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Portal Empire: Plastic Power and Thalassic Imagination

Peter Murphy

Abstract

This paper looks at American democracy from its relatively small scale origins with strong localised and hierarchical social foundations through its development into a medium-sized, continental scale structure based on planar and procedural notions of power through to its global stage. The paper points to the crucial role that navalism, sea regions and portal cities played in the emergence of American globalism. The paper discusses the conjunction of a collective American sense of destiny with the architectonic, rhythmic and plastic power of portals, and how the exceptional capacity of nodal thalassic regions to produce intellectual capital shaped the peculiar and distinctive nature of American empire.

Democracy in America

Hierarchies, networks, and navigations are fundamental social-historical structures (Murphy, 2003). Consider for a moment this typology as it applies to the question of governance. Historically, the most persistent model of governance has been hierarchy. Even today—when hierarchy is rhetorically downplayed in the name of social equality—it remains the most common type of rule. It appears in many guises. Most people find their lives caught up in one or other familial, patrimonial, bureaucratic, clerical, corporate, or party hierarchy.

Hierarchies operate in one, vertical dimension—up and down a line or chain. Such power is a face-to-face, personalized kind of power. Networks add to the one dimension of the hierarchical line, a second or planar dimension. Network power functions across plane surfaces. Technology, law and narrative organize it. Network power operates more impersonally than hierarchy does—which means that its reach across both space and time is greater. The final kind of power, navigational

power, is a function of the third, *plastic* dimension of space. It is the most abstract, most impersonal kind of power. Geometries, rhythms, harmonies, ratios, and proportionalities organize it. It has the greatest reach of any kind of power. It is the kind of power most intimately associated with the city or, more particularly, the world city.

Planar orders typically accompany movements to democratize. The most spectacular example of this, in modern life, is the American case. We see the influence of planar or network democracy in America reflected in its model of office holding. America was a leader in the adoption of democratic proceduralism and strong rule-based institutions in political life. But this was slower to occur than is often assumed. We think of America as the antithesis of a hierarchical society. But nineteenth-century America had slavery in the South, political clientelism and the boss system in its ethnic cities, and a Protestant political gentry elsewhere. Until at the least the 1870s, in what was basically a decentralized rural society, a part self-made, part collegially-formed gentry class of professionals, family business owners, and clergy dominated political life (Hofstader, 1955). Governance was organized through relations of eminence and deference. These relations were not feudal, but they were hierarchical. John Adams' phrase, "a hierarchy of talent", is a very useful way of describing these kinds of relations.

Hierarchy is the typical glue of face-to-face societies. It has its most powerful effects in localized moral geographies. In the American case, outside of the South whose characteristics were *sui generis*, local status groups commanded deference and asserted personal authority. They did so on the basis of "high-minded" ideals and "respectability". The personal nature of American political and social authority was quite long lasting. We should not forget that Jefferson personally answered practically all of the letters sent to him at the White House, or that, until the end of the nineteenth century, a lawyer did not need a degree to tout for business. Andrew Jackson practiced very successfully without qualifications. In ante-bellum America, oratory (delivered in face-to-face forums) was the principal mode of political communication.

Even after the Civil War, and the rapid spread of distance communications, many key American institutions remained highly

localized. Law enforcement in the nineteenth century was limited to counties and townships. There were no state or federal police forces.[1] Many rural areas went effectively un-policed. A criminal who crossed the town or county boundary was immune from the official threat of imprisonment. This is why self-help or vigilante justice was so common in the American nineteenth century, especially in California, Texas, New Mexico, and Montana (Johnson, 2000, p. 537). It was also why the bounty hunting of absconders developed—as an effective way of extending the reach of local justice.

The voluntary association and the militia, both heavily reliant on personal authority, were paradigmatic of early nineteenth-century American organizational forms. Andrew Jackson conquered Florida using a militia that he personally organized—or rather personally intimidated. Teddy Roosevelt's hand-chosen corps, the Rough Riders, led the American conquest of Cuba at least in a symbolic sense. Personal authority mattered not just in war. The Ivy League college was dominated more by social clubbing than by scholarship, and power in America's cities gravitated around political machines like the Society of St. Tammany. In pre-Civil War America, dueling was commonplace. Alexander Hamilton was killed in a duel (with Aaron Burr). Honor and even vengeance—bonds of pre-modern face-to-face societies—were remarkably persistent in America. This was particularly true in the Old South and the border-states of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri, and in the pioneering days of the West (Johnson, 2000, p. 534). The current of violent face-to-face confrontation in American society has at least part of its roots in this. The violence of American labor relations, or the propensity for assassination in American presidential politics, the use of hand-guns and the high incidence of murders that result from that— all of these are the marks of a society in which dueling has never been

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1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was a Progressive-era innovation, sponsored by Teddy Roosevelt in 1908 in a political climate pre-occupied with civil service reformism. Prior to that the U.S. Department of Justice would hire private detectives or secret service agents to carry out investigations of federal crimes. Pennsylvania created the first State Police force in the United States in 1905— and then there was no stampede. Rhode Island's State Police force for example was not established till 1925.

quite dead and buried. The American attitude was summed up in a 1921 Supreme Court judgment, in a case concerning the judgment of a Texas court that had convicted a man who had stood his ground when an assailant attacked him with a knife. The man had shot the attacker to death. The Supreme Court quashed the conviction. Oliver Wendell Holmes ruled that "a man is not born to run away" (Johnson, 2000, pp. 534-535).

Despite the persistence of surrogates for pre-modern honor culture in America, the ascendancy of personal authority in American politics and society did change precipitously, and painfully, after the American Civil War. America began on the path of urbanization and large-scale geographical integration. To achieve such integration, it had to create ways of relating, and forms of authority, that would permit action across a continent without relying on local hierarchies of notables—or on personal honor, familial preference, and social clubbing.[2]

America became a large-scale, grid-like territorial state due to its command of law, technology, and narrative. Law defined the scope— the jurisdiction—of its territory; technology provided the means, the media, for administering that space. Technology produced the communicative networks of rail, later road; post, later telegraph and telephone that enabled the communicative integration of a continental territory—no mean achievement. Narratives provided the stories that tied the citizens of a large-scale territorial union symbolically together in lieu of deferential symbols. These stories ranged from the martyrdom of Lincoln to the conquest of the West to the struggle for American independence. They were often tinged with various kinds of religious symbolism—mainly of a Hebraic-Protestant kind. These evoked images of America as an evangelical nation, a redemptive nation, and Americans as an exceptional, chosen people, capable of doing what the vaguely damned Europeans had proved incapable of: creating a nation based on enlightenment and freedom, and propagating those values to the world. Other, more classical images were woven into this symbolic

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2.   This was never eradicated entirely. The social register and patrician styles continue to be defining characteristics of certain American elites.

tapestry as well (Murphy, 2001a). Most notable was the idea that America had a Roman-like manifest destiny. In all of this, there was a curious symbiosis between the religious and the classical, something that made it possible for Americans to re-invent ancient civil religion, and to worship their Constitution.

Whatever the symbolism, all of it hinged on the epic story of America as it progressed itself, Virgil-like, from rebellious maritime colonies to confederal union to constitutional experiment to land acquisitiveness to civil war and bloody nationalism. Throughout the climb to continental epic scale, the American constitution proved a remarkable legal-procedural mechanism for the proliferation and addition of states. The rapid post-Civil War expansion of the Union, though, was equally a function of networked communications—rail in particular. The railroad not only allowed for economic and political transport but also provided the model for the development of the modern equity corporation. What all of these institutions—from the constitution to the corporation—shared in common was a preference for proceduralism over local eminence. Law, rules, methods, committees, protocols, and standards were the foundation for constructing institutions that extended well beyond the local scale.

Hierarchies of eminence and deference forged out of talent nonetheless remained central to the workings of American managerial institutions. Modern American bureaucracy was a hybrid of deferential hierarchy and administrative proceduralism. Moreover, surprising numbers of non-bureaucratic patrimonial structures (e.g. the municipal "boss system") survived and flourished in America, a long time after the ethos of managerialism appeared—as did patrician styles amongst the established wealthy and powerful. American legalism had to cohabitate with the county sheriff and "good old boy" who knew everyone and disliked strangers on principle.

Thus by the turn of the twentieth century America was a very contradictory place, and was to remain so. It had its patrician notables who claimed and acquired democratic precedence based on moral conviction and precocious (or at the very least self-promoting) talent. It had its emergent corporate and communicative networks that spread

in planar fashion across the continent following along behind the railroads and the indubitable American sense of manifest destiny. This space of lateral expansion—what Andrew Jackson dubbed the "area of freedom" (Stephanson, 1995, p. 31)—was defined not by a geographical boundary but by the scriptive (and in a tacit sense scriptural) boundary of the American nomos, the law of the constitution. Finally, in the ecumene that stretched along the Hudson River and across to the Great Lakes, between New York City and Chicago, an urban revolution unprecedented since the Roman Empire started to explode, confounding the Protestant gentry of rural America. This urban revolution began, inchoately, to define a civic order of rhythm in contrast both to the impersonal space-defining nomos of legal order and to the personal heroics of an Andrew Jackson and the personalized bonds of the local voluntary association. The urban revolution, one of the greatest urban creations in history, involving one of the largest and swiftest shifts from rural to urban society of any time, provided a nodal interface, a portal and pipeline, between continental America and the rest of the world.

The third American revolution

The political expression of this urban-portal eruption was the rise of American globalism in the 1890s. This decade was to bring a third revolution in American life. The first revolution laid the basis for the rule of the self-made gentry of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian America. The second revolution, the Civil War, was a nationalist revolution. It resulted in a strong territorial state, an integrated national economy based on the railway, and the distinctive American managerialism of chain, branched, and franchised network organization. The third revolution was played out in the period from the 1890s to the 1920s. Its beginning moment was the Spanish-American War (1898). The third revolution created an American empire.

Let me stress—this was, from the beginning and was to remain, a very distinctive kind of empire. It had limited territorial ambitions. Brooks Adams (1848-1927) imagined it in the following way: Adams was a friend of Theodore Roosevelt, the first President of America's global age, and the last of the self-made heroes. In *The law of civilization and decay* (1896),

Adams conceived of an American empire based largely on the control of maritime trade routes (Adams, 1896). This was an empire that had much more in common with the maritime empires of Venice and Amsterdam than it did with the Russian or Austro-Hungarian Empires, or even with the British Empire, which in its latter phases rushed to command vast swathes of the earth. The emergent American global empire was an emporial kind of empire. It was based to a very large extent on maritime power and world trade, and *not* on the possession of land, or for that matter on international law or legalitarian proceduralism.[3]

We are all aware of the impact of this empire on the world. What is less appreciated is its impact on the United States. In the Gilded Age, after 1865, the United States consolidated itself as a continental republican empire. The pre-bellum territories it had acquired—the Mississippi, Florida, Texas, New Mexico, and Oregon—were welded into a common entity. This Union had a predominately rural character. By the 1890s, however, this transcontinental empire was being matched in power and influence and self-consciousness by two sea-region powerhouses: the Hudson River-Great Lakes ecumene, and the California coastal region. Both gave rise to portal societies and portal economies with strong global characters, and to world cities.

What happened to America in the 1890s was not an accident nor was it unrehearsed. In 1853, William Seward told the U.S. Senate that "command over ocean" was the only "real empire". "The nation that

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3 . Correspondingly, land war has proved the least distinguished aspect of American warfare overseas. The classic example is the Vietnam War. While the Americans never lost control of the maritime delta region in Vietnam, interior landed and mountainous war was well beyond their keen. Less obvious, but in a way even more illustrative, was the European theatre of war in the Second World War. America successfully defeated Nazi Germany, and successfully occupied Germany over the short term for the purpose of reconstruction. But in the larger theatre of European geopolitical territory, America committed a great folly. In the closing stages of World War Two, Roosevelt resisted Churchill's pressure to invade Europe via the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. Had that been done, Soviet domination of Eastern Europe would have been checked, and the Cold War would have been minimized. Roosevelt preferred the quick advance to Berlin via France to the slower slog through Eastern Europe. Another way of understanding this is that the American genius is for aerial and naval and cavalry wars of movement, and not for infantry wars of position.

draws the most materials from the earth, fabricates the most, and sells the most of productions and fabrics to foreign nations, must be, and will be, the greatest power on earth" (Stephanson, 1995, p. 61). "Command over ocean" was no ordinary kind of empire. It had its own particular type of dynamic—and its own logic.

Much about America even today remains an enigma. This is a society that is habitually misunderstood by both its friends and its enemies. One of the reasons for this misunderstanding is America's inherently ambiguous, even contradictory, character. We have on the one hand the world of Jacksonian America that Alexis de Tocqueville described—a world that managed to be both egalitarian and patrician in the same breath. Then we have the world of the network revolution that arrived with a vengeance in America after the Civil War. Railroad, later road—and telegraphic, later telephonic, broadcast, cable, and packet-switched—networks were the technology backbone of commercial and administrative networks that were to reach into the most isolated rural areas creating, with great ingenuity and a large amount of violence, a national polity. From this emerged branded, chain store America in contrast to the small-town Main Street Americana of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian provenance.

The 1890s added to this the thread of another "American character". In this protean moment, world cities—the great portal cities of Chicago and New York—emerged as nodes that not only tied America's continental networks into a global system of commerce and politics, but also became centers that attracted massive concentrations of intellectual capital. Like their analogous predecessors—such as Venice, Amsterdam, or late Augustan London—New York and Chicago emerged to world standing not just as centers of commercial wealth but also as centers of informational and plastic power.

These were places in which the power of design, the ability to think and act architectonically, was as important as dynastic-patrician power—symbolized by power-families and power-couples in the White House—and as important as network power, the managerial power of the franchise and the chain command organizations that the inventive managerial genius of the Americans spawned. In 1896, right at the

opening of America's thalassic age, the Spanish-American philosopher, George Santayana, immediately grasped the nature of the power underlying America's third revolution. In Santayana's view, this was the power of form based on the sense of beauty (Santayana, 1936 [1896]).

Such a power did not go uncontested. Fin de siècle America was a tense mix of high-minded moralism, aspirations to national procedural fairness, and emergent plastic power. American Progressives demanded the removal of ethnic patrimonialism from municipalities and urged the passage of social laws to regulate working hours and conditions.[4] At the same time they protested large-scale corporate power, and dreamt of a return to a pastoral world dominated by independent lawyers, local business, and moral conscience. Such was the paradox of America that, at the very moment Progressive opinion decried the evils of the city, the very nature of the city was being reinvented. The vertical-skyscraper city of Chicago and New York was the first new city form since the medieval gothic type. The countervailing hope of Progressives lay in suburbs that mixed neat orthogonal street grids with the green space of the Pilgrims' New England countryside—a reconciliation of rural topos with the legalitarian space of an infinitely extensible Cartesian network.

Nothing has changed today. American democracy is still distinguished by the same mix of patrician morals, fascination with law as the panacea of all ills, and a mute aspiration for an architectonic spirit that rises above the other strains in the American character. It still hankers after personal moral authority, its voting power lies in the suburbs, and its wealth and global influence extends outwards from its vertical portal cities, with their world trade centers and their maritime sea regions.

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4. In actual practice this meant the regulation of factory hygiene. The Upton Sinclair novels were written to scandalize the conscience of the Protestant middle class about factory working conditions. What really upset Sinclair's readers, however, were the depictions of hygiene (or lack of it) in the factories. This triggered the modern movement for consumer laws.

Traffic

It is the latter, sea-based, thalassic aspect that is the least well-understood feature of American democracy. In republican America before the Civil War, the maritime economy, centered on New York and Boston, had been very large.[5] It extended across the Pacific as well as the Atlantic. In fact it was so large that states like Massachusetts and Connecticut refused to send militia to fight in the 1812 war against England—to try and avoid the damage this war caused to their Atlantic trade with Britain. Yet, after that, nation-building and territorial politics in the nineteenth century focused American attention away from the seas. It only belatedly returned to thalassic preoccupations in the 1890s. Models of territorial imperium are pretty useless to explain what happened thereafter. So also is the supposition that thalassic power is a kind of unprincipled "globalization" in which American vices are projected indiscriminately across the surface of the globe. In fact, thalassic politics has a *sui generis* logic and well-developed, if not especially well-understood, principles.

It was the Delft-born Dutch theorist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) who defined the core principle of thalassic politics: the freedom of the seas (*Mare Liberum*). Grotius developed this notion in opposition to attempts by Spain and Portugal to treat the oceans as just another form of territory. He argued that the liberty of the seas was an essential correlate of *the right of nations to communicate with each other*. Significantly, the first foreign policy act of America was to engineer the removal of pirates from the Mediterranean Barbary Coast. It was the commitment to protect maritime commerce and passenger cargo in the Atlantic that brought the United States into World War One. Support for Britain in the Second World War, prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, hinged on

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5. From the 1780s onwards, Eastern seaboard towns and cities of New England, New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland had a major interest in the Pacific. This included whaling fleets and trade in sea otters, fur and hides. "These interests were so strong as to develop a sense of ownership over the Pacific coast long in advance of the event." In 1816 and 1820, John Melish, the official cartographer for the U.S. government, published maps showing the Pacific coast from the 52nd parallel and then the 49th parallel as part of the United States. (Alsytne, 1974, pp. 106, 95).

much the same considerations. But it is notable that America interpreted Grotius' right of nations to communicate with each other also as *the duty of nations to communicate with each other*. The long-term premise of America's East Asia policy, beginning early in the nineteenth century, was the maintaining of an open door to maritime trade.[6] This has been vigorously enforced.[7] America has always had a palpable loathing for hermit states of all stripes.

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6. Trade with China and Japan attracted American attention from the early nineteenth century. The Boston merchant William Sturgis sailed to Canton as a vessel captain in 1800. He made four round-the-world voyages in the following eight years, "Canton being the principal destination of each voyage", and later established a major business trading between China and the American Pacific coast (Alsytne, 1974, pp. 170). In 1813, the American naval captain David Porter, who had been on assignment searching for British merchant shipping in the Pacific, wrote to President Madison: "We border on islands which bear the same relation to the N.W. Coast as those of the West Indies bear to the Atlantic States... The important trade of Japan has been shut to every nation except the Dutch... Great changes have since taken place in the world—changes which may have effected [sic] even Japan. The time may be favorable, and it would be a glory beyond that acquired by any other nation for us, a nation of only 40 years standing, to beat down their rooted prejudices, secure to ourselves valuable trade, and make that people known to the world" (Alsytne, 1974, pp. 125-126). In 1835, the United States established an East India squadron with an eye to the China trade. In the 1840s, under pressure from the West, China acceded to demands to open its doors, and allowed the establishment of treaty ports where Western nations could freely trade on equal terms. In 1844, U.S. Ambassador Caleb Cushing negotiated a commercial treaty with China opening five China ports to U.S. merchants. In 1847, President Polk declared that Californian harbors "would afford shelter for our navy, for our numerous whale ships, and other merchant vessels employed in the Pacific ocean, [and] would in a short period become marts of an extensive and profitable commerce with China, and other countries of the East" (Alsytne, 1974, p. 145). Foremost among those other countries was Japan.
7. Once the China door had been opened, the Americans immediately turned their attention to Japan. Naval commander Perry was sent to Japan with instructions to use force if necessary to open Japan to the world. "The world has assigned this duty to us," Perry declared: "we have assumed the responsibility and undertaken the task, and can now not hold back" (Alsytne, 1974, p. 173). The Commodore's hope was to turn the island of Okinawa into an American *entrêpot*, and to negotiate the establishment of treaty ports with Japanese authorities. By 1858, six treaty ports had been opened, and Americans had been granted rights of trade, residence and consular representation. The U.S. was also able to establish naval depots at Nagasaki, Kanagawa (near Yokohama) and Hakodate (Alsytne, 1974, p. 175).

Open door policies, which suppose that there is a universal duty to communicate, are often thought of as simply a matter of economics—as if history hinged on an economic interpretation. But, when Grotius declared for the freedom of seas, he had something more than commerce in mind. Let us call this "something else" the system of circulation. Circulation represents a peculiar space that exists within and between portal cities. The signifier of the port city is its traffic. This traffic is created by the circulation of persons, goods, services, and ideas *in and around*, and *between*, cities. This traffic takes place in the portal space of "backwards and forwards", "in and out" (Murphy, 2001b). Practical politics, including realpolitic, concentrates on keeping this circulation going. When such circulation stops, we end up with what happened in the Mediterranean in the seventh century CE. When the Mediterranean was split between Christian and Islamic power, trade ceased, and the European dark ages began. The fall into a dark age is not simply a commercial matter or a matter of material wealth. It is fundamentally also a metaphysical and spiritual matter.

It is metaphysical in the sense that it is the kinetics of traffic, or navigation, that brings alive the third or plastic dimension of space. The third dimension of space is rather peculiar. *Movement through space in time* creates it. This is not the epic movement *across* space; nor is it the static place *assigned* by hierarchies. As the great modern painter of the plastic, Georgio de Chirico, understood well, *the third dimension of space requires the fourth dimension of time*. In an immediate sense, this insight was based on de Chirico's rather good knowledge of the early twentieth-century revolution in mathematics. Instinctively, though, the makers of the great plastic cities—*viz.*, those who created Periklean and Demosthenes' Athens, Hadrian's Rome, Florence, Venice, New York and Chicago—have always tacitly understood this.

So far as the city is concerned, the fourth, kinetic dimension of space—that is to say, movement through space in time—is musical. I mean this in the sense that movement through space in time is governed by the order of rhythm. What makes kinetic-plastic creations great are their marvelous rhythmic qualities—qualities created by all sorts of architectonic devices. These devices help us to mark out, in gorgeous

time, our passage through space. These are the devices of proportionality, ratio, harmony, accent, beat, and so on. Our most beautiful, our most just political orders are mirrored in this implied music.[8]

The sound of the portal city is polyphonic and polyrhythmic.[9] Movement through space in time occurs on multiple levels and through multiple channels. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, the great New York composer Charles Ives captured exactly this sense of polyrhythmic order. In Ives' case, it was a polyphony that bordered on near cacophony—like a kind of musical cubism.[10] Ives's life is a perfect miniature of America in transition through the era of its third revolution. His personal metaphysic looked back to the philosophic Transcendentalism of gentrified Boston. His politics was a type of radical democratic Progressivism. He advocated a procedural utopianism of direct voting on laws and ballots to recall errant legislators. His music, though, was something altogether different. His *Fourth Symphony* sounded as though it had come directly out of New York's rush hour—a

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8. This is a beauty, a justice that is something more, and less, than words. There are moments when the declarations of presidents and the rhetoric of those in legislatures surprise us with their intimations of justness. This does not happen often, but it does happen. It happens when their voice suddenly becomes musical and architectonic. This is what set the great British statesman Winston Churchill apart from his peers. His oratory did not always serve the greatest of causes or the best calculated ones. But when it did, it entered another dimension that is immediately recognizable. In those moments, we are confronted with unbelievably beautiful contrapuntal words, with a rhythmic force that exceeds all verbal meaning but has a meaning all of its own. When we hear those words, the hair on the back of our neck stands up. It is the same feeling we have when we enter a plastic masterpiece like the Pantheon or St. Peters. It is the metaphysical sense we have when we enter and exit great plastic space. It is the sense that we have when we move round a sculpture in the public square, or through the halls of a university, a parliament, a monastery, a palace, or a house that has been designed with a musical sense.

9. This is meant not only in a figurative sense. The great Renaissance and early modern music-making of the Flemish and the Venetians was polyphonic, as was the Catholic musical tradition of New Orleans that was to influence in profound ways the demotic musical genres originating in the Mississippi— ragtime, jazz and blues—that were to reach mature form in New York City and Chicago in the first half of the twentieth century, and were to provide a polyrhythmic ethos that deeply influenced modern American art music composition (see Murphy, 1999).

10. See most especially Ives' *Symphony No. 4* (1914).

vertiginous, riotous yet coherent sound collage of staggering rhythmic complexity. Ives created a music whose planes of movement and time generated a surface of chaos that betrayed an extraordinary underlying sense of order.

Portal knowledge

The kind of order that Ives portrayed is an outgrowth of the peculiar crosscurrents of portal cities. These crosscurrents are produced by the very nature of a portal that is inherently "open to world" —indeed to the cosmos—but which, in order to succeed, must structure and orchestrate and schematize the flows that pass through it. The signature of this "opening to the world" and the first schemata that a portal adopts is its relationship to other portals. The cosmos, from the standpoint of the portal, might be thought of as the sum of all relations between portals.

This is not just a philosophical observation. Contemplating what was destined to make the United States' "the world's historical center", an anonymous American Whig editorialist writing in 1849 observed that technological advances would shrink distances. "The barriers of time and space will be annihilated." The result would be the opening up of commercial opportunities. "The trade of China and of a large portion of Asia must find its way across the Western ocean to our Pacific shores, building up great towns and cities there, and thence across to the Atlantic coast, there to meet the trade of Europe coming over the Atlantic on its western route" (Stephanson, 1995, p. 58). In this modern cosmos, what was essential was not just trade in a generic sense, but trade intertwined with "building up great towns and cities" on both sides of the Pacific that, in turn, linked with nodal cities on both sides of the Atlantic.

Great portal cities only exist in tandem with other cities. There is no New York without Chicago, London or Shanghai. There is no Venice without Constantinople. Circulation between cities generates a flow of news, letters, reports, and speculations. This establishes relations of correspondence. Already even centuries ago the scale of this could be staggering. For example, Datini, a Renaissance-era Venetian merchant, exchanged over 125,000 letters with his factors and agents between 1364 and 1410 (Jardine, 1996). Relations of correspondence are different

from the communicative structures of the procedurally defined or law-defined citizen city. Notices of assemblies and proposed new laws, news of the violation of laws and of impending threats, reports on the state of the city's planar networks of power and utility and investigations of the relation between country and town, earth and artifice define the "progressive" city. Circulation supposes a different or additional kind of knowledge to that of the citizen city.[11] Circulating knowledge is based on having been to other cities, or other parts of the city, and on the assumption that audiences have also been to, or may one day go to, those places. Knowledge of this kind arises out of the milieu of contacts, friendships, embassies, transactions, traffic, trade, and voyages in and between cities.

Circular knowledge and its works arise for a number of reasons. Traders want to know whether crops have failed or rivers are silting up or war has broken out in some distant place. Envoys want to know the mood and disposition of the officials they are going to meet. Travelers to religious and sporting festivals want to know about travel conditions, lodging, and the reputation of the place or the event they are going to. This is elementary knowledge—*information*. But, in the course of time, this stimulates *speculation* concerning much more fundamental questions about large-scale structures of geography, climate, warfare, dynastic change, security, hospitality, and sacred life.

Consider the example of price information. Like political news, indeed like any type of information, it is ephemeral. This is the nature of information. It is disposable. It is only important for the moment. It is generated by our responses to contingencies and uncertainties. On the other hand, the good use of information requires frames of interpretation. Is a slump in prices likely to be short-term or long-term? Does the agent sell now or hold onto their commodity? Is the spy providing good information or misleading disinformation? To answer such questions assumes that we can make inferences about large-scale systems—the impersonal order of things. The behavior of markets, war, and government are not random. They have patterns, as difficult as these

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11. For a discussion of these types in the ancient Greek setting, see Lewis (1996).

are to figure out. This is the work of intelligence.[12] Intelligence is the discernment of long-range and long-term patterns, which may range from knowledge of the seasonality of monsoons to the political cycles of states.

The intelligence of the portal requires both heavyweight and lightweight media. Portals typically excel in both. The "built environments" of historic Venice, golden age Amsterdam, London, and New York are collective works of art. At the same time, each of these portals have been great centers for publishing and the dissemination of information—Venice in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Amsterdam since the seventeenth century, London since the eighteenth century, and New York since the nineteenth century.[13] They are places for the bartering, sale and storage of information. London produces the Reuter news service because "the world passes through" the portal, and because the portal city exists as a "carrier" to the world. But information is a kind of raw material, only of the meanest value, until it is given form and structure. This is what writers and anthologists, editors and publishers, librarians and curators do. They organize information into navigable forms—whether this is a gallery display, a newspaper layout, a web page or a searchable database catalogue. While most of this architectonic work is prefabricated, it rests on an important principle: intellectual capital is accumulated where cultural and scientific labor extracts something like orderly, architectonic structure from the random, stochastic, or contingent nature of information.

Thalassic power and the right of nations to communicate

Portals are foci for the accumulation of intellectual capital. They are locales where intelligence is highly concentrated. Plastic spaces play an essential role in this concentration. Plastic forms serve as *a model of and*

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12. Charles Ives is a good example of this. As well as a composer, he was a highly successful businessman in New York's insurance industry. His genius for understanding the patterns of the insurance market not only made him a millionaire but also had direct parallels with the kind of mastery of complexity that his composition required.

13. On the origins of Dutch book publishing in Antwerp, Leiden, and Amsterdam, see Steinberg (1955, pp. 127-132).

stimulus for pattern creation and recognition. In light of this, it is unsurprising that the portal city should have become, in the middle and late twentieth century, the major center for the development of information technologies. This technological revolution had as great an impact on the world as the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth century. Just as the Mersyside portal-region was the birthplace of industrialism, it was American portal city-regions that pioneered technologies for the electronic manipulation, storage and distribution of information. The most spectacular example was "the Californian coast", encompassing the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Area (with its Palo Alto/Santa Clara/Silicon Valley off-shoot) and the mirror city-region of the Southern Californian strip-polis that stretches from Santa Barbara to San Diego-Tijuana (and may, in all probability, one day eventually extend far down into Mexican Baja California).[14] In the same border-hopping sense, America's Puget Sound-Seattle region, another post-industrial pioneer, extended its influence into Canadian British Columbia. These city-regions geographically front the Pacific Ocean, and each constitutes a kind of simulated sea region underpinned by military-industrial economies of great sophistication.

What made all of this possible? In the mid-nineteenth century, as we have observed, and largely because of the building of railroads and the coincidental spread of the telegraph, America hit upon a new kind of planar power. Its communicative technology was to prove more far-reaching than anything since the age of Roman road building. Just as the Roman roads were a network medium that bound Roman society — and its administrators and its armies — across vast distances, America's rail and electric networks made possible a new class of American rulers who replaced the collegial patricians and the self-made gentry of the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ages. Of course, it is not technology but culture that makes a class, which is why the Germans or the French, who had the same technology, did much less — or certainly very different things — with it. The Americans in the age of continental empire

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14. The expatriated English art critic, Reyner Banham, in his insightful book (1971) on *Los Angeles: The Architecture of Four Ecologies* called this strip-polis, *"surfburbia"*, which goes someway to capturing its *sui generis* qualities.

building—with the land deals they transacted with the French and the British, and their wars against the Indians and the Mexicans—were the modern Romans par excellence. Their mastery of planar network power if anything eclipsed the Romans.

But, here, now: a word of warning. Despite the popularity of the analogy, American global power—the power that grew out of America's third political revolution—*is not Roman in character*. A society that had ambitions in the mid-nineteenth century of incorporating Canada and Mexico could reasonably be described as Roman. Insofar as NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) will, in all likelihood, eventually produce such an empire by peaceful union, the tag Roman remains valid. However, it is not valid to describe the thalassic, global, post-1890s reach of America.

Something very different from the Roman model gradually started to take shape in America during the twentieth century.

In the 1920s the U.S. Congress made an historic decision to strategically concentrate its overseas military forces around harbor locations in San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay, and Puget Sound. The most striking thing about this concentration of naval and naval-air power, however, was that it was never "just a military force"—in the same way that Venetian or Dutch military force in the golden age of those states was never "just a military force". It did not produce a garrison-city, or a presidio-like culture. The crucial difference was that American globalism was a product of the doctrine of "navalism", a doctrine that was subordinated implicitly and explicitly to the thalassic principle—Grotius' principle—of the right and, in the American interpretation, the duty of nations to communicate with each other. Thou shalt communicate, or else.

This was a complex, and historically unprecedented, world-view. A U.S. naval captain, David Porter, neatly summed it up in 1813. After a spell chasing British merchantmen in the Pacific, Porter wrote to President Madison. In his letter, Porter observed of Japan: "The time may be favorable, and it would be a glory beyond that acquired by any other nation for us, a nation of only 40 years standing, to beat down their rooted prejudices, secure to ourselves a valuable trade, and make that

people known to the world" (Alsytne, 1974, pp. 125-126). This is a perfect synopsis of the American doctrine of globalism. There is the frank, even disarming, admission of trading self-interest. Yet this is combined with a political and moral metaphysic. This metaphysic supposes both the right and duty of nations to communicate with one other. States that retreat into the incommunicado of prejudice—behind impervious walls of tradition—violate the principle of free communication. It is correspondingly the duty of America to break down such barriers to communication, and to make those who have closed themselves off from the world known to the world.

