written reply by a middle-class fifteen-year-old Corson comments, 'there are few italicised words which the child could leave out of the text or replace with near synonyms or suitable periphrases, and still convey his personal meaning effectively'. (p.89)

> Telling a lie can be *profitable*, but it can also *destroy* your *conscience*. In *rare cases* lies are *accepted*. For *example*, when *protecting* friends, *relatives* and people you love. It is *unjustified* when trying to *escape responsibility*.

Without wanting to identify myself irretrievably with the "anything can be said in 850 words" Basic English camp, I suggest that the following is a close approximation, if not a full semantic equivalent, and conveys the same meaning effectively:

> Telling a lie can pay off, but it can also break down your knowledge of right and wrong and that feeling you get when you know you've not done the right thing. Sometimes, but not very often, people think lies are not wrong. Like when you are looking after friends, kin, and people you love, to see that they come to no harm. It is not right when you are trying to get out of doing what you ought to do.

This is a grossly artificial exercise since most of the excluded Graeco-Latin words are in everyday use. The real problem for me is 'conscience', - my periphrase is clumsy to the point of absurdity - but conscience is a good Biblical word (preserved even in the most destructive modern translations) and must be allowed as a word of popular speech. "Protector" has been known to English speakers at least since the days of Cromwell (in any case everyone has now heard of "protection money"); and, for some reason, the Anglo-Saxon "kin" survives outside anthropology largely in the term "kith and kin". "Responsibility" has connotations of a duty with which one has been charged whereas "doing what you ought to do" is a more general moral imperative, but "responsibility" is commonly used in this same wide sense. All these words are on the popular side of Corson's lexical bar, but even so, it is not clear to me that the writer's "personal meaning" (whatever that might be) is not conveyed effectively in my version (although I won't claim more than that since one good word is better than six good words). This is all somewhat playful since it is always possible to replace a word by some acceptable definition - the serious point is just that nothing can be known about the concepts people have available for thought from the knowledge they have of the precise terms that name those concepts. We should not suggest that responsible and moral actions are in any sense "exotic" and "irrelevant" to those who do not produce those words on demand. Obviously, communication is made easier if people do know and use the common words for common concepts, and least I be misunderstood I will state specifically that I advocate teaching them in so far as it is necessary, but that is not the point at issue here. Corson's thesis rests too heavily on a tendency to conflate

the terms "Graeco-Latin", "abstract", "precise" and "specialist" as if they were synomymous terms. Work on cognition and language needs to pay as much attention to concepts as to words. These so called specialist words often have a role that is the very opposite of aiding precise expression. Consider this crucial theoretical statement from Corson:

> By injecting large numbers of adverbs into their utterances the middle-class children place more conditions on their arguments, they allow their claims to be recognised as hypothetical and they modify the meanings of their statements by the subtle or blatant alterations in sense which an adverb produces for the kernel word of a sentence. (Corson 1985:48-9)

This sentence, is I suggest, vague and I shall risk rewriting it with fewer "specialist" words just in order to make it less vague:

> Middle-class children use more adverbs in their speech. An adverb blatantly or subtly alters the sense of the kernel word in a sentence and by their high use of adverbs the middle-class children modify the meaning of their statements. Adverbs also allow claims to be recognised as hypothetical and their use by middle-class children enables them to place more conditions on their arguments.

Some comment may be added: "injecting" is not a technical term and we can do without it; the use of adverbs does not only or necessarily place conditions on arguments but may perform other functions; the range "blatant to subtle" is not a technical statement of the range of modifications permitted by adverbs, and so on. But what my rewriting really does is bring out the hidden arguments in Corson's thesis that need evidence and don't get any. I think it is undoubtedly correct to say that in general:

(1) children who do well at school have a more extensive vocabulary;
(2) an extensive English vocabulary means knowing more Graeco-Latin words; and
(3) middle-class children who do well at school (and middle-class children do better than working-class children even when we control for intelligence) do know more such words.

It is the direction of causality and its mechanisms that Corson needs to demonstrate and although he reports that working-class Australians with Romance language backgrounds do better in the educational system than working-class students from English speaking homes, he is well aware that the responsible causes may have little to do with language and it must be concluded that so far we have no more than speculative evidence on this question. For this, of course, is the crux of the matter. Show that children who possess an extensive "specialist" vocabulary do better in school because of that fact and the thesis is demonstrated: that will not, however, be easy to do.

We must try to get to the bottom of this question of language in relation to class differences in modes of cognition. Post-Bernsteinian or not Corson's work is, as one would expect, strongly influenced by Bernstein's contribution to socio-linguistics. Yet the point about Bernstein's work, which I think Corson does not fully acknowledge in this book, is its essentially sociological and philosophical character. Bernstein has always been concerned with how working-class and middle-class people categorise

and conceptually order the world in different ways, the working-class in typically particularistic ways and the middle-class in typically universalistic ways, and this is not fundamentally a linguistic distinction or problem at all. Bernstein's theories, like Durkheim's, are concerned with the effects of the division of labour within advanced societies; there are people who create the routines, people who supervise the routines, and people who actually perform the routines. People: but people enabled and constrained by social structures which have a real existence and determining power on other structures. It is only within this problematic that Bernstein has any concern with language.

