new zealand sociology
volume 15 number 1 2000

Articles

ISSN: 0112 921X

new zealand
sociology

Objective: To foster a referred journal to disseminate and promote research and thought that has, as its objective, the clarification and development of theoretically informed research in sociology and related disciplines, with a predominant, though not exclusive, concern with New Zealand.

Articles for publication: Contributors should consult the detailed instructions inside the back cover and submit two copies together with a computer disk (IBM compatible) to:

New Zealand Sociology
C/- Sociology Programme
Massey University
Palmerston North, NZ

Books for **review** and **advertising copy** should be sent to:

New Zealand Sociology (Reviews)
C/- Sociology Programme
Massey University
Palmerston North, NZ

Issues: 1 Volume per year, 2 issues per Volume.

Subscriptions:

Student rate	NZ$15.00 per Volume
Individual rate	NZ$22.00 per Volume
Institutional rate	NZ$40.00 per Volume
Surcharge for overseas postage	NZ$7.00 per Volume

Mail subscriptions to:

New Zealand Sociology (subscriptions)
C/- Sociology Programme
Massey University
Palmerston North, New Zealand

ISSN: 0112 921X

Papers in this Journal are indexed by the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences

new zealand sociology

new zealand
sociology

2000 **volume 15 number 1**

CONTENTS

BOOK REVIEWS

Editorial

Readers will note the new look of the Journal. Its format and appearance have been changed considerably, partly in response to comments received from subscribers over the past twelve months, partly as a consequence of the Editorial Board's own perception of a need to revise the Journal's content and appearance. We have abandoned the old cover, which we have been using for the past seven years, and adopted a simplier and rather more austere design which we see as symbolising the 'back to Sociology' theme apparent in the contributions to the 'State of New Zealand Sociology' symposium published in the last edition, volume 14 issue 2. We have adopted a more pleasant looking font. We shall continue to give careful attention to editing and, while we would never claim that any edition is free of typographical errors, we shall continue to ensure that these are minimised. We have not, however, engaged the services of a publishing house in the belief that this would involve raising the cost of the Journal with a consequent negative impact on circulation. (The cost of the Journal has remained at $22 for individual subscribers for the past eight years.)

We are pleased to announce that the symposium on the state of New Zealand Sociology, contained in the last edition, is to be used to facilitate discussion at the forthcoming SAANZ Annual Conference on a similar theme. Plans for a further symposium, this time on cultural studies in New Zealand, are well advanced and other topics to be given a similar treatment are under consideration. Suggestions, or worked up proposals, for others are welcome. We shall continue the publication of professional notes on current contributors, a feature that was introduced in the last edition and which should aid communication among authors and subscribers.

In the last edition, Peter Beatson, our Book Reviews Editor, initiated a new development in that area: the opportunity for the authors of books reviewed in previous editions to respond

to their critics. We have decided to extend this opportunity by publishing comments on Journal articles and replies to those comments by the authors of the papers. We do hope that at least some of our readers will take up one or the other, perhaps both, of these opportunities.

Within the next few months the Journal will establish its own website. In addition to publicising the Journal this will also provide an index to recent editions. It is intended that the index will be progressively extended to cover the contents of the Journal since its initial publication in 1986.

You will see a strong theme through most of the changes described above: a renewed desire to bring sociologists and sociological institutions in New Zealand, of which this Journal is one, and those of other related disciplines, into a more interactive and hopefully lively and constructive dialogue.

The objective remains the same: to foster a referred Journal to disseminate and promote research and thought that has as its objective, the clarification and development of theoretically informed research in Sociology and related disciplines, with a predominant, though not exclusive, concern with New Zealand. Perhaps we need to ask ourselves whether this too needs revision. Your ideas on this are welcome together with any other suggestions which you might like to make about improving the Journal or the service that it offers. Please address them to the editors.

Domestically Violent Men Speak: A Post-structuralist Critique

Damian O'Neill
Dept of Communication and Journalism
Massey University

Abstract

The present study critically explores domestically violent men's accounts of their violence to their female partners. Thirteen New Zealand men who had physically assaulted their spouses in the home were interviewed concerning their violence. Transcripts of these interviews were then analysed discursively using a Foucauldian Post-structuralist framework. Firstly themes in the way in which the men construct their violence were identified and these are documented and demonstrated through example quotations. Further analysis revealed two predominant discursive resources featuring in the men's accounts of their abuse; Romantic 'expressive tension' and personal 'pathology'. These accounts are theorised in their own terms and the implications of these narrative structures for understanding and intervening in men's domestic violence are discussed.