Without question this is not merely a doctrine of trade, though doubtlessly it squares neatly with trade interest. It is not even just a doctrine of enlightenment, even if beating down a state's rooted prejudices represents a rather assertive form of enlightenment— enlightenment as a duty of confrontation and challenge. What really makes the American doctrine stand apart is the self-incurred duty to make closed societies known to the world. On the world stage, the American conception of enlightenment was not formulated in terms of rights or liberties, but as duty and destiny. It carried with it the burden and the gravity of responsibility for the world at large. This was no mean consideration.

To assume responsibility for the freedom of the seas and open communication between nations supposed a military power that was of a very distinctive kind. Grotius' basic point was that the oceans were not territory. They could not be commanded like territory. Neither traditional tribute and resource-extracting hierarchies, nor Roman techniques of legal and planar network power worked effectively over seas. It was the Dutch and the Venetians who first found effective ways of projecting power over distance without behaving territorially. The key was their accumulation of intellectual capital. The Venetians at their peak built the best boats and invented financial accounting. The Dutch at their height built the best boats and invented the stock exchange. Both learned to command distance rather than territory. Both learned to command distance through information as well as technology. Both learned to do this because each had an architectonic sense. Both eschewed social

and even legal power for the power of abstract relations—relations of design, form, number and structure. You see it in their art, their science, their architecture, and their town planning.

It is this condition that American thalassic power has groped towards. Through the twentieth century, U.S. military spending, spearheaded by its naval and naval-air establishments, created the phenomenon of "the knowledge economy".[15] It funded a regime of perpetual innovation by technology and science companies spun off from research universities, primarily located in its thalassic cities, and shielded from market timidity and short-term perspective by a public-private system of defense contracting. Other nations look at this and try and replicate bits and pieces of this model. They fund technology research but miss the military and political and architectonic dimension. Venice did not become either prosperous or immortal just because it denizens were great ship technologists. Rather what the Venetians learnt with painful experience was how to command distance rather than territory. Ultimately, what made them brilliant at this, for several centuries, was their exquisite sense of the plastic.[16] In a more contradictory way, the same is true of the Americans.

Thalassic power and plastic creation

Plastic form is a paradigm of pattern creation. This is creation achieved by the ordering forces of harmony, proportion, rhythm, scale, symmetry, and the like. The most effective way of acting at a distance is through

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15. A classic example of this is the Oracle software company whose first contract in the late 1970s was struck with the Advanced Technology Division of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. As Oracle founder Larry Ellison was later to observe: "Who but the Federal Government would buy database technology from four guys in California?" (Ellison, 1995). Another early Oracle customer was the U.S. intelligence agency the CIA.

16. Typical of this is the founder of the afore-mentioned Oracle Corporation—the South Side Chicago-raised Larry Ellison (1944-)—whose first vocational passion was architecture and one of whose abiding intellectual loves has been Japanese landscape architecture. Commercializing the idea of relational databases made Oracle's fortune. Conceptually the relational database was—just that— relationships: the transference of the architectonic schema of relationships into the field of information.

pattern media. The great sea powers, in addition to hierarchy and command, law and technology, were masters of pattern creation. When we look at the Americans, we see a thalassic power still in the process of formation. Territory commands part of their heart. The phrase "the heart land" sums it up. "Country" has an enormous pull on the American psyche. But in the history of the city, New York and Chicago are as remarkable plastic creations as any. These cities grew to maturity due to their ability to command distance rather territory. They accumulated vast artistic, scientific, and commercial wealth on the basis of the principle of the right and duty of nations to communicate with each other. In targeting New York City, the September 11 terrorist attackers in 2001 understood more than most the intimate connection of plastic and thalassic power, and the centrality to the American empire of the portal principle of the right and duty of nations to communicate with each other.

Plastic-thalassic power has different expressions. American west coast cities lack the iconic plastic appearance of New York and Chicago. Los Angeles in particular is a planar city par excellence. It was created in the image of the railways. It grew around their networks. Its freeways follow their demolished tracks. Even its principal harbor (Long Beach) is an artificial creation. Nonetheless, a kind of plastic genius was central to Los Angeles' rise to maturity. For its endless suburbs and its aero-space economy would never have taken off without two great engineering projects—its aqueducts and the Hoover Dam in Nevada that supplied the hydroelectricity, the cheap power, that drove the most dynamic economy in the world since the days of the industrial revolution. By the end of the twentieth century, California was the sixth largest economy in the world. The availability of cheap power rested on a crucial judgment made in the 1920s. The American President Herbert Hoover made the decision. Hoover's presidency is one that has been much misunderstood. The cliché about Hoover, a Republican, was that he was a free-market President who failed abysmally to deal with the on-set of the Great Depression. But, in fact, he was an enthusiast for great public works, and created many of the prototypes of the New Deal institutions that Franklin Roosevelt later became famous for.

Most striking for the evolution of American thalassic power was Hoover's interest in hydraulic power—the command of rivers. Such was his interest, had political conditions of America have been otherwise, Hoover-style engineering politics might have seen the emergence of a kind of hydraulic despotism in America.[17] If you think that is a frivolous notion, then consider the Mississippi slave economy. It set a powerful precedent in American history for such a thing. However, as it was, Hoover, the engineering graduate from the Bay Area's Stanford University, was more interested in the control of nature than persons. Just as Teddy Roosevelt backed William Mulholland's aqueduct (1913) for water-hungry Los Angeles, Hoover backed the scheme of Ezra Scattergood to dam the Colorado River system at Boulder Canyon to provide hydroelectricity for California. The latter, renamed the Hoover Dam, was to supply phenomenally cheap electricity to Los Angeles and San Francisco. The Grand Coulee Dam provided the same for Seattle (Johnson, 2000, pp. 704-706, 757; Nye, 2003, pp. 244-247). But as well as the crucial power, these projects also provided a plastic imaginary for California.

A strong sense of artifice or "second nature" has been central to all intellectual capital-intensive societies in history. Great acts of artifice on a public and symbolic scale provide a spur to general pattern creation. California found the locus of its designing mind in some remarkable feats of engineering. When the Hoover Dam was completed (1935) it was the largest man-made structure on earth (Nye, 2003, p. 244). This was without a doubt a prodigious Promethean act, but creating intake towers as tall as skyscrapers was also an incitement to artifice and a stimulus for the kind of designing intelligence that city building in New York and Chicago at the turn of the twentieth century had unleashed. Both power and plasticity were decisive for the creation of the first truly post-industrial economy. As a result, the California coast and Seattle— supplemented by the technological science of maritime Boston and (at least till the 1950s) New York—produced the most dynamic economy in

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17. It is not difficult to imagine the New Deal's Tennessee Valley Authority as the prototype of a rationalized hydraulic state.

the world since the industrial revolution. As with England's industrial revolution, its incubator was a naval economy and its technology demands.[18] Its most iconic structure was not a traditional architectural structure but a brilliant hybrid engineering-architectural masterpiece—the Golden Gate Bridge (1938).[19] The puzzle of it all, though, is that this military-industrial economy did not produce a Prussian-style militarism as Berlin did—and that its great engineering water projects did not produce the kind of hydraulic despotism that the Mississippi Jim Crow economy had threatened to do. The difference ultimately was the orientation to the sea, and the desideratum to command distance rather territory.[20]

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18. The knowledge needed for English machine building derived from the Liverpool-region clock-making industry that serviced British naval ships.
19. The structure spans the Golden Gate Strait, the entrance to the San Francisco Bay from the Pacific Ocean. It was a collaborative work by engineers (Joseph B. Strauss and Leon S. Moisseiff) and architects (Irving F. Morrow and Gertrude C. Morrow). It is an astonishingly beautiful structure—a work of enormous span, sweeping cables, elegant lines, soaring towers, delicate accents, and subtle art deco styling.
20. So when the American empire is judged, remember this: before the Civil War, politicians from the American South fancied that the American Union would one day soon extend to incorporate states in the Caribbean and Central America. Their explicit intention was that these new states would be slave owning. In contrast, the ethos of commanding distance rather territory is much more benign. Despite all of the realpolitic that any effective state will engage in, and must engage in, power over distance is infinitely more capable of producing human wealth in all its aspects than either social hierarchy or even national-democratic procedure.

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Peter   Murphy is   Director   of   the   Master   of   Communications   Program, Victoria University of Wellington. His recent books include *Agon, logos, polis* (2001), *Civic justice* (2001), and *Dialectic of Romanticism: Critique of modernity* (2004).

Disciplinary Knowledges of Knowledge Societies and Knowledge Economies[1]

Michael A. Peters

Introduction: Mapping disciplinary knowledges

Concepts have histories. They also have homes. Normally we can locate them in relation to a family of kindred terms that have a home in a discipline or discourse. "Knowledge society" and "knowledge economy" are no exceptions. In fact they prove the generalisation as both concepts are anchored in a complicated network of family terms and belong to different discourses or disciplines, respectively, as one might expect, the disciplines of sociology, on the one hand, and of economics, on the other. These twin concepts while displaying similar characteristics – among them the attempt to describe society or economy in terms of dominant axial principle from which other societal or economic trends can be inferred – belong to different disciplines and discourses. To all intents and purposes these are separate and parallel discourses that are not cross-threading—in each case the trajectories of the disciplines seem to be powered by their own problematics, by the set of problems thrown up by the discipline rather than any external pressures, and they seem particularly impervious to radical cross-disciplinary borrowing or analysis. Where they do come together is in the area of policy, in policy studies, in actual policies or policy discourse, where the master concepts borrowed from the sociology and economics of knowledge have come to help shape and define policy templates for economic and social development and well being. At the level of policy the same demands for theoretical consistency or disciplinary rigor or internal consistency do not seem to operate; rather the easy dualism of

1. A version of this paper was presented as part of a panel on the knowledge society at the annual conference of the Sociological Association of Aotearoa New Zealand, Auckland University of Technology, December 9, 2003.

the knowledge *society* and the knowledge *economy* is embraced without difficulty or contradiction. While there is, of course, some analysis of trends and even the collection of relevant data, these twin concepts are empirically underdetermined. They operate more like *performative ideologies* with constitutive effects at the level of public policy. And there are a whole series of self-legitimating sibling concepts spawned by policy analysts and think-tanks that now roll off the tongue of any sociology undergraduate: "information society", "learning society", "information economy", and, more recently, "learning economy".

A more complete map of disciplinary knowledges of knowledge societies and knowledge economies would embrace not only the *blended* discourses of policy and future studies but also relatively newer hybrid discourses in the field of management, such as human resources management, performance management and knowledge management. One might also draw on and attempt to sketch the recent disciplinary contributions of geographers who have been to the forefront in providing spatial analysis of knowledge societies and economies. By contrast, one might also chart the contributions of first, second, and third generation cognitive psychology in theorising the mind or "intelligence" in terms of information processing models. In this connection the links between the mathematical theory of information first proposed by Claude Shannon in 1948, Norbert Weiner's cybernetics, Vannevar Bush's "memex", third generation cognitive psychology and network economics provide ample historical material for a *different* disciplinary-oriented sociology of knowledge societies. Such an approach based on forms of network analysis would attempt to recognize the significant differences among neural nets, the formation of social and economic networks, and the development of the Internet, while preserving the general thrust of post-human (human-machine) network knowledge practices.

In this paper I restrict myself to two disciplines—those of sociology and economics. In one sense these are the home disciplines for the two concepts. Sociologists, especially those standing in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge, have provided some important theoretical analyses and leads concerning the knowledge society. At the same time they have often tended to accept dominant descriptions of the

changing western or global economy and to concentrate on its social and stratification effects rather than to engage directly with mainstream neo-classical and neo-liberal economists. In the first section of this paper—"From the sociology of knowledge to the concept of 'knowledge Societies'"—I track out some features of the rise of the sociology of knowledge and its contributions to understanding knowledge economies or what I prefer to call knowledge capitalism.

If sociologists in this tradition have been reluctant to engage with economics, economists have not learned much from sociologists. There are notable exceptions in the work of the Regulation school, and those that loosely follow its understandings – notably the work of Bob Jessop (2000) and David Harvey (1989). There is also the exception of Michel Callon (1998) whose *The laws of markets* provides a promising sociological analysis of mainstream economics as *technologies* rather than "bad science". When it suited them knowledge economists have borrowed from philosophers, such as Polanyi, which is not surprising given the Western tradition of epistemology dating from Plato. Much is made, for instance, of Polanyi's concept of personal and tacit knowledge, especially in the area of intellectual and human capital theory. More broadly, the specter of Popper and Wittgenstein hang about in the air.[2] In the second section of the paper I discuss the rise of the economics of knowledge and the emergence of the knowledge economy—"From the economics

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2. Friedrich von Hayek opens his essay on "The uses of knowledge" with the very first footnote acknowledge to Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery. The relationship between these two intellectual giants of the twentieth century requires closer scrutiny. Hayek was responsible for inviting and encouraging Popper to apply for a lectureship at the London School of Economics when Popper at the time was still at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand from 1937-43. Shortly after Popper's arrival, Hayek went to the University of Chicago, although not to the economics department. By contrast, Wittgenstein's questioning of Cartesian certainty as a basis for knowledge in, for example, On certainty provides a radically contextual and culturally situated "epistemology" anchored in practices, where the chain of reasons come to an end and "the spade is turned". This is a continuation of his language game analysis of the Philosophical investigations which moved away from the formalism of his early logicism and the logic of inquiry to cultural forms of analyses of rationality that influenced succeeding generations of thinkers, philosophers and sociologists alike, including philosophers of science, Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Hesse, French theorists, Lyotard, Bourdieu, and Foucault, and sociologists, Barnes and Bloor.

of knowledge to the concept of the 'knowledge economy'".

More problematically, the question of the relationship between sociology of knowledge and knowledge societies both a sociological concept (see, e.g., Stehr, 1994) and a posited sociological reality, is difficult to fathom, as is the relationship between economics of knowledge and knowledge economies. In other words, the relationship between the discipline and disciplinary knowledge and the reality it attempts to depict in each case is not straightforward. Is it a relation of depiction, description, and analysis, or is it constitution or construction, or visionary? The way in which the relationship is pictured also may differ between these disciplines and it may differ accordingly to how the disciplines themselves picture the relation.

From the sociology of knowledge to the concept of "knowledge societies"

There is a question in sociology of knowledge concerning its own origin and the development of the field separately in three or four major locations: France, Germany, USA, and UK, although the so-called Edinburgh school established by Bloor and Barnes, based on Wittgenstein's work, is a relatively new tradition by comparison to the other three traditions. I shall only remind you in the briefest of ways signaling these traditions rather than giving any historically fully-fleshed living account. In France, it was Durkheim and his student Mauss who studied "collective representations" of primitive and pervasive social categories. Later in similar fashion Bloch and Febvre produced studies of "collective mentalities" (or a kind of psychology of the epoch) and established the Annales school in 1928, which was famously continued in the work of Braudel. In the early years this analytical history was very radical and subversive, strongly opposed to the tradition of political history. Later, it became a school of thought, with its structuralist concepts (structure-conjuncture) and a method emphasising serial history of changes over the long term. Finally, the school fragmented and shifted its concern from the socio-economic to the socio-cultural.[3]

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3. See, for example, David Moon's "Fernand Braudel and the Annales School". Available http://www.strath.ac.uk/Departments/History/s_adams/annales.htm.

In the USA Veblen, a student of Pierce and colleague of Dewey, initiated an inquiry into the sociology of truth, concerned with the relation of specific groups and institutions to knowledge. For Veblen, writing in the first decade of the twentieth century, the "cult of science" was the consequence of the rise of industry and modern technology, and he questioned the role of academics, likening them to keepers of esoteric knowledge. In a separate study he wrote an essay on the pre-eminence of Jews in modern Europe.

By contrast, in Germany, motivated by the work of Marx and Weber, Schiller and Mannheim argued that ideas are "socially situated" and shaped by styles of thought. Mannheim, in particular, was an important figure in the tradition of the sociology of knowledge. He helped shape and christen the emerging discipline — *Soziologie des Erkennes, Wissensoziologie* — which he defined as "the relationship between human thoughts and the conditions of existence in general" and turned it into a scientific endeavour (as opposed to a philosophical one) by studying science as a social organisation. Mannheim also occupies a special place in the tradition because he traversed German and English traditions: first as a member of the Lukacs circle in Hungary, he taught at Heidelberg (1926-30) and Frankfurt-am-Main (1930-33), before his Nazi suspension as a Jew and his "escape" to England in 1933 to take up a teaching post at LSE at the invitation of Laski. Later he accepted the first chair in the sociology of education at the University of London (1933-1947) where he wrote *Freedom, power, and democratic planning* (1950).

The question of why the sociology of knowledge floundered thereafter is also part of its own self-reflexive study for it was only Merton, whose Weberian-inspired thesis on Puritanism and science, written mostly in the 1940s and 1950s, dominated a near defunct field. There was Zaniecke, the Polish sociologist who followed in the footsteps of Veblen, Gurvitch who died before he could move beyond his programmatic outline and Berger and Luckmann, whose hugely influential *Social construction of reality* (1966) promised much but was not followed up by substantive work.

Peter Burke (2002), from whom I have taken this rough threefold typology, suggests that the main stimulus for renewal for sociology of

knowledge came from outside sociology: from Lévi-Strauss in anthropology, from Kuhn in the history of science, and from Foucault in philosophy. The revival of sociology of knowledge, from this mixed disciplinary inheritance, engaged the attention of both Elias (an assistant of Mannheim), and Bourdieu, who was trained as an anthropologist and whose notion of practice owes much to Wittgenstein. Burke also mentions the anthropologists, Geertz and Goody, enabling us to talk meaningfully of an anthropology of knowledge.[4]

Burke (2002) in his *Social history of knowledge* suggests that the second wave of sociology of knowledge differs from the first wave in terms of four emphases. First, the shift from the acquisition and transmission of knowledge to its "construction" or "production" which reflects the postmodern turn in sociology. Second, "knowledge-holders" are no longer considered homogenous or necessarily a class or elite formation and knowledge is categorised and described by reference to groups who use everyday or practical knowledge as well as intellectual knowledge. Third, second wave sociology of knowledge tends to adopt microsociology to investigate networks or "epistemic communities" (cf. "communities of practice") in the spaces and institutions in which they work, such as the laboratory, or the library. This has given rise to the notion of the "anthropology of knowledge". Fourth, while the first wave focused on class in relation to knowledge as social, second wave has tended to give more attention to questions of gender and space or geography—that is, the likes of Haraway and Said.

What is curious in Burke's analysis is that he does not mention two groups that I think are important for understanding contemporary sociology of knowledge, although it would be hard to talk of third wave. Perhaps we could call it second wave concurrent. First, while Burke he unpacks the modern history of sociology of knowledge he neither mentions Heidegger, nor Wittgenstein, nor the tradition of phenomenology from Husserl onwards, which is important not merely because of the tendency to prioritize practical over theoretical

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4. Geertz, it must be remembered, was heavily influenced by Wittgenstein, who was responsible for influencing the cultural turn of the twentieth century.

knowledge—indeed, to emphasize the notion of *practice* per se—but also their influence over the Edinburgh and Manchester schools. Second, and more obviously significant for the purposes of this paper, Burke fails to mention at all the sociologists of post-industrialism, by which I mean the work of Daniel Bell (1973), Alain Touraine (1974), in the first instance, and Masuda (1980), Block (1990), and Stehr (1994), in the second. Castells (2000) stands out as sociologist who has contributed to this mini-tradition, although not in tradition terms. Maybe we could call this third wave the sociology of postindustrialism as the technology-driven shift from manufacturing to service industries with a focus on the consequences of that shift for social structure. These three waves I call "from sociology of knowledge to the concept of knowledge societies". With the postindustrialists we get a triangulation with economic sociology, a contrast with sociology of industrialism, and links both to knowledge as the axial principle for social organization—the so-called knowledge society theorised by Bell and Touraine in the early 1970s. Bell emphasises the scientisation of society and the emergence of new knowledge classes or elites. Touraine theorises new forms of social resistance based on new knowledge workers; while Masuda and Castells analyse the informatisation of society or the rise of network society, and Lyotard places weight on the leading techno-sciences in knowledge capitalism and their influence on the legitimation and production of knowledge. With the sociology of postindustrialism of Bell and Touraine, and a new generation of British sociologists such as Steve Fuller and Gerard Delanty, there are obvious links to the economics of knowledge and the knowledge economy, especially through the analysis of higher education policy.

Let me also sound a note of caution for little of this sociological tradition really deals explicitly with the economics of postindustrialism, with the tradition of the economics of knowledge or with the "knowledge economy". Let me briefly discuss two exceptions: first, the Regulation school and the sociology of post-Fordism and, second, the work of Michel Callon. The Regulation school was founded in the 1970s on the writings of Aglietta (1979) and developed further in the work of Boyer (1990) and Lipietz (1987). The term itself, as most people know, was coined by the

Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci in his *Prison Notebooks* to refer to a new industrial capitalism based on the "American way". Aglietta appropriated the term to describe the structure of Fordism in the American postwar economy and its coming crisis signaled the slow-down in production and declining profitability after the long post-war boom. Regulationists focus on the assembly line system of production characteristic of Fordism in the 1940 and '50s and coming to its endpoint in the 1970s with the opening up of an era based on new forms of flexible economic organisation and production. Fordism thus refers, above all, to assembly line production, economies of scale, deskilled, often pre-union massed workers, long- runs of standardised goods in protected national markets and bureaucratic, centralised management. What distinguishes the Regulation school is an emphasis upon the mode of regulation and in particular political and cultural forces, including the role of the state, in "regulating" economic growth or the "regime of accumulation". Regulationists stress contradictions or crises as an endemic feature of the capitalist system and trace the structural crisis of Fordism to the limitations of the labour process under mass production methods to realise further productivity gains, on the one hand, and increased competitiveness of strong economies that challenged US supremacy and lead to growing international instability, following the "oil shocks" of the 1970s.

Broadly speaking, both neo-Fordist and post-Fordist resolutions have been sketched: the former points to the transformation of the labour process, including increased automation and new work practices, while the latter emphasises global shifts in the organisation of production and the flight of capital from advanced to less developed economies. In addition, post-Fordists tend to link changes in production ("flexible specialisation") with those in consumption (niche markets and new cultures of consumption). Harvey (1989), for instance, emphasizes the new dynamics, based on compressed time-space, of a more flexible regime of accumulation, located in the emergence of truly global finance capital. Motivated by the Regulation school and neo-Marxist state theory Bob Jessop's (2000) "The state and the contradictions of the knowledge-driven economy" provides some useful insights on technological change

and capital development, and perhaps the clearest statement of this approach in relation to knowledge capitalism. His conclusion is worth stating:

> First, the globalizing, knowledge-driven economy cannot be adequately understood by regarding knowledge as a natural(ised) factor of production. Instead it is based on the contradictions between knowledge as a collective resource and as intellectual property — contradictions which are rooted in its fictitious commodification. Second, the increased importance of knowledge in this contradictory sense is related to changes in the primary modalities of competitiveness that transform the relationship between the economic and the extra-economic and thus the modalities of state intervention. Third, information and communication technologies have played a key role in extending and re-articulating time-space distanciation and time-space compression. This too has implications for the modalities of competitiveness, for re-scaling and re-temporalising of competition, and for the relative dominance of different fractions and sectors of capital. Fourth, as a consequence of the above, the globalizing, knowledge-driven economy involves a transformation not only in the primary and secondary aspects of the contradictions of capitalism and also in the relative importance of different contradictions.

Michel Callon (1998) is interested in the relation between economics and economies. On one standard sociological account the relation is weak in the sense that economics provides highly abstract models of market behaviour based on governing assumptions that have no real world equivalences (Barry & Slater, 2002). On similar lines Thrift (1998) argues that academic economics does not have a great deal of importance for business although it has significance for states as discursive elements justifying actions that the state enacts as 'economic'. By contrast, Callon's (1998) *The laws of markets* suggests that rather than see economics as bad science it is better to view economics as a set of technical practices –as technologies — that create phenomena and participate in shaping the thing it describes. Callon is less interested in economics as a set of accurate representations of markets than in the part played by economics in *performing* markets. When I use the term ideology in relation to knowledge economy, then, I use it more in line

with Callon's "performative" and constitutive sense that stresses its role in creating markets and policies.

From the economics of knowledge to the concept of the knowledge economy

Paul Krugman (1995) begins his *Peddling prosperity* with the story of the rise of conservative economics, the attack on Keynes and the growth in influence of the supply-siders whom he calls "policy entrepreneurs".[5] He focuses on the work of Milton Friedman and his critique of high taxation and the welfare state. He chronicles the acceptance of monetarism under Reagan, the rise of the "strategic traders" (the liberal equivalent of supply-siders) and the impacts of conservative policies in terms of the lackluster growth record, the huge rise in income inequality and the blow outs of budget deficits. He also chronicles the revival of Keynesianism and the emergence of a more interventionist economic theory in the early 1990s after the implosion of conservative macro-economics. Krugman does mention the "paradigm shift" that accompanied "the economics of qwerty", basically how the keyboard layout invented in the nineteenth century—not the most efficient for finger movement—had become "locked in" to the Markey, demonstrating how market competition often depend upon historical accident rather than invariably leading to the unique, best solution. Krugman's analysis focuses on US economic policy and does not profile recent debates in economics on the knowledge economy that came into their own really only at the close of the 1990s and presided over the decade-long upswing of the US economy up until the dot.com bubble burst in May 2001. The narrative I want to spin about the economics of knowledge goes back well before Friedman and monetarism to Friedrich

5. In the Preface, Krugman (1995) quotes an Indian-born economist's theory of reincarnation: "If you are a good economist, you are reborn a physicist; if you are a bad economist, you are reborn a sociologist". He comments: "A sociologist might say that this quote shows what is wrong with economists: they want a subject that is fundamentally about human beings to have the mathematical certainty of the hard sciences" (p. xi). And he concludes economics is a hard subject because of complexity: "it involves human beings, who do not behave in simple, mechanical ways" (p. xii). Nevertheless, he suggests, "we do actually know a lot about economics—more than we know in any other social science—because economics studies human beings in their simplest (if least edifying) activities" (p. xii).

Hayek.[6]

Friedrich Hayek (1899-1992) is probably the single most influential individual economist or political philosopher to shape what is now understood as neoliberalism, although he is best regarded, and considered himself, as a classical liberal.[7] Hayek's own theoretical direction sprang out of the so-called Austrian School established by Carl Menger, Eugen Boehm-Bawerk, and Ludwig von Mises during first decade of the early twentieth century. What distinguished the Austrian School from the classical school of political economy pioneered by Adam Smith and David Ricardo was their "subjective", as opposed to the "objective", theory of value. Leon Walras (1834-1910) of the French Lausanne school presented economics as "the calculus of pleasure and pain of the rational individual", and Carl Menger, developing the "subjective" theory of value, launched what some have called a "neoclassical revolution" in economics. Menger questioned the notion of perfect information that was seen to underlie *homo economicus* by both classical and neo-classical economists.

Hayek's work also emphasised the limited nature of knowledge: the price mechanism of the "free" market conveys information about supply and demand that is dispersed among many consumers and producers and cannot be coordinated by any central planning mechanism. His early work emphasized that the key to economic growth is "knowledge" and this insight provided him with the grounds for casting doubt on socialism and state planning, and for advocating that the market was the best way to organised modern society. In an early paper entitled "Economics and knowledge" delivered to the London economic Club in 1936, Hayek contended:

> The empirical element in economic theory – the only part which is concerned not merely with implications but with causes and effects and which leads therefore to conclusions which, at any rate in principle, are capable of verification – consists of propositions about the acquisition of knowledge.

6. The following brief account of Hayek I have taken from Peters (2002).
7. For Hayek's two papers on knowledge, along with other full texts, commentary and scholarly articles see: http://www.hayekcenter.org/friedrichhayek/hayek.html.

This insight, in part, he attributes in a footnote to Karl Popper's notion of falsification outlined in the 1935 German edition of *The logic of scientific discovery*, thus indicating a close relationship to his distant cousin that helped to determine the intellectual history of the twentieth century. Hayek provided an analysis of the tautologies that comprise formal equilibrium theory, arguing that the extent that these formal propositions could be filled out with empirical propositions about how we acquire and communicate knowledge determines our understanding of causation in the real world. With that statement he distinguished the formal element of economics as the Pure Logic of Choice – a set of tools for investigating causal processes. The problem he addressed receives its classical formulation in the following question: "How can the combination of fragments of knowledge existing in different minds bring about results which, if they were to be brought about deliberately, would require a knowledge on the part of the directing mind which no single person can possess?" And he proceeds to offer a solution in terms of the now celebrated notion of spontaneous order: "the spontaneous actions of individuals will, under certain conditions which we can define, bring about a distribution of resources which can be understood as if it were made according to a single plan, although nobody has planned it". This is also an answer, he surmises, to the problem of the "social mind".

In 1945 Hayek returns to the problem of knowledge in a paper entitled "The use of knowledge in society" when he poses the problem of constructing a rational economic order and he criticises the approach from an economic calculus which assumes that we all possess the relevant information, start out from a given system of preferences, and command complete knowledge of available means. By contrast, he maintains that the problem is not merely one of how to allocate given resources; rather, "it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality". Hayek emphasises the importance of knowledge of particular circumstances of time and place, which constitutes the unique information which every individual possesses, and he champions practical and contextual or "local" knowledge ("unorganized knowledge") against the scientific or theoretical knowledge, as an understanding of general rules, in economic activity.

This "local knowledge" is the sort of knowledge, he hastens to add, which cannot be made into statistics or conveyed to any central authority.

Hayek's 1945 paper, then, is considered the classic argument against central planning and the state. It is an argument that he develops through the notion of *evolutionary economics*, for he considers the pricing system as an institution that has developed as a means of communicating information where "prices act to coordinate the separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the individual to coordinate the parts of his plan". This he takes to be the central theoretical problem of all social science – as Whitehead puts it – not the habit of thinking what we are doing but the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them, a kind of spontaneous system that has developed as practices and institutions over time. Some have argued that Hayek's genius was to recognize that liberal democracy, science, and the market are such spontaneous self-organising systems, based on the principle of voluntary consent that serve no end beyond themselves (see, for example, DiZerega, 1989).

I have started with Hayek for a number of reasons. First, his work on the economics of knowledge is generally regarded as the starting point for contemporary economics of knowledge and information.[8] Second, Hayek's liberal constitutionalism provided the blueprint for a form of liberalism understood as a critique of state reason which presaged the rationale for restructuring the state during the highpoint of the Thatcher-Reagan era. Third, Hayek was important not only intellectually but also historically and organisationally. In 1947 Hayek set up the very influential Mont Pelerin Society, an international organisation dedicated to restoring classical liberalism and the so-called free society, including its main institution, the free market. Hayek was concerned that even though the Allied powers had defeated the Nazis, liberal government was too welfare-oriented, a situation, he argued, that fettered the free market,

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8. This is not to say that there is general agreement on Hayek's economics of knowledge. See Zappia (1999) who uses Bowles and Gintis' recent survey of "contested exchange economics" to argue for socialist alternatives to the competitive market mechanism in using information.

consumed wealth, and infringed the rights of individuals. With the Mt Pelerin Society Hayek gathered around him a number of thinkers committed to the "free market", including his old colleague Ludwig von Mises as well as some younger American scholars who were to become prominent economists in their own right – Rose and Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and Gary Becker – and who went on to establish the main strands of American conservative, monetarist and neo-liberal economics. Fourth, in education research and policy very little attention has been given by educationalists to economics *per se*, or the economics of education or of knowledge. Indeed, broadly speaking only those who embrace a political economy approach or some variant of it, come close to economic questions, but not in any formal sense do they approach an understanding of neoclassical economics and its contemporary variants or demonstrate either an awareness of the history of economics or its powerful contemporary policy effects in education.[9]

With respect to the economics of knowledge and information today we can tentatively identify at least six important strands, all beginning in the post War period and all but one (i.e., new growth theory) associated with the rise to prominence of the neoclassical second (1960s-70s) and third (1970s–today) Chicago schools.[10]

- The economics of information pioneered by Jacob Marschak (1960, 1974) (and co-workers Miyasawa, and Radner), and George Stigler (1961), who won the Nobel Memorial Prize for his seminal work in the economic theory of information;
- Fritz Machlup (1962, 1970, 1980), who laid the groundwork and developed the economics of the production and distribution of knowledge;

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9. There are exceptions to the rule: Mark Blaug is an influential economist who consistently has worked in the field of education as are Bowles and Gintis, who have been very influential. See the webpage for the recently established Centre for the Economics of Education, funded by the Department of Education and Skills and set up as a partnership by the London School of Economics and the London Institute: Available http://cee.lse.ac.uk/index.html.
10. See the New School site on the Chicago School: Available http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/chicago.htm.

