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community forms of gambling

Steve Matthewman

Reach for the skies: Towards a sociology of the weather

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to the United States: A case study in sport migration

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The third shift: Task allocation and ultimate responsibility  
on family camping holidays

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Immigration and New Zealand: From localism to  
globalism?

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## **State licensing, taxation and the marginalization of community forms of gambling**

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### **Abstract**

This article examines the escalation of gambling in New Zealand and its promotion by the state. It is argued that the expansion of gambling is not the result of neo-liberal reforms *per se*. Rather revenues from gambling in the form of taxation and especially 'soft' taxation are identified as important to state policies. The state is also an important gambling operator. The combination of tax revenues and state stakeholding has engendered efforts at the marginalization of community forms of gambling. An important part of this marginalization is to problematize the existing licensing arrangements for gaming machines outside casinos. In this respect it is possible that the state-owned TAB and/or Lotteries Commission will assume an operational responsibility. However, three developments act to undermine state policies: networking, internet gambling and interactive TV. These new technologies may problematize community forms and state initiatives.

### **Introduction: The expansion and taxation of gambling**

'...the Government has no intention of allowing fruit machines or 'one-armed bandits' [gaming machines] into the country', (Hon. D.A. Hight, Minister of Internal Affairs, speaking to the New Zealand Parliament, 23 September 1977).

There were 15,697 gaming machines licensed by the state for operation in casinos, pubs and clubs in 1999 (pers. com., Casino Control Authority; pers. com., Department of Internal Affairs).<sup>1</sup> By the end of 2000 there are likely to be 1500 more gaming machines licensed in New Zealand. If nothing else, these figures show a dramatic reversal in the policies purported by the Minister in 1977. Further, the licensing of gaming machines is only one aspect of what is now a burgeoning gambling industry. While gaming machines are arguably the most important of gambling products presently licensed in New Zealand (generating the greatest share of turnover and gross profits), they are only a single component of the industry. Alongside these gaming machines – located in casinos, clubs and pubs – is an array of other products. These include: (1) raffles and lotteries, sold mainly by the Lotteries Commission and some other small operators; (2) race and sports betting, sold through the Totalisator Agency Board; (3) housie, sold by a range of small operators; and (4) table and card games, sold by casinos. All these gambling products and operators are licensed by the state.

The most striking feature of the gambling industry is its rapid growth and diversification in recent years. In this regard, the introduction by the state-owned Lotteries Commission of a televised lottery (*Lotto*) is an important marker. Since the

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<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank staff of the Casino Control Authority, the Department of Internal Affairs, the NZ Treasury and Parliamentary Library for their assistance in providing interviews and written materials in aid of my studies. This greatly assisted me and allowed for an important element of triangulation with interviews and ethnographic materials collected from a range of gambling operators. I am especially grateful to the Chartered Clubs Association for their help. Also I wish to thank the University of Auckland Research Committee for their support in funding a part of the research which informs this paper. I am further indebted to the useful comments made by two anonymous referees.

introduction of *Lotto* in 1987 the amount spent on gambling in New Zealand has skyrocketed. Wholly accurate figures are not available on the increase but gross profits from gambling can be estimated to have at least tripled: from around 330 million dollars in 1987 to in excess of 1 billion dollars in 1999 (Department of Statistics, 2000; McMillen et al., 1998:329-332).<sup>2</sup>

The coincidence of a televised state lottery with a more general expansion in gambling is not peculiar to New Zealand. Both internationally and locally televised state lotteries, like *Lotto*, are referred to as the 'standard bearer' of gambling. State lotteries have in many cases been the first gaming product to be given state sanction. In a range of jurisdictions their appearance on television has been the precursor to an expansion of gambling activities. It can be argued that where state lotteries lead, other forms of gambling are soon to follow. The most common explanation for this pattern of causality is drawn from the USA (of which the New Hampshire state lottery, begun 1964, is the exemplar) and centres on the taxation revenues generated first from state lotteries and subsequently from other forms of gambling. It is argued that the result is an increased reliance by states on gambling as a source of taxation and especially 'soft' taxation (Ereckson, et al., 1999).

Soft taxation refers to taxes levied against consumption that are voluntary insofar as consumers can eschew the relevant goods and services. In this respect, gambling products, are somewhat like tobacco and alcohol products which are also

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<sup>2</sup> 'Gross profits' are the total amount accruing to the operator of a gambling product. Gross profits are also referred to as 'expenditure'. Gross profits/expenditure are the total amount lost by gamblers. 'Prizes' are the total amount won by gamblers. Gross profits/expenditure in addition to prizes provide the 'turnover'. The reinvestment of prizes means that turnover usually far exceeds expenditure.

commonly used as vehicles for voluntary taxation. Possibly, the somewhat dubious moral status of gambling, smoking and drinking *vis à vis* other activities that can be subjected to tax (e.g., eating, clothing, health care, travel) renders their taxation relatively acceptable to consumers. Certainly, there is considerable evidence for the taxation thesis in motivating states and the expansion of gambling. Eadington (2000) has described this process in terms of state regulation establishing monopoly conditions for operators and consequently economic rents. Munting (1998) argues that the pursuit of taxation fosters an integration of state regulatory activities with industry interests which in turn favours the escalation of gambling.

The case of New Zealand fits an emerging trajectory of policy reversal and the state promotion of gambling. Austrin (1998) and to a lesser extent Markland (1996) and McMillen et al. (1998:273-339) have demonstrated this relatively recent revision of policy. In short the New Zealand state, like many others, has changed tack from restriction to promotion of gambling. Evidence for this is found in the expansion of both gambling operators and gambling products licensed by the state. At the same time, the tax take from gambling is very large. This includes the amounts levied directly by the state through the offices of the Inland Revenue Department and The Department of Internal Affairs, as well as amounts retained by statutory bodies acting as gambling operators (the Lotteries Commission and Totalisator Agency Board). Figures are not available for the company tax paid by casinos or charitable trusts that operate gaming machines. However it can be estimated that in 1997 the state received in excess of \$120.75 million from its Goods and Services Tax (GST) on gambling turnover, and about \$132.29 million from its Gaming Duty on operators. This amount, approximately \$253 million, represented around 0.77% of total tax revenue that year 'levied through the Crown's sovereign power' (Department of Statistics, 1997:610). The revenues of the two statutory bodies are even more significant. The current

annual return of the Lotteries Commission to the Lottery Grants Board is approximately \$630 million. The Totalisator Agency Board returns around \$65 million to its stakeholders in the racing industry (Department of Statistics, 2000).

### **Framing neo-liberal reform and the state**

For sociologists, any engagement of the state with the promotion of gambling markets should be unsurprising. On the one hand are the well-documented 'neo-liberal reforms' that have characterised successive Labour, National and Coalition Governments since 1984. There is no need to reprise the debate here, suffice to note that the neo-liberal reforms are regarded as an accomplished fact by many commentators. The process of reform is understood by policymakers and critics as deregulation and with it the unleashing of market forces (for example, Easton, 1999; Kelsey, 1995; Pusey, 1993; Rudd and Roper, 1997). In this respect, the expansion of gambling markets approximates the putative process of deregulation. On the other hand are the mounting fiscal pressures many of these reforms place on the state, including long-run reductions in corporate and income tax rates. Two points can be made about fiscal pressures on the state and the state's mounting need for revenue. First, the tax from GST on gambling and gaming duty runs at around 1% of the annual take. While the state cannot be made to function on this level of revenue alone, in the context of a current account crisis, the tax from gambling is an important fillip. Furthermore, the possibilities for soft taxation from gambling is fully in line with the process of reform which saw the introduction of an overarching consumption tax, GST, in 1986 (Easton, 1994). Second, and more pointedly, those tax revenues from gambling collected through the Inland Revenue Department and the Department of Internal Affairs, enter the consolidated fund.



Specifically, they are not used to ameliorate the negative consequences of gambling or its promotion.<sup>3</sup>

Yet the promotion of gambling markets and the rhetoric of neo-liberalism are not one and the same. Larner (1998) argues for the fluid and shifting character of the reforms since 1984. Viewed in this way, neo-liberalism and the policies of deregulation resemble justifications for policy made on the run and after the fact. This appears as a useful proposition, especially in the muddled field of gambling. In many respects, the state finds itself mired in a policy debate of the type Schon and Rein (1994:4) call an 'intractable policy controversy' and Callon (1998:263) a 'hot' situation. In this context, charting a path, eliminating what Markland (1996:80-82) calls 'anomalies and inconsistencies' in gambling, seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, these anomalies can be understood as the regulatory bases of economic rents. Furthermore, it should be noted that the vaunted Gaming Reform Bill has been in train since 1990 and the current iteration is again being criticised for its imperfections (Burton, 2000). Nevertheless, the puzzle remains: How best to decode policy? This article emphasises two elements in the state-sanctioned promotion of gambling, both of

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<sup>3</sup> Indeed the refusal by the state to divert tax revenues from gambling (including the specifically targeted Gaming Duty) into areas such as the treatment of problem gambling is an extremely contentious issue. The election of a Labour-Alliance Government in November 1999 might stimulate a reversal of this policy. For example, the Ministry of Health may recognise 'problem gambling' as a core health issue and subsequently fund its treatment. However, this may result in an increase in the 'levy for problem gambling' already paid by operators in addition to the ordinary taxes and the extraordinary Gaming Duty. The levy for problem gambling is currently administered by the Committee on Problem Gambling Management (Committee on Problem Gambling Management, 1999).

which confound any straightforward reading of a state engagement with neo-liberalism and the unleashing of market forces. These are: (1) the extent to which the state functions as both a regulator of gambling and as a gambling operator; and (2) the marginalization of community forms of gambling.

### **Some problematics of state stakeholding**

The key enactments [statutes] differ in a number of respects, including their aims, the beneficiaries of the gaming activities they cover, the level of regulation they impose, their level of prescriptiveness, the nature of the entity responsible for regulation, and the ownership and operation of each gaming product. However, taken together, the present legislative and regulatory framework governing the gaming industry in New Zealand can be characterised as an uneven, complex, highly prescriptive and inflexible one (Racing Industry Board and Totalisator Agency Board, 1995:57).

The escalation of gambling, we might say the expansion of gambling markets, is not the result of a liberalisation of the law *per se*. There has been no deregulation of the type associated with neo-liberal policies elsewhere in New Zealand. Rather, the diversification of gambling is associated with the *ad hoc* addition of legislation and regulation. Nor has diversification reprised the surrender of state forms of activity to those of market forces (for want of a better term). Elsewhere in the economy, the putative agenda of neo-liberal reform by successive governments has seen the corporatisation and privatisation of ministries, 'state-owned enterprises' and the public assets of local governments (for example, in airports, banking, energy, forestry, housing, ports, public transport, railways, telecommunications, etc.). This amounts to the state exiting those industries, at least as a commercial operator. In the case of gambling, the state remains

as an important and active operator in the business (the sale of gambling products).

Indeed the diversification of gambling has involved both incumbent (state entities) and new (commercial) gaming operators being licensed by the state. Among the former are two 'statist' operations. The Totalisator Agency Board (TAB) has diversified into sports betting (1996) and internet wagering (1999). Similarly, the Lotteries Commission has diversified into a televised lottery (1987), scratch-cards (*Instant Kiwi*, 1989), a televised version of keno (*Daily Keno*, 1994), and a televised version of housie (*TeleBingo*, 1996). Of singular importance among the new operators are the commercial enterprises running casinos established in Christchurch (1994), Auckland (1996), Dunedin (1999), two in Queenstown (1999) and another likely to open in Hamilton (2001).

By and large the continued stakeholding by the state is understandable in terms of two dynamics. First, is the longstanding approach to gambling wherein the focus has been to channel activity into charitable forms. This rationale underpins the statutes empowering the Lotteries Commission and the TAB (that is, the Gaming and Lotteries Act (1977) and the Racing Act (1971) respectively). What is at stake here is the extent to which gambling is undertaken for charitable or commercial ends. However, before discussing this tension it is useful to identify a second factor in stakeholding, which is the problematic character of the Lotteries Commission and the TAB as 'state-owned enterprises'. In this respect it can be argued that continued stakeholding by the state reflects problems in defining and then disposing with either of the Lotteries Commission or the TAB as state assets. Clearly these two dynamics for stakeholding are somewhat at odds, while at the same time they raise different issues in terms of the 'taxation thesis'.

What is most at issue from the accretion of statutes relating to gambling is the extent to which gambling is conducted for charitable or for commercial purposes. Three Acts coexist:

the Gaming and Lotteries Act (1977), the Racing Act (1971), and the Casino Control Act (1990). The Gaming and Lotteries Act continues a long tradition, by in effect making illegal all games or games of chance. At the same time, one set of exceptions are those games made legal under Section 8 of the Act. This section reads:

The Minister may from time to time, at his discretion, on the application in writing of any society, grant to that society, in respect of any game or games of chance that would otherwise be illegal, a licence authorising it to conduct the game or games of chance specified in the licence if he is satisfied that the society's object in doing so will be to raise money for an authorised purpose.

Section 2 clarifies what is an authorised purpose. By this term is meant: 'any charitable, philanthropic, cultural, or party political purpose, or any other purpose that is beneficial to the community or any section of it.'

A multitude of housie operators, lottery organisers and operators of gaming machines in clubs and pubs (that is, all sites other than casinos) are licensed by the Department of Internal Affairs, through the Gaming and Lotteries Act (1977) (and, it should be noted, the Housie Regulations (1989)). However, alongside this regulatory function, the Act also provides for the establishment of the Lotteries Commission. The Commission was instituted to: 'promote, organise and conduct state lotteries and prize competitions' (Department of Internal Affairs, 1995:79). In doing so, the Commission assumed responsibility for duties previously those of the Department of Internal Affairs. As such, the Lotteries Commission drafts the rules under which it sells gaming products (e.g., Keno Rules (1994) and Lotto Rules (1996)). At the same time, the Act also established the Lottery Grants Board.

A share of profits from the sale of Lottery Commission products are paid to the Lottery Grants Board. For the period 1994-98, this share amounted to 45% of gross profits (approximately \$630 million). The Lotteries Grants Board, in turn, operates as a charitable trust making disbursements to a range of dispersal committees. Around 41.5% of this amount is given to three organisations: The Hillary Commission for Sport, Fitness and Leisure (20%), Creative New Zealand (15%), and The New Zealand Film Commission (6.5%). The balance is distributed through 13 standing committees.

What can be considered as a second set of exceptions to the strictures of the Gaming and Lotteries Act (1977) and its earlier iterations, are the activities of the Totalisator Agency Board. These are proscribed in the Racing Act (1971). The activities of the TAB are controlled by interpretation of the two Acts. The Racing Act outlines the products and services the TAB can offer. For example, the Racing Act (Section 99s) allows the TAB to operate games of chance (in terms of Section 8 of the Gaming and Lotteries Act), prize competitions (Section 26 of the Gaming and Lotteries Act), or lotteries (Section 35 of the Gaming and Lotteries Act). Any change in the gambling products supplied by the TAB requires amendment to the Racing Act (Racing Industry Board and TAB, 1995:58-59). In this respect, the Gaming and Lotteries Act makes mention of the TAB by default. It does so by delineating the legal activities of other gambling operators (with the exception of the casinos), including the Lotteries Commission, housie operators, and people running lotteries, and by criminalizing all private forms of bookmaking.

The terms 'charitable' or 'authorised purposes' do not appear in the Racing Act. Instead, the Totalisator Agency Board is required to transfer a fixed percentage of its gross profits (fixed at 33%) to the Racing Industry Board (RIB) (also created by the Racing Act), which in turn makes disbursements to incorporated galloping, hunt, harness and greyhound racing clubs. In many respects, the Lotteries Commission and the TAB are much alike.

Both are creations of statute. Both enjoy state licensed monopolies: the TAB in bookmaking and sports betting; the Lotteries Commission in a range of televised and scratch-card games. Both return a significant percentage of their gross profits to separate, at arm's-length, disbursement organisations. Both exist, at least formally, to generate revenues solely for this type of disbursement (that is, by the Lotteries Grants Board and the Racing Industry Board). Both generate substantial tax revenues.

Most exceptional to the preceding canon on gambling is the Casino Control Act (1990). The Act is at odds with the rest of the law on gambling, insofar as it allows the licensing of casinos as sites for various games and games of chance that are undertaken for commercial reasons.<sup>4</sup> Section 5 of the Act states:

The object of this Act is to establish a system for the licensing, supervision, and control of casinos with the aims of (a) Promoting tourism, employment, and economic development generally; and (b) Ensuring that gaming in casinos is conducted honestly; and (c) Ensuring that the management and operation of casinos remains free from criminal influence or exploitation.

The Act also established the Casino Control Authority to: 'consider applications and grant casinos licenses, act as an appeal authority for license holders and advise the Minister of Internal Affairs' (Department of Statistics, 1997:329). The Casino Control Act can be interpreted as a model for the type of 'neo-

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<sup>4</sup> The Lotteries Commission noted in its document *Responsible Gaming: A Commentary*: 'the introduction of casinos for private gain was a major aberration in the general pattern of the New Zealand gambling and gaming industry. It should remain as an aberration... the contagion should not be allowed to spread' (Lotteries Commission, 1997c:15).

liberal' reform of gambling, discussed above, wherein the state surrenders its active stakeholding in the industry. Its coexistence with the earlier legislation sharpens the contradictory character of the state as a principal (operator) in the business of gambling.

Putting aside the state's historical and ongoing commitment to use of the TAB to fund the racing industry and the Lotteries Commission to fund the Lotteries Grant Board, there emerge some concerns in replicating a privatisation programme in gambling. The issue of ownership is central. Both the TAB and Lotteries Commission are state entities in the sense that they exist because of statute. However, whether this basis of existence makes them 'assets' of the state, especially assets available for sale by the state, is highly debatable. The Lotteries Commission is charged to organise state lotteries. There is no operational reason preventing this responsibility being conducted, on a subcontracting basis, by a fully commercial business. Indeed such a business had the monopoly on the sale of 'Art Union' tickets in the 1930s (RIB and TAB, 1995:46). What is more problematic is the extent to which a monopoly license to run a state lottery could be granted to a commercial operator in the current context. The most important aspects of monopoly are access to television and retail outlets. The evidence here is contradictory. On the one hand, the privatisation of Telecom necessitated the ending of monopoly arrangements. On the other hand, the privatisation of New Zealand Rail furthered a monopoly.

Any such privatisation of the Lotteries Commission would ultimately constitute a political rather than a legal problem. Certainly, the legal ramifications of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises did not figure in the 1984-1999 round of asset sales. In terms of the present political climate, Easton (1994, 1999) notes that the 'radicalism' of the reform process is exhausted. Further, the recently elected Labour-Alliance Government has promised no further asset sales. Arguably the moment for any privatisation of the state entities in gambling has

passed. In terms of the reform process, gambling may indeed prove to be a casualty of timing or what Nagel calls 'policy-sequencing errors' (1998:223). However, there are protagonists for privatisation. Such enthusiasm is clearly the case for the TAB. In its joint submission with the Racing Industry Board, *A new direction for the future: reforming the gaming industry*, the claim is made that: 'the Government should no longer participate as a principal in the gaming market' (1995:14). Furthermore, the RIB and TAB suggest it is appropriate to 'review existing legislated gaming product markets' (1995:14).

In short, the RIB/TAB submission points towards the privatisation of the TAB and the elimination of its monopoly over bookmaking. However, there are contesting claims to the Board as an asset. On the one hand, it can be argued (and is by senior officials of the TAB) that the Board enjoys the same status as any other product of legislation. As such, the TAB could be privatised in the same way as the former ministries of state. On the other hand, there is a strong *prima facie* case for the racing clubs as sole fiduciary stakeholders in the TAB. Hence, there are at least two contesting versions for its privatisation.

The unevenness, complexity, and inflexibility in legislation and regulation claimed five years ago in the RIB/TAB submission to the Review of Gaming (1995) remains, and is likely to stay regardless of the Gaming Law Reform Bill currently in Parliament. In this context, a focus by the state on gambling as a source for taxation begins to resemble a working compromise. This compromise is buttressed by opposing interests wherein lobbyists for the liberalisation of gambling and those for its (re)stigmatisation and restriction (Preston et al., 1998) have tended to cancel each other out. At the same time, the current arrangements must be regarded as insecure. While it may be feasible for the state to continue the highly uneven practices of licensing, there are tensions both within and outside the currently licensed field.



Of immediate concern to the state is the reliance of the TAB and Lotteries Commission on stagnant or declining gaming products. Horse and dog racing sold by the TAB and all the products sold by the Lotteries Commission (with the possible exception of *Instant Kiwi*) are experiencing absolute, long-run declines in turnover and expenditure. For these operators the only viable solution is product diversification. In this regard, the move by the TAB into sports betting is significant. Still more significantly, the operation of gaming machines promises a new source of revenue for the TAB and/or the Lotteries Commission.<sup>5</sup> This version of product diversification could be achieved either by: (1) the TAB and/or the Lotteries Commission taking over control of the gaming machines currently licensed in pubs or clubs; or (2) by the TAB and/or the Lotteries Commission being licensed in new sites. However, the possibilities for reallocating existing gambling products and operators is not the only source of tension for the state. An entirely new range of gaming products to those currently licensed in New Zealand are now either available or are soon to be so. The most important of these involve the networking of sites, internet gambling and interactive TV. These new forms will be discussed below. For now it is sufficient to note that all three might rework state licensed monopolies or jurisdictions.

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<sup>5</sup> David Bale, former CEO of the Lotteries Commission has argued: 'at the moment we are in the public gaming business. If you want to make more money we will have to move into the public gambling business; gaming machines, club keno, club bingo [housie]' (Inform, 1998).

## **The marginalization of community forms**

Thus far, the discussion of the state's role in the gambling industry has emphasised, at least in part, the accretion of statutes and some of the different aspects of policy. It is suggested that circumstances in the industry impose decidedly crosscutting demands on the state. Among these are conflicting pressures for: (1) the liberalisation or stigmatisation of gambling; (2) gambling for charitable or commercial ends; and (3) the continued involvement or exit by the state from the business of gambling. However, in one important dimension the inconsistent elements of state policy cohere. This unity is found in the marginalization of community forms of gambling.

By 'community forms' of gambling are meant the licensed arrangements wherein the local community is important as both a source of expenditure and as a recipient of these gross profits. The most important feature of any community form is that gross profits are returned and recycled to the local community, if not the very gamblers who sustained the losses in the first place. In this sense, a community form of gambling can be contrasted with, for want of a better word, the corporate forms wherein gross profits are dispersed to shareholders (as in the case of the casinos) or stakeholders (as in the case of the TAB and Lotteries Commission) well beyond any version of the local community. It is contended that gambling at housie sessions, on gaming machines in clubs and pubs, and at rural race clubs constitute these 'community forms'. As such it must be noted that this definition is at odds with that of the Lotteries Commission (Lotteries Commission, 1997a, 1997b).

The Lotteries Commission proposes its own 'Community Benefit Model' for gambling (Lotteries Commission, 1997a). This model is based on the preservation and extension of the licensed monopolies enjoyed by the Lotteries Commission and its continued funding of the Lotteries Grants Board. However, the extent to which the gaming products sold by the Lotteries

Commission take money out of local communities, albeit for redistribution by the Lotteries Grants Board, is not addressed. Consequently, a more accurate name for the model championed by the Lotteries Commission might be that of a 'National Benefit Model'. That is, revenues that are generated locally are redistributed nationally (and to elite sporting and cultural organisations at that!). What is more, as Howland (1999:26-27) has noted, given the high level of integration between the Lotteries Commission and big business, the model might better be called a 'transnational' one. Regardless, the Lotteries Commission extracts gross profits from local communities in precisely the same ways as do fully commercial casinos. The difference between the two types of operators rests solely in the mechanisms for redistributing revenues: in the case of the Lotteries Commission via the Lotteries Grants Board; in the case of the casinos via dividends to shareholders. Further, both the Lotteries Commission and the casinos are favoured in terms of how they are licensed to sell gaming products *vis à vis* their smaller competitors.

The advantages enjoyed by the Lotteries Commission are partly a product of the Gaming and Lotteries Act (1977), which established the operator and gave it powers to draft its own rules for the sale of a range of products. Thus the Lotteries Commission is able to draft rules that made its games (gambling products) far more attractive than those offered by 'traditional' housie operators.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, the Lotteries Commission is

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<sup>6</sup> In its submission to the *Review of Gambling* (a precursor to the *Review of Gaming* and, ultimately, the Gaming Law Reform Bill), Bingo World (a manufacturer of housie products) described the organisers of housie games as being: Sports Clubs, 29%; Ethnic Organisations, 25%; Service Clubs, 20%; Senior Citizen Clubs, 11%; Schools, 8%; Sundry 7%, Bingo World (Department of Internal Affairs, 1990:35).

favoured by its close working relationship with the Department of Internal Affairs, which administers the Act (most notably Section 8) and the Housie Regulations (1989).

While it may not be the intention of the policy and inspectorate units of the Department to disadvantage housie operators, their interpretation of the regulations has certainly functioned in this way. As a result, housie operators have been severely constrained, by: limits on prizes (a maximum of \$700); limits on play (no play on Sunday); limits on the number of games per session (no more than 50 housie games can be played in any one session); restrictions on the payment of commission (forcing a reliance on volunteers to run games); limits on advertising; and an absolute freeze on any innovations in the game or in the technologies used to play those games (McMillen et al., 1998:321-327). A significant number of prosecutions have been secured by the Department against variously 'illegal' housie games. Contrast this situation with the national retail chain, television coverage, constant innovation, huge jackpots, and the enormous advertising budget enjoyed by the Lotteries Commission in the sale of its products. Unsurprisingly, housie has gone into a steep decline since 1987 (and the introduction of *Lotto*).<sup>7</sup>

A parallel effort to marginalize community forms is found in the regulation of gaming machines. Once again, the policy and inspectorate units of the Department of Internal Affairs have acted to constrain community forms of gambling, in this case at pubs and clubs. The decisive moment in the regulation of gaming machines (outside casinos) is found in a reworking of the licenses granted under Section 8 of the Gaming and Lotteries Act. This change in licensing was undertaken in

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<sup>7</sup> Approximately 1500 licenses were issued by the Department of Internal Affairs for housie games in 1986 and about 700 in 1995 (McMillen et al., 1998:323).

1988. It forced severe limitations on existing gaming machine operators. Thus, the operators of gaming machines were required to have both a liquor license for their gambling sites and be incorporated societies. For publicans, this meant that the ownership of gaming machines became vested in charitable trusts (established exclusively for this purpose). These charitable trusts (the three largest operate over 6000 machines in nearly 900 pubs) are required to pay GST and the Gaming Duty on revenues, as well as ensure that 33% of gross profits are paid to duly 'authorised purposes' (approved by the Department of Internal Affairs). Each publican receives a rental on each machine (the current maximum rental is \$220 per machine, per week). Because clubs (including Returned Servicemen's Clubs, Workingmen's Clubs and sports clubs) are incorporated societies in their own right, they were deemed eligible to benefit from the revenues (that is, after the deduction of tax and all other operating expenses) generated by the gaming machines on their premises. However, both clubs and pubs are restricted in the operation of these machines. A maximum of 18 machines per site is enforced. The maximum prize (a jackpot) is \$1000. The gaming machines may not be advertised. Further, only members may play machines in clubs and the revenues so generated may not be used to subsidise food or alcohol. Contrast this situation with that of the casinos.

Casinos (who, as noted above, are licensed under the Casino Control Act, 1990) are able to operate as many machines as they deem commercially viable in their premises (subject to the approval of the Casino Control Authority). Similarly, these machines offer whatever range of prizes or jackpots are favoured by the operator. Furthermore, the casinos have no restrictions placed on their advertising. Unsurprisingly, after the opening of the casinos in Christchurch (1994) and Auckland (1996), the clubs and pubs experienced about a 30% drop in their gross profits. Anecdotal evidence suggests a recovery in these revenues (although this is difficult to ascertain because of the increased

numbers of machines in clubs and pubs). More clearly, and more importantly, one result of the advantaging of casinos *vis à vis* clubs and pubs is that gaming machines in the former generate around five times the turnover of machines sited in the latter.

The marginalization of housie operators, clubs and pubs is readily explicable in terms of the taxation thesis and the state furthering its stakeholding. Hence, what flows from the decision for the Lotteries Commission to launch *Lotto* in 1987 is the Department of Internal Affairs – led campaign against housie and gaming machine operators. The decision to allow casinos complicates issues insofar as casino-based gambling might (and probably does) cannibalise the TAB and the Lotteries Commission. However, the entry of casinos coincided with a redoubling of effort on the part of the Lotteries Commission and Department of Internal Affairs against clubs and pubs. An important feature of this campaign was prosecutions against operators for breaches of license conditions. Surely, the broader agenda here is to prize gaming machines from the charitable trusts (pubs) and clubs.

In this context, what may be considered as the more defensive manoeuvring of the TAB and Racing Industry Board also acts to marginalize community forms, in this case rural racing clubs. This third version of marginalization centres on the systematic closure of rural racing clubs (Racing Industry Board, 1997:1-3). Here, the Racing Industry Board has developed a four-tier categorisation of racing clubs, ranging from A to D venues and depending upon their strategic importance to the industry. This strategy arguably stems from declining gross profits generated from New Zealand-based racing. The criteria for categorisation of clubs involves: location; the size of nearby human or horse populations; racing surface; and the proximity and value of other venues. It is expected that, over time, the race meetings held at C and D venues will be transferred to A and B venues. Venues in category D are considered to have significance in servicing the local community, but get no preferential funding.

Significantly, all rural racing clubs are categorised D and thereby face eventual closure.

### **Beyond the community: Networking, internet gambling and interactive TV**

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion. First, tax revenues can be used to account for the relatively recent move by the state towards the promotion of gambling. Second, while this shift in policy occurred within the context of the neo-liberal reform process, it has been played out in a decidedly uneven way. Most significant here is the state's continued stakeholding in gambling. Third, the combination of a pursuit of (tax) revenues and stakeholding has engendered efforts at the marginalization of community forms of gambling. It is considered that an important aspect of this marginalization is to problematize the existing licensing arrangements for gaming machines outside of casinos. In this respect, both the TAB and, more likely, the Lotteries Commission might very well assume an operational responsibility.

Beyond these conclusions, it is possible to construct a more speculative close or coda. This centres on the very rapid development of gambling products and technologies. To date, state licensing of gambling in New Zealand has deployed jurisdictional powers. That is, the state has been able to mobilise monopoly licensing arrangements, assigning products to operators within particular sites. This rationale has underpinned both charitable and commercial gambling, including its statist, commercial and 'community forms'. However, at least three developments stand to undermine this sited rationale: networking, internet gambling and interactive TV.