Male Domestic Assault as a Social Problem

In Western society there is a common sense that the 'home' is a safe haven of security and comfort which provides sanctuary from the harsh spoils of an outside, public and somewhat dangerous world (McMaster and Swain, 1989:7; Bograd, 1988:11; Giddens, 1989:413). This construction of the 'private' or 'domestic' sphere of society contrasts with the empirical evidence to date which documents the prevalence of men's violence in the home and

draws attention to the issue as a prevalent *social problem* occurring 'behind closed doors' (Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz, 1980:iii).

A consistent figure, which emerges throughout the international literature on family violence, is that one in ten women are physically abused by the men with whom they are intimate in any given year (Sampselle et al., 1992:4). In New Zealand eighty percent of all violence reported to the police is family related (Taylor, 1997:99). The vast majority of these reports document assaults by adult males on women and children, usually in a context of repetitive violence over time (Policing Development Group, 1994). National crime surveys throughout the Western world indicate that 90-97% of all occurrences of 'interspousal violence' are assaults by men against women (McLeod, 1984:171; Schwartz, 1987:190; Warrel and Pease, 1986:18-24).

Such interspousal violence' is a gendered issue, with men being more likely both to initiate and to use dangerous and injurious forms of violence in a 'domestic' situation (Kurz, 1989:489; Yllo, 1988:28). New Zealand men's physical violence against women most commonly includes pushing, grabbing, slapping and throwing objects at the victim. At it's most severe it includes beating the woman up, choking her, punching her, threatening her with and/or using a knife or a gun, forcing her to have sex, punching her and kicking her (Leibrich, Paulin and Ranson, 1995:85). The magnitude and degree of severity of men's violence in the home distinguishes it from women's violence to men and consequently it is typically women who are seriously injured as a result of 'inter-spousal' or 'domestic' violence (Kurz, 1989:489; Yllo, 1988:28).

Post-structuralism and the Field of Family Violence

The literature accounting for family violence and in particular men's violence in the home is fragmented, divided and controversial with many competing theories available, ranging from personal pathological to social structural accounts (Breines

and Gordon, 1983:490; Bograd, 1992:256). The field is very politically charged, with different points of analysis competing for scarce resources and hegemony over what constitutes effective intervention. Previously I have sought to deconstruct the theoretical literature surrounding wife abuse, through a Foucauldian Post-structuralist perspective, in an attempt to unravel some of the conflicts and points of tension within the field at large.

Foucauldian post-structuralism (Gavey, 1989:459; Weedon, 1987:12; Bannister et al., 1994:95) poses that culturally relative systems of meaning exist independently of any individual and can be selected and employed by individuals and social institutions to account for any event, including violence. Defined, discourse refers to an interrelated 'system of statements which cohere around common meanings and values' (Hollway, 1983:131) and discourse analysis involves identifying the discrete discourses underlying and informing people's talk and writing. Discourses possess the power to go beyond explanation, to organise and to regulate social behaviour (Weedon, 1987:12-42; Foucault, 1969:131).

Using a Post-structuralist framework I came to identify five discourses to be underlying the various theories posited from within the social sciences (O'Neill, 1998). These are Medical pathology, Romantic expressive tension, Liberal humanist instrumentalism, Social-systemic and Tabula rasa learning. Through various applications of these discourses a multitude of theoretical causes have emerged, such as psychosis, the cultural normalisation of violence, patriarchy, instinct, cycles of violence and overwhelming explosive anger. These imply in turn a series of interventions, some of which are highly incongruent with others. How one accounts for violence and which constructions and metaphors are employed in this process has logical implications for what one is to do about the behaviour (for examples to support or challenge it; to provide punishment, education or therapy).

Building on this critique of the discursive field, I became interested in documenting how violent men themselves account for

their abusive behaviour. To this end, I am interested once more in applying the principles of post-structural discourse analysis. Approaching the men's stories from a post-structuralist position, in which the individual's subjectivity is posited as being fragmentary and contradictory (Bannister et al., 1994:94; Gavey, 1989:459-464), enables an analysis which is sensitive to the various ways of speaking which emerge both between and within interviewee's talk (Coyle, 1995:249). Further, such an analysis affords an exploration of the various implications for agency and action enabled through the particular stories provided (Coyle, 1995:244).

