# New Zealand Sociology



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# Contents

# The Neo-liberalising University? Spaces of Policy, Practice and Performance

*Wendy Larner and Richard Le Heron*

**Opening Address, SAANZ Annual Conference, 2002, University of Canterbury**

In Aotearoa New Zealand the governance of universities is a topical issue.[1] In May 2002, a major re-orientation of the national tertiary education system was announced with the launch of a strategy that would "drive the *transformation* of our tertiary sector into one that is both more strategically focused, and more connected and collaborative" (New Zealand Government 2002, p.1, emphasis added). One consequence already clear is that the spaces between general reforms and tertiary sector reform, between the components of the tertiary sector (polytechnics, universities, private providers), amongst the universities, and the groupings inside each university are increasingly highly charged sites of conflict over resource allocation, vision, strategy, tactics, all greatly aided by new technologies of calculation.

Internationally, there is nothing unique about efforts to improve efficiency, accountability and performance in a national tertiary education system, and the use of quality control mechanisms to induce these characteristics. Indeed, it could be argued the New Zealand university sector was a late starter in this regard, and is only now catching up to rest of the world in terms of education reform at the tertiary level. We contend that the very fact of this late start is now giving rise to distinctive efforts to "reinvent" New Zealand universities. Consistent with an ongoing emphasis on and experience of experimentation, we show that tertiary sector reform in New Zealand is not driven so much by concerns to increase efficiency – to simply do more with less – as it is by the ambition to re-create universities in a qualitatively new form.

1. This paper is drawn from a larger Marsden project on "The spaces and practices of a globalising economy".

Our aim is to highlight the new significance of global referencing capabilities. Our particular interest is in the recent and rapid growth of the family of calculative practices known as benchmarking (see also Larner and Le Heron 2002a, 2002b, forthcoming).

We argue that it is through such calculative practices that New Zealand universities are now being positioned and are positioning themselves in the neo-liberalising spaces of university education. In turn, these calculative practices are giving rise to new views of the university world and altering staff and student behaviours. In developing our account of the significance of benchmarking and associated techniques, we have found it important to draw attention not only to the constitutive power of these techniques, but also the politics and contestations that surround them. We argue that the spaces and subjectivities of the neo-liberalising university are multiple and contradictory, and the attempted reinvention of the sector is likely to have many varied effects and give rise to multiple political forms.

Our case for a more nuanced account of recent developments should not be seen as unequivocal support for the reform of New Zealand universities. Like many of our academic colleagues, we are both sceptical and concerned about many recent changes. At the same time, however, we argue for a deeper appreciation and an improved understanding of the terms under which we, and others, currently act. At the most general level, critiques of the reform process need to be tempered with recognition of the implications of increased tertiary participation rates, and an understanding of the changing relationships between the universities and society. More specifically, it is clear not only that benchmarking and other calculative practices are here to stay, but also that these techniques are mutating in both expected and unexpected ways. In particular, we are concerned to identify greater possibilities for agency in our responses to new policies and practices. A greater appreciation of these political possibilities, coupled with a perceived need to consciously develop them, might allow academics to re-imagine the neo-liberalising university in quite different ways.

### Neo-liberalism, governance and governmentality

It is now increasingly accepted that neo-liberalism is not simply a policy response to the exigencies of the global economy, or the capturing of the policy agenda by the "New Right". In particular, the rise of "third way" or "social democratic neo-liberals" is generating a rigorous debate about the theoretical status of neo-liberalism, and a reworking of earlier understandings. We argue that New Zealand's neo-liberalising reform project has now been through three distinct phases: 1) during the 1980s the state withdrew from many areas of economic production, while at the same time attempting to preserve – and even extend – the welfarist and social justice aspirations associated with social democracy; 2) the more punitive phase of the early 1990s, which saw an extension of the marketisation programme accompanied by the introduction of neo-conservative and/or authoritarian policies and programmes in the area of social policy; 3) a third phase beginning in the late 1990s characterised by a "partnering" ethos in both economic and social policy.

In this paper, we are concerned to identify the discourses and practices through which reconstruction is happening in the university sector, the implications of reconstruction and reinvention for the spaces and subjects of tertiary education, and the politics of these. We want to highlight the changing role of the university, from that of an institution premised on, and constitutive of, a national economy and a national society, to that focused on a particular understanding of international competitiveness in which the aspiration is to identify the points of difference and areas of strength that will allow the institution to be linked into global flows and networks. The discussion that follows identifies key aspects of governance and governmentality in relation to each of the three phases of neo-liberalism, and explores their implications for spatialities and subjectivities. We argue these shifts raise important questions about the current role of universities in relation to economic and social development, and are re-shaping the kinds of politics we engage in. As Jane Kelsey (2001) explains:

> The challenge which confronts us all is to harness the advantages of a more effectively focqused institution and the benefits of devolution, while not losing sight of the principles and ideals

that underpin the tradition of the university. (p. 6)

### Social democracy and marketisation

During the first phase of the "New Zealand Experiment" (from 1984 to 1989), the universities remained relatively untouched. Tertiary education remained understood to be a public service funded and provided by the nation-state. During this period, content-based forms of expertise governed both universities and academics. Internally, checks and balances were provided by professional judgement, peer review and trust. Externally, the University Grants Committee represented the collective interests of the sector. Information was shared amongst universities, but this was primarily qualitative information and the style of questions quite different to those of today. In comparison, quantitative comparisons remained rudimentary and primarily involved the overall resourcing of the sector.

Not surprisingly, universities continued to be predominantly nation-state focused during this period. That said, it is important to recognise that there are very long-standing forms of internationalisation in the New Zealand university sector. These early forms of internationalisation were largely the legacy of colonial linkages, and in all cases were international – in that they involved (often hierarchical) relationships between nation-states – rather than the new patterns of global relationships explored later in this paper. Examples include programmes such as Commonwealth Scholarships and the Colombo Plan, sabbaticals, the use of external examiners at doctoral level, and external members of departmental review panels.

Moreover, while universities purported to be nation-building institutions, they were also reflective of historically based arrangements of protection and privilege. While it is tempting to be nostalgic about this period, it is important to remember that departments and universities were democratic in name but not always in content. Not only were claims of universal access and social inclusion demonstrably untrue, there were also significant problems of fiefdoms and patronage within institutions. Indeed, it can be argued that during this period the main

axis of political contestation in the university sector was between the (relatively elite) university and "others", particularly women, working class students, and Maori.

### Marketisation, massification and neo-conservatism

It was the Hawke Report of 1988 that foreshadowed a more radical rethinking of the character and nature of New Zealand universities, then the passing of the Education Amendment Act in 1989, followed by Public Finance Act of 1990, that marked the beginnings of a profound period of transition. The next decade saw universities increasingly caught up in the neo-liberal reform process more generally, and they subsequently experienced a variant of the commercialisation experienced in the rest of the state sector with the flow through of new financial and other management practices, notably audit and then benchmarking.

The shift to EFTS-based funding gave rise to increased pressure to produce accurate annual student data, and the need for more rigorous financial data was entrenched by the Public Finance Act. However, the development of indicators in other areas proved more difficult. Efforts to provide detailed quantitative information saw the re-deployment of some very long standing indicators (eg., staff-student ratios, numbers of students graduating) as well as the invention of new indicators (eg., increased use of graduate opinion surveys). In some cases, these new indicators were initially ad hoc, driven by the demands of a particular situation, and they were as likely to be products of pre-emptive moves or efforts to resist managerialism as they were to be top down. It is salutary to observe one of our own departments, institutional home to vehement critics of managerialism, inventing workload models and arguing for greater transparency to contest the "incomplete transition from feudalism to capitalism" in a 1993 review document (University of Auckland, 1993). Anti-calendars, produced by students to provide their views of the quality of university teaching, are another such example.

At the most general level, what happened during this period was the creation of systems through which diverse elements of the university system were re-coded into calculable and comparative terms. No longer

were universities and academics to be trusted to do their jobs; evidence was needed that they were doing what they said they were. These systems represented a new generation of overt and indirect governing techniques indicative of new questions asked. What systems are in place to ensure quality? How can quality be measured? It is important to stress that the rise of these diverse indicators did not reflect a managerialist conspiracy. Nor are we suggesting the diverse indicators "added up" to an integrated whole. Indeed, quite the contrary. The techniques had multiple origins and impetuses, travelled through multiple circles, and different techniques took prominence in different contexts.

The cumulative effect, however, was a huge increase in the significance of calculative practices. In turn, these began to have material effects as they were harnessed to a more general reform project. Participation and completion rates increased dramatically, reaching then overtaking OECD averages. Not only did the universities enter into fierce competition with each other; within each institution faculties and departments also began to compete, thus becoming more strongly "siloed" and defensive. Those who would not play the new competitive game were threatened, coerced, censured, disciplined and, ultimately, penalised. This, we would argue, is the neo-conservative aspect of this phase of neo-liberalism, characterised by the withholding of extra resources, and by newly reconstituted divisions between those who could and those who could not, or would not, enter into these new comparative and competitive relationships.

New spatialities and subjectivities also began to take form during this period. Most noticeably, there was greater internationalisation of universities. First, the long-standing orientation towards the UK and the Commonwealth began to be complemented by new linkages. More New Zealanders were choosing to undertake graduate work in the United States and the "internationalisation" of university staff began to involve far more diverse cohorts than the (often very able) English ex-patriots who dominated earlier forms of internationalisation. Second, there was the emergence of trans-national university consortiums. Universitas 21, for example, was formed in 1997. These university consortiums were

not national university projects and further marked the differential integration of New Zealand universities into international educational networks and flows (Irwin, Le Heron & Larner, forthcoming).

The new emphasis on counting and comparing, together with a sustained effort to foster "entrepreneurial drive" thus marked a significant shift away from the older nation-state, trust based, model of the university. These shifts were not uncontested of course. Indeed, if the politics of the earlier period were between the university and its "others", in this period these insider/outsider tensions were cross-cut by growing tensions between the "marketisers" and those who saw the role of universities as "critic and conscience" as under threat. However, as we have seen, managerialist techniques were also used by some academics to make contestatory claims, and the divides were neither clear nor uncontested.

### Partnering, performance and polarisation

The third moment of neo-liberalism is characterised by what we might call the "partnering state". A new emphasis on collaboration and partnerships now crosscuts both economic (public-private partnerships) and social (government-community partnerships) domains. In the case of tertiary education, the emphasis on partnerships is giving rise to a reconfigured university-industry-government nexus, as exemplified by the 2001 Knowledge Wave conference. Research providers (both universities and crown research institutes) have begun to re-orient themselves away from explicit competition with each other. More generally, these shifts reflect new governmental narratives in circulation, notably that of the knowledge society/economy. In these narratives, the universities are re-presented as a new agent of national development – a key means of fostering international competitiveness and social cohesion in a global and turbulent world.

While the new government agenda for the universities appears to involve a turning away from the more-market approaches of the earlier phases of neo-liberalism, it could also be seen as a re-attack on efficiency that involves more closely scrutinising government spending on education. As Gould (1999, p. 28) predicted, with the decline in public

funding, universities have come under increasing pressure to develop new income streams, particularly for research and research-based activities. They have also begun to build new relationships with external organizations, notably business, Crown Research Institutes and the public sector, in an effort to identify additional resources and new opportunities. As the universities have turned to "non-traditional" funding sources, including those in the private sector, increasingly they are required to manage "risk" and demonstrate they are being run efficiently.

However, this is not simply a matter of doing more with less. Perhaps more significantly, the reform programme mapped out for the tertiary education system is strongly inflected by a new ambition to generate institutional innovation and encourage performance. This is to be achieved by radical reform of tertiary education, the aim of which is to enhance the performance of the sector as a whole, while at the same time encouraging greater specialisation through the forthcoming introduction of Performance Based Research Funding (PBRF). That said, there are also strong continuities and there continues to be a sustained emphasis on mass participation and improving accountability. Hence the significance of the title of the "blueprint" document produced by TEAC for the tertiary system: "Excellence, relevance and access: An introduction to the new tertiary education system".

On one hand, the new emphasis on partnerships and relationships has involved an explicit rejection of the competitive model and a growing emphasis on collaborative relationships both within and across universities. Of course, many of these new initiatives have not fully overcome the legacies of earlier, more competitive, formations. Indeed, they might best be characterised as "competitive collaboration".

On the other hand, the sector is being reshaped by the rise and rise of benchmarking. The calculative techniques of earlier periods are being multiply reconstructed and re-deployed for new purposes including not only the longer established goals of efficiency and accountability but also the more recent ambitions for collaboration and innovation. In broad terms, each of the three goals for the tertiary sector – excellence, relevance, access – is now seen as amenable to calculation although

there is less agreement as to the criteria that should be used for the calculations.

What happens when partnerships meet performance? There are many different arenas in which the contradictions and tensions associated with these new configurations are being played out. In relation to students, for example, the emphasis on overall numbers remains, but is now refined by additional indicators such as programme, gender, ethnicity and residency status. In turn, evidence of the changing composition of the student body is being used to push claims for resourcing and accountability, particularly to minority students. Similarly, at graduate level several "objective measures" understood to be relevant to the experience of students have emerged. In turn, these indicators are used to drive political claims about the need for an increasing emphasis on professionalisation, labour market preparedness and responsiveness to student demands, and the increasing accountability of supervisors to students.

Amongst academic staff, processes such as workload modelling and performance appraisals are now well entrenched. These are not simply disciplinary mechanisms (although they are certainly that), but are increasingly the site around which workplace politics are being played out. This suggests a certain internalisation and normalisation of comparative techniques amongst academics. At the same time, however, this emphasis on outputs and accountability sits uneasily with the demands of relationality. Most dramatically, these tensions play at the level of individual academics and are likely to become more salient with the introduction of PBRF. Already senior academics and administrators have begun to observe that junior academics appear less willing to involve themselves in broader institutional processes.

The emphasis on indicators will increase further in the context of the new tertiary strategy that requires each institution to develop a charter and profile. Not only are the charters and profiles expected to articulate to national development goals, the measurements are also a means of demonstrating to the government that they are getting value for money from their tertiary spending in a context where the current forms of accountability were recently described as "completely useless" by the

Minister for Tertiary Education at a public meeting. At the same time, the new system is also designed to enhance performance, particularly through the introduction of PBRF in 2004. Indeed, we would argue that the meeting of partnering and performance reaches an apex with the PBRF, which looks likely to involve qualitative indicators rather than the preoccupation with straightforward quantitative comparisons that characterise the Australian DETYA system, for example.

These changes are no longer simply about a national tertiary education system. Most immediately, it is apparent that there is a move from individuals and institutions internationalising to the sector itself internationalising. What we are seeing is the rapid growth of "best practice" networks in which institutions or parts of institutions trawl/scan the globe looking for the next new idea. New Zealand universities and departments now benchmark themselves internationally as a matter of course. Politics are increasingly fought out over these indicators as they are used to push both hegemonic and oppositional narratives. For example, whereas comparison with the Australian G8 universities was first used by a University of Auckland technocrat in an effort to develop internal benchmarks for that university, AUS is now beginning to argue that salaries should be compared across Australasia. While the emergence of a globalising educational space is not always being consciously pursued in such efforts, this does not diminish the potency of the technologies of calculation, nor does it reduce the constitution of new spaces of educational endeavour.

The processes around the creation and introduction of PBRF mark a further phase in the deployment of calculative practices and the constitution of new spatialities. Indeed, even the invention of the PBRF involved engagement with a range of sites, the scanning of international horizons to get the best out of the options, and the creation of new connectivities. Moreover, this is not simply an adoption of what is found elsewhere. While we are seeing ourselves through a "world of comparisons", this involves leveraging from a disjuncture in a context where we are aware of what has happened elsewhere and what we need to avoid (see Boston, 2002). Of course, this international re-orientation is being further fostered by the huge growth in international

students and the increasing number of local people who are "unlocal" – who have "their head in one place and their feet in another", to quote one of our colleagues. In this context particularly, the new spatial imaginaries have the potential to be energising while at the same time participants must negotiate multiple national/international tensions.

What forms of subjectivity will these new spatialities constitute? At the national level, it is clear there will be an increased emphasis on performance. Already people are beginning to represent their own and others' activities in PBRF terms. However, while this is the most obvious outcome, it will not be the only one. There are likely to be other more relational changes as new forms of inclusivity challenge the closed doors of the past. For example, the new emphasis on outcomes rather than outputs, while remaining firmly linked to an overall reliance on calculative practices, is giving rise to a more process oriented approach and eroding disciplinary orientations. This is giving rise to new sites of intervention, redesigned curriculum and new forms of collaboration. In this context, the constitutive practices, their relational arenas, and the contradictions and tensions that are arising, are multiple. We always need to be attentive to the complexity and uncertainty of performed spaces and subjectivities. By asking "how" and "for whom" we ensure we confront the spaces between practices, policy and performance.

## Conclusion

There can be no doubt that these are tumultuous and troubled times in the New Zealand university sector. For example, very real financial constraints underpin the overall reluctance of New Zealand universities to accept the "fees maxima" proposal that limits further increases in student fees. There is also considerable concern about the extent to which the government might attempt to "micro-manage" universities through the new charters and profiles and revised funding categories. It is also clear we are entering into a period of calculative practices unlike any we have comprehended before. While we have very real concerns about many of the proposed changes, our argument in this paper is that they *may* be more liberating than has previously been anticipated. In this context, our concluding question is: What will need

to be focused on if we are to effect this?

Our aim is to construct not the middle ground, but rather a *different* ground. While we are not yet clear about the specifics, we can see a re-orientation happening. Most immediately, we need to understand that realities of the university sector are quite different than those of earlier periods. The universities are being shaped by a much more cosmopolitan, mobile and globally connected population that is as much outward looking as it is inward looking. Benchmarking and other calculative practices are central to these new ways of being a New Zealander. How will these "new times" play out in terms of, for example, graduate programmes, curriculum and ethnic diversity?

There are no easy answers to such questions. While it is clear that the New Zealand universities have begun to shift away from particular arrangements of protection and privilege, the outcomes are not clearly discernible at present. More generally, it is also important to remember that the universities have never been particularly successful at fulfilling their societal ambitions, or at least they weren't really in terms of social democracy or the neo-liberal agenda. Moreover, the university is an institution that has successfully reinvented itself in the past (most recently as a nation-building institution). Today, it is clearly undergoing another transformative process as it becomes part of the globalising education system. If the future will always be different, how will the university be performed? By whom and towards what ends? What spaces, subjects and temporalities will be constituted?

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# Class Struggle and Travelling Theory: From the Chile Experience to the New Zealand Experiment

*Len Richards*

**Abstract**

This paper tracks the journey of neo-liberal ideas to New Zealand; an example of what Edward Said called "travelling theory". This saga encompasses a time interval from the 1930s to the 1980s, and a geographical expedition from England via Chicago to the "tragedy" of Chile and thence to the farce of neo-liberalism in Aotearoa-New Zealand. The setting of this story is the meltdown of the "historical compromise between capital and labour" (as Samir Amin called it) struck after WWII. In New Zealand this took the form of the introduction of neo-liberal ideas and policies by the 1984-1990 Labour Government in a country hitherto rightly considered as a bastion of Keynesian Welfarism. The Labour Government was a willing captive of the neo-liberal "ideological trap". Keynes, Hayek, Friedman, the "Chicago Boys" of Chile and the functionaries in the NZ Treasury feature as key actors.

> ...[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. ...I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. ...soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil. (Keynes,1936, pp. 383-384)

> Theory, my friend, is grey, but green is the eternal tree of life. (Mephistopheles in Goethe's Faust, quoted in Lenin, 1970, p. 9)

## Introduction: From tragedy to farce

This is a narrative about ideas, their journey to New Zealand and their implementation. Marx (1978) once noted that when history repeats itself it does so "the first time as tragedy, the second as farce" (p. 594). This saga encompasses a time interval from the 1930s to the 1980s, and a

geographical expedition from England via Chicago to the "tragedy" of Chile and thence to the "farce" of neo-liberalism in Aotearoa-New Zealand. The setting of this story is the "historical compromise between capital and labour" (Amin, 1998, p. 17) struck after WWII, and its subsequent meltdown from the late 1960s. By 1980, in the words of Samir Amin, "the new single thought" of (international) capitalist ideology, guiding and justifying government policies all over the world, had changed from Keynesianism to one directing policies aimed at "systematically dismantling the specific rights that had been achieved by the workers and lower classes" (pp. 44-45). In New Zealand this took the form of the introduction of neo-liberal ideas and policies by the 1984-1990 Labour Government in a country hitherto rightly considered as a bastion of Keynesian welfarism.

The New Zealand experiment, as it is known, is perhaps definitively depicted by Jane Kelsey (1995). She describes how the newly elected Labour Government in 1984 "*chose*" (p.19) to implement a rigorous version of the neo-liberal economic (and social) programme. Kelsey somewhat simplistically contrasts this "voluntary" choice with the compulsory imposition of similar programmes by international financial institutions in the "third world" (pp. 1, 15). She outlines the "pressures" on New Zealand in a world increasingly dominated by transnational corporate enterprises and finance capital (pp. 15-17). Although she does not elaborate, she asserts that in Western capitalist democracies "tensions had emerged" that created "a stark choice between the promotion of profit through the free market, and the protection of the welfare state through government intervention" (p. 17). She claims that the TINA ("there is no alternative") thesis of those who drove the New Zealand experiment was falsified by the alternative path taken, for example, by Australia. Her explanation for what happened in New Zealand takes a "conspiracy theory" form. The opportunity for a cabal of "economic fundamentalists" to redesign the economic and social structure of New Zealand arose, and they grasped it with "almost evangelical fervour" (p. 27). Her account tells an important part of the story; but only part. Contra Keynes (see quote above), we *must* examine "vested interests", and any consequent conflict involved, to understand

the good or evil spawned by ideas, to understand how the "Rogernomics" revolution took place in New Zealand. It is the conflict, the "class struggle", that is largely left out of Kelsey's account (and she is not alone in this).

### Travelling theory

Keynes is right to point to the fact that ideas do have a powerful determining effect. However, ideas do not "rule the world" as he claims; it is people, people in positions of power who rule the world, and they wield ideas to influence the actions of others (as Foucault (1983) would say) in order to maintain their hegemony. But given that, it seems reasonable to metaphorically describe ideas as having "a life of their own" as they travel around the world. For instance, Moses Naim (1999) describes the term "Washington Consensus" coined by former IMF adviser, John Williamson, in 1990, as an expression that "acquired a life of its own, becoming a brand name known worldwide and used quite independently of its original intent or even its content" (p. 4). It became what Zizek (1999), after Lacan, calls a *point de capiton*: a "nodal point" of ideological unification that bound together a set of otherwise "free floating" ideas into a "structured network of meaning" (p. 87). The term "Washington Consensus" became the ideological unifier of all the power centres working to overcome the repeated crises that have plagued world capitalism since the breakdown of the post-war boom in the 1970s. In particular it became the ideological mask for those acting on behalf of the most powerful vested interests (primarily US capitalism).

In the 1980s the *point de capiton* for the sweeping New Zealand experiment in monetarist neo-liberalism was perhaps the seemingly innocuous call by the Treasury (1984) for "adjustment" (p. 107) to overcome the "lacklustre performance" (p.103) of the economy. This call became translated in the political arena into the mantra of *"restructuring"* accompanied by the incantation of *"there is no alternative"*. Another candidate for the *point de capiton* of the reforms could be the call for *"more market"* which became ubiquitous after its introduction into the New Zealand lexicon by the NZ Planning Council in 1979 (Easton, 1987, p. 137). It was those who supported this slogan that the pre-1984

Muldoon-led National Party Government, with its "anti-market" wage and price freeze, ran up against as the tide of "public opinion" turned.

This new ideology was an import, it was a "Travelling Theory" (Said, 1981, p. 226). As theories travel, they change. Theories, from their point of origin, travelling over some (spatial or temporal) distance meet a new set of "conditions of acceptance" (after overcoming any resistance) and are incorporated (fully or partly) into their new situation. In the process the ideas are "to some extent transformed by (their) new uses, (their) new position in a new time and place" (p. 227). An uncritical approach to this process sees theories being applied to a different reality in a dogmatic fashion. This was unquestionably the case with Rogernomics. If theory is not answerable through its successes and failures "to the essential untidiness, the essential unmasterable presence that constitutes a large part of historical and social situations" then it becomes "an ideological trap" (p. 241). The 1984 Labour Government was a willing captive of the neo-liberal "ideological trap". Let us then explore the genealogy of the "alien" ideas that were the bars of this trap.

### Keynes

The ideas of Keynes, that were so dramatically overthrown in New Zealand in 1984, had their genesis in the Great Depression. Keynes wrote his famous and hugely influential treatise in 1936 in the aftermath of the 1929 crash, and in the shadow of the rise of Fascism in Europe. In its final chapter he wrote: "The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes" (Keynes, 1936, p. 372). Keynes saw the policies he advocated in his *General Theory* as a means of ameliorating the worst aspects of capitalism. He thought they would eventually lead to the demise of "the transitional phase" of the "rentier aspect of capitalism" (p. 376) to a regulated capitalism "harnessed to the service of the community" (p. 377). He was sure the transformation he advocated would be attained gradually and "will need no revolution" (p. 376).

And the possibility of revolution, particularly following the success of the 1917 Russian (anti-capitalist) revolution, was very much a consideration. US President F.D. Roosevelt had already embarked on his Keynesian-style New Deal reforms three years before Keynes published his *General theory*. Kiernan (1948), in a biography of Roosevelt, wrote that "fear of revolution" (p. 88) was certainly one of the major motivations of the New Deal. Keynes first advocated "interventionist" reforms in Britain as early as 1929, after the stock market crash (Klein, 1954, pp. 32-37). His pre-1929 writings were standard contemporary neo-classical economic tracts (e.g., *A treatise on money*). The "revolutionary" *General theory* was in effect a theoretical justification of the policies of Government public works spending and other interventions *already* being instituted. "It was not his theory which led him to practical policies, but practical policies devised to cure honest-to-goodness economic ills which finally led him to his theory" (Klein, 1954, p. 31). Nevertheless, Keynesianism proper was, in the words of Joan Robinson (who worked with Keynes in the "Cantabrigian" circle of economists), "a violent revolution" in the theory of money (Klein, 1954, p. 31).

Keynesianism was internationally institutionalised after WWII. This enabled the threat of revolution, which was again very real, to once more be largely headed off, particularly in Europe (aided by the vital collaboration of Stalin). Keynes was a key participant in the negotiations at Bretton Woods in 1944 (Latin American Bureau, 1983, p. 21). The Second World War had "upset the balance of social forces in favour of the working classes and oppressed peoples" (Amin, 1998, p. 39) and the unspoken task of the Bretton Woods conference was the establishment of an international class compromise[1]. The IMF and World Bank were set up to ensure financial stability based on the strength of the US economy (the US was the only real winner of WWII). The US dollar was backed by gold at the rate of $US35 per ounce and every other currency was (theoretically) fixed to the US dollar. The IMF was to act as the international financial "policeman". It was a set up as an international

1. Cf. Bruce Jesson's analysis of the "historic compromise" in New Zealand (Jesson, 1989, pp. 14-21).

body, but effective control was (and still is) in the hands of the US[2] (Latin American Bureau, 1983, pp. 15-29).

### Hayek, Friedman and Keynesianism

In the inter-war period, "The Keynesian Avalanche" (McCormick, 1992) was opposed by F.A. Hayek in a prolonged debate between himself and Keynes. Both had supporters in their respective academic institutions (the London School of Economics (LSE) and Cambridge University). (Coase, discussed below, was one LSE academic who was influenced by Hayek (McCormack, 1992, p. 147). Hayek, however, never produced a comprehensive criticism of *General Theory* because he failed to construct a workable alternative explanation for the 1930s breakdown of capitalism (pp. 170-171). He also stated that "to proclaim my dissent from the near unanimous views of the orthodox phalanx would merely have deprived me of a hearing on other matters about which I was more concerned at the time" (p. 171).

Hayek moved to the University of Chicago in 1950 where his writings "set out in a coherent and comprehensive manner his views on the workings of a liberal society" (McCormack, 1992, p. 236). During the war, while still in London, Hayek wrote *The road to serfdom* in which he opposed "fascism and socialism" as "manifestations of a drive towards totalitarianism" (p. 235-236). It was the "hostile political climate" of the newly elected "socialist" Labour Government with its Beveridge Plan for a welfare state that prompted his move. Beveridge was at this time the Director of the LSE so Hayek's move was understandable. The "Chicago programme" that he was central in developing opposed central planning. It put faith in the market as a means to liberty and thought social justice was a mirage (pp. 237-238). As Jesson (1989) perceptively comments, the Austrian (Hayek) and Chicago (Milton Friedman) versions of the "Chicago School" (there are differences of emphasis between the two) are both "quite openly political" and both oppose Keynesianism, the welfare state and socialism on principle (p. 36). The Chicago School

2. In 1982 the US held 20 per cent of the vote in the IMF (today it is down to about 17 percent). This gave it (and still does) an effective veto since any major changes in IMF policy require an 85 per cent vote.

remained marginalised until the end of the 1960s when the break-up of the post WWII boom discredited Keynesian theories. Keynesians were not able to account for, nor remedy, the "stagflation" (high inflation and unemployment) that plagued the 1970s. Hayek re-emerged as an intellectual force. He was awarded the so-called Nobel Prize for Economics[3] in 1974 (McCormick, 1992, p. 245).

That same year, perhaps emboldened by this recognition, Hayek argued in the *London Daily Telegraph* that "...we must face the fact that in the present situation merely to stop the inflation or even slow down its rate will produce substantial unemployment" (Hayek, 1978, p. 193). The cure for inflation was "a real labour market in which the wages of the different kinds of labour are determined by demand and supply" (p. 195). Hayek was urging the deliberate creation of unemployment to drive down wages, a complete reversal of Keynesian full employment policies. Hayek's was not just an economic policy prescription, but a political call to arms for the resumption of the class struggle. Thatcher, as UK Prime Minister in the 1980s, took Hayek's call to its logical conclusion with her use of the full force of the state to smash the coal miners' union. This was necessary in order to break organised worker resistance to unemployment and the cutting of living standards. Reagan, in the US, initiated a similar union-busting strategy.

McCormick (1992) states that Keynesianism was "discredited as a result of the experiences of inflation" (p. 257) in the 1970s. But it was more than that. The whole post-war boom was staggering to a halt. Profit rates had steadily declined (Brenner, 1998; see also Dumenil et al., 2001) and the US dollar was destabilised by the massive Euro-dollar market that had developed. After devaluations of the British pound and the French franc in the late 1960s, the killer blow for the post-war boom came when decades of US balance of payments deficits (every year since 1947), fuelled by expenditure on the war against Vietnam, finally forced Nixon to announce (in August 1971) the end of the gold-

3. The Nobel Prize for Economics is actually The Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. The Economics Prize was not part of Alfred Nobel's original will. It was added in 1969, with the support of the Bank of Sweden.

convertibility of the dollar, and its devaluation. "Thus, in one single announcement, the US toppled two fundamental pillars of the Bretton Woods agreement, fixed exchange parities and gold as the common denominator of the system" (Latin American Bureau, 1983, pp. 19-20). Currencies were now "floating" and fluctuating rapidly against one another. "The system was out of control" (p. 20). Brenner (1998) puts an empirically well documented case that the underlying cause of the crisis was the fall in profit rates. Roper (1991, pp. 137-147) comes to a similar conclusion. The printing of paper money in the days of Keynesian deficit spending, the creation of vast amounts of fictitious capital (as Marx called it), had the dual effect of masking the falling rate of profit and creating the conditions for uncontrollable inflation. Unemployment also rose in most of the wealthy countries as production was interrupted by crises like those provoked by the oil-price shocks.

Keynesianism was now compromised and the way open for its opponents. The Chicago School played a central role in the rise of "globalised neo-liberalism" (Amin, 1998, p. 43). The University of Chicago was founded in 1892 with money donated by oil-tycoon John D. Rockefeller. It was known by the "opprobrious title of The Standard Oil University" (Valdes, 1995, p. 53). The Chicago School of Economics retained the ideological stamp of its founder. This was a conservative pro-business institution[4]. In the 1950s Milton Friedman became the de-facto leader of the "small beleaguered minority" (as Friedman referred to the members of the School) who formed a "rational sect" that hunkered down to survive "the dark ages of Keynesianism" (p. 60). They were described as "the extreme vanguard of neo-classicism" (p. 66). However, they were by no means content to fulminate in frustration. They put their time in exile to good use, extending their cadre as much as possible while waiting for a more propitious time to implement their free-market programme.

4. Not to be confused with the "Chicago School" of Sociology which played a leading role in establishing Sociology as an academic discipline.

### Chile experience

Their most notable success in this cadre-training endeavour was in Chile. Unable to gain traction in the industrial centres of capitalism, the Chicago School turned its attention to confronting Keynesianism (and communism) on the periphery. The target was the "development" and "modernisation" agenda for underdeveloped countries initiated by Roosevelt (itself an "anti-communist" initiative) (Valdes, 1995, p. 92). Friedman opposed economic aid: "I do not believe that the world needs a redistribution of wealth. I think it is wrong" (p. 96). Others in the School like Shultz and Harberger were not so strident but wanted to use Shultz's "human capital" theories in a real situation, and to that end an "experiment" was begun involving the training of graduates from the Universdad Catolica in Chile (Valdes, 1995). Part of the motivation for the "Chile project" was the need to source high quality students. In the 1950s, Keynesianism reigned supreme and the unorthodox Chicago School was having difficulty attracting top US students who preferred to enrol in universities like Harvard (p. 99). With the support of the right wing *El Mercurio* newspaper and under the banner of the development of human capital, the training of the "Chicago Boys" began. The PhD courses that the specially selected Chilean students undertook were, according to one Chicago economist, "an acculturation process ... whose end result is an economist with the Chicago style of thought" (p. 147). Those who could not be "acculturated", failed the course. By the mid-70s there was "a core group of 50 to 100 of Chile's best economists (who) were thoroughly conversant with and convinced of the need to adopt a free-market approach to economic policy" (Pinera quoted in Williamson, 1994, p. 227).

The propitious time and place for the *implementation* of the free-market approach arose abruptly and violently. On September 11, 1973, Salvador Allende, the democratically elected Marxist President of Chile was overthrown and killed by the armed forces.[5] Powerful business interests in Chile and the US worked alongside the CIA to undermine

5. Some Chileans refer to the more recent September 11 events as "Allende's revenge".

Allende and organise the coup (Latin American Bureau, 1983a). A major organising centre for this opposition to Allende was the "Monday Club" that met in the editorial offices of the newspaper *El Mercurio* (the editor was a key CIA contact) (Latin American Bureau, 1983a, p. 34.). The Chicago Boys were linked closely to the Monday Club[6] (ibid.). They were commissioned to write an economic plan to be implemented after Allende was toppled (pp. 38-39). After the coup, inflation raged as Allende's price controls were lifted (in the name of the free market). Friedman, during a visit to Santiago in 1975, urged a "shock" attack on the inflation crisis. He advocated a 20 per cent cut in government spending (p. 58).