In recent years, the Department of Internal Affairs has declined proposals from housie and gaming machine operators to network their sites. At least one proposal involved networking (by fibre optic cable) with gaming machine operators in an

Australian state. Networking offers operators (and consumers) larger prizes and jackpots. It also presents possibilities for improved surveillance of operators. Indeed the distance surveillance of gaming machine operators is a stated goal of the Department of Internal Affairs. Networking has been (and will be, other than for surveillance) denied to community forms of gambling. However, should either the TAB or Lotteries Commission be allowed access to gaming machines (or their sanitised variant, the video lottery terminal) then such product enhancing, networking is more or less a certainty.

In terms of the internet, the Casino Control Authority has refused (in 1998) an initiative by Christchurch Casino to offer on-line gambling. This site currently offers play-money options only ([www.christchurchcasino.com](http://www.christchurchcasino.com)). In contrast, the TAB has an involvement with three internet wagering (betting) sites ([www.worldcupworld.com](http://www.worldcupworld.com), [www.tab.co.nz](http://www.tab.co.nz), [www.ebetonline.com](http://www.ebetonline.com)). Again, community forms will be denied the internet. However, it seems extremely likely that an on-line gambling site will be approved in New Zealand. What makes this very probable is that on-line gambling is readily available to consumers in New Zealand. Thus the state cannot readily prevent internet gambling as it can stand alone and networked sites. At best it can move to secure a portion of the gross profits that currently go off-shore. In this respect the underlying policy issue is about which existing or new operator is to be licensed to host the site.

Gambling via interactive TV is also technically possible (Reith, 1999:113-114). The addition of a new 'black box' on top of household televisions would enable betting on games. Both the Lotteries Commission (*TeleBingo* and *Daily Keno*) and the TAB (sports betting) are positioned to take advantage of this new technology. Once again, it can be argued that the underlying policy issue is 'when' rather than 'if'. This is because interactive TV (received via satellite) will in the near future have the potential to by-pass state jurisdictional claims (rather like the internet). While the recent history of gambling licensing has been



characterised by contest over the control of gaming machines, it seems likely that interactive TV will constitute the most significant product diversification. It would allow the Lotteries Commission and/or the TAB to escape a reliance on stagnant or declining gaming products. Interactive TV will greatly expand turnover and gross profits.

All three developments discussed in this concluding section (networking, internet gambling and interactive TV) are likely to be licensed in ways that continue the marginalization of community forms. Indeed, some combination of these three developments might precipitate the demise of community forms of gambling. However, it is important to stress that new technologies are not by their nature inimical to community forms. They could be deployed to revitalise the community. It is a safer bet that new developments will not be licensed in ways favourable to existing community forms.

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## **Reach for the skies: Towards a sociology of the weather**

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### **Abstract**

This paper advances the case for a sociology of the weather. It does so on the basis that weather pervades every facet of our existence: from questions of cosmology to those of political economy. Despite this, sociologists have never studied the weather seriously. The reasons for this historical oversight are explored and explained, and the argument is made that by studying the weather as both a physical and a cultural force we are provided with a way of transgressing the unhelpful nature/culture dichotomy.

### **Introduction**

My favourite quote about the weather that is not about the weather comes from Oscar Wilde's (1949:15) *The Importance of Being Earnest*. The character Gwendolen has our attention: 'Pray don't talk to me about the weather, Mr. Worthing. Whenever people talk to me about the weather, I always feel quite certain that they mean something else'. They may well mean something else, for de la Soudiere (1994) has shown that weather talk is used 'covertly' to express moods, open conversations, circumvent serious issues and fill conversational pauses. However, the increasingly frightening prospect of global warming and the severity of recent *El Niño* and *La Niña* events has meant that '[t]he weather as a topic of conversation has lost most of its neutrality for us – it's no longer "safe", brought up in order to

make inoffensive small talk. We talk about it because it is important, because it is not a little strange' (Godrej, 1999:8-9).

Despite its significance, weather remains outside the purview of established sociological research. While psychologists (Bell and Baron, 1976; Sanders and Brizzolara, 1982; Anon. 1993) and criminologists (Michael and Zumpe, 1983; DeFronzo, 1984) have shown us weather's impact on moods and murder rates, and historians (Utterström 1955; Le Roy Ladurie, 1972; Mackay, 1981) have highlighted weather's role in riots and civil unrest, sociologists have sought shelter from it. This paper asks the important question: why? To find an answer we begin with our discipline's progenitors.

### **Marx and Durkheim: The making of an indoor discipline**

We are all schooled into thinking that Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim are the discipline's founding fathers. Admittedly, in the American context this is more a function of Talcott Parsons than of truth. On Britain's side of the Atlantic the same beliefs are traced back to Anthony Giddens. As Steve Fuller (1998:92-3) writes:

[i]n at least one important respect, sociology has yet to escape its philosophical roots. Sociological theory ... continues to be devoted to preserving, elaborating, and transmitting the *concepts* of the continental European polymaths – Marx, Weber, Durkheim .... The paradigm of this synthetic exercise is Parsons, though Anthony Giddens has proven how one can become a world-class sociologist simply by engaging in this exercise often enough until the latest generation of British students come to think that Giddens himself is responsible for originating the concept of modernity.

Significantly, this fictitious past has very real consequences for our disciplinary present. These canonical works continue to influence our own: they guide, illuminate, inform; we apply, amend, reject. If we look at the former and the latter of this holy trinity we will see why subsequent generations of sociologists have not been inclined to factor the weather into their own analyses.

We commence with Karl Marx. Marx never made man and nature analytically separate. As people changed nature they changed themselves. He even made some attempts to include the weather in his work, linking the Orient with despotism, but the results were both embarrassing and disappointing. Marx, like Herodotus, Aristotle, Montesquieu and Hegel before him, associated tyranny with the East. This was a functional requirement for successful agriculture: irrigation systems had to be centrally controlled. Seasonal drought on large plains could only be alleviated by the operation of massive waterworks. Farming was impossible in the absence of this. But it came at a cost, a rigid social order marked by stasis and oppression, a formation 'that ... restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath the traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies' (Marx quoted in Said, 1995:153). Eastern stasis contrasted starkly with the civil society of Europe that provided the soil in which freedom, progress and reason could flourish (Lewis and Wigen, 1997:95).

The binary opposites of dynamic Enlightened West and stagnant despotic East emerged from this scholarship. But as Lewis and Wigen (1997:36) observed: 'its theoretical function was not to analyse Asiatic society but to explain the rise of capitalism in Europe within a comparative framework'. Palat (1988:396) identifies the most surprising element of this theory as 'its distinctly anti-dialectical construction. Unlike their other works, where they had deconstructed earlier approaches to expose underlying ideological biases, Marx and Engels relied

uncritically on the observations of British colonial officials, early European travellers and some prevalent anthropological theorists’.

The paltry textual origins of this Asiatic Mode of Production should be also be noted: it is plucked from a few pages of the *Grundrisse*, a couple of pieces from the *New York Herald Tribune*, an exchange of letters with Engels in June 1853 and some scattered remarks in *Capital*, prompting Alvin Gouldner (1980:324-5) to state that those embracing the concept are simply citing notes that Marx scribbled in the margins of his books. Those throwaway lines swelled into a five hundred-page thesis on hydraulic societies by Karl A. Wittfogel (1957). Brendan O’Leary notes that Wittfogel’s work is but one contribution as Marxists ‘took the concept on a tour through world history and found that it applied almost everywhere – except to Western Europe’ (Quoted in Lewis and Wigen, 1997:94). This embarrassing brand of Orientalism has been particularly resilient. Quoting O’Leary (Lewis and Wigen, 1997:96) again, ‘like a spectre, the Asiatic Mode of Production haunts Marxist historians, even those dedicated to its excommunication from the discourse’.

Whereas Marx had let the weather into his work and subsequent Marxists have sought to expel it, Durkheim eschewed it from the start. In his classic work *Suicide: A Study in Sociology* Durkheim explicitly rejected suggestions of a relationship between climate and suicide. ‘Far from there being a relation between suicide and a given climate,’ he stated, ‘we know suicide to have flourished in all climates’ (Durkheim, 1975:105). Admittedly, it appeared that suicides reached their apex in Europe’s temperate zone, but while this zone was of a single climate it was of two distinct civilizations: one with Île-de-France and surrounding departments as its centre, the other being Saxony and Prussia. Thus, for Durkheim (1975:105) ‘[t]hey therefore coincide with the two principle centres of European civilization, not with a clearly defined climatic region’.

The briefest of historical analyses had also undermined the connection between climate and suicide: 'Italy today is relatively exempt; but it was very frequent at the time of the Empire when Rome was the centre of civilised Europe' (Durkheim, 1975:105). 'We must therefore seek the cause of the unequal inclination of peoples for suicide, not in the mysterious effects of climate but in the nature of this civilization, in the manner of its distribution among the different countries', Durkheim concluded.

Underpinning this work, and indeed undergirding Durkheim's entire intellectual project, was the attempt to carve out an autonomous social sphere (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998:5). Elsewhere in *Suicide* Durkheim (1975:38) argued that '[f]or sociology to be possible it must above all have an object all of its own [a] reality which is not the domain of the other sciences'. Durkheim's world would be without weather. Social effects would be related to social causes. Durkheim (1982:135) made this a rule of sociological method: 'the primary origin of social processes of any importance must be sought in the constitution of the inner social environment'.

Let us now consider the founding father's legacy by looking at the underdevelopment of environmental sociology.

### **Nature versus nurture**

Nature has always been one of those notoriously difficult words that defy easy definition. Yet regardless of its busy historical life and irrespective of its semantic shifts it has encountered sociological hostility. As Macnaghten and Urry (1998:4) note: 'sociology's own trajectory ... has been based upon drawing a strong and undesirable distinction between "society" and "nature"'. The supremacy of nurture over nature has always been asserted, and sometimes for good reason. Viewed through the prism of sociology, nature carries negative associations with racist and sexist arguments grounded in genetics and biology.



Newby (1991:7) argues that as a consequence of these thoroughly odious political appropriations '[t]he very *raison d'être* of sociology has rested upon identifying and demarcating a disciplinary paradigm quite distinct from, and irreducible to, the natural and the biological'. This has made sociology more reluctant than the other social sciences to study environmental issues.

While 'the environment' has been one of society's primary concerns over the last generation, it has not registered with those devoted to its institutionalised study. Anglo-American sociology's failure to tackle the environmental question is easily demonstrated. Between 1970 and 1990 neither of America's leading two sociology journals published an article on green issues (Dunlap and Catton cited in Martell, 1994:9). A year later we find Newby (1991:1) stating at the 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Founding of the British Sociological Association:

that the contribution of sociology to the public debate on environmental change, and even to debates within the social sciences, has hitherto been negligible and quite out of proportion with the burgeoning interest not only in geography and economics but in anthropology, political science and international relations. Compared with the intellectual challenge which environmental issues present and the intellectual capacity which the discipline of sociology ... has to hand, the slender contribution of sociologists to the study of the environment has been, to put it mildly, disappointing.

Here in New Zealand, sociological studies did not come near the environment until the *Sites* special issue of autumn 1991. The editorial (1991:4) announced that '[t]he interface between the physical/natural and the social/cultural environments demands and challenges our critical analysis'. Notwithstanding Nigel

Clark (1999) and Kevin Dew's (1999) recent papers, sociologists have yet to take up the challenge.

This disciplinary hostility to nature is neither entirely unexpected, nor should it be condemned outright. Andrew Ross (1992:232) has noted how, '[d]ominant ideas, whether in science or technology, are legitimised and enforced at any time by presenting them as part of the natural order of things'. Similarly, social groups have cemented privileged positions through the same rhetorical strategies: think of the domination of men over women, of heterosexuals over homosexuals, of colonisers over colonised, and of ruling classes over subject classes.

One can see how appeals to nature play a crucial part in the maintenance of New Zealand's national identity. As Dew (1999:395) reports, the centrality of the "clean green" image to our national identity is such that land contamination is ranked above human contamination in its importance. And by literally grounding our identity – that is to say by siting it in the topography – artists, poets and composers 'have ideologically sidestepped many crucial social issues such as our ugly history of race relations, the oppression of women and the exploitation of workers' (Beatson, 1991:47). They have also helped overcome what Anderson (1991:5) identifies as one of the great paradoxes of nationalism: '[t]he objective modernity of nations to the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists'. An ancient entity is forged from a novel fabrication.

Simply put, cultural constructs have always sought the sanction of nature, and the weather has been made to play its part:

[i]f extreme weather conditions can cause suffering, then people's suffering can always be explained (away) inturn by weather conditions; the foreclosure of a family farm can then be seen as an inevitable component of a natural cycle. Inequalities are evenly distributed throughout the country according to the

current weather configuration of highs and lows, some like it hot, some like it cold, some times are good, some times are bad, wherever there are winners, there will be losers elsewhere. Rewards and punishments are disbursed in a cost-benefit analysis that balances across the breadth of the nation. This weather system of credits and debits refers as much to a political model – the US constitutional system of checks and balances – as to an ideology – the holistic maxim that “Mother Nature will balance everything out.” Such appeals make it seem as natural as the weather that some people must experience hardship so that others may enjoy abundance (Ross, 1992:237).

Thus for every physical ‘explanation’ we can usually find a compelling social one. This is *Annales* historian Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s very point. In his article ‘History and Climate’ he wrote scathingly of ‘that empty form of determinism which gratuitously attache[s] a climatic explanation to every large-scale economic or demographic event that could not easily be otherwise explained’ (Le Roy Ladurie, 1972:164).

### **Sociology out of season: Right place wrong time**

There are further reasons why sociologists have been reluctant to engage with the weather, aside from the founding fathers’ legacy and the aforementioned issues of explanatory efficacy, reasons related to time and space. At this point it is fruitful to incorporate the work of Henri Bergson, more specifically Bergson’s project ‘in search of time gone by,’ (*à la recherche du temps perdu*). Bergson argued that common sense conceptions of time contaminated the natural and social sciences, real time was ruled out as abstraction took precedence over experience. This common sense approach privileges time over duration, linearity over mobility, fixity over transition, repetition and calculability over flow, in short it is measurement of the frozen moment

(*temps*) rather than of the lived totality (*durée*). The paradoxical effect is that movement has been made to equate with immobility.

'Ever since my university days', wrote Bergson (1992:12):

I had been aware that duration is measured by the trajectory of a body in motion and that mathematical time is a line; but I had not yet observed that this operation contrasts radically with all other processes of measurement, for it is not carried out on an aspect or an effect representative of what one wishes to measure, but on something which excludes it.

The line that one measures does not move, yet time is movement. The measurement appears complete, but time is occurring and makes everything occur. Such measurements never deal with duration, rather they count extremities, intervals, moments, 'in short, virtual halts in time' (Bergson, 1992:12). Between these simultaneities almost anything could happen (Bergson, 1992:13).

For Bergson, this procedure was to be expected, given the predictive role of science. Science only extracts from the material world that which can be calculated, repeated or falsified. '[U]sually when we speak of time we think of the measurement of duration, and not of duration itself. But this duration which science eliminates, and which is so difficult to conceive and express, is *what one feels and lives*' (Bergson, 1992:13, emphasis added).

One can see the problems that this brings to bear in studying the weather – a nonlinear dynamical system is explored through cognitive frameworks incapable of handling flux. This raises the problem of 'knowing' the weather. It explains why, despite our scientific and technological advances, we are no better at forecasting the weather now than we were 50 years ago,

and why non-scientific ('folk') discourses about the weather persist (with only marginally lower levels of accuracy). Indeed, it was precisely this mistake of trying to forecast the weather from fixed data sets that led to the mathematical discovery of chaos...

At the beginning of the 1960s, Edward Lorenz started modelling weather systems on a Royal McBee computer. Lorenz isolated twelve relationships between temperature and pressure, and between pressure and wind speed. The equations were based on well-known Newtonian equations of air and water motion. 'The simulated weather in Edward Lorenz's new electronic computer changed slowly but certainly, drifting through a permanent dry midday season, as if the world had turned into Camelot, or some particularly bland version of southern California' (Gleick, 1991:11).

Measurement could never be totally precise, but this caused no concern within the Newtonian canon: '[g]iven an *approximate* knowledge of a system's initial conditions and an understanding of natural law, one can calculate the *approximate* behavior of the system. This assumption lay at the philosophical heart of science' (Gleick, 1991:15). Minor errors were of no concern, they would either be cancelled out or else they would fade into insignificance.

Lorenz short-circuited a sequence one day during the winter of 1961, commencing a programme at mid-point rather than from the beginning. He gave the computer its starting conditions from an earlier printout then left the room. While this computer run should have replicated the previous one, the weather patterns in the second had changed out of all recognition. The computer had not malfunctioned. The enormous discrepancy had come from the numbers Lorenz typed in. Lorenz had rounded-off the initial six decimal places .506127 to .506. In this instance the 'small errors proved catastrophic.... Although his equations were gross parodies of the Earth's weather, he had faith that they captured the essence of the real atmosphere. That

first day, he decided that long-range weather forecasting must be doomed' (Gleick, 1991:17).

There are, of course, more obvious reasons related to time and place that account for sociology's reluctance to venture outdoors. Sociology is, above all others, *the* discipline of modernity. It formalised in Western Europe in the nineteenth century, by which time the intellectual division of labour between the physical and the social sciences was well entrenched. Moreover, this emergence occurred when, for the first time in human history, society had been freed from the tyranny of climate. This helps to account for both sociology's environmental blind spot and the resurgence of the related idea that humans are distinct from, and dominant over, all other species. As Le Roy Ladurie (1972:134) noted, '[u]ntil the eighteenth century when societies were still essentially agricultural and dominated by the never-ending problem of food supplies, there was an intimate link, which is now a thing of the past, between history and climate'. By the time our discipline crystallised, that linkage was gone.

'Modernity', Latour (1993:10) informs us, 'comes in as many versions as there are thinkers or journalists, yet all its definitions point, in one way or another, to the passage of time. The adjective "modern" designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time'. Yet despite modernity's many versions, Latour (1993) urges that at base it is best understood as the separation of nature from culture. According to Berman (1982:16) this division comes from many sources, but he identifies two principle currents: the ever-expanding capitalist world economy and the scientific-technological revolution. These effectively transformed our conception of the universe and our location within it, altering our human environments and our pace of life.

Capitalism and science created schisms between the physical and the social, the former through nature's commodification, the latter through nature's domination. On the

great economic transformation, Polanyi (1944:178, emphasis added) wrote that '[w]hat we call land is an element of nature inextricably interwoven with man's institutions. *To isolate it and form a market out of it was perhaps the weirdest of all undertakings of our ancestors.* Traditionally, land and labor are not separated; labor forms part of life, land remains part of nature, life and nature form an articulate whole'. (Recall the Maori self-identification as *tangata whenua*, people of the land.)

On the great scientific transformation, Berland (1994:100) wrote that it 'sought to displace human empathy and belief from the core of knowledge about nature. Weather was thereby refined as a purely physical, material, *autonomous* system of particles, currents and fronts, from which human beliefs and values were necessarily separated and dismissed as primitive myth and/or projection'. This feeds into Marcuse's assertion that modern society is marked by the appropriation of nature administered by technology, rather than being experienced by the social totality. 'This development reflects the transformation of the natural world into the technical world. It is more than a pun if I say that *technology has replaced ontology*' (Marcuse, 1989:121).

### **The iron cage of meteorology: Rationalization of the weather**

In the case of the weather the translation from the natural to the technical has taken place since the Second World War. And it has taken place partly as a result of the meteorological application of wartime technologies: radar, rocketry, jet aircraft and computers (Khrigian, 1970:347). Prior to the emergence and adaptation of this high technology, meteorology was more art than science. As the least qualified scientists in the immediate post-war era, meteorologists were in a poor position to challenge popular weather lore (Bello, 1958:173). Thanks to the seizing of technologically driven opportunities, and an aggressive selling of its services to the public matched only by medicine (Hare and

Thomas, 1974:143), the abstract science of meteorology has triumphed over the concrete experience of society. The soft science hardens as it continues the journey from descriptive to analytical and mathematical terrain.

Similarly, collective concerns about changed weather – acid rain, the hole in the ozone layer, global warming – speak to the growing dominance of meteorology over social memory, to the decline of folklore in the face of science. The imposition of meteorological technocratic expertise through new technologies and modes of representation continues, further enforcing the separation of weather from everyday experience. ‘The change of weather that separates us from previous generations’, Berland (1994:105) tells us, ‘has occurred not just as a result of global warming but also in tandem with satellites, electromagnetic photography, computer model-building and photographic analysis, weathermen, television, computer graphics, syndicated weather services, city living, tourism, agribusiness and environmental politics’.

The social impact of these processes is recorded by Andrew Ross (1987:119-20, emphasis added), who observes that the:

code of early warning systems for the defence and survival of local ... communities has been replaced by a massively institutionalised anxiety about the defense of national shorelines and entire regions of the country; weather-as-news on the scale of local tragedy has been replaced by weather as commentary on regional, national and international events, and weather disasters on the scale of geopolitical tragedy; the quackery which once accompanied the culture of almanacs and patent cures for weather-induced ailments has been replaced by the almost complete commodification of bodily maintenance in the face of year-round weather ... assaults; and our mental ... maps of the psycho-geographical environment have



been replaced by the objectively simulated representation of an environment under the influence of weather, *other people's weather which is only temporarily our own.*

What both scholars note, in their own ways, is that the scientific ascendancy has served to abstract the weather. Experience has given way to expertise. In this Gestalt, weather is removed from us. It is also removed from its place as the prime agent of historical processes becoming instead the principal victim of them (Berland, 1993:208),<sup>1</sup> for as Berland noted we must contend with the spectre of global warming. Where the last generation grew up with the prospect of a new ice age and nuclear winter, ours has witnessed the replacement of the atomic bomb with a climatic one. An additional element in the millenarian mix, it is communicated in increasingly apocalyptic

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<sup>1</sup> The 'nature as victim' narrative, now so prevalent in sociological theory, should not escape our critical scrutiny. Whereas the early sociology of the environment concerned itself with new social movements, more recent works have focussed on the 'death of nature'. The premier exponent of this exercise is Beck (1992, 1995). One reason for its appeal is that a deceased nature presents no danger to sociology's theoretical bases. There is, for instance, no need to rethink the nature/culture distinction. Dew (1999:390, 393) usefully reminds us that Beck's perspective is particularly Eurocentric. Located in continental Europe, encircled by nuclear power plants and nuclear weaponry, with the shadow of Chernobyl and two disastrous wars lingering in the social memory, Beck sees industrial pollutants invading from the former Communist East and acid rain encroaching from the West as he sits by that great chemical sewer called the Rhine. Nature has never been so easily contained down under (Cronon, 1999). Our nature is recalcitrant, it refuses to die: it even fights back. Hurricanes, earthquakes, cyclones, droughts and many forms of ecological invasion continually remind us of the powers of non-human agency.

tones, the necessary consequence of industrialisation. As Anthony Giddens (1995:78) has written, 'we live ... in a world of manufactured uncertainty', where risks have been 'created by the very developments the Enlightenment inspired – our conscious intrusion into our own history and our interventions into nature'.

This paradigm shift in our perception of nature provides us with an opportunity to bridge the nature/culture dichotomy. After all, ozone depletion and global climate change cross such classificatory schema. They are clearly a combination of Mother Nature and humanity.

### **The forecast for tomorrow**

Let us return the discussion to the founding fathers. On 14<sup>th</sup> April 1846 Karl Marx (1988:338) gave a speech at the anniversary of the *People's Paper*. While illustrating a point he said: 'the atmosphere in which we live weighs down upon everyone with a 20,000 pound force, but do you feel it?' Durkheim (1982:53) responded in *The Rules of Sociological Method*: 'air does not cease to have weight, although we no longer feel that weight'. It has taken the best part of a century to suggest that *perhaps we do*. Jody Berland (1994:99) makes the point that for humanity, '[t]he weather, like music, mediates between our physical and social bodies. Its rhythms and irregularities, and the rituals we construct around them, shape what it means to be part of the social, both within a particular time and space, and across to other times and places, as we imagine or remember them'. And for Canadians more specifically, she writes of 'the structural double bind that constitutes Canadianicity, namely, that we are bound together by something constitutionally contradictory at its very core, not just the airwaves, *but the air itself*, something we love to hate, and nevertheless must hate to lose: our weather' (Berland, 1993:209, emphasis added).

Weather at once speaks to notions of identity, community, locality, 'race' and nationality (Berland, 1994:99;

Orwell, 1962:100; Ross, 1991:224-8, 234-7). Writing of Canada's climatic extremes, particularly the severity of its winters, Berland (1993:208) is moved to argue that '[i]n some weird way, we *are* our weather. If we have nothing else in common, our reciprocal recognition as citizens "North of the 49<sup>th</sup>" is naturalized annually by our shared encounter with the weather'. Here in the Land of the Long White Cloud summer is our defining season:

Yes, this is New Zealand – open, and dazed, and you have sand in your hair and sand in your pockets, and every day is like Sunday. The sunsets are shocking pink, outrageous, would you look at that. The air in front of you is wrinkled with heat. Mt Ruapehu is as bald as a coot, Lake Tekapo needs a drink. You are walking on hard, pale clay. You are on the porch. There are monarch butterflies, and cicadas, and moths, and flies, mosquitoes, wasps, ants, and visiting aunts. We are a nation of summer islands – the beach, the dust, the light. It suits us. It *makes* us. It's the way we imagine ourselves, and brag about it to the world (Brunias, 2000:94).

Brunias (2000:94) continues, '[s]ome of our best literature has suntan lotion on its pages – Sargeson's *That Summer*, Duggan's *Along Rideout Road*, Frame's *The Reservoir*, and if you close your eyes while reading Stead's *All Visitors Ashore* you see orchards and wharves, bare legs and open windows. *It's our time*'.

Weather has always played such a role. Ever since Kupe's wife, Hine te aparangi, cried 'He ao! He ao!' on sighting these shores, the weather has involved, obsessed, moulded and enmeshed us. What better example than Lady Barker's (2000:190-205) account of severe winter in her mountain sheep station Steventon? The weather was so cold that 'the servants remained in their beds, declining to get up, and alleging that they

might as well “die warm”. ‘[T]his snow-storm will be a matter of history’ she predicted. Indeed, the Province of Canterbury alone lost half a million stock. Food supplies plummeted, and the inhabitants at Steventon began looking for the cat that lived under the house, ‘but we agreed to bear our hunger a little longer, chiefly, I am afraid, because she was known to be both thin and aged’ (Barker, 2000:195, 191, 196). The strongly social significance of the seasons should come as no surprise. Trevor Turner (1999:16) has even written of the very real possibility ‘that the weather, in ways much more profound than the minor personal problems that pass for experience in the modern world, affects our very soul’.

Such weather discourses clearly cross the nature/culture divide. When discussing weather it is difficult to see where nature stops and culture starts, and I argue that problems have arisen from seeking their separation. As Schama (1995:6-7) has written, ‘although we are accustomed to separate nature and human perception into two realms, they are, in fact, indivisible. Before it can ever be a repose for the senses, landscape is the work of the mind. Its scenery is built up as much from strata of memory as from layers of rock’. Newby (1991:7) encapsulates the point neatly, commenting that ‘the sociological mind has entirely missed the point that “the environment” is not *only* a set of symbols, powerful though these are; it also has a material aspect ... which cannot be either ignored or explained away in this fashion. This, in turn, bears upon a problem which is as old as social science itself: the place of humankind in nature and the place of nature in ourselves’.

Weather, then, warrants our study. It is at once a physical *and* a cultural force. But proper sociological analysis will require a recalibration of our conceptual frameworks and a linguistic overhaul. Deferring to Berland (1993:213) once more, ‘[w]e talk about it continuously .... Yet, aside from ritual grumbling, we have no evolved creative, poetic, iconographic or epistemological language for it ... no appropriate artifices or reconstructions with

which to reclaim it'. The sociological project that we must engage in now is in the provision of theoretical tools that will allow us to reclaim the weather.

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## **The recruitment of New Zealand student athletes to the United States: A case study in sport migration**

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### **Abstract**

For several decades New Zealand sport has lost a number of talented competitors to the US on athletic scholarships. National coaches and administrators generally deplore this move. This paper examines the rationale for New Zealand athlete recruitment, and its denigration. The research locates US student-athlete migration in the wider context of New Zealand and global sport. It shows that while US student-athlete migration has some unique features it nevertheless also resembles other sport-labour migration. The ill repute of athletic scholarships within New Zealand reflects a tension between the rights of sportspeople as individuals, on the one hand, and a preoccupation with national ownership by sports administrators and coaches, on the other.

### **Introduction**

Over the last 20-30 years in excess of 230 potentially very good New Zealand sports players, from 13 sports, have been recruited by United States universities and colleges as sports scholars. The largest group of athletes are in track and field/cross-country (90+) and tennis (50), followed by swimming, basketball and golf (20+ each) and then smaller numbers in volleyball, waterpolo, American football, wrestling, skiing, softball, crew

(rowing) and soccer (fewer than 10 each). A provisional estimate is that there are somewhere between 100 and 150 New Zealanders currently in the US on sports scholarships<sup>1</sup>.

New Zealand National Sports Organizations (NSOs) generally disapprove of athletes taking up US athletic scholarships. From their point of view, NSOs here develop young talent then lose it to a bigger and more attractive consumer, and those athletes who do return are commonly burnt out, injured or retired. While New Zealanders are numerically insignificant on the US stage<sup>2</sup>, their loss is highly significant on the New Zealand stage. In a small country there is little depth in elite sport. The impact on New Zealand sport is apparent as US-based athletes are unavailable for national teams, as national championships are devoid of top-ranked competitors, as sponsors and domestic television lose interest in sports that cannot profile their elite members and as sub-elite competitors are deprived of opportunity to compete against better players, losing their performance benchmarks as well as their role models. It is commonly argued by national administrators and sport commentators that New

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<sup>1</sup> One of the most difficult aspects of the research has been identifying those individuals who are, or have been, sports scholars – few National Sporting Organizations keep listings, a situation which is in part a consequence of the ill-repute in which scholarships are held. Athletes in some codes simply do not advise their NSOs of their departure. Athletes were identified for this study initially from NSOs but then by word-of-mouth among athletes and coaches, as well as from media reports.

<sup>2</sup> The US collegiate sports system involves nationals from over 50 countries, including New Zealand. Most foreign athletes hold scholarships. Referring only to major [men's] sports, Bale (1991) deduced that foreigners account for around 7% of college athletes. He rarely mentions New Zealanders, citing a notable New Zealand presence only in tennis, swimming and track and field.

Zealand gains nothing and loses a great deal when young athletes take up sports scholarships.

This paper explores the recruitment of New Zealand athletes, and locates their scholarship experiences in the wider context of sport migration. The research has involved interviews with 27 national sport administrators and coaches, 54 past or present student-athletes, with staff at 14 US universities and at the NCAA<sup>3</sup> Kansas office. While theoretical interest is focussed on arguments about exploitation, perceived through the lens of hegemonic relations between athletes, colleges and NSOs (see Cameron, 1998)<sup>4</sup>, this paper focuses more specifically on athlete recruitment as a form of labour migration, thereby placing it in a context of more general sport mobility from New Zealand and internationally.