Exploring Perpetrator's Accounts

The current research explores (1) how violent men, in their own terms, account for their abusive behaviour whilst (2) paying attention to the significance of the constructive content of their stories. The research is approached from a pro-feminist orientation committed to emancipatory 'sexual politics' (Millet, 1972). By identifying violence as part of a system of men's oppressive behaviour towards women, as a male social scientist I felt challenged to engage in this research, to help explore the 'personal' and 'institutional'... 'changes we have to make, as men'... in support of 'the women's movement' to create a fair and just society for both men and women (Seidler, 1991:63).

Thirteen men attending a New Zealand Stopping Violence programme were interviewed prior to their participation in a nine-week educational course. All potential participants, once enrolled in a programme, were sent a letter and information sheet inviting them to participate in the study. Those volunteers who returned the consent form were subsequently interviewed either in their own homes or at the programme's headquarters. These men ranged in age from 24 to 45 with an average age of 31. Six had been ordered by the courts to attend the programme whilst seven were attending of their own accord.

Interviews were semi-structured, lasting for an average of thirty minutes and each was recorded on a small portable tape recorder. The men were asked to describe incidents of violent behaviour with their partners and ex-partners and to comment on possible causes and solutions. The recorded interviews were later transcribed in full with pseudonyms and a code system employed to ensure participant and partner confidentiality. Transcripts were read for themes and variations in the men's talk and were subjected to 'discourse analysis' (Coyle, 1995:247-248; Gavey, 1989:459; Bannister et al., 1994:92).

A number of regularities in the construction and implications of stories were subsequently identified through the analysis and these are presented below, firstly in thematic form and secondly as located in discourse. While the small size and non-representative nature of the sample limits the generalisations which can be made from these results, the interviewee's accounts, as will be demonstrated, clearly converge upon common themes in metaphor and construction. This enables the identification of dominant discourses, employed to understand and account for violence, in at least one group of domestically violent New Zealand men.

How Do Perpetrators Account for Their Violence?

When accounting for their violence against their partners, the dominant story, as told by each of the participants, constructed high levels of 'stress', 'frustration' and 'anger' as causing an inner emotional state which became too much for the men to rationally control. At this point they were overwhelmed by their inner 'pressure' and would 'explode', becoming momentarily violent. A number of metaphors were involved in the construction of this story.

Metaphors characterising 'wild' 'inner pressure' occurred synonymously in the men's talk with their violence.

> I just get *wild you know, inside me, really wild*...Well it's sort of in the head too really, you know *it feels like pressure to get out* (George).

> *A lot of pressure...built up and up* and all of a sudden I snapped (Carl).

Metaphors surrounding 'heat' and 'ignition' were commonly employed in conjunction with this 'pressure'.

> Just a little thing will start me *flaring up* you know. I Suddenly *explode* (John).

> I just you know, it's just that *short fuse*...Just sort of *lose my cool* and then that's it, like I get angry and then I, you know, *lose my cool* and it just happens so quick you know (Chris).

This 'pressure' and 'heat' was typically posited as reaching a 'limit' of some sort at which point the person would 'snap' or lose his 'cool'.

> My first reaction is to yell and scream and *get to the edge*, to the *verge of violence*, where I want to strike out, and I don't like that when I can't seem to handle the stress, family stress at home type thing. I physically get to *the point* where I'm over exerted, yeah...and I just can't handle it...to *the point* where I've actually pushed her a couple of times and that's not on (David).

> I *lose my cool* pretty fast. Um, had a few arguments with the wife, and ah, *flying of the handle*. Hit her a few times...it sort of built up and then um, like *something just clicked in me* and I sort of got pretty agro...get to that *breaking point* (John).

This 'snapping' and subsequent violence was frequently articulated as a reflex 'lash out' or 'explosion' response with no conscious volition on the part of the agent.

> I just *fly off me wick*...Once it happens, *BANG!*, and it's all over in 10-15 seconds, and I think what the hell did I do that for (Andrew).

> You get *wound up* so much inside *like a spring*, and the *release* of that spring is your arm *shooting out* with a closed fist...I didn't think about punching, I didn't think about hitting...it's just a *reflex action*...If I'm at the stage where, on reflex, because it's not a conscious thing, *on reflex I lash out* with a closed fist, then I'm at the stage where I need some serious help (Peter).

The men frequently reported 'blacking out' and/or 'losing control' over themselves and their behaviour during the latter stages of this 'pressure' and 'heat' build up. Several of the men could not consciously recall engaging in the violent episode.