Silverman and Torode (1980) have recently argued in a typically sophisticated left-radical critique that linguistic productions conceptualised by Bernstein as universalistic-particularistic may more adequately be conceptualised as material-ideal. In their theory what Bernstein sees as universalistic (middle-class) speech is characterised by its idealist nature whereas particularistic (working-class) speech is characterised by its materiality. Their own examples are analysed with all the technical apparatus of *avant garde* French intellectual theory but it would definitely be a step backwards to lose the centre of Bernstein's insight. This is important because the project of socialist education has been precisely to extend particularistic, immediate, locally-bound discourses structured by the division of labour and to do so with a critical conceptual apparatus of world-historic power. If pupils write of the boss with a roll of notes in his pocket, that is particularistic and corporate: when they can write of capital and labour-power, that will be universalistic and, potentially, hegemonic. The point, presumably, is that the discourse spoken by a banker and advisor to the board of a State Coroporation must be one that is capable of expressing a universalised world-view, whereas that of a worker need only be a particularistic view of the, local, class-cultural world. The systems of habitual categorisation generated within intellectual formations are likely to be quite different. This is not a class determinist position as Bernstein specifically states that those who occupy non-dominant, routine positions within the division of labour can only successfully organise within trades unions and within political parties that are able to produce a universalised working-class discourse and, for those who speak that discourse, a consciousness of that kind. This is what Gramsci's educational project is all about and if there is a core project for a common education this must be it.

It seems to me, then, that while Silverman and Torode have an interesting point it is surely wrong. Bernstein's conceptualisation gains confirmation from a variety of sources. In a well known study Luria found that unschooled peasants typically classified objects by use whereas schooled individuals typically classified objects by abstracted qualities. (Luria 1976) Thus, peasants might group glass, pan, bottle as utensils leaving spectacles, whereas those with schooling might group glass, bottle, spectacles as objects made of glass, leaving pan. If this is then linked to what Harré has to say about science as a means of revealing the nature of things then I think the implications for education and for the theorisation of thought along this dimension are evident. (Harré 1983) The question is still whether it makes sense to think of contemporary working-class thought as being in any significant respect like this. This discussion of Bernstein and his critics moves a little away from Corson's work but he does, I think, try to approach these issues differently, and elliptically, through the connection between lexical use and cognition - somehow, though, I think he misses the heart of the matter.

Corson's discussion of the cognitive processes involved in word storage and access is not crucial to either the socio-linguistic or the cognitive-linguistic aspects of his thesis.

It is quite possible that we do, as the work he cites on mental lexicons and their access suggests, operate with a three-fold functional organisation in which iconic representations of concepts organised by semantic field are linked by independent channels to two distinct storages one by phoneme and the other by orthography, which are themselves also linked. This is an attractive model that makes sense of various discrete phenomema and Corson is particularly attracted - it certainly suits his thesis - to the hypothesis that mental lexical storage is by stem or root. I have little familiarity with the literature on which Corson relies and thus any thoughts of mine on this question are of doubtful value. Yet I will hazard that lexical storage is perhaps only contingently by stem or root and that the organising principle is more likely to be phonemic. Thus, I would expect it to be found that "irrevocable" is accessed by a phonemic dictionary along with words like "irrelevant" and "irritated" rather than with "voice" and "vocation" unless, and here some modification to the model might be necessary, we have to think in terms of another independent principle of access to lexical storage. If the brain does have some mechanism for extracting and storing by roots then, at the moment, it is hard to understand how it works - yet there is a lot we don't know about how the brain works and the hypothesis might be proved right. But if in this chapter of his book Corson is content to point to a literature rather than present evidence for evaluation then, rather than speculate any further in this uninformed way, I had better be content simply to point out once again, that not a lot hangs on this one way or the other. I share his fascination with this area though.

There is an obvious sense in which one can understand that if the Anglo-Saxon compound "bookcraft" was in use it might be more transparent and accessible than "literature", but this is not a very profound point. Such motivated words most probably are more readily accessed than those that are not, but their "transparency" has to be understood - it is unlikely that anyone but an etymologist would be able to access "alone" from the words "all" and "one". Ordinary frequency of use might often be more significant. "Immediately" is now probably more quickly understood than "straightway", "direct" more readily understood than "forthright", and "gainsay" for "contradict" is perhaps no longer transparent. In this context it would be interesting to know whether the abstract words German builds from its native roots are transparent to most German speakers (I once knew a German student who read Freud in English because he found it easier!) I suspect that it might be all to the good that, for example, the English word "ontology" is not derived from "to be": at least we have been spared the dubious etymological philosophy of people like Heidegger. Indeed, it is most curious, given Corson's thesis, that it is English philosophy and thought which has long had a reputation for Anglo-Saxon "crudity" and German with its "transparent" specialist lexicon that has always been recognised as abstract, complex, and idealist.

This all might seem less than positive but it is not so much Corson's formal thesis as his break with conventional wisdom in the field of educational linguistics that makes his work so promising. For ten years or more the leading tendency in educational linguistics has contented itself with retailing a highly relativist anti-cultural deficit thesis and made no real progress - see for example Stubbs 1980. As far as contemporary linguistics is concerned there are no forms of language which cannot communicate what that language community wants to communicate and this massive tautology seems to be its central educational message. We are now convinced that accent (class or regional) has no relation to the meanings that may be expressed and communicated by a language; that dialect has no necessary relation to meaning; that "language code" (in Bernstein's sense) has an ambiguous place, if any, as an analytical concept of socio-linguistics; that languages are not fixed; that languages, dialects and

accents are variably significant markers of social position, and so on and so forth. Academic linguistics can certainly refute uninformed assertions about the linguistic superiority of standard speech forms over other forms and to the extent that teachers need to know this such "language in education" teaching performs a necessary task. But this "linguistics" is only marginally relevant to some of the most intransigent problems of language teaching in schools, namely the essentially sociological ones of the place of dialect use and bilingualism in societies where one language - standard English especially in its written form - is dominant and essential to full social competence, as it is in Britain and in other predominantly English speaking countries.