### **The recruitment of New Zealand sportspeople**

While some New Zealand athletes recruited to the US solicit their own 'invitations', the majority are actively recruited by colleges. US coaches discover potential recruits by scanning New Zealand

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<sup>3</sup> National Collegiate Athletic Association – the controlling body of most college sport.

<sup>4</sup> The exploitation thesis is problematic. While Bale clearly identifies student-athletes as an exploited 'proletariat' (1991:131), few student-athletes interviewed during this study saw themselves as 'used', let alone exploited. Simplistically, one might say this is evidence of 'false consciousness'. The relationships, however, are more complex than this, with a variety of actors taking quite different positions, based on quite different experiences: US and NZ coaches; NZ administrators and sponsors; US-based athletes; NZ-based athletes, among others. These and other issues related to supposed exploitation are under ongoing analysis in this study.

and international results, by word of mouth recommendations, by watching competition in New Zealand or watching New Zealanders at competitions overseas (e.g., Commonwealth Games; World Junior Championships; US tournaments).

The recruitment process is a highly regulated commercial activity<sup>5</sup>, accompanied by glossy brochures, seductive sales patter and sometimes less-than-truthful promises. As one US coach interviewed for this study said:

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<sup>5</sup> Like other scholarship arrangements, recruiting is controlled by NCAA rules (Bylaw Article 13:109-152, 1996-97 NCAA Manual). Violation of these rules results in the athlete becoming ineligible to compete for that college. However, in reality recruitment rules are forever bent, and within the US top athletes are offered significant inducements to sign with a college – including low-interest loans, money for travel, profits from sale of game tickets, jobs for parents and relatives, use of expensive cars and motel rooms, acquiescent dates and sometimes money (Sacks, 1989:41-42, 72; Woolf, 1989:101-104). One-time NCAA Executive Director Walter Byers holds boosters (alumni) responsible for much of the rule violation regarding inducements (Byers with Hammer, 1995:171). Agents, more commonly referred to as sports attorneys, are the other key culprits (see Woolf, *op.cit*). Woolf describes college athletes as innocent, naive and vulnerable; because they risk ineligibility once they have accepted inducements, they are not likely to admit to any arrangement with boosters or agents.

While it is unlikely that any New Zealand athletes are formally linked to boosters or agents, it is the case that some New Zealand coaches and administrators act as referees or advocates for New Zealand athletes (i.e. as informal agents). As well, current and recent college athletes are sometimes involved in recruiting a New Zealand athlete for their college (i.e. act as boosters). Some New Zealand athletes have also contravened the amateur eligibility requirement by accepting small monetary prizes prior to taking up a scholarship.

Well, that's the way the American coaches go. The coach is paid to coach and get the best results, to get the best team, so he wants the best athletes. *And he'll tell them whatever he needs to in order to get them here.*' (emphasis added)

US coaches use current New Zealand sports scholars to persuade a potential recruit who might already be a personal acquaintance. This tactic, alongside coach preference for nationals of a given country, produces 'pipelines' to colleges, the best known of which are the Ireland-Villanova and Kenya-Washington State pipelines, both involving distance runners. New Zealand has potential pipelines with Western State College, University of Oklahoma and Oklahoma State (distance runners), Southern Methodist University (throws), Idaho State (tennis) and University of Alabama (swimming). Interestingly, just as Villanova now has an Irish distance coach, Idaho State at the time of a research visit for this study had a New Zealand tennis coach, further enhancing the pipeline attraction. Southern Methodist University (SMU) track coach, Dave Wollman, exemplified the manner in which pipelines develop:

Ian Winchester came directly because of Courtney Ireland. I saw Courtney's name in World Junior results. Then the New Zealand runner Jackie Goodman ['89 NCAA 10,000m champ while at Oklahoma State] ran in a cross-country race here, so I asked her if she knew Ireland. She said, 'Sure, we were on teams together. You want his phone number?' (Hendershott, 1997:49).

The essential objective of athletic recruitment is points scoring. For many sports, versatility, consistency and 'attitude' are at least as important as excellence. Athletic writer Sieg Lindstrom cites teams as far back as the 1940s to back his claim that 'top flight coaches have known for years that the best way to

win the nationals is to find athletes who can score in more than one event'. The recruitment challenge is to find the sprinter who can race hurdles and relays, the thrower who is as useful with shot or javelin as with the discus. In these days of scholarship limitations, he says, 'that's more true than ever'. (1997:8-9).

Despite the desire to double or treble score, it is apparent that the big forces in national track and field have what Lindstrom calls 'power event areas'. Thus Villanova has been noted for its distance running teams, Oregon for distance and throwing, Arkansas for horizontal jumps, Texas for women's sprints, SMU for throwing. For such schools, the challenge is to recruit the very highest quality, 'three or four or five studs' (ibid). The different approaches would appear to reflect the strength of the school's athletic programme. Strong schools can afford to specialize, adding strength to strength.

Coaches' recruitment tactics reflect the mix of available talent and resident expertise. SMU provides an interesting case study. 1997 coach Wollman built his team over a number of years. Foreign recruits, including New Zealanders, played an important role:

Wollman's first NCAA scorer, putter Roar Hoff in '90, was Norwegian. Countryman Lars Sundt followed and twice scored in the discus. Three-time shot placer Courtney Ireland hailed from New Zealand. The '91 hammer went to France's Christophe Epalle. [In 1997, top three discus throwers] Tammert is Estonian, Tunks is from Canada and Winchester is from New Zealand. Hammer thrower Xavier Tisson is French, Gustaffson Swedish, Swords is Australian. (Hendershott, p.48).

US coaches have an obvious objective of building and maintaining a winning team. Key questions for this research have been, 'Why do they need to recruit foreign athletes to do this? Why, *in particular*, do they recruit New Zealanders?' The

answers to these questions commonly reflect the achievement ideology behind collegiate sport, the 'attitude' referred to above. Texas track coach Bev Kearney has stated that 'It's not always the most talented person who ends up being the most successful. ... But it's those who are able to dedicate themselves all around that make the biggest difference'. A lot on her team, she said, 'have persevered through very difficult and trying times in their own ways and have made it and survived and are here and competing well'. (Hendershott, p.10). Other coaches interviewed during the research reiterated this theme. For example:

The sort of person I look for for the team is someone with a burning desire to excel and compete and to improve themselves. I would rather have someone who isn't necessarily at the top, but is showing a huge amount of potential and has a hunger for excellence, than take onto the team someone who is already a star and maybe laid back and complacent. (US swim coach)

The image of New Zealand athletes in the US is of basically pretty hardworking athletes. They work from the heart, which is the quality of most New Zealand athletes. And they want to be the best that they can be and under the heat and the pressure they do pretty well. (NZ and ex-US college volleyball coach)

In addition to being versatile and prepared to compete in a range of events, New Zealand athletes are often older and more experienced than local athletes would be. This maturity is important both on and off the sports field. For example:

Foreign athlete[s] ... always know how to look after themselves. They take responsibility. If you tell them to do something they do it. ... *It's not that they do*

*everything right, but they get the job done.* (US waterpolo coach, emphasis added).

Visits to US colleges revealed that small schools, or schools just establishing a sports programme, use foreigners as a 'quick fix'.

There are a lot of good players in the US but a lot of schools to go to. So we are trying to get a reputation and it's hard to do that. It's hard to get our good local kids to come here. You have to be good enough for people to respect you. So we have to start winning and doing better before we will get some strong players here. So usually what a lot of the teams will do is get foreign players, build the team, get the team really strong and that'll help bring in a few more. We sometimes call it a 'quick fix'. (US tennis coach)

For a developing program a lot of times it is almost a short cut. I might not be able to bring in the number one in the US but I might be able to sign someone from New Zealand or Australia or England who is as good at the same age. They might be a better athlete than I could get in the US. (US track coach)

The rationale for recruiting foreign athletes, New Zealanders included, is also economic. It is a highly cost-effective means of getting quality athletes. Whereas coaches might have to bring American athletes on campus for visits, for foreign athletes a few phone calls often suffice as enticement. In sum, New Zealand athletes are attractive to US coaches because they are eager to achieve, they are versatile and often experienced competitors, they are often mature and easy to 'manage', and they are cheap and easy to obtain. One might add that many New Zealand athletes seem unaware of, or unimpressed by, the reputation of a school. Even low ranking schools appear to



provide opportunity and will be considered seriously, a factor which is important for schools having difficulty attracting good American athletes.

On the other side of this equation, New Zealand athletes accept US scholarships because they offer experiences perceived to be impossible (or very difficult) to achieve in New Zealand: top level competition; among the best facilities, scientific expertise and support systems in the world; provision of all sporting material needs (clothing, equipment, etc.); a 'free' education<sup>6</sup>; opportunity to travel, experience a new culture and become independent. The cost, which often remains unseen until they arrive, is becoming a cog in a highly sophisticated sports business machine which too often, it seems, requires them to relinquish individual responsibility to the coach and shift allegiance from New Zealand representation to college obligations. Some athletes thrive on this. Others suffer socially, culturally and physically<sup>7</sup>. It is the latter group of athletes who

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<sup>6</sup> As a financial return for sport labour this 'free' education, in monetary terms, is in fact very meagre payment. It might be argued that education's ideological value significantly outweighs its economic value.

<sup>7</sup> See Cameron (1998) for accounts of the student-athlete experience. Relevant comments include:

'No one knows that you like vegemite on your toast and eat crumpets. Everything is different. It is fast and it is big' (golfer).

'[Swimmers] go from being a big fish to a small fish in a 12-hour flight. They just can't handle it' (NZ swim coach).

'Sometimes I get just too run down and it's too much. ... You have to get used to it. You have no choice' (tennis player).

'I'd never run so badly in my life. But the experience made me grow up. Made me more independent' (distance runner).

'You learn to be a bit more streetwise' (rower).

return home prematurely and in so-doing help form the negative image held by national administrators and coaches.

### **NZ-US sport migration in national and global context**

The loss of elite and sub-elite sports players from New Zealand is not unique to collegiate sport. New Zealand soccer players migrate to Germany and the UK, volleyballers to American and Australian beach circuits. In 1997, Canterbury Rugby League reported losing ten representative players in the previous two years, only two of whom returned. Australia is the key destination of league players. (*The Press*, Christchurch, 22.10.97). Camilla Obel (pers. comm. 1998) documented 208 rugby players being given clearances in the 1992-93 summer to play overseas (mostly in Europe, Japan and Australia). Although some transfer to League, it seems likely that most rugby players migrate for only a season. Elite players contemplating longer term contracts overseas are a bigger concern for the NZRFU. Newly-appointed Coach Wayne Smith observed:

Once players start deciding to go overseas then, in terms of All Black ambition, they've already gone, in my opinion. ... [T]o bring them back to play for the All Blacks would be wrong. It would send the wrong signals and start us on a one-way road to mediocrity in our country because we'd lose most of our best players (Schumacher, 2000:16).

For Smith, echoing the NZRFU, the incentive of playing for the All Blacks should be enough to keep players in the

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'It's a cruisey life, a great lifestyle for three years' (tennis player).

country – if they are not sufficiently committed to All Black selection then they lose the privilege of being considered.

Just as the migration of sports players is not a phenomenon peculiar to athletic scholarship migration, neither is it peculiar to New Zealand. Top athletes travel the globe, sometimes nomads in search of competition, at other times shifting between contracts from country to country. Maguire (1994a; 1999) documents some particular trends in recruitment of sports labour, both within nation states and between nation states. Rugby union players move from Wales to England (see Williams, 1994); America and Canada benefit from neighbouring Dominican Republic baseballers; Italy and Spain benefit from neighbouring European soccer players. Indeed, in Europe, soccer labour flows across the continent and even in countries such as Scandinavia, where there is an outflow of elite soccer talent, there is at the same time an inflow of lesser talent from elsewhere.

At trans-continental level, particular trends are also observable. At one point, Maguire notes, over 400 Americans were playing in Europe's professional men's basketball leagues (1994a:475). Ten out of 15 of Britain's 1993 Ice Hockey team were Canadian born (Maguire, 1994a:477). Africans were prominent in French, Belgian, Portuguese and Dutch soccer leagues and Afro-Caribbeans in English soccer. For many decades English cricket has benefited from Australians, Afro-Caribbeans and South Africans. On the other hand, sports labourers also flow out of Europe: Scandinavians go to America to play ice hockey, and other Europeans have been recruited to US colleges for track and field, soccer, rugby, basketball and swimming (Maguire, 1994a:455-6).

This picture as painted by Maguire and others (see Maguire and Bale, 1994), serves to emphasize that collegiate athletic migration is only a small frame in the moving picture. It is not unusual. However, the loss of athletes from New Zealand to US colleges is a little different from the international examples

cited and from the case of rugby, league and soccer, in particular, within New Zealand. First, the majority of student-athletes are from Olympic sports, codes that have a high profile in New Zealand, have political import, and are contested by large numbers of countries on the world stage. Many of these are also numerically very small codes<sup>8</sup>. They do not have the depth to draw on that rugby does, and cannot afford deliberately to exclude their overseas players from contention for representative teams.

A second difference from the migration experienced in other sporting codes is that the inducements to migrate to the US are not directly financial, or even for prestige, but are in the form of a good unconnected to the sport itself, namely a sports scholarship and a 'free' education. In other words, from the student's perspective student-athlete migration is not obviously an economic transaction. Student-athletes are also likely to be younger than those recruited by professional teams and corporations from other codes. They represent potential.

New Zealand is not alone in deploring the impact of US athletic scholarships on domestic sport. Neither is this concern something new. As early as the 1950s, Australia proposed that athletes who accepted US athletic scholarships should be stripped of their amateur status (an interesting proposal, given that an ideology of amateurism underpins collegiate sport – see Cameron, 1995). In Britain in 1961, the British Amateur Board was reported to be 'taking a serious view' of US athletic scholarships. Twenty years later the exodus of student-athletes was considered to 'seriously undermine' Canadian athletics,

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<sup>8</sup> In 1990-91, for instance, athletics reported 7486 non-child competitors, swimming 23,269, tennis 32,612, basketball 31,150 and volleyball 32,000 against rugby's 207,000 (Cameron, 1996, pp.224-6).

while in Ireland the migration of track athletes (which has included at least eight Irish Olympians) was decried as a 'disaster' for Ireland (Bale, pp.194, 198). The consistent complaint, over time and across national boundaries, lends support to arguments that collegiate foreign athlete recruitment is akin to imperial exploitation and has been so for at least half a century. Such arguments conform to more general theories of core-periphery relations (Maguire, 1999:18-19)<sup>9</sup>.

Some of the issues arising from sports labour migration that are highlighted by Maguire are issues that also affect New Zealanders. A familiar argument is that the 'movement of athletic talent involves, in specific instances, the deskilling of "donor" countries' (1994a:458). The loss of star baseball and soccer players from Latin and Central America to the USA and Europe is cited. 'Not only is the native (*sic*) audience denied direct access to the talent nurtured and developed in their country, but, in some cases, ... sports lose some of their quality players when the demands of European clubs clash with international matches' (*ibid*). Referring to a range of case studies, Maguire concludes one common theme to be 'questions regarding the perceived threat to national team performance and the under-development of indigenous talent' (1999:102). These comments, which are different dimensions of the same problem, mirror the views of two New Zealand sport administrators when they said:

If New Zealand retains the athlete then the entire country's standard [in that event] improves; if the

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<sup>9</sup> Maguire refers to Wallerstein's theory, which characterises economic relations as 'enrich[ing] the industrial areas and impoverish[ing] the periphery'. Maguire comments, 'As yet, this ... approach has not been taken up by scholars studying global sports ...' (1999:19).

athlete goes overseas the individual might improve but the national standard stays the same or declines. (Regarding track and field)

Taking the US athletes out of the nationals leaves a huge gap. Currently, we are missing our top female backstroker, our top male backstroker, our top 1-miler man, our second best female breaststroker and our second best male sprinter. Because American swimmers are never here to race the nationals they are boring meets, no atmosphere, records don't fall, media aren't interested, tv won't come, it becomes very difficult to get sponsorship. The New Zealand public, their own contemporaries, coaches, and selectors don't get to see them competing at their peak because they are not doing it here. (Regarding swimming)

Bale and Sang (1994) have critiqued the development/underdevelopment thesis by studying the consequences of Kenya-US track athlete migration. Since 1950, Kenya's production of athletes ranking in the top 100 in the world, on a per capita basis, peaked at 6.0 times the world average in 1972 before dropping to 4.5 times the world average. Over the same period, Kenyan track and field athletics became highly specialized, with a decided focus on distance events. Women were virtually invisible in the competition arena. The first Kenyan athletes arrived in US colleges in the late 1960s. During the period 1973-85, Kenyans were the major foreign source of elite male track talent. However, during the 1980s the proportion of top Kenyan athletes domiciled in the US declined, from 31.6% of those ranked top 50 in Kenya in 1982 to 15.4% in 1986 and for international class (top 10 Kenyans) from 68% in 1982 to 25% in 1986. Of the 67 Kenyans residing in the US in 1982, only three were field eventers. (Bale and Sang, 1994:212-216).

Despite the remarkable flow of athletic talent to the US, Bale and Sang argue that the success of Kenyan middle-distance athletes in the 1960s owed little to the US experience. Conversely, by the time this recruitment began, Kenya was already establishing itself as an athletic power, especially in distance and middle-distance running. Many of the athletes who took up scholarships were already experienced athletes. Bale and Sang state categorically, ‘the seeds of their athletic development had been sown in Kenya; the US colleges basically *exploited*<sup>10</sup> existing talent – they did not develop it’ (216). During the same period, athletes from the Caribbean and West Africa were being recruited for sprints and Scandinavians for throws, further emphasizing the skill-specific nature of college athlete recruitment.

Bale and Sang also note that although Kenya appeared weak globally in other track and field events, it was *not* weak in other events continentally: during the 1970s Kenya produced more throwers and jumpers than any other nation *within Africa*. These observations suggest that US athletic migration was not responsible for either the underdevelopment of track and field generally in Kenya or for the development of distance running specifically.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> original emphasis

<sup>11</sup> Bale and Sang (1994, pp.220-3) argue that a variety of factors have contributed to Kenya’s dominance in distance running, among them the prevalence of “muscular Christianity” in Kenyan colonialism (many of Kenya’s top runners were trained in mission schools); the role of the army and the police in athletics (Keino is one such product); the increasing number of Kenyans living outside Kenya in places other than the US (for example Wakihuri in Japan and others in Europe); foreign investment in Kenyan athletic facilities and coaching, especially from China and Germany; and special investments made by the IAAF in training centres, coaching clinics and assistance with travel and international competition.

The Kenyan experience is salutary for New Zealand. Despite the criticisms of national officials about the 'loss of talent' of US-based athletes (whether from non-availability or burn-out and injury), they offer no evidence that international performance by teams in their sports are either weaker or stronger as a consequence of athlete migration. Comments might be made about the extent to which specific individuals have or have not improved, but in national terms empirical support for sports generically is notably absent. The issue is different for local competition, as indicated by the swimming administrator cited on the previous page. Local competition commonly misses the sport's star performers. Here again, though, no evidence is given to support arguments that missing US-based competitors in fact lead to weaker performances by those athletes who are NZ-resident. Considerable 'hard data' are needed before judgments about competition strength can be empirically justified.

The other side to the sport migration coin is the impact on host sport when elite teams are packed with imported recruits. Student migrants would seem to pose little such risk in the United States: several US coaches made it clear that if local athletes of equivalent standard were available they would be recruited. As local standards improve then the standard for overseas athletes would also have to improve<sup>12</sup>. While some countries attract migrants to replace local players who have been

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These factors place Kenya's success in a global context, rather than at the door of US colleges. However not all agree. Kenyan Olympian, US alumnus and Kenyan Commissioner for Sport, Mike Boit, has argued that Kenyan Olympic success *is* due to their US experience (Bale and Sang cite an unpublished paper 'Track scholarships: The pros and cons' by Mike Boit, Department of PE, Kenyatta University 1988).

<sup>12</sup> The director of one US track programme advised, 'If you [NZ] have athletes who are potential Olympic finalists then I'm interested. Otherwise, forget it'.



recruited out (the case of soccer in Scandinavia, for instance), New Zealand does not appear to do this in the sports from which student-athletes are recruited. However, that is not to imply that New Zealand is 'innocent' of using foreign players. Bale and Sang (1994:206) observed, for instance, that most members of the 1991 Samoan World Cup rugby team were actually resident in New Zealand. More recently, the 'stacking' of some school rugby teams with Pacific Island imports has caused school sport administrators to develop policy on sport migrations<sup>13</sup>, signalling the concerns that could emerge should Olympic sports engage in similar strategies. Local impacts are two-fold: first, such players deprive local players of opportunity. A second concern is that expressed by the NZRFU in 1997 that 'New Zealand rugby is fostering talented players [from Samoa, in particular] who have no intention of continuing to play the game in this country' (Dalton, 1997a). While the situation of rugby is not currently a reflection of that of the Olympic sports mentioned, the concerns are fair warning for these codes. These examples also warn against extrapolating from 'sports' to 'sport' in any discussion of athlete recruitment: as with other labour movement, inwards and outwards migration are qualitatively different flows.

## Discussion

This paper has shown that NZ-US student-athlete recruitment is no more than a specialized kind of labour migration. Student-athletes sign a contract that links ongoing support to

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<sup>13</sup> In 1997 the Auckland Secondary Schools' Heads Association passed rules not unlike NCAA rules to curb recruitment of foreign rugby players. Rules included the prohibition of inducements and limitations on the number of foreign players per school (Dalton, 1997b).

performance. Sports labour migration is a global phenomenon, part of a bigger process of globalisation of labour generally, affecting other New Zealand sports, too. In addition, Maguire notes, migration of sports labour is only one component in the globalisation of sport, whereby sports goods, equipment and even 'landscapes'<sup>14</sup> flow from one country to another. Although Maguire's empirical material is derived primarily from case studies of specific sports (e.g., ice hockey, basketball, football, cricket<sup>15</sup>) rather than multifaceted collegiate sport,<sup>16</sup> he does draw attention to several important aspects of sport migration which serve to contextualize student-athlete migration further.

First, he notes that this form of migration is not new: just as 'artists, musicians, poets and scholars have long moved around European royal courts, salons and universities' (1994a:453) 'the migration of sports talent as athletic labour is [now] a major feature of the "new global economy"' (1999:97). Although, as Maguire points out (1994a:453), 'It is not usual for sports devotees to think of these sportspeople as workers', sport

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<sup>14</sup> e.g., golf courses – Maguire, 1994a:464.

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, Maguire and Stead, 1998, 'Border crossings. soccer labour migration and the European Union'; Maguire and Stead, 1996, "'Far Pavilions"?: Cricket migrants, foreign sojourn and contested identities'; Maguire, 1996, 'Blade Runners: Canadian migrants, ice hockey and the global sports process'; Maguire, 1994b, 'American labour migrants, globalization and the making of English basketball'; Maguire, 1993, 'American football, British society and global sport development'.

<sup>16</sup> See also Maguire and Bale, (1994) Ch 1. The case of student-athlete migration challenges Maguire's analysis in interesting ways. On the one hand it involves a significant array of sports (at least 30 – see Cameron, 1998:94); on the other hand it involves migration of nationals from over 50 countries, in a migration flow which is almost totally periphery to core.

migrants are in practice only a variant on a form. Most industrial societies today have highly mobile workforces. Sports labour is no different from other labour in this respect. Essentially, sport migrants reflect the commodification of sport and the transformation of sport-as-work.

Second, Maguire (1999) links the migration of elite sports people to the globalization of economy and culture. He cites Dunning's observation that the sportization of society owes significant cause, *inter alia*, to 'the widening network of international dependencies' (Maguire, 1999:78)<sup>17</sup>. National sports success is located within a much wider sports figuration which involves knowledge, technology, human resources (coaches, etc.), facilities, media and sponsors as well as competition (Maguire, 1999:89-90). While New Zealand experiences all dimensions of such figurations, a major issue in terms of the present study is dependence on others for elite competition. This is particularly so for the sports represented by student-athlete migrants. As a small country, in the 'wrong' hemisphere for most elite competition, many New Zealand NSOs are absolutely dependent on northern nations for competition experience. Part of the dilemma of collegiate sport is that the trade-off is permanent; the price for gaining that experience often is to lose the competitors themselves.

Third, in his 1994 paper<sup>18</sup> Maguire points out that, like any migrant labourer, sports migrants are sometimes disadvantaged, dislocated or even exploited, but they also usually gain from the process. Sports labourers tend to be 'hired' by specific clubs and these employers set the terms of work. This is the case with New Zealand student-athletes: though an

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<sup>17</sup> Guttman, (1991:186) points out that although cultural dependence might align with political and/or economic dependence, this is not a *necessary* alignment.

<sup>18</sup> Maguire, 1994a.

exploitation argument has substance it is quite clear that the athletes themselves gain significantly. But they, too, are 'hired' by employers (colleges) who set the terms of work in the form of contracts and NCAA rules that govern all aspects of scholarship administration, hours of training, competition, provision of living requirements, etc.<sup>19</sup> It is also NCAA rules that dictate that athletes must be amateurs and may not receive any form of financial return (including prize money, personal sponsorship, television endorsements, etc.). Undisguised, the scholarship is simply a work contract.

Fourth, Maguire observes that while free movement of labour is now part of EU law, employment rights differ across sports played in different countries.<sup>20</sup> In North America unionization, negotiation, collective bargaining and strikes among (for instance) football, ice hockey, basketball and baseball players have achieved varied success. College athletes lag further behind these other sports, having shown little inclination to unionize or even negotiate<sup>21</sup>. Despite working in a system where all other participants – coaches, trainers, athletic directors, etc. – receive substantial payment but where they receive no financial reward themselves, New Zealand student-athletes responded with a decided lack of interest to queries about payment, reward and

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<sup>19</sup> The NCAA can be argued to operate in a manner akin to the cartels of professional sport. See Fleisher et al.

<sup>20</sup> See Maguire, 1999, Ch 5. Maguire notes that although individuals are technically free to negotiate sports contracts anywhere within the European Union, in practice European soccer still operates a transfer system which is described as a 'slave' system (1994a:458).

<sup>21</sup> The short-term transient character of student athletics reduces opportunity as well as inclination to unionize or lobby for reform. Fleisher et al. note, 'for the most part [student] athletes are a silent voice' (1992:152).

conditions of employment. Yet these same athletes, as labourers, have been described by Bale as a proletariat, 'ranking among the most exploited workers in American society' (Bale, 1991:131). The success of the terms of employment, for New Zealanders, would appear to lie in a trade-off in 'goods' that are not commensurate, in particular the exchange of sport labour, skill and performance for opportunity, material support and life-style.

While a sociologist might define NZ-US athlete recruitment as 'just' a form of labour migration, New Zealand NSOs do not see it this way. What needs to be unravelled is the extent to which athlete migration is denigrated because of its impact on some individuals and the extent to which it is denigrated because of how it is believed to impact on national sport. Throughout discussions of student-athlete migration, whether with coaches and athletes in the US or with coaches and athletes in New Zealand, there is a tension between institutional allegiance and individual autonomy. The objections by NSOs in New Zealand primarily relate to unavailability – whether because an athlete returns home injured or burnt out or whether because college commitments take precedence over national representation (athletes have commented, for instance, that Commonwealth Games do not hold high status in the scheme of college athlete competition opportunities – they might well get better competition at an NCAA meet). The problem with this argument, as Bale points out, is that 'it totally over-rides the freedom of movement of students, or for that matter of athletes. It places national interest over individual interest, treating individuals as pieces of 'human capital' (Bale, 1991:195). That is, NSOs decry US colleges for doing precisely what they themselves wish to do: exploit 'their' athletes. A fundamental matter of individual sovereignty and ownership lies at the centre of all student-athlete migration debate.

The issue of ownership is tied to the issue of nationality. Maguire points out what might be taken for granted: 'global sporting success not only reflects national sports systems but also

reinforces national esteem' (1999:90). He likens global sport to 'patriot games'. Allegiance to one's country of origin is particularly important when that country has little depth of talent from which to select national teams. However, sport migration is not about nationalism or even loyalty. It is, as Maguire and Bale characterize it, a highly rational technical process to do with the status and market value of the migrants. Today's sport labourers, in whatever context, are recruited for their technical skill and performance excellence. This was evident in the quotes by US coaches cited above.

Sport migrants probably have little attachment to their community of origin. One can go further and suggest that truly elite athletes work in a total international environment, commonly spending different seasons in different hemispheres. Inevitably their 'culture of community' is likely to be a global one<sup>22</sup>. Acknowledging this is very difficult for sports administrators and coaches who work hard, often unpaid, to provide coaching and obtain increasingly scarce public funding<sup>23</sup> to facilitate performance appropriate to *national* representation. Few take the position of the New Zealand waterpolo administrator who, while lamenting the loss of players to US colleges, said 'It reflects well on New Zealand waterpolo that we are able to get players to that level'. Understanding the dilemma

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<sup>22</sup> Alongside this emphasis on the global there is at the same time an emphasis on 'club' or 'team' in some sports (e.g., soccer; basketball; baseball). Here, as point out (Maguire and Bale, 1994:284), highly successful athletes can also assume a status that transcends national boundaries and national identity. They, too, are dislocated from any national identity. As participants in the globalisation process 'the new generation of sport migrants ... may have little sense of attachment to a specific space or community' (Maguire and Bale, 1994:461).

<sup>23</sup> Including corporate sponsorship, which is no more than diverted public money.

faced by national sports administrators is fundamentally a task of unravelling the seemingly contradictory global trend of 'cosmopolitan consciousness' (Maguire, 1999:213) on the one hand and national expression on the other. Paradoxically, international sport can exist only on the back of national sport, which sport administrators fear, in turn, is compromised by the particular *inter-national* trend described in this paper.

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## **Model without a cause: Public choice and bureaucratic reform in New Zealand**

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### **Abstract**

Public choice theory is widely acknowledged as having been one of the most influential of the various theoretical traditions which have informed the process of public service reform in New Zealand. The suspicion of the motives of bureaucrats which lies at the heart of public choice has proved highly attractive to reformist politicians, who have drawn upon it for inspiration while changing both the contours and functions of government departments. However, while many accounts of New Zealand's experience of bureaucratic change concentrate on the impact of developments within new managerialism or institutional economics, relatively few have thus far focused on the various effects of the public choice-inspired reforms. The purpose of this article is to gain a sense of that impact by assessing recent trends in a range of indicators, including public spending on the core state sector, employment patterns within government departments, and the size of agencies' budgets. The article concludes that, while public choice notions may have rendered the public service more efficient, they have also weakened the capacity of the departmental sector to carry out the tasks expected of it by both governments and citizens.