- The application of free-market ideas to education by Milton and Rose Friedman (1962), although Friedman's form of monetarism has become relatively less important;
- The economics of human capital developed first by Theodore Schultz (1963), and later by Gary Becker (e.g., 1964) in New Social Economics;
- Public Choice theory developed under James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962).

Broadly speaking, as with the sociology of knowledge, in the economics of knowledge we can distinguish waves of theory, including first generation, beginning with Hayek. It is also important to distinguish between the economics of knowledge, of information – based on information theory—and of science. Second wave, might be said to consist in the work of Marschak and his colleague Kenneth Arrow, who worked at the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics at the University of Chicago during the 1940s and whose combined work represented a mathematisation or formalisation of economics, and, consequently, an important stage in its epistemological maturity as a social science probably unmatched by sociology. Marschak (1960) employed statistical distribution parameters to describe the demand and supply price of information and he drew on the work of von Neuman in game theory and Shannon's information theory. Arrow worked at the Rand Corporation during the heady days of the emergence of game theory and mathematical programming. He was an advocate for the employment of mathematical models in the social sciences (see, for example, Arrow, 1962). In this regard, we might also mention Shannon's (1948) mathematical theory of communication as a forerunner to information theory and the economics of information. Shannon defined information, identified the critical relationships among elements of a communication system, and defined mathematically how much information could be transmitted over the channels of an ideal communication system, comprised of a source, encoder, channel, decoder, and destination. Work in information economics has been carried further by a new generation of economists, including Stigliz (for popular works, see 1999, 2002).

Third wave, we might gloss over by grouping various Chicago school contributions influenced by Milton Friedman and his brand of ideologically conservative economics. Concurrent third waves might include Machlup's ground-breaking work on the production and distribution of knowledge in the US economy, and Becker's human capital theory, although these research directions proceed from different assumptions and use different methodologies.

New growth theory, which has been championed by the OECD's (1996a,b,c, 1997) studies of the knowledge economy might be said to constitute a fourth wave. New growth theory has highlighted the role of education in the creation of human capital and in the production of new knowledge and explored the possibilities of education-related externalities, not specified by neoclassical theory. The public policy focus on science and technology, in part, reflects a growing consensus in macroeconomics of "new growth" or 'endogenous growth theory', based on the work of Solow (1956, 1994), Lucas (1988), and Romer (1986, 1990, 1994), that the driving force behind economic growth is technological change (i.e., improvements in knowledge about how we transform inputs into outputs in the production process). On this model technological change is *endogenous*, "being determined by the deliberate activities of economic agents acting largely in response to financial incentive" (Snowdon & Vane, 1999, p. 79). The neoclassical growth model developed by Solow assumed technology to be exogenous and therefore available without limitation across the globe. Romer's endogenous growth model, by contrast, demonstrates that technology is not a pure public good for while ideas are *non-rivalrous* they are also partially *excludable* through the legal system and patents. The policy implication is twofold: knowledge about technology and levels of information flow are critical for economic development and can account for differential growth patterns. Knowledge gaps and information deficiencies can retard growth prospects of poor countries, while technology transfer policies can greatly enhance long-term growth rates and living standards.

Tentatively, we might also mention *network economics* and the economics of the Internet as fifth wave, although there are epistemological continuities and overlaps with previous waves. Network

economics focuses on the provision, efficiency and desirability of network services and network-based applications using concepts of interconnection, interoperability and intermediaries.[11] The economics of networks began in the mid 1970s with Roland Artle, Christian Averous, Lyn Squire, and Jeffrey Rohlfs who developed the concept of demand externalities demonstrating the possibility of alternative market allocation. This literature received a renewed impetus after the break-up of AT&T in 1984, and market allocation inefficiencies were linked to consumer expectations and switching costs developed by Michael Katz, Carl Shapiro, Christian van Weizsäcker and Paul Klemperer. By the 1990s the economics of networks helped explain global changes in information industries, following liberalisation of world telecommunications and the development of new forms of dynamic competition, together with their anti-competitive consequences (for example, the unchallenged position of Microsoft in the global software industry). Increasingly, the economics of networks must take on board Internet 2 and the White House's Next Generation Internet Program (see, for example, http://www.ngi.gov/).[12]

Conclusion: After theory, a theory of knowledge capitalism?

In his recent book *After theory*, the British Marxist critic Terry Eagleton (2003) – perhaps the most able literary critic in Britain today—reminds us that Foucault, Lyotard, Deleuze and Said are dead. We are living in the trauma of post-theory. Habermas and Derrida are on their last legs. Their most exciting work was completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Eagleton bravely ventures into the terrain of post-theory, the domain of what I shall call a "metaphysics of life"—death, love, friendship, and faith or spirituality; all the normal stuff of life that cultural studies, since its heyday in the 1970s and 1980s, has managed to safely ignore. Under the influence of Raymond Williams, Richard Hoggart, Stuart Hall, and Perry Anderson (and members of *New Left Review*) British cultural studies

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11. For introductions to the economics of networks see Hal R. Varian's website at http://www.sims.Berkeley.edu/resources/infoecon/.
12. For a detailed history of the Internet, its design, basic and advanced use, key features and security, see http://www.livingintenet.com/i.i.htm.

championed Marxist politics, albeit in a cultural sense. There was a heady mixture of Althusser, early Foucault, and Barthes, alongside Gramsci and more traditional Marxist themes. The working class had lost its theoretical privilege and also its hold on the imagination, and the new generation of theorists had become more motivated by a self-interested politics based on gender, sex, culture and sub-culture.

Eagleton does a superb job explaining this recent disciplinary history, although there is a touch of English back-slapping and self-congratulation—even a cultural smugness—about his portrayal of postmodern theory and his implicit appeal to the tradition of British cultural studies and the Centre for Cultural Studies established at Birmingham University by Hoggart in 1964. The school established at Birmingham, as everyone well knows, numbered among its luminaries not only Hoggart, but also famously, Stuart Hall, Dick Hebdige, Angela McRobbie, and many others. Strangely, Eagleton does not mention that the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies was closed down last year as a result of the latest Research Assessment Exercise. While it attracted many students, the change masters decided that its continuing scholarship was doubtful or at least not sufficient in order to stay its disestablishment.[13]

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13. The text of a letter to the Guardian indicates the shock at its closure, signed and written by a few who attended the school:

Dear Sir,
We are writing to express our shock at the decision to close the Department of Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham. Cultural studies at the University of Birmingham has a worldwide reputation. The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) played a formative role in the emergence of cultural studies as a distinct field of study. Those who studied at the centre have played a major role in the development of cultural studies. Producing key books, and establishing courses and departments around the world. Such has been the impact of this body of work that in overviews of the field, the term "Birmingham School" is often used. To close the department is to squander the benefits of this legacy and to turn a blind eye to the substantial benefits that a reputation can confer. We hope the university can be persuaded to reconsider this decision.

The signatories to this letter were all students, staff or close associates of CCCS at the University of Birmingham (available http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/news/story/0,9830,757490,00.html).

What I find objectionable about Eagleton's book is its tacit appeal to a cultural Marxism which, itself, is untheorised. Insofar as it surfaces explicitly, it does so wearing the dress of the 1970s. Marxist theory itself is never examined; it is simply assumed as a kind of yardstick or background — the old commonsense. Yet what we desperately need, perhaps more than any other time in contemporary history, is theory — a big theory of the knowledge economy or global knowledge capitalism. And this theory is likely to be Marxist in spirit, although with modifications to attune it to the exigencies of twenty-first century conditions. It will be a theory peculiar to our interests as academics, as writers, and as educators, and it is curious that for a condition that engulfs us and determines our institutions and subjectivities we should have so little to say about it.

The shape of theory of knowledge capitalism, if I am permitted to forecast a few sociological futures and the basis of past successes, will be based on the classical understanding shared by Marx, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger that knowledge and the value of knowledge is rooted in social relations. It will also argue, in line with these thinkers, for the priority of practical knowledge and practical reason over theoretical knowledge and theoretical reason. The primacy of the practical and, indeed, of *practices* in general, gels with other important trends in social and cultural theory. It distinguishes the first generation, and especially Bell, from later generations of sociologists in their analyses of the knowledge society and it picks up on Polyani's fundamental insight concerning *tacit* knowledge — how theoretical knowledge often depends upon personal or cultural knowledge that cannot be analysed as propositional knowledge nor easily codified. Along with this privileging of practical knowledge, of practice *per se*, we can acknowledge the practical and theoretical advances that have come with the historicisation or socialisation or operationalisation of epistemology. Equipped with these assumptions fourth generation sociology of knowledge will be able to theorise knowledge networks in the service of equitable social and economic development and defend the future of ideas of the intellectual commons in a interconnected world.

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Michael Peters is Professor of Education at the University of Glasgow and the University of Auckland. He has research interests in educational theory and policy, and in contemporary philosophy, and has published many articles and books on these topics.

Creating a New Zealand-Styled *Fa'a-Samoa*: Samoan Identity in Christchurch

Susan J. Wurtzburg

Abstract

Results of social research with members of the Christchurch Samoan community are presented here. The people interviewed discussed conceptualisations of ethnic identity in which personal needs were sublimated to family concerns, although many of the younger New Zealand-born study participants emphasised their opposition to these "traditional" mores. The influence of New Zealand-born Polynesians has dramatically increased the diversity of cultures derived from the Pacific Islands; resulting in a wider range of social customs, languages and linguistic prowess present in New Zealand. Despite this state of affairs, Samoans living in Christchurch still experience social pressure stemming from the expectations that group concerns should prevail over those of the individual. Many of these "traditional" expectations have been transplanted to New Zealand creating increased stress for contemporary young members of the Samoan community. This paper demonstrates the range of Samoan identities present in Christchurch and suggests that public policy emphasising rigid protocols and static community norms may not provide adequate representation for the variation present in the New Zealand Samoan community.

Introduction

The research reported here is part of a larger project which deals with the interplay between beliefs and behaviours concerning ethnicity, gender, domestic violence, and conflict resolution. The larger project focused on Pacific (Islands) people and how they may adapt Polynesian concepts and behaviour to a New Zealand context (Wurtzburg, 2000a, 2000b, 2003a, 2003b). In the course of this work, detailed information was obtained about how some members of the Christchurch Samoan community conceptualise their ethnic identity and how this connects with individual needs and family concerns. These data are worthy of separate analysis and presentation, given the paucity of academic

reports on the Christchurch Pacific communities. The focus is on examining how "particular historical accounts are used as tools in the *contemporary* creation of identities" (Eriksen, 2002, pp. 71-72; emphasis in the original) and the data on which the analysis is based are individuals' narratives about their lives. I begin with the theoretical considerations underpinning the research.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is challenging to define and difficult to understand; this is well attested in the extensive sociological and anthropological literature (e.g., Eriksen, 2002; Hutchinson & Smith, 1996; Linnekin & Poyer, 1990; Parker & Song, 2001; Thompson, 2003; Titus, 1996). For the purposes of this research, "the term 'ethnicity' denotes both the self-consciousness of belonging to an ethnic group ('ethnic identity') and the dynamic process that structures, and is structured by, ethnic groups in social interaction with one another" (Hall, 2002, p 9). Ethnic groups are cohesive social units bound by similarity of inherited and socialised traits, which may include physical appearance, kinship alliances, history, origin, language, religion, and other bodies of shared customs or beliefs. At the same time, ethnic boundaries typically are permeable to some degree, and people may highlight selected aspects of their ethnic repertoire to suit particular occasions. This means that ethnicity may be manipulated in order to serve varied individual or group purposes. When individuals seem to shift their ethnic identity – for example, concentrating on their "Samoan" self rather than their "New Zealand-born" identity – it can be disorienting for others, often resulting in considerable miscommunication and misunderstanding (Anae, 2001; Bedford & Didham, 2001; Crichton-Hill & Wurtzburg, 2003).

In this paper I focus on ethnicity and the ways in which Samoans living in Christchurch may maintain their "Samoan" characteristics. The investigation deals with the two processes underlying ethnic identification, specifically: (1) insider affiliation and reliance on cultural traits for the demonstration of ethnicity, and (2) ethnic self-definition as a result of communication with those who are "different" – contact with the "other." These conceptions of ethnicity fit definitions currently employed by many New Zealand sociologists and anthropologists (e.g.,

Dupuis, Hughes, Lauder & Strathdee, 1999; Macpherson, Spoonley & Anae, 2001; Spoonley, 1995).

As part of the investigation, I inquired of research participants how they determined their own ethnicity, and what characteristics they considered essential to maintaining this identity. "Since ethnic groups ... exist only insofar as people recognize their existence, their existence must be continually reinforced and restated by acts that communicate the continued salience of the categories" (Harrell, 2001, p. 33). Generally participants placed primacy on traits that related to the family and to broader social groups, rather than on traits which pertained only to individuals. This finding fits well with the broad generalisation that among Polynesians "relationships are inclusive and people go to great lengths both to remain inside the boundaries of community definition and to hold or draw others in there too" (Ritchie & Ritchie, 1979, p. 22). Anthropologists and sociologists dealing with Pacific communities sometimes use the term "collectivism" to describe this social emphasis on working together in a manner that fosters group goals, although they may also document the phenomenon without actually applying this term. ("Collectivism" and its opposite, "individualism" have a lengthy history in psychology [Abrams & Hogg, 2001; Gouveia, Clemente & Espinosa, 2003; Singelis & Brown, 1995; Triandis & Singelis, 1998; Voronov & Singer, 2002].) For example, in the influential volume *Cultural identity and ethnicity in the Pacific*, Linnekin and Poyer (1990, p. 6) present "an Oceanic theory of cultural identity that privileges environment, behaviour, and situational flexibility over descent, innate characteristics, and unchanging boundaries." Oceanic identity systems (based on collective values) are contrasted with Western models (supported by an ethic of individualism), which focus more on ancestral links resulting in more fixed and bounded group membership. Both the Oceanic-collective framework and the Western-individual one are envisaged as two opposed templates arranged along a continuum of difference.

Recent research among the New Zealand and North American Samoan communities has provided further documentation of the strong differences between collective-based and individual-focused social groups, although most authors have not used these terms. In a Seattle-based study, McGrath (2002) uses the metaphor of "communities" to

describe the different lifeways of Samoan family-based groups living in the city and the diverse conceptualisations of identity underpinning these behaviours. Many of the factors important to community cohesion help to sustain collective values, such as social and religious hierarchies, journeys, and international connections. Earlier research, in California, also demonstrated similar patterns in the development of "urban villages", based on church congregations (e.g., Ablon, 1970; Janes, 1990).

While most American immigration from Samoa tends to be from American Samoa, in New Zealand most Samoan immigration is from Samoa (formerly Western Samoa). However this broad generalisation is confounded by the reality that many individuals have family connections in both islands and also on both sides of the Pacific.

In New Zealand, contemporary research dealing with Samoan identity has mainly been conducted in Auckland (e.g., Anae 1997, 2001, 2002; Macpherson, 2002; papers in Macpherson, Spoonley, & Anae, 2001; Schmidt, 2002), with some work in Wellington (e.g., Levine, 2003; Tupuola, 1998). Fine-grained analyses of the North Island communities are aided by the quantity of research and also by its temporal depth (e.g., Pitt & Macpherson, 1974; Rowland, 1973; Trlin, 1973). Unfortunately, little attention has been directed toward South Island residents of Samoan origin and their ethnic characterisation, which is the focus of this paper.

Most researchers dealing with diasporic communities at some point consider the issue of cultural change versus cultural conservatism (this issue is well discussed by Levine [2003] and by authors in Macpherson et al. [2001]). Levine concludes that "to better understand ... cultural stability and changes and their impacts on identity we need analyses of a wider, more representative sample of data, one that is linked to finer understandings of the social, cultural, personal and historical situation of New Zealand Samoans and their communities" (Levine, 2003, p. 184). Interestingly, despite this conclusion, Levine admits that he recruited the 20 informants who participated in his Wellington research through a snowball sampling method (based on social networks), which suggests that these interviews do not fully represent the wider community's views. This is a general concern for much community research conducted in New Zealand and certainly for my project as well (which is why I explain below the context of my research and provide some general data about

participants and how they were recruited).

Despite the over-reliance on snowball sampling methods in New Zealand, generally most research with the contemporary diasporic Samoan communities does manage to document a diverse range of behaviours and identity descriptions. For example, Macpherson is able to describe individuals whose:

> identities ... have begun to diverge from those of their parents and from one another. General agreement on the nature of identity is now more difficult to obtain: in place of *a* Samoan or *a* Tongan identity, one finds *various* Samoan and Tongan identities. These in turn are nested within an emerging Pacific identity which embodies certain common experiences of growing up as a person of Pacific descent in Aotearoa and which reflects the dynamic reality of being a Pacific person in a complex society" (Macpherson, 2001, p. 67; emphasis in the original).

While Macpherson and other authors in the same publication point to increasing identity differences among the New Zealand Pacific communities, Anae reaches slightly different conclusions (also discussed in Levine, 2003). She maintains that "it is precisely *because of* formal education, changing personal networks, upward mobility, ethnic intermarriage, language loss, changing socio-economic conditions, and geographical dispersal that, despite the 'time outs' during their identity journeys, many New Zealand-borns maintain a strong Samoan identity" (2001, p. 117; emphasis in the original).

Levine (2003, p. 183) reconciles these two viewpoints by suggesting that they reflect the different "foci" of the researchers rather than actual "disagreement" about the nature of the Auckland Samoan community. It is also possible to understand the discrepancies as being the result of philosophical differences in the researchers' approaches to taxonomic structures. There is no agreed cut-off point for how much trait change is needed before a category, in this case "identity," is registered as "new" and "different." This difficulty in defining continuity versus transformation is a challenging one, both in the context of Samoan identity classification, and in other situations, such as language categorisation or species taxonomy. Scholars in linguistics and physical anthropology have been arguing these issues for years and still have

not reached general consensus in their fields, which suggests that researchers analysing Samoan diasporic identity will take some time to attain complete agreement with each other.

Before I discuss further how this continuity-transformation contrast may operate for Samoan people settled in Christchurch, I turn to the methods used in this research.

Methods

The research reported in this paper is based on approximately five years of participant-observation at several Christchurch agencies which counter domestic violence. During this time I met with the organisers of Pacific services and with individual members of the Christchurch Samoan community. Part of the investigation also took place in Apia, Samoa. My interactions were documented in field notes, and also in formal tape-recorded interviews with 24 adults who defined themselves as Samoan. The 24 Samoan research participants ranged in age from their early 20s to mid-60s; five of them were men. These interview transcripts are cited in order to present people's accounts in their own words, which is a conscious attempt to give their "muted voices" representation in this work (as recommended and followed by Behar, 1996; Behar & Gordon, 1995; Chamberlayne, Bornat & Wengraf, 2000; Stewart & Strathern, 2000).

With respect to the people interviewed, the methodology was constrained by several factors, including the relatively small size of the Christchurch Samoan population, and the extreme sensitivity of enquiring about domestic violence. I used a "snowball sampling" method (involving social networks), whereby I asked people whom I interviewed to help me in finding other people who would be willing to be consulted. Similar strategies have been used by other researchers to locate potential participants for research dealing with topics such as sexuality, child discipline, identity, and the health effects of communal housing (Howden-Chapman et al., 2000; Schoeffel & Meleisea, 1996; Tupuola, 1996). I now turn to the results of the research.

Samoan ethnicity in New Zealand

In my interviews I asked how people defined their ethnicity. Some individuals found this an easy question to answer, but for others their

response was complicated by emotional uncertainties relating to belonging, to how others might view them, and to other matters. While often people acknowledged a multiethnic background in their conversation, interestingly, in my study, no one initially defined themselves as belonging to more than one Pacific group, although some born in New Zealand or Australia incorporated other aspects of dual identity. Patricia's response provides insight into her attempt to balance these considerations: "I have a very European view, but [I] also maintain my culture and Pacific Island sense."[1]

Performing ethnicity may be simplified by the fact that the Pacific communities in New Zealand are of fairly recent origin. Only occasional island immigrants settled here prior to World War II, although the numbers have soared since 1951, when only 3,600 Polynesians were New Zealand residents (Crocombe, 1992). By 1996, 5.6 percent of the New Zealand population defined themselves as Pacific Islander; this was the result of immigration augmented by high birth rates (Statistics New Zealand, 1997, 1999). As a consequence of natural increase, many Polynesians now share the identity of being "New Zealand-born." For example, in the early 1990s approximately 50% of the Samoans who were living here were born in the North or South Island (Statistics New Zealand, 1995). In the 1996 census, 56% of the Samoans who identified a birthplace indicated that they were New Zealand born (Bedford & Didham, 2001). This may not always be recognised by *Palaagi* New Zealanders (non-Pacific or European people), and a comment by Riona – a Samoan woman whose children were born here – is illustrative: "[My daughter] describes her ethnicity as Samoan, Irish, and Scottish ... and New Zealand-born because this is her birthplace." It has been claimed that the influence of New Zealand-born Polynesians has dramatically increased the diversity of cultures in New Zealand.

> In Island societies, the elders' control of access to land and other resources had given them considerable power. In Aotearoa, where the control of access to land, resources and or employment resided with others, their influence and control were reduced,

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1. For safety and privacy reasons, all the individuals who I interviewed were given pseudonyms to protect their identities.

while those of other groups within the enclaves grew" (Macpherson, 2001, p. 73).

Many of the people whom I interviewed mentioned the range of Pacific customs, languages and linguistic prowess present in New Zealand, despite the general conception among *Palaagi* New Zealanders that these various communities can be adequately categorised and accurately understood simply by grouping them all together as Pacific Islanders. For example, a Samoan woman, Fagamalama, living in Christchurch stated that, "[in New Zealand] we [are] all lumped together as Pacific Islanders, but we all have different ways of doing things, different languages [and] different cultures."

Considerable effort may be expended to demonstrate and maintain one's distinctive cultural background, since it has implications for the socio-economic health of both the group and the individual. For example research from California has shown that "'staying Tongan' means maintaining one's identity as a Tongan, but more important, it also means thinking and behaving in a Tongan manner – what Tongans call the 'Tongan way' (*anga fakatonga*)" (Small, 1997, pp. 171-172).

On occasion, differences between the overseas-born and the island-born are dramatically manifested in a single family. A typical case is one in which parents who were born overseas migrate to New Zealand but still regard themselves as retaining their island ethnicity while their children consider themselves New Zealanders, at least to some degree. Lisi points out differences in viewpoints between island-educated children and their New Zealand-born siblings: "My eldest brother was brought up by my grandparents in Samoa, and [me and] my other brother [were] ... brought up here [New Zealand] ... I grew up with ... predominately European friends ... so ... I suppose I was a New Zealander."

There may be differences in addition to those relating to language, national origin, or place of birth. This multi-identity trend may be further augmented or fragmented when people move every few years. Eleni's situation would not be unusual; she recounted that: "I'm sort-of from all over: Palmerston, overseas, Australia, States, all over. I was born in Auckland, and my family migrated [to Samoa] when I was four [since]

my father's Samoan. [Then I was in Samoa for] eleven or twelve years."

Pacific settlement in New Zealand is also characterised by different regional patterns. The resident Pacific community differs dramatically depending on which city is under consideration. Auckland and Wellington have much higher numbers of resident Pacific people than do centres such as Christchurch or Dunedin, while Wellington also has proportionally higher numbers of Samoans in comparison to Dunedin's Polynesian population (Statistics New Zealand, 1997). These two types of variation – namely the percentage of Pacific people in the urban population and the various proportions of the different Pacific groups in the city – mean that the New Zealand Pacific communities exhibit strong regional differences from one another. In turn, the specific urban context influences people's interactions. With reference to Christchurch, Patricia remarked that "the [Pacific] communities ... work very well together."

Another important issue with regard to Pacific settlement in New Zealand is that people often move around the country. As they change locations, their ethnic identity may alter to fit the context in which they find themselves. For example, as cited above, Lisi mentioned that "in Dunedin, we didn't have many Samoans at all, and I grew up with ... predominantly European friends." However, she remembered that "I was quite young when we shifted here [Christchurch], about nine ... and there were so many Samoans ... and ... I had more Polynesian friends."

Generally, it can be concluded that the Pacific community both in Christchurch in particular and New Zealand in general is characterised by much diversity and variation (Macpherson & Macpherson, 1999; Macpherson et al., 2001; Schmidt, 2002). This was recognised and clearly articulated by Lisi when she said: "it's very hard for one Samoan to comment on their experience and say that that's the experience of all Samoans 'cause everyone is different." Some community members may cling to the past, while other constituents of the group may develop completely new views, behaviours, and customs. The resulting diversity in the overseas community makes it difficult to fix cultural norms, since they may only hold for a subset of the group. However, despite these challenges, there were some general trends identified by the people whom I interviewed (see also Wurtzburg, 2003a, 2003b).

Here I examine a portion of the interview data which deals with people's considerations of their lives in New Zealand and how they balance the New Zealand stress on individuality with Samoan traditions which emphasise responsibilities to the family and the community. Cultural norms are absorbed in childhood during socialisation and incorporation into the kin group. During this developmental period, children are encouraged to position themselves within the culturally-endorsed range of behaviour along the individualism-collectivism continuum (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 2001; Singelis & Brown, 1995; Triandis & Singelis, 1998). Some groups may allow a broader range of variation, while other groups may be more restrictive about the degree of variation that will be tolerated. Later events as a child matures into adulthood may serve either to confirm or to challenge this cultural programming. Clearly, a greater degree of challenge will apply to children or adults who immigrate to another country (Myers, 1999). New migrants may choose to re-situate themselves on the individualism-collectivism spectrum, and different family members may end up having quite different outlooks as a result (Linnekin & Poyer, 1990; Macpherson et al., 2001). Obviously, this discussion oversimplifies complicated interactions and removes emotional and psychological reactions from the equation. It is assumed that the reality is considerably more confused and variable than can be shown here. I now examine Samoan collectivistic concerns, namely obligations to the extended family group and other supporting structures, before examining evidence of more individualistic leanings that also surface with immigration to New Zealand.

Collective commitments and responsibilities

A community based on collective principles encourages its members to value and honour group goals above individual aims. When people spoke about their commitments and responsibilities to the group, their narratives tended to concentrate on social structures which connected them to others. They often seemed to envisage their lives in collective terms, and spoke about functioning within a kinship network, with religious, financial and other obligations. Similar observations have been made about other diasporic Samoan communities. For example, Seattle

"Samoans' evaluations of behavior tend to be more sociocentric than egocentric, emphasizing the social effects over the causes of the actions or the personal motivations" (McGrath, 2002, p. 322). Here I discuss several linkages, beginning with the connections from New Zealand back to the island homeland.

Island Connections

Many of the people whom I interviewed were surprised by how long they had remained in New Zealand. For example, Fagamalama stated: "I feel embarrassed ... that I've lived ... longer in New Zealand than I have in my own country [Samoa]." Her emotions were not unusual. From people's narratives, it seemed that often immigrants did not intend to stay here, but somehow they ended up with relationships, family members, and other responsibilities in the new country which ensured that they remain.

There were a range of responses to my inquiry about possible plans for an eventual return to island homelands. Some of the people interviewed expressed the desire to return eventually to their island of birth or the island of their parents' birth, whereas others firmly stated that they would only visit and had no intention of moving back permanently. For example, Marlene recounted how her "grandmother has ... always been opposed to ... going back."

Despite spending extended periods of time in New Zealand, most immigrants interviewed in the study still had extensive connections with and accountability to family members in the islands. Small (1997) summarised these responsibilities with regard to Tongans living in the United States:

> Those who stayed in Tonga must caretake the assets of those who left. They look after land. They tend houses or care for relatives left behind. They send traditional wealth overseas, and they offer overseas kin a place of importance and comfort when they return to visit. They also receive the hundreds of children sent back to Tonga each year from the United States, New Zealand, and Australia.

> Migrants shoulder different responsibilities. They must continue to send back money and goods to their island kin. They support

village projects. They help other islanders to make the trip overseas, and arrange housing, sponsorship, and work for new arrivals (Small, 1997, p. 196).

In my research, members of the Christchurch Samoan community reported similar types of responsibilities. Gabrielle provided a typical account when she said, "My aunties ... came ... to New Zealand, and left us ... in the islands ... looking after the ... land for them." John exemplified the responsibilities of immigrants as he told me, "[when] I was in Samoa last year, my sister said she needed to fence our land in the village. ... So I sent a [shipment] of fence wire. ... [It was] very expensive."

The financial remittances sent by overseas family members back to the various islands are contributions connected with and reflecting family responsibilities. As a result of the remittance economy, immigrants to New Zealand may find it difficult to save the funds necessary for mortgages, hire-purchases, and other financial transactions. Helen told me that "you have this wonderful budget that works until someone dies the next week." With a death, overseas relatives may be approached for funds or materials for the funeral or associated ceremonial proceedings (Ablon, 1970; Yamamoto, 1997). Celebrations of marriages, graduations, or other events may also require pooled family resources (Macpherson & Macpherson, 1999; Pitt & Macpherson, 1974). This socio-economic pressure can be difficult for overseas family, since many Samoans are both regarded by others and consider themselves to be responsible for the well-being of their island communities even if they do reside in a different country. Still, some people with whom I spoke strove to put limits on the amount of financial assistance that they sent overseas. For example, Roina explained that "I would never ... go to the extreme of ... her [teenage daughter in Christchurch] going without and sending all the money to Samoa." All these considerations bear on how people structure their lives and their families once they settle in New Zealand.

Family connections
Not only are there kinship connections and responsibilities linking people back to the island homelands, there are also structures which have

been relocated to New Zealand, and these are often re-enacted in somewhat different form in the new country. Research with Samoan groups – whether in Seattle, USA or Auckland, New Zealand – demonstrates the special significance of family (Macpherson et al., 2001; McGrath, 2002; Sua'ali'i, 2001). This statement also holds for most members of the Christchurch Samoan community, who often discussed family connections and pointed to their altered structures in New Zealand. For example, Lorraine said "here [in New Zealand] ... [you are] the head of your own little household. You are the *matai* [chief], not by means of bestowing a title name, but because you are the father." These transplanted restructured customs may be difficult for New Zealand-born children to follow, as indicated in the following account by Luisa: "Our culture is really difficult. I mean just because he's [her father is] the chief in the family ... we have to do what he says ... He has to realise this is New Zealand." Other people also spoke about strong parental prohibitions on the behaviour of their children. For example, Lisi recounted how "Mum would always say ... 'respect your Father' ... You don't talk back to your parents, and if you do, that's seen as being cheeky or disrespectful. It's *Palaagi* influence!" Sometimes prohibitions were indicated clearly in behaviour that I observed, such as, to mention just one instance, Gabrielle's interactions with her children, characterised by staccato commands for the youngsters "not" to do things. However in this case, parental control over children may continue for their lifetime. Laulu expounded that "although you are grown up, and [you have] become parents, you are still under [your parents] or you still respect your elders. Your parents are [the] priority of anything." Recognition of age-related status is implicit in Lisi's statement that "respect for elders is very important within our [Samoan] culture. If I was disrespectful in any way toward my older siblings ... I would be disciplined."

The following are revealing with regard to dealing with parents and following other customs. Laulu lamented that "the New Zealand-born children do not look to the [Samoan] culture as important as the adults 'cause they haven't ... lived in it. They only look at it with their New Zealand eyes." However for New Zealand-born individuals who return to the islands, lapses in customary etiquette may be both noticed and

commented on, as Gabrielle makes clear: "She was brought up in Samoa and she forgot [the customs] ... It's a little bit shame[ful] you know to go back and to forget about the customs." Tradition is not just important in the abstract, but it must be enacted correctly.

In the context of speaking about family there was much discussion about marriage and how differently it is conceptualised in many of the islands. Typically, it is an event of significance to the whole extended kinship group – rather than just the individuals involved – since it serves to unite both families. For example, Lorraine said that "when you are married, you are married to the whole family. You are not married as an individual to another individual."

Marriage also results in expanded generational commitments and responsibilities since parents provide aid to children, even when the children may be adults themselves. Gabrielle explained how "your parents [are] a good support for you [especially] if you have problems with your husband. You will be going back and ... your father and mother ... will accept you with open arms ... So you got to keep ... that good relationship with your mum and dad."