The neo-liberal economic programme was instituted with the advice and approval of the IMF. In fact, the Pinochet junta went even further than the IMF programme, to the extent that *Business Week* called Friedman's "shock treatment" "draconian" (12 Jan. 1976). This was full-blooded monetarism carried out at the point of a gun. The "solution" for inflation was a drastic cut of 27 per cent in Government expenditure. Inflation was not stopped dead though. It was still running at a rate of nearly 200 per cent a year later. GNP, however, slumped by 16.6 per cent; a staggering, unprecedented collapse of the economy (Latin American Bureau, 1983a, p. 63). Wages were slashed (as recommended by the IMF) and by 1975 they were 40 per cent of their 1969 level. Industrial production contracted. Bankruptcies were rife. Unemployment, which had averaged five per cent in the 60s and was only three per cent in 1972, rocketed to 20 per cent by March 1976 (Latin American Bureau, 1983, p. 58). The World Bank was ecstatic: "The Chilean government has made the hard policy decisions required ... These measures are consistent with recommendations made repeatedly by the Bank and other international institutions over the past decade" (Latin American Bureau, 1983, p. 58). Friedman's only concern was "that they push it long enough and hard enough" (*Business Week.*, 12 Jan. 1976).

6. "The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities disclosed last month that 'CIA collaborators' had helped to plan economic measures that Chile's junta enacted immediately after seizing power" (Business Week 12 Jan. 1976).

The Latin American Bureau (Latin American Bureau, 1983a) explains that

> after 1973, Chile became the purest example of the new *laissez-faire* model. ... Key figures like Milton Friedman, Hayek himself, and Arnold Harberger, a Chicago economist married to a Chilean who was the spiritual godfather of many of the Chicago Boys, appeared in Chile, often to throw their weight behind their proteges at crucial moments". (p. 57)

Eventually GDP growth turned around, registering impressive results from 1977 to 1981, and inflation was reduced somewhat. Chile was lauded as producing an "economic miracle" as a result of implementing the monetarist (neo-liberal) programme. The social costs, however, were enormous. Family incomes halved for a huge proportion of the population. Health and education services were severely curtailed. High unemployment became endemic. And the growth figures were only mediocre if averaged over the whole period from 1974 to 1980. The Chilean economy has staggered from crisis to crisis to this day. Democracy has been restored, but neo-liberal policies remain intact (Valdes, 1995, p. 280).

The policies implemented were almost exactly the same as those which John Williamson (1990) ten years later dubbed the "Washington Consensus" (Chossudovsky, 1975, p. 15). The tens of thousands of people who were murdered, tortured and exiled under Pinochet's "National Security Doctrine" (Latin American Bureau, 1993a, pp. 44-45, 110-117) and the massive increase in poverty and inequality (Latin American Bureau,1983, pp. 62-63) was the price paid by the people of Chile for, in the words of one of the Chicago Boys, Jose Pinera, "the detoxification of a state-hobbled economy" (Williamson, 1994, p. 228). Despite, or because of this, the Chile experience gave the neo-liberal programme and paradigm international credibility.

### New Zealand experiment

The New Zealand experiment was not conducted at the point of a gun but its economic and social consequences paralleled those in Chile. In New Zealand, an extreme form of "bastardised" Keynesianism (Philpott

1992, p. 14) (as practised by Muldoon) was overturned, and this was done quite constitutionally. The political route taken in New Zealand may have been different but the ideological one was very similar. There was no Monday Club but similar informal and formal groupings of figures in key institutions, over a protracted period of time, pushed the Chicago message in New Zealand. Some of the most influential were the "biscuit group" in Treasury (Gorringe, 1991, 22; McKinnon, 2001), the "Talavera Group" established by Roger Douglas in 1983 (Bertram, 1993, p. 42) and the infamous "fish and chip" group in the Labour caucus. Easton (1988, pp. 70-90) describes in detail the make-up and activities of what he calls the "Rogernomics Group" (or just the "Group").

In New Zealand the Treasury, the main policy-setting arm of the state apparatus, played the central role in importing the neo-liberal theories (Bertram, 1993; Boston, 1989; Easton, 1988; Jesson, 1989; Kelsey, 1995; NZIER, 1988). The Gorringe Papers recently published on behalf of the Treasury (Gorringe, 2001; Treasury website) reveal how pervasive the influence of the Chicago School was in this supposedly impartial state body. Gorringe was one of the economists set the task in the 1970s, "especially after the second oil shock", by Secretary of the Treasury, Noel Lough, of questioning the "conventional wisdom" (i.e., Keynesianism) and "seeking fresh insights into the New Zealand economy" (Scott in Gorringe, 2001, p. xv). Gorringe was something of a theoretical guru for the Treasury. His strong interest was in the "comparative institutional approach", particularly that of the Nobel Prize winner, Ronald Coase[7] (Gorringe, 2001, p. 1) whom he knew personally. He was often critical of simplistic versions of neo-classical economics, and thought "classical economists such as Adam Smith and Karl Marx, had a much better appreciation of the big picture" (p. xii).

His was a sophisticated, but nevertheless thorough, neo-liberal perspective. According to his former boss, Graham Scott, Gorringe's work was crucial to the implementation of Ruth Richardson's Fiscal Responsibility Act (one of the fundamental legislative pillars of neo-

7. Coase had moved from the LSE to the University of Virginia by 1959 from where he exerted an important influence on the Chicago School (Coase, 1991).

liberalism in New Zealand) (Gorringe, 2001, p. xvi). Scott also links many of the other major changes that underpin the New Zealand experiment with Gorringe's work. He says these included the floating of the dollar on Treasury advice in 1985, the Reserve Bank Act, the "corporatisation" of State Owned Enterprises, the State Sector Act and the Public Finance Act (p. xv). Sections of the 1987 briefing papers to the incoming Labour Government (entitled *Government management*) bear the imprint of Gorringe's thought[8] (for example, terms like "bounded rationality" (Treasury, 1987, p. 11) are straight out of Gorringe's papers). Although Gorringe played an important intellectual role, others took a more ideological and political stance as "permanent persuaders" (Gramsci, 1983, p. 10) on behalf of the Chicago-style ideas.

Graham Scott (Treasury Secretary from 1986-1993), Roger Kerr (Treasury Official from 1976-1986), and Rob Cameron and Bryce Wilkinson who co-wrote the 1984 briefing papers (Treasury, 1984) to the incoming Labour Government, were all neo-liberal ideologues in the Treasury. The Reserve Bank chief economist, Rod Deane, who came from a stint at the IMF into the job in 1979, was another key figure. Private institutions like the Hayekian-oriented Centre for Independent Studies, the Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) and the Business Roundtable, with which the above figures also had strong links, played their role as well (Kelsey, 1995, p. 47). The "New Right" cadre included leading business people like Ron Trotter and Alan Gibbs who both had close links with the Labour Party (p. 48). The story of the transfer of neo-liberal ideas into New Zealand via these agencies and how they permeated important section of the business world[9] and crucial elements in the Labour Party[10] have been well documented. The NZIER (1988) publication of the Fulbright Seminars on *The influence of American economics on New Zealand thinking and policy* is clear on the source of these ideas. Easton (1988) traced the Chicago School influence on the (Rogernomics)

8. Compare for example his paper on "A contracting theory view of industrial relations" (Gorringe, 2001, pp.13-33) with the section on labour relations in Government management (Treasury, 1987, pp. 270-290).
9. See Roper (1992).
10. See Oliver (1989), Debnam (1992) , Jesson (1989), Easton (1987), Boston and Holland, (987), and Kelsey (1995).

"Group" (the New Right cadre) in his contribution to these seminars.[11]

The result was that when the opportunity arose, "a coherent and united economic team" (Williamson & Haggard in Williamson, 1994, p. 578) committed to "getting the fundamentals right" (p. 550) was willing and able to carry out the "stabilisation, liberalisation, and opening up" (p. 529) of the economy. This description is found in a comprehensive 1993 study produced by the Institute for International Economics (IIE) (Williamson, 1994). This study had more than thirty contributors, including New Zealander Alan Bollard (now Governor of the Reserve Bank), then from the NZIER.[12] The study aimed at examining "the politics of economic reform" (p. 4). It was an international drawing together of all the lessons learned from Chile onwards on "how to do it" (p. 3), that is, how best to implement the Washington Consensus. In her book, Kelsey (1995) lists Williamson's ten point Washington Consensus "structural adjustment programme" (p. 18) to show how closely the New Zealand experiment had followed it. It is important, however, to understand that the Chilean and New Zealand experiences were constituent elements in the *creation* of the Washington Consensus, not just formal applications of some pre-existing plan. In 1990, when Williamson described the Washington Consensus, he was summarising the results of at least a decade of attempts (some more successful or consistent than others) by the world elite to deal with the fall-out of the collapse of the post-war boom and the failure of Keynesian remedies. What Williamson defined in words had already defined itself in reality, in a struggle of opposing classes.

The weakness of many contemporary New Zealand accounts of the New Zealand experiment is their avoidance of the class struggle. This arises out of an unwillingness to step out of the orbit of what Samir Amin (1998) calls "a capitalist way of thinking" (p. 40). Kelsey (1995, p. 17), for example, cannot see past a choice between free-market and Keynesian capitalism. She also sees the situations in New Zealand and Chile as being somehow separate and fundamentally different because the latter was forced to implement neo-liberalism and New Zealand did it

11. See also Bertram (1993), Boston (1989), and Jesson (1989).
12. The NZIER was a private economic think-tank that supported the neo-liberal agenda.

"voluntarily" (pp. 1, 15). The stark reality is that the Chile experience and the New Zealand experiment were and are part of a continuum of international class struggle. The most powerful capitalist interests in the world were being served in both countries, with or without the formal intervention of the IMF or World Bank.

One who does take up the question of the class struggle is Roper (1991). He does this in his Marxist explanation of the transition *From the welfare state to the free market* in New Zealand. Roper problematises the neo-Marxist (semi-Weberian) regulationist approach that influences many of the critical accounts of the rise of Rogernomics (e.g., Jesson, 1989; Kelsey 1995; O'Brien & Wilkes, 1993). He criticises these accounts for having "failed to provide an integrated analysis of crisis, class, ideology and the state" (p. 38). He particularly criticises them for ignoring the "crucial strategic location of the blue collar working class at the very heart of the economic system" (p. 62), and by implication the class struggle aspects that are pivotal to a complete account. One aspect requiring much greater attention than it has received up to now is the role of working class leadership in abetting the rise of the New Right. Contributing greatly to the weakness of the opposition to Rogernomics was the support that the trade union leadership gave to the 1984-1990 Labour Government. The Council of Trade Unions (CTU) leadership's refusal to mobilise workers against the destruction of union rights was also a decisive factor in allowing the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act by the subsequent National Government (Kelsey, 1995, pp. 186-187). A large part in the success of the introduction of neo-liberal policies was the muting and pacification of potential organised working class resistance.

### Conclusion: "Resistance to theory"

The ideological transfer of neo-liberalism from the Chicago School to Chile was not a conspiracy. In fact, it contained a fair element of chance, including the fact that a leading Chicago School professor was married to a Chilean (probably providing the initial point of contact). A further chance element was the need for the School to find a source of good post-graduate students. Valdes (1995) insists, though, that the transfer

of ideas was not accidental: it was "a calculated bid to implant previously absent notions in the Chilean "ideological market" " (p. 14). The Chicago professors found in Chile an ideological battleground in which they could "defend true economic science (i.e. neo-classical orthodox theory) against contamination by Keynesianism or socialism" (Valdes, 1995, p. 14)). In contrast to Chile, where university economists provided the main channel of neo-liberal influence, it was Victoria University economists who were the main source of intellectual opposition to neo-liberalism in New Zealand (Bertram, 1993, p. 44; Zanetti, 1984). However, as Jesson (1989) observes, this opposition was isolated and "scarcely heard above the free market conformity" that was created by the "blitzkrieg effectiveness of the economic reforms" (p. 98). The "political success" of Rogernomics gave the reforms a sense of credibility; it "provided their own justification" (Jesson, 1989, p. 98).

New Zealand helped to write the textbook (e.g., Williamson, 1994) on how to implement a neo-liberal programme. The long history of anti-theory sentiment and anti-intellectualism in New Zealand (Horrocks, 1984) helped create the climate where a cohesive group could steamroller over the existing (by 1984, very shaky) Keynesian paradigm. Muldoon rejected the need for a theoretical defence of Keynesianism. He thought the theories of Hayek and Friedman could only work under a dictatorship (as in Chile) and he was scathing towards the "left-wing intelligentsia", the only ones who were likely to be equipped to discredit neo-liberal monetarism (p. 120). Neo-liberalism arrived in New Zealand, like Chile, as the result of a "calculated bid" to implant it, but it arrived at its destination via the Trojan Horse of the 1984-1990 Labour Government rather than at the point of a gun. The role of the Labour Party was crucial. The implementation of policies that attacked the very mechanisms of class compromise in New Zealand would probably have required, as Muldoon supposed, some form of dictatorship if not carried out by what is putatively the working class's "own" political party. At the very least, a class confrontation on the scale of Thatcher's with the miners in 1984, or our own 1951 watersiders' lockout, could have been expected. Neo-liberalism slipped under the radar of the New Zealand people who did not vote for it then, nor since.

The fact is that the intellectual radar of New Zealand was scarcely alert for such an occurrence - the rearguard action initiated at Victoria University notwithstanding. This is a lesson that should be learnt well. To quote Said (1994 [1978]): "...systems of thought like [neo-liberalism], discourses of power, ideological fictions – mind-forg'd manacles – are all too easily made, applied, and guarded" (p. 328). The "grey theory" of neo-liberalism was both the guide to action and the justification for the creation of the (misshapen) "green tree of life" that was post-Keynesian New Zealand. It was the rallying *point de capiton* of those who sought to reverse the gains made by the workers and lower classes in the post-war period. Said (1981) emphasises the need to grasp theory with a "critical consciousness ... as it turns up for use" (pp. 241-242) in a different time and place from whence it emerged. This is no less pressing now.

The "Third Way", well described by Perry Anderson as "the best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today" (quoted in Callinicos, 2001, p. 8), is the current ideological unifier to have travelled from afar (again from the UK and the USA). Although less openly embraced of late by the Labour Party in New Zealand, partly because Blair has compromised this "theory", we still have such Third Way notions as the "knowledge economy/society" being promoted at the "Knowledge Wave" conferences supported by the Labour Government. Travelling catch-phrases such as "human capital", "social inclusion/exclusion", as well as "rights, benefits, and responsibilities", "communities", and "well-being", as used by Steve Maharey, Minister of Social Policy, further express the third way theme (e.g., Maharey 2001). "Partnership", especially "public-private partnership", is another "floating idea" that helps make up the "structured network of meaning" that is the Third Way in New Zealand. It is vital to maintain an attitude of critical engagement with this new theory if intellectuals are to perform their role as the conscience of society.

As Edward Said (1981) wrote, "it is the critic's job to provide resistances to theory, to open up toward historical reality, toward society, toward human needs and interests"; the "concrete instances drawn from everyday reality" that lie outside the "interpretive area ... circumscribed by every theory" (p. 242) are the stuff of this resistance.

There is more to be discovered in reality than theory prescribes and the process of discovery is itself resistance. For Said, "critical consciousness" is "at bottom ... an unstoppable predilection for alternatives" (p. 247). More than this, the critic who believes in "actual" rather than merely "formal" freedom will, Zizek (2001) asserts, intervene not "*within* the coordinates of the existing power relations" but make "an intervention which undermines those very coordinates" (p. 7). The class interests of the powerful are defended with all manner of hegemonic tools, including brute force as a last resort. Ideas adopted and adapted from different places and times, travelling theories, play a central role in this tool-kit, as the saga of neo-liberalism shows. "Critical understanding", Gramsci (1983, p. 333) explained, is a key element in the battle of opposing hegemonies. It is a "politico-practical" as much as a theoretical imperative. This is an injunction worth remembering, and acting upon.

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# Between Empires: Rethinking Identity and Citizenship in the Context of Globalisation

*Michael A. Peters*

**Abstract**

Two competing and influential conceptions of the "new imperialism" have emerged recently to focus on questions of international security, world order and the evolving system of states. Robert Cooper, Deputy Secretary of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat in the British Cabinet Office, posits the development of a postmodern European state system based on transparency, interdependence, and mutual surveillance. He calls for a "new imperialism" – one compatible with human rights and cosmopolitan values – in order to sort out the problems of rogue states and the chaos of pre-modern states. By contrast, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri use the combined resources of Marx and Deleuze, to chart the emergence of a new form of sovereignty they call *Empire*. They narrate a history of the passage from imperialism to Empire, that is, from a modernity dominated by the sovereignty of nation-states, and the imperialisms of European powers, to a postmodernity characterised by a single though decentered, new logic of global rule. They suggest that the passage to Empire, with its processes of globalisation, "offer new possibilities to the forces of liberation", arguing that our political future will be determined by our capacity "not simply to resist these processes but to reorganize them and redirect them toward new ends" (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xv). Beginning from these contrasting accounts, this paper focuses on the concepts of identity and citizenship, rethinking them in the context of globalisation. The terms "globalisation" and "citizenship" are not normally juxtaposed in social and political analysis. They appear as contradictory or, at least, conflicting: the former points to an economic and cultural process of world integration, based on the unregulated flows of capital and underwritten by developments in new information and communications technologies, while the latter serves as a metaphor for political community or solidarity. Globalisation seems to threaten the

sovereignty of the nation-state and with it the notion of citizenship (and national identity) that developed during the modern era. Within the context of globalisation, how can we develop a sense of community and local identity to establish or defend the entitlements of social citizenship? And what possibilities are there for developing transnational alliances and defining entirely new rights within supranational arenas? The paper ends with a brief conclusion and postscript examining the schism between the US and "old" Europe over the Iraq war, and prospect for its democratisation.

## Introduction

This paper addresses the question of rethinking citizenship within the context of globalisation. It adds the conference code words "between empires" to the title. It accepts the proposition that we are between two different historical periods characterised by forms of empire: essentially the nineteenth-century imperialism of the European powers and the American decentred system of global rule of the twenty first century. The paper focuses on the latter by contrasting two competing and influential conceptions of the "new imperialism" that have emerged recently to focus on questions of international security, world order and the evolving system of states. Questions of globalisation, national identity and citizenship are transformed when raised in this new geopolitical context.

Robert Cooper, Deputy Secretary of the Defence and Overseas Secretariat in the British Cabinet Office, posits the development of a postmodern European state system based on transparency, interdependence, and mutual surveillance. He calls for a "new imperialism" – one compatible with human rights and cosmopolitan values – in order to sort out the problems of rogue states and the chaos of pre-modern states. By contrast, Hardt and Negri use the combined resources of Marx and Deleuze, to chart the emergence of a new form of sovereignty they call *Empire*. They narrate a history of the passage from imperialism to Empire, that is, from a modernity dominated by the sovereignty of nation-states, and the imperialisms of European powers, to a postmodernity characterised by a single though new decentred

logic of global rule.

In a strong sense Hardt and Negri's *Empire* and Cooper's "new imperialism" are both geopolitical and juridical forms of globalisation that are dependent on emergent forms of global sovereignty. The difference between the two views is that whereas the former focus on American Empire as the dominant form the latter concentrates on an emergent European postmodern state system. They both entertain extranational forms of citizenship based on these supranational systems and problematise the concept of citizenship based on the bounded system of the sovereign state.

Perhaps, more than ever before the question of globalisation and citizenship revolves around the free movement of peoples. By this I mean not only the modern Diaspora, or the planned colonial migrations or the more recent global mobility of highly skilled labour that is rewarded by citizenship. But more importantly, I mean refugees of all kinds and asylum-seekers and all that that entails – enforced border crossings, ethnic cleansing policies, the huge illegal movement of so-called "aliens", detention camps the likes of Woomera and even, Guantanomo Bay, where the concept of rights is fragile or has entirely disappeared.[1]

## Globalisation and citizenship

At the beginning of the twenty-first century the world experiences processes of both integration and disintegration. The expansion of world markets, as a form of economic globalisation, can be understood as a process of integration composed of international flows of capital, goods, information, and people. The same process is both a form of economic integration and a polarisation of wealth that exacerbates existing tendencies towards greater global inequalities between rich and poor countries and regions. It also accentuates the need for reviewing the templates of the global system of governance that emerged from the Bretton Woods agreement, founding of many of the institutions that

1. On this question, see the deliberations of two philosophers, Derrida (2001) and Dummett (2001). Derrida argues for a form of cosmopolitanism that entails the right to asylum while Dummett discusses refugee and immigration policy in Great Britain.

now comprise the architecture of the world system. Now, more than at any time in the past with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet system, the consolidation of the EU, and the entry of China into the WTO, we are witnessing an accelerated set of changes – economic, cultural, technological, and political – that impinge on one another in novel ways and create new possibilities and dangers, both for the democratic state and the notions of citizenship and national identity that underpin it.

The modern concept of citizenship – a recent concept historically – implies the existence of a civil or political community, a set of rights and obligations ascribed to citizens by virtue of their membership in that community, and an ethic of participation and solidarity needed to sustain it. Most traditional accounts of citizenship begin with the assertion of basic civil, political and social rights of individuals and note the way in which the modern concept, as inherently egalitarian, took on a universal appeal with the development of the liberal tradition which is often understood as synonymous with modernity. Yet the concept has appealed to both conservatives and radical democrats: the former emphasise individual freedom at the expense of equality and see state intervention as an intolerable and unwarranted violated of the freedom of the individual, while the latter stress the democratic potential of citizenship. Increasingly, on the left the concept has been seen as a means to control the injustices of capitalism. For the left the most pressing question has been the status of citizenship in the modern state and what kind of political community best promotes it.

The classic theorisation of democratic citizenship is to be found in Marshall's famous modelling of three forms of citizenship: civil, political, and social. In this conception, civil citizenship referred to personal liberty and a regime of individual rights, political citizenship referred to both political participation and democratic representation, and social citizenship to intervention by the state to reduce economic inequalities and promote social justice. It is now possible to chart the significant shifts in the definitions of citizenship that have accompanied globalisation, including the breakdown of the historic compromise between capitalism, democracy and the welfare state, the rise of neo-

liberalism and with it the expansion of world markets. In the United Kingdom under Third Way politics there has been a shift from the concept of *rights* to *responsibilities*, a move away from State intervention towards community involvement in civic networks with a corresponding emphasis on promoting forms of social capital, and a shift from active political citizenship to passive political literacy (see Gamarnikov & Green, 1999).

These shifts are emblematic of what Faulks (2000) calls the "ten dualisms of liberal citizenship". The abstract individualism of the liberal tradition, dating back to Locke, tends to view "the individual and community as being in opposition and ... in part this explains their ambivalence towards responsibilities, democracy and social rights" (Faulks, 2000, p. 57). In particular, the emphasis placed on individual autonomy makes liberals suspicious of notions of community and tends to result in what Faulks (2000, p.11) describes as "thin" and "thick" citizenship. Neo-liberalism and, some would argue also Third Way politics, tend to entertain versions of "thin" citizenship, which are largely compatible with the diminished role of the state with the rise of globalisation and multi-national capitalism.

The two terms "globalisation" and "citizenship" are not normally juxtaposed in social and political analysis. They appear as contradictory or, at least, conflicting: the former points to an economic and cultural process of world integration, based on the unregulated flows of capital and underwritten by developments in new information and communications technologies, while the latter serves as a metaphor for political community. Globalisation seems to threaten the sovereignty of the nation-state and with it the notion of citizenship that developed during the modern era. Within the context of globalisation the pressing political question is how people can create and protect a sense of community and local identity in order to protect and bolster the institutions that provide them with social protection.

On one influential interpretation, globalisation represents the historical culmination of a set of world processes that began much earlier in the age of colonisation leading to the now dominant system of late world capitalism, based on the form of the multinational corporation. It is this multinational form of the corporation, which many theorists see

as threatening the sovereignty of the nation-state and also diminishing the prospect for community, civil society, and citizenship. On this view, economic liberalisation and restructuring have eroded the economic and social rights of people in many countries, while at the same time developments in international communications have expanded the international awareness of rights and created conditions for the emergence of international networks that may come to comprise civil society on a global scale. The processes of globalisation, on this view, undermine both the modern notion of citizenship and the sovereignty of the nation-state on which it depends. More importantly, some theorists (e.g., Mishra, 1999) argue that the logic of globalisation increases inequalities and weakens the basis and ideological underpinnings of social protection and partnership.

Yet so far most of the debate on citizenship has occurred within national boundaries without much regard for the impact of globalisation. As the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) indicated at their international conference on the theme of globalisation and citizenship held in 1996, "globalisation" serves as a synonym for contemporary forms of rapid structural change, and "citizenship" serves as a metaphor for social protection and the reconstruction of solidarity.

> Until recently, they were not systematically juxtaposed in social analysis. "Citizenship studies" have traditionally been more likely to focus on debates over civil and political rights, immigration law or forms of political participation in particular countries than on global economic and social trends. And analysis of "globalization" has been the terrain of macro-economists and sociologists not usually well trained in the intricacies of individual rights. But as the pace of change quickens, the relevance of the two concepts for each other becomes clearer. Global market forces now pose a fundamental challenge to social citizenship in advanced welfare states. At the same time, the new ease of international migration continually forces reconsideration of "who belongs" in national societies, and what their rights should be. The revolution in telecommunications encourages debates on the proper balance between the private and public realms.

> And the definition of rights and obligations of various groups, like women, whose identity and sense of solidarity may transcend national borders, is being subject to persistent re-evaluation. In consequence, it becomes increasingly important for national citizenship debates to incorporate international elements, and for students of globalization to understand the changing parameters of citizenship. (UNRISD, 1996, pp. 5-6)

Not only is it important for national citizenship debates to incorporate international elements, but it is also important to rethink questions of citizenship and national identity within the context of globalisation. In what follows I offer a synopsis and analysis of two competing versions of the "new imperialism", both of which question forms of citizenship tied to the nation-state and to national sovereignty.

### Two versions of empire: Cooper's "new imperialism"

In two influential publications – *The Postmodern State and the World Order* (Cooper, 2000) and "The Postmodern State" recently published in a collection entitled *Re-ordering the World: The Long-term Implications of September 11* (Leonard, 2002) – Robert Cooper has helped to shape Tony Blair's foreign policy outlook. The *New Republic* describes Cooper as the foremost commentator on strategic issues of our age, and Cooper's diagnosis of the era we live in has taken on the power of prophecy after the events of September 11. His analysis is terrifyingly simple, and I would argue, also alarmingly Eurocentric. Cooper argues that the year 1989 marked a turning point in European history, not only being the end of the Cold War but, perhaps, more fundamentally a change in the European state system: it marked the end of the balance-of-power system in Europe. What emerged after 1989 is not a re-arrangement of the old system but an entirely new system based on a new form of statehood, which Cooper calls the postmodern state.

With the emergence of the postmodern state, we now live in an international system comprised of three parts: the pre-modern world (of, for example, Somalia, Afghanistan, or Liberia) where the state has lost its legitimate monopoly on the use of force and chaos reigns; the modern world where the classical state system remains intact, and; the

postmodern world where the state system is collapsing and a new system is being born. The new postmodern system of states is best characterised by the EC. It exhibits the following characteristics:

- The breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs;
- Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance;
- The rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of rules of behaviour, rules that are self-enforced because all EC states have an interest in maintaining the rule of law;
- The growing irrelevance of borders;
- Security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability (Cooper, 2000, pp. 19-20).

The postmodern system of states – the so-called decentered state – originates in the postmodern world. The old imperialism is dead, at least among Western states. Member states no longer want to go to war against each other to acquire territory or subject populations. The postmodern state is "more pluralist, more complex, less centralised than the bureaucratic modern state". In this postmodern system that state becomes both less dominating and state interest becomes less determining in foreign policy. With the deconstruction of the state, the media, popular sentiment, public opinion, and the interests of particular groups and regions come into play. As the deconstruction of the state proceeds – a process not yet complete – so the processes of individualisation, regionalisation, and privatisation become more important.

On Cooper's analysis Europe is postmodern, and so are, possibly, Japan and Canada, but what of the US? He writes:

> The USA is the more doubtful case since it is not clear that the US government or Congress accepts either the necessity and desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance to the same extent as most European governments now do. The United States' unwillingness to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and its relative

> reluctance about challenge inspections in the CWC are examples of US caution about postmodern concepts. (Cooper, 2000, p. 27)

He characterises the USA in terms of a "defensive modernism". There is a certain force to his analysis on this point. After September 11, the US created the Office of Home Security, perhaps, the biggest change in government departments in the US since World War II. It is a super-department headed up by Henry Kissinger, combining departments of immigration, customs and domestic security, with an $80 billion dollar budget and with some 175,000 employees. With this new office and the prevailing ethos, the US has turned in upon herself, policing its borders and monitoring the flows of people, information, and goods in and out of its territory. As well as greater internal surveillance, the US has shifted its historic policy of containment to one of "pre-emptive first strike" and "regime change" in the name of national security.

What are the implications for security? In the postmodern zone there is a new transparent and interdependent security order. "Our task", he says, "must be to preserve and extend it" (Cooper, 2000, p.34). Yet dealing with the modern world requires a different approach as evidenced by the Gulf War and wars in the former Yugoslavia. In the first case, he suggests the Western response to Saddam Hussein's attack on Kuwait was exactly what it should have been: "Build the most powerful coalition possible, reverse the aggression, punish the aggressor, deal with the weapons programme" (Cooper, 2000, p. 36).

The initial support for the notion of a New World Order following the Gulf War was based on the hope that the UN was going to function as a world authority policing international law, that is, as an organisation of collective-security, but "the Gulf War was fought to protect an old order, not to create a new one" (Cooper, 2000, p. 37). Thus, for the postmodern system or state, there is a difficulty in dealing with militant, rogue modernist states, as Cooper (2000) writes:

> We need to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of state outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era – force. (p. 39)

In his second essay, Cooper (2002) openly advocates a new kind of imperialism: "What is needed is a new kind of imperialism, one compatible with human rights and cosmopolitan values: an imperialism which aims to bring order and organisation". He distinguishes between two kinds of "new colonialism" that can "save the world": the "voluntary" imperialism such as the IMF and the World Bank, which "provide help for states wishing to find their way back on to the global economy", and the "imperialism of neighbours", when states intervene to sort out "instability in their neighbourhood".

While Cooper has nothing directly to say about citizenship or rethinking this concept within the context of globalisation his analysis provides at least a three-pronged approach: pre-modern, modern and postmodern. In pre-modern states, the concept of citizenship is hazy, fragile, and volatile. The notion of rights in pre-modern states often are not recognised at all, and, if they are, the weak state is often unable to enforce or uphold them. The notion of citizenship in modern states is straightforward and conforms to the pattern of rights and responsibilities previously discussed. The important addition from Cooper might be the notion of citizenship in the postmodern state, and while he does not discuss this we can draw some inferences from his analysis. The notion of citizenship is still modern in that rights are ascribed first on the basis of national sovereignty and only secondly in terms of the greater EU. So we have a kind of two-tiered or layered structure that has both a national and an international community component, where the latter covers the right to work, to move freely, and to make use of the developing judicial and legal infrastructure such as the European Court. While Cooper's analysis might have something to say about citizenship in the postmodern state, he has nothing to say about stateless peoples or the vexed question concerning the rights of stateless peoples.

### Two versions of empire: Hardt and Negri's *Empire*

Nothing could be further from Cooper's conception than the picture Hardt and Negri (2000) present in their path-breaking *Empire*. This book has been variously hailed as "the first great new theoretical synthesis of the new millennium" by Fredric Jameson, and "nothing less than a

rewriting of *The communist manifesto* for our time" by Slavoj Zizek (cited in Kimball, 2001). At the same time it has been vilified as "the profoundly silly book that has set the academic left aflutter" (Peyser, 2002), and a "new anti-Americanism" by the likes of Kimball (2001).

Writing in the spirit of Marx and in combination with Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri (2000) provide the poststructuralist basis for a renewal of materialist thought, charting the emergence of a new form of sovereignty they call *Empire*. As they indicate in a footnote, "Two interdisciplinary texts serve as models for us throughout the writing of this book: Marx's *Capital* and Deleuze and Guattari's *A thousand plateaus*" (p. 415).[2] Hardt and Negri (2000) narrate a history of the passage from imperialism to Empire, that is, from a modernity dominated by the sovereignty of nation-states, and the imperialisms of European powers, to a postmodernity characterised by a single though decentered, new logic of global rule. They write: "Our basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sovereignty is what we call Empire" (p. xii). They use *Empire* not as a metaphor but as a concept that calls for a theoretical approach:

> The concept of Empire is characterized fundamentally by a lack of boundaries: Empire's rule has no limits. First and foremost, then, the concept of Empire posits a regime that effectively compasses the spatial totality, or really that rules over the entire "civilized" world. No territorial boundaries limit its reign. Second, the concept of Empire presents itself not as a historical regime originating in conquest, but rather as an order that effectively suspends history and thereby fixes the existing state of affairs for eternity ... Empire presents its rule not as a transitory moment in the movement of history, but as a regime with no temporal boundaries and in this sense outside history or at the end of history. Third, the rule of empire operates on all registers of the social order extending down to the depths of the social world. Empire not only manages a territory and a population but also creates the very world it inhabits. It not only regulates human

2. See also, Peters (2001), especially Chapter 5, "Deleuze's 'societies of control': From disciplinary pedagogy to perpetual training in the knowledge economy".

> interactions but also seeks directly to rule over human nature. The object of its rule is social life in its entirety, and thus Empire presents the paradigmatic form of biopower. Finally, although the practice of Empire is continually bathed in blood, the concept of Empire is always dedicated to peace – a perpetual and universal peace outside history. (Hardt & Negri, 2000: pp. xiv-xv)

They go on to suggest that the passage to Empire, with its processes of globalisation, will "offer new possibilities to the forces of liberation", arguing that our political future will be determined by our capacity "not simply to resist these processes but to reorganize them and redirect them toward new ends" (p. xv).

Imperialism, in its heyday, was simply the extension of the sovereignty of European nation-states beyond their own boundaries (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xii). Imperialism or colonialism in this sense, they seem to agree with Cooper, is now dead. But so are all forms of imperialism insofar as they represent restraints on the homogenising force of the world market. Empire is, thus, both "postcolonial and postimperialist". Drawing on the deleuzo-guatarian concepts of (de/re)territorialisation,[3] they argue:

> Imperialism is a machine of global striation, channelling, coding, and territorializing the flows of capital, blocking certain flows and facilitating others. The world market, in contrast, requires a smooth space of uncoded and deterritorialized flows .... imperialism would have been the death of capital had it not been overcome. The full realization of the world market is necessarily the end of imperialism. (p. 333)

Writing before the impending Second Persian Gulf War, Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that the US "does not, indeed no nation-state can today, form the centre of an imperialist project. Imperialism is over. No nation will be world leader in the way modern European nations were" (pp. xiii-xiv). In retrospect it is interesting to focus on their assessment of the US. The Vietnam War, Hardt and Negri suggest, "might be seen as the final moment of the imperialist tendency and thus a point of passage to

3. For a discussion of these concepts see my "Geophilosophy and the pedagogy of the concept" (Peters, 2002a).

a new regime of the Constitution" (pp. 178-179). This passage to a new global constitutional regime is shown by the Gulf War, during which the US emerged "as the only power able to manage international justice, not as a function of its own national motives but in the name of global right ....The U.S. world police acts not in imperialist interest but in imperial interest [that is, in the interest of deterritorialized Empire]. In this sense the Gulf War did indeed, as George Bush claimed, announce the birth of a New World order" (p. 180). As Forster (2001) puts it:

> Empire, the name they give to this new world order, is a product of the struggle over sovereignty and constitutionalism at the global level in an age in which a new global Jefffersonianism – the expansion of the U.S. constitutional form into the global realm – has become possible.