## Introduction

In 1971 one of the doyens of American public choice, William Niskanen, unveiled an economic model of bureaucracy at the centre of which stood (or perhaps sat) '*good men (sic) who work very hard at their jobs, [but who] in certain institutional conditions, can and do make an awful botch of things*' (1973:4; original emphasis). Niskanen's model, and its attendant assumptions of bureaucratic profligacy, inflexibility, and general shiftlessness, has since assumed icon status on the political Right across the globe, and reformist political élites from Washington to London (where Niskanen's text was made required reading for civil servants during the Thatcher years), and Toronto to Wellington, have turned to it for analyses of and remedies for the bureaucratic 'problem' in the context of swingeing programmes of public sector reform.

Surprisingly, however, relatively little empirical attention has been paid to Niskanen's model in the New Zealand context, particularly in relation to its impact upon reforms within the public service. Readers of this journal will be well aware of the growing literature on the experience of structural reform in its various manifestations in New Zealand. There are many analyses that explore the theoretical bases of New Zealand's experience (Boston et al., 1996; Kelsey, 1995; Rudd and Roper, 1997; Scott and Gorringer, 1989; Sharp, 1994), the majority of which rightly identify neoliberal politics and neoclassical economics as the key drivers; equally, there is no shortage of commentary on the continuities between what has occurred in this country, and the experiences of other nations that have been subjected to similar reform experiences (see Castles et al., 1996; Self, 1993). But beyond generic descriptions of the process of departmental restructuring there is a reasonable dearth of academic accounts that focus specifically on the intellectual antecedents of bureaucratic reform (although see Boston et al., 1996; Shaw, 1999), and there are fewer still that dig into the empirical record in

an effort to gain a sense of the degree to which incessant change over the last decade or so has altered the parameters of the public service.

This article is an attempt at redressing that lacuna, and its chief purpose is to demonstrate the impact the theory of public choice has had on the institutions that collectively comprise the New Zealand public service.<sup>1</sup> To that end, it begins with a short resumé of the nature of public choice, and of the key features of the economic model that that tradition has spawned. Secondly, and following a necessarily selective description of the pre-reform public service, the key public choice-inspired reforms applied to the government's departments are described. The bulk of the discussion thereafter is given over to an assessment of the institutional health of the public service, as measured against indicators such as trends in government spending, employment and remuneration rates for public servants, and the size of departments' budgets (see Table 1 at end of article). The article concludes that years of institutional change predicated on a disdain for all things bureaucratic have left the New Zealand public service in a parlous state, and that an alternative approach is urgently required if complete bureaucratic dysfunction is to be avoided.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The focus throughout is on the public *service* rather than the wider public *sector*. The public service comprises those government departments that are listed in the First Schedule of the *State Sector Act* 1988, and does not include agencies such as State owned enterprises and Crown owned entities. Moreover, while the generic term 'department' formally refers to both Ministries and government departments, on occasion a distinction is drawn here between 'departments' (which typically provide public goods and services) and 'Ministries' (which focus in the main on the provision of policy advice).

<sup>2</sup> The paper represents work-in-progress, and reflects the author's primary research interests in the theoretical drivers of, and

## Public choice

Over the last three decades or so, a paradigm shift has occurred in the public sectors of the majority of Western democracies. The new paradigm, comprising a coalescing of public choice theory and neo-classical economics, has no universally agreed-upon appellation, but Peter Self's phrase 'government by the market' captures its essential orientation: that competitive markets, rather than conventional structures of democratic governance, represent the most appropriate means of meeting the needs and aspirations of citizens. Specifically, the new orthodoxy advocates that:

governments should in general do less; ... they should reduce or relinquish their previous responsibilities for maintaining full employment and a comprehensive system of state welfare; ... they should privatise public services or their delivery wherever practicable; and ... they should reform their own operations in accordance with market concepts of competition and efficiency (Self, 1993:ix).

Nowhere has the approach exerted greater influence than in New Zealand, where it has been used as the inspiration for a series of rolling reforms within the public service since the late 1980s.<sup>3</sup> Far from emerging in an *ad hoc* and piecemeal fashion,

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institutional outcomes of bureaucratic reform in Westminster parliamentary democracies.

<sup>3</sup> The process formally commenced with the passage of the *State Owned Enterprises Act* 1986, and the most recent raft of reforms saw the disestablishment of the former Department of Social Welfare in 1999, and the creation of the Ministry of Social Policy, and the departments of Work and Income (in 1998), and Child, Youth and Family Services

the signal feature of the New Zealand experience has been the striking extent to which bureaucratic change has been characterised by congruence between theoretical prescription and institutional outcome. The point has been made that 'New Zealand pursued a vision derived almost deductively from an interpretation of economic theory' (Nagel, 1997:350); similarly, in one of the most comprehensive reviews of the public service reforms, Schick has observed that the agenda for change was 'driven by notions which have only recently entered mainstream economics, and the ideas were applied with full fidelity to their internal logic' (1998:124).

Public choice has been singled out by some commentators as the most influential of the various theoretical frameworks drawn upon by reforming administrations in this country (see Boston et al., 1996:27).<sup>4</sup> As a branch of the economics discipline that 'has found its most ardent disciples not in its American heartland, but in the remote, small islands of New Zealand' (Self, 1993:173), public choice is characterised by the application of the principles of neo-classical economics to decision-making amongst voters, politicians and bureaucrats (Borins, 1988:13; Lane, 1993; North, 1993; Paldam, 1993; Self, 1993).<sup>5</sup> In its original incarnation, it focused on the extent to which policy decisions taken by elected members of government can, when based upon the pursuit of self-interest, result in policy outcomes that are some way short of optimal.<sup>6</sup> Subsequent developments gave rise to a

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<sup>4</sup> Other theoretical influences include managerialism, transaction-cost analysis and new institutional economics, or agency theory (Boston et al, 1996:16-26).

<sup>5</sup> Borins (1988) has a fascinating analysis of the extent to which the British television show 'Yes Minister' popularised the principles of public choice.

second bloc of public choice theorists who were far more concerned with the administration of public policy, and in particular, with the alleged propensity of bureaucrats to substitute their own interests for those of elected political representatives.

Whether their concern is with the politics or administration of public policy, running through all standard public choice fare is the belief that the political sphere is most appropriately thought of as a market place which mediates the demand and supply of public goods. In this grand market place: voters can be likened to consumers; political parties become entrepreneurs who offer competing packages of services and taxes in exchange for votes; political propaganda equates with commercial advertising; government agencies are public firms dependent upon receiving or drumming up adequate political support to cover their costs; and interest groups are co-operative associations of consumers or producers of public goods (Self, 1993:3).

At the core of public choice lie two assumptions. The first is that 'all decisions in society can be disaggregated into decisions made by individuals acting either alone or in concert with others' (Sproule-Jones, 1988:36). This attachment to methodological

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<sup>6</sup> In its application to representative politics, public choice has provided the theoretical justification for statutes such as the *Reserve Bank Act* 1989, which have removed responsibility for the day-to-day management of monetary policy from elected representatives. More than one commentator (see Dalziel, 1993) has commented on the 'democratic deficit' created when control over important policy levers is placed in the hands of appointed officials, ostensibly because elected representatives are irredeemably prone to making decisions on the basis of calculated self-interest.

individualism lends to all public choice analyses an exclusive concern with the motivations and actions of individual actors. For one leading public choice scholar, methodological individualism recognises 'the autonomous standing of individuals in the constitution of ... societies' (Ostrom, 1993:170), while in the view of another, '[p]urposive behaviour by individuals is the essence of social behaviour, [such that] theories of social behaviour that represent individuals as automatons in some social mass ... have rarely proved valuable' (Niskanen, 1973:20).<sup>7</sup> In public choice it is the preferences and conduct of individuals that count, rather than nebulous constructs such as the 'common good', or the 'public interest'.

The second, and related, pivotal public choice postulate is the notion of rational egoism, which describes the belief 'that man (sic) is an egoistic, rational utility-maximiser' (Mueller, 1989; cited in Self, 1993:2). In other words, public choice assumes that individuals are motivated solely by considerations of pecuniary self-interest, and, moreover, that it is rational to consistently engage in behaviour that is non-altruistic and self-serving (see Downs, 1957; Mueller, 1993; Niskanen, 1971; Ostrom, 1993). The self-interest maxim squeezes out of most mainstream public choice scholarship political and economic conduct that is other-regarding or publicly spirited. Instead, public choice prefers the proposition that individuals' choices are predicated upon 'stable preferences and a rational consideration of alternatives and their consequences, where the alternative yielding the highest level of expected utility is chosen' (Lane, 1993:177). This rather arid conception of human nature leads theorists to conclude that

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<sup>7</sup> Niskanen refers to Hayek's *The Counter-revolution of Science* as the best account of the 'problems and consequences of applying the models and methods of natural science to social behaviour' (1973:20).



individuals are inherently inclined ‘to shirk, to be opportunistic, to maximize ... self-interest [and] to act with guile’ (Donaldson, 1990:372).

### **The economics of bureaucracy**

Those two core assumptions have generated a vast public choice literature on political behaviour. Much of that scholarship is given over to accounts of the outcomes of political activity; so-called demand-side public choice explores the ways in which self-interested conduct on the part of politicians, voters, and interest groups structure the demand for publicly funded goods and services (see Buchanan and Thelock, 1962, 1986; Tullock, 1965, 1993). The central assumption in this *genre* is that politicians are primarily motivated to secure and maintain political power in order to gain the utilities derived from holding public office (such as status, power, and influence). In fact, demand-side public choice reduces the entire *raison d’être* of democratic politics to little more than ‘the battle over the spoils of politics’ (Tullock, 1993:43).

But this article is principally interested in the public choice work on bureaucracy, or what are termed supply-side accounts (for their concern with the type and amount of output supplied by public agencies). And in the view of a great many commentators (including Bendor, 1988; Blais and Dion, 1991; Dunleavy, 1991; McLean, 1987; Mitchell, 1983; Rowley, 1993), the intellectual antecedents and the current parameters of that literature were established by William Niskanen’s seminal publication *Bureaucracy and Representative Government* (1971).<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Other early contributors to the supply-side literature include Bartlett (1973), Breton (1974), and Mueller (1979). Mitchell (1983; cited in McCool (1995) provides an extensive bibliography of the public choice literature on bureaucracy.

Niskanen's economic model has been described as the single most cited study of bureaucracy (Bendor, 1988:354), and is certainly 'one of the most provocative and debated models of bureaucratic behaviour' (Blais and Dion, 1991:3). Significantly, the influence of Niskanen's work has spread well beyond academia. It has assumed the status of received wisdom in a great many political circles, particularly conservative ones, and Niskanen's prototypical budget-maximising bureaucrat has played no small part in the entrenchment of popular assumptions concerning bureaucratic inefficiency and government failure (Blais and Dion, 1991).

For Niskanen, 'the beginning of wisdom is the recognition that bureaucrats are people who are ... not entirely motivated by the general welfare or the interests of the state' (1973:20). Instead, he contends, public servants are driven by self-interest, and thereby constantly strive to increase the size of their department's overall budget. What Niskanen terms the bureaucratic 'maximand' (i.e. what public servants are motivated to seek) derives from the relationship between the size of an agency's budget and the welfare gains secured by its officials, which typically take the form of 'salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau' (Niskanen, 1971:38). Niskanen considers all but the last two of these to be a 'positive monotonic function of the total *budget* of the bureau' (1971:38; original emphasis), for which reason, he assumes, instrumental bureaucrats will push for continuous budget increases in negotiations with their political sponsors (principal amongst which, in parliamentary systems, are numbered Ministers and legislative committees).

The classical argument is that budget-maximising behaviour takes place in an institutional environment which is heavily skewed in favour of bureaucrats. In particular, Niskanen contends that in traditional Weberian bureaucracies there tends to be a significant 'disparity in the relative information available to the sponsor and to the bureau' (1973:16). Typically, bureaucrats

know a great deal more than anyone else, including their minister, about how their agency allocates resources, and what benefits and costs attach to its various activities. Senior bureaucrats are thereby well placed to exaggerate the level of public demand for their services, and to understate the costs of producing the same. Furthermore, in the economic model bureaux benefit from the fact that the political executive tends not to have recourse to alternative suppliers. There are no competitive markets for genuinely public goods, and the capacity for ministers to seek out non-departmental suppliers is therefore circumscribed.<sup>9</sup> In Niskanen's framework, this absence of contestability ensures that public agencies enjoy a monopoly over the supply of publicly funded goods and services.

Orthodox public choice is deeply suspicious of the consequences of this state of affairs. The unholy alliance of bureaucratic self-interest and systemic advantage would, Niskanen predicted, produce a bloated departmental sector that inefficiently produces excessive levels of goods and services, and stifles private sector initiative and innovation. In the economic model, increasing public expenditure, expanding departmental budgets, and ever larger public sectors employing greater numbers of bureaucrats are the unavoidable legacy of unfettered bureaucratic self-interest.

### **The public choice project, New Zealand-style**

Prior to the onset of reform, the architecture of the New Zealand public service, which remained substantially rooted in the *Public Service Act 1912*, was broadly consistent with the traditional bureaucratic model so roundly derided by public choice. Several features of those institutional arrangements are especially apposite here. First, the various tasks performed by government agencies,

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<sup>9</sup> For a commentary to this effect in the New Zealand context see Upton (1999).

the two most significant of which are the provision of policy advice and the implementation of policy decisions, were typically housed within single departments. The traditional preference for this particular institutional form reflected a consensus amongst policy-makers that the quality of policy advice and service delivery was enhanced if both functions were undertaken by officials employed under a 'single roof' (Boston et al., 1996:73).

Second, government departments were funded on the basis of the annual cost of inputs, which included personnel, maintenance and materials (Boston et al., 1996:260). That is, the financial management of the public service hinged around the cash cost of the various factors of production required to deliver departmental programmes. Departments were also required to comply with detailed controls over the deployment of inputs.

Finally, the centralisation of decision-making extended to both personnel and routine administrative matters. Permanent heads of departments enjoyed limited discretion regarding human resource issues, and in many instances decisions concerning appointments and promotions within particular departments required clearance with the State Services Commission (Scott and Gorringer, 1989:83). Moreover, senior managers were expected to administer their agencies and execute their personal responsibilities in accordance with the rules, regulations and procedures specified by the control agencies (the State Services Commission and the Treasury) (Martin, in Holland and Boston, 1990).

These and other features of the extant departmental sector were anathema to key members of the political and administrative wings of the executive branch in the mid-1980s. The prevailing intellectual climate, strongly influenced by public choice, embodied a mistrust of bureaucrats and bureaucracies. But public choice contains both a diagnosis of *and* a prescription for bureaucratic distemper, and in the programme of institutional

change that rolled out across the public service, three remedial measures were pursued with particular enthusiasm<sup>10</sup>:

### ***The division of functions***

From the point of view of public choice, the combination of both policy and operational functions within a single agency permits self-serving bureaucrats to promote policy advice that privileges their own department's service delivery wing over other providers, and to push for constant budget increases to support those activities. Since 1986, therefore, virtually all government agencies have been restructured so that the policy advice and implementation roles have been placed in separate agencies. This form of institutional 'decoupling', reformists contended, would permit ministers to obtain policy advice that was not contaminated by the vested interests of a department's operational arm.

### ***Greater competition***

Public choice has long argued that the absence of contestable markets for public goods enables bureaucracies to over-state both the public demand for their activities, and the quantum of resource they require to produce those goods. Secondly, public choice accepts the standard neoclassical nostrum that public provision is inherently less efficient than private provision. Unsurprisingly therefore, the New Zealand solution to the alleged incidence of government failure was to promote greater contestability in the markets for public goods and services. The privileged monopoly status of government departments has long since been stripped away in most policy sectors, largely on the assumption that by permitting private sector interests (and other public providers) to

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<sup>10</sup> For a more extended discussion of the features of the new machinery of government, see Boston et al., (1996:29-32) and Shaw (1999:192-202).

compete for public contracts, the government's own agencies would be forced to be more efficient and less wasteful.

### ***The shift to output-based funding***

Thirdly, the provisions of the *Public Finance Act* 1989 altered the basis on which the public service receives parliamentary appropriations through the Budget process. The previous funding régime, its critics contended, encouraged budget-maximisation and bureaucratic profligacy by failing to link departments' appropriations with demonstrated performance. In addition, in the view of some commentators, input funding tended to exclude effectiveness and efficiency considerations, and encouraged bureaucrats to pay little attention to the quality of the outputs, and subsequent outcomes, of productive processes (Scott et al., 1990). The shift to a new model in which the amount a department receives is explicitly tied to performance expectations specified by Vote ministers was intended to cap an agency's ability to expand its budget. The ring-fencing of bureaucrats' spending tendencies is bolstered in the 1989 legislation by stringent reporting requirements, a key purpose of which is to allow ministers and the Parliament to hold departments to account for the efficiency of their spending.

### **The impact of reform**

There is little doubt that these and other institutional reforms were implemented in order to reign in the presumed tendency of officials to act in self-serving and opportunistic ways. That the empirical evidence of the sort of government failure alleged by public choice was spotty and largely anecdotal (see Schick, 1996) seems to have been largely incidental: what was significant was that the architects of the New Zealand reforms *believed* that officials behaved in the ways described by public choice, and acted accordingly.

What, then, has been the cumulative impact of public choice on the New Zealand public service? One means of gauging that effect is to examine recent public expenditure within the bureaucracy for trends that are consistent with Niskanen's budget-maximising hypothesis. Indications that senior bureaucrats have successfully increased their budgets might suggest that the public choice inoculation has been largely ineffectual; evidence of the reverse might be read as proof that the reforms have helped constrain spending in the departmental sector.

This approach distinguishes between two assumptions: that bureaucrats seek to increase their budgets, and that they are generally successful in doing so. The methodological challenges associated with testing the first assumption are such that most empirical studies concentrate on the second. For there is a paucity of data from sources other than officials themselves regarding bureaucrats' motivations, and while an individual's assessment of what drives him or her may be no less credible for being subjective, such accounts are difficult to independently verify or contest. Moreover, even if it is accepted that officials have a 'well-developed propensity ... to seek larger budgets' (Blais and Dion, 1991:359), it is the success of those tendencies that has the greatest real-world impact. For this reason, most tests of Niskanen's model fall back on proxy measures of 'the *success* of bureaucratic entrepreneurs in achieving their (presumed) goals [rather than] the existence of those goals' (Peters, in Blais and Dion, 1991:305; original emphasis). Typically, too, those surrogate measures of budget-maximising behaviour are dependent variables such as government spending, public service employment figures and remuneration rates, and the size of departments' budgets.

### **Public expenditure**

The crudest test of the budget-maximising hypothesis is to examine trends in overall public expenditure. A fiscal cushion is a necessary prerequisite for budget growth, and the economic model

would anticipate signs that total spending by New Zealand governments has increased in recent years. Greater public expenditure cannot be explained solely as a function of officials' proclivities (most obviously as budget decisions reflect political priorities as well as bureaucratic imperatives), but equally, consistent reductions in public spending would suggest that maximising officials have been stymied in their quest for larger budgets. The data in Table 2 (at end of article) indicate that, since 1993, the proportion of GDP that constitutes public spending has fallen by around 10%. Interestingly, too, the 1999 figure is only marginally less than the public expenditure/GDP ratio of 35.2% that applied in 1980 (State Services Commission, 1999b:33). Assuming the veracity of Niskanen's notions, some twenty years ago a vastly inflated ratio might have been forecast to apply at the end of the twentieth century. In fact, the reverse has occurred, and the ratio continues to slide as the core departmental sector comprises an ever smaller slice of domestic economic activity.

### ***Employment and remuneration in the departmental sector***

Of course, had New Zealand experienced spectacular economic performance during the 1990s, even a falling public expenditure/GDP ratio might have represented opportunities for self-interested bureaucrats. However, with the exception of the years 1994 and 1995, when real GDP increased by 6.3% and 5.4% respectively (Reserve Bank, 1998), New Zealand's economic performance has been decidedly patchy (Dalziel and Lattimore, 1999).

In any event, patterns in overall government spending reveal, at best, an imprecise picture of developments in the public service, and a truly comprehensive test of the Niskanen model is properly based on a much more detailed exploration of the data. Dunsire (Blais and Dion, 1991:190) provides a useful point of departure, noting that within public choice there is 'more than a suggestion ... that the real aim of self-regarding bureaucrats in maximising budgets is to maximise establishment, or staffing: it is



extra staff that is said to bring more prestige, promotion and power'.

If that is so, then the data on employment patterns in the New Zealand public service over the last decade suggests that senior officials have been hard put to maintain, let alone increase their staffing complements. Since the late 1980s there has been a striking reduction in the numbers of officials employed in government departments. In fact, the size of the public service workforce had shrunk (some might say atrophied) from 88,000 in 1984 to fewer than 30,000 by June 1999 (State Services Commission, 1999a:2). Furthermore, the trend has shown little sign of abating. There was a 6.9% reduction in the total size of the departmental labour force between June 1997 and June 1999, at which point public service numbers dropped beneath 40,000 for the first time since World War 1 (State Services Commission, 1999a). In late 1999, officials constituted just 1.8% of the total paid labour force in New Zealand; as recently as 1987 that figure had stood at 5.7% (State Services Commission, 1999a:2).

Proponents of public choice might well counter with the argument that such aggregate figures mask quite varied developments within particular departments, and that it is entirely possible that some bureaucracies have managed to avoid swingeing staffing reductions in the wider context of retrenchment. Perhaps, then, Niskanen's hypothesis might be said to broadly apply if it were the case that a majority of departments have either maintained or increased their staffing bases in recent times. The data set out in Table 3, however, which provides a profile of staffing changes in selected public service departments, suggests that this has not been the case.

**Table 3: Employment trends in selected departments (1990-1994)<sup>11</sup>**

Department	1990	1995	1999	% change (1990-1999)
Commerce	694	695	738	+6.34
Conservation	1,795	1,583	1,695	-5.57
Crown Law Office	54	86	121	+124.00
Customs	831	815	682	-17.93
Defence	60	66	60	n/c
Education	885	506	581	-34.35
Education Review Office	306	163	155	-49.35
Environment	105	115	100	-4.76
Foreign Affairs and Trade	656	631	602	-8.32
Health	804	443	459	-42.91
Inland Revenue	5,827	6,019	4,578	-21.43

<sup>11</sup> Table 3 draws on data from the State Services Commission (2000), which aggregates information collected from departments during regular six monthly and annual surveys. The magnitude and complexity of organisational change in the public service since 1990 makes it difficult to trace precisely the evolution of a number of departments. The data reported here are limited to agencies the responsibilities and organisational boundaries of which have remained substantially intact during the 1990s. It does not include agencies established as distinct entities since 1990, such as the Office of the Auditor General (created out of Audit New Zealand in 1994), the Serious Fraud Office (1991), and the departments of Courts (1996), Corrections (1996), Work and Income (1998), and Child Youth and Family (1999); neither does it include the ministries of Cultural Affairs (1992), Fisheries (1996), Housing (1993), Pacific Island Affairs (1991), and Research Science and Technology (1991).

Internal Affairs	3,172	956	1,002	-68.41
Land Information	1,020	1,011	678	-33.53
Maori Development	677	283	333	-50.81
National Library	562	486	385	-31.49
Prime Minister and Cabinet	38	109	109	+186.84
Public Trust	562	487	434	-22.78
State Services Commission	191	129	134	-29.84
Statistics	960	921	734	-23.54
Treasury	340	384	344	+1.18
Women's Affairs	47	35	37	-21.28
Youth Affairs	24	23	22	-8.33
Total	20,030	16,197	13,879	-30.71

Adapted from State Services Commission, 2000

Those caveats to one side, however, it is clear that most departments have experienced staffing reductions during the last ten years, some of which have been very significant indeed. The largest losses seem to have been sustained in organisations, such as the departments of Inland Revenue and Internal Affairs, which have important service delivery responsibilities, and which therefore require relatively large administrative and personnel infrastructures. On the other hand, very few departments appear to have gained additional staff, and the two which have secured the largest increases, the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Crown Law Office, are relatively small departments that are principally policy focused.

The story thus far indicates that the term 'minimisation' describes what has occurred across large swathes of the public service rather more accurately than does 'maximisation'. Again, however, there is a plausible public choice rejoinder to that observation. Perhaps it is reasonable to propose that there will be

**Table 4 Employment trends in agriculture, justice and welfare sectors (1990-1999)<sup>12</sup>**

Department	Staff	Department	Staff	% change (1990-1999)
Social Welfare	8,028	Social Policy	180	
		Work & Income	4,924	
		Child, Youth & Family	1,969	
Total	8,028		7,073	-11.89
Justice	6,485	Justice	152	
		Courts	1,815	
		Corrections	3,786	
Total	6,485		5,601	-13.63
Agriculture & Fisheries	4,754	Agriculture & Forestry	991	
Forestry	636	Fisheries	322	
Total	5,390		1,313	-75.64

greater evidence of staff-maximisation in policy domains in which large departments have been broken up and reconstituted as separate agencies. In such instances, the establishment of new organisations, each with its own administrative and staffing requirements, creates opportunities for bureaucratic empire-builders to consolidate and expand their staffing complements. In

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<sup>12</sup> These figures reflect numbers of full-time equivalent staff, including both permanent and temporary employees. With two exceptions, the table draws from State Services Commission (2000). The 1999 figures for the Ministry of Social Policy are taken from that agency's 1999 post-election briefing papers, while the data for the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services were received in personal community with the department, and applied as at 23 September 1999.

Table 4, three areas in which institutional changes of this nature have recently been implemented are detailed.

Each of the cases profiled below has undergone extensive restructuring over the last decade, as a result of which the total number of departments servicing the social welfare, justice and agriculture/fisheries areas has increased from 4 to 8. The overall staffing picture, however, is much the same as that portrayed in Table 3. Major organisational change, in these instances at least, has not resulted in an increase in the numbers of bureaucrats. Quite the reverse, in fact, has occurred. If staffing increases constitute one of the critical indicators of successful budget-maximisation, then there is virtually no evidence which would suggest the New Zealand public service is currently inhabited by successful maximising bureaucrats.

The evidence looks a little more favourable for Niskanen on the issue of public service remuneration levels. With its emphasis on the centrality of pecuniary rewards to the incentive structures that drive officials' behaviour, public choice argues that salaries paid to bureaucrats will, over time, comprise an increasing component of total public expenditure (Peters, in Blais and Dion, 1991:331). Some evidence to that effect might have been expected following the devolution of the employer function to departmental Chief Executives (CEs) with the passage of the *State Sector Act* in 1988. After all, with the dismantling of the centralised system for determining public sector wages and salaries, lead bureaucrats might have been expected to use their executive control over remuneration settings to reward appropriately instrumental behaviour amongst the public servants in their employ.

And indeed there is some indication that average remuneration levels within the public service have drifted up in recent years. With two exceptions (1995/1996, 1996/1997), total spending on bureaucrats' wages and salaries has fallen every year since 1990, but at a lower rate than the overall number of public servants has dropped. For that reason, data from Statistics New Zealand (1999) and the State Services Commission (2000)

suggests that the average fiscal cost per public servant increased from \$64,624 in 1990 to \$81,075 in 1998.

However, the scope for pecuniary gain has been constrained by a steady reduction in aggregate expenditure on the payment of departmental staff. Between 1990 and 1999, public spending on the compensation of employees fell from \$3,373 million per annum to \$2,759 million per annum (Statistics New Zealand, 1999).<sup>13</sup> Moreover, in 1990, wages and salaries accounted for 61.4% of the spending associated with the production of departmental goods and services, and fully 12.5% of total public expenditure; nine years later, those proportions had fallen to 54.4% and 8.3% respectively (Statistics New Zealand, 1999). Significantly, too, between 1992 and 1999, salaries and wages in the public service moved by a total of +6.7% (as measured by Statistics New Zealand's Labour Cost Index), compared with a +10.8% movement across the economy as a whole (State Services Commission, 1999b:22). Contrary to the received wisdom that the 'absence of a market restraint on wages means that the ... civil service is able to extract substantial wages for itself' (Peters, in Blais and Dion, 1991:343), public servants in New Zealand have become a little worse off relative to those employed in the wider economy.

### ***Spending on public service operations***

If the numbers employed in the public service are in decline, then how might the continuous growth in public expenditure be explained? One possible answer, which constitutes the most compelling evidence against Niskanen's prediction of bloated

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<sup>13</sup> The data are drawn from the Crown Accounts prepared by Statistics New Zealand for the year to June 1999. In the discussion that ensues, while the raw figures are drawn from the Crown Accounts, the proportions and ratio reported are my responsibility.

bureaucracies, is found in the ways in which government spending is disbursed. In particular, when government spending directed at (a) income support payments and (b) non-departmental organisations is set alongside that which goes directly to core departments, the sense of a bureaucracy in retreat is enhanced.

At least two important observations can be drawn from Table 5. The first is that a sizeable portion of the increase in total public spending is a consequence of growth in the payment of social assistance grants. While income support payments are administered by departments, principally the Department of Work and Income (DWI), that public resource does not constitute revenue that can be drawn on for the sorts of purposes specified in Niskanen's economic model. For instance, the much-maligned CE of DWI, Christine Rankin, cannot use money ringfenced for the payment of welfare benefits to employ more staff within her department; she would have to draw on funds within her department's core operational budget (FCE) for that purpose.<sup>14</sup> Right across the public service, however, the latter component of departments' budgets has been steadily shrinking in recent times.

The second noteworthy trend is that the continuous fall in departments' operating budgets has been paralleled by a marked increase in the funding of both non-departmental public sector organisations, and non-public sector organisations. In 1999, total government spending was almost 23% higher than it had been in 1990. However, the amount spent on transfer payments and the direct funding of organisations other than government departments

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<sup>14</sup> That said, growing workloads have not translated into larger staffing complements in benefit administration agencies. Between 1993-1997, for instance, the numbers of benefit applications processed by former Income Support staff increased from 391,374 to 446,649; during that period, however, total staffing in the organisation fell sharply from 5,200 to 3,300 (Petrie, 1998:58).

constituted a significantly greater proportion of public spending at the end of the decade (73.18%) than it had nine years previously (61.23%) (Statistics New Zealand, 1999). Funding for non-departmental public providers (i.e. for Crown entities such as schools' Boards of Trustees) rose by \$3,620 million, while that for voluntary and private sector agencies grew by some \$123 million. However, during that time spending on government departments decreased by some \$417 million. In 1990, 20% of the spending announced in that year's Budget was directed towards government departments; in 1999, that proportion stood at just over 15% (having fallen to 13.5% in 1998) (Statistics New Zealand, 1999).

### **The state of the nation**

The empirical record in New Zealand indicates that, in the main, the predictions associated with the economic model have not been borne out over the last decade. Far from witnessing 'an expansion of already existing large agencies, or certainly no diminution in their scale of activities' (Dunleavy, 1985:325), governments have turned their backs on the New Zealand public service. Services that have long been associated with government departments are increasingly being delivered by other organisations; the total number of public servants has plummeted; and departments' budgets are shrinking, not expanding, as a proportion of public expenditure. If budget-maximisation has been attempted, then it seems to have been singularly unsuccessful, and if anyone can be said to have benefited from the growth in public expenditure, it has certainly not been the public service.