Much of the discussion about family emphasised respect and the importance of the family's good name. At times, especially when the conversation was about domestic violence, the additional consideration of bringing shame to the family name was included. Lisi said "everything you do reflects on the whole family ... the church and ... the wider community. So, if you do good, that's wonderful ... At the same time, if it was someone who was in prison for domestic violence or something, then it's a great shame." For this reason, Samoan women may make the decision for some purposes to deal instead with non-Samoan individuals and institutions because, as Helen reminded me, "at least when you deal with *Papaalagi*, they don't know who your family is and they can't make the connections ... Sometimes, Samoan women prefer to deal with the New Zealand-born for the same reason." As is well attested in the anthropological literature, gossip holds people to social norms and that is true here as well. A typical account, by Gabrielle, explains that "some of the Samoan women ... [are] so gossipy ... So ... they think it's better to go and talk to a real *Papaalangi*, not to a ... real

Samoan." Similar responses also were recorded in Tupuola's (1996) research in New Zealand and research in a Tongan community in California (Small, 1997).

The family orientation in "Pacific ways" was also evident in discussions about food. Laulu contrasted the cooking arrangements in Samoa with those found in New Zealand in the following account: "[In Samoa], they all eat from one source of food, one *umu*, the oven. They all cook together and eat from that ... But here in New Zealand ... you live in ... your own little house and ... you cook for your own self instead of cooking for everybody."

In addition to culinary or provisioning responsibilities, people spoke about other tasks that must be performed for parents or other family members. Helen said "it's the obligations to church [and] to family which they impose on themselves, and are imposed on others." Luisa referred to "my [Samoan] culture, no matter how young you are, or got children, or ... married, you still have to give [money] ... to your parents. And they'll say things like 'you'll go to hell if you don't.'" Incorporation into the system of reciprocal obligations can result in strong resentment on the part of children born or educated overseas who have not been fully socialised into these island financial and emotional commitments. Luisa, who arrived in New Zealand at the age of nine, enviously mentioned "some Europeans ... get to spend their own money, not giving any to [their] parents." Another Samoan woman in reactions to family commitments posted on the web-site "Polynesian café," wrote "I'm Samoan and married to a Samoan guy, but I feel that with all my education and 'Americanized' up-bringing ... I find myself wanting to move away from family ... because of the obligations that come with living near family" (Schyland, 1997).

In the context of speaking about family relationships, many parents spoke about their children's ethnicity. Often they approved of the choices made by offspring, as in Maiava's account: "our children ... need to identify themselves as New Zealand-born." At other times, parents found their children's choice of ethnicity baffling. Laulu said "with the New Zealand-born, they're just not interested in it [Samoan things] ... which is another frustration to the parents because every parent's dream

is for their children to follow them." Additional connections to family are often expressed in residential choices on arrival in a new country, and I turn to these ties now.

Residential connections

Many people spoke about their residential arrangements, which differed from those in the island homelands, but also tended to be more communal than typical New Zealand households. Helen said "instead of living in your extended family in the village, you're suddenly living [isolated] in a flat in Hoon Hay [district of Christchurch]." Lorraine told me that "here [in Christchurch] ... you live in your own little room ... and it's hard because it's not an open space like back home. I can see what's happening there, in that *fale* [house] ... I can't see what's happening here. It's the four walls, locked in." Laulu pointed to the benefits and disadvantages of New Zealand housing when he said that "[in New Zealand] you have the house to your own ... You are your own boss ... and if a crisis happen to you, you have no one to turn to because the family is not there to help out." These comments need to be considered in their New Zealand context. In 1991, "16 percent of Pacific Island women lived in households with two or more families ... compared with 10 percent of Maori women, 8 percent of women from other ethnic groups and only 2 percent of European/Pakeha women" (Statistics New Zealand, 1993, p. 49). According to the 1996 Census, almost a quarter of the New Zealand Samoan population lived in crowded homes (Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs, 1999).

Communal living may be partly an economic strategy, and partly a protective device for surviving the challenges of the New Zealand emphasis on individuality (Howden-Chapman et al., 2000). Marlene reminded me that "generally, you provide for the family, not ... ask for something for yourself." This matter of whether or not one provides for the family is a major problem for those who act in some manner which warrants people's disapproval and thus suffer the community's sanctions. This happened to Eleni, who said, "the family is supposed to help you, but I just got to a point. At this stage ... I don't actually have any family to help me ... I'm in a pretty embarrassing situation ... two kids and not married." Similarly, Gabrielle told me that "it's much different

here because I've got no parents here ... No one to know here." In the case of Gabrielle, she had additional challenges with settling easily in Christchurch because of her difficulties with spoken English. This can be a problem for many new immigrants from Samoa and I now turn to pertinent material regarding language.

Linguistic connections

Discussion of language played a role in all conversations about ethnicity. The Samoan language may be used to demonstrate Samoan identity by people living in New Zealand (e.g., Anae, 2001; Hunkin-Tuiletufuga, 2001). Linguistic ability is a crucial factor since "it is ... an important aspect of cultural competence in its own right and not an arbitrary ethnic symbol" (Eriksen, 2002, p. 138). Several of the following statements attest to the importance of language among those I interviewed – both as a symbol of identity in the case of Samoan and for functioning in New Zealand in the case of English. Roina said "I ... speak Samoan a lot. I try to participate in all the cultural things that I can and when I do I become a total Samoan." Telefoni reiterated that "you really have to make sure that you maintain your identity and know where your roots are, know where you come from and know where you belong ... I speak to you in English but my mind is telling me in Samoa[n]."

With reference to functioning in English, difficulties in understanding may make for an arduous settlement process. Fagamalama's comments reflect this well:

I found it really difficult when I first came [to New Zealand] ... I used to listen very carefully to what the woman that was training me was saying because I used to translate it into Samoan and then try and put it back into English and see whether I understood what she was saying ... I could read ... and write English very well, but it was actually the speaking and listening because you're not used to listening ... Also, the accent. Because you thought you could speak English very well, but hearing it from a New Zealander ... was quite difficult for me.

Functioning in a new linguistic environment is particularly challenging for people who immigrate to New Zealand as adults. In this regard, Gabrielle told me about her difficulties in coping in Christchurch. She

lamented that "Samoan people ... don't even speak ... English very well ... Samoan people ... feel embarrassed to speak ... English."

The language complications may create difficulties for communication between generations of the family. Helen recounted "the frustration of sometimes having children who can't speak Samoan, and parents who can't speak English." This problem was also mentioned in an interview with Laulu, who stated that "we ... tried to teach them [the children] how to speak Samoan and how to listen [as] Samoans, but when they first went to school [in New Zealand], they got ... frustrated." This type of situation is also frustrating from the perspective of children educated in New Zealand. Elaine told me that "it's hard when your parents speak a different language."

Occasionally people spoke about successful family strategies which resulted in bilingual children. Lisi recalled of her father that "even though he's been here a long time, he doesn't speak English that well ... but ... at home you speak Samoan." In this way, she managed to learn both languages, although her father was still linguistically disadvantaged in interactions with the non-Samoan community in New Zealand. This can be problematic for parents as Helen recounted: "They're poor. They're unqualified, uneducated to a particular standard that is required in New Zealand. They may be hugely educated in terms of their genealogy and cultural things here [in Samoa], but their status in that new society is as a manual labourer migrant ... It's low." Difficulties in integrating to a new society may increase the importance of island structures which allow people to feel comfortable in the new environment, such as the familiarity of church services or religious observances.

Church connections

Many people emphasised the importance of the church to their lives. This is a not unusual finding among New Zealand Samoan communities today or in the recent past (e.g., Anae, 2002; Pitt & Macpherson, 1974; Taule'ale'ausumai, 2001). Lisi's account is typical: "one thing I always associated with being Samoan was church." In a new land, participation in religious services and activities may help provide unity of purpose to Pacific people who may be from different nations with different

languages. Helen whom I interviewed in Samoa suggested that "from my own experience in Wellington, I know people rely on the church minister to compensate for the absence of the other networks that they would normally have [in Samoa]." Lisi informed me that: "In New Zealand, your village is actually your church ... If you ... met another Samoan, you work out where they're from through the church. If you go back to the islands, it's 'what village are you from?'" The correlation of church with village is also reported for Samoans in the USA, as well as New Zealand (e.g., Janes, 1990; Levine, 2003; Meleisea & Schoeffel, 1998).

In addition to people gaining strength from religious beliefs, they also may be asked for financial contributions to support church initiatives. It is a network entailing commitments and responsibilities. Taniela said "Samoans will give money to the church, and a lot of times, it's outside their means." However, some ministers are sensitive to this issue. For example, Telefoni remarked that "a lot of people, they look at the church as their top priority. But I always say to them, 'you're wrong. You know, if we have things in the church that we have to pay and you know you cannot do it because you have to feed your kids. Now, the church is second priority. Your family is top priority.'"

Given all the elements that pull Polynesians toward group commitments, namely: church, language, residence, family, and connections to island homelands, it is interesting to consider how Samoans view the New Zealand focus on individual achievement and responsibility. I now turn to this issue, with the caveat that the people whom I interviewed often described these supposedly individualistic processes in very communal terms, which suggests that their conceptualisations of the individual were quite different from those prevalent among non-Pacific New Zealanders.

Negotiating individuality in New Zealand

Probably the most frequent individual trait that was mentioned by people whom I interviewed was that of respect. Lisi (quoted above) suggested that "if you ... talk back to your parents ... that's seen as being cheeky or disrespectful. It's *Palaagi* influence." These strictures concerning behaviour refer to that of the individual; however their conceptualisation

is communal in nature.

Politeness as appropriate behaviour for dealing with others was stressed in many interviews. Gabrielle told me that "the best law in Samoa is you got to be polite." Lisi said "Samoans are very polite and courteous people and ... they'll be very polite and courteous to you." She connected this politeness to methods of disciplining children with the information that "if a child of mine was rude, or did something they weren't supposed to, I'd slap it on the hand perhaps." (There were many remarks about disciplining children, but this material will not be covered here.)

Shame was also a frequently mentioned topic, and it, too, was discussed in terms of how the family would be affected. For example, Gabrielle sadly repeated to me the words of her father, spoken when she left her husband: "Shame on you. You put the family down. You put the name of the family down." Once again, a very individual reaction is processed in terms of how that individual relates to their family, rather than in terms of an isolated actor confronting the world, which might be more typical of European New Zealander's views.

The issue of finances was mentioned earlier in other contexts. It is interesting to re-consider the topic of money in this context, and to that end I repeat Luisa's account (quoted earlier): "some Europeans ... get to spend their own money, not giving any to [their] parents." Children who were born or educated in New Zealand tended to see financial matters as personal issues, whereas those who migrated to New Zealand as adults were more likely to view finances as family matters. This topic exposed a tremendous generational gap between parents and their children.

A generational gap also was apparent in discussions of oratory. New Zealand-born Polynesians did not discuss public speaking, whereas it was mentioned on several occasions by those born in the islands. Telefoni said "in Samoa, they have meetings within the village community where they have chiefs and orators." Lorraine's explained: "there are ... two types of *matai*; one is the speaking *matai*, and one is not ... The orators who are speaking will ask the guidance of the chief." Historically, oratory is strongly connected with a family's genealogical connections and

current hierarchical position with relationship to other families (Meleisea, 1995).

The topics discussed above are considered by many non-Polynesians to be individual concerns. However, as presented here, many Samoan people would view these issues as pertaining more to family responsibilities than to personal rights. Exceptions to this generalisation tended to be expressed by some of the New Zealand-born or New Zealand-educated Samoans whom I interviewed.

Conclusions

The statements recounted in this paper both represent and provide insights into Samoan views of ethnicity and the means by which some Christchurch community members may subscribe to collective views and behaviour in some instances and to the tenets of individualism and personal responsibility in others. (These issues and their implications for domestic violence and New Zealand laws are discussed in Wurtzburg, 2000a, 2003a.)

These conversations about ethnicity in Christchurch demonstrate support for using the term "identities" for the range of variation considered to be "Samoan" by the research participants. At the same time, there was a core of key features which appeared in most people's considerations of identity. These core notions of Samoan identity are presented here by the metaphor of "connections," specifically linkages maintained with the island homeland, and through family, residence, religion, and language. Based on these data, there is support for the suggestion that Samoan identity in Christchurch is based on several fundamental features but with considerable tolerance for variation. It seems that use of the terms "identity" or "identities" both may be applied to the Christchurch Samoan community, depending on taxonomic preference.

By way of conclusion, I briefly summarise some differences between Samoan-New Zealand viewpoints and *Palaagi* New Zealand norms. This material has implications for New Zealand policy makers since it encourages understanding of some general differences between cultural groups, while at the same time, promoting awareness of the variation

displayed by individuals operating within their cultural norms.

- Members of the New Zealand Pacific communities typically emphasise responsibility to the family and the broader social grouping. This contrasts strongly with the more individual-oriented New Zealand society, expressed in beliefs stressing personal responsibility and marriage contracts which are deemed to be the concerns of individuals, more than of family groups.
- Respondents in the research paid great attention to the topic of language as a marker of ethnicity and group membership. Lack of proficiency in spoken or written English has strong consequences for people living in New Zealand and interacting with English speakers.
- The connections between church affiliation and ethnicity were identified in the comments of many informants. Generally, the importance of these links is inadequately understood by New Zealand policy makers.
- The topics of respect and shame engendered much discussion by study participants. Typically, these concepts are comprehended in very different terms from those prevalent in mainstream New Zealand. In practical terms, these issues may have disadvantageous outcomes for Pacific people negotiating educational or work performance hurdles since Polynesians may be restrained in language or action before those viewed as elders or somehow superior.
- People may sometimes refuse to deal with others of "similar" ethnicity because of shame and fear of gossip. This may distress New Zealand educational or other organisations who may be attempting to implement "culturally-appropriate" services.
- Individuals may alter their ethnic ascription depending on the circumstances, for example, depending on with whom they are interacting, or who will be aware of the information. This can be puzzling to *Palaagi* New Zealanders who may view ethnicity as fixed regardless of the social context.

It is important to emphasise here that the New Zealand Samoan

community consists of many different individuals who possess a range of beliefs and who enact a variety of behaviours. While this paper has focused on Samoan community norms nonetheless a plea must be made not to assume that all Samoans living in Christchurch will behave according to these standards. This was clearly expressed by Lisi (cited above) when she said: "it's very hard for one Samoan to comment on their experience and say that that's the experience of all Samoans 'cause everyone is different." There is now a sizeable body of New Zealand research which demonstrates the truth of her statement.

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Susan J. Wurtzburg has a Ph.D. in Anthropology from the University at Albany, SUNY, USA and is currently at the Department of Communication Disorders, University of Canterbury. Her research interests include: Polynesia, ethnicity, health needs of minority populations, domestic violence, problem gambling, and ethics.

"Insufficient Attention": Making sense of the Sociology and Ethics Debates

Rhonda Shaw

Abstract

Over the course of the last ten years there has been a resurgence of interest in the question and place of morality and ethics in sociological analysis and social theory. This paper addresses one influential trajectory that has developed as part of this renascence. In particular, it discusses the contribution of Zygmunt Bauman's writing on postmodern ethics to the sociology and ethics debates. The concluding section of the paper responds to some criticisms of Bauman's conception of ethics in order to demonstrate the importance of the ethical relation, as Bauman conceives it, in the context of broader sociological concerns.

Introduction: The relationship between sociology, morality, and ethics

There has always been a relationship in classical sociology between social life and morality (see Shilling & Mellor, 2001). Where sociology's "founding fathers" are concerned, Emile Durkheim is clearly one of our most illustrious and canonical exponents. His sociological study of morality aimed, in short, to demonstrate that moral life would ultimately need to be connected to the requirements of society. In Max Weber's writing, by contrast, modernity heralded the dissolution of ultimate meaning, leaving the onus of moral responsibility weighing heavily on the shoulders of the individual, who was now required to choose between competing values. The moral dimensions of Karl Marx's work, too, while not overt, were never far from the surface of his polemical deliberations. Although not sociological in the strict sense of the term, the moral impetus of Marxism, which has been linked inexorably to practical issues about political programmes and strategies, has had a profound and enduring impact on sociological analysis. It has never been the case however, in any of these thinkers' work, that the question of ethics or the problems moral philosophers take as central to their thinking, have

ever been explicitly or systematically addressed.

While questions about morality and ethics have always had a place on the sociological agenda, in twentieth century sociology this has been primarily tacit and underground. According to Zygmunt Bauman, the subject has been so marginalised in the discipline that "most sociological narratives do without reference to morality" (1989, p. 170).[1] Not only has post-classical sociology bypassed critical discussion about morality, the relationship between sociology and ethics (both as a branch of philosophy and as formulae for conduct) has been beset with problems.

In the last decade, however, sociologists have begun to acknowledge the fact that the discipline has "paid insufficient attention" to ethics (Lash, 1996a, p. 75). It is hard to underestimate the import of such a statement. Lash's (1996a) authoritative observation, noted in the Editorial of the first *Theory, Culture & Society* issue devoted entirely to the topic, has been subsequently cited in a number of secondary commentaries on the emerging ethics debate (e.g. Haimes, 2002. p. 96; Smart, 1999, p. 113; 2002, p. 509). In keeping with recent sociological analysis that has attempted to put the subject of ethics on the analytical map,[2] this paper addresses debates about the morality and ethics deficit in sociology

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1. In an illuminating account of the relationship between sociology and morality, Laura Bovone (1993) cites Erving Goffman's work as one exception to this general rule. Always positioning his social analysis and research against conventional sociological wisdoms, Goffman counter-intuitively distinguishes between ethics and etiquette. In Goffman's writing, ethics refers to the conceptual anchorages of law and morality, and etiquette to ceremonial rules and expressions. That which orthodox sociology considers insignificant (the neglected situations of everyday life for instance), Goffman reanimates as pivotal to a sociological analysis of the contemporary world. Bovone suggests that it is because Goffman begins his analyses from the perspective of the sociology of everyday life and the actual habitus of the sociological actor that he is able to overturn the traditional philosophical hierarchy between principle and practice. By reorienting sociology's relation to morality, Goffman both avoids the positivist sociological 'purity' so indicative of his time, yet simultaneously manages to escape nostalgic prescriptions as to how we should live. See Bauman (1994) for a discussion of the so-called genuine philosophical dismissal of the sociology of morality as merely accounts of ethnographic data (i.e. ethnoethics) and thus not ethics as 'properly' conceived.
2. See Russell (2000), Shaw (1996, 2003), Shilling and Mellor (2001), Smart (1996, 1999, 2002), and Tester (1997).

and discusses the value of incorporating these insights into the disciplinary corpus.

Disciplinary fissures and the quest for a core

Arguably, the lack of attention paid by sociologists to ethics can be attributed to the sociological ambition, existing since its inception as a discipline, to achieve status as a fully-fledged social science. In striving to achieve the mantle of *science*, sociology has sought to absolve itself of any metaphysical pretension, especially of the sort that a discussion of ethics might seem to entail. In this sociological drive or will to speak the truth, moral behaviours have been construed as norms and calculated merely as social products. When moral phenomena have been discussed, they have been adduced from the surrounding social milieux in terms of fundamental sociological categories such as class, or more latterly, for example, in terms of gender.

Disappointingly, anecdotal evidence indicates that when the topic of ethics is raised within the conventional sociological symposium - even when articulated in concrete terms of generosity, altruism, or hospitality - it is often dismissed on the grounds that the issues it addresses are too abstract and lack "contextualisation". Accordingly, it is asserted that the "proper terrain" of ethics belongs strictly to philosophy or theology, not sociology. Yet the default position sociologists often adopt when relegating ethics to the realm of the philosophical or theological is a curious one, and conveniently forgets the legacies of its so-called "founding fathers". Not only are all social practices and strategies imbued with ethical and moral import, the sources of the sociological imagination, as Robert Nisbet (1980, p. 180) pointed out many years ago, are never "divested of their moral origins". From a more contemporary and interested platform, Steven Seidman (1992) also says the same thing, noting the apparent disavowal of moral intent in sociological discourse. For Seidman (1992, p. 6), it is incumbent upon those who work in the social sciences to recognise the impossibility of differentiating or purging analytical inquiry of social, historical, and discursive embeddedness. As he argues, theory and the cognitive truths it espouses are invariably context-dependent, and thus inextricably

invested in and with practical, moral, and political intent.

Over the course of its brief history, however, sociology has proved most effective at marginalising and displacing the other of its analytical point of reference ("the body" being a central figure here). Certainly in mainstream sociological exegeses, questions of ethics and of value in general have tended to be sublimated to non-reflexive explications of the social (see Smart, 1993, ch. 3). In these accounts, as Georg Stauth and Bryan Turner (1988a, p. 28) imply, ethicality is considered nostalgically as a loss of community, often originating - *à la* Durkheim - from fears that "if the normative grip of society slackens, the moral order will collapse" (Bauman, 1992a, p. xvii). The assumption underlying this position is that morality is intangible outside, or is residual to, the framework and structural imperatives of society. Such an idea feeds into the ideal/material dichotomy that positivists and some of their erstwhile Marxist counterparts are well renowned for. In these paradigms, it is clearly society as structure that determines the system of morality from whence it arises. To speak of morality or ethics outside of this given is thus meaningless and without ground.

Ironically, in its more scientific guises, sociologists have attempted to craft the uncontaminated status of purely secularised, value-free discourse. In texts such as *Modernity and the holocaust* (1989), however, which is expressly critical of this kind of sociological project, Bauman makes his reader patently aware of the rose-tinted glasses of these scientific and rationalist endeavours. As he points out, the so-called civilising processes of modernity include innumerable horrific events. In Bauman's view, it was under the auspices of German *Volk* nationalism that science and its *doppelganger*, technology, became a much defiled, inhumane, value-laden discourse and set of governmental practices. Rather than achieving freedom of interest from science, *Volk* nationalism put reason to use in industrial contexts in order to secure the interests of one group against the interests, and with the purpose of, silencing the Other. It is this effacement of ethics and the effacement of alterity upon which it rests, set in train by the monstrous union of reason, science, and technology, contemporary commentators of ethics rail against.

Despite the intractability of post-classical sociology towards morality

generally speaking, the recent flurry of inter-disciplinary forays has reintroduced ethical issues to sociological discussion and debate. Ethics has incontrovertibly returned to the theoretical agenda, if not in what has been considered sociology pure, then either via fissures in the disciplinary matrix (e.g. Habermas, 1990), or in the manner of edifying dialogic conversation.

It is pertinent to make brief reference to the permeability of the discipline with respect to these analytical fissures. The point might be well made that sociology *per se* is itself nothing *but* fissures, all of which are now more than ever, jostling for a stake in the pedagogical and research-funding pie. Certainly there is no consensual agreement upon the status of sociology as a science. Whether or not the social sciences deserve the warrant *science* is, in fact, a matter of long-standing dispute - an issue contested within the discipline of sociology itself. Such contention has precluded any agreed-upon notion of purity regarding the method and object of sociological analysis. According to Bauman (1992a, p. 76), who confirms the lack of disciplinary cohesiveness around a common object, "concern with self-justification has been, since the beginning, a conspicuous feature of sociological discourse."

If, indeed, the history of sociology is nothing but fissures, then one of the more fertile and noteworthy of these dialogical openings is to be located through the social and cultural analysis of Zygmunt Bauman himself, particularly his work on postmodern ethics.[3]

Bauman's critique of sociological theories of morality

The first point to note about Bauman and his sociological vision, as I intimated above, is that he opposes the purposive-rationality of the modern world and any version of the sociological project that seeks to promote it. Bauman is not, therefore, a modernist in any straightforward sense of the term. While he seeks to restore to social life fundamental moral responsibility for others, it should be made clear that his vision is not simply based on finding a "way back" to a notion of the primary source of the divine or the sacred as encapsulated in the signifier society.

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3. See Bauman (1990a, 1990b, 1992b, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1999).

Bauman resolutely refuses the idea that society is given by God, and eschews the position that, after the death of God, the essence of the sacred emanates - or at least ought to emanate - from society. Nor does Bauman cower "in the shadow of the sinister warning of Dostoyevsky: if there is no God, everything is permissible" (1992a, p. xvii). He does not concur with the belief that once social coercion is removed humans will relapse "into the barbarity from which they had been but precariously lifted by the force of society" (Bauman, 1989, p. 173).

While Bauman's thought may appear, on first sight, to fulfil the final criterion of the nostalgic paradigm (see Stauth and Turner, 1988b), Bauman is not nostalgic.[4] To the contrary, Bauman offers a world-opening approach to the understanding of cultural phenomenon, which neither pines for the authenticity of "full being" marking discourses of the absolute, nor subscribes to an emancipatory modern politics of truth. Against the overarching logic of capitalist rationalism, Bauman also refuses to transform morality into interest, utility, and performativity, which can then serve as a model for human relations. Without succumbing to a nihilistic celebration of the void or to an anti-aesthetic ethical silence, Bauman sets store by what he refers to as the ethical relation. Following Emmanuel Levinas (1969, 1988, 1989), to whom he is philosophically indebted; Bauman's version of the ethical return is premised upon the primacy of a relation between self and other. In a radical philosophical and sociological move, he asserts that ethics, or the ethical relation, makes a claim on subjectivity *prior* to the claim of society and the moral codes and laws that are inscribed by it.

In order for the complexities of Bauman's thesis to be elucidated, it is illuminating to trace his interpretation of the deficits of sociological theories of morality. Bauman's rebuttal of classical sociological understandings of moral life is initially addressed in his work via a reading of the Holocaust (see Bauman, 1989). His opposition to the

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4. Georg Stauth and Bryan Turner (1988a, p. 513) identify four principle components of the nostalgia paradigm. These are summarised as: a sense of historical 'decline, fall and loss', an overwhelming sense of cultural crisis and loss of moral coherence, dehumanization, and the colonization, surveillance and bureaucratization of human action.

barbaric excesses of the Holocaust needs to be read as an extended critique of the terms of foundationalism *per se* and as a critique and problematisation of both religious fundamentalisms and secular metanarratives (see Bauman, 1994). While the point of departure for Bauman's argument is a sociological investigation of morality strictly speaking, his own deliberations might be read as more firmly in the mould of post-sociological thinking. I do not use the preface "post" here to assert that Bauman is unambiguously an end-of-sociology or end-of-philosophy thinker. Although Bauman wages war against totality in the form of orthodox sociological depictions of society, the new orientation he gives social and cultural analysis is similar to Georg Stauth and Bryan Turner's neo-sociology of friendship, as explicated in *Nietzsche's dance* (1988a). In this respect, post-sociology is a lot like the conception of postmodernity, especially if we argue that it does not mark a complete rupture from modernity. In Bauman's words, postmodernity is "modernity coming to terms with its own impossibility; a self-monitoring modernity, one that consciously discards what it was once unconsciously doing" (1991, p. 272). Defined as such, Bauman's socio-cultural analysis can be read through the lens of Jean-Francois Lyotard's famous passage from *The Postmodern Condition* (with, of course, the appropriate qualifying erasures):

> A work can become ~~modern~~ [sociological] only if it is first ~~postmodern~~ [post-sociological]. ~~Postmodernism~~ [Post-sociology] thus understood is not ~~modernism~~ [sociology] at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant. (Lyotard, 1988, p. 79)

In Bauman's ground-breaking text, *Modernity and the holocaust* (1989), it is the orthodox sociological insistence upon morality as an epiphenomenon, and as superstructural to society as a whole, that he takes issue with. Sociology and social theory that takes the "study of society" as its self-authenticating foundational certitude is not, therefore, immune to the force of Bauman's interventions, since it is the very conception of society (and corresponding notion of the nation-state), adumbrated in social-scientific practice, that is the target of Bauman's scrutiny (Bauman, 1989, 1990a, 1990b). Arguing against classical sociological theories of morality predicated upon a notion of society as

a hypostasised and totalised object, Bauman's assertion is that a "proper" sociological theory of morality must be more attuned to the problem "of the social production of immoral behaviour" (1989, p. 169), and "the manipulation of moral capacity" (1989, p. 178). In this regard, sociology needs to take account of both the analytical-conceptual and pragmatic relations between society and moral conduct. Only when it is recognised that "the general *theory* of morality" and "the *history* of morality" are not coterminous, argues Bauman (1989, p. 175), will sociology be capable of "accommodating in full the new knowledge generated by the study of the Holocaust" (1989, p. 169). An integral part of what Bauman seeks to do, then, is to admit the evidence of the Holocaust into the sociological imagination. His objective, as Lyotard (1993, p. 147) so poignantly observed in regard to Heidegger's silence of Auschwitz, is to "bear witness to the Forgotten in thought, writing, art and public practice"; and not primarily as Being, but also as "the obligation of justice". By reminding a discipline like sociology of its own "great unthought", Bauman thus rethinks the reductionist scope of the sociological problematic.

In unison with critics of positivism, and what he has elsewhere called legislative forms of analysis (Bauman, 1987, 1992a), Bauman argues that conventional sociological approaches are predicated upon a secular discourse that presumes value-freedom from interest. The taken-for-grantedness in sociological circles that "facts" somehow speak for themselves, nonetheless ignores Nisbet's reminder that the moral imperative is never far from the sociological surface of analysis. What gives Bauman's argument radical novelty, compared to humanist critiques of positivism like Nisbet's, is his assertion that the place assigned to morality within sociological discourse has been secondary and derivative to that which is perceived to ground morality: the "conscience collective" and "the societal" (Bauman, 1989, p. 179). Almost as an afterthought and certainly subordinated to society in general, morality is read off instrumentally in one of two ways; either as a response to satisfy the collective needs of a community, which are held to be "essential" (e.g. food, security, or defence against an inclement climate), or as constraint and prohibition, ensuring the social cohesion and

integration of the group by rewarding the conformer and punishing/ stigmatising the transgressor (Bauman, 1989, p. 171). In these latter Durkheimian-nuanced approaches to sociology, it is the social need of integration that is held to be of paramount importance to the maintenance of group order (Bauman, 1989, p. 172). Moral systems are effective only if they satisfy this collective need of cohesion. On this view, Bauman states:

> the persistence of society is attained and sustained by the imposition of constraints upon natural (a-social, pre-social) predilections of society members: by forcing them to act in a way that does not contradict the need to maintain societal unity. (1989, p. 172)

What Bauman objects to is the way in which society is commonly conceived as an organic unity, greater than the sum of its parts and historically prior to its individual members. Because society is taken to predate the individual, it is society that provides the context within which human being develops moral maturity. It follows from this that if human beings do exist outside of society, morality too is also impossible outside its bounds (Bauman, 1989, p. 173). In this perspective, social reality *is* morality, and ethically superior to the sum of its parts. Existing over and above individuals as limitless sovereign, society inspires in people a sense of sin, "of fear and of deference, of awe, wonderment, and mystery, a sense of the divine" (Hearn, 1985, p. 35), thus enforcing "social conformity and obedience to the norms observed by the majority" (Bauman, 1989, p. 175). After all is said and done, Society capitalised, is held to be the "actively moralising force" (Bauman, 1989, p. 172).

In his work on rethinking morality, it is clearly Durkheim who is Bauman's "devil's advocate". In at least two independent texts, Bauman makes reference to the same line from Durkheim in which sociology's founding father contends; "man is a moral being only because he lives in society" (1989, p. 172; 1990a, p. 7). Thus, by Durkheimian definition, immoral conduct is invariably an expression of pre-social or a-social drives and a return to a pre-social state, or it is "a failure to depart from it" (1989, p. 174). In contrast to Durkheim, Bauman's position is that the "pre-social" provides the condition and possibility for the moral impulse.

Bauman therefore interprets Durkheim's perspective of moral life in the following way:

> Pre-social or a-social motives could not be moral. By the same token, the possibility that at least certain moral patterns may be rooted in existential factors unaffected by contingent social rules of cohabitation could not be adequately articulated, let alone seriously considered. (1989, p. 174)

The challenge of the Holocaust to sociological thinking, argues Bauman, is that it forces sociologists to view its significance in terms greater than an aberrant set of events. What this means is that the Holocaust should not be interpreted as devolution into a kind of pre-social atavism and from the norms of so-called civilised moral conduct. Nor should it be perceived as a defiance of "the common conception of good and evil (proper and improper conduct)". Moreover, asserts Bauman, it should not be viewed merely as "an outcome of failure or mismanagement of the 'moral industry' " (1989, p. 174). Rather, the Holocaust is the *waste*-product of an almost victorious manifestation of modernity privileging the quest for rational order and the imposition of social control. Under the imperatives of legislative and scientific reason and a new form of governance with its centralised bureaucratic state system, ambiguity and chaos have no place. Modernity is therefore a ceaseless effort to "exterminate ambivalence" (Bauman, 1991, p. 7). Yet while "the tropes of 'the other of order' [...] undefinability, incoherence, incongruity, incompatibility, illogicality, irrationality, ambiguity, confusion, undecidability, ambivalence" (Bauman, 1991, p. 7), are to be eradicated, they are at the same time, intrinsic to the project of modernity. As Bauman points out in *Modernity and ambivalence*:

> It is against [...] negativity that the positivity of order constitutes itself. But the negativity of chaos is a product of order's self-constitution; its side-effect, its waste, and yet the condition *sine qua non* of its (reflective) possibility. Without the negativity of chaos, there is no positivity of order; without chaos, no order. (1991, p. 7)

The unique way in which Bauman's discusses the Holocaust enables him to present both an analysis of cultural assimilation and genocide,

and a pointed critique of orthodox sociological exegesis. Against explanations of the Holocaust wholly in terms of anti-Semitism, and/or as a specifically German problem, he articulates an alternative description of the moral conduct of human beings. This alternative, he argues, must be sought in the capacity to "resist, escape and survive" social processing. In this sense "moral behaviour is conceivable only in the context of coexistence, of 'being with others' " (1989, p. 179). And it is ethics, as the "existential modality of the social" (1989, p. 179) - in contrast to the *societal* – that provides a basis for Bauman's reformulation of a sociological theory of morality.