> I just looped out, snapped out, just you know went blank just for I don't know, however long it was...I *wasn't really conscious* of what I was doing, it *just happened*, and then when I sort of did come clear I sort of stopped straight away in horror, and went oh no...I just *looped out, snapped out* (Mike).

> I mean most of the time it's not even, it doesn't even *register* with me that I'm doing it, *it just happens* (Paul).

Among the half of the men who could recall the violent behaviour, it was typically reported that they felt 'out of control' of their behaviour and 'unable to stop themselves'.

> There was no need to stay and let it get out of hand, all I had to do was turn and walk away. But I don't know, you feel *trapped* sometimes, it's not that easy...*I couldn't walk away*...It's a double sided coin, or um a spiral effect, a *catch 22*. You can't walk away to relieve the anger because *the anger is stopping you* from walking away (Peter).

> I could feel myself doing it, beating her up and that but *I couldn't stop myself*...it was just *like blacking out*...I didn't want to do it but I *couldn't stop myself* (Chris).

Many of the men claimed that this 'stress' reaction could be set off by silly, trivial and small things that would just 'blow up' into huge, retrospectively unnecessary, arguments and consequential violence. They were shocked with their 'over reactions' yet felt powerless to respond otherwise.

> um *short fuse* and just *nutting off over little things* and things like that, yeah (Sean).

> I do get quite bad tempered quickly, it doesn't take much really. Yeah, Yeah. A lot of the time I just *fly off the handle at nothing* really (George).

Alongside their bewilderment the men reported feeling remorse for their actions.

> I *regretted it straight after* and *I regret it* just as much today. You wouldn't have a clue how big I regret it (Robert).

> ...after I did the damage I didn't feel to damn hot. I felt like a *gutter rat* at the time (Carl).

The men typically owned their violence, seeing themselves as having an underlying 'problem' with it. They identified this problem with part of their character; a part they wanted to change.

> I always knew *I had a bit of a problem* with it...I sort of never realised that it affected everybody else so much. Until I spoke to a few people...*I'd like to be able to change that* (Paul).

> *I've got a problem*...That's *the type of person I am.* I'm the one that's dishing out the violence...I can certainly do without it as *part of my character. It's a part of my life that I don't want* (Peter).

When probed about the nature of this problem the men typically constructed themselves as possessing 'anger' or 'temper' problems.

> *I was the abuser*...I want to put a stop to it...that's part of the parcel of what *I'm trying to receive help* for...a better way of *dealing with anger* before *it turns to violence* (Sean).

> I've got a short temper and when I get angry I just get physically violent...I get violently angry (David).

Given their underlying anger or temper 'problem' it is understandable perhaps that from the Stopping Violence programme the men typically wanted one thing; strategies and skills which would help them to deal with their tension without resorting to violence.

> Well hopefully *a way to deal with that frustration* so I don't, I don't know, so *I channel it somewhere else* I suppose, so I don't end up doing things like throwing chairs at the wall...it's just a totally childish and stupid thing to do but um, rather than lashing out at what

> happens around me *it would be a lot nicer to be able to do something else* (Aaron).

> Well the reason I've come (to the programme) is because I'm aware of the *anger* that I've got *inside me* on certain issues and I want to *learn* how *to deal with it* in a more positive way...I want to become aware of some *different mechanisms to deal with it* sort of thing (Mike).

Many of the men identified their 'problem' as their own to the extent that they would protest the 'innocence' of the woman who was the victim of their abuse. The wife/partner of the man was frequently identified in the stories as bearing the brunt of the man's anger/tension 'release'. These men acknowledged that they, at least some of the time, would take their anger out, unfairly, on their partners.

> Bad temper...I just fly off the handle at her...If my car was outside and had a flat battery or something and I couldn't get it going like if (*wife's name*) was out there and I was out there I would probably abuse her, cause the car wouldn't go, and *it's not her fault* (George).

> If I was in a foul mood from work *I'd take it out on her*...I take it out on her when *it's not her fault*...it lets out some frustration I suppose (Paul).

Not all the men, all the time however, stated that their violence was their own 'personal' problem, reflecting 'character flaws' and 'anger problems' exclusively on their part. Co-existing with this dominant story was another explanation, employed simultaneously or alternatively by the men.