As Forster suggests, reading Hardt and Negri, "the struggle now is simply over the form that globalization will take".[4] As Bruce Lindsay (2000) makes clear, the new axiom of geopolitical power implies a spatial totality that differs

> from the system of nation-states, linked contractually (i.e., by treaty, centered on a form of 'the people' (whatever the specific form of regime) and containing a particular odering of space (the internal and the foreign, or 'outside'). Empire tends to supersede this basis of sovereignty, posing imperial authority as an overarching framework without a centre, embodied in networks of institutions, states, military forces and corporate powers.[5]

He goes on to clarify:

> The imperial model accompanies new productive models and processes—based on information and communication, global networks and flows—and the logic of Empire is to elaborate and extend control across this productive terrain. Empire tends to take the (de)territorializing tendency of capital to its extreme.

4. Forster (2001) champions the "decidedly unfashionable" view of Istvan Meszaros' (2001) new book Socialism or barbarism.
5. Indeed, Hardt and Negri refer to Samir Amin's (1992) Empire of chaos as the leading center/periphery alternative view to their own.

Without necessarily endorsing Hardt and Negri's view, it is easy to see the connections to the major themes of this conference and particularly to a form of global rule based on the globalisation of communications. There is a form of global government rationality that we might refer to as *communicative governmentality*. It is a concept-marriage that recognises the need for new terms to critically discuss forms of global rule that depend upon spaces of subjectivity more than ever linked to media and other forms of communication. The mouthful *communicative governmentality* also refers to the relations between modernist nation-state conceptions of "the people" as a basis for democracy and postmodern forms of subjectivity that may form the basis for alternative conceptions of globalisation – a sort of antagonistic or anti-globalisation and anti-Empire.[6]

### Anti-globalisation, anti-empire

Hardt and Negri have coined the term "multitude" to refer to the new spaces for subjectivity within globalisation and its democratic impulses. In the nation-state the multitude was reduced to "the people". The first element of a political programme for the global multitude is global citizenship—a political demand "that the juridical status of the population be reformed in step with the real economic transformations of recent years" (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 400). They proceed to argue:

> This demand can also be configured in a more general and more radical way with respect to the postmodern conditions of Empire. If in the first moment the multitude demands that each state recognize juridically the migrations that are necessary to capital, in second movement it must demand control over the movements themselves. The multitude must be able to decide if, when, and where it moves. It must have the right also to stay still and enjoy one place rather than being forced constantly to be on the move. The general right to control its own movement is the multitude's ultimate demand for global citizenship. This demand is radically insofar as it challenges the fundamental apparatus of imperial control over the production and life of the multitude. Global

6. In this regard, see my "Anti-globalization and Guattari's The three ecologies" (Peters, 2002b).

> citizenship is the multitude's power to reappropriate control over space and thus to design the new cartography. (p. 400)

Hardt and Negri (2001) have applied their analysis to recent events surrounding the so-called anti-globalisation protests. Writing in *The New York Times*, they recognise that the rainbow protests at the Genoa G8 "world" summit are united in the belief "that a fundamentally new global system is being formed" and that "[t]he world can no longer be understood in terms of British, French, Russian or even American imperialism". They maintain that no longer can national power control or order the present global system and that, while the protests often appear anti-American, they are really directed at the larger power structures.

The protestors must win the same kind of battle for democracy at the global level that ordinary people – citizens – won at the level of the nation-state, over three hundred years ago. And since those first democratic revolutions, movements of various kinds – civil rights, anti-racism, anti-war, women's rights, children's rights, animal rights, environmental protests – have progressively enfranchised ever larger groups of the world's populations, although not inevitably or without struggle or reversals.[7] Hardt and Negri point out the salient fact that "this new order has no democratic institutional mechanisms for representation, as nation-states do: no elections, no public forum for debate." And they go on to describe the anti-globalisation protestors, as a coalition united against the present form of capitalist globalisation, but not against the forces or currents of globalisation *per se*. Neither are these protestors, isolationalists, separatists, or nationalists. Rather, as Hardt and Negri claim, the protestors want to *democratise globalisation* – to eliminate the growing inequalities between nations and to expand

7. In his The age of rights(1994) Norberto Bobbio provides a useful description of these generational rights, although his Hegelian philosophy of history appears to me wrong-headed, especially in light of the reversal of so-called social rights that occurred in the 1980s under the combined forces of the neo-conservative Thatcher-Reagan administrations. There are no real signs that Third Way governments in the West have attempted to restore these social rights. If the second-term Blair government, re-elected in 2001, is anything to go by, the privatisation of public services and, thereby, the continued erosion of citizen rights is pursued with a renewed vigour.

the possibilities for self-determination. Thus, "anti-globalisation" is a false description of this movement.[8]

Against all odds, against the power of supranational forces, people in the street at Genoa – and earlier in a series of locations at Gothenburg, Quebec, Prague, and Seattle – still believe in a form of resistance in the name of a better future. They believe, against all propagandising and media control, in the story of democracy and in the seeds that were sown for emancipation and self-determination over three centuries ago. Hardt and Negri believe that a new species of political activism has been born, reminiscent of the "paradoxical idealism of the 1960s". Such protest movements are part of democratic society even though they are unlikely to provide the practical blueprint for the future. Yet they create political desires for a better future and, remarkably, unify disparate interests and groups – unionists, ecologists together with priests and Communists – in openness towards defining the future anew in democratic terms.[9]

Hardt and Negri are not the only ones to have asserted a connection between the so-called anti-globalisation protestors and those who demonstrated during the 1960s. Todd Gitlin (2001) also clearly considers the present-day movements evident at Genoa as a successor movement to the student movements of the 1960s and 1970s – one that he claims has already engaged more activists over a longer period of time and one he predicts will be longer-lived. Gitlin, similarly, pictures the protestors as "creating a way of life", although he profiles the protestors

8. Klaus Schwab (2001), founder and chairman of the World Economic Forum, also points to the "systemic failure" of the present institutions that provide a measure of world governance (UN, IMF, WB, WTO) and embraces the need for global institutions that more effectively and democratically deal with the problems we face. He suggests that the G8 be replaced with the broader Group of 20. Foreign Office Minister in the BlairGovernment, Peter Hain, like a number of other commentators, criticised the "ruling elite" in Europe talking to itself and becoming remote from ordinary people (reported by David Hughes in the Daily Mail, July 25, p. 2).

9. Susan George, by contrast, provides a graphic account of the anti-democratic strategies and tactics adopted by the opponents of the protestors at Genoa, detailing the use of force and manipulation and reporting on the ideological backlash. George suggests that there is evidence of complicity between authorities and gangs of the Black Bloc agent provocateurs (see her web page: http://www.tni.org/george/index.htm).

as engaging in the debate about the meaning of Europe, seemingly truncating its obvious more global aspects outside Europe. He also questions the anti-globalisation label, drawing attention to anti-capitalist revolutionaries, reformists who demand to "Drop the Debt", and anarchists bent upon violence. The new face of protests is a *composite* of different types: anarchist and Marxists, "kinder, gentler globalists", health-issue advocates, environmentalists, consumer advocates. The protest groups have been named from violent to non-violent in the following order: Black Blocs (anarchist and Marxists who wear black masks); those who claim to be non-violent but often provoke retaliation such as Globalize Resistance, Reclaim the Streets, Tute Bianche (Luca Casarini), and Ya Basta!; decidedly nonviolent groups ranging from celebrities to religious leaders, including, AIDS activists, ATTAC (Bernard Cassen and Susan George), CAFOD, Christian Aid, Cobas, Confédération Paysanne (José Bové), various consumer groups, Drop the Debt (Bono), Greenpeace, La Via Campesina, Oxfam, Rainforest Action Network, Roman Catholic Church, War on Want, World Wildlife Fund (Brant & Nadeau, 2001).

The multitude against Empire is best represented in spatial movements which cannot be subjugated to the laws of capitalist accumulation. These movements – the flow of bodies – reappropriate space to reconstitute themselves as active subjects. The political action of the multitude is expressed in its ultimate demand for global citizenship and in the constitutional principle that links right and labour. Without commenting in any systematic fashion on the programmatic political demands of the multitude working in the new temporalities of biopolitical production, I want to conclude by mentioning a number of features of Hardt and Negri's analysis that converge with my own interests and research on the knowledge economy and some of the themes of this conference.[10]

10. Basically, Hardt and Negri call for a social and a guaranteed income for all (a citizenship income) and the right to reappropriate the means of production (i.e., the right to self-control and autonomous self-production). On the knowledge economy see my "Education in the age of knowledge capitalism" (Peters, 2003a), "Poststructuralism and Marxism: Education as knowledge capitalism" (Peters, 2003b), and Poststructuralism, marxism and neoliberalism (Peters, 2001).

In their discussion of "postmodernization" or what they also call "the informatization of production" (see p. 280ff), Hardt and Negri (2000) provide an analysis of what I have called "knowledge capitalism" (Peters, 2001, 2003a, 2003b). They argue, for instance:

> The first aspect of the telos of the multitude has to do with the senses of language and communication. If communication has increasingly become the fabric of production, and if linguistic cooperation has increasingly become the structure of productive corporeality, then the control over linguistic sense and meaning and the networks of communication becomes a more central issue for political struggle. (p. 404)

Later they ask:

> How can sense and meaning be oriented differently or organized in alternative, coherent communicative apparatuses? How can we discover and direct the performative lines of linguistic sets and communicative networks that create the fabric of life and production? Knowledge has to become linguistic action and philosophy has to become real *reappropriation of knowledge.* (p. 404)
>
> Reappropriation, in this context, "means having free access to and control over knowledge, information, communication, and affects – because these are some of the primary means of biopolitical production" (p. 407).

For Hardt and Negri, it is the figure of the militant which best expresses the life of the multitute, as they say *"the agent of biopolitical production and resistance against Empire"*, yet a militancy that is constitutive not representative and based upon a form of resistance that is at once positive, constructive, and innovative.

### Conclusion and postscript[11]

As I argued earlier, both Hardt and Negri and Cooper entertain extranational forms of citizenship based on supranational systems that to some degree problematize the concept of citizenship based on the bounded system of the sovereign state. Yet in the form of empire

11. This paper was written and presented before the beginning of the Second Persian Gulf War, hence this postscript.

identified by Hardt and Negri and in the form of the postmodern state system identified by Cooper, it is clear both that the traditional concept of citizenship based on the state remains, and that the traditional Left concern for nation-building and developing a sense of community and local identity necessary to sustain and defend social rights must also remain as part of the political agenda against the undermining effects of globalization on social and welfare policy. Yet we might argue that questions of identity and citizenship, at least in the EU, has a layered complexity that arises from the effort to build extranational, indeed universal, "Kantian" judicial structures and systems (such as the International Criminal Court), that are seen by Europeans as prototype world institutions. Indeed, the EU is behind the promulgation of a Kantian philosophy of universalisation of world institutions that attempt to determine *rights* per se, springing from earlier attempts going back, immediately, to the Nuremberg Trials and the conventions developed and adopted in 1950 by the United Nations on the definitions of "crimes against the peace", "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity", and in the longer term to the constitutions of the League of Nations and United Nations (with its impetus to carry forward the project of human rights).

In this process of Europeanization with ten new members joining the EU in 2004, local identity – especially that based on ethnicity and language – is still significant for recognising social and linguistic rights and may well become even more important, for example, in the realm of education. States still ascribe rights, yet EU membership enhances and legitimates those rights in some respects, especially in relation to the free movement of people. I remarked at the beginning of this paper that more than ever before the question of globalisation and citizenship revolves around the free movement of peoples, and its opposite – the curtailment of cross-national and cross-regional mobility, especially for Third World peoples and refugees of all kinds. Yet members of the EU both nationally and internationally have not tackled the question of illegal immigration and refugees with any distinctiveness that distinguishes the UN ethos on human rights.

What Hardt and Negri on the one hand, and Cooper on the other

hand, demonstrate is that citizenship now has other dimensions. Cooper's analysis of the imperatives of the new imperialism has directly contributed to a policy outlook in Britain that identified Blair's Labour government – against his own backbenchers, affiliated trade unions, and people in the party machinery – with a conservative Republican US oil-president. Cooper's foreign policy stance that deliberately embraces "double standards" (meaning that the EU cannot use the same standards in dealing with so-called rogue states as they do for dealing with member states) may well have provided the analysis and "moral vision" that Blair acted on, but it has embarrassed the EU, splitting "old" Europe (France, Germany and Belgium) from "new" Europe (basically the former Soviet satellites, including Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) as well as risking a longer term stand-off or uneasiness between the EU and American foreign policy. One of the consequences of the protection of the special Anglo-American relationship and the split with so-called "old" European (Donald Rumsfield's terminology) is a historic distancing between the US and EU with potentially enormous political fallout not only for NATO but also for the ratification by the US of treaties and conventions struck by the EU and UN.[12]

Hardt and Negri anticipate a form of extranational and extraparliamentary protest – "anti-globalisation" – that, in part, is also aimed at a form of global citizenship or, at least, world democracy. This is the counter-narrative and counter-movement to the US hegemon and export of American juridical forms as the value basis and ethos for world governmental organisations.

The recent Gulf War – an illegal war if we are to judge by the Nuremberg principles adopted by the International Law Commission of the UN – is clearly an extension of the neoliberal/neoconservative project of globalisation. The post-war reconstruction is driven by the

12. On this very matter, see the recent book Of paradise and power by Robert Kagan (2003) who now speaks of the US hegemon and Americanisation of world institutions – a kind of right wing interpretation of Empire based upon the export of American democracy and juridical forms. This split, Kagan claims, now problematises the concept of "the West" and recognises a divergence based upon the level of investment in military technology especially during the 1990s which has given the US unrivalled power.

same principles that underwrote the "Washington consensus", in particular, the privatisation of public services, which is entirely unsuitable for a country that has such a poorly developed public sector. Moreover, Haliburton, one of the world's largest oil and gas companies, of which Cheney was CEO from 1995-2000, has been granted contracts to resurrect Iraqi oilfields, along with other US companies (including Bechtel, the Fluor Corporation, and the Louis Berger Group, which also have strong links to the present US administration).

It is also clear that the export and transplant of American democracy is a project likely to fail in the sense that, it could be argued, democracy is not something that can be imposed or easily transplanted at will but requires generations of development as well as a commitment to the public sphere and public institutions to sustain it – to a local sense of identity. There is no way that the present US administration will allow a Iran-style religious government even if it is freely elected by the people. The question of citizenship and democracy cannot ignore local history and local identity. For Iraq, as for other states where democracy has been imposed, the issue of culture and of local identity is paramount. A pressing question for the coming years is whether Iraq (and other Islamic states) can embrace modernity and democracy in a way that reflects its own values, culture, and sense of identity. This would be to begin the process of rethinking citizenship and identity within the context of globalisation.

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# Performativity or Performance? Clarifications in the Sociology of Gender

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**Abstract**

The suggestion that gender can be understood in terms of performance or performativity is common within New Zealand sociology, as it is overseas and in other disciplines. This article critically examines the theoretical background to these metaphors: ethnomethodology (Goffman, Garfinkel and others) and the writings of Judith Butler. A close reading of these theorists' work reveals the differences between Butler and the ethnomethodologists, while a number of useful similarities emerge. A synthesis of these authors' strengths allows us to create an integrated checklist which can be taken to specific studies of gender performance.

## Introduction

Suggestions that "gender" can be understood as "performative" or "a performance" are now commonplace within sociological discussions on gender, just as they inform work within a range of other (sub)disciplines – literary studies, anthropology, critical psychology, sociolinguistics, women's studies and cultural history. Various recent antipodean examples include Cameron (1996/7) on household labour; Campbell (2000) on alcohol and rural masculinities; Jones (2000) on gender relations within organisations; and Plumridge, Fitzgerald, and Abel (2002) on smoking, youth and gender. Despite the popularity of performativity and performance as metaphors for exploring gender, the two terms are themselves often confused and their theoretical first principles elided. This confusion arises in part because performance and performativity have quite different theoretical antecedents, even though the terms themselves are often regarded as synonymous.

In this article I attempt something of a clarification by critically exploring the two theoretical strands which underlie the use of these

metaphors. Most popular is that exemplified by Judith Butler's writing on performativity. The less popular strand hails from ethnomethodology, and understands gender as a performance or accomplishment achieved in everyday life. The most prominent authors here include Erving Goffman, Harold Garfinkel, Suzanne Kessler, Wendy McKenna, Candace West and Don Zimmerman.

A close intertextual reading of the work of these theorists reveals the differences between Butler and the ethnomethodologists, demonstrating that performance and performativity differ markedly in the ways they account for social action and gendered selves. At the same time a number of similarities emerge, particularly with respect to the social construction of sex and gender. In the following sections I work through these authors' writings chronologically in order to tease out a number of relevant insights, differences and interconnections. After comparing Butler with the ethnomethodologists, I conclude with an attempt at an integrated theoretical position that adopts the strengths of each theoretical strand and attends to the weaknesses. I propose a checklist for studying gendered enactment which can then be taken to specific studies of gendered identities, milieux and histories.

### Erving Goffman and the presentation of gendered self

Goffman's book *The presentation of self in everyday life*, written in 1956, offers the underlying principles which inform his analysis of gender as a performance. For Goffman, there is no authentic core self and no "natural" maleness or femaleness. Fundamentally, the self is an outcome of actors' management of self-impressions to those in their immediate presence (Goffman, 1971, p. 26). Those involved in social interactions will develop their own sense of self as they are influenced by others' impressions on the one hand and seek to manage their own self-impressions on the other. Goffman suggests that we all seek to perform in ways that will gain a favourable impression from others, in the hope of influencing the "definition of the situation" being collectively formulated in the context in question (1971, p. 15).

In this dramaturgical scenario, performances involve "front" and "back" regions, analogous to the relationship between front- and back-

stage in a theatre. The public performance takes place up "front" under the scrutiny of others, while impression-management and performance techniques are practised out "back", screened from the view of others. While an actor might "appear" as a coherently gendered man or woman in the public street, he or she would prepare appearance, emotions and deportment in the privacy of the home, for example.

These performances of self are not voluntaristic, however. Goffman's frame analysis suggests that performances are always constrained by "principles of organization which govern events" in a particular context (Goffman, 1986, p. 10). According to Goffman, individual actors are not free to frame experience as they please. Frames are properties of the social order and organise subjective experiences by providing the meanings governing interpretations of social events. Thus, frames set the parameters within which presentations of self can take place. In his work on gender and advertising, Goffman suggests that gender schedules frame gendered performances, to the extent that gender identity is an illusory artifact of the available "schedule for the portrayal of gender" (Goffman, 1979, p. 8). This schedule is continuously cited in interactive settings, with one's continued characterisation as a member of a given gender category dependent upon displaying a "competence and willingness to sustain an appropriate schedule of displays" (1979, p. 8).

For Goffman there is no natural truth to gender or to "sex", and to this end he rejects the "sex/gender distinction". This distinction was proposed by Robert Stoller in 1968 and adopted for feminism by Ann Oakley in 1972, and it was argued that "sex" could be understood as the biological distinction between male and female, and "gender" the cultural overlay that created men and women, boys and girls (Jackson & Scott, 2002, p. 9).[1] Goffman eschewed such a distinction, arguing that any division of bodies into one of two sexes is itself a product of social practices such

1. This move sought to open up a space for the criticism of biological determinism and a consideration of the social and cultural arrangements of gender. See Delphy (1996, pp. 1-2) for an interesting discussion of the concept of gender 'role' as an even earlier means of clearing a space in the thicket of biological determinism. Delphy suggests that gender 'role' hails from the sociology of the 1940s, an example of which is Klein (1946).

as naming and talk in the first instance (Goffman, 1977, p. 319). For Goffman, these social practices do not express "natural" differences so much as produce them (1977, p. 324).[2] To some extent Goffman recognised this as an unequal difference, suggesting that the production of gender generally works to men's benefit at the expense of women (1977, pp. 314-5).

### Garfinkel and the managed achievement of sex

Harold Garfinkel's principal contribution to the sociology of gender is his piece "Passing and the managed achievement of sex status in an intersexed person", published in 1967. Garfinkel discusses the case of Agnes, an intersexed person who was assigned to the "male" sex at birth on the basis of possessing a penis and testicles. However, Agnes felt herself to be truly "female", her penis an error in contradiction of the "true facts" of her femininity (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 126). Accordingly, the penis was removed and a vagina constructed at age 17, with Agnes reassigned to the female sex. This reassignment marked a turning point: Agnes had to learn how to "accomplish" femininity.

Garfinkel suggested that Agnes' transition can illuminate the ways in which all people must strive to present themselves as gendered. Garfinkel argues, like Goffman, that for all of us gender is a managed and routinised accomplishment involving particular constructions of self and our representations of these to others. Routinisation ensures that we may "do" our genders without necessarily having to think about the processes involved (1967, p. 181). This accomplishment of gender comes to be regarded by self and others as "a natural matter of fact", as indeed it did for Agnes (1967, p. 123). This "natural attitude" requires one to be either male or female, else one is regarded as a "freak of nature" (1967, pp. 123-4). In this way, Garfinkel suggests that being one or the other sex becomes a "moral" or evaluative rather than a "natural" matter (1967, p. 124). Like Goffman, Garfinkel does not draw a distinction

2. Goffman's most famous example is probably that of the segregation of men's and women's public toilet facilities. "Toilet segregation is presented as a natural consequence of the difference between the sex-classes, when it is in fact rather a means of honouring, if not producing, this difference" (Goffman, 1977, p. 316).

between sex and gender, regarding genitalia as symbols with which both are socially constructed.

Garfinkel also follows Goffman in his understanding that in order to attain maleness or femaleness one must act in concert with others within particular social contexts involving prevailing "communities of understandings" (1967, pp. 181-2). This is certainly not an individualistic or voluntaristic process. One must adhere to predominant gendered performances, appearances, activities, particulars of talk, attitudes, dress, feelings, membership obligations and style of life (1967, pp. 123-5, 134, 181). If compliant, the reward is freedom from excessive interference by others, otherwise community sanctions ensue (1967, pp. 122-5).

On one important matter Garfinkel disagrees with Goffman's work on the presentation of gendered self. Garfinkel suggests that Goffman's analyses tend to focus on individual, discrete episodes in the presentation of self, but eclipse the ways in which the accomplishment of self is in fact an ongoing matter (1967, pp. 166-7). While Goffman's focus on impression management devices is useful in that it permits an examination of *how* the self and its impressions are managed in particular contexts, it can obscure the ongoing courses of action involved in the mastery of personal circumstances. For example, Agnes' accomplishments of her "new" gender were ongoing rather than episodic, in terms of her sense of herself and her "interpersonal transactions" with others (1967, p. 175). With his focus on longer runs of time, Garfinkel raises the possibility of a socially constructed gendered self with a biography. While receptive to feedback and susceptible to change, reconstruction, inner conflict and inconsistency, such a biography exhibits some continuities over time and the self is able to experience recollection, remembrance, anticipation, and expectancy.[3]

### Kessler and McKenna on gender attribution

Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna's book *Gender: An ethnomethodological approach* is concerned primarily with the gender

[3] In another point of departure, Goffman implies that impression-management is goal-directed, while Garfinkel suggests that the result achieved at the end of the conduct of everyday affairs may not be deliberately striven for (1967, p. 184).

attribution process. These authors explore those means by which bodies become understood as gendered through the granting of meaning, and the manner in which these meanings are reproduced within society.

In the course of elucidating their position on gender attribution, Kessler and McKenna revisit several themes from the work of both Goffman and Garfinkel. Following the lead of the earlier authors in rejecting a distinction between sex and gender, they understand the division between male and female as a practical accomplishment achieved within social settings (Kessler & McKenna, 1978, p. 163). This accomplishment is achieved in interactions between performers and interpreters. The display and interpretation involved is guided by social rules for attributing gender to bodies (1978, p. 157), a suggestion not dissimilar to Goffman's notion of gender schedules.

The means by which these performances and accomplishments are widely understood as "natural" is a strong theme in Kessler and McKenna's work. They suggest that "men" and "women" engage in different gendered practices in part because this is necessary in order to convince others that one is one's gender not the other (1978, p. 155). In contrast to Garfinkel, these authors place the emphasis not on sustaining one's particular gender in social interaction, but rather upon sustaining others' sense that one's gender is "natural". Others must be convinced not so much that one is a particular gender, but that one has always been that gender. This, in turn, requires the sharing of trust in order that all agree that events are what they appear to be (1978, p. 158). Through this process, the belief in the naturalness of all aspects of gendering ("the natural attitude") can be maintained. All behaviours are then filtered through the gendered attributions made, and those behaviours made sense of in that context (1978, p. 160).

Kessler and McKenna appear to understand gender enactments and their meanings as more stable than do either Garfinkel or Goffman. While Garfinkel and Goffman imply that the significances of gender enactments are potentially amenable to re-working, Kessler and McKenna see the "natural attitude", once established, as difficult to undermine – however inconsistent or transgressive individuals' performances might be. Once a gender has been attributed to an

individual to the satisfaction of all, the natural attitude prevents the circulation of further cultural anxiety. For Kessler and McKenna, then, the path to large-scale social change lies in dislodging the "incorrigible propositions" of "female" and "male" themselves from their status as external, natural, objective, dichotomous, physical facts (1978, p. 164).

### Candace West and Don Zimmerman: "Doing gender"

In their paper illustratively titled "Doing gender", West and Zimmerman also build upon the work of the ethnomethodologists who go before. They adopt Goffman's analysis of gender as a "two-part exchange" involving displays, exhibitions or portrayals which come to signify the "naturalness" of the two sexes/genders (West & Zimmerman, 1991, p. 16). While West and Zimmerman agree with Goffman that gender can be understood as a "socially scripted dramatization", they argue that he does not go so far as to regard gender as part of the "serious business of interaction" (1991, p. 17). These authors also revisit Garfinkel's discussion of Agnes in order to explore the cultural and interactional basis of appearing as gendered. They share Garfinkel's view that gender is a routine, methodical and recurring accomplishment and that the understanding of women and men as natural categories is always socially situated in particular ways (1991, pp. 18-21).

West and Zimmerman's piece adds a few more items to the ethnomethodological gender checklist, and offers a few corrections to what has gone before. Gender is interactional but also micropolitical. Garfinkel's recognition of sanctions upon gender performance can be elaborated: "doing gender" demands competence and thus involves the risk of negative assessment, being called into account or even disciplined. West and Zimmerman introduce a panoptical twist here: we do gender in the "virtual" presence of others as well as their "real" presence, and engage self-regulating processes to ensure we are doing our gender "correctly". This raises interesting questions about Goffman's notion of "back" stage, and whether we ever inhabit spaces entirely free of surveillance, especially when considered in light of Foucauldian analyses of the self within a disciplinary society (Foucault, 1977).

While one form of power involves self-regulation and discipline in the Foucauldian sense, another involves hierarchical relationships between women and men. Given that the very methods of attaining gender competence reinforce ideas about the naturalness of predominant gender arrangements, doing gender legitimates the hierarchical arrangements of male domination. In doing gender, men may be doing dominance and women deference, thus "doing gender" involves "doing power" (1991, p. 33). In adopting such a position, West and Zimmerman hint at the ways in which micro-level social relationships play a part in contesting or reproducing power at the level of social structures.[4]

### Gender and performativity: The writings of Judith Butler

I suggested earlier that Butler's writing can be separated theoretically from the ethnomethodological approaches to gender and performance. At no point does Butler credit those writings in her own discussion; rather, she develops her accounts of gender and identity by engaging psychoanalysis, the speech act theory of John Austin, and the materialist feminism of Monique Wittig.

First developed in *Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity* (1990), Butler's analysis of gendering is derived in part from Austin's work on performatives. These are linguistic declarations that perform actions, including calling objects or situations into being (Austin, 1962). Butler suggests that through performativity – the exercise of performatives – categories such as male and female, man and woman are brought into being. As performative speech acts "bring into being that which they name", so performativity is "the discursive mode by which ontological effects are installed" (1996, p. 112). The proclamation "it's a girl!" uttered at birth, for example, is the initiator of a process of "girling" the female subject (Butler, 1993, p. 232). In this respect, performativity operates not dissimilarly to Althusser's notion of "interpellation" or "hailing" (Althusser, 1984).

Butler is commonly misunderstood as arguing that performativity

4. For more analysis of the relationships between macro- and micro-levels of power, see Jackson (1999), and Smith (1990).

involves subjects performing gendered presentations, even though her performativity does rely upon the repetition of norms through language. Performativity is predominantly a process of invoking the subject, not a performance by a subject:

> [p]erformativity cannot be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regularized and constrained repetition of norms ... this repetition is not performed *by* a subject: this repetition is what enables a subject and constitutes the temporal condition for the subject. (1993, p. 95)

Incessant repetitions of gendered norms within "a highly rigid regulatory frame" enable the constitution of the gendered subject (1990, p. 33). However, these repetitions are not doings by subjects who originate them, and therefore gender is "not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed" (1990, pp. 25, 112). While the ethnomethodologists understand the performance of gender as a doing or achievement by actors through which their gendered selves come into being, Butler appears reluctant to grant actors any capacity for enacting gender.

This disinclination to locate agency in the acting subject creates a highly confusing and perhaps insoluble set of problems, which have already been explored to varying degrees (Allen, 1998; Lloyd, 1999; McNay, 1999; Webster, 2000). Some writers have found themselves hopelessly tangled, stressing that Butler disallows the "one" who takes on gendered norms while also suggesting (contradictorily) that she sees gender as "something that one does" (Allen, 1998, pp. 459-60; Lloyd, 1999, pp. 196-201). It would appear that Butler's rather confusing position on this stems from her rejection of the "metaphysics of substance", a term from Nietzsche scholarship signifying the notion of the individual or person as a "substantive thing" (Butler, 1990, p. 20). In her attempt to reject the substantive or sovereign individual, she rejects the acting subject entirely. As a result, Butler tends to reify gendered acts, "gestures", "movements" and "stylization of the body", as though these originate outside of gendered subjects (1990, p. 33). Even in her later work, Butler seems unsure about the extent to which human subjects actually come to exist, and if they do exist what degree of autonomy

they might possess relative to the forms of power which enable them to exist in the first place (Butler, 1993, p. 7; 1997, pp. 12-15; 1998, pp. 278-9).

It seems to me that this set of problems need never have arisen in the first place. As has already been well theorised in sociology, there is no need to regard gendered subjectivity as either essential to the human person or as an illusion to which we are all misguidedly wedded, or to adopt an extreme position in the structure/agency debate. To say we act in the world and that these actions have consequences for ourselves and others is not necessarily to say that we are self-evident, sovereign subjects. We become ourselves through social processes and social interactions; we do construct biographies, but from the resources available to us within our culture – as Garfinkel points out.[5]

While this discussion may at first glance appear tangential, these ontological questions are important. As it stands Butler's analysis frequently fails to meet the demands placed upon it by those seeking a theoretical basis for their studies of gendering in particular contexts. Take, for example, this excerpt from Cameron's study of the construction of heterosexual masculinity through young men's talk:

> For Butler, gender is *performative* – in her suggestive phrase, "constituting the identity it is purported to be" ... Butler claims that "feminine" and "masculine" are not what we are, nor traits we *have*, but effects we produce by way of particular things we *do* ... Gender has to be repeatedly reaffirmed and publicly displayed by repeatedly performing particular acts in accordance with the cultural norms which define "masculinity" and "femininity". (Cameron, 1997, p. 49, original emphasis)

While Cameron looks to Butler to provide a framework in which we do, repeat and reaffirm gender, this does not reflect Butler's position in which we are constituted as gendered through a set of apparently reified acts. In attempting to make Butler's writing useful for her project, Cameron is forced to reclaim the subject and hence to collapse

5. And as Marx famously noted, we make our histories although not in circumstances of our own choosing. For further useful discussion of selves, creativity, agency, cultural resources and social structures, see: Crespi (1989, pp. 97-110), Elliott (2001, p. 32), Giddens (1992), Hekman (1992, p. 1099), and Lemke (1995, pp. 20-4).

performativity (bringing regulatory notions into being) into performance (doing).[6] The outcome is that Butler's performativity is defined in terms of subjective performance when her discussion in fact appears to reject such a proposition.

We need to be able to account for subjective action in the performance of gender, even if this action becomes routinised to the extent that we do not realise or pay attention to what is going on, at least not wholly. In the concluding section I suggest that in this respect, the ethnomethodologists offer a more coherent account of gender performance than Butler does. However, Butler does offer some apposite observations. Her two foremost contributions concern the centrality of heterosexuality and the mimetic aspects of gender performance.

Butler argues that the division between men and women comes to exist only though the invocation of heterosexuality, so the "heterosexual matrix" is central to the gender distinction itself (1990, pp. viii, 18). In contrast, the ethnomethodologists consider heterosexuality incidental to a gender distinction that seeks stability and claims its naturalness for its own stake. Butler, however, argues that an apparently stable and oppositional heterosexuality is a precondition of the internal coherence of gender categories (1990, p. 22). Homosexuality troubles the coherence of the gender distinction, at least potentially. At this point Butler draws from the French materialist feminism of Monique Wittig, for whom the "category of sex" is a construct of heterosexuality (Butler, 1990, p. 21; Wittig, 1992).[7]

6. To make matters even more complex, Butler's rejection of the subject behind the performance expresses Nietzsche's philosophy rather than Austin's. The latter saw 'performatives' as indeed uttered by active speakers (Austin, 1962, p. 8; Butler, 1990, p. 25).
7. Butler's appropriation of Wittig is not without its problems. Butler ignores Wittig's argument that it is the appropriation of women's labour power and selfhood by men within heterosexuality that creates the "category of sex" (Jackson, 1999, pp. 128-9). While Butler adopts part of the radical feminist analysis of heterosexuality (the argument that gender is an effect of heterosexuality), she disavows and disallows the analysis of male domination that goes along with it. This partly explains her dismissal of Catharine MacKinnon, a radical feminist who also suggests that gender can be understood as a construct of heterosexuality (see Butler, 1994, p. 7; MacKinnon, 1987).