Bauman's ethics and the debt to Levinas

What distinguishes Bauman's definition of ethics and morality from that of normative moral philosophy is that his (re)turn to ethics protests "the universality of reason, the unity of truth, [...] the human as self-conscious subject" (O'Connor, 1988, p. 57). Like Michel Foucault (1987, 1988), for instance, Bauman refuses to fall back on notions of a fixed and universal conception of the good. In this respect, both Bauman and Foucault signal an appeal to difference and alterity as leverage points through which to speak of ethics as a domain or sphere of relations between self and Other. This enables these two analysts to render anew, novel distinctions from conventional meanings of morality and ethics. Although there are significant differences between Bauman's and Foucault's respective interpretations, each, in their own way, discredits the view that science *done well* exists beyond normative and ethical horizons. While Foucault has argued that truth is never freed from power relations of one sort or another, Bauman impresses that we should vigilantly monitor any further circumvention of substantive moral issues from scientific practices. In both cases, reason is not axiomatically coterminous with freedom, and "freedom promises no certainty and no guarantee of anything" (Bauman, 1991, p. 244).

Drawing directly on Levinas' (1989) ethics as first philosophy, Bauman's delineation between "being for" and "being with" others enables us to see how his conception of the origin of morality differs from standard sociological versions. A subject does not already exist,

who then gradually takes up an ethical position once she or he becomes socialised. Rather, "ethics does not follow subjectivity: it is subjectivity that is ethical" (Bauman, 1990a, p. 18). For Levinas, ethics begins at the point in which one's spontaneity is put into question by the presence, or the living force, of the Other. Moreover, as Simon Critchley says, the "face" of this Other exceeds "the idea of the other in me" (1999, p. 5). In this account, then, the ethical relation precedes reason, knowing, and intention, and subjectivity cannot be reduced to the self-consciousness of the knowing subject or to the domain of Being.

This is clearly not a conception of ethics that conventional sociology or philosophy ordinarily works with. In fact, if ethics is considered at all within the discursive formation of sociology, the notion of otherness as alterity is suppressed and reduced into a conception of oneself and into the Same. It is the moral actions and conduct of the actor or the agent that are paramount here, and these are expressed and analysed in terms of the *context* of action and the purposiveness of the content of activity. When other human beings are acknowledged, their status is usually interpreted in terms of constraints and limits to the agent's freedom of choice.[5] Others are therefore perceived as constituting a "technological challenge" to be surmounted (Bauman, 1989, p. 180) in the field of action for the primary agent. Within this perspective, the subjectivity of the other is subsumed by the intent and purposes of the primary agent, in such a way that the other has no "qualitative" bearing on the actions of the agent, except perhaps in so far as their presence or reactions may inhibit, limit, or constrain the conduct of the primary actor.

The alterity, differential significance, and embodiment of the other are thus inconsequential to the terms of moral theory as it is conventionally understood in sociological practice and in philosophy. If contemplated at all, argues Bauman, the subjectivity of the other is read only in a language that is comprehensible and communicable from the perspective of the One doing the considering. This interpretation of

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5. See Smart (1996) for a critical discussion of this issue in relation to Erving Goffman's work.

the other takes place from the perspective of the "I" or Ego and thus disregards the basic sociological insight that the self is not already given to us. The distance between the Same/Other, or Self/Other, relation is so reduced that any difference or alterity between the two is almost impossible to discern. Reinforcing the tyranny of the binary, the relationship assumed with the other is thereby de-ethicalised. The other becomes but a replication of the same, a person whose identity is ultimately negligible (see Bauman, 1990a). Needless to say, the marginalised status of the Other is necessary in order to reassure the One, because without the *general body* of the Other, the master can not survive. In other words, the existence of the ex-centric, or vulnerable and marginalised persons (e.g. the poor, women, ethnic minorities, homosexuals, the unemployed, refugees), is ultimately required for capitulation to the Law of the Same. Any possibility of ethics, as responsibility for the Other, therefore fades.

Sketching a preliminary sociological theory of morality, Bauman tentatively suggests a way out of the moral *cul-de-sac* instantiated by legislative descriptions of ethical conduct. This he articulates via Levinas' (1989) formulation of the ethical relation as responsibility for the moral proximity of the other. According to Levinas, this non- or a-symmetrical responsibility toward the other is both primary and unconditional, and precedes the constitution of subjectivity (see Bauman, 1989, p. 183). As Bauman points out, pivotal to this description of "being with others" as moral proximity is "the face". This face-to-face relation constitutes the primary structure of the intersubjective relation (Bauman, 1989, p. 183). However, once proximity is eroded, and responsibility toward the other is replaced with social distance, the human subject is transformed into an Other as an abstract category incommensurate with the Same. Social distancing, which proved to be the crowning technological and bureaucratic glory of modern rational society, precipitated the socio-legal separation of Jew from Nazi, thus making possible the technical objectification of Others to death (see Bauman, 1989, pp. 184, 188). In Bauman's view, it is this extension of social distance between self and Other that erodes the possibility of the face-to-face encounter. Moreover, that distanciation functions to remove any responsibility for the moral

consequences of one's actions. Bauman's abiding contention is that without the capacity of Nazi technoculture to isolate and objectify, the Holocaust would not have been possible.

What Levinas gives name to as "the face" should not be taken for the physical attribute of appearing to an Other. Levinas is not talking about the physiological features of a particular person or *my* perception of that person's appearance or presence. Rather, "the face" corresponds to a critical access or demand to "exterior being" (Critchley, 1999, p. 5) in which; "the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question" (Levinas, 1989, p. 83). While this is a demand by an Other that interrupts my being, and not a response to the concrete attributes of an Other's face, the implication is that physical proximity is crucial in terms of the production of an ethical relation (see Bauman, 1989, p. 139). As noted above, *Volk* nationalism facilitated the social production of *visual* distance, and thereby achieved the segregation and separation of Jew as Other. This apartheid then escalated into a series of disembedded, de-contextualised, technological, bureaucratic actions that resulted in mass annihilation and genocide. It is in these sorts of rationalistic scenarios, Bauman demonstrates, that the face is effaced with obdurate indifference, and where technical responsibility is substituted for moral responsibility (1989, p. 199). Once the Other is stripped of all vestige of humanity, she is no longer treated as a subject of moral evaluation, but an object of techno-scientific manipulation.

Additionally, as Bauman points out, concern for the Other can only be moral when it is manifest as "an unconcern with the subject's own comfort, pleasure or welfare" (1990a, p. 13). Ethicality, in the sense of the term used here, then, is not a product of calculation, rational scrutiny or choice, but rather *precedes* the mental processes that lead to the basis of such decisions. What makes a human relationship moral, writes Bauman, is that:

> it stems from the feeling of responsibility for the welfare and well-being of the other person. First, moral responsibility is distinguished by being disinterested. [. . .] The responsibility is moral as long as it is totally selfless and unconditional: I am

> responsible for another person simply because he or she is a person, and hence commands my responsibility. Secondly, responsibility is moral in so far as I see it as mine and mine alone; it is not negotiable, it cannot be passed on to another human being. [. . .] Responsibility for the other - for any other - human being simply because this is a human being, and the specifically moral impulse to give help and succour that follows from it, need no argument, legitimation or proof. (1990b, p. 69)

A number of scholars, including Bauman, whose work is consistent with Levinas' account of the face, maintain that the Other can neither be classified nor catalogued (see also Ahmed, 2002, p. 560). Because the otherness of the other is infinite, she always remains alter, indeterminate, nomadic (see Bauman, 1990b, ch. 3). The upshot of this, which makes perfect sense if we accept Bauman's statement that ethics precedes subjectivity, is that we do violence to alterity and difference by attempting to comprehend otherness from the terms of our own perspective. In fact, Sara Ahmed (2002, p. 560) reads Bauman as saying that there is no finite Other, whose particular characteristics can be accounted for and understood. The face is not *"somebody's* face", as Bauman (1993, p. 74) says. Rather, it is a disposition, or better still, an *exposure* to alterity and responsibility.

Bauman's account of the ethical relation must be read in conjunction with his analysis of postmodernity, as this is what distinguishes his interpretation of postmodern ethics from the expressly philosophical concerns of Levinas. Obviously Bauman's view of postmodernity is not one of wholehearted appraisal. Indeed, he argues that the effacement of faces has been exacerbated by a number of contemporary processes and trends unlikely to abate: the increased mediation of distance technologies which work to eliminate the "inefficiencies" and deep investments of face-to-face contact, the increasing rationalisation of politics, and the ubiquity of instrumental forms of rationality. Nonetheless, although the modern war against ambivalence has all but secured the neutralisation of ethical criterion, Bauman hints that ethicality is not altogether extinct. While he does not offer a way out of this predicament upon the reconstituted back of the modern project, Bauman suggests that ethicality may in fact be on the road to recovery,

if we would only accept the aporetic nature of the postmodern situation.

Conclusion: Questioning the limits of Bauman's ethics

The question I now want to pose in regard to the notion of the face, and to Bauman's interpretation of the ethical relation, is what kinds of resources it offers empirically informed sociology and social theory. In the last section of this paper, I will briefly flag some perceived difficulties, as well as possibilities, associated with attempting to use Bauman's ethics as an analytical tool for sociological research.

If, in the course of his writing, Bauman offers us "no neat inventory of ethical precepts nor other props of moral self-confidence" (1993, p. 223) upon which to guide our actions and construct our social policies, does this mean - as Bauman (1988, p. 229) says - the business of sociology can no longer go on "as usual"? If Bauman's provisional notes toward a sociological theory of morality are indeed post-sociological as I have suggested, then one is forced to ask what this means for a discipline like sociology that is traditionally conceived around either a unified concept of the social or a notion of the sacred interiority of the social subject. Moreover, what happens to the legislative function of sociology if contemporary social agents or subjects are increasingly required to take responsibility for "the centrality of *choice*" in their "self-constitution" (Bauman, 1992a, pp. 201-4)?

Bauman's response to these questions is hermeneutic. He calls upon sociologists to take on an interpretive role of translation that facilitates dialogue across and between cultures and groups (see Bauman, 1987; 1992a, ch. 1). One point of departure for this reorientation of the sociological project, as I have been at pains to demonstrate, is to rethink the concept of ethics from the perspective of the Other, rather than from the perspective of the Same. Nevertheless, while I agree that dispensing with legislative forms and normative systems of social analysis is imperative for good sociological practice, I wonder how we are meant to document and interpret the plural and often incommensurable perspectives of others if these are, theoretically, unknowable? To seek to represent the perspectives of others would be to define a person, as a determinate social identity, not to face the

"Other" as Bauman admonishes.

When confronted with this methodological conundrum I can't help thinking that the abstractly philosophical position of Levinas' first philosophy and the impossibility of grasping or knowing the Other, ends up leaving Bauman's sociological perspective between a rock and a hard place. It is all very well to acknowledge the futility of anticipating, understanding, or possessing the strangeness of the Other, and to thereby celebrate the futural possibilities of other Otherness, but does it really help sociologists who are interested in accounting for the specific details of human encounters with particular others at specific points in time? Certainly, Bauman's work offers us scope for rethinking the ways in which selves are constituted in relation to others, and provides us with a mode of encountering difference that supports, rather than denies or assimilates it. Nevertheless, the question remains as to how we can put Bauman's deliberations vis-à-vis the ethical relation to work in the context of social problems that affect real-life others in the so-called here-and-now. What is the value, in short, of postmodern ethics for social research if we cannot apply it to actual empirical situations? And how can we use this concept of ethics as a tool to understand, with a view to changing, the worst excesses of oppressive and exploitative social relations?

Admittedly, there are a number of problems involved with translating Bauman's vision of the ethical relation into a workable resource for sociological analysis. One immediate concern, to which I have already alluded, derives from Levinas' conception of ethics as first philosophy, and pertains to the impossibility of characterising ethics as a real empirical "event" situated in historical time (see Davis, 1996, p. 45). For Levinas, the ethical relation occurs *prior* to any understanding of the empirical encounter as an event involving self-present individuals or persons. At the same time, in no way does it determine the encounter will proceed in an ethical (read: "good") manner. In other words, human nature is neither good nor bad. Rather, it is ambivalent, even though subjectivity is constituted by an ethical encounter. The ethical relation makes a certain sort of encounter possible, that is for sure, but once we (sociologists, for example) attempt to pin down and document the

specificities of that encounter, we have already engaged in a different kind of philosophical project. Even attempting to give "voice" to the Others we describe as engaging in ethical encounters, reveals our hermeneutic aim, as sociologists, to ascertain the intentions of the subjects we are researching (as if these could be fully known in the first place), and to make familiar that which isn't immediately intelligible.

I struck this social research problem myself when analysing a case study involving a woman who breastfed another woman's infant, without her consent, at a New Zealand Parent's Centre conference in the late nineties (see Shaw, 2003). Out of the blue, I was given the rare opportunity to interview the woman who had been accused of wrongfully nursing the other woman's baby. While I had initially discussed the case through the lens of Bauman's postmodern ethics, I realised that interviewing this woman would entail prompting her to recall her motivations and intentions for choosing to cross-nurse the other woman's infant. Not only would this do violence to the notion of exterior being implicit in Levinas' notion of the ethical relation, and the fact that subjectivity itself is constituted by the encounter and not after it, but it would also require the interviewee to "memorise" the event, which she may have already rehearsed in the manner of a reiterated script. This might turn what could have been legitimately read as an instance of asymmetrical, unconditional responsibility for the Other - a call to responsibility that cannot be refused, in other words - into a conscious, considered, noble act of choice.[6] What if, in addition, I had taken this errant breastfeeding woman's original statement - that she acted responsively in "the most caring, giving way" (quoted in Crawshaw, 1997) - at face value, only to discover, upon interviewing her, that she had self-consciously deliberated over the dilemma of whether or not to cross-nurse the infant with another person? Such purposiveness on the part of the errant cross-nurser would surely render my Levinas-informed account

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6. A similar kind of problem is identified by Helene Ragone (1994) in her interviews with surrogate mothers in North America during the 1990s. Ragone's solution regarding the 'memorized quality' of her interviewees' reasons was to deploy a kind of depth hermeneutics, designed, as she puts it, to 'move beyond the surrogates' stated motivations to a more complete and complex rendering of their motivations' (1994, p. 9).

somewhat disingenuous.

I cannot respond to the questions I am raising decisively. But I would contend, in defence of the account of ethics I have been discussing, that we need to take stock of the conditions or opportunities that make these relatively anomalous ethical encounters possible in the first place. This is where I think sociology and sociologists have a pivotal role to play. We need, however, to be attentive to the complex dynamics involving the research methodologies we engage. First, we need to recognise that while knowledge, and the thinking that leads to knowledge, is of a different order, or exists in a different realm, to ethics; thinking and ethics are not closed off to one another. There is a connection between these realms, and this can be demonstrated by reconceptualising what we ordinarily take to occur as part of the process of thinking and knowing. Rosalyn Diprose's (2002, pp. 125-43) discussion of this relation in regards to Nietzsche's insights, and with reference to Levinas' work, is instructive here. Diprose suggests that exposure to alterity or difference is a precondition to thinking critically (2002, p. 139, p. 141), and that critical thinking arises from a disturbance or provocation that exists within the domain of embodied relations between self and other. In Diprose's account, thinking does not occur in isolation from others, but is experienced in an "ambiguous intercorporeal field" (2002, p. 135). We are prompted to think, when, in a pre-reflective moment our "encounters with other social beings" (p. 131) unsettle our sense of the familiar, or "get under our skin", as Diprose (2002, p. 125) remarks. Good sociology often begins when sociologists themselves "think through the body" in this way. Acknowledging the roles and sensibilities of affect and emotional expression in the constitution of subjectivity and in the production of knowledge, enables us to include these sorts of precipitant experiences as data for legitimate sociological study. This, in turn, enables us to risk thinking differently than we thought before.

Facing "the face" doesn't mean we lose our ability to communicate or engage in sociological conversations either. On the contrary: by situating dyadic encounters, such as the ethical relation, within larger

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7. See Haimes (2002) for a discussion of the various ways in which sociology can contribute to ethical debates.

economies of social exchange, reciprocity, and risk,[7] sociologists can shed light on the sorts of social and cultural processes that help shape the life worlds of particular ethical subjects. This is precisely what Bauman does in his analysis of the Holocaust, when he shows how the production of moral irresponsibility in modernity is construed as the "normal" state of human being.

This brings me to the final issue I want to raise in this paper and that is the perception, by a number of sociologists (Lash, 1996b; Shilling & Mellor, 2001), that Bauman's account of the ethical relation is individualist and cannot be applied beyond the dyadic relation of the face-to-face.

As George Salemohamed (1991, p. 120) once said in reference to the face-to-face encounter, this is "an ethics that cannot be used". This would also appear to be the view of Chris Shilling and Philip A. Mellor (2001), in their book *The Sociological Ambition*. They accuse Bauman of endorsing individualism and reducing the scope of the sociological horizon to the restricted and fragmentary spaces between one individual and another (Shilling & Mellor, 2001, p. 199). My concern with Shilling and Mellor's perspective is that they appear to be suggesting *social* relations are underpinned by reciprocity of human contact that doesn't necessarily exist in the face-to-face relation. Not only do Shilling and Mellor reduce the field of different kinds of reciprocity (e.g. asymmetric, equivalent, alternating asymmetry, obligatory, and so on) to a singular universal mode of giving and receiving, they also imply that social relations are inherently consensual, expressing a shared knowledge and understanding. While this may be a condition of desirable social action, it is not sufficient. The plurality of social life in the contemporary world is such that social encounters, exchanges, and interactions are frequently incommensurable and incomprehensible; fragmenting social bonds as readily as they bind them. It is not for nothing, therefore, that Diprose (2002: 138) advises; "in the face of hostility or indifference, it could be said, we have no ethical obligation to respond and hence no obligation to think again". At the same time, our ethical responsibility to and for others is such that we need "to be continually ready to hold the political world of government to account" (Smart, 2002, p. 516). There is nothing inherently unpalatable about alterity or incommensurability,

but we still need to *face* it in order to negotiate the emergence of otherness in the most just way possible. And this entails negotiating the thin line between truly radical questioning, where our own "autonomy" and "self-possession" (to borrow Diprose's language once again) is at stake, and unconditional welcoming, whereby the other calls me to responsibility.

It is important to note that ethics, in the sense that Bauman and Levinas define it, pertains to the domain of relations between the self and the other; but that this domain is invariably set against the backdrop of broader institutional and social processes. Although Bauman suggests that Society (capitalised), and the modern social order, has the capacity to repress or delimit moral proximity as well as neutralise ethical motivations for action, we should not conflate Bauman's critique of the societal with the notion of the social, as Shilling and Mellor (2001) mistakenly do. Like Levinas (1969), Bauman argues the face-to-face relation is prior to the interested realm of politics, which is needed to establish conditions of equality and "fraternity" for social relations, but that ethics is not closed off to either politics or social life. When the face summons me, it immediately opens out onto the face of all Others, calling me to responsibility for all others, as well as to the Other of the face-to-face (Levinas, 1969, pp. 212-14). Recognition of other social beings, then, also involves a dispossession of oneself that makes me open to alterity and otherness.

There is a distinction between ethics and politics. My exposure to the Other of the Other, or the third party, requires a different level of negotiation - one that presupposes judgement, compromise and decision-making[8] - to that of ethics. However, just as the asymmetry of the face-to-face relation is not enough to ensure the emergence of justice with the arrival of the third party, politics without ethics is not enough to ensure justice.[9] This is best summed up by the following remark from Richard J. Bernstein:

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8. See Bauman (1999), Bell (2001), and Diprose (2002: Part III), for interpretations of the relation between ethics and politics in Levinas' work.
9. Thanks to Lisa Guenther (Philosophy, University of Auckland) for clarifying this aspect of Levinas' work.

> Although we can distinguish ethics and politics, they are inseparable. For we cannot understand ethics without thinking through our political commitments and responsibilities. And there is no understanding of politics that does not bring us back to ethics. (1992, p.9)

This intersection between politics and ethics can be discerned by analysing the relations of social proximity in the so-called "New Zealand Parent's Centre" breastfeeding case. That is to say, the face-to-face encounter I was endeavouring to discuss in this incident can be construed as ethical insofar as it is governed by an asymmetric and non-reciprocal relation, but it is also a social relation inextricably bound up with institutional patterns of sociality. These are predicated on unstated and unspoken demands for reciprocity that rest on assumptions about the roles and identities of certain kinds of social subjects – mothers and women in this case. Sociologists, whose work functions as a bridge between micro and macro concerns, and who believe that the sociological imagination is never divested of its moral origins, must take the ambiguous interplay these different modes of subjectivity elicit, into account. In short, this involves considering the "pure" ethical relation in which I am radically (and passively) exposed to the demands of another (as true in our capacity as social subjects as social researchers), as well as recognising that social situations, in which ethical relations are encountered, have ramifications beyond the face, which also make me hostage of the moral and social consequences of my actions.

Acknowledgement

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Rhonda Shaw is a FRST Science & Technology Post-Doctoral Fellow (2002-2005) based at the University of Auckland. Her current research focuses on debates around the ethics and politics of bodily gifting in the areas of cross-nursing, ovarian egg donation and reception, surrogate pregnancy arrangements, and living organ donation.

A Social-History of the Articulations Between Rugby Union and Masculinities Within Aotearoa/New Zealand

Richard Pringle

Abstract

Sport is recognised by many critical commentators, particularly those within the sub-discipline of sport sociology, to be one of the prime social institutions for defining and legitimating discourses of masculinities that contribute broadly to male privilege but also gender troubles. In this paper I help illustrate how fruitful sport can be as a subject for sociological research through providing a discursive history of rugby's articulations with masculinities. I trace the socio-historical links between rugby and masculinities from nineteenth century England to contemporary times in Aotearoa/New Zealand to help understand how a male dominated sport associated with violence, injury and sexism came to be known as "our national sport". I conclude by making pleas for further empirical research concerning rugby's contemporary impact on masculine subjectivities and gender relations to be undertaken.

Introduction

In this paper, I provide a discursive history of rugby union and masculinities to examine how the culture of rugby, which is male dominated and associated with elements of sexism, homopohobia, violence, corporeal risk/injury and excessive alcohol consumption, came to be culturally dominant within Aotearoa/New Zealand. My methodology employs a merging of historical and sociological concerns, which is a research approach increasingly advocated in studies of sport sociology (Hutchins & Phillips, 1997). Although I did not utilise Foucault's (1977) genealogical method, I was influenced by his belief in the value of exploring the discursive origins of specific claims to truth, and the connections between regimes of truth and power relations. More specifically, I was motivated to explore how the discourses of rugby, that proclaim that rugby is a "man's game" and "our national game",

emerged as truths within Aotearoa/New Zealand and remain dominant in contemporary times despite competing masculinities, the growth of feminism and increased concerns with violence.

I begin by discussing assumed articulations between masculinities and sport, followed by an examination of the workings of various discourses of rugby and masculinities in mid-nineteenth century England, and their adoption and adaptation into the context of Aotearoa/New Zealand. I finish by paying particular attention to the multiple and competing discourses of rugby and masculinities that have developed since the 1970s.

Masculinities, sport and rugby

Although men have traditionally dominated the world of research, men themselves have only relatively recently become topics of investigation (Connell, 1995; Mac an Ghaill, 1996; Messner, 1990a; Paris, Worth & Allen, 2002). This interest in studying men has grown so quickly that masculinity is now recognised as "something of a hot topic in academia" (Law, Campbell & Schick, 1999, p. 15). This increased interest in studying masculinities has been partly influenced by sweeping social changes that have occurred in postmodern times. These changes relate, in part, to more women in full time employment, the gay and feminist movements, the growth of feminist scholarship, changes to family forms, consumption patterns, communication technologies, and the shape of global capitalism (Connell, 1995; Law et al., 1999; Mac an Ghaill, 1996). These social changes have helped many understand that gender is a "basic organising principle of social life" (Messner, 1990, p. 136) and should be an important focus of social research.

Masculinities have also become a focus of research as it is increasingly assumed that many of men's behaviours and attitudes are linked to problematic behaviours (Sabo & Gordon, 1995; Paris et al., 2002). Evidence from Aotearoa/New Zealand, for example, suggests that 79% of pathological gamblers are men, 69% of fatal road accidents kill men, and that men are over-represented in their use and abuse of alcohol and other drugs, and are both the victims and perpetrators of the majority of violence (Adams, 1997). This recognition of the pervasive

and, at times, problematic influence of discourses of masculinities has encouraged numerous researchers to examine the gendering processes associated with "the transformation of biological males into socially interacting men" (Kimmel & Messner, 1998, p. xv). A growing number of researchers, more specifically, have directed critical attention to understanding the relationships between sport and masculinities.

Sport and masculinities are believed to exist in a symbiotic relationship: sport, it is assumed, helps affirm traditional notions of masculinities, while these notions help shape sport and gender relations (Connell, 1987; Messner, 1992). Although the sports world is no longer an exclusively male domain, sport is still regarded as vitally important in influencing how men and boys "define and differentiate the meaning and practice of masculinity" (Rowe, 1995, p. 123). Many critical commentators have illustrated that sport, particularly the popular winter football codes, problematically link aggression, bodily force, competition and physical skill with maleness (e.g., Bryson, 1990; Connell, 1987; Hickey, Fitzclarence & Matthews, 1998; Pringle, 2002). Hickey and Fitzclarence (1999), for example, warned that the primary messages that boys receive about "appropriate" masculinity through sports are grounded in traditional notions of masculinity, so that boys "in intensely "male" ways ... are supposed to learn how to get back up after being knocked down, how to express themselves physically, how to impose themselves forcefully, how to mask pain and how to release anxiety" (p. 52). White and Young (1997) argued that sport is a prime social institution that promotes the construction of "dangerous masculinities" (p. 1) that can act to encourage men to "ignore or rationalize the risk of physical harm" (p. 1), while also contributing to male dominance and privilege in society.

The critical analyses related to sport and masculinities raised my concerns with respect to the place of social importance that rugby union holds in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Regardless of whether New Zealanders love it, hate it or try to be indifferent, McConnell (1998) states that rugby "shapes New Zealand social history and everyday life" (p. 11). Critical examination of the social influence of rugby is, therefore, an important topic. Fraser (1991), for example, argued:

> The place rugby enjoys demands analysis. It is not simply a
> sport but it encompasses such matters as the class structure,
> mateship and male bonding, the perpetuation of sexist attitudes
> in New Zealand, not to mention the social functions it performs in
> diverse communities around the land. (p. i)

In the following sections, to help understand rugby's contemporary
claims to truth, I provide a social-historical analysis of the links between
rugby and masculinities.

Rugby and masculinities in nineteenth century English public schools

A dominant theme in literature examining the history of rugby,
particularly from a figurational perspective, is that the sport developed
from barbaric folk-games of medieval England and over time, as social
values changed, it was "civilised" (e.g., Collins, 1998; Dunning, 1986;
Dunning & Sheard, 1979). Reports suggest that the participants of these
folk-games were predominately men from neighbouring towns and
various social dispositions and that these unruly games often resulted
in injury and even death (Collins, 1998; Dunning & Sheard, 1979).
Nevertheless, these games persisted for several centuries. Dunning
(1986) speculated that the longevity and legitimacy of these games were
supported by "a fairly extreme form of patriarchy. As such, they
embodied the expression of macho values in a relatively unbridled form"
(p. 81). By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the folk-games were
in decline and by the end of that century they were virtually extinct
(Reid, 1988). The discourses of manliness that had long supported the
folk-games, however, continued to flourish within the boundaries of the
male only contexts of the English public schools. Indeed, it is widely
believed that the game of rugby developed from the modified folk-
games played within the English Public schools of the nineteenth century
(e.g. Chandler, 1996; Collins, 1998; Crosset, 1990; Dunning & Sheard,
1979; Morford & McIntosh, 1993; Rowe & McKay, 1998; White & Vagi,
1990). Moreover, Rowe and McKay (1998) argue that the
institutionalisation of these violent games by "bourgeois-aristocratic
classes ... mean that the genesis and development of modern sport
cannot be explained as simply an expression of a male predisposition to

violence" (p. 114). Rowe and McKay's argument help negate essentialist beliefs that problematically position males as inherently violent and rugby as a needed cathartic outlet for this violence.

From approximately the 1770s to 1830s, Dunning and Sheard (1979) suggested that the teaching fraternity who viewed the modified folk-games as ungentlemanly, increasingly frowned upon these games. Clashes between pupils and staff, often in reaction to the teachers' attempts to ban the games, led to numerous student protests and a small number of open rebellions (Dunning & Sheard, 1979; Morford & McIntosh, 1993). During the 1830s student numbers dropped and calls for radical school reforms became widespread (Morford & McIntosh, 1993). Dr. Thomas Arnold, headmaster at Rugby School (1828-42), was perhaps the first to achieve the balancing act of re-gaining staff authority yet allowing students a measure of independence so that parents felt that their sons were receiving a manly education that simultaneously trained them as gentleman (Dunning & Sheard, 1979). Arnold, among other reforms, infused the prefect-fag system with a moral/Christian tone (Morford & McIntosh, 1993). Specifically, he encouraged the boys to be physically tough but morally ethical, in other words, to be muscular Christians. Yet it would be overestimating Arnold's influence to assert that he alone changed the boys' prevailing notions of gentlemanliness. Nevertheless, the discourses associated with muscular Christianity are believed to have helped shape the Victorian notion of sportsmanship; which emphasised not only fair play, modesty, and following of rules but also encouraged males to participate in a "redblooded, aggressive and virile" manner (Morford & McIntosh, 1993, p. 61).

By the 1850-60s school masters began to believe in the educational value of sport, and a prevailing discourse emerged that helped constitute sport as an appropriate means for instilling manly character. In addition, sexuality became a pedagogical concern within the Victorian era (Foucault, 1978), and sporting practices became closely tied with issues of morality and sexuality. Many Victorian educators believed that by encouraging school-boys to be active in sport that little time or energy would be left for sexually immoral practices (Chandler, 1996). Sport was, therefore, believed to help build moral character by preventing

immoral thoughts and actions: "Weak, intellectual boys were thought to suffer from perverse thoughts and actions" (Crosset, 1990, p. 52). In contrast, "strong, athletic boys were thought to be in control of their passions" (Crosset, 1990, p. 52). Thus, discourses of sport and sexualities helped constitute power relations between sporting and non-sporting boys. Crosset contended that within the Victorian context, males who did not participate in sport indirectly risked becoming known as effeminate and unhealthy. Relatedly, weaker and non-sporting boys were marginalised as "wankers" or "saps". Crosset also argued that the institutionalisation of sport played a prime role in helping define "male sexuality as distinct from and superior to female sexuality" (p. 53). Sport, therefore, began to act inadvertently as a prime dividing practice.

The dominant and blurred discourses associated with manly character, sexuality, morality and health were factors that contributed to and legitimised the institutionalised growth of rugby from the 1860s onwards (Chandler, 1996). With the development and spread of sporting clubs during the 1860s, rugby football and other sports gained increased popularity, particularly among the middle classes (Collins, 1998). In 1863, given the growth of various "football" clubs and modes of playing, meetings were held to develop a *national* set of rules for football in England. Debate at these meetings centred on whether the game should be a running/handling or kicking/dribbling game, and whether hacking (e.g. kicking and foot-tripping of opponents) should be part of this game (Chandler, 1996). Chandler argued that because the Victorians were consumed by the moral imperative of health, and hacking was increasingly viewed as unhealthy, that the Football Association (FA) was formed with the ruling that football would be a kicking/dribbling game without hacking. This decision helped create the discursive space for rugby football to become institutionalised as a *hard man's* sport.