Corson well understands this and proposes a distinctly hard-edged programme for English language teaching that has not gone unnoticed. He suggests that for teachers of English his thesis implies that a particular emphasis should be given to extending the specialist vocabulary of students and that attention should be paid to the etymology of this particular lexicon. According to Skeat there are 178 native English roots and 280 others, mainly Latin and Greek, and there can be no doubt that a formal knowledge of word roots is useful to the extraction of meaning from unfamiliar words, and such knowledge may help to restructure the organisation of the mental lexicon. (Skeat 1917:111) But I think the etymology must be known and the connection made. As I've said, I doubt that "voice" and "irrevocable" will be accessed together unless the etymological connection has been learned, but that is all the more reason for teaching it. It will also be useful for teachers to be aware of class-cultural processes that may lead some groups of pupils to reject this specialist and learned lexicon and to consider how most appropriately to respond to those processes of withdrawal and resistance. This must be good advice - although, as I discovered twenty years ago, persuading some students to accept such a pedagogy might not be easy - but I'll add something else because I can see this thesis of the classically derived specialist lexicon getting out of hand. Even if we do allow a "lexical bar" in English there is not, as there is in German, a "syntactical bar", nor is there, as there is in French, a "stylistic bar" between the rhythms of common speech and written literary forms. There is a tradition in English, the tradition of Wyclif, of Bacon, of Defoe, of Swift, of Bunyan and of Orwell that sticks close to the words and the rhythms of common speech. We should offer students, without allowing ourselves to fall into archaism, the principle of that style as the basis for good English prose.

So while Corson's thesis may not be entirely right it certainly touches on something very important. There is a study waiting to be done (but perhaps I just haven't found it!) on the popular attitude to "big words". Think of the music hall compere introducing some performer as, 'that prominent psychic, that predictor of the predestined, that prophetic prognosticator', and the audience responding with sham awe. People loved this sort of thing. In this setting verbal power could be admired without envy and mocked without fear. The instinct to resist "big words" is, I think, a sound one. We know that it is possible to be "blinded with science", that fine-sounding phrases can be empty, and that words can be used to mislead and deceive. Forms of English have been developed specifically for that purpose. I shall not soon forget watching a spokesman for an American air base being interviewed after a plane had smashed into a Welsh mountain: 'Were there bombs on the aircraft?' 'Standard operational parameters permit me to confirm only that the aircraft was equipped with a certain configuration of external stores.' (Wales also gets its news in Welsh; the interview went: 'Oes bomiau ar y plen?' 'Er, nag oes, does dim bomiau.' You need more than a public relations crash course to produce in Welsh formula circumlocutions of the sort that have become so common in English.) Lexical choice is to a great extent

a matter of personal style, but it is irritating when people say "masticate" when they mean "chew", "relocate" when they mean "move", "refurbish" when they mean "decorate", and so on. As for some words, they are rarely heard at all. There might be some social group that includes "adumbrate", "vicissitude", "condignly", "exigencies" and other "bookish" words of that sort in its spoken lexicon - but not one that I know. Corson might be right to suspect that at some point in the formation of their class-cultural trajectory some working class young people do start actively to resist "big words", to adopt dialect forms where they have cultural access to them, and do thereby cut themselves off from certain abstract concepts - and I think we should explore this more directly with respect to specific social and political concepts - which are capable of more or less precise expression in English words. Those words are, indeed, most likely to be of Greek or Latin derivation but whether that is no more than a marginally relevant historical happenchance (as I suspect) or whether it has deeper significance is still unclear. We should at least be aware of the processes Corson draws attention to. There is much work to be done, but here is a book facing in the right direction.

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DAVID CORSON REPLIES:

The Ghosts of Gramsci, Wittgenstein and The Lexical Bar
A Reply to Roy Nash

A sociology of language is that subdivision of the study of language and society that is both sociological and linguistic in intent. It offers a meeting point between all the various "sociologies" and thereby suggests that it is, in an important sense, the *primus inter pares* of those sociologies. It comes as a surprise to me, as one working very often in the sociology of language, that there are so few of us about. In Australasia I can think of only one other, bearing in mind that "sociolinguistics" (purely linguistic in intent) is not "sociology of language". It is therefore with some trepidation that I approach reviews of my work in this field since very often they are written by people who tend to see the work through a perspective that is too different or too blinkered or too monodisciplinary. Part of the problem is that a "sociology of language" is too limiting a title for a field that covers the "language" aspects of psychology, philosophy,

linguistics, anthropology, history etc., as well as all the areas traditionally associated with the vast fields of education and sociology themselves. The central concern of a sociology of language is with the social, political and educational aspects of the relationship between language and society; to do this it integrates concepts and approaches from many realms of discourse.

Having said all of this I can also say that Roy Nash, by background and interests, seems a very suitable reviewer of my work. The fact that his review is, on the whole, approving made me wonder at first how well he had read the text of the book, since he is not widely known for writing commendatory reviews. However, with the exception of one major omission, he seems to have read the book very closely indeed and brings perspectives to his review that other reviewers have not taken up, whether through disinclination or by dint of experience I do not know. As a practising "deconstructionist", whether consciously or not, Nash seems to identify hidden meanings and purposes in the work with a flair that even Derrida would envy (or not envy as the case may be). In particular his reading into my text of a debate with the ghost of Gramsci is very perceptive since there is no reference to Gramsci at any point in the text except an obscure hint about his work (in Italian) in the book's bibliography. More of this later.

Let me deal first with that major omission I can discern in Nash's reading of the text: I certainly do not want to be tagged as someone who attributes too much importance to the priority of language in the control of mental behaviour. I am a follower of the later-Wittgenstein in relation to language matters, if not always epistemic ones. Many people (perhaps Nash is one of them) are unaware of Wittgenstein's famous intellectual metamorphosis from positivism to a more linguistically phenomenalist position of "objectivity"; he realised that his earlier view that knowledge was a linguistic picture of reality was untenable and propounded a quite different philosophy. We are all participants in language games being played within fairly closed linguistic circles; when we have knowledge we have it according to the linguistic rules that obtain in a given circle; in order to play the games we need to learn the idiosyncratic "rules" of the circles in which we are operating or hope to operate within. These rules are little more than arbitrary conventions, laid down by those who have the power to decide those linguistic conventions in whatever circle they happen to be.