The relationship between gender and heterosexuality as expressed by Butler involves mimesis: particular symbolic invocations of "copy" and "original". She suggests that heterosexuality is erroneously regarded as the "original" form of sexuality with homosexuality as the "copy". This makes some sense of the assertion that gay men and lesbians are inferior copies of "real" (read heterosexual) men and women. Butler queries this equation, arguing that the opposition of "real" and "imitation" gendering is in fact a construct for which there is no "real" original, merely the *idea* of an original. Thus, "gay to straight is *not* as copy is to the original, but, rather, as copy is to copy ... the original [is] nothing other than a parody of the idea of the natural and the original" (1990, p. 31, original emphasis). All forms of gendering are constructed, some as more authentic than others, and yet what is really going on is the circulation and privileging of particular, imaginary authenticities. According to Butler, dissident forms of gendering may rework and potentially subvert these relationships (1990, p. 34; 1991, p. 23).[8]

### How different are these theorists really? Clarifying gender and performance

So far I have suggested that the writings of the ethnomethodologists and Butler contain key differences. They do, however, share some common ground. The following discussion commences with an analysis of the commonalities before returning to the differences between the two theoretical strands.

All writers surveyed here reject the sex/gender distinction that was developed elsewhere during the 1970s, and posits a demarcation between "biological" sex and "socially constructed" gender. This distinction was formulated in order to assert a space for social constructionist and feminist critique in the face of biological determinism, although its critics have more recently suggested that it is itself a social distinction based on the historically-specific nature/culture binary (Delphy, 1996; Scott, 1999; Thompson, 1991). The ethnomethodologists argue that "biological"

8. While further discussion of the problems and potentialities of subversion is beyond the scope of this essay, see Brickell (forthcoming).

attributes such as genitals possess no meaning outside of social interaction, but can be understood to acquire symbolic meanings that render them important as markers of social distinction. These symbolic meanings are then routinised so they appear to verify the naturalness of differences between male/man and female/woman.[9] For her part, Butler rejects the sex/gender distinction on the grounds that gender cannot follow from sex if it is understood as "the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes", or the means through which sex is taken as a given (1990, pp. 6-7). Sex, like gender, is an epistemological matter, not a "natural" one.

Following on from this, all the theorists surveyed here regard "naturalness" as a cultural construction, the ethnomethodologists generally stressing its origin in interactive situations, and Butler suggesting that it arises from the meeting of discourse and performative acts (1990, p. viii). Apparent stability is contingent: an "accomplishment" (Garfinkel, 1967), which "congeals" over time (Butler, 1990, p. 33). "Natural" sexes as foundational categories do not cause performances and gender arrangements, but can be seen as the effects of these arrangements (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 135; Goffman, 1977, p. 324; Kessler and McKenna, 1978, p. 155), and of the power that regulates the forms these take (Butler, 1990, pp. viii, 8, 16, 32; West & Zimmerman, 1991, pp. 32-3). Incoherent gendering is significant in both theoretical strands: Butler suggests that gendered norms of cultural intelligibility are potentially threatened by the incoherently gendered even though the latter are cast as logical impossibilities (1990, p. 17), while Garfinkel regards gender incoherence as revealing the accomplishment and naturalising of all gendering (1967, p. 118).

The divide between Butler and the ethnomethodologists opens up not beneath questions of natural sexes or authenticity, for indeed both

9. West and Zimmerman represent something of an exception in that they do make a distinction between sex and gender, but even then it is not a purely natural vs cultural one. For them, sex is a "determination made through the application of socially agreed upon biological criteria" (my emphasis), while gender is the "activity of managing situated conduct in light of normative conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate for one's sex category" (1991, p. 14).

positions regard gender (and the ground often covered by "sex") as socially instituted, and both employ metaphors of performance, although not in the same way. It is the ontology of that performance, with the related questions of agency and the self that causes the dissension. While others have understood Butler's writing as a poststructuralist reworking of Goffman, for instance (Bordo, 1993, p. 289), Butler has not acknowledged Goffman as an influence. Rather, she has sought to distance herself from him:

> Indeed, [the term] 'actor' carries a theatrical resonance that would be very difficult for me to adopt within my own work, given the propensity to read 'performativity' as a Goffmanesque project of putting on a mask or electing to play a role. I prefer to work the legacy of humanism against itself, and I think that such a project is not necessarily in tension with those who seek to displace humanism .... (Butler, 1998, p. 285)

This dismissal of Goffman does express the crucial difference between him and Butler: the existence of a performer. While Butler appears to reject the self *in toto* as an illusory effect of the problematic "authentic-expressive paradigm" (1990, p. 22), Goffman does see a self as coming into effect through performance. His concept of self is not a coherent essence who simply performs, but rather something that emerges through an actor's involvement in the performances undertaken during social interaction. While Goffman suggests we bring the potential for action to social interaction, we achieve self only within social, interactional processes (1971, pp. 244-6).

In this respect Butler's criticism is overdone. In her haste to banish all notions of a humanism that represents a core gendered personhood (1990, p. 10), she fails to notice the nuances in Goffman's theorising. While Butler implies that Goffman's notion of performance represents merely the clothing on a humanistic dressmaker's dummy, his theory in fact suggests a much more reflexive process of self-production than this. His self is an outcome of performance as well as an originator and an effect of future performances (1971, p. 26). Similarly, it is difficult to read the other ethnomethodologists as harbingers of a humanistic metaphysics of substance, given their discussions of the ways that

ostensibly immanent gendered selves are in fact social contingencies. Garfinkel extends Goffman's notion of self by introducing the possibility of biography: self as a continuation with a past and a future. Again, however, this is an interactively achieved attainment, not an expression of a humanistic core.

In seeking to banish the self entirely in the name of banishing humanism and the metaphysics of substance, Butler overrules the ethnomethodological insight that gendered selves are accomplished through one's actions – and interactions – in social context. What we need to adopt, and what the ethnomethodologists offer, is a gendered self which is neither pre-social nor insignificant and neither sovereign nor transcendent. Instead, this self comes into being as a social accomplishment through its presentation and performance, within the context of cultural resources, prohibitions and compulsions. The subject *does* sometimes pre-exist the deed, and is reinforced through the enactment of the deed, but it never pre-exists the social relationships in which it is embedded. In addition, these performances through which selves are constructed involve the exercise of power relations at the micro- and macro- levels of society, and the interrelationships between these levels (Scott & Jackson, 1996, pp. 10-11; 2000, p. 175; West & Zimmerman, 1991, pp. 33-4).

## Conclusion: the uses of performance

The tradition of ethnomethodological writing on gender is an evolving one. Goffman's *Presentation of self in everyday life* from 1959 represents not a final word so much as a starting point for a particular theoretical trajectory. A layering across time is evident, as each successive author adapts the tradition and adds new ways in which we can understand gender as a performance and an attainment.

This layering has continued. For example, Kessler has recently examined the phenomenon of intersex, expanding upon and taking up the discussion of the male/female division as a cultural phenomenon perpetuated by us all on an everyday basis as well as by powerful social institutions such as medicine (Kessler, 1998, p. 31). The interrelated fields of discursive psychology and conversation analysis draw upon the

ethnomethodological writings surveyed here as they theorise the connections between gender, speech, text, discourse and identity (Stokoe & Smithson, 2001; Weatherall, 2002). The ethnomethodological focus on social interaction and gender as a "doing" has proved particularly useful here. Paul McIlvenny reflects upon the ways in which Butler's work might inform the earlier classics within ethnomethodological tradition (McIlvenny, 2002). However, he seems reluctant to concede that the reverse may also be possible, that ethnomethodology might strengthen a Butlerian approach.

By considering the ethnomethodologists and Butler together it is possible to formulate a useable checklist that we can work through in analysing gendered performances in particular moments and contexts. As sociological theorists and researchers, we can ask how:

- The gendered self is constructed in particular contexts through the presentations actors make in two- (or multi-) way interactions with others;
- Gender presentation or performance can be understood as a reflexive process; or, current performances condition future ones;
- We develop biographies (which may be more or less stable) through the consolidation of gendered enactments and interactions over time;
- Gender is attained in ways considered satisfactory (or not) by selves and others;
- Participants in society "do gender" on an ongoing basis;
- Rules and norms about what constitutes "competent" gendering are established, enforced and changed in particular contexts;
- Those doing gender are subject to the surveillance of themselves and others, and they may be held to account if gender is not done in an approved manner;
- The placing of selves into gender categories, and those categories themselves, come to be seen as natural, and this ostensible naturalness is enforced;
- Doing gender involves micro-level forms of power; or, doing gender involves doing power, and the micro-level relates to wider social structures.

If we then bracket the questions about subjective agency, Butler's analyses offer further additions to the list. We might ask how:

- Discursively informed means of gendering congeal over time to create the illusion that gender is a matter of an abiding substance rather than a construction specific to particularly interested relations of power;
- Repetition and stylisation are implicated in any given form or instance of gendering;
- The gender distinction is created and reinforced through the specific operations of heterosexuality, and the regulatory power accompanying the heterosexual matrix disciplines gendered subjects;
- Gender and heterosexuality rely upon mimetic logics in which the manipulation of symbolic copies and originals may reinforce or challenge dominant relationships.

To some extent this combining of Butler and ethnomethodology already takes place as researchers search for theoretical perspectives to inform their empirical investigations. However, the similarities (and the differences) between Butler and the other theorists are not necessarily recognised at the time, at least not explicitly. By way of example, the following excerpt comes from a public health-based investigation of smoking, youth and gender in New Zealand schools (Plumridge et al., 2002, p. 169):

> Everyone is instantiated as a particular identity through the way they comport themselves. Butler's argument is that identity consists in that 'doing'. Identity is not something we 'acquire', but something we 'do' ... Such presentation of self is inescapable for everyone, and the accoutrements used, the products consumed and the competence in behaviours displayed are the basis of claims and ascriptions of identity. Individuals are not free to 'fashion' identity as they choose, but have to do so under others' reading of their competence.

Plumridge et al. follow Butler in their suggestion that identity is not acquired so much as performatively constituted. However, in arguing that identity is something "we do", they move away from Butler's

aversion to subjective action and toward the "doing gender" approach developed by West and Zimmerman. The idea that we "do gender" under others' readings of our competence is similarly reminiscent of West and Zimmerman, while the reference to "claims and ascriptions of identity" suggests Garfinkel, and the term "presentation of self" echoes Goffman. While Butler is credited with originating this analysis of gender as performance, she is but one of those responsible. It might not even be unreasonable to say that this excerpt resembles Goffman, Garfinkel and West and Zimmerman more than it does Butler.

Butler's disinclination to concede that subjects act in the world ensures that sociologists need to go elsewhere – including ethnomethodology – for an adequate set of theories. (Not that turning to sociology's traditions could possibly be a bad thing, of course!) Thus, Butler's influence is not total, even if the work most often cited in discussions of gender and performance is *Gender trouble.*

The gendered self is a concept that must lie at the heart of sociological investigations of gender. While Butler's subject – if it exists at all – can be understood really only as a discursive outcome, I would much rather see the gendered self as a reflexive construction. It comes into being through our interactive performances among the symbolic resources provided by the surrounding culture and social institutions (Brickell, 2002). As theorists, then, we can reclaim the social action and interaction central to the term performance, without slipping back into essentialist assumptions about the performers. As researchers, we can investigate how gender is "done", and how such doings reproduce gendered selves and bestow illusions of naturalness upon particular manifestations. For her part, Butler can widen the scope of this investigation rather than setting its terms.

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# Maori Masculinity, Post-structuralism, and the Emerging Self

***Brendan Hokowhitu***

**Abstract**

The objective of this paper is to forge new research ground by providing a framework for deconstructing the dominant representations of Maori masculinity. Specifically, it examines post-structuralism's utility for analysing the dominant construction of Maori masculinity. The introduction looks at some personal perceptions of masculinity I held growing up as a Maori male. Secondly, this paper describes the utility of post-structuralism for deconstructing dominant representations of Maori masculinity. Thirdly, a genealogy of representing Maori masculinity as savage and biologically determined is briefly outlined. Finally, Maori masculinity is described as a tactic of power that has been employed to provide an allegory for the emerging Pakeha masculinity.

## Introduction

As a Maori male who is a caring and nurturing father of two, how do I reconcile the barrage of aggressive, violent and sexually deviant representations of Maori men that are constantly displayed in the mainstream media? Do these images mean that Maori men are somehow constrained to the physical world of the savage, and that patriarchy and macho-ism are traditional Maori culture? Are these the codes of behaviour expected of me? Do I have a place in the realm of the new man?

The objective of this paper is to forge new research ground by providing a framework for deconstructing the dominant representations of Maori masculinity. Specifically, I examine the applicability of post-structuralism to the deconstruction of the Maori man as Other. The theoretical propositions are grounded through an analysis of historical and contemporary representations of Maori masculinity in relation to

the transforming New Zealand masculine ideal. As an introduction I look at the perceptions of masculinity I held growing up as a Maori male. Secondly, the utility of post-structuralism for deconstructing dominant representations of Maori masculinity in relation to the emerging Self is analysed. Thirdly, a genealogy of representing Maori masculinity as savage and biologically determined is outlined. Finally, Maori masculinity is described as a tactic of power that has been employed to provide an allegory for the emerging Pakeha masculinity. Within this final discussion, the interface between what is considered to be traditional Maori masculinity and attributes of the new Pakeha man is explored.

### Pretext

I was raised in a culture where it was necessary for both Maori and Pakeha men to be physical. My experience of a physical masculine ideal was not dissimilar to many boys of my generation in New Zealand (Philips, 1987). Being physical and especially playing sport was, for me, a means to feel successful. Whether it was the stamina required for pig-hunting, athleticism on the rugby field, dexterity in surfing, or the challenge of diving for *kai moana* (seafood), expressing my physicality gave me confidence and allowed me to strive for success without facing ridicule.

In Opotiki (a small rural town in the Bay of Plenty), physical prowess was revered. In contrast, academic achievement was, at best, acknowledged but usually derided. Opotiki was a town where both Maori and Pakeha literally lived off the land and, therefore, being physical was not a leisure pursuit, hobby, or sport – it was a way of life. As a 14-year-old, I could walk into the local "Stag & Boar Bar" and play pool with the late Barry Crump without batting an eyelid (in fact it was important not to). Opotiki was the Wild West of New Zealand, a place where helicopter pilots such as the late Joe Collins, and deer recoverers, such as Milton Kiri, were living legends and icons of manhood, their feats recorded forever in prose and literature (eg. see Forrester, 1983). They were tough and silent men who refused to yield to physical pain. Opotiki was a place where acts of humble daredevilry marked the man, where feats

of silent attrition, such as carrying a 250-pound boar out of the bush, were championed over copious amounts of beer. Indeed, alcohol (specifically beer) was inherently tied to one's physicality; a man was considered weak if he could not drink voluminously, and hard if he could (see Campbell, Law & Honeyfield, 1999). In Opotiki, males had to be extremely confident in their physicality or they would face social ostracism. So embroiled in this culture was I, that I believed uncompromising physicality defined male New Zealand, for both Maori and Pakeha.

I have come to realise, however, the physicality that helped define what I thought to be a masculine ideal was not underpinned by a generic "Kiwi bloke" culture. In particular, I have learnt that what underscores the image of the physical Maori male, differs significantly from that which underpins notions of the physical Pakeha male. Or more succinctly, Pakeha men in general[1] enjoy a fluidity of masculine culture that the Maori male, as yet, does not. Since leaving Opotiki (in 1988), it has become apparent to me that some forms of Pakeha masculinity have transformed themselves to lie beyond that silent physical world I once considered normal New Zealand masculine culture, whereas the dominant representations of Maori men shackle them to many of those traits integral to the quintessential "Kiwi bloke".

## Post-structuralism and masculinity

> Men are not born with masculinity as part of their genetic makeup; rather it is something into which they are acculturated and which is composed of social codes of behaviour. (Beynon, 2002, p. 2)

Post-structuralist theory describes masculinity as a multi-layered social construction that varies depending on how one collates an image of themselves or others through dominant discourses on race, class, age

1. This is not to say that there was or is one general Päkehä masculinity. As explained below, there were/are different Päkehä masculinities based on class, genealogy and religion, (e.g. upper-class English protestant immigrant versus the lower-class Irish Catholic immigrant), however, Mäori masculinity, as a tactic of power, was employed to provide a counterpoint for the emerging dominant Päkehä masculinity.

and sexuality (Connell, 1995). In *Discipline and punish* (1977) the French philosopher, Michel Foucault, describes bodies as sites of resistance and of power over others, a material process that "functions through the disciplinary procedures and self regulation of everyday life" (Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 1994, p. 37). For Foucault, socially constructed codes of behaviour, such as masculinity, are inherently tied to power: "if power was never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, do you really believe that we should manage to obey it?" (1977, p. 36). In other words, dominant masculine ideals and other social constructions are powerful because they are disciplined norms that one willingly acts out or willingly obeys. Power's ultimate authority, Foucault challenged, was not in its monolithic or repressive form, but rather in its power to discipline through construction. Essentially power, through the control of knowledge, creates a normal representation for the interaction between a person's socially constructed perceptions of class, gender, race and age. The interface between this social narrative of normalcy and an individual can be a site of embodied power for the dominant group and willing compliance or resistance for marginalised groups (Foucault, 2001).

Post-structuralism is a valid epistemology for analysing the dominant discourse surrounding Maori masculinity because it provokes a deconstruction of the "truths" written into texts. It dis-shelves representations of the Other as scientific, objective or authentic and enables the assumed primacy and authority of the Self to be deconstructed; essentially "it involves constant revisitation and questioning of what knowledge is being produced and why" (Spivak, 1987, p. 201). It is hoped that this article's use of post-structuralism will allow me, a Maori male, to insert my voice as opposition to the "truth" about Maori masculinity created by the dominant discourse.

## History, racism, gender and biology

> Masculinity cannot be treated ahistorically. (Roper & Tosh, 1991, p. 12)

Masculinity cannot merely be analysed from a contemporary snapshot;

Masculinity is, more than anything else, an historical construction (Connell, 1995). For example, Bob Connell (1995) argues, "white fears of black man's violence have a long history in colonial and [neo] colonial situations" (p. 75). Maori masculinity, specifically, is created through a genealogy of biological and primitive determinism.

Foucault offers an understanding of European history and its inherent racism that can be applied to power relations in the colonial context, and particularly to the binary oppositions that have informed the dominant discourse on Maori masculinity. Foucault believed the key to European racism was the binary opposition inherent in the fabric of European society. Notions of opposition took the form of survival of society against itself, and laid the foundations for "one of the great inventions of bourgeoisie society... normalisation" (Foucault, 1976a, cited in Dirks, Eley & Ortner, 1993, pp. 219-20). The bourgeois State saw itself as "the protector of the integrity, the superiority, the purity of race" (Foucault, 1976b, cited in Stoler, 1995, p. 71).

According to Foucault, "bio-power" developed coterminously with bourgeois nationalism and normalisation in Europe. Racism was essential to uphold the moral good; it gave credence to the claim "that the more degenerates and abnormals are eliminated, the lives of those who speak will be stronger, more vigorous, and improved" (Stoler, 1995, pp. 84-5). Biological racism was born out of the Self's proclaimed right to define what is normal, and hence the right to construct the Other based on what the Self delineated as abnormal. The construction of race was and remains less about cultural or biological differences and more about differences in power. Hence, dominant racist representations of Maori masculinity did not simply originate from ignorance or hatred for an alien culture, more importantly they emerged because of a mentality that denoted the dominant Pakeha male as normal and the Maori male as abnormal.

De Man describes allegory as permitting "language to say the other and to speak of itself while speaking of something else" (Derrida, 1986, p. 36). Allegory in the colonial context pivots on the dialectic of the Self and the Other, where the former, even though it is looking towards its periphery, strives to describe the centre: "that one is not what the Other

is, is critical in defining who one is" (Sarup, 1996, p. 47). For example, when defining the Other as barbaric, inferior or childlike, European explorers were implicitly defining themselves as civilised, superior, and advanced (Smith, 1999). In relation to masculinity and race, allegory suggests that the social construction of masculinity cannot be understood without reference to the Other (Kimmel, 1987). That is, descriptions of the dominant male group are constantly being reinforced by counter-images depicted in the masculine Other.

In the nineteenth century, traveller and missionary writings along with scientific (especially anthropological) discourses combined to represent the Maori race as the abnormal and primitive Other (Smith, 1999). The role played by images of the exotic masculine Other created by early accounts should not be underestimated. They provided an increasingly literate European public with dreams of other lands and verification of themselves as civilised and of the Other as barbaric: "new migrants set off for their own adventures in the colonies armed with all their newly acquired misinformation" (Smith 1999, p. 82). Many European travellers constructed Maori masculinity to represent their image of masculinity in a primitive state. Early representations of Maori men portrayed them as lacking the qualities of the civilised European male. They had women-like characteristics – they talked a lot, were animated and did women's work, while they lacked a stoic disposition because they were over emotional and whimsical (Hokowhitu, 2002).

Most of the early representations of Maori (especially the anthropological descriptions) were based on biological determinism and quasi-Social Darwinism (see Smith,1999, especially Ch. 4) and, consequently, Maori were delimited as lying somewhere between the civilised European and the ape. Representations of Maori men, in particular, were usually in a negative light, centring on their lack of evolution to the civilised sensibilities of the European man. Maori men were said to have lacked the mature European man's inherent leadership qualities because they were childlike and their reason and thought was unsophisticated. Because they were ruled by passion, as opposed to Cartesian reason, Maori men could also demonstrate uncontrollable animal-like or savage aggression and violence (Hokowhitu, 2002; Smith,

1999; Wall, 1997).

Yet, at times Maori men were depicted as having seemingly positive qualities such as "physical prowess", "nobleness" and "warrior-likeness" (Hokowhitu, 2002; Smith, 1999). Indeed, Maori were often referred to as the most civilised of all savages, or as Jock Phillips puts it, the "Aryan Maori", a concept suggesting Maori, of all the Indigenous peoples, "were most like us" (cited in Schick & Dolan, 1999, p. 56). Regardless of whether the initial depictions of Maori masculinity were presented in a positive or negative light, the ensuing genealogy of representation these images created has served to limit Maori men's access to the privileges enjoyed by Pakeha men.

Discourses on power, race and gender supported Pakeha men's right to rule and, consequently, justified colonisation. As Gail Bederman suggests, "civilisation wove [power, race and gender] together by rooting them in a progressive, millennial tale of human history" (p. 217). That is, the dominant discourse, with positivistic zeal, presented a pioneering tale of manly hardship that was underscored by the white man's humanistic "burden" to conquer the world, civilise it and then provide enlightened leadership into the twentieth century. It was believed that only the white man possessed the combination of physical strength and mental fortitude to tackle such a burden. The civilised man was free of will, virtuous, secular, liberated in thought and autonomous. Conversely, the Other – the savage man – was represented as biologically constrained, immoral and sinful, ruled by mythical ritual and burdened by an encumbering collective (Smith, 1999; Hokowhitu, 2002).

In *A man's country*, Jock Phillips (1987) presented an historical account of the transforming Pakeha masculinity, socially constructed to represent the changing needs of an emerging country. Similarly, dominant representations of Maori masculinity have transformed to buffer colonial aspirations. Masculinity, as a tactic of power, serves to bolster the position of the dominant group. Colonial representations of the indigenous masculine Other were strategic tactics that upheld the desires, aspirations and policy of the coloniser; truth in the colonial context was/is undoubtedly tied to the needs of the dominant group

(Said, 1978).

Post-structuralist analysis challenges the Cartesian claim that the world may change while identity remains permanent (Connell, 1995). Representations of the masculine Other, because they are tactics of power, necessitate fluidity. While constructions of the Maori as Other are static in the sense that they remain tied to discourses such as physicality and savagery, like any anti-image, they must also be superficially fluid to reflect the changing needs of the dominant culture. Like the chameleon, the discourse's core nature remains constant but its exterior mutates to reflect the changing environment. At the centre of a mutating Maori masculinity is the emerging Pakeha masculine ideal. The depiction of Maori male savagery is, thus, a tactic in the sense that it holds certain truths over time (e.g. it is biologically determined), but will be employed, largely, to describe what the dominant Pakeha masculine ideal is not. Essentially, what constitutes the notion of the savage Other is fixed by biological determinism, but the representations it emits will change as the self changes (Hokowhitu, 2002).

Colonists constructed knowledge of the Other's masculinity not based on objective facts, as most anthropological accounts and history books have us believe, but rather to legitimate their actions. For example, initially the civilising European romanticised Maori men as child-like, a construction that led to the "noble savage" representation (Hokowhitu, 2002; Smith, 1999; Wall, 1997) and justified colonisation under a paternalistic guise. Later on, during the "New Zealand Land Wars" Maori men were depicted as wild and violent heathens (Belich, 1988), a construction that validated colonisation via force. In the early decades of the twentieth century, following the acceptance that Maori were not going to die "a natural death", seemingly positive representations of Maori men were sought after and found in the feats of *tane* in the Maori Battalion and on the sport's field. A positive construction of Maori men was needed at this time to placate those in the Pakeha public unwilling to accept their new found compatriots and, furthermore, to assimilate Maori men through acceptable physical and warrior-like roles (Hokowhitu, 2002). Delgado and Stefancic (1995) argue that representations of the masculine Other at any time can be "intensely

negative" but will change from period to period in response to social needs: "now a hapless, dim-witted figure, now a threatening animalistic one... in one period, society needs reassurance that blacks are happy with their lot, in another, it needs to justify repression" (p. 217).

The Maori male, like various 'Othered' groups, has had conditional access to the white man's world. For example, as a warrior in the service of the British army or in rugby: "they showed themselves to be good at those things which Pakeha men [were also] proud of. Maori were good at war and they were damn good at playing rugby, so they took on a special status of being Kiwi males with a slightly exotic flavour" (Philips, cited in Schick & Dolan, 1999, p. 56). Yet, war and rugby were two of the few sites where Maori men were able to enter into the Pakeha domain on a "level-playing-field" (MacLean, 1999). Maori were allowed access to these arenas because they were "damn good" at them, but more importantly because the representation of the Maori athlete or the Maori warrior was not in conflict with the genealogy of savagery that pervaded the social narrative on Maori men. Both rugby and war require physical prowess, can be brutally violent, yet in both, upper-class academic intelligence was not a prerequisite, especially in the sites where Maori were typically found, that is, the engine room of the scrum or the trenches of the battlefield.

### Maori masculinity: The Maori man as Other and the "new" Pakeha man as Self

Gender and race are ideologies that form common-sense, yet fictive, social narratives. The material manifestations of these narratives are evident in the physical differences of men and women, white and black. Moreover, the socially constructed behaviours that align with these narratives are highlighted by the dominant discourse to provide examples of it being the "truth". For instance, New Zealand's news media highlight when a violent criminal is a Maori man, but describe a similar Pakeha criminal as an outlier or anomaly of society. The only news on the Maori male worth mainstreaming, other than sporting profiles, army items, "Maori radical" pieces and entertainment spots, is "bad news". McGregor (1991) found that, when dealing with Maori, the

mainstream media emphasised "conflict", "bad news" and defined Maori in "problem terms" (pp.6-7). Maori men are constantly represented as rapists, as wife beaters, as child abusers and as gang members; from mainstream accounts one gets the impression that Maori men are still nothing more than violent out-of-control savages. When Maori men do feature in political or business news, it is the sensationalised items besieging their credibility that gain the greatest coverage (e.g., Tuku Morgan, Dover Samuels, and John Tamahere).

The representation of Maori masculinity is deeply entrenched in biological determinism (Wall, 1997). Not only are Maori men tied to a discourse that links them to a savage physiology, often they are categorised by a common-sense biological approach to gender, which suggests men's persona and behaviour are natural outcomes of their physiological make-up (Bourke, 1996). The compounding of common-sense gender and racial stereotypes produces a strongly coded masculinity that serves to represent and control the Maori male as Other. As Sue Tait points out

> Representations of black bodies remain inscribed with the fantasies and anxieties of our racist histories... biology it has been assumed accounts not only for physical variations like skin colour, but also qualities like intelligence, behaviour and ability... there remains vestiges of its assumptions – for example, a warrior instinct 'in the blood' of Maori men, or sporting or muscular ability among blacks due to 'natural rhythm'. (1999, p. 207)

### The new man

The breakdown of traditional masculinity, according to Beynon (2002), occurred in part as a reaction to the rise of feminism. The women's movement undoubtedly catalysed the metamorphosis, referred to by Anthony Clare (2000) as "masculinity in crisis". Being logical, disciplined, rational and competitive are "now seen as the stigmata of deviance... [whereas] the very traits which once marked out women as weak and inferior – emotional, spontaneous, intuitive, expressive, compassionate, empathetic – are increasingly seen as the markers of maturity and health" (Clare, 2000, p. 68). The new man has a "puny frame" and an "unassertive manner, a desire for nurturant activities and a wish to

express emotion" (Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 1994, p. 16). Yet, the new man represents less of an acquiescence to power, and more of a change in tack in order for the masculine elite to hold onto power (Chapman, 1988). The new man is "co-opted into the service of patriarchy... he is a patriarchal mutation, a redefinition of masculinity in men's favour, a reinforcement of the gender order, representing an expansion of the concept of legitimate masculinity and thus an extension of its power over women and deviant men" (p. 247).

The movement of Pakeha men into the realm of the new-age man must be qualified, however. The qualities of the new man described have probably not established themselves completely or even to a large extent within New Zealand masculine culture (especially within lower and working-class cultures), yet these are the qualities that more and more Pakeha men are turning to in a transforming social scene. From the observance of media constructions it is perceived that, generally, middle to upper-class New Zealand men are more rapidly moving towards those traits of the new-age man than working-class men. Working-class men are often depicted as reproducers of masculine "Kiwi bloke" vestiges, and scornful of a changing masculine pseudo-culture. Such a phenomenon is evident in television adverts that reinforce traditional masculine ideals but only for working-class men. A classic example of this occurs in the "That man deserves a DB" advert for Dominion Bitter beer. In this advert three icons of New Zealand manhood, a "Digger" dressed in an army uniform, an ex-All Black, and a working-class man, are given the power to award a DB to those they see as deserving. A humble truck driver is rewarded for a heroic manly act, and a Maori man is rewarded for setting up a try in rugby. Yet an image of the new man, clad in a suit and shown reading the paper in a toilet, goes unrewarded and mocked as his beer mug's handle breaks causing him to spill his beer. Such a representation clearly shows that the working-class man (including the Maori male rugby footballer) is still being rewarded for holding onto traditional masculine culture. The advert also sets a clear divide between the working-class man and those middle to upper-class men moving into the realm of the new-age man. In this advert, new age man culture is portrayed to the working-

class man as idle and insincere.

Clearly not all Pakeha men have had access to middle to upper-class privilege, for working-class Pakeha men, like the majority of Maori men (past and present), have had to contend with a class-based hegemonic oppression. For Maori men, however, such oppression has been double-edged in that they have had to contend with both limiting representations based on race, and the constrictions of largely belonging to the working-class. Indeed, the two discourses of race and class amalgamated to form the notion that Maori men, because of their physical propensity, were best suited to manual labour. Up until the 1940s State education overtly discriminated against Maori by providing them curricula focused on manual instruction (Hokowhitu, 2002). Native School curricula, for example, were limited to training Maori boys in manual training and English language, while academic subjects were largely prohibited from being taught (see Barrington, 1988; Simon 1990; Hokowhitu, 2002). Unlike Pakeha, who came to enjoy a normal spread throughout occupational strata, by 1965 "Nearly 90 percent of Maori men [were] employed as farmers, foresters, labourers, transport operators, factory workers, or in other skilled and unskilled occupations" (Watson, 1967, p. 6). Such confinement to manual labour type jobs, combined with a general discourse that described Maori men as inherently physical, led to generations of Maori men thinking of themselves as "practically minded", as opposed to intellectual.

So how does Maori masculinity fit into the new man archetype? Unlike the fluidity middle to upper-class Pakeha masculinity is increasingly enjoying within the realm of the new man, the ability of the Maori man to transform his identity is constrained by representations that harness Maori masculinity to limited roles. In a society where mainstream masculinity is rapidly leaving behind its begrudging, tough,

2. This statement could be challenged based on the amount of television advertising that still celebrate this type of image (e.g. the "Speights Southern-Man" and the Toyota "Bugger" man), but I see this sort of representation as a larger-than-life comic caricature of a past masculine icon, which celebrates the image of "the good old days", while only reinforcing that image as reality in contemporary society to a certain audience. As I have already noted in text, such adverts are, largely, only attempting to target those men still holding onto traditional masculine New Zealand culture. That is, in these examples, farmers and beer drinkers.

rural persona,[2] Maori masculinity is still harnessed to the macho roles generic to most New Zealand men prior to the introduction of the new man. The Maori man, as Other, struggles to reside in the world of the new age man because he embodies the antitype of the new man: he is economically, culturally and physiologically tied to the patriarchal masculine prototype. These macho traits may reproduce masculine power over women and children at the micro-level – in power's most savage sense – but ultimately limit many Maori men to physical, violent and stoic roles by providing the dominant discourse with salient examples of Maori male savagery.

At a superficial level, the dominant images of Maori masculinity simply do not correspond with the traits of the new man. For example, the new man as narcissist (see Beynon, 2002) generally does not gel with representations of Maori men. Although the image of the sexualised Maori man as a figure of the dominant gaze does to some extent cross into narcissism, the animal-like black sexual predator construction differs from the new man as narcissist image. The new man as narcissist is a highly expressive individual who has a "love affair with appearance, clothes, cars and possessions" (Beynon, 2002, p. 124), whereas the "black-stallion" merely embodies white men's sexual insecurities. Of course, many would view the converse of narcissism, humility and immaterialism, as desirable qualities. However, the image of the unassuming and simplistic Maori has its roots in the "noble savage" ideal (Hokowhitu, 2002), a representation that serves to limit Maori from striving for success in the material world. In many ways, it suits the dominant group for Maori to be depicted as humble, unassuming and content with "their lot". Then Maori land claimants, for example, can be represented as materialistic freeloaders who work for individual gain and outside the hub of the community.

An influential discourse that delimits Maori masculinity to traditional patriarchal roles is, unsurprisingly, "tradition". One of the tactical moves of colonial discourse "is to present the colonial subject as unchanging and immutable" (Niranjana, 1992, p. 37). Delgado and Stefancic (1995) argue that the dominant narrative of race is so slow to change because new representations are interpreted in terms of "pre-existing stock... if

the new story is too different from the ones we hold, we pronounce it extreme, political or bizarre... [while] deeply inscribed narratives do not seem like narratives at all, but the truth" (Delgado & Stefancic, 1995, pp. 218-219).