It is possible to interpret those trends as evidence that New Zealand's institutional reforms have brought the bureaucracy back under the control of the people's elected political representatives: the information asymmetries that favoured public servants have been stripped away; ministers are better positioned to demand higher levels of bureaucratic performance in return for appropriations; and departments are required to use their resources



more efficiently and transparently. Public choice, it would seem, has solved the bureaucratic 'problem'.

**Table 5: Total current government expenditure**  
(\$ million; 1990-1999)

Category	1990	1993	1996	1999	% change (1990-1999)
FCE <sup>15</sup>	5,488	4,428	4,493	5,071	-7.59
Social Assistance <sup>16</sup>	10,838	11,729	13,067	14,871	+37.21
Other government <sup>17</sup>	5,434	6,586	7,420	9,054	+66.61
Other NZ residents <sup>18</sup>	299	431	365	422	+41.13
Total expenditure	27,061	26,535	33,682	33,269	+22.94

Source: Statistics New Zealand, 1999

<sup>15</sup> The category Final Consumption Expenditure (FCE) refers to the value of goods and services produced directly by government departments, and is the most accurate gauge of the amount of public resource accounted for by the public service.

<sup>16</sup> The Social Assistance Grants category covers spending on income support paid to individuals and families, including the unemployment benefit/Community Wage, domestic purposes benefit, and superannuation (which is the single largest class of expenditure in this category).

<sup>17</sup> Other New Zealand residents covers transfers to private, non-profit organisations.

<sup>18</sup> That said, growing workloads have not translated into larger staffing complements in benefit administration agencies. Between 1993-1997, for instance, the numbers of benefit applications processed by former Income Support staff increased from 391,374 to 446,649; during that period, however, total staffing in the organisation fell sharply from 5,200 to 3,300 (Petrie, 1998:58).

Arguably, however, these gains represent a pyrrhic victory in which narrowly defined efficiency considerations have crowded out other legitimate concerns. There are mounting concerns about the costs attached to the process of reform, particularly in relation to the erosion of the ability of the public service to perform effectively the many tasks expected of it by both government and civil society. Increasingly, those concerns are being expressed within the public service itself. Some of them relate to the incessant restructuring to which departments have been subjected since the onset of the reforms. The State Services Commission has estimated that at any one time up to 25% of all public servants are directly affected by restructuring (State Services Commission, 1998a:14). Quite apart from direct costs, constant organisational change of that magnitude saps morale and loyalty, drains institutional wisdom and experience, and deflects the attention of public servants away from their primary responsibilities to citizens. For those and other reasons, the employer of departmental CEs, the State Services Commissioner, has called for what he termed a 'restructuring culture ... in which we reach for the restructuring option instinctively, regardless of the nature of the problem we are trying to solve' to be put aside (State Services Commission, 1998b:8).

The negative impacts associated with the systemic squeeze on departments' budgets have also prompted warnings about the parlous state of the public service. Tellingly, a number of these emanate from the heart of the machinery of government. The State Services Commission notes that there are 'signs of strain' (State Services Commission, 1999c:1) in the public service, which are at least in part due to the unwillingness of recent governments to invest sufficiently in departmental infrastructure. Elsewhere, the Commission alludes to the funding pressure most departments are under, warning that that if the public service is to cope with 'anticipated increases in demand for services' it will require 'a significant increase in tax revenue' (State Services Commission, 1999b:18).

There have been other negative outcomes of the reform experience, too, which are not canvassed here, including the wholly inappropriate emergence of a corporate culture in some departments (see Hunn, 2000:5), the loss of a spirit of public service (State Services Commission, 1999b), an erosion in standards of integrity (Gregory and Hicks, 1999), and an exclusive concern with the efficient production of outputs at the expense of a complementary focus on what public service delivery is actually achieving (Shaw, 1999).

The political and bureaucratic élite responsible for the drastic overhauling of the bureaucracy in New Zealand derived considerable inspiration from an economic model that is wrapped around a particular normative orientation to its subject matter. Public choice proposes a solution to a problem that may or may not have existed in New Zealand before those reforms, but that notwithstanding, its implementation has substantially changed the structure and operations of the public service. The changes have allowed for efficiencies, but those gains, if gains they be, have been won at considerable cost. With deliberate reference to an earlier episode in the country's bureaucratic history, the experiment conducted on the public service has been, in many respects, an unfortunate one. The notion that the public service exists to serve the public has slipped beneath the surface in recent years, but it needs rapid resuscitation if the fabric of those institutions is to be successfully restored.

**Table 1: Trends in total government expenditure (\$million)**

<b>June Years</b>									
<b>1990</b>	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>
27,061	26,814	25,748	26,535	29,027	32,148	33,682	33,415	33,873	33,269

Source: Statistics New Zealand, 1999

**Table 2: Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP (1993-2000)**

Category	June Years									
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000		
Social security	16.2	14.2	13.5	13.3	13.2	13.2	12.7	12.7		
Health	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.7	5.9	6.1	5.9	5.9		
Education	6.1	5.7	5.5	5.4	5.6	5.8	5.5	5.5		
Finance Costs	5.3	4.7	4.3	4.0	3.2	2.8	2.5	2.5		
Core government	8.6	7.5	6.7	6.8	6.6	6.9	6.1	6.1		
Total	41.8	37.8	35.6	35.2	34.5	34.8	32.7	32.7		

Adapted from State Services Commission, 1999b

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## **The third shift: Task allocation and ultimate responsibility on family camping holidays**

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### **Abstract**

Using data drawn from participant observation of family camping holidays and in-depth interviews with thirteen women campers, this exploratory study focuses on domestic division of labour tasks and responsibilities associated with the family camping holiday. While men help, women perform and take responsibility for the vast majority of domestic holiday tasks. Patriarchy is at work even at leisure. Complicating these oppressive relationships is the fact that the women in this study still manage to enjoy their camping holidays. Such enjoyment is partly attributed to the holiday providing increased opportunities to nurture relationships and to it reducing the pace and standards of work.

It used to be quite relaxing when it was just Keith<sup>1</sup> and I. Like it was 'Let's go for a swim'. 'Let's read a book'. 'Let's do nothing'. But now it's get up and have breakfast....do the washing and I make the beds, sweep out the tent and tidy it up.

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<sup>1</sup> All names have been changed in order to maintain confidentiality.

Along with pavlovas, barbecues and jandals, the annual summer camping holiday with the family is part of the New Zealand way of life. The great expectation is one of carefree days with countless hours of fun as the family escape with their camping gear to the beach or river for a week or two. The adults in two-parent families allocate equally the tasks and responsibilities for any necessary household labour, or so goes the myth. Here is a reality check. Sharon, camping with her husband Seth and two children recalls their daily camping holiday walks in the bush and along the beach:

Seth tends to organise where we are going to go. He is the organiser really of the day's activities. You know, the activities camp manager. To begin with at camping (sic) he had reasonably strong ideas on where we should go each day but that was because he had read about the walks in the area.....He was probably a bit unrealistic with the children initially because he would want to get ahead and we were absolutely exhausted by the end of the day. You know, it was 'Mum, when are we going home?' I mean he did slow down. One of the walks we started on at the beginning of our camping holiday was very steep. We started up and I said 'No'. And he said 'It's not good for you is it?' And I said 'No and it's not okay for the children'. So we realised that and turned back.

The walk was Seth's idea supposedly for the recreation of the whole family. Besides having the allocated task of organising where they would walk to Seth decided on the pace and terrain. While this suited him and his own leisure needs (he is a keen walker) it did not always suit the rest of the family or meet their leisure needs. Only when other family members complained was the walk adjusted.

The overall responsibility was Sharon's. She monitored the children's progress, assessed any difficulties that lay ahead, and when the children wanted help she alerted Seth. Then together she and Seth decided how to respond to the situation. The exercising of this responsibility was primarily (physical, mental and emotional) labour for Sharon even though the context was one a family holiday. The goal of this study is to document other embedded relationships like Seth and Sharon's to explore the difference between (Seth's) task allocation and (Sharon's) ultimate responsibility.

Dempsey (1997a:27) argues that a person who has responsibility for a task is aware that it needs performing and ensures that this happens. On the other hand a person helping by performing an allocated task does not have this responsibility. If they fail for whatever reason to complete the task, it becomes 'someone else's responsibility to see that the task is carried out' (Dempsey 1997a).

Several studies (Dempsey, 1997b:218; Novitz, 1987:45-46; Oakley, 1985:138) reveal that where men are involved in the domestic division of labour including child care, their role is most likely to be one of helping rather than assuming responsibility for it. The responsibility falls to women to ensure that either they or someone else completes the tasks. The buck stops with them, so to speak. Embedded in this issue of performing work while at holiday lies the question 'Why is it that women on holiday with their families feel compelled to assume responsibility for holiday household labour in order that their families may have a successful holiday?' Here are three explanations.

First, feminists (Beechey 1987:115; Delphy 1984:20; Hartmann 1981:371-372; Walby 1991:21) emphasise that the reason why household labour including child care has become the responsibility of women is anchored in the concepts of patriarchy and capitalism. These concepts assert that men's prime responsibility is their own paid employment performed in the

public sphere while women's prime responsibility is household labour performed in the private sphere for the benefit of men (Hartmann, 1981:372-373). Even where women are involved in paid employment (Brines, 1994:652; Dempsey, 1997a:59; Gardiner, 1975:60; Novitz, 1987:47-48) or have been successful in getting their husbands to share equally in performing household labour tasks (Dempsey, 1997b:222; Hochschild, 1989:201-203), the prime responsibility for household labour tasks still appears to lie with women. Several studies (Dempsey, 1997b:218; Habgood, 1992:165; Novitz, 1987:45-46; Oakley, 1985:138) reveal that men are most likely to be helping (or performing a task) rather than assuming responsibility for household labour. Shelton and John (1996:312) posit that household labour serves a wider purpose than just producing goods and services for family consumption. Household labour also produces and reproduces gender relations given their husband's/partners' general reluctance to perform such tasks.

Second, allied with patriarchy is the concept of familism. It too sees household labour as women's responsibility (Bella, 1992:12) and assumes that women experience family leisure in the same way as other family members. That is, family leisure is women's leisure as well (Hunter and Whitson, 1991:220). Shaw (1992:283) points out, however, that this masks the work women do for their family's leisure.

Exploring the assumption that only paid employment earns a person leisure time is also useful in seeking to explain why it is women and not men who are required to work while at leisure (Desaulniers and Theberge, 1992:136; Woodward and Green, 1988:135). Unlike paid employment with its clear boundaries between work and leisure time, household labour does not provide social rewards (James and Saville-Smith, 1994:56) such as a holiday entitlement for its performers (Deem, 1986:61-62).

The linking of holiday entitlements with only paid employment fails to recognise the work women do in performing unpaid household labour (Desaulniers and Theberge, 1992:136). It also ignores their alternative experience of intermingling or blurring of boundaries between household labour and leisure time (Wearing and McArthur, 1988:156) that occurs, for instance, when women read while supervising children. Furthermore, with unemployed or retired men often enjoying better access to leisure time than women (Kynaston, 1996:230), holiday entitlement becomes a matter of gender.

Yet a third explanation, again a manifestation of patriarchy, relates to Gilligan's 'ethic of care' psychological theory. Such an ethic suggests that women are more likely to put the care of others ahead of their own needs in order to maintain their own moral equilibrium (Henderson and Allen, 1991:99; Shaw, 1992:283-284). As women live in unequal relationships, the ethic of care affords them a positive aspect to their labour. Gilligan (1982:149) suggests that women need to place the care for self alongside and not after the care of others, enabling them to exercise choices that are compatible with the multi-facet aspects of their lives.

The ethic of care is reflected when women classify some holiday labour tasks as leisure, particularly emotional labour to do with nurturing family relationships. Although this can give women pleasure, satisfaction and meaning to their holiday experience (Davidson, 1996:99-102), they are not usually free to choose whether or not they nurture family relationships as there is a social expectation that they will take the responsibility for the emotional well-being of the family at home and on holiday (Davidson, 1996:101).

On the surface, the family camping holiday appears to be an innocent social practice free from the influence of power and politics. Green, Hebron and Woodward (1990:29) note that leisure is often portrayed as such and is frequently contrasted with paid work (an area where the impact of power and politics is

acknowledged). Yet, as McKay (1986:359-360) argues, power and politics do impinge on leisure experiences as patriarchy endeavours to legitimise their particular practices as being in the best interests of all.

While most studies of the domestic division of labour have been confined to the family home and its environs, what is original in this present study is that it is centred in a well-known but infrequently studied holiday setting, the camping ground. For Sharon and the other twelve women involved in this study, the ultimate responsibility for holiday household labour<sup>2</sup> was primarily theirs. While these women were on holiday with their family, their household labour severely encroached into their personal leisure. By leisure we mean 'freedom choosing a self enhancing experience that provides a sense of "my space"' (Wearing and McArthur, 1988:151). In other words, when the women toiled within a leisure situation to provide leisure experiences for their families as Sharon did on the walks, their labour was often mistaken as their leisure.

In what follows, the majority of the paper focuses on the theme of 'Their Tasks: Her Responsibilities' and is divided into the various moments that feature in a normal New Zealand family camping holiday when gendered tasks and responsibilities are to the fore. These moments include: preparing for camping, establishing the camp site, cleaning, cooking and childcare and finally the inevitable stressful return home. Each moment is similar: women ultimately responsible for camp labour with their experience of leisure differing markedly from men. Before

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<sup>2</sup> 'Household labour' is used to distinguish between inside domestic division of labour tasks such as housekeeping and child care, and outside domestic division of labour tasks such as lawn mowing, vegetable gardening and repairing/maintaining the house the household equipment.



proceeding, however, we briefly outline both the methodology and the ethical issues surrounding this research.

A qualitative research methodology was adopted. Participant observation was conducted by the senior author during the summer of 1998-99 and took place in two New Zealand camping grounds. But by and large the data presented below stems from in-depth face-to-face or telephone interviews. Thirteen interviews were conducted with thirteen women who had recently experienced a family camping holiday in a commercial or remote (no hot running water or electricity) camping ground in various parts of New Zealand. Each woman was furnished with details about the study, a note regarding their interview rights and each signed a consent form. Given that the camping grounds were in the public domain, no formal informed consent was sought from the campers observed by the senior researcher. As a precaution, (perhaps unnecessarily) the camp ground managers where the observations took place were informed about the nature of the study. A verbal approval was obtained after an assurance that no campers would be approached for an interview and that informal conversations that moved in the direction of the study would not be allowed to develop further.

### **Their tasks: Her responsibility**

*Getting established* for the family camping holiday began at home where a 'tried and true' list of what to take, and boxes of camping equipment stored in the garage between holidays were the backbone of camping preparations. Katie, who usually went camping in a remote area with her husband, two children and two youths, was anxious that everything was packed. She said:

I've got the list and Angela and Russell (Katie's teenage daughter and husband) check it and it is all

ticked off. But I then personally go and tick it off myself so that I know that everything is there.

While the task of initially checking was Angela's and Russell's, and important though it was, the ultimate responsibility of ensuring that everything was packed was Katie's. She was the manager of the task. If either Angela or Russell failed in their task to pack everything Katie, who had the ultimate responsibility, would do their work for them. Most pre-camping tasks exhibited this style of gendered division of labour.

Frequently, the women informants referred to packing up as hard, stressful work but for Leanne, who went camping with her husband and three children at the same remote site each year, the stress level became apparent not prior to departure but when she and her family tumbled out of the car at the camp site, after a three-hour journey. Much of this drive was over a dusty, winding road. She recalls:

Well, God! (Sigh). You get two older children demanding to go for a swim and that they are hungry...and they get out and basically we spend probably the next two hours unpacking the cars.... We then put up the tent, blow up the air beds and put everything away.

In Leanne's story meeting the demands of children while striving to establish a makeshift holiday home had little relationship to leisure. Instead it had the hallmarks of household labour as did unpacking and setting up camp. These latter two activities usually involved a gendered division of labour with men performing the visible outside tasks such as positioning the caravan or erecting the tent and unpacking the trailer and car with assistance from the family. Women's invisible labour related to making up beds, unpacking the boxes and bags, finding a place

for everything and accepting responsibility for remembering where everything was put.

It may be thought that having established a makeshift home, temporary liberation from both paid and unpaid labour would commence. However, the family's requirements necessitated the continued performance of cleaning, cooking and child care. Yet with the absence of routines imposed through paid labour, schooling and scheduled activities, holiday household labour was able to be performed at a more relaxed pace, with less demanding standards and more people potentially available to share in the tasks and accept some of the ultimate responsibility.

The arrangements for performing 'house'keeping tasks in Erin's family were typical. Erin, camping with her husband Murray and four children, said:

I'll sweep out and tidy up and that sort of thing. Murray will often check on the children's beds and sometimes he'll make the younger children's ones, but I always do ours. The older children have jobs to do, but being children they will often get away on you before you have managed to get them to do their jobs....Well, sometimes I'll fetch them back and then sometimes I'll just do the job myself.

While some tasks were imposed on members of Erin's family, if they failed to do them it became Erin's responsibility to follow up and make sure that someone (often herself) performed the task. This is the fundamental difference between self-allocated and imposed tasks, and ultimate responsibility. In the small confines of a tent or caravan the performance of many tasks could not be left to a time best suited to the individual on whom the task had been imposed. This made it imperative that the person holding the ultimate responsibility either ensured the individual performed the task more or less straight away or that the task was imposed on some one else. In this study women

frequently imposed the task on themselves even though they were already performing many self-allocated tasks.

Men also performed self-allocated tasks. Often, though, the difference was men performed self-allocated tasks they enjoyed. Tessa, who went camping with two children and two youths, described her husband Ray's involvement in heating water for household use. She said:

He does it because he likes it. Well it is not a chore for him. It is a pleasure.

Choosing to perform pleasurable tasks was not a position enjoyed by most of the women in this study. They usually carried out tasks because no one else performed them rather than through choice and pleasure.

*Washing clothes* was an intrinsically pleasing task, so said Katie, who did the daily washing for the six people in her family, while in a remote camping. She explained:

I actually quite like washing. You go and stand there. There are lots of other ladies there every morning. You stand and all do your washing together and you help each other put it through the wringer and not many men go there. So it is actually like the old African ladies down by the river. So we go there and chat to people....I would rather do the washing than sweep the tent and make the beds and tidy up. Well when the children were little it was something I could do where I could think as I was doing it. It is just finding head space for me really.

Washing clothes by hand was time-consuming strenuous, labour. However, it did create a child-free opportunity for Katie to enjoy the company of other women and to have space for herself and her thoughts.

Both Katie and Tessa's husband Ray as noted above, chose to perform a task they enjoyed. The difference, however, between the two is that of ultimate responsibility. If Ray did not choose to maintain a supply of hot water, the responsibility for getting it done was not his because as a man he was not ultimately responsible for holiday household labour. For Katie, though, if she freely chose not to do the washing, it became her responsibility to find someone else to do the task. As a woman she was the one ultimately responsible.

*Food preparation, cooking of meals and the subsequent cleaning up* also divided tasks from responsibilities. For most camping families, the evening meal was a barbecue, consisting of barbecued meat or fish, potatoes, easily prepared salads and maybe vegetables. Cooking food on the barbecue was invariably 'men's work' often amounting to a public performance. Fieldnotes recorded a man tossing meat patties about 50 centimetres into the air and as they fell back down onto the barbecue plate, the watching audience of children cheered.

The very visible labour of barbecuing gave the mistaken impression that the men were responsible for dinner. Barbara was under such an impression. She said:

Well in some ways Ken is doing the bulk of it (getting dinner) and I'm just helping. I mean he doesn't do everything like any dishes or things like that. The boys do them. Neither does Ken prepare the food. He cooks it.... Well I normally prepare the salads, get out the plates, set up stuff like that. Then I'll have a glass of wine and Ken will have a beer or something like that. You can enjoy it because you tend to relax more than when you are rushing around the home.

Barbara not only prepared the food and salads, she also set the table for dinner. The boys did the dishes. Yet Ken, who placed food on the barbecue, periodically turned the food over and later served it, was seen by Barbara as performing most of

the tasks associated with the barbecue. The ultimate responsibility for dinner was Barbara's, even if she did not acknowledge it. If Ken refused to cook on the barbecue it would still be Barbara's responsibility to produce dinner for the family.

*Childcare* had a dramatic effect on a holiday. It substantially increased the labour and reduced the amount of leisure time. While several women indicated that child care was a shared task, as the interviews proceeded it became apparent that 'shared care' often meant sharing only the task of supervising children's leisure. The intimate aspects of child care such as showering or toileting, or meeting the child's emotional needs were invariably tasks undertaken by the mother with the father helping as requested. Karen, camping with an emotionally dependent or 'clingy' two-year-old and another child, explained the effect of being responsible for the task of caring for the two-year-old:

Like if Richard (husband) wanted to go to the toilet he just went to the toilet. Whereas you know I had to make sure that Kylie (2 years old) knew where I was going otherwise she would start crying if she could not see Mum.

With Kylie being emotionally reliant on Karen this severely restricted Karen's activities.

Unlike the men, who could choose whether or not to participate in child care, that same choice was not available to the women. Erin, who went camping with her husband Murray and four children, was a case in point. Sometimes she was left with the task of supervising the children while Murray relaxed, although there did not appear to be a reciprocal arrangement. She said:

Murray goes for a walk or a bike ride....He does get pleasure out of it though. He's allowed because he

does work hard but I have to plan for that (his leisure absence) happening. Sometimes he will take one of the kids...I know the nature of my husband's work. He really needs a rest so I just let him have one and try to keep the children quiet.

Even though back in suburbia Erin's total hours of labour, exceeded that of her husband's, (she is in part-time paid employment and has responsibility for the household labour), her entitlement to and need of leisure took second place. Further more, she performed extra child care tasks in order that he could enjoy his leisure.

*Leisure* – Freely choosing a self-enhancing experience that gives a person a sense of 'my space' while on a family camping holiday varied greatly between family members. Leanne, her husband Keith and three children, regularly camp with another family. She described family leisure at the beach:

You take the buckets, the spades, the boogie board, everything. And you have swims and spend most of the time there. Keith and his friend Damien and the kids, a couple of the kids, will go out fishing in the boat....I mean I will take them (the pre-school children) down to the beach. It doesn't worry me. I can sit down there or paddle around or come back.

While Leanne felt she was having leisure and could choose how she spent her time, in reality she was working at child care and her choices were governed by the pre-schoolers' leisure. Keith was involved in child care too through taking the school-age son fishing, but it was Keith's leisure that governed the event. Nonetheless, Leanne said she valued being at the beach with the children. Caring is an important measuring stick against which women measure their actions, and through putting the needs of others first (the 'ethic of care' principle) (Gilligan,

1982:82) Leanne was more likely to feel some satisfaction from working while at leisure.

Embedded within the ethic of care is the importance of nurturing relationships (Gilligan, 1982:17). Sometimes, when both parents were involved in the nurturing, the task needed managing, and that responsibility inevitably fell to women. Sharon explained:

When you are out walking you get the chance to talk to a particular child...I would say (to husband Seth) 'Look. I've noticed that Emma was getting a bit upset because you were spending all the time today with Matt. Do you want to have a chance to talk with Emma? I'll lag a bit behind tomorrow so that you can have a chance to talk with her'.

The family camping holiday was not just experiential but involved building too. It afforded time for family leisure and its ensuing outcome of providing opportunities for the nurturing of family relationships.

While both genders experienced family leisure differently, men's and women's experience of their own individual leisure involved gendered boundaries too. Men frequently enjoyed clear cut boundaries between work and leisure. Women, however, often experienced blurred boundaries between household labour and leisure, making it less likely for them to have the large discreet blocks of leisure time that often characterised men's leisure. Boating, for example, provided men with several consecutive hours of leisure of their own choosing. When women accompanied their husbands on a leisurely boating trip, the women's leisure was interspersed with providing food and care for those on board.

Yet the women did pursue leisure time of their own and some, like Leanne, purposely sought out and protected longer time blocks of leisure. She said:



I mean this year I actually took a book which I couldn't put down and I would say quite loudly 'I'm in here reading. Don't come in here. I've got two chapters to go'. No, you don't actually need it (time for her own leisure) terribly much over there. It is so relaxing anyway.

Even though Leanne wanted time to herself to read and erected a barrier to ensure she got that time she felt the holiday atmosphere practically negated her entitlement to her own leisure time. This ambivalence to her own leisure underlies the lower priority accorded to women's leisure and suggests Leanne feels that this lower priority was somehow fair.

Leanne was not alone in feeling the unequal was fair. In spite of having their own leisure accorded a lower priority, or of servicing the leisure of others, or of performing holiday household labour while their husbands were at leisure, most women felt they enjoyed a holiday equal to that enjoyed by their husbands. When asked to consider their family camping holiday overall, all but one 'just loved it'. We will let four of the women speak for themselves:

Katie: I mean I just love it. (Laughter). In fact you know I would be quite happy to pitch my tent and be there for six weeks....I really find it is a holiday.

Pam: Tony likes cooking and that makes a big difference for your holiday. It's what makes it a real holiday of it for me.

Sharon: We had such a good time that when we came back in the New Year we went and bought a big family-size tent and went back again.

Leslie, however, was not totally convinced she had had a real holiday. Her response when asked did she think she had had a real holiday, was: '(Pause). Ummm. (Pause). Yeh. (Pause)'.

Left to provide all the child care, her only personal leisure time was when the children were asleep in the evening.

*Packing up at the end of the holiday* bore little relationship to leisure. The women considered it was unambiguously work requiring organisation to minimise stress and to ensure everything was packed correctly. Once more everything was packed, loaded into the trailer and car and on arrival at home, unpacked, sorted, cleaned if need be and put away.

‘Packing up together’ was a description used by several women. It generally referred to men and women having separate and defined packing up roles. Christine, a regular camper at the same remote spot, talked about her family’s packing up routine:

It is the same for when we are unpacking. He just sort of goes for things like the barbecue and he dismantles the cooker and I just automatically go in and pack up the kids’ clothes and, yeah, it is probably just what we would do at home. The sort of area. You know the old stereotype thing.

Christine’s ‘old stereotype thing’ revealed a gendered division of labour when packing up that was very similar to when they prepared for their holiday. Again, her tasks were performed mainly in private and were unseen by others, while his were seen and therefore could be publicly acknowledged.

Arriving back home meant busyness and for Barbara, tension as well. She said:

Well it is full on for me from the time I hit the door. I come back to book work for my clients, all the camping washing and unpacking, kids to get ready for school again and that type of thing. And you might have all those phone calls for Ken for work. You know clients wanting work done....I always find it

hard going when I get home. You start to get all tensed up again.

Busyness also caught up with Christine when she arrived home. Having been able to do the family washing only by hand in cold water at an isolated camping ground, life in suburbia now meant more demanding standards of clothes' cleanliness, leading her to 'chuck(ing) whatever in the washing machine....everything needs washing when you come back home'.

Although the post-holiday wash was time consuming, the task was able to be done in the comfort and convenience of Christine's home, using the washing machine and warm or hot water if she chose. However, Christine, like all the other women, could not choose whether or not to perform the task, for the ultimate responsibility for the washing was still theirs irrespective of the location being the camping ground or the home.

### **A third shift?**

The paper's title, 'Third shift' follows on from Hochschild's 'second shift'. Hochschild used second shift to describe the phenomenon of women being responsible for household labour after they had completed their first shift: their own paid employment. 'Third shift' describes the responsibility for household labour when on holiday with the family.

The central point that emerged from this study was that irrespective of whether the family was at home (second shift) or on holiday (third shift), the women were still ultimately responsible for household labour. While the men allocated some holiday household labour tasks to themselves, and the women imposed some tasks on the men, the bulk of the tasks were performed by the women. These women did not perform the tasks by free choice. Rather they performed them because patriarchy has determined that household labour is women's

responsibility. Whether it was washing the family's dirty clothes, preparing food, supervising children's play or walking with the family, much of the work that the women performed revealed a caring ethic.

The women welcomed and enjoyed the increased opportunities camping provided to nurture relationships, even when this work was categorised as leisure, due to it taking place in a leisure setting. Consequently, this disguised the women's unequal access to a leisure time of their own. Such masking of women's work has its base in gendered ideology and endeavours to hide contradictions that arise when only men's experience of leisure is used as the defining standard. Although the women experienced more leisure time of their own than they experienced back home in suburbia, they still did not enjoy access to as much leisure time as the men.

In spite of the inequalities of responsibility for holiday household labour tasks and the inferior access to a leisure time of their own, the women gained much pleasure from their family camping holiday. This is attributed at least in part to the increased opportunities to nurture family relationships, the change in the location of household labour and the reduced pace and standards of the tasks performed.

The family camping holiday is not the innocent practice it is generally portrayed as. It involves power and politics where the role of the holiday is to reinforce and reproduce patriarchy's ideology. Such ideology decrees that women are ultimately responsible for household labour and that this labour is not worthy of the holiday entitlement allocated to paid employment. The more or less surreptitious way patriarchy allows men to dominate women while on a camping holiday obscures the inequalities embedded within that holiday.

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## Immigration and New Zealand: From localism to globalism?

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### Abstract

Since 1986 New Zealand has had a government immigration policy with the potential to globalise immigration to New Zealand. Globalisation has not occurred, but there has been considerable Asianisation of immigration to New Zealand. The lack of globalisation should not be surprising, as New Zealanders hold overwhelmingly local rather than global views about life. There would appear to be aspects of life that will be very resistant to globalisation, and local ethnic and cultural identities may well flourish along side the global economic trends that predominate at present.

### Introduction

The hallmark of the age of migration is the *global character* of international migration: the way it affects more and more countries and regions, and its linkages with complex processes affecting the entire world (Castles and Miller, 1998:283. Emphasis added.)

Immigration for the globalists epitomises the process of the world becoming one. The major theme in the globalisation literature is the increasing tendency for the world to become interconnected and unified (Waters, 1995). This analysis identifies the 1986 change to state immigration policy as having a globalising potential for immigration to New Zealand. Attitudes toward immigration and immigrants and personal experiences

with immigrants are examined followed by a consideration of the degree to which localism and globalism is manifested by New Zealanders.

The findings come from two sources: (1) Aspects of National Identity Survey (NIS) and (2) Catholic Parish Survey (CPS). In 1996, the International Social Survey Programme carried out a nationwide mail survey of 1810 people aged 18 and over randomly sampled from the New Zealand electoral roll. A response rate of 67% produced 1043 valid replies (Gendall et al., 1996:1). In 1997, 349 adult parishioners in an urban parish in the Catholic Diocese of Christchurch completed a questionnaire on immigration. The response rate was high compared with the average Sunday Mass attendance of 265 adult parishioners.