It is an interesting instance of the permeation across cultures of "Weltanschauungen" if we remember that Gramsci was developing similar ideas to Wittgenstein's at about this time, in a fascist prison, while Vygotsky, also with an entirely different set of problems, was on a similar intellectual course in Stalinist Russia. The links here with Bourdieu's "cultural capital" (as lexes, for example) are relevant too; they are deep links but clear ones.

I agree with Nash that 'privileging language in the study of cognitive development gets things backwards' (even though language is no doubt the most accessible evidence of subjective events that we have available to us). Had he read my Foreword more closely he would have read the following and used it as his backdrop for any deconstructing of the text that it might touch upon.

> Language though is not much more than the means by which its users set in motion the complex processing equipment of one another. Understanding arrives for us, as individual language users, only when we manage to use the sounds or letters produced by others to locate some vaguely appropriate setting within our own store of knowledge,

beliefs and experiences. The language used by others, then, enables us
to assemble in part what we already know....(Corson 1985:viii)

These heretical ideas owe much to Vygotsky, as well as Wittgenstein, Bourdieu and
Gramsci. In fact my agreement with Vygotsky on these matters is so close that I am
ready to concede the likelihood of that most incisive of the conjectures that he was able
to conceive in the early 1930s. Verbal thought is not an innate and natural form of
human behaviour; thinking in language is something determined by a historical/cult-
ural process; we come to think in language mainly because human cultures have found
this a useful thing to do; and this kind of thought has specific properties and laws that
cannot be found in either thought or speech on their own. This relates, I think, to
Bruner's phrase "analytic competence" and his view that equipping children with this
kind of competence is the chief task of education in the later years: teaching children to
"think in language" to solve problems.

Set against all of this it seems vaguely ridiculous even to ask the question whether or
not a word or a set of words is "high status" or "pretentious" or "low brow". Perhaps
we can ask sensible questions about whether or not a given language game is
"pretentious" or "low-brow" or whatever, but the words used as the game's tokens will
be different. If the conventions for their use make them acceptable within the language
game being played and make them necessary, as well, if we are to demonstrate mastery
of that game and its consequences, then acquire them we must if we want to succeed in
that game. It is an accidental fact of history that the many language games of education
in English are largely played using word tokens whose etymology is Graeco-Latin. We
could play them in other ways, but it wouldn't be in English.

The above point relates as well to Nash's refutation by periphrasis using language
stripped of its Latinate content. I don't think there is much to be gained by
paraphrasing texts, as Nash does, and claiming semantic equivalance for them, since
the exercise is a contrived one that disregards the fact that spontaneous texts in English
in difficult areas of discourse are heavily laden with Graeco-Latin derived terms. As
evidence for this claim I randomly selected two passages of 100 words from Nash's
review; they returned figures for Graeco-Latin content of 34% and 31% which I have
no doubt are generalisable across Nash's academic writing because percentages of this
size are about average for serious writings in the language games of the social
sciences. I don't think, on this evidence, that Nash would want to claim for the 20th
century, as he does for the 16th, that it seems to be 'stylistic preference rather than
content that determines the proportion of Graeco-Latin words'.

Before I come fully to the ghost of Gramsci, promised in the title of this reply, there
are a few other points of rather less significance that I am going to indulge myself by
making.

Nash quite properly challenges my claim that 'for those to whom some words seem
anomalous or bizarre in form, an expectation follows that the meanings associated with
such forms are unusual, exotic and rather irrelevant'. I have no evidence for this except
what I found in my own experiences in teaching young children to read in primary
classrooms and, perhaps more persuasively, from teaching adult illiterates to read. I ran
the Tasmanian adult literacy scheme for several years and was impressed by the
frequency with which adult beginning readers associated word semantic difficulty with
word morphophonology, even when the word was something like "marmalade". There
may be a doctorate in this for someone.

Nash challenges us to show that children who possess an extensive "specialist" vocabulary do better in school because of that fact. He seems not to consider as evidence for this the correlation studies that I report on pages 74-75, between fifteen year old children's performances on the lexical tests and their end-of-year examination results, and perhaps he is right not to. Coefficients of correlation, even at these levels, suggest but do not confirm a cause and effect relationship between factors; but do we need empirical evidence for something that we can arrive at in an armchair by logical analysis? Schooling, whether we like it or not, is predicated upon children displaying their knowledge within the language games being played: those who use the tokens that fit the rules of the games win the prizes; the others go into transition education or join the dole queues, as did the majority of the poorer working class fifteen year olds in my samples.

While I was developing this theory I was travelling in the Soviet Union in a study group that included an Austrian educationist. The two of us were discussing my set of ideas on lexis and I asked him if he thought that there was anything of the kind operating in German. He was quick to point out that rather than opaqueness (which is the main "difficulty" that Graeco-Latin words seem to present to inexperienced English language users) word length is the salient factor for difficulty in German. I asked whether or not any work had been done to link this with sociological variables and of course there is no known work. The "lexical bar" in German that Nash inquires about is probably there, if only someone would look. As for the lexical advantage that German philosophers might have over their English counterparts, it is true that the Germans have had the same advantage over the English in their lexicon that the Greeks themselves had over the Romans; this fact possibly provided the hinge of Hellenic intellectual progress, since for the Greeks the terminology that became the instrument of intellectual discourse was the terminology of ordinary language reapplied (pages 33-34). By borrowing Greek philosophical terms for their lexically impoverished language the Romans probably created a "lexical bar" of their own. We could speculate on the connection between this fact and the failure of the Romans to build much of value on the Greek philosophical heritage.