The staunch supporters of the sport that originated at Rugby School would not agree to become part of the FA. Campbell, a nineteenth century supporter of "Rugby" football, argued that banishing hacking supported "far more of the feelings of those who like their pipes and grog or schnapps more (sic) than the manly game of football" (as cited in

Chandler, 1996, p. 22). Campbell further predicted that if hacking was abolished "you will do away with all the courage and pluck of the game, and I will be bound to bring over a lot of Frenchmen, who would beat you with a week's practice" (as cited in Chandler, 1996, p. 23). In essence, Campbell argued that by banning hacking, the game would be less manly, less English and it would, therefore, emasculate the game (Chandler, 1996). Thus, the "manly" supporters of Rugby football did not join the FA. Campbell's comments, according to Chandler were a "precursor to much of the rhetoric of manliness and masculinity which was to surround rugby football in the future" (p. 23).

Violent practices within rugby football remained widespread. Reverend Dykes from Durham school in the 1860s, for example, stated: "'Hack him over' was the cry when anyone was running with the ball, and it was the commonest thing to see fellows hacked off their feet" (in Collins, 1998, p. 5). This pride of roughness also infiltrated the middle class game of rugby football played in the clubs in the 1860s-70s. In fact, Collins (1998) stated that "the violence and gamesmanship of middle-class football of this period must cast doubt on the reality of the so-called gentleman's code of playing the game purely for the game" (p. 16).

Collins (1998) argued the importance of pain tolerance or "hardening", specifically the practice of hacking, could not be underestimated in the development of rugby throughout the 1850s-60s. He stressed that "there was a wide spread view that great empires of the past had fallen because the ruling classes had grown luxurious and effeminate" (Collins, 1998, p. 4). Collins argued that nationalist aspirations associated with the British Empire helped legitimise the practices of rugby violence. Nevertheless, although the practice of hacking was central to the game of rugby throughout the 1850s-60s it was often under pressure to be abandoned. Chandler (1996) argued that the prevailing Victorian belief of a healthy mind in a healthy body finally led to the "official" abandonment of hacking in 1871, when standardised national rules for Rugby Football Union were developed.

By the 1870's, when the British Empire was at its largest, the sport of rugby football had become institutionalised. Sport, in general, now

constituted a central element of school life, so much so, "the way of sport became an indelible part" for every English school-boy, but not for girls (Morford & McIntosh, 1993, p. 69). Parker (1996) also asserted that sport became so influentially tied to nationalism that it was "seen as a kind of nurturing ground for the attitudes and values imperative to the maintenance of British imperialism" (p. 127). Indeed, it was at this time that graduates of public schools spread the sport of rugby to the English "colonies". Richardson (1995), for example, stated:

> The game reached New Zealand's shores as part of the cultural baggage of a generation of English public school old boys .... As the founding fathers of New Zealand's national game, these apostles of rugby were well versed in the litany of the games cult. To them, rugby was a game which inculcated 'manliness'. (p. 1)

The development and institutionalisation of rugby as a heavy-contact or dangerous sport in nineteenth century England was legitimated, in part, by discourses that constituted the sport as a maker of moral, healthy, and manly subjects. I argue that it is not necessarily helpful to conceptualise rugby's historical development and institutionalisation as revolving specifically around an assumed and broadly operating "civilising process" (e.g. Dunning & Sheard, 1979). In contrast, I suggest that although certain violent sporting practices and actions were eliminated throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, "the developing sport of rugby resisted 'civilising' trends and staunchly defended an essentially physical version of manliness" (Young, White & McTeer, 1994, p. 177). In the following section, I illustrate how the discursive influence of late nineteenth century English rugby shaped the development of rugby within Aotearoa/New Zealand.

Rugby and masculinities in Aotearoa/New Zealand from 1840 to 1970

Following the colonisation of Aotearoa/New Zealand in the 1840's and 1850's by the British, folk-football games took place in a casual and impromptu manner with teams seldom of equal size and, at times, a blurring between spectators and players (Crawford, 1985). During the 1870's and early 1880's, these early versions of rugby struggled for

legitimacy. Phillips (1996a) suggested that the violent image of the sport combined with its connections with elements of male pioneering culture – specifically excessive drinking, swearing and gambling - produced resistance to the game from the "more respectable middle class" (p. 77). Phillips reported, for example, that a Dunedin newspaper in 1875 described rugby as an excuse for anarchy and violence. Concern about rugby's violent image was such that the Bank of New Zealand instructed staff members not to participate in the sport (Crawford, 1985).

 To help pave the way for rugby's eventual cultural dominance, Phillips (1996b) suggested that attempts were made to make the game appear scientific and civilised. Regional rugby unions were formed in the 1880s and efforts were made to standardise the rules. In 1892 the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) was formed and a constitution was developed with the aim, in part, to help "curb the violence and bad behaviour associated with the game" (Phillips, 1996a, p. 79). Hacking was banned and an endeavour was specifically made to curtail, or at least hide, the practices of excessive drinking of alcohol that surrounded the game (Phillips, 1996a). The protagonists of rugby also drew on the discourses of muscular Christianity to help inculcate belief that rugby was a manly exercise necessary for the making of muscular gentlemen. The following extract from a letter to the editor, printed in the *Otago Daily Times* in 1878, reflects such sentiment:

> Was it to be held for a moment that on account of its danger football should be given up and young men should grow up effeminate? .... There was not the slightest doubt that football improved the stamina of Englishmen, Scotsmen and Irishmen. (as cited in Crawford, 1985, p. 43)

The efforts of the NZRFU and rugby supporters apparently succeeded because criticism of rugby declined and was replaced by growing acclamation. A by-product of the legitimation of rugby was that the game quickly grew in popularity. By the mid-1890s there were nearly 700 clubs throughout Aotearoa/New Zealand (Nauright, 1990) and over 50,000 male players were affiliated with the NZRFU (Phillips, 1996a).

 Phillips (1996b) suggested that the *initial* growth of rugby stemmed from the "old boys" from English schools who had the financial means,

leisure time, connections and desire, as disciplined by the discourses of muscular Christianity, to organise and promote inter-regional rugby games. However, Phillips' prime thesis of why rugby so quickly became important to a broad range of New Zealand males, rested on the assumption that rugby reinforced and meshed with the values inherent with the rugged pioneering male culture. He argued that rugby was characterised by long periods of hard and rough scrummaging, demanding of great physical strength and tolerance of pain and, therefore, rugby reflected and resonated with values already instilled among the pioneering males. Macdonald (1996), however, suggested that a "hard physical game was not the best pastime for men engaged in hard physical labour" (p. 10) and urban men with sedentary occupations - not rugged pioneers - were the first who populated the burgeoning rugby clubs.

The growing popularity of rugby amongst males was not restricted to the upper and middle classes as it was in England. An investigation of rugby players from Manawatu during 1878 to 1910 found that they "represented an almost exact cross-section of the male population" (Phillips, 1996a, p. 73). Maori males have been significant "actors in and users of rugby almost since its introduction in 1870" (MacLean, 1999, p. 1). The first team from Aotearoa/New Zealand to tour the United Kingdom was the "Native" team of 1888, all but four of whom were Maori (Ryan, 1993). As such, many believed that rugby was a prime producer of the "egalitarian culture" of Aotearoa/New Zealand. MacLean argued, however, that this quixotic belief is long due critical examination because the "hegemonic image of the New Zealand man excludes Maori" (p. 2). He asserted that rugby participation for Maori men did not help constitute them as muscular gentlemen, as it did for pakeha, but instead helped reaffirm the discursive framing of Maori as savages and warriors. Phillips (1996a), for example, reported that in the 1870s the *Wairarapa Star* problematically reported that Maori rugby players were "warm blooded animals whose interest easily degenerated into pugilistic encounters" (p. 77). However, Ryan (1997) stated with respect to the "Native tour" of Great Britain in 1888, that although "aspects of the behaviour of the tourists can only have reinforced notions of the

"degenerate" and "savage" Maori" (p. 75), the tour also helped challenge racist beliefs through showing "Maori were willing to conform to the very British customs of the sports field" (p. 75).

Although by the end of the nineteenth century rugby was the prime participation sport of Aotearoa/New Zealand men, valued for its apparent ability to masculinise its men, a growing nationalism also helped fortify rugby's cultural dominance (Sinclair, 1986). The successful tour of England and Wales by the 1905 Aotearoa/New Zealand men's rugby team, nicknamed the All Blacks during this tour, was strategically seized by politicians to help forge a national identity and affirm the value of rugby (Nauright, 1990). The many victories of the 1905 All Blacks, when Britain was dominant in world politics, provided political fodder for Premier Richard Seddon to laud the benefits of the "healthy" Aotearoa/New Zealand lifestyle (Phillips, 1996b). Rugby was soon deemed in the media as "our national game" and as a panacea for fears that urban males were becoming soft (Phillips, 1996a).

The success of the 1905 All Blacks entrenched discourses of rugby that positioned the game as a maker of tough but moral men. Phillips (1996a) illustrated that rugby was praised for its abilities to teach young males the benefits of hard work, determination, team-work, and moral character. Rugby, more specifically, became viewed as a valuable tool for sublimating sexual deviance through providing "a suitable channel for (male) adolescent energies" (Gray, 1983, p. 29). Truby King, influential medical doctor and founder of the Plunket society, warned in 1906 that, "only strenuous exercise would enable boys to maintain supremacy over themselves and those innate tendencies which have to be fought with and mastered" (as cited in Phillips, 1996b, p. 82). At the beginning of the twentieth century rugby was deemed an essential part of a boy's education (Richardson, 1995), and in boys' secondary schools, rugby participation became compulsory (Phillips, 1996a). The NZRFU, in 1908, worked to further entrench the dominance of rugby through freely distributing rugby balls to both primary and secondary schools (Richardson, 1995).

A serious threat to rugby's emerging cultural dominance, in the first decade of the twentieth century, was fuelled by resentment from working

class men to the amateur, elitist and imperialist ideals that underpinned rugby union (Richardson, 1995; Vincent & Harfield, 1997). The 1905 All Blacks had witnessed the professionalism of the "Northern Union" game (rugby league) in England and as rugby made the transition from pastime to mass spectator sport, the expectation that working men should travel to inter-provincial games without payment was challenged. Indeed, the "All-Golds", a professional rugby league team who included four All Blacks from the 1905 team, toured England in 1907 (Haynes, 1996). This tour helped endanger the status of rugby union and a lively dispute developed between the "conservative 'sporting Imperialists' and the reform-minded 'sporting Nationalists'" (Vincent & Harfield, 1997, p. 236). The imperialists argued that professionalism would corrupt the character-building abilities of rugby as a form of "manly exercise" (Vincent & Harfield, 1997, p. 236) and they actively protested the growth of rugby league. The threat of a major split occurring was also thwarted, in part, by "colonial pride" (Richardson, 1995, p. 6). Richardson (1995) suggested that many rugby officials knew that if Aotearoa/New Zealand rugby became divided, that this split would have consequences for playing standards at the international level. Appeals to nationalism, therefore, played a part in repelling the "ungentlemanly" threat of professionalism. Macdonald (1996) further argued that the outbreak of World War One helped dilute the tensions between the rival rugby codes.

From the 1920s to the late 1970s the dominating discourses that surrounded rugby in Aotearoa/New Zealand exerted their political influence with seemingly little resistance.[1] Rugby was discursively positioned as a hard man's game, a maker of moral and healthy men, "our" national game and a unifying force for the good of Aotearoa/New Zealand. Rugby, as such, became a "hard reality of life for every

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1. I acknowledge that it is easy but problematic to treat the 1920-70s as a somewhat homogenous time because it is a grossly under-researched period, particularly with respect to rugby. However, throughout this period, Aotearoa/New Zealand's rugby tours with South Africa did produce controversy. Thompson (1975), for example, stated that the South African policy of race restrictions "caused concern in the 1920's, a public outcry in the 1940's and a nation-wide protest in the late 1950's, the 1960's and early 1970's" (p. 1).

schoolboy" (Phillips, 1996a, p. 88) and "an inescapable feature of life in New Zealand's small–scale communities" (Star, 1999a, p. 231). The discourses of rugby legitimated the corporeally damaging nature of the sport and helped shape dominant notions of masculinity. Specifically, the dominance of rugby helped circulate and promote the knowledge that *real men* are tough and ignore pain (Phillips, 1996b). Indeed, ability to withstand and inflict pain had long been lauded qualities for rugby participants, particularly the All Blacks.

Rugby's cultural dominance reigned well into 1970s, however, by the late 1970s the stage was set for many New Zealanders to finally question the cultural position and values associated with rugby.

Contextualising rugby in the era of "high" modernity: 1970s to 2002

It was in the context of uncertainty, change and resistance of the 1970s and 1980s that the meta-narratives that had long supported rugby were finally questioned, and influential critiques of rugby were first published (e.g. McGee's 1981 iconoclastic play *Foreskin's lament* and Phillips' 1987 critical history *A man's country?*). Within this time period concern with racism, sexism and violence (e.g. anti-war protests) became major political issues and rugby was at the heart of some of these concerns. In 1973, for example, the newly elected Labour government cancelled the proposed South African Springbok rugby tour of Aotearoa/New Zealand, after a commissioned police report suggested that it would spark massive civil disturbance (Thompson, 1975). This decision by the Labour government proved politically damaging and the stage was set for bitter conflict between rugby supporters and anti-apartheid protestors.

Richards (1999) claimed that dependent on one's viewpoint, the Springboks were either Aotearoa/New Zealand's greatest sporting rivals or "the embodiment of ... a society whose architects were among the most emotionally backward and spiritually bankrupt members of the human race" (p. 44). In 1975 the National party, long supported by the conservative rural "backbone", made rugby relations with South Africa an election issue and swept to victory (Nauright & Black, 1996). The subsequent All Blacks' tour of South Africa, in 1976, occurred at the same time as the Soweto student uprisings and massacre (Nauright &

Black, 1996). In protest of this tour and on an unprecedented scale, 22 African countries boycotted the 1976 Montreal Olympics. To help prevent a similar boycott of the 1978 Edmonton Commonwealth Games, the Commonwealth Heads of Government adopted the "Gleneagles Declaration on Apartheid and Sport", which aimed to discourage sporting contacts with South Africa. Yet only three years later, the New Zealand government, again the National party, ignored the Gleneagles agreement and supported the NZRFU's invitation for the Springboks to play rugby in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Thompson, 1999).

The 1981 tour polarised the nation and produced spirited anti-racist protests that "unleashed a depth of public feeling and civil unrest in New Zealand unmatched since the depression" (Fougere, 1989, p. 111) or, as Sinclair (1986) suggested, since the Anglo-Maori wars of the 1860s. The protests were on such a grand scale that the tour only proceeded because the government made the playing of the matches possible by providing police and army protection for the rugby players and spectators (Thompson, 1999).

One remarkable feature of the protests was the influential role played by women (Star, 1992; Thompson, 1988). Feminists had long regarded rugby as a prime site for the production and affirmation of values that helped legitimate men's abilities to exercise greater power than women (Star, 1994a; Thompson, 1988). Thompson (1988), for example, asserted that rugby had historically exploited women's domestic labour while acting to exclude them from a prominent role in public life. Therefore, although many of these female protestors of 1981 were clearly concerned with challenging South African apartheid, aspects of their protest were also likely directed toward the sexism and violence entrenched within rugby (Star, 1994a). A specific group, Women Against Rugby (WAR), for example, initiated protest actions to encourage women to refuse "to co-operate with their assigned rugby roles" (Star, 1992, p. 124) or, more specifically, to withdraw their domestic labour, which often supported rugby. The tour, accordingly, provided a legitimate forum for many women to finally pronounce, in a public context, their resentment toward the cultural dominance of rugby.

Although many men protested the tour it was predominately men

who supported the tour by attending the rugby matches and these men were, at times, emotionally concerned that rugby was the focus for widespread civil unrest. The police, for example, were required on several occasions to help protect the protestors from physical harm by violently upset male rugby supporters. Richards (1999) reported that for many New Zealanders the official policy of the anti-apartheid movement to stop or at least disrupt games of rugby was viewed as "sacrilege, blasphemy and defilement all rolled into one ... (and) unpatriotic" (p. 45). The notion that Aotearoa/New Zealand should not have sporting contacts with South Africa "was to many a denial of a fundamental cornerstone of New Zealand life" (Richards, 1999, p. 45).

Fougere (1989) argued that because rugby played such a powerful role in the construction of many men's subjectivities and collective national identities, that these males likely perceived the anti-tour protests as a threat to their way of life. Fougere, therefore, asserted that the strong desire that many men felt for the tour to proceed was likely not due to pro-racist beliefs or even political ignorance, as reflected by the problematic slogan "keep politics out of sport", but as a response to a perceived threat to their masculine subjectivities.

The rugby protests helped many New Zealanders understand the politics associated with rugby's dominant socio-cultural position. Indeed, the dominating discourse that proclaimed that rugby was Aotearoa/ New Zealand's "national game" was now under threat with the recognition that rugby had, in effect, divided the country. In the early 1980s, for example, reverse discourses of rugby circulated to counter-position rugby players and fans as politically ignorant, sexist and violent. The workings of these reverse discourses helped enact significant changes. The aftermath of the tour resulted in rugby losing players, coaches, sponsorship, government funding, and support from teachers (Keane, 1999; Star, 1992). Nauright (1996) described this time-period as "a moment of hegemonic crisis as threats to the established order of a white, male rugby-dominated New Zealand came to the fore" (p. 230).

This resistance to rugby also articulated with an increased academic concern about the cultural influence of rugby. Phillips (1984; 1987; 1996a, 1996b) warned that the stereotypic and narrow image of the Aotearoa/

New Zealand male as influenced by rugby's cultural dominance, was costly. This image, according to Phillips, portrayed Kiwi "blokes" as rugged, tough, strong, unemotional, hard drinking, scornful of women (yet compulsorily heterosexual) and also practical, loyal and honest. Phillips (1996b) argued that the constraining impact of this narrow image was specifically harmful to "women, gays, (and) intellectuals... In addition, the sheer ideological hegemony of the male mythology served to disguise conflicts and obscure diversity within society itself" (p. 284). Phillips argued that the narrow image of masculinity inflicted a cost on the men who uncritically adopted the tough Kiwi bloke image for themselves.

By the mid-1980s the NZRFU, well aware of rugby's predicament, became active in attempting to re-construct the image of rugby. One strategy used the televising of the 1987 inaugural Rugby World Cup "to embark on an extensive public relations campaign to present rugby as non-violent, non-sexist, non-racist, safe and so on" (Star, 1994b, p. 39). The media image that rugby adopted used nostalgic representations of past rugby successes and heroes (Nauright, 1996): these reconstructions linked rugby and manly glories with an apparently more united and stable Aotearoa/New Zealand. Images of the 1956 rugby tour by South Africa were also boldly used to gain benefit from the nostalgia associated with the 1950s: a time period when the economy was prosperous and there was little public discussion of political problems such as racism and sexism (Nauright, 1996).

The mediated image of rugby and its male participants, throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, was also deliberately softened and marketed to appeal to a wider audience, particularly women and children (Perry, 1994). Glossy magazines and television advertisements provided coverage of another dimension of rugby men's lives - their family relationships and lifestyles. A television advertisement of the mid-1990s, for example, featured All Black captain Sean Fitzpatrick hugging his mother, while she reported that she raised him on baked beans. Although this advert illustrated an All Black expressing love for his mum, Nauright (1996) stated that it still emphasised the importance of women's domestic labour for rugby. Nevertheless, rugby players were no longer solely

depicted as narrow caricatures of traditional masculinity, but a more complex and rounded image emerged.

The commodification of rugby also resulted in marketing campaigns designed to attract non-traditional rugby supporters. Pre-game entertainment started to include rock music, cheerleaders, team mascots and even fireworks when games became staged at night. Rugby was, therefore, re-packaged as wholesome family entertainment (Obel, 2001). This commodification process was also linked to the end of "shamateurism", when the International Rugby Board (IRB), in August 1995, announced that professionalisation was now officially sanctioned.

The symbiotic relationship that had long existed between rugby and the media strengthened throughout the 1990s (Star, 1999a). Rugby's ongoing reconstruction occurred in direct partnership with the media, particularly global television networks (Hutchins, 1998; Obel, 1998). Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation in 1995 gained the global televising rights for the Tri-Nations Series for US$555 million over ten years (Hutchins, 1998). Moreover, the IRB, concerned with rugby's value as a global commodity, instituted rule changes to help de-brutalise aspects of the game and to make it "pretty to watch". These changes stemmed, in part, from the media threat posed by the openly professional game of rugby league; whose successful re-imaging had resulted in its growing popularity (see Lynch, 1993). The IRB rule changes were, therefore, primarily concerned with increasing rugby's market share by aiming to make the game more exciting and accessible to non-traditional rugby viewers (Hutchins, 1998).

Changes to rugby union rules were also designed to make the game safer, or at least appear safer. The discursive repositioning of rugby, as related to the 1981 tour, had resulted in increased media concern with respect to the extent and severity of rugby injuries. The NZRFU, in part response, reformed the rules of the sport to help make the game less dangerous. The most radical rule changes targeted youth (i.e. boys) rugby, primarily in an attempt to ease the concerns of parents and teachers. The modified game for young players, aptly called "new image rugby", banned the tackle and replaced it with a two-handed touch in 1987. Rule changes also occurred in the mainstream adult game primarily

in an attempt to reduce the risk of spinal injury, which had been receiving negative press. The rule changes encouraged belief that rugby was safer to play (e.g. Calcinai, 1992), yet rugby remained a relatively dangerous game. Results from an epidemiological study suggested that the frequency of rugby spinal injuries actually increased from 1976 to 1995, despite the rule changes (Armour, Clatworthy, Bean, Wells & Clarke, 1997).

Associated with the re-legitimisation of rugby in the mid-1990s an increasing number of multi-national businesses used rugby and its link to nationalism to sell their products. An Addidas advertisement, for example, featured an array of ex-All Black captains changing their uniform while the background singer urged viewers through a patriotic song to "bless them all". Further, an advert for the Australian owned National Bank celebrated that although All Black Alama Ieremia had sustained a long list of damaging injuries he was heroically tough and did not think of "packing it in". In addition, an advert for American based fast-food chain McDonalds featured a giant size image of All Black Jonah Lomu fighting a computer-generated monster to help sell and construct the "Kiwi" burger as local (Jackson & Andrews, 1999). These advertisements, in their use of nationalism, celebration of pain and toughness, helped reflect the security of position that rugby had regained since the early 1980s.

The re-imaging of rugby, in combination with the All Blacks victory in the 1987 World Cup, helped thwart rugby's moment of "hegemonic crisis" (Nauright, 1996). McConnell (1996), for example, reported that in 1988 there were 137,000 registered rugby players but by 1993 this had grown to 205,000. Further, the deregulation of television in 1990, in accords with the growth of neo-liberalism and the new-right market philosophies, contributed to television sport coverage increasing by a remarkable 141% (McGregor, 1994). Leading this increase was rugby union followed by rugby league. These two rugby codes accounted for nearly half of all television news coverage of sport (McGregor, 1994).

By the end of the 1990s rugby was re-entrenched in a dominant cultural position in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Although rugby was more openly shaped by an array of multiple and competing discourses, the

dominating discourses of rugby that emerged in nineteenth century English public schools and that had been politically shaped with nationalistic fervour at the beginning of the twentieth century, still circulated in a web-like manner and exerted influence. Rugby, therefore, was still viewed by many as our national game, a "real man's" game and as ideal for instilling manly characteristics. The following quote from an influential sports journalist/author is reflective of these romanticised sentiments:

> From the time I saw the All Blacks run on to the park that first time, like a spill of black opals on green baize, I was hooked for life. They have never let me down. They have lost the occasional match, but it has never been because they gave up or because they did not play their hearts out to the last seconds. Because they have the guts to win, even when perhaps they should in theory lose, they represent, to me anyway, the best characteristics of the New Zealand male: resilience, courage, toughness, enterprise, innovation and perseverance. (Zavos, 1988, p. 119)

However, competing discourses and associated practices of rugby also exert influence at the dawning of the twenty-first century. The growing number of females who enjoy participation in rugby helps challenge the discourse that constitutes rugby as a man's game. More specifically, the Black Ferns' back-to-back victories in the recent Rugby World-Cup gained the national women's team a degree of credence. The advent of openly gay men playing rugby has also challenged dominating discourses of rugby and masculinities. The Ponsonby Heroes Rugby Club in Auckland, for example, was set up in 1997 with the mission to provide gay and bisexual men a club to enjoy rugby participation within. Further, as media surveillance became a more prominent feature of rugby in the 1990s, the transgressions of professional rugby players were more readily exposed. Recent images of a drunken Tana Umaga, for example, have gained media coverage, as have reports of Jonah Lomu's marital infidelities, Norm Hewitt's history of school bullying and drug dealing, and the occasional violent off-field exploits of professional players, such as Keith Robinson, Riki Flutey, Jerry Collins and Romi

Ropati (Pringle, 2001). These media reports have helped challenge the discourse that positioned rugby as a maker of gentlemanly character.

The discourse that informed that "real rugby men" should take pain in stoical fashion has also been under threat in recent years. For example, after it was revealed that Norm Hewitt played with a broken arm during the National Provincial Cup final in 1999, public debate raised the issue of whether Hewitt's actions constituted poor role modelling for boys. More pointedly, rugby has, at times, continued to be the direct target of public criticism. Well-known journalist Sandra Coney (1999), for example, recently argued that "rugby is impossible to escape, and it's heading in a direction which is increasingly harmful to New Zealand, and men in particular" (p. C4).

Critical commentators concerned with the circulation of multiple discourses of rugby and masculinity have even raised the possibility that a contemporary *crisis* of masculinity in Aotearoa/New Zealand may be in progress. Thomson (2000), for example, argued that although rugby once helped provide men with a collective identity "today, however, a strong collective identity is no longer prominent, and it might even be suggested that young New Zealand males face something of an identity crisis" (p. 34). International commentators have also suggested that males may face a more general crisis of masculinity (e.g. Næss, 2001; Whannel, 1999). Næss (2001), for example, reported that in Norway the gender order has been substantially challenged on many fronts and narratives of the new man and the caring father "have taken their place alongside, and compete with, the traditional narratives" (p. 129). Whannel (1999) concluded from his media analysis of the representation of sport stars, that the tensions from various masculinity narratives have resulted in a recomposed but tension filled form of masculinity that is "traditional but disciplined, respectable rather than rough, hard but controlled, (and) firm but fair..." (p. 263).

Last words

This socio-historic review of rugby and its links to masculinities within Aotearoa/New Zealand suggest that rugby is subject to an array of discourses that produce multiple and, at times, competing

understandings. It is, therefore, difficult to understand with any precision how rugby articulates with masculinities. Nevertheless, I am concerned that the cultural dominance of rugby likely helps link and glorify an influential way of performing masculinity with sporting prowess, acceptance of some acts of violence, heterosexuality, and tolerance of pain. The discursive articulations between rugby and masculinities could also act to marginalize other more gentle and respectful forms of masculinities. Therefore, rugby may help reinforce dominating but problematic discourses of masculinities. Yet it would be questionable to believe that involvement in rugby exclusively produces male rugby players who are consistently uncritical about violence, pain and relations of power: rugby players may often be disciplined to be disrespectful of bodies during competition but in other social contexts they are generally expected to be respectful. Rugby players, under the conditions of late modernity, can be regarded as influenced by multiple and competing discourses which come to the fore in a pastiche of different social contexts, and these discourses may produce difficulties for the maintenance of coherent senses of self.

I recognise that my socio-historic review of rugby, as represented in this paper, feels rather disembodied or removed from the lived experiences of individuals. I am also aware that my review tends to paint grand views of the workings of discourse in its attempt to account for rugby's "history of the present". Relatedly, Foucault's genealogical approach has been critiqued for its tendency to overstate the ontological effects of select discourses. Gubrium and Holstein (2000), for example, stated that: "Foucault was inclined to overemphasize the predominance of discourses in constructing the horizons of meaning at particular times of places, conveying the sense that discourse fully details the nuances of everyday life" (p. 501). In contrast they suggested that "a more interactionally sensitive analytics of discourse – one tied to discursive practice – resists this tendency" (p. 501). In following Gubrium and Holstein's advice, I recognise the importance to examine the discursive practices associated with rugby participation to help understand how lived experiences of rugby help shape masculinities. In other words, I believe it is important to understand how the multiple discourses that

surround rugby and masculinities are lived into existence.

However, little is known about the influence of rugby with respect to how males within Aotearoa/New Zealand understand and negotiate their relationships with masculinities. Although interest in examining the socio-cultural influence of rugby within Aotearoa/New Zealand has grown since the late 1980s (e.g. Fougere, 1989; Maclean, 1999; Nauright, 1996; Phillips, 1996a, 1996b; Richards, 1999; Star, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1999b; Thompson, 1988, 1999; Thomson, 1993, 2000; Trevelyan & Jackson, 1999) there have been surprisingly few empirical investigations of the relationship between rugby and masculinities: Park's (2000) critical examination of haemophilia and masculinity, and de Jong's (1991) social history of rugby being two prime exceptions. In this respect, a prime aim of this paper was to help reveal the social significance of rugby and its discursive connections to masculinities with the desire to encourage further empirical research concerning sport and masculinities. In addition, I hope to have illustrated how fruitful sport can be as a subject for research in sociological and gender studies.

Acknowledgements

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Richard Pringle is a lecturer in the Department of Sport and Leisure Studies within the School of Education at the University of Waikato. His current research includes examination of the place of rugby union in men's lives and its impact on understandings of masculinities from a Foucauldian perspective.

Buying Time: Constructing the Time of Consumption

Paul Harris

Abstract

The time allocated for consumption in industrialised societies was, for many years, based on the assumption that the family unit comprised a husband who had a paid job, and a wife who stayed at home doing unpaid labour including the work of consumption. The "housewife" was "free" to organise the work of consumption throughout the week, and legislation restricting shop opening hours reflected that. The material basis of the family unit was the "family wage" earned by the man and which became law in 1936 in New Zealand. In the post World War Two world, however, married women increasingly took up paid employment and eventually gained the legal right to equal pay. That meant the demise of the family wage, but married women continued to be responsible for the majority of the work of consumption within the family. The resulting "time squeeze" on married women contributed to the deregulation of shop opening hours, whilst the advent of internet shopping seemed to offer a means by which married women could save time in shopping. Neither development resolves the continuing problem facing married women trying to combine paid and upaid labour, which is that of a continuing inequality in the amount of time that women and men spend on the work of consumption.

The modern dream of the temporal paradise is full of the magic formula 'if only I had time for...' (Nowotny, 1994)

Introduction

Since the industrial revolution, the time of production (the hours spent in paid labour) has been an area of conflict. The history of the struggles around it, involving employers, workers, governments and unions, has been extensively documented and analysed as Adams' (1990; 1995) writings on this topic demonstrate. The work of consumption, such as buying and preparing food, was a necessity for the reproduction of paid

labour. This time of consumption also had to be constructed (Nowotny, 1994), but how that occurred and according to what norms or regulations, has been less widely analysed. One reason for the might be the privileging, for many years, of production as both an economic activity and a subject of investigation, a perspective shared by economists, Marxists, governments and social theorists alike (Nava & Minsky, 1994; Slater, 1997; Wyrwa, 1998; Ericsson, 2000).

This paper investigates the structuring of the time of consumption, with particular emphasis on the post- World War Two period and on the New Zealand experience. The subject around which the discussion is based is the working class married couple, for it was around this subject that many of the relevant policies, ideological positions and normative assumptions were built. It will be argued that two distinct but overlapping sets of factors were instrumental in the process of structuring the time of consumption, those internal to the married family and those imposed on it externally.

The family wage and the housewife

In 1936 the New Zealand Labour government took two steps of major significance for the structuring of the time of consumption. It introduced a forty- hour, five-day, working week for most occupations and it legislated for separate wage rates for female and male employees. The female rate was less than half the male rate, for the latter was meant to provide a "family wage" to enable a married man to keep a dependent wife and three children in a fair and reasonable standard of comfort (Hare, 1946; Woods, 1963). A clear idea of what a working family was and how it should occupy its time was encapsulated in these changes. The husband was the breadwinner, his realm was paid labour. The wife was the housewife, her domain was the home and the work of consumption was her responsibility. The weekends were to be family time. This was to be New Zealand's version of the "cult of domesticity" (Toynbee, 1995; Nolan, 2000).