### **State policy: From traditional source country preference to the potential for globalisation**

A significant change to New Zealand's state immigration policy in 1986 created the potential for immigration patterns to become globalised. From the beginning of non-Maori immigration to New Zealand most has been from northern European countries. This pattern was so strong and persistent that it became part of state control of immigration, and was known as the traditional source country policy. Immigrants from northern European countries were given nearly exclusive preference by the state. In 1986, the fourth Labour Government changed this component of immigration policy. Legislation was passed to drop the traditional source country policy and replace it with a global approach (Burke, 1986:15-16). Under the new state policy, immigrants from anywhere can now apply and be accepted if criteria for meeting sustained economic growth are met (Ongley, 1996:13-15,25). In terms of the new state policy, anyone from anywhere who met certain criteria could theoretically now immigrate to New Zealand.



Although this change in state policy is analysed in this paper for its globalisation potential, it should be noted that the change in state policy was economically driven. This was made explicit by Kerry Burke, the Minister of Immigration who put the change through parliament in 1986. 'If non-traditional markets for New Zealand exports are to be developed and expanded it is important to build up personal as well as commercial relationships and the inflow of capital is more likely to proceed in an environment which welcomes human as well as financial investment' (Burke, 1986:15).

### ***Knowledge of state policy***

Knowledge of state immigration policy is extremely limited among the respondents in the Catholic Parish Survey. Only 19% of the parishioners indicated that they were aware that New Zealand changed its immigration policy in 1986 with respect to the country of origin of immigrants (See Table 1). But for most of these parishioners, their knowledge consisted of only a general awareness of change. In fact, only 22 parishioners (6%) knew the exact change that the government made in its policy about source country of immigrants in 1986 (See Table 1). That is, very few parishioners knew that until 1986 it was state policy that immigrants from northern European countries were preferred, and that in 1986 this preference was dropped and not replaced by any other specific country preferences.

**Table 1: Awareness of 1986 immigration policy changes (CPS)**

<b>Response Category</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Aware of exact change	6
Aware, but exact change not known	12
Unaware	75
No answer	7
Total N	349

**Knowledge of immigration statistics**

Knowledge about recent immigration statistical patterns was patchy among parishioners. For many, there was a real lack of knowledge of what happened, and others held inaccurate views about some of the actual developments. Yet, there were some who knew with accuracy what the major immigration statistics were.

Most respondents were unaware that there had been a long period of substantial negative migration. From 1975 to 1989 emigration exceeded immigration, and the net migration loss was over 250,000 people. Only 35 (10%) respondents seemed to be aware of this, indicating they thought that a lot more people left New Zealand than arrived (See Table 2). A further 25% had accurate knowledge of the general trend. They indicated they thought that more people left New Zealand than arrived. Well over half (58%) were not accurately aware of the migration pattern for this 14-year period. In fact, nearly one-third (31%) would seem to have had a quite incorrect view of what was happening, as they indicated they thought that more people had arrived than left (Table 2).

**Table 2: Knowledge of arrivals and departures in the years prior to 1987 (CPS)**

Response Category	Percentage
A lot more people left New Zealand than arrived	10
More people left New Zealand than arrived	25
About the same number arrived as left	27
More people arrived in New Zealand than left	28
A lot more people arrived in New Zealand than left	3
No answer	7
Total N	349

Accurate knowledge about immigration patterns over the 1994 to 1996 period was limited. On average from 1994 to 1996, 40,000 to 50,000 immigrants came to New Zealand. Only 6% of the respondents thought this was the case (See Table 2). There was a much greater tendency to underestimate rather than overestimate the number of immigrant arrivals. Over one-half (53%) had an underestimated conception of the number of arrivals, and only 16 respondents (5%) had an overestimated conception.

It is possible that many respondents were thinking of net migration numbers when answering this question. In this regard, on average the yearly population increase from 1994 to 1996 was 20,000 to 30,000 migrants. Only 14% of the respondents thought this was the case (See Table 3). There was a greater tendency to underestimate rather than overestimate the population increase. Nearly one-third (31%) had an underestimated conception of population increase due to migration, and nearly one-fifth (18%) had an overestimated conception (See Table 3).

**Table 3: Knowledge of average number of immigrants each year in 1994, 1995 and 1996 (CPS)**

Response Category	Percentage
Less than 10,000	10
Between 10,000 and 20,000	21
Between 20,000 and 30,000	14
Between 30,000 and 40,000	8
Between 40,000 and 50,000	6
Between 50,000 and 60,000	3
Between 60,00 and 70,000	5
More than 70,000	1
Don't know	4
No answer	2
Total N	349

Knowledge about the source countries of migrants over the 1994 to 1996 period was more accurately known than knowledge about actual numbers. Between one-third and two-thirds of the immigrants came from Asian countries. Over four-tenths of the respondents (44%) indicated that they thought this was the case (See Table 4). The trend was to overestimate the number coming from Asia, with nearly one-fifth of the respondents (18%) indicating that they thought that over two-thirds came from Asia, whereas only 13% thought that less than one-third came from Asia.

**Table 4: Knowledge of the proportion of immigrants from Asian countries in the last three years (CPS)**

Response Category	Percentage
Less than 1/3	13
Between 1/3 and 2/3	44
Over 2/3	18
Don't know	22
No answer	3
Total N	349

***Personal experiences with immigrants***

In the Catholic parish in Christchurch, socialising between parishioners and recent immigrants was quite limited. Approaching one-third (29%) never had social contact with recent immigrants, and a further 42% rarely had contact (See Table 5). Only just over one-tenth of the parishioners (11%) frequently had contact with recent immigrants which involved socialising.

**Table 5: Frequency of meeting socially with people who are recent immigrants (CPS)**

<b>Response Category</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Never	29
Rarely	42
Occasionally (say one or two times a month)	15
Frequently (say weekly or more)	11
No answer	2
Total N	349

The relationships involving socialising between parishioners and recent immigrants generally worked out very well. Nearly half of those who met socially with recent immigrants (48%) felt their relations were always pleasant (See Table 6). Only 11 parishioners (2%) found their relations with recent immigrants always difficult.

**Table 6: Nature of social relationships with recent immigrants (CPS)**

<b>How would you rate your social relationships with recent immigrants? (for example at school, church or neighbourhood)</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Always pleasant	48
Usually pleasant	28
Satisfactory	15
Usually difficult	2
Always difficult	2
No answer	6
Total N (of those who have social relations with recent immigrants)	267

Considerable work and business contact occurred between parishioners and recent immigrants. Nearly half the parishioners (48%) related to recent immigrants through work and business.

The work and business relationships parishioners had with recent immigrants worked out well almost all the time. Of the parishioners who had work and business relationships with recent immigrants, over two-thirds (70%) found the relations were usually or always pleasant or satisfactory. Only 11 parishioners (6%) found the relations usually difficult, and only two people found the relations always difficult (See Table 7).

**Table 7: Nature of work and business relationships with recent immigrants (CPS)**

How would you rate your work and business relationships with recent immigrants	Percentage
Always pleasant	32
Usually pleasant	31
Satisfactory	17
Usually difficult	6
Always difficult	1
No answer	12
Total N (of those who have work and business relations with recent immigrants)	191

There was considerable parishioner involvement in the incorporation of immigrants into the local community. Nearly half the parishioners (47%) had been involved personally in helping new immigrants feel at home in the community (See Table 8). Only 9 persons (3%) indicated they were not interested in immigrants.

**Table 8: Involvement in helping new immigrants (CPS)**

Have you personally been involved in helping new immigrants feel at home in the community?	Percentage
Yes, in minor ways	30
Yes, through groups, church, clubs	17
No, because not in contact with immigrants	45
No, because not interested in immigrants	3
No answer	6
Total N	349

### **Attitudes toward immigration and immigrants**

New Zealanders' views about immigrants and immigration were much more moderate than extreme. When there was concern and some negativeness, it was tempered by at least a small element of positive globalism. A strong consensual position in society on immigration did not exist; considerable division prevailed. For example, in the Catholic Parish Survey, nearly one-third (32%) felt that immigration was assuming the features of a social emergency. A nearly equal number (29%) did not think this was the case (See Table 12). It is a time of changing attitudes: in the parish survey, nearly one-fourth (24%) would like New Zealand to revert to its pre-1987 policy of accepting most of its immigrants from traditional source countries of northern Europe, but approaching one-half (45%) did not wish this to happen (See Table 9).

**Table 9: Views on number of immigrants, source countries of immigrants and political control of immigration (CPS)**

<b>Response Category</b>	<b>Agree Strongly</b> %	<b>Agree</b> %	<b>Neither Agree or Disagree</b> %	<b>Disagree</b> %	<b>Disagree Strongly</b> %	<b>Can't Choose</b> %	<b>No answer</b> %	<b>Total N</b> %
New Zealand should revert to its pre-1987 policy of accepting most of its immigrants from traditional source countries of northern Europe	5	19	21	34	11	3	10	349
I am quite satisfied with the change to New Zealand's population mix	8	44	23	14	3	2	6	349
I would prefer New Zealand to have a declining population and to have kept to a European and Polynesian population	5	10	16	40	13	4	12	349
More immigrants should be selected from anywhere in the world without regard to their race or ethnicity	21	38	15	11	7	3	5	349



More immigrants should be selected from European or North American countries	12	33	22	17	2	5	9	349
More immigrants should be selected from Asia	1	12	27	36	9	5	10	349
More immigrants should be selected from the Pacific Islands	1	17	24	31	10	6	11	349
New Zealand should tighten immigration laws and reinforce border control systems	11	36	17	22	7	6	2	349
Immigration challenges individual states today more than ever	7	38	30	11	1	3	10	349

Even over number of immigrants, there was a diversity of views. By 1995 there was a good deal of concern about the number of immigrants. In the National Identity Survey, more than half (57%) felt that too many immigrants were entering (See Table 10). In fact, one-fourth (26%) favoured reducing immigration a lot (See Table 10). In the Catholic Parish Survey, the level of concern about the number of immigrants was not as great. Only 9% thought immigration should be reduced a lot (See Table 10).

New Zealanders vacillated in their attitudes about source countries of immigrants. On the one hand, there was widespread support for globalism when opinions were expressed as matters of principle, for example, in the Catholic Parish Survey, 59%

thought immigrants should be selected from anywhere in the world without regard to their race or ethnicity (See Table 9). On the other hand, there was a clear pattern of preference when specific countries were considered. Immigrants from traditional source countries were favoured. Over half (54%) in the national survey and approaching half (45%) in the parish survey thought the number of immigrants from the United Kingdom was about right (See Table 11). Similarly, in the Catholic Parish Survey, 45% felt more immigrants should be selected from European or North American countries (See Table 9).

**Table 10: Views about number of immigrants**

<b>What should be done about the number of immigrants coming to New Zealand?</b>	<b>CPS %</b>	<b>NIS %</b>
Increased a lot	5	3
Increased a little	19	9
Remain the same as it is	39	24
Reduced a little	22	31
Reduced a lot	9	26
Can't choose	2	6
No answer	4	1
Total N	349	1043

There was concern about too many immigrants from two regions, the Pacific Islands and Asia. In the National Identity Survey, over half (53%) felt too many immigrants were coming from the Pacific Islands, and nearly half (48%) thought there were too many Asian immigrants. The pattern was similar in the parish survey, although it was not as strong (See Table 11 at end of article).

This concern persisted among parishioners when responding to another question on the topic. More immigrant selection from Asia was supported by only 13%, and from the Pacific Islands by only 18% (See Table 9). However, when the situation was presented in a more general way, there was support

in the Catholic Parish Survey for a more global approach to immigration. Over half (52%) supported the changes to New Zealand's population structure brought about by the recent period of immigration compared with only 17% who were concerned (See Table 9). Further, only 15% preferred New Zealand to have a declining population and to keep the population predominantly European and Polynesian (See Table 9).

Economically, a substantial number of New Zealanders had positive views about immigrants. In the National Identity Survey, nearly half (48%) thought immigrants were generally good for New Zealand's economy, and only 16% did not hold this view (See Table 13). In the Catholic Parish Survey, support for immigration for economic reasons increased. Over two-thirds (67%) thought the flow of immigrants into New Zealand was good for the economy (See Table 12). This view was strongly reinforced in the response to a slightly rephrased version of the question (See Table 14), in which 79% said that they thought immigrants were good for New Zealand's economy.

**Table 12: Views on immigrants and immigration (CPS)**

<b>Response Category</b>	<b>Agree Strongly</b> %	<b>Agree</b> %	<b>Neither Agree or Disagree</b> %	<b>Disagree</b> %	<b>Disagree Strongly</b> %	<b>Can't Choose</b> %	<b>No answer</b> %	<b>Total N</b> %
Immigrants are generally good for the economy	6	61	19	7	1	4	2	349
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in New Zealand	7	22	18	39	8	2	3	349

Too many immigrants will alter our characteristic way of life	10	39	17	25	2	3	4	349
If New Zealanders expect to be able to leave New Zealand and settle in other countries, then people from other countries must be allowed here	13	64	11	7	1	1	3	349
If we did not have enough immigrants New Zealand would tend to become isolated from Asia and the world	5	40	20	24	6	2	3	349
Immigrants make New Zealand more open to new ideas and cultures	17	64	8	4	1	1	4	349
Immigrants make New Zealand a more interesting and existing place to live	16	49	15	13	4	2	3	349
Immigration is assuming the features of a social emergency	8	24	29	26	3	4	6	349
Immigrants create problems in New Zealand society	6	37	20	23	13	3	7	349
Immigrants increase crime rates	5	18	29	36	8	2	3	349

When the economy was considered in the more specific terms of the labour market, a greater number of New Zealanders had negative attitudes towards immigrants. In the National Identity Survey, nearly two-fifths (39%) thought immigrants took jobs away from people who were born in New Zealand (See Table 13). However, this degree of negativity was considerably

counter-balanced by the number who did not hold this view of immigrants and the labour market. Nearly one-third (32%) did not think immigrants took jobs away from people who were born in New Zealand (See Table 13). In the parish survey, the number who did not have this concern about job losses was even higher. Nearly half (47%) did not think immigrants took jobs from people who were born in New Zealand, but there was still a significant proportion (31%) who had this concern (See Table 12).

These views about the economic effects of immigration were held alongside some reservations about possible risks and disadvantages of immigration in other areas of life. In the Catholic Parish Survey, a substantial number (49%) saw that immigration would alter our characteristic way of life compared with only just over one-fourth (27%) who did not agree that the New Zealand way of life would be affected (See Table 12).

Reservations gave way to pragmatism, with an accompanying switch from localism to globalism, as was apparent in the strong agreement (77% in the parish survey) with the statement that, 'If New Zealanders expect to settle in other countries for business or career purposes, then people from other countries must be allowed to come here' (See Table 12). The reservations, which were generally locally focused, gave way to a broader concern about the need to be globally linked. There was a widespread belief among parishioners that if there was not sufficient immigration then New Zealand would tend to become isolated from Asia and the rest of the world. Almost a half (45%) agreed that this was a concern compared with 30% who did not agree (See Table 12).

**Table 13: Views about immigrants and immigrations (NIS)**

<b>Response Category</b>	<b>Agree Strongly</b> %	<b>Agree</b> %	<b>Neither Agree or Disagree</b> %	<b>Disagree</b> %	<b>Disagree Strongly</b> %	<b>Can't Choose</b> %	<b>No answer</b> %	<b>Total N</b> %
Immigrants are generally good for the economy	5	43	31	14	2	3	2	1043
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in New Zealand	11	28	26	27	5	2	2	1043
Immigrants make New Zealand more open to new ideas and cultures	15	61	13	6	1	1	2	1043
Immigrants increase crime rates	7	16	32	32	7	3	2	1043

New Zealanders did not have an internally consistent, wholistically integrated view of immigration and immigrants. In fact, they held contradictory views about immigrants. On the one hand, a substantial number of New Zealanders had a positive global outlook about immigrants' influence on New Zealand culture. High numbers (NIS - 76%; CPS - 81%) felt immigrants made New Zealand more open to new ideas and cultures (See Table 13 and 14). Also, a high proportion (65%) had the view that immigrants made New Zealand a more interesting and exciting place in which to live (See Table 12). On the other hand, immigrants were readily seen to be problematic. In the Catholic Parish Survey, over two-fifths (43%) thought immigrants created problems in New Zealand society (See Table 12). Furthermore, a minority of New Zealanders held very negative views about

immigrants. In their eyes, immigrants were often criminals. In the national survey, close to one-fourth (23%) thought immigrants increased crime rates (See Table 13), and in the parish survey, 23% held this view (See Table 12).

**Table 14: Are immigrants good for New Zealand's economy? (CPS)**

Response Category	Percentage
Yes	79
No	14
No answer	7
Total N	349

### Localism

Localism prevailed pervasively among New Zealanders. Local identities were strongly held. In the National Identity Survey, nearly two-thirds (64%) indicated their emotional attachment to their neighbourhood was close or very close. Less than one-tenth (7%) felt not at all close to their neighbourhoods (See Table 15).

**Table 15: Degree of identification with neighbourhood, town or city, province or region, New Zealand and the South Pacific region (NIS)**

How close – how emotionally attached – do you feel to these places?	Very Close %	Close %	Not Very Close %	Not Close at all %	Can't Choose %	No answer %	Total %
Your neighbourhood	16	48	27	7	1	1	1043
Your town or city	19	55	20	4	1	2	1043
Your province or region	19	49	23	5	2	2	1043
New Zealand	55	38	6	1	1	1	1043
The South Pacific region	14	36	31	12	4	3	1043

A similar degree of close or very close identification existed for province or region (68%) (See Table 15). Local identification then increased substantially for town or city (74%), and for New Zealand (93%) (See Table 15). Identification that moved toward globalism was lowest. Only 50% felt closely or very closely emotionally attached to the South Pacific region (See Table 15).

Local identification remained strong relative to improving working and living conditions. In the national survey, a little over half (54%) of the respondents would be fairly or very willing to move to another neighbourhood to improve work or living conditions (See Table 16). The willingness to move then declined steadily as the move became less and less local in nature. Fewer than four-fifths (40%) were fairly or very willing to move to another town or city, 36% to another part of New Zealand, 24% outside New Zealand, and only 18% outside the South Pacific region (See Table 16).

**Table 16: Willingness to move to improve work or living conditions (NIS)**

<b>If you could improve your work or living conditions, how willing or unwilling would you be to move?</b>	<b>Very Willing</b> %	<b>Fairly Willing</b> %	<b>Neither</b> %	<b>Fairly Unwilling</b> %	<b>Very Unwilling</b> %	<b>Can't Choose</b> %	<b>No answer</b> %	<b>Total N</b> %
To another neighbourhood	20	34	15	14	14	2	1	1043
To another town or city within your region	13	27	18	20	19	2	1	1043
To another part of New Zealand	12	24	16	22	23	2	1	1043
Outside New Zealand	7	17	15	17	41	2	1	1043

Localism was a significant component of what constituted being truly a New Zealander. In the surveys, substantial numbers believed that being born in New Zealand



(NIS-67%; CPS-56%) and having lived in New Zealand for most of one's life (NIS-69%; CPS-52%) were fairly or very important for truly being a New Zealander (See Table 17 at the end of article).

In economic matters, New Zealanders tended to lean toward localism. In the national survey, just over half (52%) took a local stance in agreeing or agreeing strongly that New Zealand should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy (See Table 18). There was a minority (25%) who favoured economic globalism (See Table 18). They disagreed or disagreed strongly with import controls.

**Table 18: Views on economic developments, language teaching and environmental issues (NIS)**

<b>Response Category</b>	<b>Agree Strongly</b> %	<b>Agree</b> %	<b>Neither Agree or Disagree</b> %	<b>Disagree</b> %	<b>Disagree Strongly</b> %	<b>Can't Choose</b> %	<b>No answer</b> %	<b>Total</b> N
New Zealand should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy	18	34	19	20	5	2	2	1043
New Zealand should take much more effort to teach foreign languages properly	11	32	29	19	4	2	2	1043
For certain problems, like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions	23	45	11	14	2	3	2	1043

Economic localism was very strong with respect to consumption preferences. Nearly half (49%) thought New Zealanders should buy New Zealand-made products wherever possible. A further 36% felt this should happen, but only if the price was right (See Table 19). Only 9% did not support this form of economic localism.

**Table 19: Views on whether New Zealanders should buy New Zealand-made products wherever possible (NIS)**

Should New Zealanders buy New Zealand made products wherever possible?	Percentage
Yes, wherever possible	49
Yes, but only if the price is right	36
Yes, but only if the price is lower	4
Not necessarily	9
Can't choose	1
No answer	1
Total N	1043

Mono-national localism had a very strong existence in New Zealand. In the national survey, an overwhelming majority (92%) were committed to New Zealand remaining one nation. Only 3% thought parts of New Zealand should be allowed to become fully separate nations if they chose (See Table 20).

**Table 20: Views on nationalism (NIS)**

Response Category	Percentage
It is essential that New Zealand remains one nation	92
Parts of New Zealand should be allowed to become fully separate nations if they choose	3
Can't choose	3
No answer	2
Total N	1043

This mono-nationalism carried over into nation state localism, which maintained a good hold over many New Zealanders. Over three-fourths (79%) would rather be a citizen of New Zealand than of any other country in the world (See Table 21). Similarly, three-fourths (75%) thought New Zealand was a better country than most other countries (See Table 21). In a stronger expression of nation state localism, nearly one-half (49%) thought New Zealand should follow its own interests even if that led to conflicts with other nations (See Table 21). However, there was also a minority who looked beyond national boundaries. Nearly one-fourth (24%) did not subscribe to this manifestation of nation state localism (See Table 21). And in a back-handed way, globalism got a look-in, with nearly one-third (32%) claiming that the world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like New Zealanders (See Table 21).

A moderate degree of localism over land ownership in New Zealand exists. There was also a minority who did not adhere to this form of localism. In the national survey, close to half (47%) were opposed to foreigners being allowed to buy land in New Zealand. Just over one-fourth (28%) found foreign land ownership acceptable (See Table 21).

Neither localism nor globalism prevailed over content of New Zealand television. In the national survey, only a little over one-fourth (29%) supported the position that New Zealand television should give preference to New Zealand films and programmes (See Table 21). For a larger proportion (35%), the localisation of television content was not something to be preferred.

**Table 21: Views on nation state localism, foreign ownership of land and television content (NIS)**

<b>Response Category</b>	<b>Agree Strongly</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree or Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree Strongly</b>	<b>Can't Choose</b>	<b>No answer</b>	<b>Total</b>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
I would rather be a citizen of New Zealand than of any other country in the world	51	28	14	4	1	1	2	1043
Generally speaking, New Zealand is a better country than most other countries	27	48	16	4	1	1	2	1043
New Zealand should follow its own interests even if this leads to conflicts with other nations	12	37	21	22	2	3	2	1043
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like New Zealanders	9	23	40	20	4	2	2	1043
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in New Zealand	25	22	21	23	5	2	2	1043
New Zealand television should give preference to New Zealand films and programmes	9	20	33	30	5	2	2	1043

Ethnic localism was strong for many New Zealanders. In the national survey, nearly four-fifths (79%) of the respondents felt closely or very closely emotionally attached to their ethnic groups (See Table 22). For Maori, this ethnic localism existed for 80%, and furthermore nearly half (48%) had a very close identification as Maori (See Table 22). Nearly as high a level of ethnic localism existed for Pakeha: 79% identified closely or very closely as Pakeha (See Table 22).

**Table 22: Strength of Ethnic Identification (NIS)**

How close – how emotionally attached – do you feel to your ethnic group?	Maori	Pakeha	All Ethnic Groups
	%	%	%
Very close	48	33	36
Close	32	46	43
Not very close	14	13	12
Not close at all	3	4	4
Can't choose	2	5	5
No answer	0	1	1
Total N	165	844	1043

In the case of ethnic localism, manifestation of it did not extend much beyond a sense of emotional identity. In the surveys, over half (NIS - 56%; CPS - 54%) did not think ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions (See Table 23 at end of article). Also, over one-third (NIS - 34%; CPS - 35%) felt that it was impossible for people who did not share New Zealand customs and traditions to become fully a New Zealander (See Table 23 at end of article). Similarly, over half (54%) in the national survey (See Table 24) and two-thirds (66%) in the parish survey thought it was better for ethnic groups to adapt and blend into the larger society rather than maintain their distinct customs and traditions (See Table 23).

**Table 24: Views on ethnic and cultural diversity (NIS)**

<b>Response Category</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions	29
It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society	54
Don't know	13
No answer	4
Total N	1043

Support for ethnic localism even waned among Maori when it came to legal and political developments. In the national survey, only a minority (26%) of Maori felt that they should be able to make their own laws and take disciplinary action in a similar way to regional councils and professional bodies (See Table 25). Politically, Maori ethnic localism was even weaker when it came to the possibility of forming a separate nation or setting up an independent state. Only 12% of Maori respondents favoured forming a separate nation within New Zealand, and only 15% thought Maori should be able to set up their own independent state (See Table 25).

New Zealanders manifested a tension between localism and globalism over immigration. There was a distinct desire for state political control of immigration. In the parish survey, close to half (47%) indicated New Zealand should tighten immigration laws and reinforce border control systems (See Table 9). This commitment to localism contrasted sharply with the realisation that immigration posed a global challenge. Again, almost a half (45%) acknowledged that immigration challenged individual states more than ever (See Table 9).

**Table 25: Maori views on ethnic localism (NIS)**

<b>Response Category</b>	<b>Agree Strongly</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neither Agree or Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree Strongly</b>	<b>Can't Choose</b>	<b>No answer</b>	<b>Total</b>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	N
Maori should be able to make their own laws and take disciplinary action in a similar way to regional councils and professional bodies (e.g. , the Law Society)	13	13	22	29	14	5	4	165
Maori should be able to form a separate nation within New Zealand if they choose	5	7	15	39	24	5	4	165
Maori should be able to set up their own independent state if they choose	8	7	16	35	25	4	4	165

## **Globalism**

Globalism took second place to localism in New Zealand. Support for globalism among New Zealanders was seldom strong. This was the case when it came to the use of multiple languages. In the national survey, fewer than half (43%) of the respondents felt that New Zealand schools should make much more effort to teach foreign languages properly (See Table 18). A contrasting commitment to a more global multilingual perspective

existed for fewer than one-fourth (23%) of the respondents (See Table 18).

There was, however, one area of significant globalism in New Zealand: a firm global perspective on environmental issues was maintained. In the national survey, over two-thirds (68%) of the respondents felt that for certain problems like environmental pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions (See Table 18).

### **Conclusion**

The high number of recent immigrants from Asian countries is significant. Prior to 1986 New Zealand had exclusionary policies towards Asians. Then within the short space of 10 years, New Zealand has become a multicultural and multi-ethnic society. As significant as Asian migration has been in introducing diversity into New Zealand along these lines, immigration to New Zealand has not become globalised. Besides the Asians and immigrants from traditional source countries, few have come from other places. Since 1986 there has been an Asianisation but not a globalisation of immigration to New Zealand.

It is clear that the views of New Zealanders are overwhelmingly local in virtually all matters. With localism being the prevailing and dominant orientation in New Zealand society, immigration is unlikely to become highly globalised. Even if there are a high number of applicants from a diverse range of countries, the views of New Zealanders are not supportive or conducive to the population of New Zealand becoming more diversified globally. Furthermore, it is unlikely that state policy would be implemented in a global manner as it is most unlikely that the change in state policy in 1986 was intended to bring about globalisation of immigration to New Zealand. The change in state policy was clearly economically grounded, with a primary focus upon one region of the world – Southeast Asia.



Often very sweeping claims are made about the process of globalisation. For example, it is Spybey's contention that "the world at the end of the twentieth century is one in which it is virtually impossible for the individual human being to engage in any piece of social interaction without consciously or subconsciously relating it to social interaction on the global scale" (1996:11). If we juxtapose Amit-Talai's caution that "it would be easy for globalization to become a tacked on veneer of contemporaneity for familiar and hardly innovative ethnography" (1997:329) against this claim about the all-encompassing nature of globalisation, a middle ground of critical understanding could ensue. Such a middle-ground position is embodied in Simpson's views about the relationship between ethnicity and globalisation (1996).

In addition to the trend of universalisation, the process of globalisation, according to Simpson, also involves a sharply contrasting trend in which "the life-worlds of ethnos, family and locale increasingly colonize the developed, rationalized global system" (1996:11). Simpson argues that local ethnicities, like those of Maori and Pakeha, are not giving way to a hegemonic global cultural singularity. Rather, Maori ethnicity may not only survive but may also flourish as perceived traditions of the past continue to hold out against progressive globalisation of the world.

Turner's claim, that the traditional dominant cultures of nation states are being challenged by globalisation producing a new level of multiculturalism, must be seriously considered in the light of the amount of recent Asian immigration to New Zealand. It could very much be the case that aspects of Maori culture and Asian cultures increasingly challenge the dominant Pakeha culture in the nation-state of New Zealand. If this occurs, it will only in part be a result of the 1986 state policy change. It will be a very much an unintended consequence, and, ironically, one that could erode state power and ultimately lead to the demise of the nation state.

**Table 11: Views about source countries of immigrants**

	Total N		CPS		NIS	
	No answer	CPS	%	11	11	7
		NIS	%	3	3	3
	Can't choose	CPS	%	22	20	20
		NIS	%	19	16	16
	Not enough	CPS	%	16	3	4
		NIS	%	13	3	1
	About Right	CPS	%	45	30	34
		NIS	%	54	30	27
	Too many	CPS	%	5	41	35
		NIS	%	11	48	53
				From UK	From Asia	From Pacific Islands
				349	349	349
				1043	1043	1043

**Table 17: Being truly a New Zealander**

How important are the following things for being truly a New Zealander	Very important		Fairly important		Not very important		Not important at all		Can't Answer		No answer		Total N	
	NIS	CPS	NIS	CPS	NIS	CPS	NIS	CPS	NIS	CPS	NIS	CPS	NIS	CPS
Being born in New Zealand	40	27	27	29	19	29	10	10	1	2	2	3	1043	349
Having lived in New Zealand for most of one's life	33	21	36	31	21	33	7	9	1	2	2	4	1043	349

**Table 23: Views on ethnic and cultural diversity**

<b>No answer</b>	CPS	%	2	2	3
	NIS	%	2	2	-
<b>Can't Choose</b>	CPS	%	3	3	2
	NIS	%	3	2	-
<b>Disagree Strongly</b>	CPS	%	13	8	1
	NIS	%	18	8	-
<b>Disagree</b>	CPS	%	41	38	14
	NIS	%	38	36	-
<b>Neither Agree or Disagree</b>	CPS	%	20	14	14
	NIS	%	22	19	-
<b>Agree</b>	CPS	%	17	26	49
	NIS	%	13	24	-
<b>Agree Strongly</b>	CPS	%	4	9	17
	NIS	%	4	10	-
			Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions	It is impossible for people who do not share New Zealand customs and traditions to become fully a New Zealand	It is better if groups adapt and blend into larger society

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This volume comprises a collection of papers presented at a conference on children's rights in Dunedin in July 1999. Professionals working in various capacities for children (teachers, health professionals, lawyers, researchers, social workers and police) and from a range of countries (Africa, Europe, Russia, China, United States, Canada, South America and the Pacific Rim) provided both the conference and the resulting publication with an interdisciplinary and international scope. While all contributions are underscored with an appreciation of children's rights, most consider the conditions of childhood in relation to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC). Smith (Chapter 13) does this explicitly in regard to early childhood education, while Wood and Tuohy (Chapter 14) adopt a similar approach in their discussion of consent in child health matters. Throughout the book there is an implicit acknowledgement of the three categories of rights identified by Lansdown (1994) in relation to UNCROC – provision rights, protection rights and participation rights. It is the third group, participation rights, that promotes the greatest consternation in the public arena, and many of the contributions in this book examine aspects of this debate. Others highlight continuing failures to ensure adequate provision and protection rights both in New Zealand and overseas.