We should be indebted to Nash for his summary rehearsal of the great tautologies and cul-de-sacs that have bedevilled the language and education field for a generation. No doubt we had to go through this twenty year process in order to emerge from the other side, however it is going to take more time to emerge than many of us have available to us. Nash cites as a source for his summary one of the major contributors to 'the leading tendency in educational linguistics' that has 'made no real progress'. Unfortunately that contributor holds the only Chair in the world, that I know of, in English in Education: a post at the University of London that he is eligible to occupy until well into the second decade of the 21st century. In doing a journal review of a recent book by the same person, a book that was embarrassingly bad on many other counts, I found him writing as if Bourdieu, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Gramsci, Vygotsky, Derrida, Habermas et al. had never lived. It is very sad.

We all have our favourite examples of "bureaucratese", like Nash, that we draw upon and use to argue against pomposity and deviousness in language use. My "favourite" was acquired as a national serviceman during the Vietnam War: 'denying the enemy the population resources' was American at that time for 'killing Vietnamese civilians'. But we cannot use these powerful and evil examples of doublethink to suggest that "difficult sounding words" are always pretentious, devious or hypocritical; most

Graeco-Latin words are words we can hardly do without when playing the language games of educated discourse; nor can it be argued that nearly 70% of the English lexicon is there to pander to English-speakers' needs to indulge in pretence and hypocrisy.

I hate to have to say that Nash's very long, valuable and interesting introduction to his review, examining 16th century English word use, owes its origin to a single word that I used imprecisely; but I must. It was wrong of me to say that the lexical bar was 'institutionalized' in English in that century and the next, since this was plainly misleading for Nash and perhaps for others who know and care about these matters. What I meant to say, and should have said, was that the social divisions that were later to promote a lexical division in English society between the ruling classes and the ruled were given impetus through social institutions at that time (hence 'institutionalization': namely the church and the grammar school system), providing their patrons with a very different and contrasting orientation to the lexicon of the language.

Quite properly Nash suggests that the extralinguistic contexts in which my language transcripts were gathered would have different impacts upon children from different backgrounds. I have gone into this more fully elsewhere (Corson 1986) and say only briefly here that no one can predict or is ever likely to know how individual children will interpret specific contexts and how they will control their language as a result. Nash gives the example of children coming from a class-cultural background permeated by powerlessness, suggesting that this would certainly control the kinds of language they were prepared to offer in a semi-formal interview situation. But can we be sure in what way? I was impressed, in interviewing the 139 children used in these studies, at the variation there was even within groups in the children's readiness to offer a flow of spontaneous dialogue, with individual poorer working class children just as careful or as careless as their middle class mates: for example, a child from the rather pedantic background that many middle class homes offer may be as reticent in venturing anything that might "incriminate" or be proved "wrong" as would be a child located at some other class-cultural position. The average transcript length from each child was about 700 words and there was no significant variation in verbosity across groups (I would like to publish the transcripts in full if a publisher could be found: there are over 150,000 words of not very startling adolescent language. Several transcripts are included almost in full in a recent book - Corson 1987). The fact that the same lexical patterns (i.e. access to Graeco-Latin terms) across groups occurred in the private language mode of writing as it did in speech seems to me a powerful refutation of the thesis that extralinguistic context has much control on social group lexical orientation (even though before these studies I was a sympathetic adherent to that thesis).

Moreover to put too much emphasis on what children might do if the context were different (i.e. if it were other than the context of the school) is misleading. It takes us away from the central problem of these research studies: accounting for the failure of real children in real schools as they presently exist, not as they might be in some utopian future. By arguing for some undemonstrated facility in lexical use that might be available to the children of the poor outside schools we risk directing attention away from examining our success with the real tasks of schooling: to make available to all children, without discrimination, access to the rules needed to play the language games of education so that they can succeed in education, and have power and influence over their own affairs and a say in their own culture and society. To do less is to serve the interests of the existing hegemony.

This allows me the adit to Gramsci I was looking for. Nash gives us the example of Joey, from Willis' book, as counter-example to the thesis that working class kids are not at home with the Latinate vocabulary. It is a compelling example. He does concede though that Joey is certainly bright, and my response of course is that all the children used in these studies of mine were matched in groups whose non-verbal reasoning levels were between the 50th and 60th percentile. These children are "average" in ability, unlike Joey. We have to akcnowledge that bright children from low income and culturally different backgrounds will very often succeed in spite of schools, not because of them; if it were otherwise how are we to explain the immoderate success in education that Nash and I and a legion of others have received ourselves. Gramsci's 'organic intellectuals' are not going to be drawn from the 50-60th percentile band, who seem on the evidence to be defeated by education's inequalities, as Gramsci no doubt would have been himself had he not had that 'unquestionably powerful brain' (Mussolini) that allowed his own development as an organic intellectual. Gramsci's grasp of Florentine Italian, in contrast to the Sardinian "dialetto" that was his cultural inheritance, was due to his recognition as a boy that the only way to challenge the existing hegemonies was through possession, mastery and use of the language games recognised as overlays upon the fabric of those hegemonies. For him 'the object of the school is the complete mastery of the standard language'. It's not surprising that this point is lost on the kids who are average and on the plodders, who very often don't recognise the language games of education that are being played around them in schools until it is too late and until they have been failed by those schools for the very last time.

Nash's mention of Luria's study is very much to the point and he is right in attributing to Bernstein's work the central concern with how people from different class positions conceptually order the world in different ways. All of this bears upon the deconstruction of my work into Gramscian categories that I attempted as part of the first draft of **The Lexical Bar**, only to have it excluded on the fiat of the series editor who claimed that 'the **Language and Communication Library** is not the appropriate forum for proposing or discussing reforms'. This is more than a hint about the difficulties that a sociology of language confronts in academic circles where the language hegemony remains in the hands of a set of rather sterile schools of linguistics. I was ready to submit to this fiat, though, to get the book into a fully refereed series, which is a rarity in the social sciences and possibly unique in education.