The family wage had long been campaigned for by New Zealand (and Australian) trade unions (Nolan, 2000). Its achievement did not "make" married women into unpaid dependents, for the great majority

of them were in that position already. In 1936 less than 4% of married women in New Zealand had a paid job (Society for Research on Women, 1983; Nolan, 2000). The sole bread-winner model of the family had been predominant in urban New Zealand from the turn of the twentieth-century (Toynbee, 1995) and it had become a mark of working class "respectability" for married women not to have paid jobs, just as it was in Britain (Grint, 1991). The "family wage" simply made this system more sustainable for male workers, and it thereby put a legal seal of approval on the separation of male and female roles within marriage that that became "crystallised in the twentieth century" (Iglehart, 1979).

"Freed" from paid labour the housewife could undertake those tasks necessary to sustain the family. These included domestic production tasks such as sewing and knitting clothing and pickling and preserving foodstuffs. Work directly associated with family consumption included shopping for food and household necessities, buying children's school clothes and supplies, food preparation and cleaning up after meals (Wells, 1998; McCracken, 2002). To some degree how this work was organised seemed to be more open to choice than strictly regulated and employer-policed hours of paid labour. Within budgetary constraints the housewife had some choice of what to buy and when to buy it. Shopping could also be a leisure as well as a functional activity (Newby, 1993: Nava, 1994). But there were internal and external limits to the degree of choice available. For meals, what could be bought depended not only on money on but the husband's taste in food, for feeding the breadwinner was the housewife's duty. The time of the husband's return from work became the focal point around which the main meal of the day was eaten, just as it became a "tradition" for the housewife to prepare the main family meal of the week on Sunday (Charles & Kerr, 1988; Beardsworth & Keil, 1997).

The structuring of the time the housewife had available for shopping was externally constrained by legislation governing shop closing hours. The Saturday (whole or half-day) and early evening closing of large shops, such as department stores, had become the practice in the majority of industrialised nations. This often followed, as in the New Zealand case, from the same "protective" legislation that reduced the

working hours of female shop employees (Pember Reeves, 1902). Sunday closing also became the norm, but this followed a somewhat different logic. In those countries with a Protestant heritage such as the USA, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, sabbatarian laws – known as the "Blue" laws in the USA (Rakoff, 2002) governed what was permissible on Sundays. Paid labour was generally not permissible and neither was Sunday shopping – other than at small, local, shops, and many forms of mass entertainment were also prohibited. Sunday was a day for the family to be together and the State did its best to ensure that families had little choice in that matter.

Equal pay and the decline of the housewife

The construction of the married woman as the housewife who had all week "free" in which to do the work of consumption began seriously to be undermined in the post-World War Two long boom. The "golden age" of capitalism, that lasted from the 1950's to around 1975 (Schor, 1991) saw increased numbers of married women enter paid labour. In New Zealand, 10.4% of married women had paid jobs by 1956 (12.9% for Pakeha women) and 32.6% by 1976 (Society for Research on Women, 1982; Nolan, 2000). By 1971 in New Zealand, just under half of all the women in paid jobs were married (Select Committee, 1975). The same trend manifested itself in the majority of industrialised nations, and particularly so in the USA and Scandinavia (Hagen & Jenson, 1988, Fukuyama, 1999, Forssén, 2000). The need to increase family income to pay for the newly acquired commodities such as tvs, washing machines, cars, fridges, and in some cases newly acquired mortgages, provided an incentive (Goldthorpe et al, 1968; Department of Statistics, 1984; Hagen and Jenson, 1988; Schor, 1991; Wells, 1998). The expansion of State and private sector services also saw the creation of jobs that were seen as "appropriate" for women (Armstrong & Armstrong, 1988; Nowotny, 1994).

The increased participation of women in paid labour brought with it intensified demands by women's organisations and supportive bodies for equal pay. From the late 1950's through to the 1970's various nations conceded that demand, such as Canada in 1956, the USA in 1963 and

Britain in 1970 (Justice Canada, 2000: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2003; Equal Opportunities Commission, 2003). In New Zealand women employed in government service gained equal pay in 1960 and in 1972 coverage was extended to the rest of the paid labour force (Equal Opportunities Commission, 2003; Parliament of New Zealand, 1960, 1972). The importance of equal pay for this discussion is that it meant the end of the legally enforced family wage. Toynbee (1995) argues that the family wage was meant provided the material basis for the breadwinner/housewife family, if so then in New Zealand this basis had a maximum shelf life of only 36 years.

These changes did not imply the end of the role of the housewife. On the contrary, the 1950's have been characterised as the "golden age" of the breadwinner/house wife family (Iglehart, 1979; Crompton, 2002). A German marriage law "reform" of 1958 legally defined the married woman as the "woman housewife" and the husband as the breadwinner (Niemeyer, 2002). In 1960's Britain women were still dominated by the role of housewife/mother (Pahl & Pahl, 1971) and in the early 1970's in New Zealand it was still the "widely accepted" view that "women's primary function is that of housewife and mother" (Select Committee, 1975, p.65). Wives continued to be responsible for by far the greatest amount of time spent on the work of consumption, though in the 1960's husbands seem to have increased the time they spent on food preparation (Baxter, 2002). Wives put in long hours on this work and it has been estimated that in 1965 of the 55.4 hours a week on average of domestic labour that they did, 27 hours were spent on food preparation and shopping (Wells, 1998).

The total amount of time spent on consumption work fell only slowly. What changed most was the composition of that time. The time spent on food preparation decreased, that spent on shopping increased (Hewitt, 1993; Wells, 1998). One of the factors that led to the decline in the hours spent on food preparation was a shift from making food to buying it. An obvious example was the switch from baking bread to buying loaves (Roberts E, 1986; Eldred-Grigg, 1990). Another factor was the increased availability and acceptability of pre-prepared and fast food. Married women who had had paid jobs had been using such foods, fish and chips

for instance, for many years (Roberts, R. 1976; Black, 1983). The Hamilton housewife who in the 1970's bought "ready-cooked food so that she doesn't need to cook" (Society for Research on Women, 1976, p.49) was following an established pattern. The longer hours spent shopping have been associated with the processes of suburbanisation and the spread of supermarkets and shopping malls (Whyte 1956; Hewitt, 1993; Ritzer, 1996). Shopping time became increasingly organised around the car/ supermarket nexus or, for poorer people, the public transport/ supermarket nexus. In either case, trips to make major shopping expeditions took more time.

After the boom ended in the mid-1970's, the rate of married women's participation in paid labour continued to increase, as did the proportion of women in full-time jobs (Hagen & Jenson, 1988; Fukuyama, 1999; Forssén, 2000). This was in the context of, and was partly a response to, decreasing real male wages caused by lay-offs and closures in areas of high male wage employment and in employer driven reductions in male wages and conditions (Armstrong & Armstrong, 1988; Wells, 1998; Fukuyama, 1999). By this point in time the housewife as a category and as a career was losing its popularity. Women in the USA in the 1960's and 1970's had began to rebel against it (Iglehart, 1979) and by the 1970's there were also signs of rebellion amongst New Zealand housewives (Select Committee, 1975; Society for Research on Women, 1976; Iglehart, 1979). Changes in society were taking place that functioned to undermine the category of housewife. Although marriage continued to be popular, the divorce rate in New Zealand had more than doubled from 1965 to 1975 (Goodger, 1998). By the early 1980's women were having an average of two children each compared to four in the 1960's (Statistics New Zealand, 2003). There was a small but steady rise in the number of single parent families in New Zealand. The introduction of the Domestic Purposes Benefit in 1973 offered financial support to all single mothers, whether they were divorced, separated or never-married, although this policy could be interpreted as one that was meant to focus women on their role as mothers and keep them out of paid labour (Goodger, 1998; Walter, 2002; Statistics New Zealand, 2003).

But for married women, who continued to function as housewives,

trying to combine the times of production and consumption became problematic. For women in full-time jobs, doing family shopping posed difficulties. It might be possible to snatch a few minutes out of a lunchbreak or by going straight to the shops on the way home from work, but this could also be difficult if the workplace was located well away from the shops. The continued restrictions on shop opening hours that remained the norm in much of Europe, Canada, Australia and New Zealand exacerbated this problem. In the New Zealand retail trade, from 1945 onwards shops - with the normal exceptions such as dairies - operated on a five days, forty hour week. This situation had only been relaxed slightly by the 1970's when Christie could refer to the "present basic structure of five days plus one late night shopping...certain goods cannot be sold at the weekend" (1973, pp.19-20). Saturday shopping was not introduced until 1980 and even then it was only after overcoming vehement opposition from the shop workers' unions (Hince et al, 1990). The changing pattern of shopping was noticeable in the United States, where the lack of women shoppers during the week, and consequent lobbying by retailers, was one reason US legislators became supportive of shops opening on Sundays (Rakoff, 2002).

Open all hours

The deregulation of shopping hours proved to be one means by which the time pressure on employed married women might be eased, though that was not the reason for its introduction into nations like New Zealand. Rather, it was part of the wave of neo-liberalism that swept the country after 1984. A central theme of neo-liberalism is that of consumer sovereignty. The individual consumer is seen as the driving force of the competitive market that the neo-liberals hold as the goal to be attained through deregulation and other pro-market economic "reforms" (Kerr, 1993). In this vision of economic reality, consumption is valued in its own right, not as a mere adjunct to production. The "subject of consumption" (Miller & Rose, 1997) for neo-liberals is the individual exercising choice in the market place, theoretically their gender is irrelevant and so too are any considerations of family or community ties (Beck, 1992). Hence as neo-liberalism became the dominant ideology of New Zealand

capitalism in the post-1984 years, neo-liberals were happy to push through the deregulation of shop opening hours whatever the protests of unions, churches and civic groups and all other would-be protectors of women workers or supporters of family life. In 1990 the Shop Trading Hours Repeal Act revolutionised New Zealand shopping hours. There were to be only three and a half days a year (Christmas Day, Good Friday, Easter Sunday and Anzac Day before 1 p.m.) when the majority of shops could not open (Parliament of New Zealand, 1990). A 2001 amendment to that law exempted garden centres from the Easter Sunday closing proviso (Parliament of New Zealand, 2001).

Other developed nations that have not embraced neo-liberalism as fervently now find themselves with more restrictive shopping hours than New Zealand, especially as far as Sunday shopping is concerned. In 1996 Germany permitted shops to open until 4 p.m. on Saturdays whilst still prohibiting Sunday opening (Flippo, 1998), whilst recent proposals to extend Saturday opening to 8 p.m. have led to protests by the union representing retail workers (UNI Commerce, 2002). In 2000 Austrian proposals to allow shops to increase their total weekly opening hours from 66 to 72, but not including Sundays, also met with union opposition (eironline, 2001). Within its federal framework, Australia allows different States to legislate their own shop trading hours. Though the national trend has been to deregulation, Sunday shopping remains as being either forbidden (except for small shops) or subject to restrictions that no longer exist in New Zealand (Government of New South Wales, 2003; Government of Queensland, 2003; Shopping Center Council of Australia, 2002). Even in post-Thatcher Britain it was not until 1994 that the British allowed shops to open on Sunday (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003).

The Internet began to gain popularity around the globe at approximately the same time that neo-liberalism did. In its wake, it brought new possibilities for extending the time in which shopping could take place. The Internet promised to liberate shopping from the constraints of both space and time by making it available globally, around the clock. As Ritzer (1998) says, in describing the US Home Shopping Network: "Now goods from anywhere in the world can be purchased at

any time of the day or night; no more frustration over being unable to consume because the shops are closed" (p.91). Two main kinds of consumer operation have become available through the Internet. There are the "bricks and mortar" outlets such as supermarkets like Woolworths in Australia and New Zealand and Marks and Spencer's in Britain, banks, real estate agents and travel agents, all of which offer Internet access to their products and services. Then there are the specialist "virtual shopping" outlets such as Amazon and CD Universe that are available globally on a 24/7 basis. Access to the Internet has a social class bias in that it requires ready access to a computer and also, for many types of Internet shopping, the possession of a credit card. In New Zealand, as in other nations like the USA, Internet access and credit card usage are both weighted in favour of higher income groups (ACNielsen, 2002; Statistics New Zealand, 2002).

Men have been the heaviest users of Internet services but women are increasing the amount of time they spend on it. An international survey in 2002 found that women were the majority of the home internet audience/users in Canada and the USA, with New Zealand in third place with a 49.1% female user rate, followed by Australia, Finland and Korea at over 47% (Nielsen NetRatings, 2002). Shopping is one of the major uses that women are making of the Internet (Rainie, 2002; Cyber Atlas Staff, 2002). In Britain women outnumber men as online buyers of clothes, toys, groceries, and domestic appliances (Nua.com, 2001). Those items are ones associated with women's role as family shoppers, suggesting that the Internet has simply been substituted for the physical shop within a continuing gendered division of domestic labour. There is also a growing tendency to do Internet shopping from the workplace, although to do so can lead to dismissal (Rainie, 2002; Wilde, 2002; Cacciottolo, 2003). Why take the risk? Women who shop from work say that they do so because it saves time (Microsoft Press Pass, 2001; Rainie, 2002).

The need to save time, and the readiness to take risks in so doing, is a reflection of the "time squeeze" to which married women with jobs, and especially those also with young children, are subjected (Schor, 1991; Robinson & Godbey, 1997; Hill and Wei-Jun 2000). This is a phenomenon now common in developed nations. In Canada, for

instance, time use survey evidence shows that women aged 25-44 who are employed and have children at home are by far the most time-stressed group in the nation (Statistics Canada, 1999). One way to relieve the pressure is to speed up shopping, as the women using the Internet are doing. Another option is to cut back on the overall time spent on consumption work. This is where fast and pre-prepared foods have their advantages. As McCracken (2002) says: "Stopping for fast food seems easier than rushing home to cook dinner for a family after a long day at work". The USA leads the way in the production and consumption of fast and instant foods and the speed at which they can be served or made is seen by consumers as one of their great advantages (Smart, 1994; Jekanowski, 1999a; Meyer, 2001; Schlosser, 2001; Horovitz, 2002). There is also a growing trend to the consumption of ready prepared meals sold by supermarkets and other food retailers (Jekanowski, 1999b). In the late 1990's this Home Meal Replacement (HMR) market began to boom in the USA and the UK and Australian supermarkets soon followed suit in catering for it (Moomaw, 1996; Australian Food News, 1997; Institute for Horticultural Development, 1998).

The use of these foodstuffs has enabled both women and men to reduce the amount of time that they spend on food preparation and cleaning up after meals. In Australia, from 1986 to 1997 the hours per week spent on these tasks by women and men fell from 14 to 10 and from 7 to 5 respectively (Baxter, 2002). These figures also illustrate the fact that women are continuing to do a disproportionate amount of the work of consumption. Men in two income families are doing more, especially food preparation, but still less than women (Hewitt, 1993; Beardsworth & Keil, 1997; Statistics New Zealand/Ministry of Women's Affairs, 2001; Baxter, 2002). The time gap continues to be particularly large for family shopping (Robinson & Godbey, 1997; Arent, 1999) and in Australia, for example, women "continue to spend about twice as much time as men" on grocery shopping (Baxter, 2002, p.414). Speeding up and saving time on consumption can therefore be seen as contemporary attempts to adapt to external and internal circumstances. The hours of the paid labour the wife carries out, and also those of the husband, comprise an external restraint. Internally, they are responses to the

continuing inequalities between women and men in the amount of time each spend on the work of consumption.

Consumption now and for ever

Consumption is no longer a junior sibling to production. On the contrary, it is now a matter of major economic, political and theoretical significance. Consumer confidence is used as a measure of the success or otherwise of an economy. President Bush urged the people of the USA to consume as a patriotic duty in order to prevent a serious recession in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks (Said, 2003). Its significance is now recognised by sociologists and other social theorists (Miller, D. 1995; Slater, 1997) and some, such as Bauman, have spent a considerable amount of effort on analysing it and in trying to explain to us its manifold ramifications. The advertisers, marketers and sellers of goods and services reiterate to us the importance of consumption, and especially of buying. Acting as they are within the calculus of sales and profits, to them the time to buy is the "Now!" that is emphasised in countless promotions. The time of consumption thereby becomes an "extended present" (Nowotny, 1994, p.52) or a "series of perpetual presents" (Jameson, 1993, p.125), and the "spectacular career of the 'now'" (Bauman, 1998, p.81) is launched.

Yet the "long arm of the job" (Nowotony, 1994, p.108) continues to exert its pressure on the time available for consumption in all its forms. For dual income families, this time still has to be wrested from the employers. Over the last 30 years or so there has been a trend to a reduction in the hours of paid labour in industrialised nations, although there is some evidence that the opposite development has occurred in the USA (Schor, 1991; Raghavan, 1999). Significant reductions in the basic working week of paid labour are few and far between. The establishment of the40 hour week in 1936 was the last major reduction in formal working time in New Zealand. The35 hour week introduced into France in 1997 was scrapped in 2002, partly because working class families resented the limits it put on their opportunities to work overtime (Webster, 2002). Gaining increases in the amount of paid leave available is another way that workers can reduce total paid working hours per year. The extension

of paid leave is open to contestation by employers, and New Zealand employers opposed attempts to increase the basic holiday entitlement from three to four weeks (Business New Zealand, 2002).

Holidays have become a time in which working families can enjoy consumption that was not subject to the rhythms of production, although the extent of an holiday is bounded by the time of production. Whilst on holiday, people could enjoy a pattern of consumption in which the satisfaction of the pleasure principle predominated. The shopping holiday, of which the main objective is to undertake a sustained bout of hedonistic consumption, is a more recent innovation. It has been facilitated by the deregulation of shopping hours, the construction of urban space like malls that are focussed on consumption and the accessibility of speedy transport system. Three hours after take off from Auckland, people can be arriving in Sydney for a shopping spree, for example. Increasing the amount of paid leave improves the chances that families will either combine shopping with other forms of tourism or just use their free time to go shopping overseas. Amongst the major industrialised nations, US workers are entitled to substantially less paid leave than their European Union counterparts and to less leave than Japanese workers (Carley, 2002). Because of that, US firms with interests in the tourist travel markets have understandably become extremely supportive of campaigns to increase that entitlement (Escape Magazine, 2000; Work to Live, 2003a).

The shopping holiday, internet shopping, the myriad cafes in which one can buy breakfast or lunch or dinner and thus escape the necessity of making a meal, the fast food outlets, the instant products: all combine to create the illusion of a sphere of consumption freed from all the old constraints imposed by time and space. The promise is of Uchronia, a utopia of "More free time, less work, more consumption, more fun...Uchronia is now, and it too seeks realization in the extended present" (Nowotny, 1994, p.136). But the gates of the consumer paradise are locked to those who lack the financial wherewithal to afford the entrance fee. Nor is there an escape from the time demands made by the organisers of production. This is most evident in the USA where the drive to the "24/7 working world" has been seen as forcing workers to structure their

lives around the imperatives of continuous production (Rakoff, 2002, p.46). Employers are aided by "24-7 technology" (Work to Live, 2003b) such as home computers, home fax machines, laptops and cell phones that enable employers to make round the clock demands on workers' time.

The consumer Uchronia also comes up against physical limits. There are 168 hours in a week and some of those must involve sleep. Scientists might well be working on eliminating sleep as a necessity and thus removing a barrier to consumption time, just as they are seeking to abolish death, which puts a similar limit on the ability to consume. Until then, consumers must juggle the time requirements of production with those of the work of consumption and also of carrying out the other tasks of unpaid domestic labour. Referring again to the married couple as the subject of analysis, that means the wife remaining responsible for the majority of the work of consumption and taking on board the major share of the time spent on it. For married women with children and with paid jobs, consumption is work, and stressful work at that, not the pursuit of pleasure nor the restless seeking after identity that Bauman (1988, 1998), for instance, portrays it as.

Conclusion

This discussion took as its starting point the advent of the family wage in New Zealand as a de jure means of confirming a de facto reality of married family life. In that reality, the husband was the breadwinner, the wife was the housewife, constructed as a non-income earner dependent on her husband's wages. As such, she was also responsible for all the domestic labour of the household, including the work of consumption. The time of this consumption was her time. In New Zealand, as in other industrialised nations, consumption was seen as a minor matter compared to production, and as such it could be safely delegated to women. Because it was less important than production it could be made into "women's work", and as "women's work" it was by definition of less significance than the male work of production.

As housewives were free to shop during the week, restrictions on shopping hours could be maintained. The post-war long boom saw the

undermining of this arrangement, both de jure and de facto. The legislation of equal pay made the family wage a redundancy. The increased participation of married women in paid labour began the process of eroding the category of "housewife" in practice. But the greater time that married women spent in paid labour, the less time they had available for the work of consumption. Hence there was pressure to liberalise shopping hours and also efforts by wives to reduce the time of consumption, for example by making use of the growing range of fast and convenience foods.

The neo-liberal "revolution" that swept through the industrialised nations in the last two decades of the twentieth century saw consumption elevated to the centre of the economy. Shopping hours were deregulated as part of a general drive to "liberalisation" and the concurrent spread of the Internet offered the possibility of consumption freed from the boundaries of time and space. Husbands also increased the amount of time they spent on tasks such as shopping and meal preparation. Despite these changes, the work of consumption has continued to fall most heavily on women. Married women with children and paid jobs have found their time to be "squeezed", they are tied to the wish for more time. For them, the key word relevant to the time of consumption is not the "Now" of the promoters and purveyors of consumer goods and services, but the "When?" of someone under pressure of time.

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Paul Harris is a senior lecturer in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Waikato. He teaches industrial relations in New Zealand, comparative labour studies, social policy and the sociology of work, and his research areas cover critical analysis of market liberalism, the changing nature of work and employment, globalisation, and contemporary sociological theory.

Review Article

Documenting the New Zealand Body: Problems and Pleasures of the Historical Record

Book Reviewed: Leisure and pleasure: Reshaping and revealing the New Zealand Body 1900 - 1960. Daley, C. (2003). Auckland: Auckland University Press.

Mike Lloyd

The body is now an established topic of sociological inquiry. The 1980's saw publication of a number of important books, including Turner's *The body and society* (1984) and O'Neill's *Five Bodies* (1985), both of which are now into second editions. This was followed in the 1990's by the launch of the important journal *Body & Society*, the inevitable production of teaching textbooks (e.g. Shilling, 1993; Williams & Bendelow, 1998), and conferences devoted to the body (e.g. British Sociological Association annual conference, 1998). Sociological work on the body is now in a consolidation phase where the key work of the earlier decades forms a platform for more specific investigations (e.g. Crossley, 2001; Williams, 2003).

New Zealand sociologists were not slow to follow this international development. In particular, many graduate students developed work on body topics, keenly following the latest literature from overseas (see any recent list of graduate thesis topics in New Zealand sociology departments from the 1990's). Sociologists were not alone in this endeavour, with others from Geography, Women's Studies, Cultural Studies, and Anthropology also working on the body in their particular disciplinary ways. Note though, that History is not included in this list – could it be that local historians were not aware of the explosion of interest in the body? Answering such a question is not the key task of Caroline Daley in her book, *Leisure and pleasure: Reshaping and revealing the New Zealand body 1900 - 1960,* but she does bemoan the lack of local historical

research on leisure and the body. In *Leisure and pleasure* she sets about rectifying this neglect by tracing important developments in physical culture in the specific period 1900 to 1960, noting that the choice of time period is somewhat arbitrary. She is also clear to emphasise that, in contrast to other historians, the book is not an all-encompassing, general account: "If New Zealand historians were less intent on trying to crack the code of New Zealand's uniqueness, and not so obsessed with quests for national identity, they might notice that many of the supposedly particular characteristics of this society are really not so particular after all" (p. 4). A brave statement that many sociologists would surely agree with.

In my view the book is a welcome move by an historian into the realm of the body, deserving attention from sociologists, however, alongside the pleasures in reading such a detailed account there are some problems with its overall approach in documenting the "New Zealand body". Document is a key word here, for much of the critical comment below stems from the centrality and interpretation of the documentary record.

Daley's book has a leading character – Eugen Sandow – who figures prominently in the early chapters, fades significantly as the chronological story is told, but nevertheless closes out the book. As befits a leading character, he appears on the front cover of the book. It is a photograph of Sandow, taken just before his 1902 visit to New Zealand, in leopard-skin loin cloth, muscles flexed, chin raised, nobly looking into the distance. By today's muscle culture standards he appears well-built, but hardly out-of-the-ordinary. We could walk into any of our downtown gyms and see much more hyper-developed bodies, for Sandow has nothing of the massive steroid and technology-aided bulk of the modern bodybuilder. The point is, however, that at the beginning of the twentieth century Sandow was "the best known body in the world" (Dutton, 1995, p. 123). His historical legacy should not be underestimated, for as Dutton (1995) puts it, "his great innovation lay in the shifting of the audience's attention from the strength of the male physique to the look of the physique" (p. 122). This focus on muscular development for the sake of display, not

strength, is still at the core of bodybuilding culture[1], and Sandow had a major role in its establishment. In fact, he is the acknowledged father of modern bodybuilding (Chapman, 1994; Dutton, 1995), so Daley chooses wisely in making him the leading character in her book.

The first two chapters – "The strongman cometh", "Sandow's legacy" – provide details of Sandow's tour to New Zealand and the subsequent development of a body-shaping culture influenced by his techniques. Daley suggests that while the New Zealand public were in awe of his displayed muscularity, that is, his actual body mattered, his sense of timing was equally important in explaining his influence: New Zealand as a nation and culture was ready and waiting for an "ideal" body to be revealed. Moreover, the public would not just acknowledge that ideal, but be prepared to work on their bodies to achieve their own version of ideal muscularity. This was all good news for Sandow, as he was a man on a mission. Influenced by the eugenics movement (environmental, not "race fitness"), he strove to convert young men and women to physical culture, holding a view that a strong body equals a strong mind, equals good citizens contributing to a strong society.

Daley provides much detail of how successful Sandow was with his mission. In his two month tour of the country, crowds flocked to his shows, and newspapers carried very favourable reports and correspondence. Sandow spoke very little in these shows, but was more than willing to hold forth on the benefits of his exercise regime when visiting those who wished to know more, for example, members of "Physical Culture" clubs, policemen, firefighters and men in the armed services (see chapter 2). As Daley convincingly details, Sandow's success was also a sign of the times, that is, he tapped into a rich vein of concern about the physical woes of modern life, offering a clear system to cure them. Consider this report from the *Lyttelton Times* (1902):

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1. Interestingly, the display versus strength issue was not resolved overnight. As Fair (1999) details, a battle raged for several decades in the US between weightlifters and bodybuilders over the best way to judge manly muscle. The former argued that muscles also had to be functional and body contests should therefore also involve measurement of strength through lifting weights, however, the bodybuilders' view won the day and such contests are now purely based on display of muscularity in itself.

> He has done something – a great deal, indeed – to check the physical deterioration of the race that has resulted from the concentration of men and women in great cities, and he has given to the weary brain-worker, to the city clerk and shop assistant a simple and effective means of obtaining the healthy body that is necessary as the dwelling-place of a healthy mind. (cited on p. 30)

This discourse of modernity's woeful effects on the body is familiar to us from historical scholarship on the rise of rugby in New Zealand (e.g. see Phillips, 1987). Daley's book constitutes a welcome addition, as it highlights that there was more to New Zealand masculinity than building the body and mateship through playing rugby. Many men in fact joined "physical culture" clubs and/or worked on their body at home through their "Sandow Developer" and barbell sets.

But it was not only men that were reshaping and revealing their bodies, and in chapter two Daley broadens out the discussion to show that many women, directly influenced by Sandow, also began to pick up their barbells. Sandow classes for women and girls were included in the gymnasiums that began springing up around the country, and they too were not excluded from the physical development competitions, although in the female ones "symmetry of form" was given more emphasis than absolute muscular development. This female reshaping was couched in an appropriate social "rhetoric of bodily responsibility" (p. 69), that is, a woman should control her body to help fulfil her childbearing duties and as good preparation for marriage. This theme is extended in chapter three where, in essence, Daley details the birth of the modern female beauty contest. Local beauty contests actually began as early as 1907, but it was not until 1926 that a "Miss New Zealand" was crowned. The death of Sandow creeps in as an incidental remark in this discussion, nevertheless the connection with him that Daley wishes to draw is clear enough:

> The first Miss New Zealand quest reinforced the link between beauty, health, exercise and a natural lifestyle: it was as though the spirit of the recently deceased Sandow were hovering near. (pp. 110-111)

No other details of Sandow's death are given, but it is clear Daley is suggesting that he set something important in motion.

The further course of this motion and its effect in supposedly altering the New Zealand body is detailed in chapters four to seven[2], but it is by about chapter three that a common niggling problem becomes apparent in Daley's approach. This has a lot to do with the nature of historical inquiry into the body. Historians, perhaps rightly so, pride themselves on their ability to amass detail (the "historical record"), and there is indeed plenty of that in the book. However, one of the key weaknesses is in what might be called *analytical* detail. For example, in chapter three on "Beautiful bodies" we read that Sandow "and other like-minded men encouraged women to display their reshaped bodies in public. The male gaze was being reasserted. Women were there to be looked at (p. 84). At the end of the sentence is a footnote, which informs us that "The classic article on the male gaze is Laura Mulvey, 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema'" (p. 266, fn 13). All well and good, except that Daley does not delve into the fact that since the publication of Mulvey's article in 1975 there has been a substantial discussion and critique of the "male gaze" argument (e.g., see *Screen*, 1992). Some incorporation of literature like this into the actual text could have added much more sophistication, and in its absence the more sociologically inclined reader is left disappointed at the theoretical avenues that remain unexplored. Daley's text is dominated by documenting the record to tell the story; anything that gets in the way of outlining that narrative is relegated to footnotes, but these very rarely amount to anything more than source-giving,

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2. The content of these remaining chapters is not summarised in the remainder of this article. They move on significantly from the earlier focus on Sandow. Daley does not try to make a direct link with these earlier developments, rather she is selectively showing changes in New Zealand physical culture between the 1920s to 1960: Chapter four, "In the Swim", details the growth of bathing/swimming with an interest in changes in swim attire and beach behaviour; Chapter five, "Indecent Exposure", details the growth and public reaction to the import of nudism/naturism to New Zealand; Chapter five, "Swings and Roudabouts", details the growth of physical education for children; Chapter seven, "State Experiments", details how the state made attempts to intervene in the physical health of its citizens.

hence analytical discussion of the kind that sociologists are used to is virtually absent.

There is more to this problem than the adoption of the traditional form of presenting history. All too often what dominates the book is an implicit functionalism, as if this was sufficient to do the hard work of theory-based analysis. For example, in chapter two Daley suggests that one influence of Sandow's bodily display was to provide the impetus for the acceptance of female beauty contests. But this had to be done very carefully because the public were still cautious about too much fleshy display of the body. This was one reason, she argues, for "the predilection for invoking ancient precedents whenever women disrobed in public. If the Greeks had done it, modern New Zealanders could claim that it was artistic and civilised, not crude and brutish. ... A passing reference to ancient statues, and Sandow's body was clothed in respectability". The argument is clearly functionalist: the function of the appeal to the ancient Greek tradition is to make contemporary bodily display respectable (ie., it is a "framing" exercise). The problem is, to suggest a function is not to give us the reasons why people do what they do. Functionalist accounts are structural type explanations that bear an unknown relationship to the ordering of everyday practice. What if Sandow and his followers really did hold that the stylised ancient Greek body was for them the paradigm body-type? In other words, they acted upon their strongly held beliefs, aspiring to shape their bodies in line with a model they had chosen, not the function (latent or otherwise) ascribed to those beliefs by an outside commentator?

Or to take another example, in chapter six, "Swings and roundabouts", Daley details how the state introduced physical education into schools, including postural examinations and measurements used to rate individuals against an ideal model of physical development. Obviously, Sandow himself had a lot to do with the acceptance of this notion of a bodily ideal, Daley commenting that this allowed for

> quite specific monitoring of children's bodies, and helped instructors to determine which bodies needed special attention. The pupils ... who were found wanting were put into a remedial class, where they received special attention for two hours a week.

> Alongside their regular classmates, they also spent fifteen minutes a day exercising in the school grounds ... Sandow was dead and gone but his legacy lived on in Depression-era New Zealand. (pp. 209-210)

Daley never really tells us what she thinks of this development, whether she is for or against it, rather she sees her job as showing us how what happens at a particular point in time has its antecedents somewhere else in history. Of course, this is perfectly sensible, but there is a rather interesting question that goes begging in this approach. It is this: did the Sandow legacy live on, that is, have an effect in the development of future physical culture, because his techniques worked? That is, could there be something efficacious, physically advantageous, or even enjoyable, in the physical practices that he recommended? This is to broach an area that Daley appears not to have thought of, that is, that we do not have to understand current body practices solely in terms of their antecedents, rather we can investigate them for how they might be variants of common social forms. To be human is to be embodied, and thus to face a similar range of corporeal, practical, problems – how to deal with aches and pains; how to produce bodily pleasure; how to deal with the ageing body, and so on. Sociologists interested in such questions, and in developing theoretical understandings of body practices, have two simple techniques available to them. Firstly, they can talk to people and ask them about the body practices they engage in; secondly, they can engage in some kind of ethnographic inquiry, that is, they can partake of the body practices that interest them.