Implementing UNCROC and ensuring compliance is the focus of a number of contributions. Covell and Howe (Chapter 3) describe the process of introducing children's rights education

into school curricula in Canada as a means of meeting the requirements of Article 42, which specifies that state parties shall ensure that the principles and provisions of the Convention are widely known to adults and children alike. Contrary to the concerns of some teachers about the programme's potential for undermining adult authority, knowledge of rights amongst children has fostered an appreciation of responsibilities and enhanced tolerance and respect for others. This initiative stands in marked contrast to the evaluation of New Zealand's progress in complying with the Convention provided by Ludbrook (Chapter 8).

Ludbrook documents a history of tardiness and indifference by state organisations, and argues that the New Zealand government erroneously assumed compliance with the Convention in the face of clear conflicts between local legislation, policy and practice and the principles and provisions of the Convention. He contends that New Zealand has consistently failed to serve the principles of UNCROC, both through action and omission, which he attributes in large measure to 'a miasma of bureaucratic inertia and a lack of any centralised responsibility' (p.123). This general lack of commitment to the Convention is evident in specific form in the work of Henaghan and Tapp (Chapter 5), who focus on Articles 12 and 13 of the Convention and the ways in which New Zealand policy and practice fail to uphold the autonomy rights enshrined in these articles. Henaghan and Tapp argue that conceptions of childhood within the Family Court have tended to be shaped by psychology and its associated normative understandings of children. New Zealand's legal system has been slow to adopt a conception of childhood that is consistent with the Convention, resulting in the prevailing emphasis on family autonomy effectively silencing the voice of the child within the system. They argue that complying with UNCROC requires that professionals act to ensure their actions best serve the rights and interests of *this* child, rather than a generalised, normative conception of the child.

By contrast, Bray and Gates (Chapter 2) argue that children with disabilities are better served by their inclusion within the more normative, generalised conception of childhood. In fostering the notion that all children are children first and foremost, the authors argue that the protection of the rights of children with disabilities is best served by inclusion within mainstream children's rights groups and advise caution to ensure that where attention to difference requires additional or different supports and treatment of some children, such attention does not serve to stigmatise and foster discrimination. Stigmatisation also features in Kiro's account of the consequences of New Zealand's neo-liberal reforms for Maori children (Chapter 6). Indicators of Maori wellbeing – health, housing, income, employment and educational status – suggest Maori and their children are faring worse from the reforms than non-Maori. The introduction of targeted rather than universal assistance fosters stigmatisation of Maori, and Kiro argues for a return to universal entitlement, along with augmenting the emphasis on economic development with an appreciation of humanitarianism as a pre-requisite for a healthy society.

Kiro's argument reflects cultural differences in assessments of wellbeing, and is mirrored in Le Tagaloa's description of Samoan perspectives on children's rights (Chapter 7). The manner of the expression of children's rights in UNCROC is alien and non-Samoan, as is the worldview and philosophy that underpin it. Her analysis, however, promises much in finding ways to accommodate the inherent Western philosophical underpinnings of the Convention at a global level. Drawing on the concept of Faamatai, Le Tagaloa demonstrates that the basic right of all Samoan children – the right to live and enjoy life – stems from their traditional right to inherit their matai (hereditary identity) title, aiga (extended family) land and gagana (language). As heir to all this, Samoan children are automatically entitled to all the protections afforded by UNCROC.



Rizzini extends the cultural dimension through a discussion of global trends and concerns, drawing together a range of demographic, technological, environmental and economic changes that affect some groups within the global village far more than others (Chapter 12). Like Kiro, Rizzini notes that inequality has been exacerbated by these changes, with the most vulnerable carrying a disproportionate share of the burden. Rizzini is also concerned to extend children's participation rights, and advocates the development of a global children's agenda that promotes "children's participation in key public debates and processes" (p.186). She views an end to child labour as among the priorities of this agenda. Miljeteig (Chapter 11) demonstrates the complexity of children's rights issues with respect to child labour. While acknowledging the need to protect children from economic exploitation (UNCROC, Article 32), Miljeteig notes the potential conflict of this with Articles 12-15, which reiterate the right to freedom of thought, expression and association, along with Articles 16 (the right to protection of privacy) and 17 (the right to access to information). A commitment to children's rights must therefore allow children themselves to have a voice in decisions concerning work, and foster respect for the organisations developed by working children, as exemplified in Miljeteig's research.

There is amongst the contributors an informative variation in perspectives on how participation is to be understood. Participation rights require that invisibility of children in policy, practice and research be redressed. Atwool (Chapter 1) describes the process of invisibilisation, siting her analysis in relation to the treatment of traumatised children. The prevailing social construction of childhood, with its foundation in developmental psychology and its privileging of the adult view of the world, results in a conceptualisation of children as subordinate, dependent and incompetent, as passive objects. Atwool argues for the adoption of a postmodern approach incorporating the subjective accounts of children such that the

child is treated as an active participant in the process of making sense of trauma and managing its consequences.

Mayall (Chapter 9) vigorously supports the inclusion of children's voices and the addition of a sociological perspective to concepts of childhood. She also identifies an inherent paradox within the three categories of rights: provision and protection rights tend to conflict with participation rights, since dependence characterises the former while autonomy characterises the latter. The potential for conflict is also addressed in Melton's discussion of the distinction between self-determination and participation, in which he stresses the greater importance of the latter (Chapter 10). While Garbarino (Chapter 4) links participation with competence, Melton discourages this. In developing policy principles for legal reforms enabling greater participation rights for children, Melton argues for a shift in focus from parents *or* children to parents *and* children, thereby removing much of the potential for conflict. Mayall's inclusion of the subjective worlds of children in her own research has produced data suggesting that the adult valuation of autonomy is not appropriate in child advocacy. Interdependence and reciprocity, rather than autonomy, are the central values emphasised by children in her research. Thus, the application to the research process of the imperative of allowing children a voice may yet provide the means to overcoming the protection/autonomy dilemma.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the publication was not organised around a collection of sub-themes – for example, theoretical considerations, implementing UNCROC, the New Zealand experience and research initiatives – rather than simply presenting a collection of perspectives and projects united only by the more general theme. Nonetheless, cohesion is assisted by Smith's introduction and Ludbrook's summary, and the volume provides a valuable and timely contribution to discussions of children's rights at both the local and international level. Its greatest strength lies in giving expression to multiple perspectives on children's rights.

**Reference**

Lansdown, G., 1994. 'Children's rights' in B. Mayall, (ed.), *Children's Childhoods: Observed and Experienced*. London, Falmer Press, 33-44.

Davey, Judith 2000 *Another New Zealand Experiment: A code of social and family responsibility*. Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, \$29.00, 194p.

Reviewed by Simon Campbell  
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The Code of Social and Family Responsibility (CSFR) proposed by the National/NZ First Coalition Government in 1997 was an ambitious attempt to acknowledge explicitly the principles underpinning social policy development in New Zealand during the 1990s. In addition, the consultation process for the CSFR sought to generate broad public discussion of these principles, hopefully in support. Despite the fact that no formal code eventuated, the underlying principles continued to influence specific social policy decisions, and the proposed code was a significant event in the history of New Zealand social policy, which makes it well worth documenting.

Judith Davey's book provides a detailed discourse analysis of the language and concepts used in the CSFR process, both within central government (politicians and officials) and in the wider public debate. The first two-thirds of the book are Davey's discourse analysis of the CSFR process, while the second part is four chapters by different authors highlighting specific issues.

Davey's account begins with the election of a new

National Government at the end of 1990 and early uses of the language and concepts that would eventually be used in relation to the CSFR. Careful attention is paid to the rhetoric of key policy documents between 1990 and 1997, revealing an emphasis on terms such as welfare dependency, self reliance and families, and policies that tended to support 'independent' working families. Davey suggests that by the time of the Beyond Dependency conference in March 1997, the general policy direction was well-established, although NZ First was a moderating influence on National in the coalition government following the 1996 Election.

Chapter Two covers the political process between the CSFR's announcement in the June 1997 Budget and the beginning of the consultation process in February 1998. The CSFR announcement caused a major public reaction from both supporters and critics, and the Government itself presented a less than united front. It was not clear whether the CSFR would apply to everyone or just beneficiaries, or how punitive it was intended to be. When Jenny Shipley replaced Jim Bolger as Prime Minister late in 1997 the CSFR proposal was given greater emphasis.

Chapter Three offers a tight textual and content analysis of the CSFR consultation documents, including their explicit and implicit values, the rationale behind the research methods and analysis employed, and problems with the question design.

Chapter Four looks at public debate during the consultation exercise, February-May 1998, and the positions taken by a range of commentators, primarily through analysing media reports. Many critics were suspicious of the Government's motives in proposing the CSFR, especially when the May 1998 Budget announced the Community Wage with work capacity testing before results from the consultation process were available. Davey concludes that the CSFR was effectively finished by media debate during this period and the wariness of officials over the practicality of a legislated code.

Chapter Five considers the analysis of responses to the consultation process by officials and subsequent report, as well as the Government's reaction over the remainder of 1998. The analysis of responses had to be thorough to deflect criticism of the hasty research design and because it happened in the context of pressure from the Coalition Government's collapse and the Hikoi of Hope. When the report was released in October 1998 it produced a meagre set of outcomes – a mixture of existing initiatives, vague proposals and unrelated items – and the media and opponents were generally critical. Davey suggests that the consultation process achieved some of its objectives but failed to reach consensus.

Chapter Six concludes Davey's account with a discussion of the overseas concepts and debates that influenced the CSFR process, such as social capital, third way welfare, shared responsibility/reciprocity, and communitarianism. What made New Zealand unique in its application of these principles was the process of national consultation. Davey concludes that while the idea of a formal code was abandoned, subsequent social policy initiatives followed the principles underlying the CSFR proposal.

Part Two of the book allows four other authors to comment on specific issues in relation to the CSFR proposal.

John Angus is a senior civil servant who managed the analysis of responses, and he looks at the CSFR process as a discussion of the appropriate level of government influence on family behaviour, especially parenting. He also discusses international debates on parental responsibility and the state.

Derek Wallace, a linguist, broadens the textual analysis of the rhetoric involved. Combining the ideas of Giddens on family structure and Deleuze on social control in the contemporary world, he suggests that New Zealand is moving from a civil to a global society, so the public was never going to accept a coercive, punitive code. He also uses Bordieu's notion of field to analyse the way official documents and the discussion

booklet reflected the influence and interests of various government departments.

Jonathan Boston teaches public policy at Victoria University, and argues that liberal neutrality is difficult to achieve in practice, so governments/states should have the right to intervene for the promotion of a high quality of living on the basis of clearly-stated values. However, he doesn't consider the CSFR process a good example of how to promote debate about values.

Colin James is a political commentator who emphasises the specific origins of the CSFR proposal in the values and experiences of politicians and officials, as well as external influences. He describes the personal motivations of National and NZ First Ministers, where the ideas behind the CSFR came from, and where those ideas are taking National and Labour.

The book makes no claims to being any more than a case study using discourse analysis, and performs this function well. Davey's application of discourse analysis is appropriate because of the CSFR's abstract and controversial nature, and the central importance of language to the whole process.

The structure of the book has worked well, with its main section and four further commentaries. Davey's analysis provides enough detail to understand the specifics of the case but would be a short book on its own. The other four authors represent a good range of perspectives, and each adds something to the discussion.

The writing style throughout the book is clear and to the point, and the presentation of key ideas in tabular format at appropriate places, such as Chapter Three, is also useful. Much of the contextual detail is dealt with very succinctly, which at times may appear too brief but makes the material accessible to a wider audience. On the one hand, Davey's account presents the language and concepts used by politicians and officials with very little analysis of why particular actors supported or opposed the CSFR proposal. For a better understanding of this contextual detail, readers could consult a comprehensive overview of social

policy in New Zealand over this period, such as Boston et al. (1999) or Cheyne et al. (1997). On the other hand, the discussion of Davey's theoretical framework in the introductory chapter and the chapter on international influences are brief and narrowly focused but well referenced, so readers have suitable starting points if they want to know more. Similarly, the explanations of methodology and theory at the beginning of most of Davey's chapters are brief but make the work more accessible to people who are interested in the details of social policy but do not have a strong grounding in the rhetoric and modes of expression of the social sciences.

This book would be useful for people with an interest in New Zealand social policy or politics, especially the process of governance. It touches on many of the key issues in New Zealand social policy during the 1990s. The book's combination of a depth of detail and clear presentation make it accessible to a wide range of interest levels, from concerned citizen to postgraduate student. Overseas researchers and students may be interested in New Zealand's attempt at national consultation, but would need to consult other sources of information on the political economy of New Zealand social policy over this period. For people who are not so interested in social policy, the book also offers a well-constructed and accessible example of how to conduct discourse analysis.

Overall, the book has much to recommend it as a case study of New Zealand social policy in the 1990s: the background research has uncovered much detail from a variety of sources; key issues and debates of the period are highlighted; information is clearly presented; and the structure of the book allows a range of perspectives. In short, a highly useful addition to the social policy and discourse analysis literatures.

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- Cheyne, C., O'Brien M. and Belgrave, M., 1997. *Social Policy in Aotearoa/New Zealand: A critical introduction*, Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Colin James (ed.), 2000 *Building the Constitution*. Wellington, Institute of Policy Studies, \$45.00, 448p.

Reviewed by Andrew Sharp  
University of Auckland

*Building the Constitution* is the written record of a conference on the New Zealand constitution held on the 6th and 7th of April 2000 in the wood-lined and magnificently red-carpeted Legislative Council Chamber in Parliament buildings. It collects the fifty-two speeches delivered by distinguished politicians, jurists, Maori intellectual leaders and academics. It records their presence, together with that of another 50 similarly distinguished and qualified participants and about 50 observers (also, except for a handful of youths, similarly distinguished and qualified). During the two days, the papers were spoken to and discussed. From all accounts – members of the public were welcome to listen – the discussions were lively, even at times heated and a trifle ill-tempered. Unfortunately but understandably (the volume is already nearly 450 pages long), the discussions are not included in the volume.

According to the convener Sir Paul Reeves, the conference was aimed at being a 'prestigious but practical event'. It turned out to be both. It should be applauded as such, and the Institute of Policy Studies should be congratulated for doing what



universities are often accused of not doing: bringing matters of practical public interest to the public view in discussions among those who know about them. But it was precisely on grounds of the status of its members and the practicality of their discussions that the conference was greeted with suspicion and scorn, not only by ACT and by New Zealand First, but by the news media. Journalists, who could have freed themselves from the right's paranoiac and unfounded fears – that the abolition of appeal to the Privy Council would threaten private property and employment relations, that MMP was an unmitigated disaster promising instability and infirmness of government, that becoming a republic would automatically herald a written constitution containing a Bill of Rights, and that all discussion about the Treaty of Waitangi encourages the establishment of divided sovereignty and untold excesses of biculturalism – nevertheless displayed (in the words of the book's editor and the conference's organiser, Colin James) 'the discomfort they exhibit with complex matters' (8). Its membership, according not only to the right-wing columnists of the *National Business Review* and the *Independent* but to the routine reports in the daily papers, was 'elitist' and 'unbalanced' – 'far removed from the hopes and fears of ordinary New Zealanders'. It was 'a who's who of Maoridom, academics, the judiciary and the legal profession'. They were a 'self-chosen' 'mafia' of 'left-leaning liberals', 'ivory tower decision-makers'. Knowing that the causes they espoused were not popular, they would 'educate' the great majority of the population who did not agree with them that the constitution was ripe for reform. What these 'paternalists' intended was a 'top down revolution...forced along by a cadre of politicians, academics and policy wonks all exhibiting totalitarian tendencies'. (NZ news source Web search, 'constitutional conference': most sources 5-14 April). According to Warren Berryman of the *Independent*: 'their pompous arrogance aside, the key factor differentiating these people from the rest of us is their wealth'. Fortunately, Berryman impolitely continued, their

'leftist, racist, impractical, pointy-headed, academic board game of PC blather' came to nothing (*Independent*, 12 April, p.12). No agreement was reached. No hoped-for 'agenda committee' was set up following the conference. Its goal of 'developing a national debate' (441) had foundered on the fact of the disagreement of the experts. The rest of the press said much the same, though more temperately. They were relieved that, in the end, the results of the conference pointed to the retention of the status quo, except perhaps of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council's remaining our final court of appeal. This, they (rightly) pointed out, was what 'the vast majority of people' wanted, and they professed themselves relieved that the Prime Minister – initially thought to be among the reformers – had judged constitutional reform 'not a high priority'.

The fuss was as remarkable to the scholar of politics and the constitution as is the book. But why? What was it about the conference that should have caused such offence? It is hard to say. For its part the book contains a large number of notable papers (and a number not so notable, designed as they were doubtless simply to provoke discussion). Some usefully describe the status quo with brevity and sometimes grace: (Bill Mansfield on the constraints of treaties and international law; Bill Oliver and Colin James on the history and framework of the constitution; Michael Joseph and Geoffrey Palmer on its legal history and contemporary configuration, Ian Poole on the demographic background; Janine Haywood and – in the best written and, I thought, the most penetrating piece – Andrew Ladley on arguments for and against a republic; Elizabeth McLeay and Jonathon Boston on the central executive; Keith Jackson and David McGee on the processes of parliament; Richard Mulgan on the electoral system; Janet McLean in an irreverent and accurate account of referenda; Robin Cooke on the Privy Council and Mike Taggart on judges; James Allen and Paul Rishworth on a written constitution and Bill of Rights. Some (that by Mai Chen most obviously) reveal what can probably be

taken to be what the newspapers called ‘the agenda of the Wellington mafia’: a republic; an entrenched constitution including a Bill of Rights containing social and cultural as well as political and civil rights; a ‘watered-down’ Treaty of Waitangi as part of the ‘higher law’. Others, often by the same people so far mentioned, but now including Maori commentators, argue for more or less extensive reforms, sometimes in incompatible directions. The Maori contributors (Annette Sykes, Moana Jackson, Edward Durie, Mason Durie, Whata Winiata, Denise Henare and Caren Witcliffe) argue in different ways for the incorporation of the Treaty of Waitangi into any reformed constitution. Most infamously, Raj Vasil argues for a federal organisation of New Zealand, with perhaps a separate Maori state. More interestingly, Carol Stigley argues for vastly expanded powers in local government. Tino Pereira and Paul Spoonley add Pacific islanders’ and other ethnic minorities’ doubts about the unalloyed goodness of majoritarian democracy to those of Maori. Others opposed these agendas on grounds of majoritarian democracy, the sanctity of private property, and the importance of everyone having equal rights. Finally, still others (Jock Phillips most successfully) attempt to elucidate New Zealand culture/s in such a way as to suggest what a constitution should deliver to its peoples.

Such a book clearly is and will remain for some time an excellent recourse for the student of New Zealand politics and the constitution. It is true that its contents are notably unphilosophical: it is simply taken for granted that (for instance) majoritarian democracy is the form of government to be aspired to; that peoples first in a country have a moral priority there; that the Treaty is the ‘foundation document’ of the country and the constitution; that it is good for a constitution to ‘represent’ all ethnic and all gender groups (but not class or status groups); that the ideas of group identity and representation are fairly unproblematic; that a constitution that divides the legislative from the judiciary from the executive is best; that it is more

important to protect the rights of people than to protect and nurture the authority and power of the state; that constitutions derive their 'legitimacy' (whatever that is) from the 'consent of the people' (however that is to be registered); that rights to private property override the imperatives of the public good. And where such propositions are not taken for granted, it is rather the wisdom of historical knowledge or practical experience that informs the doubts than any enunciated principle. But surely one would have expected just this: that constitutional arrangements in normal times are best left to the practical commonsense of those most concerned with operating them? One need not expect from such people (and I include the Maori commentators here) any deep and self-doubting analysis of the beliefs they hold. Nor need agreement be expected. Those of a law-abiding and constitutionalist temperament can well live in conditions of disagreement. And so the student is left with a collection of papers that express – except perhaps for the strange absence of Jock Brookfield – much of the best of the practical constitutional wisdom in the country.

The book then, as the conference itself did, will certainly stimulate and inform those interested in the constitution. And – even though there are no anarchist, no Marxist, no objectivist, no Maori, ethnic or feminist fundamentalists to be heard – within constitutionalist limits a wide range of competing views are expressed.

Equally, the book will bore the average punter stiff, as too complex and arcane.

So why the media fuss? Why the attacks on the elite and its desire to 'educate' the public? One can only think that they really feared that a constitutional revolution could be carried out by a tiny elite. Or was it a strange case of a right-wing and populist politics of envy, in which success and expertise in law and the constitution is to be traduced in the way socialists at times traduce economists and businesspeople? It is in the face of such anti-intellectualism – actually stupidity and arrogance – that

public seminars, organised by institutions of learning like the Institute of Policy Studies, are to be welcomed.

Tara Brabazon, 2000 *Tracking the Jack: A retracing of the Antipodes*, Sydney, UNSW Press, A\$34.95, 192pp

Interviewed and reviewed by  
Farida Tilbury  
Western Australia

It's not often that you find someone who has lived, studied and worked in the same places you have, and who shares the same interests, so when Tara Brabazon's *Tracking the Jack* was offered for review, I jumped at the chance. And when I realized we were living in the same city, it seemed only logical to meet up for an interview about the book.

New Zealand sociologists may remember Brabazon from her 1-year stint at Victoria University in 1994, during which she made quite a name for herself as an exciting and challenging lecturer and cultural commentator, or from the 1996 'Culture Shocks' conference at Te Papa, which she reviewed in *Sites* in 1999.

So, I emailed Tara to arrange an interview and received an offer of coffee at her place with the apology that 'It's not the Lido, but hey...'. Such a response resonated. We shared a knowledge and an experience from our time as part of the café culture of Wellington, a shared experience that was shared because it's part of the culture of Wellington, not because we shared it together.

It is this together, but not really together, quality of the relationship between Australia and New Zealand that Brabazon deals with in *Tracking the Jack*. How is it that our two nations can have such a close relationship that people who have lived in

the same cities in both countries feel close enough to become friends simply because of that shared experience? How is it that migrant traffic between the two nations is so constant that we can have had the same experiences, and yet also recognise enormous differences? In her conclusion, Brabazon suggests that 'travel across the Tasman confirms that we are not home – well, not really'. The language, the television, the sport, the food, the groceries, the language, the beer – all are just slightly different, and it is the slightness which is so disconcerting. It is that 'not quite together' quality that is Brabazon's interest in this book.

*Tracking the Jack* ostensibly analyses the differences and similarities between the two major British colonies in the Antipodes, and their relationship to England and to each other. This is done through a historical tracing of their pasts, and analysis of the social, economic, political and cultural relationship with each other. But it is much more than this – coming from someone concerned with cultural studies, it traces the different attachments, interests, problems, and concerns that form part of the psyche of Australians and New Zealanders as evidenced in concrete examples from popular culture.

Brabazon describes her intention in writing *Tracking the Jack* as a desire to investigate where we are at in the year 2000. This involved an examination of 'the tyranny of distance' and its influence on our own sense of national identity, and who we are in relation to those around us and to Britain. She suggests that it is time to get beyond the politics of guilt, which has white identity in the region being based on what Ghassan Hage has called a black arm-band version of history (Hage, 1998) and to reconsider what it means to be Antipodean. Through tracing the symbolism of the Union Jack and other British icons, Brabazon seeks to investigate continuing ties with the 'mother country'.

Writing for herself rather than any particular audience, Brabazon provides personal anecdotes and reactions to illustrate observations about wider social issues in New Zealand and Australia. The result is a mix of autobiography, style journalism,

popular culture, and historiography. Thus both style and content are interdisciplinary, producing a readable book that is both 'dip into-able' and easy to read cover to cover.

The book divides into two parts – the first a historical journey, structured around the symbol of the Antipodes, which seeks to answer the question of how our different pasts have produced two quite distinct cultures in New Zealand and Australia. This section is smattered with iconography to illustrate the connections and tensions between the colonies and the 'mother country', and the nations' ambivalent identity as both colonizer and colonized. Brabazon goes on to trace the development of cultural studies in the Antipodes, but does so in very palpable terms, looking at the development of the journal *Sites*, the problematic 1996 'Culture Shocks' conference held at Te Papa, and the various incarnations of cultural studies in each of the Australian capital cities.

The second part develops this premise from a more cultural studies' perspective, consisting of a series of divergent 'textual engagements' that includes reviewing popular music, 'boot politics', sport, Noel Coward, Michael Palin's travels, and how masculinities are represented in local film.

The result is an odd mix of the pedestrian and the insightful. For example, her discussion of biculturalism and multiculturalism as the foundation principles behind ethnic relations' policy in each country will leave Kiwis uninspired. Arguments about fundamental flaws in multiculturalism as simply a rhetorical smokescreen to mask a fundamentally Anglophilic culture, and about biculturalism as a more viable policy foundation that at least enables a dialogue to proceed, are old hat in New Zealand. She provides a rather fuller discussion of the history and meaning of biculturalism in New Zealand, since the Australian audience may not be aware of its meaning and nature.

On the other hand, Brabazon's popularity as a teacher (she won a National Teaching Award for the Humanities in 1998)

derives partly from her ability to engage with current issues. She is adept at noting the minute detail in the seemingly mundane and making it interesting through analysis, which consists mainly of question asking. This interest is manifest in her fascination with taking photographs of many of the 'taken-for-granted' aspects of everyday life. It is this ability that makes her book so interesting. Who else would write an entire chapter about Doc Martens? And yet it seems so right when you've lived in both countries, particularly the cities of Wellington and Perth, to interrogate this particular 'fashion'. Especially when the analysis involves photographs of advertising billboards, shop fronts and bus shelter ads that demonstrate the different appeals to Britishness and marginalised counter-culture applied in Australia and New Zealand.

Also interesting are her observations about the rise and fall of the ANZAC tradition, its significance in the rupture between the two nations, and the ambivalence in the continued use of the term. The Gallipoli campaign, Brabazon argues, made clear to the troops the differences, rather than the similarities, between them. The process of remembering the event tends to ignore the contribution of each country to the other. Both nations remember it as the making of themselves as nations, yet neither adequately recognises the role of their close neighbour in the action.

Brabazon says Chapter 2 was the most difficult to write, but is the most important politically. In it she argues that working out our relationship with England is vital, and that account must be taken of what we have gained and what we have lost in this relationship. This involves confronting the colonial past, in order to move towards decolonisation. Her ultimate argument is that rather than searching for national identities, the two nations would do well to move straight to regionalism, a strategic regionalism which will enable more maturity, independence, positive self-image and greater opportunities for economic and cultural (in terms of the arts) development. When asked about the



recent immigration debate, which saw the Australian government attempt to clamp down on Kiwi migration, Brabazon notes that the siege mentality that seems to have hit New Zealand means it is losing good intellectuals. She suggests that Australia has done very well out of New Zealand's migration, and that it's now time to pay the piper.

Her observations about sport in the book are perhaps less relevant to New Zealand, but interesting all the same. She traces the recent development of soccer in Western Australia, a state which until recently was fanatically 'Aussie rules' obsessed. She suggests soccer fans, who collect in large numbers at the games to back their team with singing, scarves and beer, are 'semiotic tourists' adopting clearly British patterns of support for their team. The manner of this support sets itself up as inclusive, global and family oriented, as opposed to 'Aussie rules' football's traditional exclusivity, Australianness and masculinity. But in a climate of exclusivism Hanson-style, it is important to ask 'why now?' (well, in the last 5 years) and what is the ideological function of this nostalgic summoning of Englishness.

It has always struck me as surprising that there is not more research about the relationship between Australia and New Zealand. I asked Tara why she thought this was. She suggests the dearth of comparative analytic work being undertaken is a function of the lack of engagement that results from an assumption by Australians that New Zealand is just another state of Australia. There is a presumed familiarity that enables Australians to look solely internally for their identity, or further afield for other objects of interest. New Zealanders, on the other hand, know very well that there are real differences, and they are angry at the Australianization of New Zealand. As a result, NZ academics have dug their heels in, turned introspective, and written solely about NZ.

Brabazon hopes the book will appeal to Australians who know nothing of New Zealand. It will enable them to step out of their 'Australia box' and think of their place in the Antipodes.

She feels the New Zealand audience is different, being better read and more aware already of their positioning, and not needing a history lesson. What Kiwis will find interesting are the connections and cultural studies aspects of the book. Ideally, Brabazon says, it will open up a political debate about the nature of the relationship between Australia and New Zealand. With typical drama Brabazon says, 'I want intellectual life to be like extreme sports. It takes intellectual courage to write honestly and be prepared to take the consequences'. She values an active readership, as her aim is to get people going. Yet in some ways the book is a little like Claudia Bell's *Inventing New Zealand* – lots of interesting observations and pictures, but leaving sociologists wanting a deeper level of analysis. This is not a bad thing, however, as it appeals to wider audiences than sociologists (who are a strange bunch, anyway), and there is much in *Tracking the Jack* to get brain juices flowing. It will have served its purpose if it begins an engagement between academics and cultural commentators on both sides of the Tasman.

Brabazon is close to finishing a new book entitled *Ladies Who Lunge*, a series of essays on 'difficult women', including women wrestlers and aerobics instructors.

As I sit here in the sweltering heat of a Perth summer, listening to Stellar, remembering the large Muttonbirds collection in Tara's lounge, I think her call for a regional, rather than national identity is not such a bad thing.

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Patrick Day, 2000 *Voice & Vision – A History of Broadcasting in New Zealand* (Volume 2). Auckland, Auckland University Press. \$59.95 (Hard cover), 456p.

Reviewed by Peter Beatson  
Massey University

I volunteered to review this book because I wanted the opportunity to congratulate Pat Day on his fine achievement. Ever since reading *The Radio Years*, the first volume in his two-part history of broadcasting in New Zealand, I have eagerly awaited the sequel. Now it is out, adding 'vision' (the advent of television in the 1960s) to the 'voice' of radio. The present volume narrates the tortuous story of how broadcasting in this country metamorphosed from a government department monopolised by the political party in power (the note on which the first volume ended) to its total infestation by free market values in the 1990s.