The real issue at the heart of Gramsci's pronouncements about the links between language, class-cultural background and education is captured in the following fairly obscure passage. I suppose, at bottom, it is my justification for believing that we can erect reasonable conjectures about people's mental activities upon the evidence of their language use, which lends some support to what schools are up to after all. My translation of this difficult passage may be an inadequate one:

> If it is true that every language variety (linguaggio) contains the elements of a world view and of a culture, it will also be true that from each individual's language (linguaggio) one can judge the degree of complexity of that person's world view. Someone who speaks only dialect (dialetto) or who understands the standard language (lingua nazionale) unevenly, necessarily takes a part in things with a feel for the. world that is more or less restricted and provincial, that is fossilized and anachronistic when confronted with the great streams of thought that

dominate world history. That person's interests will be restricted more or less to those things that touch the physical self or its belongings; they will not be universal interests. If it is not always possible to learn second languages (lingue straniere) to put oneself in touch with a variety of cultural existences, it is necessary at least to learn the standard language thoroughly. (Gramsci 1948:Nota III, pp. 4-5)

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John L Robson. **Sacred Cows and Rogue Elephants: Policy Development in the New Zealand Justice Department.** Wellington, Government Printing Office. 1987. 296 pp. $59.99.

Greg Newbold, Department of Sociology,
University of Auckland

For a number of years the New Zealand criminological community has awaited the observations of Dr John Robson on the development of Justice policy. In a country where penological history is colourful but poorly recorded, the work of this legal scholar and career public servant has inevitably excited interest. For Robson, a former Director of Criminological studies at Victoria University, Wellington, is not only well placed to instruct in the area of Justice history, he has also been a part of its making. Robson was Assistant Secretary for Justice in the 1950s, when some of the most adventurous (and catastrophic) experiments in New Zealand penal history were tried. And as permanent head of the Justice department from 1960 to 1970 Robson was responsible, with his Minister J R Hanan, for one of the most productive decades the department has known. There was every reason to expect that Robson's treatise would become a leading authority in the subject of Justice policy development in this county.

Broadly, **Sacred Cows** is an autobiographical chronicle of (selected aspects of) Justice history since about 1910, but which concentrates on the 1950s and sixties. Following a brief author's biography the book begins by discussing the commencement of a new era of Justice and public administration in the fifties. The clock then turns back to 1909, to review the offices of Justice Minister Findlay (1909-1911) and prisons head Matthews (1913-1924). These chapters are useful but, setting the metre which commands the rest of the book, they incline sharply towards the descriptive. As such, they leave a number of questions begging. Why Findlay was able to usurp public service control of prisons in 1909 is not explained, neither is the way in which Matthews' policies were related to the prevailing politico-economic climate. Drawn largely from the content of the annual reports, Robson's treatment of Justice's early history is an accurate official record, but it lacks the insight that an author with unique knowledge of Justice's private agenda might have supplied.

The sixth of Robson's 32 chapters concerns the regime of B.L.S. Dallard, but like the sections before it, it hungers for creative analysis. For Dallard was one of the most controversial senior public servants of this century and Robson knew him quite well. The antagonism which accumulated against Dallard cannot have gone unnoticed and in any case, it is a matter of public record that his resignation was welcomed, even in the parliamentary debating chamber. Dallard's despotic conservatism is fundamental to understanding this period, but of it we read almost nothing. Among other things, therefore, the blandness of the Dallard chapter obscures why, for 24 years, a spirit of experiment remained suspended within the Department of Justice.

Robson's personal contact with the department began in 1951, soon after Dallard had stood down. In this arena the narrative warms, and we learn of the debate which took place when Dallard's replacement, Barnett was appointed. There is an excellent discussion of ministerial responsibility, and of the relations between Ministers and permanent staff. Barnett, a bright and enigmatic character, is portrayed from the viewpoint of a subordinate who, while loyal to his superiors, had firm ideas of his own. Barnett too was imaginative and some of the tensions between him and his Ministers are recorded.

But important reflections such as these, which tell us so much about the dynamics of departmental decision-making, are conspicuous for their brevity and in their contrast with the body of the book. Even chapters about Robson's own period, which occupy more than half of the text, continue in the descriptive vein of before. When Labour lost office in 1960 we are reminded that Robson has an interest in the cause. But we are not informed of what the cause was, nor even the nature of the interest. We read of some of the overseas influences on the development of penal policy, but what aspects of policy were in this way affected is unclear. There is some interesting information about the abolition of capital punishment, and of one of the era's great monuments, the sentence of periodic detention. The establishment of the office of the Ombudsman - another of Robson's legacies - is detailed at considerable length. But as conspicuous as these achievements is the disregard of some of the most important but less celebrated sequels of the period. Why were women ignored by Justice policy throughout the Barnett and Robson regimes? There is no subject index but the reader will search in vain for reference to women. The opening of the detention centre, National's answer to juvenile delinquency in 1961, hardly rates a mention, much less its relationship to community feeling. The sacking of Mt Eden, New Zealand's only maximum security institution at the time, is considered in the most cursory fashion and the important causes of the riot are ignored. Even more noticeable is the lack of detail about Paremoremo, opened as Mt Eden's replacement late in 1968. Paremoremo was the most expensive, most controversial and most heavily publicised building project in Department of Justice history. It was conceived of, researched, constructed and commissioned entirely within the Hanan/Robson era, and its development spanned the whole of that period. Robson's decision to dispose of it in three short paragraphs is a serious omission: one which is difficult to understand and impossible to justify.