The notion of traditional Maori masculinity is bound to the idea that Maori culture is stagnant. New Zealand missionaries, early European travellers and anthropologists employed the word traditional to mean "Maori life before Europeans arrived in New Zealand" (Salmond, 1983, p. 316). The term was interwoven with the belief that pre-European Maori society was an inferior culture that had stagnated and failed to evolve into a civilised state. The study of traditional Maori society was the first of many deceptions that helped to reconstruct a fictitious Maori culture. As Salmond (1983) points out, notions of a traditional Maori culture were misleading in that no Pakeha method of investigation could ever depict Maori life prior to colonisation: "bits and pieces of information from anywhere between 1769 and 1969 have been cobbled together in accounts of 'traditional' behaviour that included practices which never would have coexisted in any given Maori community at any given time" (p. 316). An example of a dominant representation of traditional Maori masculinity is patriarchy. The next section investigates how the concepts of traditional Maori culture and patriarchy combine to present Maori masculinity as the anti-type of the new man, and demonstrates the use of masculinity as a tactic of power.

### Maori patriarchy as an allegory of the new man

Masculinity as a tactic of power is apparent in the way Western mainstream discourses declare their superiority over Other cultures by demonstrating their gender relations as liberal and democratic, as opposed to the oppressive practices of the Other. The Western mainstream media's attack on the oppression of Islamic women in Arab countries, for example, is less about the fate of Islamic women, and more about the depiction of Arab nations as anti-liberal (Said, 1978). Indeed, the depiction of Other cultures as male hegemonic is a common contemporary signifier that the culture is unevolved or, at least, that it has not reached the civilised echelons of Western culture.

The pontifications of contemporary Western discourses regarding their own evolved gender relations, in contrast to Other cultures, has changed dramatically over the past century. Ironically, androgyny used to be the marker of uncivilised cultures. Until the second half of the twentieth century, Western masculinity and femininity were commonly referred to as "stable, even innate, states directly linking biology and gender" (Beynon, 2002, p. 5). Bederman (1995) outlines how in the late nineteenth century clear gender roles were an essential component of civilisation: advanced civilisations were identifiable by the degree of sexual differentiation. Savagery was signified by androgyny, while civilised cultures had evolved pronounced sexual differences:

> Civilised women were womanly – delicate, spiritual, dedicated to home. And civilised white men were the most manly ever evolved – firm of character; self-controlled; protectors of women and children. In contrast gender differences among savages seemed to be blurred. Savage women were aggressive, carried heavy burdens, and did all sorts of masculine hard labor. Savage men were emotional and lacked a man's ability to restrain their passions. Savage men were creatures of whim... who even dressed like women in dresses and jewellery. (p. 25)

The androgynous savage provided the civilised self with examples of the exotic and outlandish Other where old women were "said to have walked 11 miles with a load of wood weighing 115 pounds" (Bale, 2000, p. 126).

The gendered roles of contemporary civilised culture may now be more androgynous, but the transformation is not one simply based on morality. It is also a tactic of power that reinforces the Western world as being underpinned by meritocracy and freedom for all. A similar parallel is the successful athlete of colour. Jonah Lomu and Michael Jordan, as spectacles (Debord, 1994), are powerful symbols of freedom and hope for other people of colour, yet ironically they reinforce dominant power structures by highlighting success within the physical as opposed to the intellectual domain. Similarly, the liberal Western discourse surrounding gender is an epistemology that enables the white male to retain power, for it buffers the notion that the Western way, as opposed to other

systems of governance, allows women an equal chance to succeed which, in turn, insidiously reinforces the existing gender power structures.

Sardonically, many representations of Maori masculinity, now regarded as traditional Maori culture, were merely qualities of colonial masculinity. In the hope of saving their *iwi* from near extinction, many Maori men were forced to assume those masculine qualities that would abet their integration into the dominant Pakeha culture (Walker, 1990). The consumption of Pakeha masculinity by Maori men served to assimilate Maori men into the violent, physical, stoical, rugged and rugby oriented mainstream masculine world that has pervaded New Zealand society for most of its colonial history (Philips, 1987). Thenceforth, both Maori and Pakeha regarded certain aspects of Pakeha masculinity as "traditional" Maori masculinity. In reality, they were simply assumed qualities (Hokowhitu, 2002).

For example, the common belief that Maori belonged to a staunchly patriarchal society is false. Sportswriter Spiro Zavos, for instance, dismisses a particular Maori reading of the Ka Mate haka because it refers to the protection of men by women through the symbolic description of a man (Te Rauparaha) being given life by a woman's genitals. Zavos's (1998) stance typifies many Pakeha who base their explanations of Maori culture around their own precepts and their own needs:

> It does not ring true to Maori tradition...Maori culture is male hegemonic... It seems implausible that the All Blacks...would embrace a haka that had such embarrassing connotations...The hairy man in this haka is an archetype of strength, a figure of power, capable of bringing about the triumph of life over death...When the All Blacks chant their haka...they will lead their great team, and the nation that identifies with it, into the sun that shines. (pp. 71-3)

In short, a Maori interpretation of the Ka Mate haka is rejected because the protection of men by women threatens both the false construction of traditional Maori masculinity, and the last bastion of macho New Zealand culture – rugby.

In my PhD research, many of the people I interviewed relayed their perceptions of pre-colonial Maori society as matriarchal. For example, one *pakeke* (adult) told me

> The change that occurred as a result of the infiltration, domination and acceptance of Western concepts into Maori life, caused imbalances that have resulted in the problems Maori society faces today. For example, the upshot of a Western patriarchal system was that a few men, who were isolated from the rest of the *iwi*, made all the decisions. The *iwi* trust boards, set up around the country, gave men all the power to make decisions. Unfortunately, Maori patriarchy is now thought of as being traditional Maori culture, in reality, however, Maori society was generally matriarchal. Nurturing those you love and the surrounding environment was at the core of *tikanga Maori*. (cited in Hokowhitu, 2002, pp. 166-7)

The interface between patriarchy, tradition, Maori masculinity and the new man presents a clear example of how the dominant discourse uses the Other as a tactic of power, where images of the masculine Other are modified to suit the developing Self. At one time the dominant discourse employed the lack of gendered roles to demarcate savagery, and the enforcement of these roles on to Maori was seen as a way to assimilate Maori into Pakeha society. Yet, today those same roles that are now represented as "traditional" Maori culture are being employed to represent Maori masculinity as rigidly patriarchal and macho, and furthermore, to provide an allegory for the developing new Pakeha man.

Although many New Zealand men still pay homage to themselves as close to nature, as physical, as humble, as rural (Philips, 1987), the post-industrial demand for New Zealand to develop into a technological-based society[3] sees a different construction of the masculine ideal emerging. Increasingly, middle to upper-class Pakeha masculinity, at least, is represented as urban, intelligent and post-modern, while the tough Kiwi bloke is more and more seen as a buffoon. With his own Kiwi

3. Regarding a 'technologically-based' society I mean a post-industrial society or one that "relies on service industries, knowledge-production, and information technology to create wealth" (Sim, 2001, p. 338).

flavour, the middle to upper-class Pakeha male is now virtually one of the new-age men: he is sensitive, emotional, mature and cosmopolitan, and is depicted sipping café lattes or toasting Hawke's Bay Chardonnay.[4] Maori men, on the Other hand, are still largely constructed as physical, simplistic, comical and unintelligent (Wall, 1997). The commonly wished for social transition to a new technologically-based paradise in the South-seas[5] is not seen as necessary across all social groups. While the growing rejection of the physical, stoic, practical and tough Pakeha masculine persona is conveniently seen as congruent with the transition from an agricultural to a post-industrial society, these macho attributes are less readily cast off by the Maori man because, if he is not unemployed, he resides overwhelmingly in the working-class; but, more importantly, because he is represented as culturally ingrained and, furthermore, as biologically determined.

The new man construction is increasingly being represented in New Zealand through the plethora of overseas television programmes, such as *Ally McBeal, ER, Chicago Hope, The West Wing, The Naked Chef,* and *Friends*. New Zealand advertisements augment the transforming construction by informing the public of the desired qualities of the new age man. For example, the new *Tararua* milk drinking man explains the changing scene: "I go shopping with my girlfriend but I can still watch rugby with my mates", while the sensitive *Steinlager* man demonstrates

4. Again, this previous discussion must be qualified. I am not trying to imply that all Pakeha men or even all upper-class Pakeha men have wholly taken up the qualities of the new man. Rather, I am suggesting that the mainstream construction of the dominant Pakeha male is transforming towards the traits of the new man, and away from his tough, rural and sexist image so poignantly portrayed by the "Speights Southern-man", an image that, for middle to upper-class Pakeha men at least, is more of a humorous cultural cliché, than a depiction of reality.
5. Technologically-based paradise in the South seas is a play on the words common to colonial New Zealand culture, "rural paradise of the South seas", referring to the ex-pat English coinage that symbolised the hope of a better life and society outside of the "mother-land".
6. I highlight "mature passion" because such a combination would have been regarded as incompatible under the constructs of modernism where the divorce of mature reason from passion (resulting from Cartesian dualism) marked a civilised and rational society (Hokowhitu, 2002), yet the image gels in a post-industrial and post-modern world where the emotional male is now regarded as more advanced (Chapman, 1988).

'mature passion'[6] by showering his wife in rose petals that fall from a massive front-end-loader. By employing the traditional masculine role of operating heavy machinery to carry out an act of affection towards a female, the advert ingeniously rejects the sexist roles associated with "men and machines" (see Lovelock, 1999), which in turn emphasises the new Kiwi man as a thoughtful and passionate partner. The advert, thus, parallels an image of the transforming new Pakeha man to the changing construction of New Zealand society from an industrial to post-industrial milieu.

Probably two of the most significant representations of the new man in New Zealand are Paul Holmes and John Kirwan. Since 1989, Paul Holmes has been broadcasting his style of intelligent, sensitive, compassionate and liberal Pakeha masculinity. Holmes' longevity as anchor-person for New Zealand's most popular current affairs television programme is a testament to the acceptance by New Zealanders of the masculine qualities he represents. Similarly, ex-All Black John Kirwan's frank and public disclosure of depression in one of a series of adverts that challenge the negative perceptions surrounding mental illness, demonstrates the acceptance of the new emotionally secure New Zealand Pakeha male, even within the rugby fraternity. The transforming acceptance of an emotionally amenable Pakeha masculinity is accentuated by Kirwan's admission to having a "panic attack" during an All Black match; such a confession would have been considered sacrilegious 20 or even 10 years earlier.

Lacking the fluidity of Pakeha masculinity, the Maori man provides the antitype of the evolving new Pakeha man: he is violent as opposed to nurturing; he is macho as opposed to sensitive and caring; he is a sexual predator as opposed to sexually mature; he is staunch and stoical as opposed to expressive; he is physical as opposed to intelligent; he is the sports gladiator as opposed to the sports watcher; he is still the savage as opposed to the cultivated and evolving new man (Hokowhitu, 2002; Smith, 1999; Wall, 1997).

## Conclusion

It seems ironic to talk of traditional Maori masculinity given that there is

no her or his in the Maori language, just *tana* – an androgynous word signifying gender-neutral possession (Moorfield, 2001). An early colonial photograph that sticks in my memory is of a group of several Maori men outside a *wharenui*: some have their arms around each other, while others are cuddling their children. It is a striking image because of the openness of their affections; a picture far removed from the contemporary images of the Maori male as the violent, savage sexual predator. It saddens me to think that prior to colonisation Maori men were highly expressive and nurturing. That is not to say that this is not the case today, but the image certainly is inconsistent with the dominant representation of the staunch and violent Maori male.

From a post-structuralist perspective, masculine representations based on race "need to be located squarely with respect to contested interpretations of power" (Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 1994, p. 38). Dominant masculinity is a social construction that recreates its power through binary oppositions. Masculinity is an allegorical construction, where power is sustained by describing its Self, based on what the Other is not, and by delimiting the Other based on what the Self is not. Just as masculinity constructs femininity as its bipolar image, so too does the dominant discourse employ "bio-power" combined with masculinity to construct the male of colour as the one of the Self's negative deviates. As a social construction, Maori masculinity is often defined in opposition to Pakeha masculinity; the Maori man is the Pakeha man's primitive Self and, thus, is constantly in the wake of his progression. From a Maori male's perspective, the new age man is merely a way for the dominant group to maintain power in a society where sex roles are becoming increasingly complicated.

Nevertheless, I acknowledge that there are representations of Maori men in the mainstream media consistent with images of the new-age man, for example, Don Selwyn in the aforementioned mental health advertising series. It could be argued that there are several instances of mainstream representations that depict Maori men in a new-age light. Indeed, judgement, as to whether Maori men are able to enter into the emerging world of the new-age Pakeha man, is reserved. History indicates, however, that Maori men will struggle to throw off the shackles

of the Other. Firstly, Maori men remain located within a discursive genealogical representation that ties them to their physical, violent and savage past. Secondly, history teaches us that while the Pakeha man remains an emerging identity, he will need the image of his antitype to mould himself against. Thirdly, the confinement of the majority of Maori men in the working and lower-classes will ultimately limit their ability to be self-determining.

It was not the central objective of this article to suggest Maori men are being debarred entry into the ideals of the new man. Rather, the focus of this paper was to demonstrate how Maori masculinity has been and is being employed as a tactic of power, not only to oppress Maori men but also to provide the antitype of the developing new Pakeha man in New Zealand society. This focus was largely aimed at forging Maori masculinity as an area of research within a post-structuralist framework. Essentially, I hoped to deconstruct the "truths" written into New Zealand's social narratives regarding Maori masculinity.

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**Editors' Note**

Due to a computing problem we were unable to use macrons with vowels in Maori words in this article. The author's desire was for these to be used throughout the article, hence we apologise for this ommission.

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# Neo-European Risk and Biosecurity: The Release of Rabbit Viruses in Australasia.

*Kevin Dew*

**Abstract**

Sociology of nature and sociology of risk theorising derived from Europe emphasise the threat that humans pose to nature. Such theorising assumes that science and scientists are increasingly implicated in the deterioration of the natural world. This paper suggests that such a view needs to be treated with caution when applied to the settler societies. The case of the illegal release of a rabbit virus in New Zealand illustrates this point. Farmers experimented with a rabbit virus that government scientists had ruled was too risky to introduce. In order to understand this event it is important to explore ways in which nature/society relationships may be inverted in the neo-Europes. Nature is seen not only as being threatened by humanity, but also as imposing a threat to humanity, and risk perception is coloured by this.

## Introduction

This paper examines biosecurity breaches in relation to rabbit control in New Zealand and Australia. In particular, the paper attempts to explain the illegal release of a rabbit virus, variously known as rabbit calicivirus and rabbit haemorrhagic disease virus (RHDV) in New Zealand. It does this by reference to the relations between the farming community, the scientific community, and the political community. It is argued here that the particular configuration of these relationships in New Zealand allowed for an inversion of roles between scientists and farmers, such an inversion being embedded in a wider set of inversions between neo-European risk societies and Europe.

In exploring the area of sociology of risk it is apparent that those concepts developed in Europe have limitations when applied to Australasia. This is not to deny the contribution of European theorists and researchers, but to recognise that in Australasia hazards are framed differently. In particular, it is suggested here that European theorists

frame environmental risk as one where society threatens nature, but nature by itself does not threaten society.

Dickens argues that a useful starting point in a sociology of risk and nature is the dialectical relationship between humanity and nature as conceived by Marx. In *Capital* Marx states that "by thus acting on the external world and changing it, [man] at the same time changes his own nature" (cited in Dickens, 1992, p. 48). Note that Marx "starts" this dialectical relationship from the position of humanity. It is humanity that first acts on nature, and such action reflects back on humanity in turn. As we change nature, nature changes us.

A prominent representative of European risk theorising is Ulrich Beck. Beck (1992, p. 155) argues that we have moved beyond modernity to reflexive modernity. In reflexive modernity scientific scepticism will increasingly be applied to science itself. Science is not only charged with the solution to problems, but also with causing problems. Beck (1992, p. 156) argues that "scientific civilization is subjecting itself to a publicly transmitted criticism that shakes its foundations and its own self-conception". Beck (1992. p. 164) claims that unlike the dogmas of religion and tradition, the dogmas of science "carry within themselves the standards for their own critique and abolition". In the past society has accepted a position where science "determines" risks and the population "perceives" risks. That is, science has enjoyed a monopoly on defining what is a hazard, whereas the population only have their own unscientific and irrational perceptions. Beck argues that this distinction is no longer tenable. Beck (1992, p. 64) goes further when he argues that by determining acceptable levels of risk science legitimates risk, it concurs in the creation of risk. In his polemical fashion Beck argues that scientists provide a blank cheque to poison nature.

Beck (1995) argues that today's hazards are a product of technological change and affect all social classes as the hazards encompass a geographical and spatial totality. He refers here to hazards that are derived from a range of technologies, including nuclear power, pesticide, insecticide and herbicide use, and developments in genetic engineering. Due to the difficulty in gaining proof that a problem is caused by a particular technology the rules of causality and guilt have broken down

in the risk society. The burden of proof in identifying a particular agent as causal is extremely one-sided as it disadvantages those who have misgivings about that particular technology (Beck, 1995, p. 3). This allows for the increase in hazards faced as those resisting the introduction and use of hazardous technologies find the burden of proof an insurmountable obstacle.

Giddens notes positive and negative aspects of our relationship to nature. Negative aspects are pollution and environmental degradation. A positive aspect is a renewed protection of the non-human world. Giddens (1994, p. 208) argues that a central element of contemporary society is that of manufactured uncertainty and manufactured risk, which have their origins in science, technology and industry. A key feature of modern institutions is that they "disembed" social relations from local contexts of action. Individuals are not in a position to understand or control all the complex technical systems of modernity, seen in for example information technology, medicine and public health. These systems have extended into areas of life previously governed by traditional forms of social organisation (Higgs & Jones, 2001). Personal trust is replaced by impersonal trust. Trust is not so much related to known individuals, but is a faith in the workings of systems and processes in situations where one possesses limited knowledge (Giddens, 1991). In other words, in contemporary society there is a reliance on experts. In this way Giddens contests Beck's vision of reflexive modernity.

For Giddens, nature as a hostile and feared force appears only to apply to small horticultural, or hunter and gatherer societies. Where Giddens does discuss a natural disaster, the Mississippi floods of 1993, this is framed within arguments about the possible human causes of such disasters. For both Beck and Giddens the dialectical relationship between society and nature starts with society. Society threatens nature, but nature does not by itself threaten contemporary society.

Similarly, in their discussion of "reading" nature sociologically, Macnaghten and Urry suggest that one prominent contemporary notion of nature is that of nature "threatened" (1995, p. 211). They do not consider nature as threatening. A similar one way relationship can be seen in Benton's discussion of human/animal relations. In his typology of nine

categories of human/animal relations there is no categorisation of animal as pest (Benton 1993, pp. 62-66). This lacuna in human/animal relations would be inconceivable in New Zealand given the high public profile and destructive impact of possums and rabbits.

The scenario painted by European theorists is one where humans act on nature and now pay for the consequences. The cost is seen in reflexive modernity, where the entire population is exposed to potentially uncontrollable hazards, and where the cultural authority of science is considerably undermined. It is perhaps more salient to invert the society/nature relationship in neo-European conceptualisations of risk, and explore the impact of *nature as threat* on risk perceptions.

One way we can conceptualise these differences is to consider the different degrees to which nature threatens in Western Europe and the Antipodes. New Zealand is a group of islands formed and being torn apart by huge tectonic plates. Periodically, New Zealand witnesses a devastating earthquake and media attention is caught by potential volcanic action. Along with this there are regular visitations from cyclones and hurricanes. "While some countries, such as Britain, have very few serious earthquakes and have not been the site of an active volcano for millions of years, other countries of similar size, such as New Zealand, have more than their fair share of both" (Cox & Hayward 1999, p. 8).

At a different level, Franklin (1996) talks of an inversion of human-animal relations in Australia as compared to the UK. In the UK hunting tends to be an activity of those with high status and wealth, and they are involved in the hunting of species indigenous to the UK. In Australia, and equally in New Zealand, hunting is by no means restricted to the rich, in fact it can be seen as more a part of the culture of taming the bush. Whereas in the UK foxhunting and rabbit hunting may become the focus of struggles between hunters and animal rights activists, this is not the case in New Zealand or Australia. Hunters are seen as providing a useful service in controlling imported pests such as deer, possums (in New Zealand at least) and rabbits, and thus protecting the native flora and fauna.

New Zealand's relationship to nature is complicated further by its

remoteness (Sinclair, 1961). New Zealand is an island nation, but unlike Britain, it is 2250 km from its nearest major neighbour – Australia. The country has only been colonised by Europeans over the last 200 years, and the indigenous Maori population is thought to have started arriving around 800 years ago. One consequence of this "islandness" and recent human habitation is a strong distinction made between invading, exotic or introduced "nature", and indigenous "nature". Efforts to alter the landscape to suit human desires have led to the introduction of exotic flora and fauna. These introductions have in turn often threatened or even destroyed indigenous forms of nature. Crosby refers to this as ecological imperialism, noting that the successful development of such neo-Europes as New Zealand was based on the successful supplanting of both indigenous peoples and indigenous ecosystems (Crosby, 1986). Those responsible for the supplanting process exhibited a strong sense of self-consciousness about their role (Dominy, 2002). Pioneers such as Herbert Guthrie-Smith recorded detailed personal observations of the change in ecosystems in New Zealand. In the third edition of his landmark book - *Tutira: The story of a New Zealand sheep station* – Guthrie-Smith asks: "Have I then for sixty years desecrated God's earth and dubbed it improvement" (Guthrie-Smith, 1999, p. xxiii). Counter efforts have been introduced to protect indigenous nature from exotic nature. These human interventions in nature play out in distinctively different ways in Australasia from Old World Europe. The relationship between introduced and indigenous species undermines constructions of nature. There is not one nature, but a number of natures, with the pristine indigenous nature being at the top of a "hierarchy of purity" and exotic nature lower down the scale (Curtis, 2002).

The following discussion of rabbit haemorrhagic disease virus (RHDV) illustrates the way in which inversions such as these can impact upon relationships between scientists, farmers and politicians in New Zealand. The argument is not made that these inversions provide a complete picture of the way in which the release of RHDV was played out in New Zealand. A complex interaction between a conservative government dependent upon rural voters, and the ideological commitment to the free market, provide more proximal explanations of

events. However, the background of relations to nature shapes the way in which different stakeholders in the RHD issue assessed risk and acted upon these assessments.

The material on which the following discussion is based was collected from a variety of sources. New Zealand newspaper and popular magazine articles related to the assessment and release of the virus were systematically collected for the years 1997 and 1998. This material was supplemented by accessing conference proceedings and journal articles where RCD/RHDV was discussed. This material was analysed to ascertain both the unfolding of events and the arguments being made about the appropriateness of releasing the virus. In terms of the "appropriateness", different groups constructed risk in varying ways. In addition, the material is related to some theoretical points about the way in which nature is conceptualised.

### Rabbit Haemorrhagic Disease

Before its accidental release in Australia and its illegal importation into New Zealand, RHDV had occurred naturally in China and Europe during the 1980s (Lawson, 1995). The virus can kill rabbits within 40 hours of infection by causing heart and lung failure (Anderson, 1995a). In both Australia and New Zealand rabbits are regarded as pests, having a major impact on the economic viability of farms in particular areas where they cause severe soil erosion. In Australia it has been estimated that the rabbits cost farmers between 120 and 600 million Australian dollars a year (Anderson, 1996; Lawson, 1995). In 1996 it was estimated that there were 30 million feral rabbits in New Zealand occupying 55 per cent of the total land area, and the national annual cost of rabbits was at least $22 million. This figure included costs incurred in attempting to control the rabbit population, and the lost primary production due to rabbits, but did not include damage to the natural environment (McLauchlan, 1996). Ironically, rabbits, along with many other vertebrate pests, were introduced into New Zealand and Australia by acclimatisation societies, those societies established to organise the introduction of species to New Zealand for "food, sport, or as sentimental reminders of their old home" (Galbreath, 1998, p. 81). This process has

been called a Britainisation (Franklin, 1996) or Europeanisation (Star, 1991) of the antipodes. Curtis (2001) notes an accelerating process of actants once constructed as resources being re-categorised as pests in New Zealand. Rabbits are an early example of this re-categorisation.

A previous rabbit disease, Myxomatosis, had decimated the rabbit population in Australia, but from the 1950s, when it was first released, the rabbits built up immunity and the rabbit population returned to pre-Myxomatosis levels (Lawson, 1995). In 1952 Myxomatosis was introduced into New Zealand but it was not successful, as New Zealand did not have the rabbit flea that transmits the virus (McLauchlan, 1996). Prior to the introduction of RHDV into New Zealand one of the main means of keeping the rabbit population in check was the use of 1080 poisoning, but 1080 poisoning was seen as expensive, and rabbits were becoming bait shy. Biological controls were then looked to as a possible solution for the rabbit problem (Houston, 1993).

Rabbit viruses have posed major biosecurity problems when considered for use as biocontrols. The Myxomatosis epidemic of the 1950s in Australia was the result of an "escape" of the virus from field trials (Fenner & Ratcliffe, 1965, p. 272). In a similar vein, the Australian and New Zealand governments funded an RHDV testing programme on the remote site of Wardang Island off the coast of South Australia. However, RHD "broke out" from these trials in October 1995 (Anderson, 1995a; Lawson, 1995). At first the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation accused visiting journalists of transporting the virus (McLauchlan, 1996), although the most likely vector of transfer was thought to be flies. Initially attempts were made to stop the spread of the virus by poisoning rabbits and ripping up their warrens, and it was hoped that the prior importation of doses of vaccine would assist this attempt (Anderson, 1995a). These efforts failed and the virus spread (Anderson, 1995b). This forced the Australian government to consider officially releasing it, which it did in October 1996 (Drollette, 1997).

These events led biologists to fear a backlash against biological control experiments (Anderson, 1995a). This backlash was fed by some spin-doctoring from the Australian Animal Health Laboratory - the

agency responsible for testing the virus - when they changed the original name of the disease from rabbit haemorrhagic disease to the more innocuous name of rabbit calicivirus disease (RCD) (Drollette, 1996). In New Zealand the moniker RCD was also used until early 1999 when European scientists named another disease RCD, thus forcing New Zealand scientists to revert back to the name RHD, used by the rest of the world (New Zealand Press Association, 1999a).

In New Zealand, officially designated scientists had turned down applications for the official release of RHDV. But in mid-1997 the potential beneficiaries of such a release, farmers, took an ecological gamble and smuggled the virus into New Zealand from Australia (Clark, 1999, p. 145), breaching New Zealand's biosecurity laws in doing so. On 27 March 1998 Parliament gave RHDV the legal status of a New Zealand organism, thus allowing people to use it legally (New Zealand Press Association, 1998d).

### The rabbit problem in New Zealand

Up until the 1980s the New Zealand government had heavily subsidised rabbit control efforts (Williams, 1998), but in the new era of economic liberalism and user pays farmers had to take on this task. From 1948 to the 1970s up to 85 per cent of national rabbit control costs were met by government grants. In 1983 a review concluded that there was no justification for subsidising the control of one specific pest. Consequently, subsidies were phased out and costs of control reverted to farmers (Williams, 1998). With these changes rabbit numbers started to increase (Flux, 1999, p. 7) A Rabbit and Land Management Programme was set up in 1989 to examine issues around sustainable land management, particularly in the worst affected areas. It came to the conclusion that, in some areas, the cost of rabbit control using conventional technology (poisoning and shooting) frequently exceeded the productive capacity of farm businesses (Williams, 1998).

Prior to the illegal introduction of RHDV there were, however, some that dissented from the view that rabbits were a major problem in New Zealand. Dr Adrian Rhodes, president of the Veterinary Association, was reported as saying that only a relatively small area of land had

been badly damaged by rabbits, whereas the cost of bringing in the virus could be huge in ecological terms ("Vets cautious", 1996). Gibb and Williams (1994, p. 163) argued that "New Zealand's unique achievement was to control rabbits without recourse to Myxomatosis ... the rabbit is now stabilised at low densities almost everywhere". They claimed that this had been achieved through a combination of decommercialising rabbits by placing export restrictions on their sale and taxing the sale of rabbit carcasses, and the use of poisoning, particularly 1080 (Gibb & Williams, 1994). However, there was one area, Central Otago, where the rabbit population was not well contained, although even here the rabbits were only intermittently at high density levels (Gibb & Williams, 1994, p. 171).

In 1991 the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) invested in a programme to develop RHDV as a biocontrol. In 1993 the government declined an application to import the myxoma virus and the European rabbit flea in favour of investment in further RHDV research (Williams, 1998). In short, from 1979 the government started to limit expenditure on rabbit control, and then phase it out. At the same time it put its efforts into testing RHDV, signalling to farmers to wait until this was legally introduced. A consortium of Federated Farmers, Regional Councils and the Commissioner of Crown Lands applied to MAF for permission to spread RHDV. The cost of preparing the application came to over $450, 000, and the cost of assessing the application came to $500, 000 (Williams, 1998).

Prior to the illegal introduction of RHDV some farmers had ceased expensive rabbit eradication efforts. This built up the pressure for the introduction of the virus. Despite these economic and social pressures the Deputy Director-General of Agriculture, Peter O'Hara, declined the application to import the virus on 2 July 1997. The reasons for declining the application were that not enough was known about the epidemiology of the virus, there was significant uncertainty about its effectiveness, and it was not clear who would be legally and financially responsible for managing the virus (Flux, 1999). O'Hara did not rule out the possibility of the virus being introduced in the future if these issues were dealt with.

The Minister of Agriculture, Lockwood Smith, reacted against the

decision, stating that he would do anything within his power to get RHDV approved, arguing that there was no doubt that a biological rabbit control was needed (Tocker, 1997e, p. 1). As the news broke of the decision to decline the application, quarantine officers were reported to be checking the border for any illegal introduction of the virus, focusing on people with a rural background, particularly those who had travelled in areas where the virus was known (Tocker, 1997f, p. 2).

By 29 August 1997 South Island farmers admitted spreading the virus, and had been doing so prior to the decision to decline the application to introduce it legally (New Zealand Press Association, 1997b, p. 1). No one was, however, admitting to illegally importing the virus. When it was apparent that the virus was in New Zealand, MAF and the police made efforts to restrict the movement of dead rabbits from areas identified as having RHD (Tocker, 1997g, p. 1). This was quickly abandoned as the virus had spread too widely. MAF officials then announced that it was not illegal to spread an organism already established in New Zealand. Later this view was contradicted by the Crown Law Office opinion that those spreading the virus were breaking the law. The Crown Law Office view prompted the government to quickly enact legislation to legalise the spread of the virus ("RCD to be legalised", 1997). This was enacted retrospectively so that farmers could not be prosecuted, and came into law in September 1997. By the end of February 1998 the Pesticides Board gave permission to a company to sell RHDV (Tocker, 1998), thus allowing regional councils and other institutions to use the virus.

The illegal introduction of the virus was trumpeted with farmers proudly demonstrating how they used their own kitchen-whiz style of biocontrol. Images were shown on television of farmers blending up rabbit livers in household blenders - the concoction colloquially known as a rabbit smoothie - to spread on bait for the rabbits. This was in fact using the virus as a biocide, something that had not been tried before. Prior to this, once released into the environment the virus would be left to spread naturally. That is, scientists were testing the virus as a biocontrol, whereas farmers experimented with it as a biocide.

In contrast to what could appear to be tacit support for the illegal

introduction of the virus by the Minister of Agriculture, Nick Smith, the Conservation Minister, called those responsible for the illegal introduction "stupid fools" and claimed that "we have been unwillingly volunteered in an experiment in which well-researched science has concluded the risks and uncertainties are too great" ("Smith lashes out", 1997). The Conservation minister was particularly concerned about the issue of prey switching. After RHD had escaped to the Australian mainland, scientists had predicted that prey switching from rabbits to other animals would lead to a "mass wave of extinctions" (Lawson, 1995). Concerns were raised when it was found in Australia that there had been a 90% decline in feral cat numbers after the loss of their prey (Drollette, 1997). This raised concerns about wildlife turning to endangered species for their food sources. Nick Smith's concerns were given some validation when in April 1998 half of the New Zealand adult breeding population of yellow-eyed penguins had been killed in a 10 day period, and by November 1998 it was reported that the endangered black stilts had their worst season ever (New Zealand Press Association, 1998b).

### The farming frame

Throughout the latter part of 1997 and 1998 there were reports on the variable success of the virus in keeping down the rabbit population, although such estimates were near impossible as there were no monitoring programmes in place before the virus appeared (Norman, 1998). In early 1999 reports were coming through that where RHDV had been used as a biocide rabbits had gained high levels of immunity (New Zealand Press Association, 1999b), and that in some areas rabbit levels had returned to pre-RHDV introduction levels ("Rabbits return", 1999). It was also reported that rabbits affected by RHD were exhibiting ear deformities, something that did not occur in other countries where the virus had spread. It was suggested that this was a possible sign of the rabbits developing immunity (New Zealand Press Association, 1998a) and also of the unpredictability of the effects of RHDV in New Zealand. Regional Councils blamed farmers for wasting this once in a lifetime opportunity to eradicate rabbits.

According to some scientists, using RHDV as a biocide was the best way to immunise the population of rabbits against RHD. To develop a biocide a rabbit dies from the disease, is collected and placed in a freezer. It is then thawed out and blended. The blend is then used to soak the bait overnight and the bait is distributed. According to MAF's National Centre for Disease Investigation, all stages of this process inactivate the virus, as liver enzymes degrade the virus in the dead rabbit, and freezing, chlorine and then heat destroy the virus (O'Keefe, Tempero & Atkinson, 1998). There is practically no virus left in the end product, but a good vaccine.

In contrast to this, some farmers painted a scenario of "genocidal precision" in the use of RHDV. A farmer who was one of the first to spread the virus in New Zealand suggested that his biocide method of spread over his 2000-hectare property had led to a 98% kill (Keats, 1998). A North Island farmer spread the virus on his property in November, early summer. Scientists claimed that it was better to spread the virus later in summer so that it would be more effective in killing young rabbits. But the farmer drew on his own experience of the situation, arguing that "all the information he had from the South Island [where the virus was first illegally introduced] was that it was killing young rabbits", and he had seen dead baby rabbits on his farm since spreading the virus (Tocker, 1997c). Scientists believed that, because of presence of maternal antibodies, young rabbits challenged by the virus could gain lifelong immunity. Farmers rejected this as a concern, arguing that rabbits under five weeks old would rarely survive the death of their mothers (Tocker, 1997d).

Whereas scientists called upon their controlled experimentation to criticise the way farmers used the virus, farmers defended their actions by appealing to their practical experience. Farmers had not disembedded their trust, relying on their own evidence and that of their own community rather that becoming dependent upon impersonal expertise.

### The science frame

There were also disputes between scientists over the possibility of cross-

species infection. Alvin Smith, a virologist from Oregon, claimed that a laboratory worker in Mexico developed antibodies to RHDV after taking part in an experiment which involved eating rabbits infected with RHDV. A New Zealand biophysicist claimed that groups exposed to RHDV were more likely to suffer illness such as gastro-intestinal symptoms, fever, influenza and rashes as compared to those not exposed to RHDV (New Zealand Press Association, 1997c). In early 1998 Alvin Smith reported to the New Zealand Parliament's primary production select committee that people exposed to the virus incurred such symptoms as diarrhoea, vomiting, flu-like illness and miscarriages (New Zealand Press Association, 1998c). In March 1998 a conference on RHD was organised in Wellington. Claims over the possibility of the disease infecting humans were again disputed. Dr Matson, a researcher from the Paediatric Research Center at East Virginia University in the United States, concluded from data compiled on people who had handled the virus that 40 percent had developed antibodies to it (Moran, 1998). By stating this he was contesting the "official line" that no antibodies were present. Researchers from Europe claimed that there was no evidence of humans being infected (Nowotny et al, 1999).