Now, it seems obvious that Daley's historical approach makes such techniques difficult. Consequently, she relies on the default position of doing a great deal of archival research – documenting the record on changes in the New Zealand body. We then must rely on her presentation of that record, for she cannot directly talk to the "past and its peoples". But are there not relatively simple ways that the historical record could be supplemented? For example, would it have been possible for the author to give us a first-hand account of what it is like to "work out" with Sandow's techniques, using something like the equipment of the time. Given that the topic is the body, is it too much to ask that we get some

direct feel for the practices being described, even if they did occur in the past? It is not unheard of for historians to actually leave the office and the archives to do research. For example, some interested in the history of Cook's sea based explorations availed themselves of the opportunity to journey from Cairns to Jakarta on an *Endeavour* replica, with fruitful results for their historical understanding (McCalman, 2003). Or, if an equivalent is not possible, are there available any personal records of how people actually engaged with Sandow's techniques (or beauty contests, nudism, beach gymnastics, and so on) and what pleasures they gained in doing so? In the absence of some attempt at a more sympathetic, enfleshed understanding of body practices, Daley's book resonates with a fairly traditional sceptical academic tone. At times it is clear that she thinks many of these body-shapers were vain and downright silly, showing how easy it is to look back from the present and be somewhat superior about past people and their practices.

Daley does show us many interesting practices in the development of the "New Zealand body", but the emphasis is in providing the social and historical context that explains why these practices develop. Essentially, the problem left unresolved is how to explain pleasure, one part of Daley's leisure/pleasure couplet:

> ... while physical culture fits the idea of a puritanical, 'Tight' society, marked by constraint and repression, it is also at home in a far less controlled world, where bodies are enjoyed, and where looking and being looked at is desired. Many local physical culturists seem to have revelled in reshaping and then revealing their new physiques in public. The pleasure they derived from the cult of exercise was often at odds with the idea that physical culture was a national good, a licensed leisure activity. Alongside self-denial and moral responsibility, physical culture allowed for the celebration of the body beautiful. (p. 69)

This passage is a rare glimpse of the book's central thesis. Hopefully, without doing an injustice to Daley, the argument goes as follows. In the flux of human body practices, some activities become relatively more organised than others, becoming "licensed leisure activities". This is often because they are in tune with the social context of the time, for example, regulated societies favour disciplined and regulated bodies.

This is one initial reason for the licensing of some practices over others. But because leisure activities have to do with the body, there is always the risk that they will shade over into unlicensed pleasure, particularly of the sexual kind, hence licensing activities are in turn bolstered by sanctions emanating from various institutions and broader organisations. Body practices become hedged about with rhetorics of national health goods – the typical connection between healthy body, healthy mind, and good citizen. But no matter how organised at sanctioning the broader organisations become, there is always space for pure pleasure – this can never be fully regulated – and this is why the book is aptly titled *Leisure and pleasure*.

Unfortunately, by the end of the book the detail of pleasure still awaits the reader. Daley is more concerned to show the sanctioning, the licensing, the hedging about with rhetoric, how "the leisure message tempered the pleasure of these [body] activities. The higher purposes of leisure, which some held dear and many others hid behind, limited how much pleasure, pure and simple, New Zealanders could enjoy" (p. 255). It seems that, as with all binaries, one pole must dominate the other. But, does Daley present a dominant leisure pole partly because of her historical method? Is it possible that leisure was pleasure all along, simultaneously, instead of always involved in some seesaw cause and effect relationship? Without some means of getting closer to the embodied feel of the body-shaping practices Daley describes, we simply do not know.

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Mike Lloyd is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Victoria University of Wellington.

Reviews

Gay men, sex and HIV in New Zealand
Worth, H. (2003). Palmerston North: Dunmore.

Reviewed by Chris Brickell

Gay men, sex and HIV in New Zealand explores the connections between the lives of men who have sexual relationships with other men and the "safety" of their sexual practices in relation to the transmission of HIV. This volume combines material from a number of New Zealand studies conducted during the late 1990s. These include the substantial *Male Call/ Waea Mai, Tane Ma* project in which 1852 men were interviewed about their sexual and intimate relationships with other men, the *Socio-Cultural Context of Sero-conversion in Men Who Have Sex with Men* study, research conducted with a number of gay couples, and the *Frayed at the Margins* project which interviewed a number of economically deprived men. Heather Worth was a co-investigator in these research projects and a co-author on most of the resulting reports.

The chapters are organised thematically, starting with a useful introduction that surveys the existing literature on gay men in New Zealand (there isn't a whole lot), and locates the emergence of HIV within the history of modern gay identity. Subsequent chapters discuss the demographic aspects of the *Male Call* study in particular, the diverse sexual practices between men, casual sex, relationships, and testing for and living with HIV. The quantitative and qualitative methodologies employed in the earlier studies are well represented, with material arising from both forms of investigation woven together throughout the chapters.

There is a wealth of statistics demonstrating correlations between age, relationship status, geographical location, ethnicity, income, identity, HIV status and sexual behaviour. Unfortunately, though, the quantitative data are not on the whole well presented: there are some tables, but the majority of the statistics used throughout the book appear in sentence

form. In places these sentences are densely packed into paragraph-sized blocks and digesting their content is sometimes laborious. There is one map designed to show the geographical spread of respondents to *Male Call*, but unfortunately it has reproduced so badly that it is impossible to interpret.

The interview material is used to better effect, with the earlier studies and some excerpts from interviews published in other sources providing breadth. The statistical material comes alive in these accounts, as men relay their experiences of coming out, negotiating sexual subjectivity, intimate relationships and sex, as well as their responses to public health messages and social norms. At times, however, the interview excerpts appear rather one-dimensional and their presence serves primarily to explain whether safer sex is being practised and why or why not. In places the interviews become conduits for eliciting public health information, and the value of individual narratives for their intrinsic interest is displaced by the researcher's more instrumentalist aims. Occasionally I can almost hear the interviewer preparing to follow up statements like "and then I came out to my friend" or "I don't find our relationship very fulfilling" with the question "so, did you use a condom?"

This reminds me of an experience relayed by a friend several years ago. Upon expressing his appreciation to the MP sponsoring changes to the human rights legislation, he was greeted with something like "nice to meet you, I hope you practice safe sex". Perhaps no longer does Gay = AIDS, as I used to hear all the time at secondary school during the mid 1980s, but gay men are still taken to epitomise the corollary: safer sex or its absence. None of this is to say that safer sex isn't important and worthy of research, merely that the myriad aspects of male sexual identity and expression ought not to be defined primarily in terms of it. Perhaps this is why I find this book's title somewhat disconcerting. I can't quite imagine a volume titled "Heterosexuals, sex and unwanted pregnancy", for example: heterosexuality is never defined coterminously with any public health issue in the way that gay male identity still is. (Tellingly, the most comprehensive British studies of heterosexuality and safer sex are titled the *Women, Risk and AIDS Project* and the *Men, Risk and AIDS Project*).

This problem with the linkage between "gay" and "AIDS" brings us to another difficulty: the coherence attributed to "gay men" as a sexual identity category. In some ways "gay" implies a clearly delineated sexual universe where any man is either "gay" or "straight" or maybe "bisexual" (Archer, 2002). However, it doesn't take much for any of these categories to fray around the edges, even though substantial numbers of men do identify with them. The appellation "men who have sex with men" (MSM) gained purchase within sexual health education during the 1980s precisely because "gay" did not speak to all of the men who were sexually involved with other men.

The original *Male Call* reports referred to MSM throughout and located "gay" as one of several available identity categories, while Worth is much less consistent on this point. The *Male Call* schema allowed some interesting complexities to come to the surface. For example, 4.5 percent of the total MSM sample reported not being particularly attracted to other men even though they were sexually involved with them. Six percent of respondents identified as "heterosexual", and of those 30 percent were in a relationship with a male partner at the time they were interviewed. In addition, significant numbers of men adopted more than one identity at once, some claiming both "gay" and "bisexual" (Saxton et al., 1997, pp. 17-21). These complexities make it difficult (if not impossible) to distil "gay" from other forms of sexual identity, although there is no need to do so provided we are happy to acknowledge the complexity of sexual identity.

Indeed, Worth's book includes men who identify as gay alongside those who claim labels such as homosexual, heterosexual, takataapui, fa'afafine, queen, transgender, and bisexual. (Men who have sex with both women and men are granted their own rather Krafft-Ebingesque subheading: "Bisexuality in Men", in a chapter titled "Sexual Minorities"). However, there is a problem here: the book claims to be about *gay men*. Bisexual, fa'afafine and transgender can be collapsed into gay only by the very crudest of conflations which few scholars of gender and sexuality would support. Perhaps the operative assumption is that those not exclusively engaging in heterosexual sex must be similar enough in their deviance to be gathered together in a single coherent collection.

One way around some of these problems may be to ditch the "gay men and HIV" coupling and focus on the interrelationships between HIV and sexual behaviours more broadly. Such an approach would involve a more sustained and careful discussion about the disjunctures, nuances, specificities and contradictions circulating within and between identity categories. We might ask what this says about how male sexuality is understood, and how broader socio-sexual currents are instantiated at the individual level. Just what is this notion of sexual *identity*, and how does it relate to sexual *practice*? What do "gay" and the other categories *mean*? Issues around HIV and safer sex might then be brought into the picture as one aspect of sexuality rather than the principal definer or inevitable conclusion of only one form of it.

It is undeniable that in New Zealand HIV and AIDS have disproportionately affected men who have sex with men. At the same time, gay identities have been remedicalised in questionable ways where HIV and gayness have been represented as coterminous. The risk remains that gay male identity and HIV are so closely linked within the same problematic that they are conflated, and useful distinctions between sexual identity and sexual practice disappear. It is worth bearing in mind that while public health campaigns do often save lives, they also reinscribe their own forms of normalisation and sets of dividing practices.

In this sense, binding together "gay men" and "HIV" causes problems. Such a move is particularly vexing because not all men who engage in unsafe sex with other men identify as gay, and not all "risky" sex occurs between men. The solution may lie in carefully picking through the relationships between sexual identity, sexual practice and HIV in ways that address the complexities and politics of identification, representation and lived experience as well as the spread of the virus itself.

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Kuhn: Philosopher of scientific revolution
Sharrock, W., & Read, R. (2002). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Reviewed by Ruth McManus

But when once a character is set down on paper it belongs to the writer no more.
Somerset Maugham

This book rests upon a misrepresentation. Sharrock and Read set out to put the record straight about possibly the most influential philosopher of science of the twentieth century. One of a clutch of critical reappraisals, including Fuller (2000) and Bird (2000, 2002), Sharrock and Read's *Kuhn: Philosopher of scientific revolution* argues that Kuhn "the man" has been done a severe injustice by the purveyors of Kuhn "the legend". It is only proper and decent to reinstate the "real" Kuhn - especially as to do so would "help end a long and utterly futile dispute" severally dubbed the science and culture wars (Sharrock & Read, 2002, p. 210). Their reinstatement takes the form of various strategies designed to de-tune Kuhn and his interlocutors.

One strategy works at the conceptual level. The first part of the book is dedicated to a painstaking elaboration of his six central ideas of paradigm, normal-science, scientific revolution, world changes, phenomenal worlds and incommensurability. Here, Sharrock and Read are persuading us that Kuhn was more about challenging received formulations of *Whiggish* conceptions of science as rational, cumulative and accessing natural reality (p. 18) than denying reason, cumulative knowledge and accessing natural reality *per se*. Chapters one and two take us through Kuhn's central ideas to show, at one level, the sometimes stark difference between what Kuhn "actually meant" and how others have interpreted what he said, at another level, how Kuhn's own understandings of these key terms took different inflections as he struggled with others' disconcerting misinterpretations (p. 35).

Sharrock and Read turn to critical issues in chapter three by engaging with the two figures that always spring to mind when contemplating Kuhn: Popper and Feyerabend. Sharrock and Read work to take the

wind out of their sails by de-tuning the pillar of their critiques, the political implications of normal science; first showing how each unjustifiably over-extrapolates Kuhn's key concept of normal science from the scientific into the political domain (p. 112), then how, when it comes down to it, their critiques are grounded in a Kuhnian view of normal science (p. 116). Chapters four and five de-tune Kuhn's own rendition of his key concepts. These chapters take incommensurability at the heart of the distinction between different scientific paradigms, first denying the key criticism made of the concept by his critics, that it is fatally flawed by a self-defeating semantic relativism then, in chapter five, elaborating how *clumsily* and *unsuccessfully* Kuhn wrestled with this concept in his attempt to engage with his critics and fans.

Another de-tuning strategy focuses on a double re-drawing of the history of science and its philosophy. Sharrock and Read show how Kuhn spent a lot of time illustrating how key revolutionary figures in the history of science (Copernicus and Planck) were not the mould-breakers that they are made out to be. It was actually figures who came after them that truly established a radical turn. And there is the subtle suggestion that perhaps Kuhn should be viewed in this light too, that he merely fumbled with the idea of scientific revolutions and it is really the works of later scholars, for instance Wittgenstein, Peter Winch, some ethnomethodologists and Foucault who draw this total change in world view more convincingly (p. 68).

Bringing the book to a close, Sharrock and Read claim that Kuhn's radicalness does not lie in the domains attributed to it by either his supporters or his critics. Rather, Kuhn's work has far reaching consequences because it "neither provides a general and true theory of science, nor a set of normative prescriptions for how to pursue science correctly" (p. 211). For Sharrock and Read, the greatest insight that Kuhn affords, following Wittgenstein, is that he has shown us how to see that the philosophy of science "leaves science as it is" (p. 211).

My first reaction to this book was to throw it across the room. I first read Thomas Kuhn's (1962) *Structure of scientific revolutions* in the 1980s as an undergraduate. Pedagogically, his work was used successfully to reveal the rich depths and far reach of sociological analysis. I was also

a willing convert to his putative relativism. So to be told that as a "fan" I had unwittingly done Kuhn a great disservice and that my reverence was mere callowness piqued me. Yet I am glad to have read Sharrock and Read's book, not because I agree with what or even how they argued, but because, by unsettling, in true ethnomethodological style, the decisions and boundaries I had built in Kuhn's name, they revealed to me my own stance.

The logic of this book is clear: to question the ferocity and partisan dealings made out of the *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, particularly as it has become a ready pawn for both sides in the "science" and "culture" wars. Fair enough too, as the latent misanthropy of much critique in the cornucopia of social studies is tiring. However, ultimately this attempt at calling time on the fight over Kuhn just fails to convince me and it fails because it is conducted in the rhetoric of right and wrong readings. Even though I accept their argument that closer and extensive reading often generates much subtler and more profound insights and that writings have independent (and unintended) trajectories in the critical domain, I am not convinced by the claim that it is possible to generate the "right" accounts. The tactic of claiming they have an inside running into what Kuhn was saying, because they have read all his work and because they want to undermine rather than take sides on the debate over Realism and Idealism in the "science" and "culture" wars, is ultimately unconvincing because they are engaged in an exercise of generating a reading of Kuhn just as much as say Popper or Fuller. To suggest otherwise is duplicitous, or ironic. Furthermore, their critical strategy leads to a deliberate concentration on detailed accounts of conceptual gymnastics at the expense of discussions about why philosophers, social theorists etc. might habitually "read Kuhn wrong". Either way, they have brought my own suppositions and interests about the status of texts in critical debate to the fore.

They call for scholarship and thorough engagement with the material at hand by means of a counter-intuitive strategy of de-tuning Kuhn and the impact of his work. This book calls attention to the need for detailed attentive and contextualised readings of classic works if their more subtle insights are not to be lost in the noise of conceptual battle. But it

also draws attention to the way in which battle is conducted – in the name of right and wrong readings. This gives value beyond the sociology of knowledge or the philosophy of science. I recommend *Kuhn: Philosopher of scientific revolution*.

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Contested knowledge: Social theory today.
Seidman, S. (2003). Oxford: Blackwell.

Reviewed by Chamsy el-Ojeili

Nothing, perhaps, signals the sorts of doubts, ambivalence, and curmudgeonly scepticism about social theory over the last decade or more so well as the title of Nicos Mouzelis's 1995 volume, *Sociological theory: What went wrong?* For Mouzelis, the problem was the unrelenting epistemological focus of the '80s and early '90s. The result was a real paucity of good theorising at the level of the development of conceptual apparatuses (Generalities II, in the old Althusserian language) towards provocative substantive theorising (Generalities III).

In his Preface to this third edition of *Contested knowledge*, Steven Seidman speaks of his own disillusionment with theorising over the last twenty years, where scientificity remained an obsession, and "Much social theory has abandoned a moral and political intention to engage the world as a medium of critical analysis and change" (p. ix). As a child of the '60s, Seidman held great hopes for the vocation of theory. However, in the face of the American "culture wars" through the 1980s and into the 1990s, it seemed that "the wreckage of professionalization" (p., vii) and theory's isolation from public life left theory and theorists sidelined from taking their essential place as "part of the ongoing conversation and conflict over the present and future shape of the social world" (p. ix).

Seidman admits though that recently he has made peace with sociology, discovering that it is, after all, his intellectual and political home, and the changes he detects in contemporary theory seem to make him more hopeful about its public vocation. Two developments in particular are underscored. First, there has been a shift from objectivist aspirations to "situated knowledge". Scientific ideals have bequeathed us a horizon of reflexivity, rigour, and methodological gains in terms of conceptual development and the collection and evaluation of evidence, but science as idol cannot be rehabilitated. Now, it is understood that we

can only know the world from the particular situation/perspective from which we approach it. Second, theory is now post-disciplinary, "clustered" around debates within certain fields, such as globalisation, identity, or civil society. In this vein, journals like *Social Text* and *Theory, Culture & Society* range across disciplines, and each cluster generates its own issues, develops its own concepts and modes of argumentation, and has its own key figures and texts. All this is a good thing, for Seidman:

> Perhaps something grand is lost in surrendering this noble dream [towards comprehensive and objective theories of society, history, and modernity]; but, the spirit of this science, a commitment to analytical rigour, critical reflexivity, and an unrelenting questioning of the meaning of knowledge and social life remains very much alive and well in our changing culture of social knowledge. (p. 282)

Contested knowledge returns, again and again, to the aporias of key social theories, as science and morality and philosophy clash. And the language and approach are clearly aimed at making social theory a public issue, something in which any citizen could and should be fluent. There's more than a touch of C. Wright Mills's *The sociological imagination* here. And there's also an echo of Freud's *Introductory Lectures*, so lucid and ringing is the language, so clear is the political and educative purpose at work. For instance, the following passage deals with Bourdieu's concept of habitus:

> habitus refers to the interpretive schemas, largely unconscious or tacitly at work, that tell us how the world works, how to evaluate things, and provide guidelines of action. Bourdieu argues that individuals are guided in their practices by these interpretive schemas. Individuals are not, though, mindless tools or vehicles of their habitus. It is less a set of rigid rules determining practices than a loose set of guidelines allowing individuals to strategise, accommodate to new situations, and invent new practices. (p. 148)

Along with this straightforward, non-obfuscatory approach, Seidman insists on clearheaded contextualisation - of Marx's and Habermas's Germanies, of Parsons' America, of Foucault's France, along with some wonderful comparative analyses. With respect to this latter strength,

here is a passage that rubs Mills against Parsons:

> Although some 14 years younger than Parsons, Mills was in many ways his chief adversary through the 1950s and early 1960s. The contrast of personalities and intellectual identities could hardly be more starkly drawn. The son of a congregational minister, educated at the finest private schools (Amherst, London School of Economics, and Heidelberg), Parsons represented the White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant elite. By contrast, Mills came from a conventional middle-class Texan household. He was educated at large state universities (Texas and Wisconsin). Mills and Parsons spent most of their respective careers as sociologists in rival departments. Parsons was at Harvard where he eventually founded and dominated the Department of Social Relations. Mills spent the better part of his short and tempestuous career at Columbia, which was known for its strong commitment to empirical social analysis. Perhaps most importantly, while Parsons was forging his grand vision of a synthetic scientific sociology, Mills was crafting a moral vision of a critically engaged 'public sociology'. (pp. 97-8)

The book is divided into five parts: the classical tradition – the Enlightenment and Comte, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim; American social theory – Parsons and Mills, but also Berger, Luckmann, Collins, Blau, and Bellah; European social theory – Habermas, Hall, Giddens, and Bourdieu; the postmodern turn – Derrida, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Bauman, and Foucault; and identity politics – feminism, race and queer theory, colonialism and empire (Fanon, Said, Hardt and Negri). Each part has an introduction and an afterword, and there is a good general introduction and a nice epilogue.

Contested knowledge is pitched at about a second or third year level. It is clearly a fabulous text for both students and teachers. While it's not clear to me that Seidman's desire for a publicly engaged sociology means an end to the noble aspirations of the big theories of Marx, Parsons, and Habermas, Seidman manages to perfectly convey the excitement those caught by theory feel. Here, social theory wins out in "its social understanding of the self, its rich conceptual language for understanding institutions and whole societies, its stories of social development, order, and crisis, and it tradition of cultural social studies" (p. ix).

Unfolding history, evolving identity: The Chinese in New Zealand. Ip, M. (Ed.). (2003). Auckland: Auckland University Press.

Reviewed by Andrew Butcher

This book is a welcome addition to scholarship on the Chinese in New Zealand. Scholars in this field are all too aware of New Zealand's shameful history with regard to Chinese migrants. The general public may be less aware, but this book should help to open up this history.

In four sections, twelve chapters and an appendix, this edited book brings together a diverse range of scholars in a general chronological analysis of Chinese settlement in New Zealand. The first two sections, "First encounters 1860s-1920s" and "Home is where the heart is, 1920s-1980s" are largely historical and/or autobiographical. In this way, they are strong reminders of Ip's earlier books *Dragons on the long white cloud* (1996) and *Home away from home* (1990).

The three chapters in the first section of the book cover: the experiences of the Cantonese gold seekers in New Zealand, 1865-1901 (Ng), archaeological insights into the New Zealand Chinese experience in southern New Zealand (Ritchie), and the politics of exclusion via *Joe Lum vs. The Attorney General* (Murphy). The three chapters in section two cover Wellington's chinatown (Shum), Maori-Chinese constructions (Lee), and Chinese identity as expressed through the Chun family Experience (Wong).

Sections three and four ("New faces, 1987-2003" and "Standing up"), however, depart from this trend and, particularly in section three, are much more engaging sociologically and raise more questions both in terms of future research and public policy. The chapters in section three by Henderson (on employment experiences of Chinese immigrants), Ho (on Hong Kong Chinese) and Ip (on Taiwanese) are by far the best chapters in the book: they successfully meld robust empirical data with contemporary theoretical trends, while raising important scholarly issues. They are well written and deal with important contemporary issues.

By contrast, the chapters in section four are the most inconsistent and, within the section, incoherent. In a book that is largely empirically grounded, Yee's highly conceptual chapter seems distinctly out of place and is the most disappointing of all the chapters. His tools of analysis tend to get in the way of actual analysis, and he provides many unsupported claims. Pang's chapter, on education, politics and Chinese identity, by contrast, is excellent. He is one of the few authors to successfully draw together educational and immigration debates *vis-à-vis* enrolling and teaching immigrant children. Given the recent increased politicisation of "educational immigration", an accompanying chapter on Chinese international students would have been worthwhile and could have conceptually developed Pang's sound analysis. Pang also moves further and considers the relationship between "old" and "new" settlers – this relationship could also have received wider coverage in the book, as it seems to be an important tension in the "evolving identity" of Chinese in New Zealand.

Wong's chapter, on the poll-tax apology, is interesting and contemporary, but – like Yee's chapter – seems out of place in the final section of the book. Like the book's earlier chapters, it is highly historical in its empiricism and would benefit from some theoretical or conceptual input. However, this chapter successfully highlights the tension between an official bicultural discourse and a multicultural reality, which warranted further exploration.

The book's appendix, by Nigel Murphy, is on archival and library resources on the Chinese in New Zealand. While it has some absences, particularly of recent postgraduate work (a consequence perhaps of publication deadlines), it is one of the best starting points for any further research on Chinese in New Zealand; it also represents one of the best historiography summaries of work done to date, with useful analysis.

By and large, the book does not add anything unique to the scholarly record, but it does uniquely bring together diverse scholars. In many ways, this book is effectively two books: one of historiography and one of sociology. Unfortunately, these two approaches are not successfully bridged. As is common amongst edited books, there is a lack of clear cohesion between the chapters, particularly conceptually. While the

chronological formatting of the book is helpful in reading it from start to finish (and who does read an edited book from start to finish anyway?) there is still too strong a sense of disparateness. This is not so much the fault of Ip (her section introductions are helpful in providing some, albeit not enough, connection); rather, it is a reflection of the different disciplinary backgrounds and writing styles of the authors.

To turn around its title, this book is more about evolving history and unfolding identity, in terms of the Chinese in New Zealand certainly, but more significantly in terms of an emerging, and changing, research approach to Chinese in New Zealand. To this end, Ip, in her chapter and preface, successfully discusses both contemporary domestic trends *and* changing international research paradigms. This book is a good start: it should serve as a springboard for researchers, from across the disciplines, to critically engage with the stories and histories of the Chinese in New Zealand.

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Society under siege
Bauman, Z. (2002). Cambridge: Polity.

Reviewed by Lincoln Dahlberg

Zygmunt Bauman's work has become synonymous with passionate and lucid critical reflections on both society and the sociological enterprise. *Society under siege* provides yet another sumptuous feast of critical theorizing. It focuses on the chance of democratic community in a world where globalisation processes have freed power from (democratic) political constraints and left individuals to face global systemic problems largely on their own. I have chosen to review his argument because I believe it to be a significant contribution to the debate around globalisation and democratic society.

The first half of the book explores the rupture between power and politics, and discusses the consequences of this for individual lives. Bauman argues that this rupture has come about due to the failure of political institutions to follow the economy into global space. Global capital now roams free from the constraints of politics, able to operate as and where it pleases. Politics remains largely wedded to territorially located states, which are unable to provide solutions to global systemic problems. The welfare and security of citizens can no longer be guaranteed by nation-states at the very time that institutional erosion and enforced individualization has destabilized social solidarities and institutions, plunging subjects into continual insecurity and anxiety. Under threat from capital flight, territorially bound states now focus upon programmes that will lure global capital to invest, for example, in programmes to strengthen policing and lower taxation. The lack of political institutions and legal constraints at the global level has not only led to the corporate domination of life but has allowed other powerful politico-economic forces to engage in "frontiers" style combat, as illustrated by the ongoing terror wars. In such wars frontlines are transnational, mobile, diffuse, and constituted by the hit and run strikes of diverse and flexible coalition forces.

This disjuncture between power and politics forces individuals to seek biographical or "life political" solutions to the uncertainties generated by the enforced individualization and institutional erosion of global consumer capitalism. Bauman sees egocentric life politics as a wholly illusory and inadequate response to systemic problems when set against the vision of an autonomous society. And yet he also accepts that without global democratic institutions life politics is a necessary individual strategy to cope with insecurity. Bauman argues that a particular form of life politics, one based on "surfing" rather than "swimming," is required in these uncertain, "liquid modern" times. The individual is advised to stay clear of immersion: of commitments, loyalties, fixity, baggage, and so on. Rather, they should take to living on the surface: light, flexible, mobile, constantly open and ready to move, dispose, switch, and so on.

The second half of the book is dedicated to exploring life-politics in liquid modernity, with a focus on consumerism (which is the dominant mode of surfing) and television (which strongly expresses the surfing culture). Bauman argues that the consumer society does not simply replace commitment to people with commitment to products, instead commitment is discarded altogether. Consumption is not about having, not about building a stock of things. Consumption is simply for consumption's sake. It is about the sensations gained from instant gratification, and particularly from the anticipation of instant use - "it is the shopping that counts" and not the enjoyment of the product (p. 54). Consumerism is not about developing products to meet pre-determined needs, except the need to consume as an end in itself. Consumerism offers individuals solutions to problems that do not actually exist. Uses are manufactured after the associated products. Consumers are provided explanations of how products can be used. Meanwhile, systemic problems are left unresolved. Consumerism, or the anticipation of consumption, offers individuals only momentary respite from their anxieties, the very anxieties that feed and are fed by consumer society.

Bauman then moves on to analyse the intersection "between the world 'as seen on TV' and the *Lebenswelt* in which we frame our life politics" (p. 161). Bauman does not simply blame the medium (TV) for

societal destabilization, as some critical theorists are prone to do. Instead, he sees the medium as part and parcel of life politics in liquid modernity. "Whatever 'is seen on TV' is in tune with the experience supplied seven days a week and twenty-four hours a day by the 'real world'" (p. 168). Television expresses our "casino culture," where each game in town vies for the scarcest resource: the attention of the individual surfer (p. 163). Television is a most suitable complement to liquid modern politics, supporting the superficial display of idol figures aimed at capturing the ever roaming, because unsatisfied, attention of the consumer. Public communication is not (or no longer) the in-depth analysis of systemic problems, but the public expression of private troubles on talk shows. Chat shows transform "socially produced antinomies and risks" into problems definable in individual terms, as problems which have emerged individually and individually need to be confronted and tackled. One has suffered because one was not skilful and knowledgeable enough to stave off suffering; lack of resolve and determination invariably figure at the top of the long list of individual neglects and errors which are blamed for causing the trouble. The issue of a 'wrong kind of society' is taken off the agenda, or rather never allowed to appear on it; and the void thereby left in the argument is made all but invisible by being filled with denunciation and deprecation of individual unfitness and inadequacy. The verdict is made foolproof by the trial being continually rehearsed and the sentence endlessly reiterated. (p. 168)

Around the talk show, and TV in general, an "oxymoronic community" is created, a community of individuals suffering in solitude, united only in that they meet under the same roof or in front of their TV sets and share their private sufferings and lonely struggles. In the process of communication, these problems are not translated into public issues, they are merely private troubles that have been publicly declared and confirmed as such. TV thus shifts

the tasks of resolving social problems to individual biographies. For politics, the impact is shattering. The substance of democratic politics (that is, of the mode of being of an autonomous society composed of autonomous individuals) is the ongoing process of a two-way translation:

of private troubles into public issues, and public interests into individual rights and duties. (p. 169)

TV speeds up the liquid modern political situation, where a focus upon socially committed injustice and politics as collective endeavour is replaced by a focus upon personal inadequacy and politics as an individual project. Political community is replaced by spectacles, events, and idols that provide short-lived "peg communities" upon which people can momentarily hang their insecurities.

Bauman is not shy about what needs to be done. Global problems need global solutions. Global institutions legitimated by global publics are needed to reign in global power. However, Bauman believes the level of global collective action is at present inadequate to the task. The "periodic outbursts of protest against eviction from decision making" is "sorely inadequate" in the face of "the human misery gestated in the new global ethical void" (p. 218). Bauman argues that,

> Diffuse and sporadic 'anti-globalization' protests, however brave and dedicated, are a poor match for the concentrated might of the multinationals, cosseted, shielded and kept out of trouble day in, day out, by governments vying for Michelin stars of hospitality and by the heavily armed forces they command. (p. 217)

It is not good enough for a few people to protest while most stand by and watch. All bystanders must become culturally engaged and collectively oriented participants before global dialogic publics will have the strength to institute a global democratic arena that can effectively reign in power. To be effective, such an arena would need to be backed by institutional networks, "woven of global agencies of democratic control, a globally binding legal system and globally upheld ethical principles" (p.117). The task is enormous, a "long uphill struggle," but Bauman sees it as the only way now for democracy. The critical sociologist's task in relation to this democratic vision is to diagnose the present and demonstrate that appearance is not necessity. The sociologist must then leave it to the dialogic community to provide the practical answers that will "guide the steps to be taken" on the path to global democracy (p. 220).

To what extent is Bauman correct in his interpretations and conclusions? Some readers may see his scenario as overly general and excessively pessimistic, judging that in his sweeping appraisal of the current situation he has overdrawn institutional decay and individualization while underestimating the strength of democratic practice within life-politics and the anti-globalisation movement. Indeed, the work does not supply extensive empirical detail nor celebrate contemporary culture and politics. Instead, Bauman concentrates upon mapping the most alarming trends of the present. The book highlights the major problems arising from globalisation and liquid modernity that must be immediately and decisively addressed if democracy is to be secured. It is a call to collective action based on a demonstration of where current conditions are leading, and it is an illustration of how sociology can make itself relevant within contemporary times. As such, *Society under siege* is a key contribution to the making of a democratic world.

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