There are many reasons why the results of Dr Robson's research have come as a disappointment. Omission, lack of examination, over-reliance on official reports and a shortage of personal input have forged a history which is sterile and incomplete; which almost anybody could have written. Dr Robson might have told us so much more about the internal machinations of a department with which has was involved for almost two decades. But he did not and thus, the bulk of truth that only Robson can disclose will

be lost and buried with his passing. **Sacred Cows** promised a lexicon of a complex and exciting past. Instead it will be significant, I think, not for what it reveals but for what it does not say at all.

Paul Spoonley. **The Politics of Nostalgia**
Palmerston North, The Dunmore Press. 1987.

Review by John Pratt, Department of Social Policy and Social Work,
Massey University

It comes as a surprise to read that during the course of the last century New Zealand has regularly had in its midst small, sometimes pitifully small, numbers of men and women who have periodically combined together to proclaim allegiance to extreme Right wing politics. These are usually of an avowedly racist nature; they may also be anti-semitic; moralistic; anti trade union; anti "Big Government", "Big Business" and so on - and sometimes a combination of one or more of these themes. Small numbers, certainly: modern manifestations of these politics have included the thirty people present at the launching of the New Zealand League of Rights Party in 1970 (p.79); the National Socialist Party candidate polled a full 19 out of 19,142 votes in the Mount Eden constituency in the 1975 Election (p.155); a New Force meeting attracted an audience of 8 supporters and 30 protesters. The New Force candidate did however fare better than the unfortunate National Socialist Party representative above: standing in the 1981 Election and campaigning for the preservation of 'European culture', he received 30 votes out of the 19,487 cast in his constituency. Then there are the Palmerston North "boot boys" who 'made their presence felt during 1983 and 1984... there was a core of six to eight members although their number expands and declines according to the event and recruitment'. (p.153) Small numbers yes, but big ideas, global horizons and plans to change the course of world history to make up for this slight numerical deficiency. The analysis of the latter group, for example, leads them to the view that

> though it seems where there is no hope for the extreme right in New
> Zealand's present political system, the best way to achieve our aim is by
> violence unless the aryans of New Zealand awake. (p.153)

Be warned! But this is not all - since 1978, we are told, the New Zealand National Front have intended 'to tap the "growing wave of fear amongst the white community."' (p.159) Elsewhere, talks have been given with such titles as 'Can Ronald Reagan Halt the Communist Advance? The Cause of the Collapse of Civilization'. (p.118) And did you know that New Zealand is 'about 90% under Communist control...The actual mechanisms for a Communist takeover are already there' and that 'the Communists and Zionists are the same people (who intend) to control the world'. (p.138) Such are the views of a member of the New Zealand League of Rights.

Were it not for the noxious and odious nature of the beliefs of these people, Dr. Spoonley's book could almost be situated in the genre of the Sociology of the Absurd - in the manner of, say, Taylor (1985). But his book is much more important and significant than this: it is the history of a century of 'reactionary and racist organizations in New Zealand' (p.14), of 'the radical examples of Conservatism who offer racist arguments' (p.18) and neo fascist groups. As such, it is an outstandingly

meticulous and detailed analysis that takes us from the origins of the Social Credit movement in the 1890s to its present counterparts, some of which I have noted above. Indeed, in terms of the detail that has been produced, the book is a testament to the author's research skills - as an archivist, observer and interviewer. Furthermore, in view of the subject nature of this book I think it is particularly helpful and appropriate that it includes a chapter on research ethics wherein some of the dilemmas relating to research of this nature are very successfully addressed.

Why has there been this history of extreme Right-wing thought and politics in New Zealand - and elsewhere, for that matter? The author addresses this question through a Poulantzian problematic. That is, the economic development of New Zealand has at various times created fractions within the prevailing class structure; as such, the old and previously powerful petty bourgeoisie such as 'the small owner operated businesses in the rural and urban sectors' (p.14) have at such times found themselves economically and socially marginalized. Left out of the mainstream, they have been attracted to the politics of the Right in a bid to recreate the nostalgic past when they did appear to have power and influence (a point which, I think could have been made more strongly throughout the book). Although remarkably unsuccessful in terms of galvinizing popular support, given their conditions of existence, the current era is one in which we might expect to see a resurgence of these politics.

Having said this, there are three further points I would like to raise. First, I think there is something of an imbalance in the book that favours narrative and exposé at the expense of theory. The author begins and ends with a theoretical framework but in my view this was obscured from time to time by the mass of empirical data that makes up the main part of the book. It is, of course, difficult to achieve the *exact* balance in work of this nature - and many may well favour the results here. But to my mind, it would have been helpful if there had been a more regular return to some of the theoretical issues the book sets out to address.

Second, it seems unfortunate that comparatively little focus is given to the activities and ideas of the "Moral Right", (as opposed to the Racist Right). I recognize that this grouping is outside the main thrust of the book (p.18). However, there is such a close overlap between the two at times - as with the New Zealand League of Rights and the Concerned Parents Association on the issue of the family, morality and "Christian values" (p.128) - that the Moral Right does perhaps merit further consideration. If there was not the space for this within this particular project, a parallel study would be well received, I am sure. Certainly, in terms of political effectivity and viability the Moral Right at least gives the impression of being more significant, in the New Zealand context, than the Racist Right.

This leads into my third point. The above two groupings are two elements of what is essentially the *Traditional Right*. What of the new petty bourgeoisie - the New Right? Although the author does distinguish the "Old" and the "New", the significance of this distinction, particularly in the British context (p.194-9) could have been more sharply defined. To me, one of the most important features of the New Right in that country is its moral and social *libertarianism* - which marks it out as a very different phenomenon from and *incompatible with* other politics of the Right (see Pratt and Sparks 1987). In other countries - notably the U.S.A. (see Gordon and Hunter 1978) and perhaps New Zealand as well - the position can seem very different. However, I think it important that cleavages and distinctions *within* the Right should be recognized and addressed.