Another concern was raised over possible viral mutations. Alvin Smith argued that the caliciviruses could rapidly mutate, illustrating his concern by stating that "The estimated number of possible viable calicivirus variants is $4^{3500}$ which greatly exceeds the number of grains of sand on all the beaches and all the deserts of planet Earth" (Smith, 1999, p. 37). Most other scientists discounted these worries (Drollette, 1996).

To investigate the matter of cross-species infection in New Zealand, MAF tested RHDV on the North Island brown kiwi and the native bat. Surprisingly, the kiwi developed antibodies. MAF argued that this was a response by their immune systems to eliminate a foreign protein, and did not indicate that they had contracted the disease. MAF did not test other species, claiming that "kiwis and bats are representatives of their genera, so other natives are expected to react similarly" (McLauchlan, 1996, p. 108).

These publicly aired disputes between scientists over the possible

impact of RHDV on humans, other species and ecosystems can undermine non-scientists reliance on scientists' expert opinion. It could be suggested that farmers' disregard for the views of scientists was in part a consequence of the uncertainty induced by such disputes.

### The public frame

In order to legalise the introduction and use of the virus the government enacted very complicated and confusing legislation against the Rule of Law in New Zealand (van Roy, 1997). Retrospective validation was introduced in defiance of the law to overrule a decision the executive arm of the government did not like (even though some individual members of government did not support the illegal release of RHDV). In order to enact this retrospective validation the government was required to consult. It did this by giving 5 working days for interested parties to make submissions on their proposed regulation, but without indicating what the actual wording of the regulation would be. Only 2 days were spent on the analysis of submissions before the regulations were brought to Parliament (van Roy, 1997). The Regulations Review Committee that examines parliamentary legislation recommended that these regulations were not properly made and should be revoked (van Roy, 1999). The haste in which these laws were enacted suggests that the government was prepared to test its constitutional boundaries in order to ensure that the rabbit virus could be used in New Zealand.

Van Roy (1997) argued that the New Zealand government in effect endorsed the "kitchen whiz" approach to manufacture of RHDV as a biocide, despite this process never having come under any scientific scrutiny. The research on RHDV had been in relation to it as a biological control under stringent conditions of manufacture and distribution. Even though science had deemed this too risky, government regarded the much more dubious process of kitchen whiz manufacture as perfectly acceptable. So acceptable in fact, that MAF had information on how to do this on its website until this was strongly condemned by scientists attending a conference on RHD in March 1998.

In addition to breaching biosecurity, some farmers also committed criminal offences under a host of other Acts, such as the Pesticides Act,

the Health and Safety in Employment Act, the Animals Protection Act, yet there was no effort to prosecute farmers who offended in this way (van Roy, 1999). For example, some farmers injected live rabbits with the virus before freeing them. This manipulation of live animals for experimental purposes was an offence against the Animals Protection Act, but no action was taken against those farmers who used this method (Tocker, 1997b).

Another legal issue meant that those given authority to deal with the rabbit problem - the regional councils - were not allowed to play a part in the use of the virus. This was a result of the virus not being registered as a pesticide, and therefore commercial operators could not spread the virus (Tocker, 1997a). Consequently individuals were allowed to distribute the virus, but institutions like the regional councils were not. All councils could do was provide information to farmers. Regional councils called on the government to fast-track legislation so that they would no longer be hamstrung - but the Biosecurity Minister, Simon Upton, was not happy to do this, suggesting that farmers were very capable of releasing the virus without the regional councils' help (Tocker, 1997a).

We can note here both the ministerial support for individual action against bureaucracy, an ideological response by a neo-liberal government, and also the politicians taking a stance contrary to their own government scientists. It is perhaps not surprising that such an "anti-science" response would come from a conservative government that espoused free-market principles but was reliant on electoral support from the rural community. At an ideological level, conflict between scientists and politicians can occur where the latter believe that the unhindered market is the best mechanism to deal with economic and social issues. To illustrate this point, when the then Prime Minister Jenny Shipley discussed a proposal for flood mitigation with an engineer she responded that this would strangle development, and that people should build where they liked and insurance would take care of it.[1] Reliance

1. Peter Kingsbury from the Canterbury Regional Council related this story at The Risk Communication Challenge Conference run by the Centre for Advanced Engineering at Te Papa Museum, 30 November 2000.

could be placed on market mechanisms to determine how hazards are mitigated, dispensing with the need for input from scientists and engineers.

### Discussion and conclusion

The case of the illegal introduction of a rabbit virus in New Zealand represents an extreme response from a neo-liberal government to the economic woes caused by pests, especially as the government was reliant on rural support. From this perspective, state regulatory agencies are obstacles to individual action, and science is a hindrance to the free action of the market.

In order to understand why farmers took it into their own hands to experiment with a potentially dangerous new method of viral spread, consideration needs to be given to the very different ways in which New Zealand relates to its natural environment. In order to position the analysis of events such as the illegal release of RHDV it is necessary to explore perceptions of risk and conceptions of nature in the local space. It is suggested that a consideration of a number of "inversions" of European theorising is central to achieving such an enterprise.

Case studies of scientists by European theorists have tended to emphasise the way in which scientists claim certainty whereas the non-expert is less certain. Wynne identifies a disparity between laboratory assessment of risk and the actual practices where hazardous substances are used, illustrating this disparity in his discussion of risk assessment of 2,4,5-T in the UK (Wynne, 1987, p. 287). A committee on the safety of pesticides asserted that 2,4,5-T was safe if it was manufactured and used properly, which the committee assumed was unproblematic. For the workers it was the very conditions under which the pesticide was used that raised concerns (Wynne, 1987, p. 287). The ideal conditions of use laid down by experts were not being met promoting risky activities. Wynne also discusses Cumbrian hill farmers' responses to the scientific assessment of their sheep being contaminated by radioactive fallout from Chernobyl. He looks at the different forms of knowledge drawn on by the farmers and the ways in which experts dismissed this knowledge.

Scientists made statements as if their knowledge was certain, but

farmers were less certain and used to this uncertainty (Wynne, 1996). In contrast to these studies, the case of the illegal release of RHDV illustrates something quite different. Scientists invoked the precautionary principle, whereas farmers, supported by politicians, took the experimental use of RHDV into their own hands. Scientists emphasised uncertainty, whereas farmers were less cautious.

This links to ways in which expertise is perceived in the Antipodes. Although the "do-it--yourself" image in New Zealand often works at the level of mythology, one must also consider the experience of relatively isolated New Zealanders confronting nature. Scientists have rarely been given the cultural authority that Beck claims they were given in Europe. Giddens suggests that in fact there is a constant tension between experts and officials on the one hand, and lay actors on the other, over the appropriation of knowledge (Giddens, 1991, p. 210). Individuals can choose to disengage from the expert systems of modern life. In New Zealand there has been a long tradition of distrusting experts. This can be seen in the fact that the New Zealand medical profession took 70 years longer to gain self-regulation in New Zealand than it did in Britain. The state did not trust them (Belgrave, 1985). That is, the "dogmas of science" and expertise have had a more circumscribed acceptance. The values of settler-descendants "privilege challenge as an equalizer and measure of worth, and value achievement over ascription" (Dominy, 2002, p. 22). Early aspects of agricultural experimentation and the manipulation of nature were frequently carried out by knowledgeable amateurs, and not by professional scientists (Star, 1991). This set up a tension between the scientist and the farmer, one that persists to this day. In relation to the rabbit problem, farmers who rely on their practical understanding of the issue have dismissed scientific conceptions of control. The first chairman of the Rabbit Destruction Council (RDC established in 1947) was said to have "little sympathy for science or scientists unless work was strictly directed towards better methods of killing rabbits" (Gibb & Williams, 1994, p. 163). Those in charge of the management of rabbit control or eradication were wary of scientific advances. Gibb and Williams (1994, p. 169) cite an example from 1960. At

a field day "scientists introduced members of the RDC to their current research on rabbits ... The Chairman of the Council, Bart Baker, made a show of turning away, declaring that the only rabbits he wanted to see were dead ones". The illegal introduction of RHDV is an exemplar of this dismissive attitude towards science.

A related issue is the control of nature in the neo-Europes. Clark (1999, p. 146) argues that: "According to the risk-society thesis, the current technological interface with the biophysical world has reached a state of such intimacy and complexity that its potential consequences defy prediction". Clark goes on to suggest that such complexity and unpredictability has in fact characterised human/nature interactions throughout the periods of colonisation in the antipodes. This is particularly salient in the case of biocontrols, where there has been a history of unintended consequences following the release of exotic flora and fauna into New Zealand (Galbreath, 1998). For example, stoats and weasels were introduced to control rabbits, but instead found native birds easier prey. Sparrows were introduced to control insects, but consumed grain as well.

The different risks faced by urban dwellers and rural dwellers in the neo-Europes and Europe shapes human/nature relationships. It could be argued that it is in the countryside in New Zealand where a greater chance of encountering hazards occurs from such things as farm accidents, use of pesticide sprays, and economic risk in relation to weather patterns and the impact of natural elements – even introduced ones such as rabbits. This can be contrasted with Europe where risk is associated with polluted cities and poor working conditions in urban areas.

As already suggested, a significant inversion in this mix is that of human/animal relationships. Even those who detest the thought of the destruction of animals are caught in a difficult situation in New Zealand, as opposed to Britain where the destruction of animals for sport is an upper class leisure pursuit. Those who can successfully destroy the "pests" of introduced species in the neo-Europes are particularly valorised (Franklin, 1996) as protecting the environment, not destroying nature.

Whereas Europe struggles with the issue of preserving the natural world against the onslaught of technical developments, in New Zealand and Australia, nature continues to threaten society. West and Smith (1996) argue that there is a "people against nature" narrative in Australia in relation to drought. They propose that the imagery of drought, one of a threatening nature, takes on a functional role in Australia in reaffirming social morality and social solidarity (West & Smith, 1997). Dominy (2002) notes that in New Zealand grass itself was a primary instrument of colonialism, and as such the preservation of grass against invading rabbits could be viewed as an ongoing aspect of the colonialist project. Such confrontations with nature may nurture attempts to find technological fixes to such problems, and economic survival is seen as dependent upon technical developments. This ranges from the development of rubber bearings for buildings to protect them from earthquakes to the ad hoc nature of our efforts to use biocontrols in the environment (Galbreath, 1998).

To conclude, we could paraphrase Marx here and say that by the external world acting on humanity it changes our nature, which in turn influences how we respond to the external world. This suggests that an important starting point is to consider how nature is seen as a threat, and not just how society threatens nature. Although we can argue that economic imperatives forced the issue on the illegal introduction of RHDV into New Zealand, it is suggested here that the inversion of human/nature relationships in New Zealand allowed for a particular response to the threat of nature. The dismissive attitude to expertise, the pragmatic drive to conquer and subdue a threatening nature, the hazardous nature of rural life and the valorisation of pest destruction are important contextual factors in understanding the New Zealand response to rabbits and rabbit viruses. The "disembedding" that Giddens discusses, which sets up a lay/expert dichotomy, is not so markedly realised in New Zealand. The small, isolated set of islands, relatively recently peopled and with a population of less than 4 million, has nurtured a scepticism of expertise. The disembedding of social relations from their local involvements has been realised in more limited ways.

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# Surviving Conflict: New Zealand's Intentional Communities

*Lucy Sargisson*

**Abstract**

Intentional communities are groups of people who live together for a common cause or purpose that reaches beyond family or tradition. This paper draws on the first countrywide survey of intentional communities in New Zealand and seeks to explore how New Zealand's intentional communities have survived conflict over the decades. It is widely accepted by scholars of intentional communities that conflict is a threat to group stability, and indeed, conflict exists within New Zealand's intentional communities, however, many of them are remarkable for their longevity. These communities seem to have been effective in surviving the dangers that conflict can bring. How have they achieved this? Discussion of this question draws on a wide body of literature from disciplines including political theory, sociology and social psychology, as well as empirical evidence from first-hand fieldwork.

## *Introduction*

This paper emerges from a general study of utopian lifestyles in New Zealand and in particular from a survey of intentional communities[1] across the country, which was undertaken by the author in 2001.[2] The survey involved pre-arranged visits to communities, during which I employed a range of methods aimed at absorbing as much information as possible in a necessarily short space of time.[3] These methods included participant observation, formal semi-structured and recorded interviews,

1. For the sake of convenience (and at the expense of elegance) the term "intentional community" will be abbreviated in this paper to IC.
2. It is part of a larger collaborative project with Professor Lyman Sargent (University of St Louis, Missouri). ICs in New Zealand have been encouraged to log their archives in the National Library, and Sargent conducted research largely using this resource. Sargisson conducted fieldwork, which yielded the material in this paper.
3. Research was funded by the British Academy (Award SG-31443) and the University of Nottingham.

informal conversations, and accessing on-site archives in some 40 communities. I was concerned to learn about these communities' dreams, visions and *raison d'être,* as well as their structures and lifestyles. I was interested, in other words, to know about their utopias and their everyday experiences.

One thing that I observed was conflict. It is perhaps ironic that a study of utopian lifestyles should lead to a paper on conflict, but these communities are real places containing real people and conflict is a very real part of human life. Intentional communities are no exception, indeed, conflict can be (and often is) more intense in these close-knit communities than in the wider society. I am concerned to explore how conflict threatens the stability of intentional communities. It is widely accepted that conflict has led to the demise of many an historic community (e.g., see Kanter (1972) on the demise of utopian communities in nineteenth century America; Manning (1980) and Roberts (1980) on conflict within therapeutic communities.) Conflict exists within New Zealand's Ics and my research attests to this, however, the communities of New Zealand are extraordinarily long-lived. This is particularly remarkable in local secular communities because religious communities tend to outlast secular communities (this is variously accounted for by higher levels of internal discipline and/or commitment (Kanter, 1972)). Notwithstanding this, a significant number of New Zealand's secular communities have survived for over 30 years. Examples include Chippenham, Katajuta and Riverside, with Rainbow Valley close behind. It would seem, therefore, that these communities have been effective in surviving destabilising conflict. How have they achieved this?

This question attributes a negative function tor conflict and this assumption needs to be explored. Indeed, to properly express this puzzle (and to begin to explore it) we need to consult the literatures on conflict and ICs. Our discussion is necessarily truncated due to confines of space, but some understanding of the theoretical terrain is essential before we can begin to think about the empirical evidence.

## Conflict

The study of conflict is an integral part of the study of any human

relationships and, as such, it is the focus of research in a wide range of disciplines. Our discussions will take us into the worlds of political philosophy, sociology and social psychology, as well as the sub-fields of conflict resolution and conflict management. Some believe conflict to lie at the heart of human nature, others see it as a necessary part of the human condition.[4] Some see conflict as profoundly dangerous, a threat to stable society. Others see it as something to be celebrated, as engendering change. Our task here is to sample these views. There are dozens of different stances on conflict but for the sake of expediency, and bearing in mind our core question, they will be discussed here under two polemical headings. Discussion will begin with Hobbes and a sample of other theorists whose attitude to conflict is that it is dangerous. We will then move on to look at contrasting approaches which view conflict as desirable and/or socially useful.

### Conflict as dangerous

Many proponents of this view have been influenced by the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). For Hobbes, conflict is both inevitable and dangerous. It is inevitable because of men's nature, which cannot be other than self-serving (1994). Mankind consists of atomised individuals, each possessed of desires (e.g., fear of death, desire for happiness) and reason, which enables them to maximise their individual happiness (1968, pp. 118-130). They are also power seeking and self-interested, hence in a world of scarce resources the consequences are deeply unpleasant, conflict-ridden and war-like. This is fully fleshed out in *Leviathan* (1968), which imagines the consequences of unrestrained human behaviour in accordance with their nature (that is, natural attributes and natural rights). In what is perhaps the most famous passage in political theory, Hobbes explains,

> In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture on Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imports

4. The term "human condition" is used in political theory to refer to "man-in-society", or people as they are in the company of other people, rather than "man" in an imaginary or solitary condition.

> by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, animal fear, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (1968, p. 186)

Competition, diffidence and the search for power and glory negate the opportunity for co-operation. This is a society in which co-operation is not possible. Instead, mistrust, competition and subsequent conflict lead to a situation in which every one is in a state of permanent war with everyone else. This is a nightmare existence.

> I set down for a Principle by experience known to all man, and derived by none, to wit, that the dispositions of men are naturally such, that except they be restrained through fear of some coercive power, every man will destruct and dread each other, and as by natural right he may, so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength he hath, towards the preservation of himself .(Hobbes, 1983, p. vii)

The solution, for Hobbes, is the erection of a common and sovereign power, via consent, which has the power to restrain man's natural impulses (1968, 1994). Rights are surrendered to this omnipotent figure and authoritarian rule restrains conflict and prevents war.

This is not the place for a fuller discussion of Hobbes. Rather, we need to note three things. Firstly, the role of conflict in his work. Secondly, the outcome of conflict in his work; and thirdly the lasting impact of this view. Conflict, for Hobbes is an inevitable outcome of man's exercise of his nature. The human condition is marked by competition and the quest for power. This is conflict and its outcome is war, death and/or the constant fear of death. Only an authoritarian ruling body can control this. Conflict is thus dangerous and must be controlled.

This view influences fields as far-flung as psychoanalysis, politics, and the study of international relations. As an indication of this we can sample a range of statements from key thinkers. Sigmund Freud, for instance, in a letter to Albert Einstein in 1932, wrote that

> Wars will only be prevented with certainty if mankind unites in setting up a central authority to which the right of giving

> judgement upon all conflicts of intent shall be handed over. There are clearly two separate requirements involved in this: the creation of a supreme authority and its endowment with the necessary power. (Freud, quoted in Burton & Dukes, 1990, p. 7).

The study of international relations was, for a long time, dominated by a similar attitude to conflict. Conflict, it was assumed, causes war:

> War is a species of conflict; consequently, by understanding conflict we may learn about the probable characteristics of war under different conditions and the methods most suitable for regulating, preventing, and winning wars (Wright, quoted in Burton & Dukes, 1990, p. 15).

Freud established a tradition in psychoanalysis that persists in Lacanian and post-Lacanian thought, namely, that conflict is primordial and that it requires restraint. For Lacan,

> The Oedipus complex means that the imaginary, in itself an incestuous and conflict relation, is doomed to conflict and ruin. [It follows that] In order for the human being to be able to establish the most natural of relations, that between male and female, a third party has to intervene, one that is a model of something successful, the model of some harmony. This does not go far enough – there has to be a law .... (Lacan, 1993, p. 96)

The law in question, for Lacan, is the 'law of the father', a symbolic order of language in which are inscribed rules and codes that establish 'normal' social relations. Again, the point for us in this is that conflict requires restraint, order and control. Otherwise, the consequence is ruin. Lacan envisages a different kind of ruin than Freud – this time we are facing the total breakdown of interpersonal communication and relations. Unrestrained conflict threatens the social fabric.

Sociologists tend to take a nuanced approach to conflict but some nonetheless see it as broadly a 'bad thing' in that its effects are socially negative. Talcott Parsons, for instance, insists in his work on Durkheim that conflict is a disruptive force. Like Durkheim, Parsons emphasised the importance of social stability and believed in the stabilising effect of shared norms or values:

> A society, as Durkheim expressed it, is a moral community, and only in so far as it is does it possess stability ... at least to the extent necessary to guarantee the minimum of order there must

> be sharing of systems of value, there must be a system of common values. (Parsons, 1937, p. 395)

The views of Durkheim (e.g., see 1947) and Parsons on conflict are nuanced. Both accept that a certain amount of conflict is 'natural' or inevitable in human society, however, both desire to minimise this in the name of stability because unrestrained conflict contributes to social discord.

Of course, these above comments are not close readings of these canonical texts from political theory, psychoanalysis and sociology. Nonetheless, they indicate a perception of conflict which can be summarised thus: Conflict is inevitable. This is due to some element in the human condition or in our natures. It arises from differences in wants, needs, desires or beliefs. The coincidence of differences causes tension and this is conflict. Conflict threatens to destabilise our relationships and can lead to aggressive and hostile situations, perhaps even war or social dysfunction. Conflict is, therefore, dangerous and must be restrained or controlled by something (a law, a sovereign body, a social glue), which can dominate it. As we shall see this view of conflict has had considerable influence in the study of intentional communities.

### Conflict as useful

This contrasting view can be found within sociology and social psychology. This position (very broadly speaking) sees conflict as valuable, functional or socially positive. Again, due to constraints of space, we can only sample this attitude and this will be undertaken by looking at three key positions, namely, Lewis Coser (functionalism), Robert Dahl and Ralph Dahrendorf (consensus and conflict theory) and the post-Lacanians (deconstruction).

Coser drew on the work of Simmel, for whom conflict is a form of socialisation and a necessary part of the human condition (Simmel, 1955). Coser's thesis is that conflict has positive functional value, notwithstanding its (sometimes) negative effects. Some forms of conflict are more useful than others. For example:

> Internal social conflict which concerns goals, values or interests that do not contradict the basic assumptions upon which the

> relationship is founded tend to *be positively functional* for the social structure. Such conflicts tend to make possible the readjustment of norms and power relations within the groups in accordance with the felt needs of its individual membership subgroups. (Coser, 1968, p. 151, emphasis added)

We shall return to Coser in more detail later in the paper when looking at actual intragroup conflicts in intentional communities. For now it is sufficient to note the stark contrast to the view of conflict as primarily dangerous. Conflict, in this reading, can permit the clarification of a group's ideas as well as allowing for adjustments for changes in balance of power. It is a force for dynamism and process:

> A flexible society benefits from conflict because such behaviour, by helping to create and modify norms, assures its [ie. society's] continuance under changed conditions. Things that work against this are rigid systems and the suppression of conflict. (Coser, 1968, p.154)

Ralf Dahrendorf takes this further. In his essay, 'Out of utopia' (1964), he challenged contemporary sociology which, he claimed, adhered to 'utopian' undesirable and unachievable values. His argument hinged upon a reading of utopia as desirous of closure, perfection and stasis.[5] This, for Dahrendorf, is a form of social death, to which he contrasts a dynamic view of society driven by conflict:

> The great creative force that carries along the model that I am trying to describe and that is equally ubiquitous is social conflict. The notion that whenever there is social life there is conflict may be unpleasant and disturbing. Nevertheless, it is indispensable to our understanding of social problems. ... conflict can be temporarily suppressed, regulated, channelled, and controlled but ... neither the philosopher-king nor the modern dictator can abolish it once and for all. (1964, p. 224)

For Dahl conflict is both dangerous and useful. Managed conflict yields a pluralist society and consensus binds political communities:

5. I have written (at length) of the function of utopia which is, I claim, absolutely not closure, perfection and stasis but rather critique and the creation of alternatives. This is not the place to rehearse these debates but for details see Sargisson (1996; 2000).

> Prior to politics, beneath it, enveloping it, restricting it, conditioning it, is the underlying consensus on policy that usually exists in the society among the predominant portion of politically active members. (Dahl, 1956, pp. 132-133)

Consensus theory asks us to accommodate or transcend our differences, (the cause of conflict, according to this approach) and believes that there is a glue that binds societies and further that this glue is stronger than the tensions (conflicts) which threaten to pull it apart.

The influences of Freud and Lacan were mentioned under the banner "conflict is dangerous", and post-Lacanians also take this view. However, they are considered here because there is in their work a certain jubilation regarding conflict. Yes, they say, it is primordial and inevitable; yes it threatens order; but this is a good thing. Conflict is seen variously as transgressive and transformative (Sargisson, 2000). Thinkers who assume this position include feminists, such as Helene Cixous and Judith Butler. They take from Lacan the idea of symbolic order that (amongst other things) resolves Oedipal conflict to create an order of meaning which is profoundly masculine.[6] Acts of transgression and deconstruction can generate conflict within this apparently hermetic system and create new space in which femininity (the repressed Other) can be re-thought, re-articulated and re-enacted (e.g., see Butler (1989), Cixous, (1996)). The specifics of post-Lacanian psychoanalyses need not concern us further, suffice to note that thinkers under this (broad) banner see the social world as a complex field of antagonistic conflict and that this is potentially transformative, perhaps in a politically desirable way. Celebrations of difference (Butler, 1989) and pluralistic social interaction (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) all derive from a perception of conflict as both inevitable and profoundly creative.

### The communities

Forty communities were visited for this project and all have experienced internal conflict.[7] The survey covered a wide range of ICs in the North

6. Femininity is silenced and "Woman" reduced to lack, absence, so that "she" becomes a veritable black hole.

and South Islands. Communities ranged in size from small or embryonic communities such as Earthspirit, Kiriwai and Motukarara Christian Retreat, which each had just three permanent members in 2001, to Anahata, which was then home to over fifty and has since grown. The largest IC in New Zealand today is the closed community of Gloriavale, which is home to over 100 members. Most of the rest have between eight to twenty-five members. Physical locations also vary considerably and include city communities with shared living space, such as Chippenham Community, or The Community of the Sacred Name, both in Christchurch; eco-villages in rural or coastal locations, with several hundred acres, such as Valley Farm Ecovillage and Mamaki Farm Village; and smaller coastal or rural communes such as Katajtuta, Clearwater and the mountain-top Anahata Retreat Centre.[8] Others are semi-rural, or near towns or cities. Examples are Timatanga, Earthsong, Awaawaroa Bay and Otamatea. *Raisons d'être* vary widely and include religious communities, such as Bodhinyanarama Buddhist Monastery and the Anglican Community of the Sacred Name; feminist communities (Earthspirit); co-operative farms such as Katajuta and Gricklegrass; and co-housing schemes and eco-villages (Earthsong, Otamatea).

### Conflict in New Zealand's ICs

Intragroup conflict is an unintended outcome of community life. It can threaten the future of a community and was identified by 98% of interview subjects as a source of personal pain and anguish. For instance, when asked about the positives and negatives of life at the new community of Anahata (formerly Centrepoint), one of the founders of this new community replied thus:

> The negatives – there have been a couple of nasty incidents (I won't go into detail) where there were new people here and because of some of the things the kids did, they were angry at

7. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a comprehensive description of each community. Summary information can be provided on request to the author.
8. Anahata Retreat, at the top of a mountain in Golden Bay, South Island is not to be confused with the newer community of Anahata, which is near Auckland in the North Island on the site of the former Centrepoint community.

> each other. There was some shouting and threats of calling the police and so on. That brought back old memories of old ways. On the other hand, it resolved itself and the police weren't called. (Chris, Anahata: 18.05.01)

Even longstanding communities experience conflict. Joy is one of the early members of Riverside community, which recently celebrated its sixtieth anniversary:

> One of the worst things, I think, is the effect [of conflict] on relationships. ... In a community all relationships are interwoven and you can't shut the door and say 'They can go to hang', because you're going to be meeting them tomorrow and you're going to be going to a meeting and talking about your common needs and your common responsibilities and your common lives, and to feel seriously out of tune with somebody and disillusioned with them, or they with you, I think, is fairly shattering. You can be irritated with another human being, and intolerant, but to lose your faith in yourself with other people or your faith in other people in your life, I find that shattering. Sometimes you accept it but you wish you could shake it off. (Joy, Riverside: 22.02.01)

Whare speaks similarly of his childhood at Chippenham:

> The worst thing was that I knew there was a problem between other people. I could feel it although I never really knew what the problem was. I knew there was some kind of tension going on between people in the house, and I found that hurtful in a way; I felt that I hurt because somebody else was kind of hurting inside (Whare, Chippenham: 12.03.01)

Conflict can destroy an IC and can require years of recovery. We can see this by looking at an example. Chippenham, Mansfield and Gricklegrass are all secular communities founded in the 1970s by an organisation called Community Assistance Incorporated (CAI). Most members of CAI lived at Chippenham in the early days. The group was committed to fostering co-operation and to providing community support. Chippenham and Mansfield are urban co-ops, located in Christchurch, and Gricklegrass is an organic farm near Oxford. In 1994 a conflict arose amongst members over the nature and future of CAI. The dispute concerned the principles on which the communities were

founded (see below). It ran for over three years, caused massive harm within the communities, cost CAI dear in financial terms and eventually led to the liquidation of CAI's assets following a High Court judgement. CAI was wound up but the communities survived, under the banner of a new umbrella organisation, Heartwood Community Te Ngakau o te Rakau Incorporated (Heartwood).

The key issue was dispute over the communities' assets. CAI was financially secure and solvent with surplus resources. Given CAI's commitment to community assistance, some members felt that the assets should be realised by selling the (now valuable) properties and using the money to support co-operative and community projects. This group felt that the communities (and their members) were reaping the benefits of CAI's assets and that this "good" should be more widely shared. An alternative view agreed that community and co-operative projects should be funded by CAI but disagreed about the need to sell the properties. It would be better, they argued, to manage CAI's existing resources more effectively. Two factions formed in what became a bitter conflict and the communities were soon in constitutional crisis, as the wording of CAI's constitution was open to interpretation in support of both positions. Mediation was tried, failed, and eventually the dispute went to litigation.

Feelings ran high and some are documented in Chippenham community's newsletter, "Chip'N'Away". One writer expresses "a sense of outrage that a very small group can so wantonly destroy the community's assets built up by so many; a sense of violation that the ideals upon which the community was founded can be so arrogantly trampled upon" (Chip'N'Away, July 1996). The ICs survived, and the properties were not sold, but CAI was wound up. Its assets went in the hands of liquidators who insisted on the creation of a new management structure for the three communities - this is Heartwood. Heartwood consists of trustees who are former members as well as representatives from each IC as well as trustees from "outside", including a solicitor and member of a nearby IC. The end of the conflict saw the loss of some members of the faction that desired the sale of the properties (one still remains). This left gaps and Chippenham took new members in haste -

a decision which it later repented at leisure as these members were not committed to community living but rather to an easy lifestyle in a large and beautiful home. Further conflict occurred and these people were asked to leave, causing more upheaval. It took a further three years for things to settle down at Chippenham, and at the time of my visits in 2001, Mansfield Community was still having problems recruiting and retaining members. The three communities are now, as I write, reaching a settled and harmonious state, with a combination of new and old members all forming cohesive groups. The effects of this conflict, then, have lasted for almost a decade and threatened the future of the ICs as well as causing hurt, mistrust, and pain to the people involved. The impacts have been financial, structural, and emotional.

A further example of the effects of conflict can be found in the story of Centrepoint Community. Centrepoint had a whole range of well-documented problems in the years running up to its closure by the High Court in February 2000. Key members of the community, including the leader, Bert Potter, had been found guilty of allegations of sexual abuse of women and children. Potter was convicted on drug charges in 1990 following a police raid on Centrepoint which yielded LSD and Ecstasy, which was apparently being manufactured on site and distributed to members. He was further convicted in 1992 and imprisoned for seven years for indecently assaulting five minors. Six other members were similarly convicted. Other problems included apparent financial mismanagement and corrupt leadership. It is never possible to identify one causal factor when a community goes wrong but former members are clear that it was internal conflict that finally ended Centrepoint. Issues of conflict included leadership, membership, money and the nature and future of the community. These issues reached into the heart of Centrepoint's *raison d'être.* Two factions formed, one comprised Potter and his supporters and the other opposed him and wanted to start afresh with a new community. Relations between the two groups grew increasing hostile and the community became socially unsustainable. The latter group has subsequently formed the new community of Anahata on the old site at Albany. The former appears to have disbanded. The issues vary but the Centrepoint story follows a

familiar pattern in the breakdown of an IC.

Empirical evidence indicates that conflict can lead to the dissolution of intentional communities (e.g., see, Barker,1989). The scholarship on ICs is almost unanimous on this point – if a community is to survive over time it needs to find ways to manage conflict (e.g., see, Kanter (1972), Abrams & McCulloch (1976)). Unrestrained conflict is socially unsustainable in an IC - it can prevent or inhibit the achievement of goals (Hardy, 1979). Intentional communities are formed to realise the collective goal of living together in a certain way. Sometimes this is for some 'higher' end, following a religion or shared political commitment. Sometimes this is to create an alternative lifestyle *per se,* sometimes to challenge the social norms by producing viable alternatives (Sargisson, 2000). IC scholarship based on empirical evidence bears out the theoretical perspective on conflict as dysfunctional and destructive. However, the fact that conflict is dangerous to an IC does not necessarily mean that it has no useful function and this is something that will be explored at a later stage.

### Three kinds of conflict

Of course, it is possible to have conflict about anything, but it is useful to have some classification of conflict. The fieldwork in New Zealand has enabled me to identify three major kinds of conflict in ICs. These are conflict over principle, domestic issues, and relationships. Conflict over principle can tear a community apart and this, I suggest, is the most destructive form of conflict in community. Disputes over domestic arrangements and relationships are more common and are both recurrent causes of conflict. They cause great heartache to members but rarely threaten the future of an IC. Indeed, in some instances, ICs have devised effective (and transferable) strategies and systems of conflict management in response to their experiences and these seem to be a positive outcome of conflict in these groups.

### Conflicts of principle

Conflicts over principle are the most difficult to resolve. ICs are formed by people who share a vision and who desire to put their ideals or

principles into practice. A serious challenge to these principles from within the group challenges the community's reason for being. We saw this in the discussion of Chippenham. A further example occurred in the Buddhist monastery of Bodhinyanarama, set in a 500 acre valley of regenerating mixed and native bush. Like many ICs in New Zealand, Bodhinyanarama is committed to an ecological programme of regeneration, involving the reintroduction of native species. It is also committed to the respect and preservation of all life. A few years ago, the community faced a dilemma: what to do about possums? Possums, as is well known, decimate woodland and inhibit the regeneration of native species. Two key issues were in conflict here. The first is the Buddhist precept to harm no living creature. The second was the community's commitment to regeneration (to create a space in which threatened species could thrive). Two routes were considered: one was an electric fence, which would keep possums off the property. This was quickly dismissed as the cost was prohibitive and the actual installation nigh-on impossible – the 500 acre valley is steep sided, borders Department of Conservation land, and is inaccessible to machinery without causing massive damage. The second option, and the one which was eventually agreed upon, was a more conventional management programme, which would involve killing at least some of the possums. This decision caused much heartache, debate and conflict and, for a time, it appeared that the community might not survive the crisis. Some members left. The monks at Bodhinyanarama spoke openly about this dilemma and the pain it caused. Subsequently new members have joined, including the senior monk, Ajhan Sucitto, who said, quite frankly, that it was easier to live with the decision than to have made it.

ICs are usually founded in order to realise a vision of the way things should be. The object of commitment varies and may be an idea (Abrams & McCulloch, 1967); a value system (Kanter, 1972); or an alternative lifestyle (Metcalf, 1989). Emerging from a critical view of the status quo, they are communities devised to realise principled lifestyles. Conflicts over these foundational commitments and common goals can be devastating.