The book is a mine that can be quarried for many different themes. Clearly, it is a meticulously researched and canonical resource for anyone with a scholarly or personal interest in the media. At another level, it makes fascinating reading if you are intrigued by the life cycle of complex organisations. What could be more complex than the broadcasting industry! Day traces its progress from the pioneer beginnings, when a handful of dedicated individuals conjured the beast into existence by their initiative, hard work and improvisatory daring, through periods of bureaucratic sclerosis to moments of energetic renewal and self reinvention. The fact that the organisation (i.e. various incarnations of the Broadcasting Corporation) functions at all is miraculous, considering the endemic structural flaws, financial crises, ideological conflicts, interpersonal rivalries and corporate paranoia with which it is beset.

What particularly fascinated me about *The Radio Years* and whetted my appetite for its sequel, though, was the symbiotic relationship between broadcasting and the evolution of national identity. Pat Day evokes this mutually reinforcing relationship in the closing words of his Introduction to the present volume:

In the years covered by this history New Zealand has moved from the comparative economic equality of the 1950s to a time when concentrations of wealth exist alongside the ravages of widespread unemployment, from a quiet consensus that we are one people to a celebration of differences coupled with rancour at the unequal treatment suffered by various groups, from an isolated and distinctive New Zealand to membership of a global society in which interests and lifestyles are shared as much among different nations as within one country. Broadcasting has been both the cause and effect of this process of change and has experienced similar upheavals in its nature, conduct and control. But constant throughout the years is the centrality of broadcasting to New Zealand life... Broadcasting is the arena in which much of our communal life is conducted, from casual conversations about entertainment programmes to the conduct of political elections, from the enjoyment of national sporting contests to the expressions of outrage at heinous crimes. It is the provider of much of our knowledge of events outside our personal experience and of large amounts of our leisure activity. Many of our values, desires and aspirations are mediated through broadcasting. Our society is so reliant on it, for everything from advertising to news, that we could scarcely function without it (p.8).

The Introduction from which this quote was snipped is an absolute must for readers of *Voice and Vision*, as is its concluding chapter 'Broadcasting and New Zealand'. They

provide thematically essential maps of the terrain Day explores in minute detail throughout the bulk of the text. Without such maps, readers risk getting lost in the undergrowth; with their assistance, the 400-plus pages of substantive research are resolved into clear patterns – historical in the case of the Introduction, thematic in the final chapter.

It is clearly impossible to summarise all the themes, epochs and substantive material in a short review. An extended metaphor may serve to give a feel for the sheer complexity of Day's project. I think of him as a solitary drover, herding a mob of cats on a long journey across treacherous terrain. In fact, he has two mobs to control, as the histories of radio and of television are quite distinct.

The cats are a fractious and variegated lot. Some are domesticated (state-owned broadcasting), some are feral (commercial). They not only fight constantly for dominance, but confuse the issue by inter-breeding promiscuously, so that by the end of the journey its virtually impossible to tell among the hybrids where public broadcasting ends and commercialism begins.

That's only the start of the problems. There is endemic tension between indigenous cats and immigrants. In principle, it is the former that should be nurtured, but they are expensive to breed, so it is tempting to neglect them in favour of their much cheaper imported cousins. One little brown native kitten is in a particularly parlous state, running along behind the rest of the herd mewling loudly to be accepted, but always either left behind or trampled under foot.

Then there are the fatalities, and also the miraculous resurrections from the dead. Local radio, for instance, which had played such a key role in sustaining community bonds before the advent of the national TV networks, seemed to have turned up its toes for good by the 1980s, only to gallop back to life with the wave of deregulation in the 1990s.

Of course, life would be a lot easier for all concerned if some bastard hadn't blitzed the whole territory with Agent Orange. Fodder is so scarce, the cats have to spend most of their time foraging for small game and fighting amongst themselves for scarce pickings. That is, the broadcasting sector has been consistently – and sometimes one feels deliberately – starved of adequate funding throughout most of its history. Day makes it clear that politicians have not been generous towards broadcasters, especially once the latter began independent news and commentary programmes outside the orbit of Ministerial control.

I'll cut my extended metaphor short at this point, as it risks growing tiresome. Even so, I can't think of a better image than herding cats for Day's undertaking. He has a host of intractable and wayward facts to organise, issues to analyse and themes to explore. Only occasionally do some subjects race ahead or lag behind the main bunch (i.e. get slightly chronologically misplaced). I was also a little concerned about the helter-skelter scamper for the finishing line: the author devoted considerably less space to developments in the 1990s than to prior epochs. In the main, though, the control was firm and the discussion balanced – without pulling punches when policies have been manifestly grotesque.

Pat Day wrote the concluding words of his chronicle in the last months of the 20th century. It was a time when the spirit of commercialism seemed to have swept all before it, but a new Labour-Alliance Government had just been elected and change was clearly on its way. A year later, Helen Clark has nailed her colours to the mast of cultural nationalism, while Marian Hobbs's broadcasting charter has set the PSB pigeon amongst the free market cats. A new century – a new phase in broadcasting history. In the meantime, Pat Day can rest on his laurels after the Herculean feat of narrating the 20th century section of the story. I only hope his publishers intend to nominate this canonical work for the up-coming Book of the Year Awards.

Bleiker, R. 2000 *Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. A\$39.95 (Paperback); A\$110.00 (Hard cover), 300p.

Reviewed by Chamsy Ojeili  
Open Polytechnic of New Zealand

Obdurate Marxists often viewed the events of 1989-1991 in Eastern Europe not as an end to ideological history but as a reconfirmation of the Marxian notions of historical change and collective agency. According to Roland Bleiker, Senior Lecturer at the University of Queensland, the fall of the Berlin Wall signals the passing away of such notions, and it entails a necessary shift from the international relations approach that privileges wars and states. Dissent today is 'transversal', transgressing and questioning national boundaries and the division between the global and the local; and international relations needs to recognise a range of actors, spheres, forms of resistance, types of identity formation, and issues.

Bleiker's work sits within the Foucauldian field of social inquiry, but is enriched with borrowings and insights from such figures as de Certeau, Adorno, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. His genealogy of present day notions of dissent and agency begins with the sixteenth century text by Etienne de la Boetie, *Anti-One*. This text, part of the emerging humanist tradition, attacked the foundations of royal absolutism, spoke of the possibility of withdrawing consent, and examined the voluntary servitude of the ruled. Bleiker traces the development of this dissenting imaginary from the sixteenth century through to more recent times – in the emergence of mass popular dissent and in the writings of Tolstoy and Gandhi.

The notion of the one revolutionary rupture, the 'day of the great sweep', as Bebel called it, is inadequate today, argues Bleiker. This conception of change and agency tends to be essentialist and a-historical, and it only ever pays attention to

macro-forces. The complexity of the processes that surrounded the fall of the Berlin Wall, for instance, indicate how inadequate are such older consent-based models of power and change, along with the often attached presumption of voluntary servitude. The dramatic events of Autumn 1989 did not appear from nowhere. Nor can they be interpreted as part of History's secret plan. In fact, so entangled and historically specific are the relations of power and the various actions and constraints in play in this situation that no grand theory could do proper justice to them.

According to Bleiker, turning to Foucault's understanding of power and to the Foucauldian conception of discourse will allow us to avoid a number of significant problems with the way dissent and agency are presently thought. We can then escape the utopianism that expects progressive social change as a catastrophic rupture followed by perfect harmony. We can also avoid essentialism and the image of dissent as the male hero riding to freedom. Further, perhaps we can now finally jettison the political and theoretical quest to erect new foundations after the death of God.

Bleiker also turns to Gramsci to examine the ever-present hegemonic war of attrition that takes place within the trenches of culture: 'There are no quick and miraculous forms of resistance to discursive domination. Dissent works by digging, slowly, underneath the foundations of authority' (pp.270-1). Promoting the centrality of slow changes in values over spectacular rupture, Bleiker devotes a chapter to the discursive transgressions of dissident East German poetry. Bleiker's culturalist focus also means a focus on 'dailiness'. This involves a closer analysis of identity – away from the occasional post-modern erasure of the subject – and it entails critical borrowings from James C Scott (*Weapons of the Weak*) and Michel de Certeau.

Bleiker rejects the pessimistic reading of Foucault and of post-modernism more generally. There are cracks that can be explored in every discursive formation. And the rejection of the idea of an end of history is not a cause for pessimism; it is instead



a gateway to more humane and modest approaches to difference, and it involves recognition of the ubiquity and inescapability of the political.

There are, of course, any number of objections that one could make to the Foucauldian approach Bleiker takes. The charges are familiar enough: idealism, aestheticism, romanticism, questionable selection of historical evidence, retreat from analysis of macro-structures, etc. Keeping such cautions in mind is worthwhile; yet, Bleiker's engaging and lucid approach sweeps these reservations aside. The reader might, though, be surprised at the absence from the text of consideration of Laclau and Mouffe, thinkers whose project appears so similar to Bleiker's, and whose work on power, identity, hegemony, and political struggle should perhaps have been considered and confronted.

P. Koopman-Boyden, A. Dharmalingam, B. Grant, V. Hendy, S. Hillcoat-Nalletamby, D. Mitchell, M. O'Driscoll, S. Thompson (eds), 2000 *Transactions in the Mid-Life Family*, Population Association of New Zealand, Monograph Series No. 1. Hamilton, University of Waikato \$29.95, 183p.

Reviewed by  
Mervyl McPherson  
Massey University

This monograph presents findings from Phase One of the analysis of the Mid-Life Transactions Project<sup>1</sup> carried out by a multi-disciplinary team of researchers from Waikato University, led by Professor Peggy Koopman-Boyden. The aim of this project

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<sup>1</sup> This project is funded by the Foundation for Research Science and Technology and the Lottery Grants Board.

was to investigate a range of family transactions (such as the provision of care and support) of people aged 40-54 years in relation to intra- and intergenerational relations, and other socio-cultural dimensions such as work, leisure, well-being and quality of life. This age group was chosen for two reasons. First, a growing concern that this mid-life group may be experiencing competing intra- and intergenerational needs for care and assistance. Second that, from a demographic perspective, this age group has contributed to major changes in long-term trends in population age structure, with each 5-year age cohort within this group experiencing contrasting family formation patterns and therefore different types of competing dependencies.

The project used survey research, combining computer assisted telephone interviewing with an optional postal questionnaire on more complex items. The initial sample was recruited using face-to-face contact and multi-stage cluster random sampling. Both recruitment and interviewing took place from May to September 1997. Approximately half (54%) of those contacted who met eligibility criteria agreed to participate in the research. Of these, a response rate of 86% (N=750) was achieved for the telephone interview, but only 73.5% of these (N=551 or 63% of total) completed the postal section. (Taking the initial recruitment response rate into account, actual response rates were 46% and 34% respectively.) A test of sample representativeness found that women, Pakeha, the unemployed, single people and women in the labour force were over-represented in the sample, so weighting was used to overcome this sampling bias. Adjustments were also made for the likelihood of selection dependent on number in household.

The findings are reported in eight chapters, plus an introduction and conclusion by Koopman-Boyden. The publication contains an executive summary, notes on the eight contributors, references, and appendices of the two questionnaires.

In Chapter Two, Koopman-Boyden and Hillcoat-Nalletamby outline existing definitions and paradigms of family and family relationships. They find these inadequate for considering inter- and intra generational transactions, so establish an alternative model for tracking family relationships and transactions both within and between generations. The model covers direction, type, timing, intensity, and impact of family transactions, and whether these transactions occur within the family domain or between family and society.

The methodology employed in this project, as summarised above, is detailed in Chapter Three. Thereafter follow five chapters of findings on different areas of the investigation. In Chapter Four, Hillcoat-Nalletamby presents findings on family transactions in relation to households and generations. This is followed by three chapters by Mitchell and Hendy on: the impact of health status on inter- and intragenerational transactions and dependency relationships within families; the giving and receipt of care among family members; and quality of life and its relationship to health status and caring roles. In Chapter Eight, O'Driscoll examines the links between employment and family. Although there is much prior research in this area, the particular contribution of this project is to explore the positive interplay between the two spheres, as well as the more researched conflict between the two. The final chapter of findings focuses on leisure and the constraints that family responsibilities may place on it.

In summary, this project found that the household is of little value as a unit of analysis for intergenerational transactions. Relationships across households are more important. Emotional support and financial support are the most common types of family support provided. These findings are consistent with those of my own study (McPherson, 1999, 2000a, 2000b).

Mitchell and Hendy's investigation of the relationship between health and family relationships and support found that, contrary to expectations, the majority of respondents reported a

high quality of life regardless of health status. Family relationships were an important component of this, with the provision of support to family not being a major determinant of satisfaction or stress. They note, though, that further research is needed into dimensions of this support – such as the level of support required and the length of time it is required – in order to understand the full implications of family-support giving for providers. While two-thirds of respondents received some kind of assistance from family, this was not related to health status and was not necessarily long-term or arduous.

O'Driscoll found that there were both benefits and burdens from simultaneous employment and family involvement, and these affect each other in both directions: satisfaction with family increases satisfaction at work, and vice versa. However, negative employment experiences were more likely to interfere with family than were negative family experiences to interfere with employment. He suggests the need, therefore, to examine the broader social impact on family life of employment policies and practices.

Another unexpected finding was that the middle-aged group is generally satisfied with the amount of leisure time they have. This does not fit with the hypothesis of an age group overstretched with work and multiple generational family commitments. While it is not clear whether this satisfaction is due to declining family demands from the younger generation, or mere acceptance of established routines, the findings of Mitchell and Hendy in Chapter Six of little care and support being provided within the family to elderly members, and of low levels of reported conflict between job and family (O'Driscoll, Chapter Eight) tends to support the former theory of excessive family demands not being commonplace.

Koopman-Boyden has identified a number of implications for policy from the first phase of this study:

- the need to take account of inter household support networks

- the need for preventative health policies to encourage the link between lifestyle and well being. Family relationships are an important part of this.
- the need for social, employment and family policies to give greater consideration to the work-family interface and to accommodate the need for family responsibilities, not just to dependent children, but to other dependent family members, particularly the dependent elderly. The finding that jobs interfere with family more than family with jobs suggests individuals and families are doing more to accommodate this interface than are employers.
- the need for policies to support intergenerational care and assistance by strengthening and supporting the family network, for instance, by providing support for family caregivers such as appropriate training, respite care, and professional support where needed.

Much of this project closely parallels my own recent work (McPherson, 1999, 2000a,2000b) in the area of the nature and role of the extended family, with overlaps in the area of family support and caregiving. Both studies reach the same conclusion: that, with an ageing population and reduced state support, there is a need for families to be encouraged and supported in their role of traditional family obligations rather than undermining their efforts by placing too great a burden on families in an effort to curb state expenditure. A partnership model where the two institutions of state and family complement each other rather than replace each other is recommended. However, it is not clear where the evidence is in Phase One of this study for such a conclusion, as the assumption that the 40-54 age group is particularly affected by competing family responsibilities was not borne out. This may be a factor of the age groups chosen.

While this study is generally well executed and reported, it does have some flaws. The focus on the 40-54 age group is

both a strength and a weakness. Some would consider mid-life to be 45-59, and such a shift may have produced different results.

Focusing on a particular cohort enables detailed examination of family relationships and transactions within that group that is a useful contribution to the policy process, but leaves me wondering about the other age groups. Perhaps this study has concentrated on the wrong group in terms of support needs? My own study, which covers all ages from 18 and over, suggests this may be the case: that it is younger age groups that are most in need of support, not the middle-aged group, or the elderly (McPherson, 2000a, 2000b). With an ageing population, all kinds of implications for policy are being surmised. This study shows the need for more empirical research to determine what these implications actually are, so that policy can respond to real rather than assumed need.

A further drawback of this study is the actual overall response rate, based on the 54% recruitment rate, which may have affected the findings, despite attempts to overcome sample bias through weighting. However, the consistency of the findings with my own study lends support to their reliability.

Overall, I find this book a good example of applied demography, highlighting the policy implications of the findings. It would be useful for demographers, sociologists, and social policymakers, particularly in the areas of social services and employment, and any family related policy. And there is more to come: Phase Two of the analysis will concentrate on the dynamics of intergenerational transactions – such as power, negotiation and reciprocity and also more on the policy context.

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Darin Barney, 2000 *Prometheus Wired: The hope for democracy in the age of network technology*. Sydney, University of New South Wales Press. A\$39.95, 5352p.

Reviewed by Lincoln Dahlberg  
Massey University

Prometheus stole for his human children both fire and hope, but it was the provision of hope that led to his severe punishment – being chained to a rock for an insatiable eagle to devour his ever-regenerating liver in perpetuity. Without hope, humans could only use fire for their immediate and limited needs. But with hope, humans would come to over-estimate themselves, they would come to regard themselves as possessing an unbounded ability in the deployment of fire for their desires. The flames of fire would go uncontained with disastrous consequences for both gods and mortals. Barney uses this interpretation of the myth of Prometheus as the theme for his investigation of the relationship between network technologies and democracy. He asks whether network technology is facilitating rational deliberation on how to organize life under limited conditions, or whether it is leading to the situation in the Prometheus story. Are computer networks providing an instrument that can serve limited human ends, or are they also acting to nourish the belief that we humans are capable of anything we desire?

To answer this question, Barney draws upon Marx, Heidegger, and George Grant. He argues that these philosophers' contemplation of the human condition provides a deeper questioning of democracy and technology than more recent postmodern writers' more descriptive evaluations. Barney takes each of these philosophers in turn to explore democracy's potential within an increasingly networked world.

Over two substantial chapters, Barney develops a Marxist inspired political economy of network society that reveals the decisive role computer networks play at present in the extension of the capitalist mode of production. He shows how people are being constituted through networked technologies within capitalism as alienated workers and homogeneous consumers rather than deliberating citizens. Barney then turns to a Heideggerian analysis of the impact of network technologies upon the self. For Heidegger, the essence of technology is not based in its instrumentality but in the way it enframes or delineates existence. Heidegger believes technology sets upon the world as a 'standing-reserve' of exploitable resources, and in the process constitutes human essence as calculative and outside nature. As a result, technology undermines the contemplative and rooted self that Heidegger sees as making for a truly human existence. Barney argues that network technology extends this calculative and rootless subject and thus undermines a democratic orientation by reducing the world to a series of electronically transmitted digital signals.

Barney then asks, is there any hope for democratic governance in a world increasingly dominated by essentially anti-democratic networks? To investigate this question he turns to an analysis of network technology's relationship to democratic governance. Drawing on George Grant's ideas on modern technology and democracy, Barney argues that although network technologies are not immune to governance and truly democratic uses, they are helping construct a liberal, capitalist, technological world that denies people any choices outside the pursuit of



liberty, profit, and progress. In terms of politics, network technologies tend to promote technical solutions (such as facilitating the registering and processing of votes and polls) rather than stimulate more deliberative forms of democratic participation. Network technologies thus simply act as the latest in a succession of 'stand-ins' for the genuine art of democracy. As children of Prometheus we have yet again been blinded by hope, naively believing that through network technologies we can overcome our mortal bounds and, like gods, fulfil our every desire. Not only do we fail to become gods, but the truly human life that comes from contemplation, rootedness, and accepting the limits of our mortality is replaced by the emptiness of a calculative existence, a virtual but virtueless life.

This short and simplified summary fails to do justice to the depth of analysis involved. Barney combines expert knowledge of network technology, arresting philosophical discussion, and clarity of writing style to produce a compelling evaluation. In marked contrast to the many simplistic, technoutopian commentaries in this field, Barney develops a weighty, earnest, and challenging argument. The result is a potent indictment of the modern technological complex – of liberalism, capitalism, and unbridled pursuit of technological excellence – of which computer networking is increasingly central. The effect is to launch the reader into the very contemplation that Barney calls for.

The argument is bound to be highly contentious, not least because of Barney's deployment of modern philosophy for the analysis of what many would consider a postmodern phenomenon or because of his resulting propositions of what it means to be fully human and of what network technology's essence consists. But Barney's work is substantial in detail and scope and I simply cannot begin an adequate assessment of it here. However, I do want to discuss briefly an aspect of Barney's methodology that concerns me and may be of interest to the general sociological reader. This is the way Barney deploys

modern political philosophy in relation to the substantive material.

Barney's analysis involves a combination of political economy and political philosophy. I feel quite at ease with much of the political economy analysis. It is Barney's utilization of the philosophy of Heidegger and Grant that I feel particularly suspicious about. While the philosophical discussion is extremely thought provoking, it seems to be deployed in a deterministic way. Not only does the substantive material seem to be read so as to 'fit' the chosen philosophy but some important material is sidelined in the investigation. For instance, little consideration is paid to the many informal and formal deliberative spaces that exist online.

Noticeably missing from Barney's analysis is an adequate consideration of the perspective of the user of network technology. In fact, disagreement between subjective experiences and the philosophical angle taken is either discarded as the delusions of the children of Prometheus or reduced to a peripheral aspect of the essentially anti-democratic and dehumanizing technology. This lack of faith in the understanding and moral vision of human subjects resonates not only with the Prometheus myth but reflects the pessimism of Heidegger and Grant about the democratic prospects of the political use of technology.

Yet actual analysis of online democratic uses indicates much resistance to the liberal, capitalist, technological ethos to which Barney sees network technology intrinsically tied. Research of online communication shows that network technology is not simply a tool for powerful capitalists nor a force enframing human life as calculative, but is being extensively used for rational deliberation (see, for instance, Slevin, 2000; Wilhelm, 2000). For sure, this potential is being curbed and reconstituted within liberal capitalist contexts, but social research into online communications indicates that network technology is not at present essentially and pervasively

anti-democratic. Thus, very different conclusions may have developed from Barney's analysis had he undertaken a more reflexive, sociological analysis.

I do not wish my reflection on aspects of Barney's methodology to detract from what is a very important contribution to the current debate on the democratic prospects of computer networks. Barney provides an absorbing discussion that demonstrates modern philosophy's ongoing importance as a resource for our analysis of the very latest technology. Moreover, through modern philosophy Barney develops a very powerful and troubling thesis that serves not only as a warning but as the basis for further sociological analysis. This book is a powerful critique of the unthought celebrations of network technology and a much needed call for us to look more carefully and deeply at our relationship with network technology and technology in general.

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## Author's response to reviewer

Greg Newbold  
*Crime in New Zealand:*

The last issue of *New Zealand Sociology* (v.15, no.1) carries a review of my latest book, *Crime in New Zealand*. Written by Robert Webb, a Ph.D student in the Political Studies Department at Auckland University, the review is, for the most part, fair and comprehensive. There are, however, a few points with which I take issue.

First, the reviewer questions my assertion that in domestic situations, women assault men at least as often as the reverse. My claim is based on the findings of the Dunedin multidisciplinary study, which has been acclaimed as one of the most competent longitudinal surveys of young men and women ever to have been conducted. I back my claim with citations to a number of overseas studies as well.

To contradict me, Mr Webb uses the 1995 *Hitting Home* survey of Leibrich et al. and the 1996 *National Survey of Crime Victims*. This is puzzling, since the former included no men at all in its sample, and no gender comparison was therefore possible. The other survey he cites did include men, and found that a minority of respondents reported partner violence. Moreover, and contrary to many much larger studies, it found that women were more often assaulted than men. But the response rate for this inquiry was only about 50 percent, and the number who reported having been assaulted was so small that the apparent gender differences were non-significant. Its findings are therefore unreliable.

Second, Mr Webb disputes my contention that women receive less severe penalties than men for equivalent crimes committed in similar circumstances. Again, his choice of 'contrary evidence' is puzzling. He cites a 1993 study by McDonald that only just mentions the gender disparity issue,

without providing any rigorous statistics or analysis and that does not, in fact, refute my assertion at all. He also cites a 1997 study by Morris, that is not even about sentencing disparity. It is about access to legal services.

The basis for my claim is a 1999 Ministry of Justice survey of 300,000 sentencing outcomes, and a 5-year study by Jeffries (2001), who uses a highly sophisticated research design, backed by statistical analysis and qualitative observation. The results of both inquiries are clear and difficult to refute: when offences and personal circumstances are held constant, there is a sharp difference between men and women, both in the likelihood of being sent to prison, and if imprisoned, in the length of sentence imposed. Even when relevant sentencing factors are held constant, the criminal courts still favour women over men.

Finally, the reviewer questions my treatment of Maori and Pacific Island offending and suggests I should have referred to Moana Jackson's 1988 monograph *The Maori and the Criminal Justice System*. I have read this publication and I have heard Moana Jackson speak on it. Moana Jackson has few scholarly credentials in this area, a deficiency which is revealed clearly in his work. The monograph is principally rhetorical and contains numerous slanted, unsubstantiated and questionable claims. As a serious professional committed to the maintenance of proper academic standards, I deliberately refrained from using Jackson (1988) because in my view, it has little factual merit and no scientific credibility.

In conclusion, I suggest that although the reviewer of my book has read it thoroughly and produced a well-written assessment, he has failed to find scholarly material to support his critique. I therefore stand by the arguments as they appear in the book.

**Greg Newbold**

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## Contributors to this issue

- Peter Beatson** is an Associate Professor in the Sociology Programme at Massey University. His latest book is *The Disability Revolution in New Zealand: A Social Map*.
- Bruce Curtis** is a lecturer in Sociology at the University of Auckland. He has wide ranging research interests including gambling, health, work, and the state. He is currently editing a book called *Gambling in New Zealand* for Dunmore Press.
- Jan Cameron** is Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Academic) and Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Canterbury. Her major research interests relate to sport migration, in particular the migration of student-athletes to the US, and gender issues in sport. The latter includes a focus on women's role in sport administration. She has also published articles on doping and gender verification.
- Maxine Campbell** lectures in sociological theory, popular culture, sociology of the family and social policy at the University of Waikato. Her particular interest is in family sociology, in which she sees the need for the development of a sociology of parenthood as a means of augmenting the understandings of the parent/child nexus that are currently provided by the sociology of childhood.
- Simon Campbell** has recently enrolled for a PhD in the Sociology Department at the University of Canterbury, looking at the applicability of European concepts of social exclusion in the New Zealand context. Prior to this he completed an MA thesis on the politics of housing policy in New Zealand during the 1990s and was employed as a social researcher in the private sector and policy analyst for a community agency.
- Lincoln Dalhberg** recently completed a PhD in Sociology at Massey University researching rhetoric and practices of Internet-Democracy. He aims to continue to question the relationship between new information and communication technologies and democratization.
- Elaine Henry** completed a MA (1<sup>st</sup> class honours) at Massey University. Currently she is a councillor with the Tasman District Council and works with various community groups

which focus on the arts and the long term unemployed. Her research interests include women councillors in local government.

**Steve Matthewman** lectures in Science, Technology and Society Studies, Cultural Studies and Social Theory at The University of Auckland. His research interests include the Sociology of Science and Environmental Sociology.

**Mervyl McPherson** is a graduate of the Population Studies Centre, Waikato University. Her research and publications over the last decade have focussed on changing family structures and inter-generational relationships and support networks. She currently lectures in the School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work, Massey University, Palmerston North.

**Chamsy Ojeili** completed his doctoral thesis at Massey University. He lectures in Communication at the Open Polytechnic of New Zealand.

**Arnold Parr** is a Senior Lecturer teaching collective behaviour, social theory and sociology of disabilities in the Department of Sociology, University of Canterbury. He is currently researching the anti-globalisation protest movement.

**Andrew Sharp** is a Professor of Political Studies at the University of Auckland. He teaches in the areas of the history of political thought and political philosophy. His most recent publications are *Justice and the Maori: the philosophy and the practice of Maori claims in New Zealand since the 1970s* (1997) and *The English Levellers* (1998). He is writing a book for a general audience called *Rangatiratanga Now*.

**Richard Shaw** is a lecturer in the School of Sociology, Social Policy and Social Work at Massey University, where he teaches courses in public policy and New Zealand politics. He is particularly interested in New Zealand's experiences of public sector reform, and in the impact which the adoption of MMP has had upon the formation of public policy. His most recent publications are in two texts on public policy and politics in New Zealand – *The New Politics: A Third Way for New Zealand* (Dunmore Press, 1999), and *New Zealand Government and Politics* (OUP, 2001).



**Farida Tilbury** completed her PhD at Victoria University of Wellington, investigating friendships between Maori and Pakeha and how such friendships affect the interactors' sense of their ethnic identity and attitudes to race relations issues. She has recently returned home to Perth where she is teaching Anthropology at the University of Western Australia and doing health research for the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners.

**Martin Tolich** is a senior lecturer in Sociology at Massey University. His recent publications are *Starting Fieldwork* (Oxford), *Social Science Research in New Zealand* and *Research Ethics in Aotearoa New Zealand* (both with Longman).

## Errata

The editors apologise for the typographical errors on the back cover of the last issue, 15:1. The notice regarding the third article should have read:

Lousie Humpage and Augie Fleras  
Systematic Bias and the Marginalisation of Somali Refugee  
Adolescents within New Zealand Education.

## NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS:

1. **Two copies of manuscripts** should be sent to the editors for consideration. Authors should retain a third copy for their own reference during proof-reading. Copies submitted will not normally be returned. To facilitate 'blind' reviewing, the **title and name(s)** of authors should be given on a separate sheet, and the **title only** should appear on the **first page** of the article.
2. Manuscripts should be typed **double spaced** throughout on one side of A4 paper with reasonable margins all round (2 cms approx.)
3. While articles **should not normally exceed 4500-5000 words**, longer articles may be accepted in special circumstances.
4. A **disc** should accompany the manuscript. The disc should be **IBM compatible**. If submitting a manuscript word-processed on a Mac obtain an IBM disc and save your article as Rich Text Format.
5. Manuscripts must be accompanied by a **short abstract** (about 100 words) typed on a separate sheet of paper.
6. From and including the next issue (Volume 16, Number 1) the Journal will adopt the stylistic conventions of the **American Psychological Association (APA)** for its referencing - referencing only. The referencing conventions are to be found in American Psychological Association. (1944) *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association and in Leonora T. Szechman. (1988) *Writing with style: APA style made easy*. Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
7. Do not underline any words in the text unless they are to be printed in *italics*.
8. Type each table on a separate sheet with as few lines as possible, and indicate the placing of the table in the text. Use wide spacing in tables. Tables should be numbered in Arabic figures with a clear legend to identify the table.
9. Drawings (graphs, figures, etc.) should be on good quality white paper and on separate sheets.
10. Footnotes are to be reserved for substantive commentary. Number them from 1 upwards. The location of each footnote in the text must be indicated by the appropriate superscript numeral. Footnotes will appear at the foot of the page where they are located.
11. The typescript submitted should be in the form in which the author wishes the paper to appear. Preliminary consultation with the editors about the suitability of an article does not necessarily guarantee its publication. Authors are encouraged to seek comments from colleagues before submitting a paper for publication.
12. The editors reserve the right to make minor editorial alterations or deletions to articles without consulting the author(s), so long as such changes do not affect the substance of the article.
13. Authors will receive a copy of the issue in which their article appears.