Notwithstanding these points, I think the book is a very important and well researched contribution to our knowledge of this political area and should be read by a wide audience.

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Roy Shuker. **The One Best System**. Palmerston North. The Dunmore Press. 1986.

Reviewed by David McKenzie, Education Department,
University of Otago.

This book represents a challenge to orthodox liberal accounts of the development of state schooling in New Zealand. Drawing especially upon the theoretical postulates of Antonio Gramsci, Dr Shuker offers a revisionist alternative to conventional educational histories whose weaknesses he is quick to spot. His own material and interpretation, incorporating as it does much of the work of recent revisionist scholarship, should indeed intrigue readers coming to this topic for the first time. But whether their appetite will be more than whetted is less certain. In his summary paragraph the writer concludes, 'The project of this book has been to demonstrate how...the dominant hegemony has been constructed and maintained through the school system. A major aspect of our analysis, however, has been to show the contested nature of the dominant hegemony.' Had this been achieved, in fact, we would have had a significant work of scholarship on our hands. But the reality is less. In truth, it is not difficult, although it is important, to illustrate how New Zealand schools have been shaped in terms of their function, programme and governance in accord with their intended hegemonic role. It is much more difficult, however, to show how the role of the school has been contested and how this contestation has produced modifications in policy and classroom experience. In the end, for this reader, Shuker fails to present a coherent account of how the various sites of contestation have indeed produced our present condition against which we must frame our policy options for the future.

The basic plan of the book is sensible. After an introductory chapter on theory and the state of the art, there is a lengthy chapter on the development of the school system from 1877-1985. Had this chapter been written with sufficient theoretical rigour and with sufficient leads into "things to come", the subsequent chapters with their interesting although not obviously related topics (e.g. The Patriot Game; From Terman to Tosca; The Backblocks and the City) could all have spelled out points introduced in the foundation narrative. Instead, for the most part, Chapters 3-11 come across as discrete explorations of interesting topics. Haste, I think, is one fault from which this book never fully escapes and the author seems often to be driven by, rather than being in charge of, his material. It is a difficulty which is compounded by the task which the author has set himself. Shuker is keen to provide his readers with access to recent scholarship in New Zealand education and all power to him for making the attempt.

But the various researchers he quotes are not writing his book and they do not all share his ideological perspective.

Thus there is a constant and uneasy sense that X has been included because it was available rather than because it particularly suits Shuker's argument, or worse still that X's argument has been tailored to fit Shuker's theoretical assertions. The alternative problem is that some of the mini-topics are so fascinating in themselves that they threaten to submerge the main sociological perspective of the book.

Having said this, I think that I should also say that this could be a good text if placed in the hands of students undertaking a foundational course. It provides a most worthwhile basis for further teaching and reading and it has no current competition. If the research field continues to expand as it has done in recent years, later authors of this genre should have an easier task than Shuker has had. But the book's use as a teaching tool still has some worries for me; worries that perhaps come easily to a more middle-of-the-road historian. I am reminded of how much writing care has gone into many of the research articles and publications which Shuker quotes throughout his text. With the best will in the world Shuker is forced by the nature of his enterprise to provide summary versions of the arguments presented - some of them very summary. An awful prospect is what some of those versions might finally look like when they come to rest in the examination script.

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS:

1. Two copies of manuscripts for consideration should be sent to the editors. Authors should retain a third copy for their own reference during proofreading.Copies submitted will not normally be returned. To facilitate 'blind' reviewing, the **title and name(s) of its authors** should be given on a **separate sheet**, and the **title only** should appear on the **first page** of the article.

2. While articles should not normally exceed 4500-5000 words, longer articles may be accepted in special circumstances.

3. Manuscripts should be accompanied by a short abstract (about 100 words) typed on a separate sheet of paper.

4. Manuscripts should be typed double spaced throughout on one side of A4 paper with reasonable margins all round (2 cms. approx.).

5. Authors should consult articles in current issues of this Journal for general indications of style - conventions on: capitalizing titles, headings, sub-headings; paragraphing; quotations, and so on.

6. Do not underline any words in the text unless they are to be printed in *italics*.

7. Type each table on a separate sheet with as few lines as possible, and indicate the placing of the table in the text with a pencil note. Use wide spacing in tables and rule all lines in pencil. Tables should be numbered in arabic figures with a clear legend to identify the table.

8. Drawings (graphs, figures, etc.) should be on good quality white paper in indian ink and on separate sheets.

9. References should normally be indicated by citing in parentheses the author's surname and the year of publication (together with page numbers where relevant), as given in the list of references or the bibliography at the end of the article. For example:

   'it has been argued (Baker, 1948:26) that...' etc.

The full list of references at the end of the article should be arranged alphabetically by author's surname. The following examples should be used as a guide, paying particular attention to the sequence of the items in the reference and to punctuation.

   Able, P. and Collins, S. 1961. 'Structuralism and the concept of class.' **Journal of Social Class**, 24(3), 138-159.
   Baker, R.S. 1948. **Sociology and Social Change.** London, Charles Publishing Co.

Note that in the first example the words in the title are not capitalized (as they are for the title of a book, as in the second example).

10. Footnotes are to be reserved for substantive commentary. Number them from 1 upwards. The location of each footnote in the text must be indicated by the appropriate superscript numeral. Type the complete, numbered set of footnotes on a separate sheet and attach to the end of the manuscript. Footnotes will appear at the foot of the page where they are located.

11. The typescript submitted should be in the form in which the author wishes the paper to appear. Preliminary consultation with the editors about the suitability of an article does not necessarily guarantee its publication. Authors are encouraged to seek comments from colleagues before submitting a paper for publication.

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