### Domestic conflict

> The primary issue with which a utopian community must cope in order to have the strength and solidarity to endure is its human organisation: how people arrange to do the work that the community needs to survive as a group, and how the group in turn manages to to satisfy and involve its members over a long period of time. (Kanter, 1972, p. 64)

When people live together in a shared space, the division of labour on domestic chores can become a source of irritation and conflict. The issues are the same as in any household. The stakes affect not only the feelings and commitment of the individuals (exit is a possibility in all households) but also the existence of the group and the continuance of its shared mission or vision. Lewis Coser sheds some light on the intensity of conflict within small tightly knit-groups. He claims that such groups are especially vulnerable to interpersonal conflict, which they are inclined to suppress. This, he says, is dangerous because suppressed conflict can become explosive:

> While they provide frequent occasions for hostility (since both sentiments of love and hatred have been intensified through frequency of interaction), the acting out of such feelings is sensed as a danger to such intimate relationships, and hence the tendency to suppress rather than allow expression of hostile feelings. In close knit groups, feelings of hostility tend, therefore, to accumulate and hence intensify. (Coser, 1968, p. 152)

Conflict, for Coser, can and does have positive outcomes but this kind of conflict, he says, is negative. Intense hostility in a small group threatens the existence of the groups (as well as the safety of the members). The outbreak of conflict under such circumstances is, says Coser, attributable to two causes, one is "realistic" and the other "non-realistic". Realistic conflict, so-called, is conflict over actual issues. "Non-realistic" conflict is very real, in that it involves hostility, but occurs over a *faux* issue: "The conflict doesn't just aim at resolving the immediate issue which led to the outbreak; and accumulated grievances which were denied expression previously are apt to emerge at this occasion" (Coser, 1968, p. 152). Conflict over domestic issues can often be of the

non-realistic kind. Suppressed hostility can explode over such an issue as who does the dishes. The trigger is often a domestic issue. Someone who persistently fails to clean up after him/herself when they've made lunch, for instance, can infuriate other people who share the kitchen. Bathroom hygiene is another common trigger for long-suppressed anger. Who cleans the toilet? Who buys the food? Who does the gardening? Who does the accounts? All of these are potential areas of dispute and resentment. This is sometimes explained in terms of frustration/aggression theory (see Bisno, 1988, pp. 27-28). The issues may appear trivial but such conflict can generate serious problems in a community and some communities cannot retain new members for this reason.

Mansfield community, for instance, was having difficulty retaining members in 2001. People would join but leave following a trial period. Mansfield, which had the potential to carry 15 people, was down to two members and was under pressure from Heartwood to recruit, not least for reasons of financial viability. One of the key problems was identified at a house discussion as an absence of clear procedures for the organisation of domestic space and work. Existing members had very clear ideas about how things should be done but these were not written down anywhere, so new members found themselves constantly and unwittingly stepping on toes. Timatanga had experienced something similar. This case concerned the use of non-organic materials in the community garden. New members had used a weedkiller without being aware of the unwritten rule prohibiting this. Both of these cases evoked resentment and anger. Both were avoidable, and in fact in each of these cases the community has learned from the experience and set in place processes and structures which aim to avoid its recurrence.

During visits to Chippenham I witnessed effective operating systems that allocated work within the group. These are structured in the House Rules, the development of which is delegated to fortnightly community meetings:

> The system for allocating house chores, duties, cooking rotas, working bees, renovating activities, etc. is determined by common agreement of a house meeting. (Chippenham Household Community Policy)

The current system runs thus: members of Chippenham are tenants of their community, as well as members of the Trust that owns the property; rents are low, compared to market rates, and include a commitment to pay something known as "sweat-rent", which comprises a commitment to work for 2 hours a week for the community. Current practice is that members decide the nature of the work themselves and log their own hours. Each member takes responsibility for a specific area, such as general maintenance or for servicing a shared space such as bathrooms, kitchen, or garden. Help may be requested in any area at the house meeting or bilaterally. Alterations are collectively agreed by consensus at the meetings. Major works are contracted in, but only if members are unable to do the job themselves. As a last resort, the community has constitutional sanctions against non-compliance:

> Residents who persistently fail to attend house meetings or abide by collective decisions; who fail to sustain required payment; who fail to carry out duties or show an interest and caring in the property; who disregard rules or flagrantly ignore behaviour codes collectively agreed upon; who act with disinterest or disregard for the vision, goals and practices of Heartwood Community Te Ngakau o te Rakau Inc., may be seen as unsuited to this community and by common agreement of a house meeting be asked to leave. It is the policy of the community to take appropriate legal action to recover any debts unpaid by vacating residents. (Chippenham Household Community Policy)

No system works across time without some problems and, during my visits to Chippenham, minor conflict occurred in the form of irritation over the failure of some members to comply with House Rules and Agreements on domestic issues.[9] The point is not that the conflict occurred, but that it was aired in an appropriate space and manner (and thereby did not fester into resentment) (see Coser, 1968). Compliance with the rules was pre-agreed and the source of this authority is consensus (see below). Indeed, the key to the success of Chippenham rules is their consensual origin and application. There is no 'leader' of

9. There was a perceived failure to log hours worked, and a second issue of irritation came when one member failed to clear up after themselves in the kitchen.

this community responsible for enforcement of rules. Rather, the community collectively revises and discusses its own rules. Agreements are collectively owned and individual participation produces a collective autonomy and responsibility. Key factors here are open communication, willingness to participate, and a clear process that is perceived to be fair.

### Conflict over relationships

> Being here over time, the worst thing has been relationship problems and not being able to get away from them, or it being very difficult with somebody actually having to leave their home in order to escape from what they are feeling. (Arafelle, Earthspirit, 12.04.01)

Problems with close personal relationships occur everywhere but can be particularly intense in intentional communities. The usual problems can become magnified for a range of reasons. The first stem from the fact that all relationships within ICs tend to be more intense than those in the wider community. ICs are close-knit and even if members are not close personal friends they usually share a vision, or a commitment to the cause or good life that is the community's *raison d'etre*. The second set of reasons is structural: even in an IC where people have their own homes, life is less private than in the wider community (Sargisson, 2001). In ICs, arguments tend to become public knowledge very quickly. Private issues are played out in a (confined) public space. So, for instance, infidelities in monogamous relationships are all the more painful if all parties belong to the community; betrayals of friendship hurt all the more when the person concerned is a member of your community; atmospheres can become intensely strained; and rifts and splits in relationships can affect everyone.

ICs do have the advantage of the provision of support. Disadvantages involve escalation. People who have lived for some time in community learn to distance themselves from other people's immediate problems:

> One thing I've learned about living in community is that if you

> get caught up in everybody else's crisis, then you do not improve it, you just magnify it. (Chris, Anahata: 18.05.01)
>
> You have to allow them their process and we have some very clear guidelines on how you deal with process, with people, and about how it is not okay to be angry at someone and walk around them; you have to sit down and work out issues and if you can't do it on your own, you call in a third person, not to decide who is wrong and who is right, simply to make sure that each person is hearing what the other one is saying. (Chris, Anahata: 18.05.01)

Some communities, like Tui, in Golden Bay, for instance, have become expert in negotiating interpersonal conflict. At the time of my visit, Tui had a mature, longstanding and stable membership, that in its 18-year history had been through various shifts in close personal relationships. Former partners, wives and husbands now live with other partners in a more or less stable situation. Some members of Tui have trained in psychotherapy and counselling skills and these people offer training and courses to the wider community. Personal trauma has thus generated both sustainable internal systems and a source of individual income.

The systems used at Tui include regular community meetings, some of which are routinely dedicated to "heart business". These include sharing, where appropriate, feelings and personal issues. When conflict arises established techniques are employed. There is a belief at Tui that issues need to be aired, and not left to fester. One technique for releasing tension involves the drawing of a line between two conflicting parties. The rule is that the line is not crossed and no physical contact is made. The parties are then permitted to shout – as loudly as possible – everything they feel about the other person. The shouting is often so loud that the other person cannot hear the words; the process appears cathartic. For deep conflict an internal facilitator is used and if serious rifts arise in the community, an external facilitator is hired.

These are all instances of "safety values", designed intentionally to permit the release of pressure and so minimise the build up of what Coser calls "non-realistic" conflict (Coser, 1968). They channel antagonism into an appropriate space. Safety values identified by Coser

include the practice of duelling, Australian aboriginal revenge mechanisms, boxing matches and violent films (1968, p. 156). All permit people to vent hostility and express dissent.

### Positive outcomes: Consensus

So, conflict is part of life in an IC as elsewhere. What is important to us is how ICs respond to this. Some communities have devised ways of preparing members. For instance, most members of Mamaki have undertaken "Forum" interpersonal training, and at Valley Farm, members are encouraged to learn "Constructive Living" techniques.[10] However, most ICs employ a version of consensus decision making and this is an important and transferable procedure. Consensus was cited by 80% of interviewees as their ICs most useful structure or process.

Most intentional communities in New Zealand operate a system of consensus decision making. Members become adept at this and real consensus formation is impressive. Consensus decision making is not a majority based system, wherein all participate in discussion which culminates in a vote.[11] Votes, it is said, create winners and losers. Rather, at the heart of consensus is agreement, seeking a decision agreed to by everyone. It is important to note, though, that the object of consensus in these ICs is not to create a conflict-free internal culture. Rather, consensus decision-making aims to enable people to live with conflict.

A certain amount of political education and socialisation is necessary for consensus to work.[12] Done wrong, it can generate an oppressive situation in which people are bound to support decisions with which they disagree: cabinet responsibility gone wrong. Done right, consensus is a fully inclusive, co-operative and non-hierarchical process, structured in such a way as to permit all voices to be heard and all opinions respected. Most ICs use a facilitator to guide meetings and this is often done by rotation and, as long as the facilitator remains impartial, the

10. See http://www.anamorph.com/todo/cl.html/
11. Some communities use the vote as a last resort but even these first aim at consensus.
12. In intentional communities people learn about consensus and the necessary skills of communication through observation (as trial members) and participation in meetings.

integrity of the process remains intact. The relationship between the facilitator and the group is important:

> Facilitation is where someone helps the group come to a solution by withdrawing from the discussion and focusing on the *process* of getting there. It is a role not a status. The facilitator makes suggestions about what to do, which the group may accept or reject, but never do they make decisions for the group. The authority stays with the group. (Swain, 1996, p. 7)

Some ICs draw on long-established practice. An example is the Quaker Community, Friends' Settlement:

> Our decision making method – widely called consensus – is an expression of regard for each person. All members, women and men, young and old, have an equal voice and responsibility. We do not take a vote. Instead, the Clerk (appointed by the Meeting to replace both chairperson and secretary of non-Quaker meetings) guides proceedings until he/she can feel unity in the sense of the meeting. The Clerk records a written minute which is then read aloud. If it is acceptable to the meeting, the next item on the agenda is considered. If not, individuals suggest changes to the minute, or discussion is resumed, or the meeting "waits on the Lord" in silent prayer until a satisfactory way forward is found. (*Questions to quakers)*

Business meetings at Friends' Settlement resemble their meetings for worship. Long periods of silence remain unbroken by the Clerk, and discussion is slow and deeply thoughtful. Solutions emerge.

> Otamatea, Earthsong and Anahata all use a formal card system to structure meetings. Each person taking part in the discussion has 6 coloured cards, one of which may be raised at any time during the discussion to indicate a wish to speak. Each colour has a particular significance and contributions are prioritised accordingly.[13] Meetings are guided by a facilitator who calls first on the people with the highest priority cards (black) to state their

13. Black: I have a personal/interpersonal difficulty that is preventing my full participation; Red: I have a process observation, eg the discussion is off the subject; Orange: I have a wish to acknowledge someone or something; Yellow: I have a question or need clarification; Green: I can provide clarification; Blue: I have a comment or opinion.

difficulty and make suggestions about how to deal with the matter. The group can then decide whether this should be processed within the group or privately between involved individuals. People holding red, orange, yellow, green and blue cards are then called on to contribute. Once a proposal has been clarified and discussed the meeting moves to the decision making stage. For decision making, each participant has five coloured cards, which similarly structure the process.

Consensus is not appropriate for every community decision, or even for every community, but observation during this research overwhelmingly confirms it as a legitimate process for effectively binding a community to a decision, policy or rule. Decisions reached by consensus bind a group.

### Conclusion: Surviving conflict

Conflict can threaten the stability of an IC. It can be dangerous. It is difficult to stretch this to Hobbesian proportions and I make no claims about human nature, but accounts from the "survivors" of some conflicts do recall extreme trauma and anxiety and a strong desire for stability. Overall, three things are apparent. Firstly, conflict endangers the unit, the IC itself, and conflict over principle is the most dangerous. ICs are remarkably robust and other forms of conflict are survivable. But when a community founded on and for shared values experiences serious conflict about those values, the future of the group comes into question. Secondly, it is apparent that conflict causes harm to individual members, to the direct participants and to those around them. Conflict in this kind of group hurts. Members have personal emotions invested in the group and its goals. This is variously termed "total personality involvement" (Coser, 1968) or "social identity" (Hogg, 1992). The individual member's sense of self may be wrapped up in their membership as described, for instance, by self-categorisation theory. This describes how people identify with groups, which they represent as "prototypes – multidimensional fuzzy sets of attitudes that describe and prescribe perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and actions that define the ingroup and distinguish it from relevant outgroups" (Hogg & Abrams, 2001, p. 5).

Through a process described by Hogg (1992) as "social attraction", members desire to model themselves closely on what they perceive to be the characteristics of the in-group. Leaving such a group is incredibly traumatic and has been described in interview as a form of bereavement. Thirdly, and we will come to this later, conflict in ICs can have positive outcomes.

Social psychology can help us to understand the mechanics of some conflict but research has mostly focussed on the theory and process of group formation as such, rather than processes of real group dissolution. This is partly because of the methods employed – laboratory tests are not applicable to real living groups and cannot be applied over a period of years but rather are employed with study groups for short periods of time. A wide body of work exists on the formation of groups (e.g., see, Bisno, (1988); Burton & Dukes (1990); Douglas (1995)), but this is of little value to the project in hand. However, some of this material is useful. For instance, Muzafer Sherif's conception of "superordinate goals" that bind a group in co-operative endeavour has explanatory value. Sherif was interested in intergroup conflict and co-operation. In his famous "summer camp" experiments, he found that different (previously competing) groups *would* co-operate if they shared superordinate goals:

> Goals which are compelling and highly appealing to members of two or more groups in conflict but which cannot be attained by the resources and energies of the groups separately. In effects, they are goals attained only when the groups pull together. (Sherif, 1958, quoted in Hogg & Abrams, 2001, p. 64)

What makes different groups pull together is also, perhaps, what makes members within a group pull together. Theories of in and out-groups, for instance, shed light on the nature of IC cohesiveness. It has been shown (in studies of intergroup conflict) that strong opposition from an out-group fosters strong ingroup loyalty and cohesion (Hogg, 1992; Sherif 1958; Sumner, 1906). ICs are often founded to realise a set of "alternative" principles (which may oppose or contrast to the norms of the wider society). This oppositional status can form an internal bond and enhance group identity. Hence, again, the devastating effect of conflicts over principle.

So we have a variety of possible explanations for group cohesion. In addition to the theory we have considered a range of procedures, structures and systems designed by specific ICs to avoid or manage conflict. ICs themselves are not naive about conflict. They see it as unpleasant to experience but nonetheless inevitable:

> I remember once thinking "community is about solving conflict" and that was true at the time but it doesn't take away from the good things about being in a community. (Trystan, Peterborough, 03.01.01).

> Conflict is a natural part of being human - it's what you do after the conflict that makes a difference to how it all goes down later. What I think we have to learn from each other is how we manage to live with conflict. (Chrissie, Te Ora, 02.02.01)

Living in an IC involves high levels of co-operation with people amongst whom there may be complex clashes, disputes and conflict. For this, procedures are necessary, such as those for making decisions by consensus. Conflict can endanger an IC but is not always a "bad thing". It can be productive and evoke necessary change. It can yield useful structures and processes, as we have seen above. It can function to establish and maintain group identity (Coser, 1968). It can contribute to a dynamic and vibrant culture (Dahrendorf, 1964). However, unminded conflict can also lead to disruptive behaviour, harm and even to the dissolution of a group. This article has threaded a course between the polemical views identified in the theory of conflict, finding conflict to be both dangerous *and* useful.

#### Reference note

Material drawn upon includes: unpublished documents from community archives, specifically, Chippenham Household Community Policy, and Riverside Community Information and Agreements; Newsletters and leaflets, specifically, *Chip'Naway*, 1996-2003, (Chippenham Community newsletter); Otamatea information leaflet about consensus decision making; and *Questions to quakers*, a booklet produced by The Religious Society of Friends, New Zealand Society Yearly Meeting.

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# Free Gifts With Every Purchase: Work transfer in retail food and furniture

*Paul Harris*

**Abstract**

The American sociologist Nona Glazer identified a form of unpaid labour she characterised as the "work transfer". By this she meant the unpaid labour that is carried out by consumers whilst purchasing. In the case of retail foods, shop-owners transferred tasks formerly carried out by paid female employees to women as consumers, thus enabling them to save on wage costs. This paper examines further developments in the work transfer in the retail trade, with particular reference to contemporary New Zealand. It then considers the work transfer in the retail furniture sector. It finds that in furniture, in contrast to retail food, the transfer involves shifting tasks from male dominant occupations to both female and male consumers. In both industries it can also be said that the transfer does involve gains for consumers.

## Introduction

According to a recent Time Use Survey, New Zealanders aged 12 and over spend an average of seven hours a day each on a combination of paid and unpaid work. The categories of unpaid work studied include purchasing goods and services for one's own household, which is defined to mean the time taken, including travel and waiting time, to complete the purchase(s) (Statistics New Zealand/Ministry of Women's Affairs, 2001). There is another form of unpaid labour involved in the process of consumption that is not considered in the survey. Namely, what American sociologist Nona Glazer refers to as the "work transfer": the restructuring of the "work process" so that whilst buying goods and services "buyers must do work once done by paid workers" (Glazer, 1984, p.67). This paper will build on Glazer's analysis by first focussing on contemporary forms of the work transfer in the retail supermarket sector, and will then investigate its application to the rather different

circumstances that prevail in the consumption of wooden furniture. As the paper is basically a reflection on and a contemporary application of Glazer's insights and arguments, its focus is mainly on the gender aspects of donated labour that were Glazer's major concern.

### Self-service and work transfer in the supermarkets

Glazer cites several areas of consumption in the USA in which self-service has become widespread, such as banking, petrol pumping, and the postal, telephone and health services. She writes as a "a feminist and a Marxist" (1993 p. xiii) and as such is particularly interested in the processes by which "women as consumers substitute for once waged workers; their work becomes a source of capital accumulation as their labour within the service sector is appropriated" (Glazer, 1984, p. 64). That is why the retail food sector particularly interests her, as it presents itself as an apparently clear-cut instance of work being transferred from women in their role as exploited employees to women in their role as consumers.

Other social scientists have also drawn attention to the work transfer. Gershuny and Miles, for instance, use the case of the supermarket shopper pushing a trolley as an example of how the "informal, unpaid labour" of the consumer can be an integral part of the service process (1983, p. 137). Jacques (1996) discusses how family labour constitutes a work transfer between the home and the corporate workplace. Ritzer, citing banking and petrol pumping as examples (but with no acknowledgment of Glazer's work), sees it as a manifestation of the McDonaldization of services and as a "most revolutionary development" (1998, pp. 64-65).

Glazer locates her analysis in a particular historical trajectory in the USA that starts with the model of the owner-operated "Mom and Pop stores", or the sort of small shop epitomised in the British television show *Open all hours*. In these enterprises the consumer presented a shopping list and the owner did all the work of advising on new products, selecting goods from the shelves, weighing and packaging purchases and, if required, having them delivered. Self-service was "reputedly first used in California from 1912 and, perhaps most memorably, by a

shopkeeper named Clarence Saunders in his first 'Piggly-Wiggly Store of 1916" (Usherwood, p. 114). Glazer argues that the initial reason for introducing it was "to lower labor costs by eliminating workers and making the customer do the clerks' work" (Glazer, 1984, p. 70). From that point on, self-service became increasingly important in the USA, although it was only one of a number of major changes in retail practice and shopping, such as the use of the car which facilitated less frequent shopping for necessities. Glazer cites a number of social and economic factors that contributed to this change (1984, pp. 68-69;1993, p. 60), but one factor that she is keen to emphasise is that of saving on wages. For her the significance of the change to self-service is that the work transfer to consumers "means that commercial capitalists hire fewer workers ... in place of the wage labour hired to appropriate a portion of surplus value belonging to the capitalist class, women as consumers do the necessary work." (Glazer,1984, p. 65).

As well as reducing the demand for retail labour, Glazer sees self-service as also contributing to a deskilling of the remaining labour force. She reports that in the 1940s the Congress of Industrial Organizations (a trade union centre) accused self-service not only of "slaughtering employment opportunities" but also of enabling employers to utilize "less skilled labour" (1993, p. 61). Self-service had been introduced into Britain in 1950, and it soon became popular because both retailers and consumers benefitted from the reduced labour costs and lower prices that followed (Gardner & Sheppard, 1989). Almost forty years later it had been identified as one of the factors that had "tended to minimise if not eliminate the service and specialised knowledge content of the sales assistant's job" (Robinson & Wallace, 1986, p. 129).

Pringle notes that self-service first appeared in New Zealand in the 1960s, and that from then to the mid 1970s, the opening of large-scale grocery outlets in the major urban centres meant that the pattern of expansion "was substantially similar to that occurring generally"(1996, p. 44). By 1978 women came to comprise almost 60% of the USA labour force, though only 16% of managers were women (Glazer, 1993, p. 74). In 1975 women were 60% of all New Zealand shop employees, but only 12% of wholesale and retail managers were women (Department of

Labour, 1975). By this point the large-scale retail outlets dominated the scene in terms of overall employment compared to the owner-operated and family-owned shops. But one brake on the ability of self-service supermarkets to monopolise the retail food market was the strict regulation of their opening hours. Basically, during the 1960s and 1970s, supermarkets could not open on weekends, and only for one evening a week. With support from supermarkets and the public, but despite strong opposition from the Shop Employees' Unions, in 1980 supermarkets were allowed to open on Saturdays (Hince, Taylor, Peace, & Biggs, 1990).

However, it was not to be until 1990 that they could open on Sundays and public holidays. According to Conway, it was the Shop Trading Hours Repeal Act of 1990 that enabled supermarkets to improve their market share: "This occurred because local dairies, convenience stores, fruit and vegetable markets...had been capturing trade in the evenings and on Sundays. But with the change in the law, supermarkets could compete directly with these smaller operators across the whole week" (1998, p. 47). The ability to compete was enhanced by the Employment Contracts Act of 1991 which facilitated the widespread deunionisation of retail employees and enabled employers to cut labour costs by reducing or abolishing overtime rates and penal rates for weekend work. (Conway, 1998; Pringle, 1996). Some supermarket employees, such as checkout operators, suffered significant wage losses as a result of these changes (Conway, 1999).

The combination of the liberalisation of shop trading hours and of the retail industry labour market also contributed to the deskilling of retail employees. Self-service can then be seen as one factor that has led to the replacement in retail of a relatively skilled, male dominant, workforce with a predominantly female, lower skilled and lower paid workforce. This in turn has reinforced the trend to reconstruct the retail workforce as a peripheral one in that it has allowed employers to deploy rostered part-time workers, such as school pupils, to meet peak periods of demand (Pringle, 1996). In his analyses of the changes to the retail supermarket sector, Pringle draws on Glazer's theory of the work transfer in his explanation of the growth of self-service (see Pringle,

1996, pp. 94-95). What he does not do, however, is explore the contemporary forms that it takes in supermarket shopping, nor does he locate it within the broader picture of labour market flexibility that he draws.

Some of the tasks performed by consumers are constant across all supermarkets, such as collecting, pushing and filling one's shopping basket or trolley. Others vary between supermarkets, though a rough rule of thumb seems to be that the lower the end of the market at which the supermarket is aimed, the greater the number of tasks passed on to the consumer. This could be seen as introducing a class element into the distribution of the tasks. Examples of the more variable tasks include: bagging, measuring, weighing, tying, and coding (eg. bulk bin foodstuffs); grinding coffee beans prior to bagging (lower end in the market outlets); and, packing purchased items into bags or boxes. Two points of discussion can be made about these examples. First, in Glazer's account of the work transfer in retail she cited the use of prepacked goods to eliminate the tasks of measuring and bagging (1984, p. 65). In the case of the diverse range of goods available in the bulk bin style of operation – including pulses, spices, coffees, lollies and pet foods, according to the supermarket involved - these functions have returned. But they have been transferred from the shop employee to the consumer, alongside the additional functions of weighing the produce, securing it into bags and writing the price code on whatever is provided for this.

A more recent development, and one that has only recently made its appearance in New Zealand, is that of allowing the consumer to check out their own purchases. This is via the "Shop'N Go" self-scanning technology that originated in the USA. It had its pilot trial at Pak'N Save Kapiti and has since spread to a number of other Pak'N Save outlets. In one instance, it accounts for 25% of sales volume. The major benefits claimed to derive from this system are speedier checkouts and, for the store, data on what the customers are purchasing. The system is highly reliant on customer honesty and according to O'Sullivan "the vast majority of our Shop'N Go customers are very, very honest" (personal correspondence, Sullivan, August 9, 2001).

### Trends and counter-trends in retail

By a process of reverse Taylorism, much of the work done by the owner-operators of Glazer's Mom and Pop model, and much of their decision making over - and responsibility for - the day-to-day activity of consumption has been shifted, via a deskilled and casualised paid labour force, on to the consumer. It is the consumer who is increasingly called upon to make decisions on and take responsibility for the process of purchasing, never more so than when carrying out self-scanning. It would be an exaggeration, though, to see the work transfer in retail food consumption as unidirectional, as part of some inevitable unfolding of a logic of retail capitalism. The consumer's donation of labour to the supermarket owners is part of a trend, but there are also counter-trends at work in this area of everyday life.

For example, if the consumer is doing more work in the supermarket, this is to an extent balanced by those activities of food suppliers to reduce the amount of work required in food preparation at home. A first step in this direction was through those canned, frozen, pre-cooked and dried "convenience foods" that were intended to be "labour-saving alternatives to less highly processed products"(Burnett, p. 309). The range of instant foods, designed to reduced cooking time, is ever-widening, especially in the USA, but the trend towards the consumption of fast-foods as takeaways or as home deliveries is one that abolishes the necessity of any cooking at all.

A second counter-trend comprises the location within supermarkets of non-self service speciality areas, such as delicatessen and fish-selling units. These shops within a shop are staffed by employees who do display a level of expertise about the products on sale and who, when selling fish or meat for example, do the handling, weighing and wrapping of the goods sold. Beyond the supermarket sector, trade liberalisation, a diversification of tastes, and a continuing demand for advice (Glazer, 1993, p. 65), have contributed to the proliferation of independent speciality food shops that commonly combine elements of both self- and counter-service.

A third counter-trend is that of shopping by computer, a procedure that includes a home delivery service. For example, Woolworths New

Zealand offers a computerised shopping and home delivery service to the Auckland, Christchurch, Hamilton, Kapiti Coast, New Plymouth and Wellington areas. Deliveries cost up to $15, depending on the dollar value of what has been bought (http://www.woolworths.co.nz). This form of on-line shopping might be seen as the latest stage in a "depersonalisation" of retailing that has resulted from its continuing automation (Forman & Sriram, 1991). But there is a specifically personal aspect to on-line supermarket shopping in that the goods have to be picked and packed by employees. Designated as "personal shoppers", they find that their work sometimes gives them insights into certain of their customers, such as the man whose order comprised wine, chocolate and condoms, which at times "feels like they are invading a customer's privacy." (Hart, 2002). The personal shoppers also have a degree of discretionary decision-making that runs counter to Taylorist deskilling. They make choices over substituting goods if the products specified are not available and also over whether or not to take advantage of any specials on offer. As one customer put it: "I hadn't had time to check out the specials, so they just made a decision for me" (Hart, 2002). This customer is in a managerial occupation and there is an obvious class aspect to computerised supermarket shopping, in that the customer must have access to a computer and to meet the additional costs of paying delivery fees. Yet, somewhat ironically, the computer shopping procedure is the closest contemporary approximation to Mom and Pop/ Open All Hours model in which the customer presents the shopping list and the shopkeeper does all the work. All that is missing is the opportunity for customer/shopkeeper banter, chat and gossip.

### Retail furniture

The work transfer in retail food is from the seller to the consumer. As shall be seen, the transfer in retail furniture is from *both* the manufacturer and the seller to the consumer. To gain a better understanding of what this means in practice, it is first necessary to outline some of the particular features of furniture consumption and the furniture industry, with particular emphasis on the wooden furniture segment of the industry.

The consumption of retail furniture follows a different rhythm than

that of retail food consumption, and it has its specific dynamics. Buying food is a routine occurrence, taking place on a regular basis. In contrast, buying furniture is an intermittent process. It has been noted that both divorce and marriage are good for the retail furniture industry, as they are occasions for people to invest in furniture purchases (Mintel, 2000). Food is normally bought for consumption in the short term, furniture is more of a long term, capital, investment. Further, there is an aesthetic dimension, as well as a functional dimension, to furniture consumption. As well as being able to fulfil its functional requirements, furniture must also be pleasing to the eye of its owners, both because it is liable to be with them for a long time, and also because it often forms the core element of a 'showpiece' room, such as the kitchen or lounge, into which relatives and friends will be invited.

Because of its aesthetic dimension, and because it is intended to last for a long term, matters of design and construction are central to the furniture industry. In the manufacture of wooden furniture, there is a long tradition of skilled crafts workers playing a key role in its production. Although there is no necessary gender bias in the task of selling retail furniture, its manufacture has been, and remains, a male-dominated industry in which a significant role has been played by male, skilled, workers such as carpenters, joiners, cabinet-makers and upholsterers. For example, skilled male workers predominate in the Danish (Kristensen, p. 148) and Italian furniture industries (http://www.minindustria.it/Gabinetto/Seg). Danske Mobler Marine Interiors, proudly advertises that in its Auckland factory "Expert craftsmen carry out fitting and finishing" (http://www.marinelink.co.nz/builders/dank.htm). The web-site of the New Zealand Furniture Industry Training Organisation reveals that, of the 483 people currently undertaking training in the industry, only 38 are women. The only woman to feature prominently on the site is a manager in the furniture section of a department store. (http://www.fito.co.nz/intro.htm).

The importance of craft skills in wooden furniture production (especially at the higher price/higher quality end of the market) has made it less easy to apply the methods of mass production to it, and it has been described as "a typical low-tech, labour-intensive

industry"(Maskell, Eskelinen, Hannibalsson, Malmberg, & Vatne, 1998, p. 98). As one industry source has been cited as saying "Furniture-making is very much a traditional craft, and it has been essential to retain the craft element without losing it somewhere in the machinery of mechanisation" (Edwards, 1994, p. 83). The continuing persistence of successful, often male-owned, family firms, in the global industry has also inhibited the transition to a mass-production model. Being small-scale does not mean that production cannot make use of automation and the small firms do use equipment such as Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machine tools: "Our modern factory is equipped with high tech precision CNC machinery, to ensure accuracy and efficiency" (http://www.marinelink.co.nz/builders/dank.htm). But small-scale is not conducive to Fordist-type mass production. Best points out that: "Mass production came late to the furniture industry. It is an industry in which bigness did not lead to success" (1989, p. 202).

One development that has facilitated elements of mass production in furniture manufacturing is that of knock-down and flat-pack furniture which has been made available to the public via outlets specialising in Do It Yourself (DIY) and Ready To Assemble (RTA) furniture consumption. The standardised components or modules such as table legs, table tops, cupboard doors and shelving, are amenable to being produced in batches or in long runs by flow-line methods that also utilise technological changes in processes such as coating, gluing and planing (Edwards, 1994, p. 82). It has been the rise of the flat-pack segment of the industry that has also contributed most to the work transfer to furniture consumers.

The idea of knock-down furniture was a nineteenth century one. Its advantage to the manufacturer was that it made dispatch easier and cheaper. The retailer normally assembled the furniture prior to sale. It was only after World War Two that selling flat-pack furniture directly to the customer became popular, coinciding as it did with a rising interest in do-it-yourself activities. Flat-pack furniture catered for customers who, for a saving in the cost of the goods on sale, were willing to transport and assemble their own pieces of furniture. (Christopherson, 1996, p. 168; Edwards, 1994, p. 83). Since the inception of this method of selling,

the demand for RTA furniture has been such to encourage the growth of firms specialising in it at the global, regional or national level. The biggest and best known international RTA firm is IKEA, which originated in 1953 in Sweden and which now has 143 stores in 22 countries. The firm's turnover for 2001 was US$9.6 billion and it employs 65 000 "co-workers" across the globe (Best, 1989; Edwards, 1994; http://www.ikea.com). It "produces classless furnishings which are supposed to appeal to all customer profiles. The selection of furnishings is enormous, ranging from the basic essentials to reasonable copies of fashionable ideas" (Edwards, 1994, pp. 165-166). The firm's own description of what it does is "to contribute to creating a better everyday life for as many people as possible by making beautiful, functional items for their homes at the lowest possible price" (http://www.ikea.com).

Although this section is mainly concerned with the transfer of labour in final assembly, IKEA's method of operating has also involved another form of replacing paid labour by consumer endeavour. Best describes this transfer as follows: "IKEA pioneered the combination showroom/warehouse concept which relies upon substituting consumer participation for dealer expertise in the sales process. In effect, they eliminated the salesperson..." (1989, p. 202). The British firm MFI (originally Mullard Furniture Industries), is a national leader in RTA furniture. Beginning as a mail-order outlet selling flat-pack furniture, by the late 1980s, it had grown to be an store operation making a billion-dollars worth of sales a year (http://www.mfigroup.co.uk; Edwards, 1994, p. 164). It followed "IKEA's showroom/warehouse strategy" and offered customers "low price and immediate delivery" of its furniture, and its focus was on meeting the needs of "low-income families" (Best, 1989, pp. 203-204). In 2001, when MFI's sales were worth over $3 billion a year, it formed an alliance with leading US retail furniture firm Ethan Allan in order to move into the high quality "premium furniture market" (http://www.mfi.co.uk).

A regional success-story is that of Freedom, an Australian owned furniture and homeware firm that started as a single-store operation and now has 62 stores in Australia and New Zealand, as well as outlets in eight Levene's stores. In comparison to MFI, Freedom did not aim its

self-assembly furniture at a low-income clientele. On the contrary, it describes itself as "Australia's leading lifestyle retailer", stresses that its merchandising strategy combines "price, quality and range" and that it has successfully captured "the leading position in our target market segment" which comprises "people 25-39" (http://www.freedom. au). For its customers, young and old, it offers the assurance that "Freedom products are generally easy to assemble and require no special tools" (Freedom, 2001, Annual Report).

As well as firms like the above, there are many more types of outlet providing RTA furniture. These include the DIY firms that have "entered the full furniture market at the lower levels, at the once lower-strata trade up to another level of business" (Edwards, 1994, p. 186). With IKEA, MFI, Freedom and the DIY outlets, the consumers have foreknowledge that they are buying furniture that is to be assembled at home. This distinguishes their case from that of the women on whom Glazer focusses, for whom the work transfer involved performing "involuntary unpaid labour" (1984, p. 81). But the work transfer *can* involve involuntary labour when the consumers concerned are not aware that they are purchasing RTA goods. Certain department stores, for example, do not make it clear that the products on display are not delivered to the customer in their assembled form. In other instances, it is possible to order office furniture from a company catalogue that illustrates the assembled product only to find that what is delivered comprises several flat-packed pieces of wood, a large number of screws and brackets, and assembly instructions badly translated from a foreign language.

As well as saving on the labour of transporting and assembling goods, RTA firms can also reduce the costs of having sales staff. Referring to IKEA, for example, Best points out that "IKEA pioneered the combination showroom/warehouse concept which relies upon substituting consumer participation for dealer expertise in the sales process. In effect, they eliminated the salesperson..." (1989, p. 202). In the food industry, the transfer of work was from a predominantly female labour force but, as Table One illustrates, a different picture is presented when we look at the transfer of assembly, delivery and sales functions in furniture retail.

***Table 1. Work transfers in retail furniture***

| Function | Likely Gender of Employee |
|---|---|
| *Sale of the product (The IKEA model)* | Female or Male |
| *Delivery* | Male |
| *Final assembly* | Male |

The question of the gender of the consumer to whom the work is transferred is also more problematical than in the case of retail food except, that is, for single individuals and for same sex couples. British research indicates that when buying furniture "Consumers tend to go shopping with their families, or as couples. Couples with children often take the children shopping with them for furniture, sometimes to help choose but sometimes because there is no alternative" (Mintel, 2000). This would lead to the conclusion that, at least in the IKEA model, it is both men and women who have become the "choosing" consumer who has made the salesperson redundant.

It might also be surmised that both partners would participate in taking the furniture purchased to and from their car or van, but that the male would often be the driver. The stereotypical "Dad", as the usual driver of the family car, thus replaces the male driver (and male assistant) in the furniture delivery truck. DIY is a male tradition in New Zealand and elsewhere, and for this reason it could be expected that the male partner would do the final assembly tasks that were formerly carried out in the workplace. This is by no means necessarily the case though. For large items, such as beds or couches, both partners might be needed. Or, in those cases of more complex assembly jobs, in which the man lacks the patience or the wit to follow the detailed instructions, the female partner alone might have sole charge of the operation. Looking at the transfer process overall, it seems reasonable to say that it is to both genders, with men having a more important part to play than in the example of retail food.

### Exception and counter-trends

One advantage of flat-pack furniture to both manufacturers and retailers is that is makes storage and transportation much easier, and thus contributes to the rationalisation of warehousing and to the adoption of "Just In Time" delivery methods. Making use of these factors, in 1994 MFI abandoned its self-delivery system and replaced it with "a nation-wide distribution system offering customers free home delivery to any address on the UK mainland". This system is based on "a network of 14 specially designed and built Home Delivery Centres" (http://www.mfigroup.co.uk).

For their part, both IKEA and Freedom will carry out home deliveries, for a charge. Both also offer assistance with furniture assembly. Freedom states that if assistance is needed in assembly "We can arrange for someone to put any large item of furniture together for you" (http://www.freedom.com.au). IKEA informs its customers that "Most IKEA stores can refer you to a reputable, reasonably priced assembly company that can come to your home to assemble and install our products" (http://www.ikea.com). Of course, if the customer has to pay for delivery and assembly, then the cost advantage of buying flat pack could be eroded or even disappear completely.

There are also numerous retail furniture outlets, including department stores, from which it is possible to buy, and have delivered, assembled items. Despite their successes, the RTA and DIY outlets have not captured all the market. In 1999 in the UK, for example, the large furniture multiple stores such as IKEA and MFI had collectively gained 34% of the bedroom furniture market, and at the same time, IKEA, MFI and the DYI multiples had 31% of the overall UK furniture market (Mintel, 2000).

The more the consumer is prepared to pay, then the more she or he moves into the realm of high-price, high quality, furniture items that can be individualised, customised, or even one-off items. For example, Poggenpohl, which started as a German firm but which is now Swedish-owned, made its reputation by offering a "customised fitted kitchen according to the specifications of the customer" and now is proud to refer to itself as providing "perfect design solutions to those people

with specialised requirements in kitchen architecture" (Best, 1989, p. 204; http://www.poggenpohl-usa.com). The higher up the price ladder one goes, the more furniture is associated with architecture and art. At this point in the market, the emphasis is on hand-made furniture made by artisans and using materials such as mahogany. This is furniture for the rich. Although prices are not normally to be found on the web-sites of the firms concerned, the US firm Phyllis Morris, of Hollywood Boulevard, is currently advertising some 'specials'. For "only US$1,650" - reduced from its normal price of US$ 2,890 - one can buy a single bar chair (http://www.phyllismorris.com). At this point, we have left the mass market of RTA and DIY products far behind.

### Discussion

The work transfer continues to find new forms of expression in different industries. Fro example, we can now carry out our personal banking by telephone and home computer. In these instances, an ironic twist is that the consumer now pays the banks a fee for the privilege of carrying out work previously done by (predominantly female) bank tellers. But in the retail food and furniture industries it might have reached a certain limit, in that it is hard to imagine what other tasks in either area could be loaded onto the consumer. Being able to check-out one's own goods or to assemble one's own furniture seem to be as far as it is possible to go in that direction.

Comparing furniture and retail, it is difficult to discern a single, dominant logic driving the trend. Glazer (1984, 1993) cites ample material from American literature to establish that, at least for American retailers, cutting labour costs was a strong motivation behind self-service. In retail supermarkets at least, the work transfer can be seen as a form of labour market flexibility based on using the consumer as an external and unpaid labour force.

The fad for DIY seems to have been a consumer-led factor in promoting the post-World War Two move to self-assembly furniture. RTA has allowed retailers to make labour savings, for example in salespersons and in deliverers. Increased volume of sales to a growing mass market, and hence increased profits, are more easily identified as

motivators than any crude desire to cut employment levels and costs and to shift workload onto consumers.

What Glazer's analysis underestimates, or even ignores, are the (non-price) gains to consumers made in both industries. From being a passive recipient of the skills and expertise of the retailer, the consumer becomes a more active participant in the process of consumption. She or he exercises more control, more choice, more responsibility, albeit within parameters defined by the structure and mode of operation of the industry and firms concerned. This is not a matter of consumer sovereignty, as the New Right ideologists would have us believe, but of a degree of consumer empowerment. The advent of self scanning also speeds up the time taken to do one's shopping and take away one's purchases, a major factor in today's "instant" society.

Miller (1987, 1997) has emphasised the importance of shopping and of consumption, in terms both of their linkages to the wider world of political economy and as processes by which we work upon objects to impose our own meaning on them. Within this framework, those consumers using stores that make use of donated labour could be seen as pursuing a positive strategy by exercising their shopping skills to minimise their expenditure. The purchase of flat-pack furniture can be seen as an instance of Miller's concept of "consumption as work" (1997, p. 190), in this case enabling the purchaser to practice craft skill within the context of the aesthetic construction of the domestic sphere.

## Conclusion

This article has attempted to demonstrate that the work transfer from sellers to consumers constitutes, as Glazer made clear, a form of unpaid labour performed by consumers to the benefit of sellers. Glazer focussed on the process of buying, but the retail furniture industry is one example of how the work transfer can also apply from selling to delivery to final assembly.

Despite Glazer's seminal work in this field, the unpaid labour of consumers that comprises a donation to the costs and profits of retailers remains unrecognised in the analyses both of labour market flexibility and of household time use. It is to be hoped that this lapse can be

rectified in the future, and this article is intended as a small contribution to that objective.

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# Reviews

***Introduction to sociology***
**Adorno, T. W. (2000). Cambridge: Polity.**

***Reviewed by Brennon Wood***

If we believe what we read, at least Karl Marx had the good fortune to live on for a century after his body was put in the ground. Poor Theodor Adorno died the other way round. By the late 1960s, he was locked in learned battle with both old reactions and new revolts, unable to satisfy either. Such contrariness proved fatal. First came death in a Frankfurt lecture hall, as the March 1969 *Der Spiegel* reported.

> After the distribution of a leaflet 'ADORNO ALS INSTITUTION IST TOT', three young revolutionary females ... circled around Professor Adorno, at first waving their bouquets of flowers, then kissing him, exposing their breasts, and confronting him with an erotic pantomime. Professor Adorno ... tried to protect himself with his briefcase, and then left the lecture hall. He has since announced that his lectures and seminars on 'Dialectics' would be indefinitely postponed. (quoted in Paddison, 1993, p. 289)

With the failure of his briefcase, Adorno decamped to Switzerland; two months later his body was dead as well. Alas, then, for "he who dies in despair has lived his whole life in vain" (Adorno, 1978, p. 167). Perhaps, though, the erotic pantomime and an indefinitely postponed dialectics remain with us. Perhaps this life is not yet over.

Back up a little, not far. 1968 (of course), 23 April to 11 July, Professor Adorno is delivering his *Introduction to sociology*. The lecture hall is packed, it's hot, there's trouble with the air conditioning and the microphone. Lectures Eight and Nine are delayed (May, you know) and as always it's hard to concentrate. Extempore Adorno, his last lecture series, recorded on tape, archived away, and now transcribed and published. Should we keep listening? The Professor, it seems, is too busy to think about aesthetics and is preoccupied instead with "the positivist dispute in German sociology" (p. 159). But we already know all about that dispute,

don't we? We know, for example, who lost. From our "post-positivist" vantage point, isn't Adorno redundant? Not only is the dragon safely slain, but aren't Adorno's weapons equally obsolete? While political philosophers may still find something useful in his aesthetics (Morris, 2001), surely for sociologists this *Introduction*'s antique, totalising Hegel-Marx is irksome and beside the point?

But then perhaps "the splinter in your eye is the best magnifying glass" (Adorno, 1978, p. 50).

Adorno forthrightly defends "the central concept of sociology, the concept of society" (p. 28). "As you may know" he remarks, "a number of sociologists consider that this term is no longer usable". It's a scandal, this talk about totality. But have we really heard all there is to say on the matter? Indeed, can we? According to Adorno, the social totality does not take shape "on the basis of solidarity or from the standpoint of a comprehensive social subject"; rather, it "binds people together only by virtue of their alienation from each other" (p. 43). As such unity is "constituted through the mechanism of separation and abstraction", "it is the exact opposite of all organicist or holistic conceptions". Society is conditioned "by the fact that we are essentially divided from each other through the abstract relationship of exchange". The fact of this abstraction - "the objectification of a concept within the structure of society itself" – "you must understand", Adorno insists, "why I attach so much importance to this" (p. 123).

Perhaps the fact of abstraction still needs to be rescued from the abstraction of fact. Holding fast to "what is given", the positivist must surely find the Professor's concept to be little more than either "ancient metaphysics" or "disguised theology" (p. 45). But then, Adorno replies, the oft-heard charge of obsoleteness, of being "pre-", may be more a sign of chronic repression than the mark of something new. Indeed, the "unfinished business, which survives in the "out-of-date", may be precisely what is most important" (p. 96). Positivists, on the other hand, concern themselves only with business that can be profitably concluded. Animated by a fervour for "practicism", they denigrate everything that fails to "prove of immediate worth in the life-process of society" (p. 55). Learning about society, culture, is reduced to "the production of

performers of useful work" (p. 58). Forget sociology, what we need is "administrative research".

Of course, such positivism has its rationales. Adorno draws our attention to how "the role of the subjective factor is changing in the overall social process" (p. 152). Society now "survives not simply by applying compulsion to the subjects, but through the subjects themselves". Adorno argues, however, that we cannot go all the way "through" these subjects. The social cannot be administratively detached from the interactions that constitute its totality. The subjective inevitably exceeds the compliant objectifications of those seeking to govern its affairs. And luckily so, for, as Adorno emphatically asserts, "the subject is also the potential, the only potential, by which this society can change". Within the subject "is stored up not only all the negativity of the system but also that which points beyond the system as it now is".

"It might be said", Adorno concludes in passing, "that what I am attempting to set out here is something like the basic principles of a rebellion of experience against empiricism" (p. 51). For those regrouping at the Foucauldian impasse, this call to arms may seem timely. These lectures are certainly as good a place as any to resume such considerations. Adorno's caustic remarks on the vocational "reform" of universities, his cautions against both "pure" sociology and the "mania" for interdisciplinarity, these also remain food for thought. Unsurprisingly, however, it is a difficult text. As a former student recalls, Adorno was never able to "escape the strain of his own thinking"; "it was impossible for him, in an altogether painful way, to be commonplace" (Habermas, 1992, p. 220). Often (and rightly) dismissed as an insufferable elitist, Adorno's lectures nevertheless also convey precisely this painful and sincere attempt to find a common touch. The attempt no doubt fails. "That you are beginners in sociology", he confesses, is "the fiction I have to maintain" (p. 53). Despite the title, no-one could recommend this collection as an introduction to the discipline. It might yet, however, find a hearing among those grown jaded with the subtle comforts of Grand Hotel Abyss.

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## *Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman*
## Bauman, Z., & Tester, K. (2001).Cambridge: Polity Press

*Reviewed by Lincoln Dahlberg*

Against the increasing instrumentalism of academic life, Zygmunt Bauman offers an exhilarating recall to the critical sociological imagination. His writing illuminates a path beyond cynical capitulation to corporatized research. Rather than withdrawing from critique, Bauman undertakes a rethink of critical theory that strengthens it, inspiring those who feel called to social criticism as vocation.

Bauman came to fame in the English speaking world with a series of important works that strongly resonated with the times, and that became central to debates on postmodernity and postmodern sociology (e.g., *Legislators and interpreters* (1987), *Modernity and the holocaust* (1989), *Modernity and ambivalence* (1991), *Intimations of postmodernity* (1992), and *Postmodern ethics* (1993)). Bauman has since turned with some urgency, and much lucidity and passion, to critical reflections upon the most significant issues of today: community, work, consumerism, poverty, individualism, globalization, and ethics. This recent writing reflects many themes and arguments that were central to his earlier work. Bauman has consistently been concerned with the relationship between individual freedom and social order. He has extensively explored forms of social control, from the domination of totalitarian regimes and ideologies (of communism and soviet Russia, fascism and Nazi Germany) to the false freedom of consumer capitalism and false hopes of communitarianism and ethnic tribalism. His main theme in recent writings has been that global consumer capitalism has led to liquid modern times of radical individualization and insecurity. With dissolving social institutions, individuals are increasingly encouraged to seek biographical solutions to systemic contradictions. Privileged citizens of wealthy nations are advised to face uncertainty with flexibility and mobility in their education, employment, relationships, location, investments, and so on. Such options are not available to the majority of the world's population who are fated with the absolute certainty of

immobility from poverty, and thus the absolute uncertainty about how their lives will be sustained. While the situation seems bleak, Bauman continues to believe in the possibility for human freedom and justice, and is passionate about the role of the social critic in showing that things can be otherwise.

Bauman is as prolific as he is insightful, which poses the question for those new to his work, or wanting to catch up on his recent writings, of where to begin. One could start with one of Bauman's recent general interpretations of contemporary society, such as *Liquid modernity* or *Society under siege*. These are significant contributions to social critique and the democratic project, but they do not give an overview of the development of Bauman's thinking. For such an overview, one could turn to Peter Beilharz's (2000) or Denis Smith's (1999) work, or to Beilharz's *Bauman reader* (2001). A more personal reflection on the major themes of Bauman's oeuvre, one that illuminates the commitments underpinning his analyses, is *Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman* (2001).

Following the introduction, this collection comprises a series of five interviews conducted by Keith Tester during 2000. The introduction by Tester offers a brief but fascinating probe into Bauman's life and work. He does not attempt to summarize Bauman, but simply provides some tentative answers to three questions: Who is Zygmunt Bauman? What does he do? Why does he do it? The chapters that follow are given titles that establish the theme of each conversation: context and sociological horizons; ethics and human values; the ambivalence of modernity; individualization and consumer society; and politics. Together these chapters cover much of Bauman's main concerns, and provide fascinating insights into the development of his past work and present thinking. The conversations add an important dimension to Bauman's work, revealing the biographical influences and the complex, reflexive mind behind his lucid, impassioned, and insightful writings.

I would be inclined to call the chapters interviews rather than conversations, given that the content is dominated by Bauman's observations and ethical concerns. However, praise should be given to Tester for his skill in crafting questions that draw out the major aspects of Bauman's thought and for organizing a book that is always challenging.

Tester's questioning illuminates not only a great thinker but also the moral substance of the man. Bauman's sociology is driven by a concern for the Other. He promotes a strong normative vision for sociology. Where Tester admits to never believing that sociology could make the world a better place, Bauman continues to insist that it can. Although famously rejecting a legislator role for the intellectual, Bauman calls for sociologists to critically interpret the world, to continue a critical and generalizing sociology that leads towards greater understanding of the conditions of unfreedom and injustice. Sociology must show there are alternatives to the present and expose paths towards greater human autonomy. Bauman's own interpretations are exemplary of this critical theorizing. This is why Bauman claims to never have associated with a "postmodern sociology", contrary to what others have claimed (pp. 96-97). While rejecting foundations for critique or the idea that social reflection could enter social reality, he continues to maintain that social reflection – through interpretative dialogue – can change self-understanding and thus the world (p. 157). Moreover, he continues to provide sweeping interpretations of society in order to stimulate public debate, debate that he sees as critical to advancing democracy.

Tester draws out Bauman's acute sociological observations and interpretations of current social conditions, leaving the reader intellectually stimulated and morally affected. For those who wish to get away from sociology as re-drafted, cut-n-paste publishing, and pursue sociology as a critical vocation, reading Bauman is a must. For those wanting to be (re-)enthused about sociology, this book will do the job. More pragmatically, for those wishing to catch up on, deepen, or start out on understanding Bauman, these interviews offer the ideal starting point. Finally, this arresting book would stand alongside the work of C Wright Mills and Peter Berger as an appropriate gift of sociology, for friend or foe.

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***Hop on pop: The pleasures and politics of popular culture***
**Jenkins, H., McPherson, T., & Shuttac, J. (Eds.) (2002). Durham/London: Duke University Press.**

*Reviewed by Steve Matthewman*

Q: What do you get if you cross the sociology of everyday life with the sociology of popular culture?

A: Cultural Studies.

It's not meant to be a joke but sometimes it feels like it. Cultural Studies moved long ago from the margins to the mainstream, from "part of an intellectual guerrilla movement waging a war on the borders of official academia" to something that is "now decidedly *passé*" (McGuigan, 1997, p. 1). By 1988 Meaghan Morris was calling it banal. Clearly the insurrectionary phase had passed. To critics, Cultural Studies had sold out. It had become part of the academic establishment. In the process scholars capitulated wholesale to consumer capitalism. (Extreme cynics might suggest that Cultural Studies was invented by Marxists that didn't believe in culture and perpetuated by culture vultures that don't believe in Marxism.) Uncritical celebration of the impacts of commodity culture prevailed (Morris, 1988). Political economy dropped out of the picture altogether. Jim McGuigan (1992) and Lawrence Grossberg (1997) even talked of a "crisis." The overwhelming obsession with signage came at the expense of structural considerations and policy formulations (Bennett 1992, 1998).

By drawing attention to its shortfalls it could well be that Cultural Studies is now in recovery. Paul Willis (2000) has even asserted that it has achieved a "kind of maturity", though it remains a contested intellectual field. Let us hope that its relevance returns, for I would argue that Cultural Studies provides important lenses through which our society might sensibly be viewed. As the nation space contracts, local subcultures negotiate global forces. Ours is a society of diverse ethnic, youth, and interest groups; marked by a rapid uptake of new

international media; dominated by a sector that is declining as the numerical ethnic majority; increasingly plugged into global networks of finance, production and cultural consumption. What better intellectual enterprise is there to come to grips with this?

If a single message can be extracted from the preceding scholars it is this: we must keep track of the connections between culture and power in the pursuit of social change (Hall, 1992) if Cultural Studies is to be anything more than "just another listing in the college catalogue under the letter 'C'" (quoted in Hall, 1992, p. 294). With a renewed sense of optimism, an eye to smoothing over the schisms of yesteryear, and a determination to be more than just a C-word, Henry Jenkins, Tara McPherson and Jane Shattuc (2002, p. 4) recently announced a manifesto for a New Cultural Studies: "If change in the academy has often been likened to an oedipal conflict in which the sons and daughters kill their parents in order to make room for their own accomplishments, we are hoping for something closer to a family reunion." This emergent and conciliatory approach is predicated on: immediacy, multivalence, accessibility, particularity, contextualism, and situationalism (pages 3-26). This translates into a commitment to active participation, to the recognition that the popular contains elements of oppression as well as liberation, to the use of language found beyond the academy, to being ever mindful of detail, to treating cultural elements as strands in a broader complex fabric, to anchoring analyses to persons, times, and places. Underpinning all of this is the realisation that modern times are marked by change: of things, relations, meanings.

This is a big book (732 pages), and by all accounts a long time coming ("This book reflects a decade of conversations"). Given the title, the casual reader could be forgiven for thinking that it offers a manifesto for paedophiles rather than Cultural Studies. The editors are aware of the problem, noting "Some have felt that [it] was too infantilizing; others that it represented too crude a reference to oedipal struggle, incest, or opportunism, depending on what meanings get ascribed to "hop" and "pop"" (p. 5). At any rate, the title was suggested by the four year old nephew of one of the editors. Believe it or not, it could have been worse. *The BIG Duke book of fun* was a serious alternative (p. 5). The book, which

is often fun, is divided into eight parts: an introduction followed by 36 contributions collected into sections on Self, Maker, Performance, Taste, Change, Home and Emotion. The choice of words is significant. Self is used in preference to subjectivity which smacks of individuals reduced to mere bearers of ideology. The use of maker denotes activity rather than authority. Performance signals the shift away from narrative structures, pointing to the increasing significance of body and affect in cultural theory. Taste is given due consideration not least of all because in commercial culture good taste functions as a "tool of social control" (p. 30). Change is used here to articulate the dialectical linking of history and theory, concrete and abstract, micro and macro in Cultural Studies in ways that avoid grand narratives or blind allegiance to Progress. Home, "one of the most emotionally charged and ideologically loaded terms in common use" (p. 537), features instead of the more neutral alternatives of site, space or origin. Thus an academic blindspot is opened up as writers peer into the private sphere. Finally, "writers look at emotion within its context to spin out all its intellectual complexity, political persuasiveness, and physicality" (p. 649).

The collection starts with its manifesto then moves on to "Defining popular culture". This is an excellent run through Romanticism, industrialisation, Marxism, the Frankfurters, American takes on pop culture, British Cultural Studies (Cambridge, Leeds, Birmingham), and its globalisation in the 1990s. Teachers and students alike should be grateful for it. There follows chapters on expected staples like shopping, sport, video games, and pop music. There are also some surprises: the Holocaust (Louis Kaplan), cabaret (Nicholas Evans), and burlesque (Anna McCarthy). *Hop on pop* takes us from consumer culture in the nineteenth century (Elana Crane) right up to today's killer application software technology (Greg Smith), making many interesting turns along the way. The prize for best title is a toss-up between John Bloom for "Cardboard patriarchy: Adult baseball card collecting and the nostalgia for a presexual past", and Peter Chvany for ""Do we look like Ferengi capitalists to you?" *Star Trek's* Klingons as emergent virtual American ethnics."

As with any collection, contributions are uneven. The best truly

illuminate, but many do not move beyond self-indulgence. Some should have stayed as field notes. This returns the spotlight to the editors. Given the massive scale of the collection a tighter editorial reign would have undoubtedly helped. Clearly at times it was too loose. This is evidenced by later copies of *Hop on pop* which contain a correction. This concerns the editors' characterisation of New Zealand-based contributor Nabeel Zuberi as a working class gay New Britain. In fact he describes himself as "middle-class Pakistani-English." As the correction notes, "nowhere in the chapter does Zuberi state that he is (or has been) working class or gay." At best this means that works were sometimes subjected to superficial reading, at worst it is a depressing commentary on the role of identity in pop theory. (The word "profiling" comes to mind.) But just as *Hop on pop* begins on a strong note, so it ends on one. Charles Weigl's "Introducing horror" is a fascinating fan's take on the horror flick, interwoven with the real life terror of minding a senile family member. Firing salvoes in all directions (film snobs, the mental health sector) some fall on academic targets. His observations on writing the popular are a timely reminder that there is a little Adorno in all of us (p. 711):

> It seems quite obvious to me: respect is something that most academic critics of popular culture seem to lack. The spectrum of their discourtesy runs from the lifeless titillation of "*slumming*" to the blind violence of denial and denunciation. Even the least offensive theoretical work stands above mass-produced culture, supposedly reading texts and films more subtly, more profoundly than the people who read and watch for "pleasure." The language of criticism ... presumes to expose rather than share, to define rather than listen ....

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## *Borderland practices: Regulating alternative therapies in New Zealand*
## Dew, K. (2003). Dunedin: University of Otago Press.

*Reviewed by Robin Gauld*

This is an important and thoroughly fascinating book that traces the regulation (or control) of different health care practitioners and therapies in New Zealand. For sociologists, the book is of inherent interest as it explores how health care practitioners and their representative bodies represent themselves in an ever-changing regulatory, social and health care delivery environment, where ideas about what is an effective or legitimate treatment and service are in constant transition. The book is also of interest to a readership well beyond sociology – health professionals and policymakers will find it interesting and useful reading, as will political scientists, historians and the like. Any reader, regardless of background or interest, will find the array of examples of medical and healing practice used over the years fascinating.

An important theme of the book is that therapies, practitioners (and where relevant, professional groups) and regulations are not static. The book shows that they are heavily influenced by societal and practitioner views and trends, and arguments about what a legitimate practice is (for instance, whether fulfilling the disciplines that "science" requires should be the key to this). Regulations, for their part, are similarly fluid and prone to shift in accordance with key events (such as misadventure), the rise of new therapies and ideas about how practitioners should be controlled. Practitioner groups and views about therapies are often in conflict with one another adding further to how regulations and professional groups are shaped.

The book considers the subject matter using cases and examples from a number of perspectives. For example, chapter 3 reviews the arguments and positioning of the medical and chiropractic professions before the 1978 Commission of Inquiry into Chiropractic, as each sought to prove its legitimacy and disprove the stance of the other. Chapter 4 looks at "deviant insiders", medical practitioners who use alternative

therapies such as acupuncture, and how this has been dealt with by the medical profession. Chapter 5 considers the complexities of controlling medical error and health care quality, feeding into which routinely are multiple factors and actors at different levels of the health care system. Chapter 6 studies how the medical profession regulates itself. It reviews a number of cases of medical negligence and error where the involved practitioners were levied small fines by the profession. These are contrasted with the case of Mat Tizard, a "heretic" doctor stuck off for using alternative diagnostic and treatment techniques yet not necessarily found to have made technical errors. Chapter 7 overviews New Zealand approaches to health service prioritisation and regulation. Prioritisation is shown to be a process that has demanded systematic review and, thus, establishment of objectifiable standards so that services can be compared with one another. In terms of regulation for health care quality the approach has been one of establishing standards, as opposed to environments that facilitate continual improvement. Chapter 8 reports on a series of interviews conducted by the author with medically qualified practitioners who incorporate alternative techniques into their work. The chapter presents their views on issues such as how they justify their practices, and whether, as practitioners of therapies not recognised by the medical establishment, they believe they have a right to belong to the medical profession. Chapter 9 provides a theoretical framework for understanding and categorising the different groups and issues discussed in the preceding chapters. The "scientific integrity" model, the author argues, helps explain the received view of medical science, its professional representatives and "objectifiable science" expectations. The "professional integrity" model accounts for practitioners of therapies for which there may not be scientific evidence but a recognised set of norms for practice. The "individual integrity" model is aimed at those whose standards rely on basic training and individual practitioner integrity.

In places, the book feels as though it jumps from subject to subject. This can be viewed in two ways: that there could have been more explanation for how the various chapters and their contents fit together, or that each chapter is a very useful study in its own right of relevance

to specific readers. Those looking for in-depth discussion of issues such as prioritisation and quality standards would find more detailed analysis elsewhere. One might ask how relevant these issues are to therapeutic regulation: what they do illustrate is the complexity of understanding and governing (eg regulating) complex systems. But such comments should not detract from what is a very important book germane to much work presently going on in the health sector. As noted periodically through the book, there is currently a review of the health professional regulatory framework making its way through parliament; and a government-sponsored review of complementary and alternative therapies in process. The ever-dynamic New Zealand health sector means that the challenges to what is a legitimate therapy or practice will continue to confront health care funders, planners and practitioners.

***Sociology of health in New Zealand***
**Dew, K., & Kirkman, A. (2002). Melbourne: Oxford University Press.**

***Healthy concerns: Sociology for New Zealand nursing and midwifery students***
**Ryan, A., Carryer, J., & Patterson, L. (2003). Auckland: Pearson Prentice Hall.**

*Reviewed by Lynne Giddings*

Over the past decade some excellent health focussed sociological texts have been published in Aotearoa New Zealand (e.g., Davis & Dew, 1999). Although the "sociological gaze" has critiqued health, illness and the medical arena for decades, the influences of the unique context of Aotearoa New Zealand are now more fully acknowledged. The two texts reviewed here continue in this genre. These are more socially, culturally, and contextually appropriate texts and will be welcomed by students and professionals within the health disciplines and social sciences. What facilitates their usefulness is their reference to historical and contemporary examples from within Aotearoa New Zealand which assist in making sociological concepts and processes relevant and understandable to the reader. Pleasing too is the visibility of health professionals as research collaborators in the sociological critique rather than, as so often happened in the past, mere actors within the field. Authors Allison Kirkman and Jenny Carryer, for example, refer to their nursing backgrounds and include examples from personal experience. Although distinctively different in focus and style, both texts are written for the sociological novice; use a readable style; and provide useful guidelines for self-learning and group tutorials, as well as up to date references.

Dew and Kirkman, as one may assume from the book's title, take a broad approach to the sociology of health and use contemporary sociological themes as frameworks for their discussion. Use of headings such as *inequalities in health, mental health and social control, health and the media* and *technology and health,* identify the immediate focus and intent

of each chapter. Such accessibility would delight the student searching for information on specific social and health issues. The content too would appeal to a wide range of social science and health students. Sociological concepts and theories (both traditional and contemporary) are skilfully interwoven within each chapter. I found my interest captured by the well-chosen examples given to highlight particular sociological concepts or theories. The authors chose these well. "My goodness!" I found myself exclaiming as I read the historical and sociological analysis of legislative and political events known to me – the Homosexual Law Reform Bill 1985-86, the Cartwright Inquiry 1988, Ruth Richardson's "Mother of all Budgets" of 1991, and the Mental Health Act of 1992, to name a few. There was so much I had forgotten and some new information that usefully contextualised these events. These examples serve as salutary reminders of the importance of such critique. Some sections of the text could have been more carefully edited. I was startled, for example, to read on page 53 in the chapter on *stigma and health* that had carefully critiqued the issue of *labelling*, "The final group of deviant mothers to be discussed in this chapter is lesbian mothers." Although this may be just a matter of missing single quotation marks around deviant, such an editing error may inadvertently reinforce naïve readers' prejudices concerning lesbianism and the lives of lesbian identified women. The glossary was a welcome resource for a sociological novice and the index useful, although some sought for events and words were not listed, e.g. Homosexual Law Reform Bill, racism, sexism, gay, gay rights, physiotherapy, osteopathy and the various other allied health professions.

Although Ryan, Carryer and Patterson specify their audience (nurses and midwives), their text could be used by students of other social science or health disciplines. Their title "healthy concerns" is a wonderful play on words. Their writing style and layout is engaging and accessible to novice readers. It does not have that heavy textbook feel. Evident from the beginning is the authors critical/poststructural positioning – the first chapter, for example, is headed "defamiliarising the familiar". Liberally spread throughout the text are examples of feminist critique, Foucauldian discourse analysis, and research that deconstructs

dominant discourses. Their comfort with poststructural language, however, does mean that at times they assume the reader is equally au fait. For example, "agency" is often referred to (e.g., on pages 15 and 37) but nowhere is it defined.

The authors chose well the framework and content of each chapter. Teachers and students will appreciate the inclusion of "chapter aims" and "study questions". An initial overview of the sociological approach appropriately and interestingly set the scene for a novice sociology/ health practitioner. A critique of the dominant nursing discourse (the biomedical model) in chapters two and three, is carefully done - without blaming. The relevance of such topics as *health inequalities, illness experience, healthcare and social policy* and *public health,* is immediately made clear in each chapter's introduction. One wants to read more. The deconstruction of issues such as obesity, illness, the sick role and medical technology is particularly interesting as taken-for-granted assumptions underpinning healthcare practice are challenged. The historical overview and sociological critique of "professionalism" in chapters eight and nine was well crafted and provided useful and interesting information for health workers and specifically those in mainstream nursing and in the developing profession of midwifery. Surprisingly, nowhere is there mention of psychiatric/mental health nursing. Missing too is a critique of the hegemonic processes occurring within nursing such as racism, heterosexism, and horizontal violence to name a few. There was also no mention of "cultural safety", a movement which has challenged the core of "what is nursing" within Aotearoa New Zealand from the late 1980s. These gaps in a text that so carefully deconstructed knowledge, power and stigma within health and healthcare is surprising. Shouldn't any nursing course that introduces students to a sociological perspective on health, illness and healthcare practices also turn the "sociological gaze" inwards?

To conclude, both texts offer readers from varying backgrounds a good overview of "What is sociology" demonstrating how a sociological lens can be used to critique the broad arena of healthcare within Aotearoa New Zealand. Both scrutinise the institutions, policies and practices, and the professional and non-professional groups involved.

Such critique will be particularly helpful to the "becoming" health professional who has to quickly learn how to safely manoeuvre through and survive the effects of competing and often contradictory discourses.

## Reference

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The author's name(s), departmental or institutional affiliations, snail-mail and e-mail addresses, and a short biography of each author should appear on the first page of the paper. A short (100 word) abstract of the paper should be included.

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(Smith, 1995, p. 47) that..."; It has been argued by Smith (1995, p. 47) that..."

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**Article in a journal:** Lichtenstein, B. (1996). Aids discourse in parliamentary debates about homosexual law reform and the 1993 Human Rights Amendment. *New Zealand Sociology, 11* (2), 275-316.
**Unpublished paper:** Ryan, W. (2001, June). *Globalisation and governance.* Paper presented at the Association of Asia-Pacific Social Science Research Council's (APSSREC) Seminar on New Zealand and the World: The impacts of globalisation – social, economic and cultural dimensions, Wellington.

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