This narrative constructed their partner's behaviour as 'pushing' the men's 'stress' or 'anger' levels to the 'brink' of violence. In this account of violence it is not the man's 'temperament' that is constructed as the 'problem' but rather the

woman's 'dominating' 'irrational' and 'frustrating' behaviour which provokes the rise in 'tension' levels. A variety of constructions constituted this 'out of order' stressful other, for example;

> her being *domineering* and her having always the last say, and *being bossy, pretty argumentative* and all that, that's probably the only thing giving us our ups and downs...*She's pretty stubborn* and *wants to get her own way all the time* and me *I just sort of couldn't handle it any more*...I was feeling you know, alright at the beginning, then it sort of built up and then um, like something just clicked in me and I sort of got pretty agro, and *I thought I was sort of put down* again...*I just snapped* and couldn't take it any more (John).

> *I didn't know what she was on about*...a lot of *irrational* things came up...I was feeling *very confused*...I was getting very angry...I was just feeling everything is so *unjustified and unfair*...I just got so *frustrated...my blood starts to boil* (Carl).

Through locating causal 'precipitatory' responsibility for the violence with the woman, some of these men, momentarily at least, considered themselves as not necessarily having a 'problem' with violence.

> *I'm not really a violent person.* I've been prone to lash out, but as far as being someone who looks for violence...*it's not part of my make up* (Mike).

> If it's just a one-off thing then that's different from an ongoing serious severe thing. The ongoing one needs something done about it. *Mine was a one-off event*...She lashed out at me first (Robert).

In summary there were two prevalent yet interrelated explanations given by the men to account for their violence. The dominant story, employed by all the men, constructed 'inner tension' as causing their violent 'outburst'. Most of the men claimed that they had a personal 'problem' with which they needed help, typically with 'stress' and 'anger'. Many of the men also blamed their partner's 'out of order' behaviour for frustrating them and making them 'tense' and 'angry'. A minority claimed not to have a problem with violence, accounting for their actions through recourse to a reasonable response to an unreasonable woman.

Accounts in Context: A Discursive Analysis of the Men's Stories

Whilst this analysis has sought to identify themes in the men's constructions of events and to represent the men in their own terms, it also aims to locate their accounts within discourse and to critically explore the effects and implications of these meaning systems. Questions emerging at this point are; What discursive resources are employed in the stories outlined above? What do these stories achieve for each agent? Further, if we understand the men's stories as representing experience for them, what can be done to empower them to stop their violence in the future? If men as a social category are more prone to inflict domestically violent behaviour, what can we do to prevent this social problem manifesting in the future generations?

When accounting for their violence towards their partners the dominant story employed by the men is one of 'inner tension' 'overwhelming' the man to the point where he, temporarily, loses 'conscious' and/or 'rational' 'control' over his behaviour. This is the men's dominant means to understanding and explaining their violence. These constructions can be located within a Romantic world view; a totalizing discourse, which reached it's zenith in Western social life in the late 18th and 19th centuries (Gergen, 1991:20). In this world view humans are understood to be at the

mercy of 'inner emotional forces' or 'passions' operating 'unconsciously' from within the deep interior (Williams, 1976:231). Many contemporary theories of aggression employ such constructions, including Freud's (1915) instinctual account, sociobiology (Goldberg, 1993), Dollard's popular 'frustration-aggression' hypothesis (Dollard et al., 1939) as well as social structural theories such as those emphasising a stress-poverty connection (e.g. Straus and Smith, 1990).

'Reflecting the Romanticist heritage, primordial energies (are thought too) disrupt consciousness (and) offset rationality' (Gergen, cited in Misra, 1993:405). It is through the employment of this Romantic linguistic resource that the men are enabled to convincingly take up the position of the 'out of control' agent who is, momentarily over time, unable to cope with their interior passionate forces 'rationally'.

This state of affairs contrasts with the dominant ideology of the twentieth century – Liberal humanist discourse in which human agents are constructed as conscious, intentional, moral, rational and free willed entities (Weedon, 1987:112; Johnson, 1994:51; Gergen, 1991:28). Liberal humanism positions agents as bounded and autonomous entities at the centre of rational choices and instrumental actions. An agent's behaviour, including violence, is intentional and purposeful. Feminist accounts of male violence frequently employ such constructs when explaining men's violence as a form of control (e.g. Bograd, 1984:560; Pence and Paymar, 1993:3).

This tension and discursive conflict concerning causality, of intent vs propulsion, between the men's Romantic accounts and contemporary Liberal humanist 'common sense', appears to be resolved by the men through their employment of another Modern linguistic resource, that of personal 'pathology', wherein the men construct themselves as having an underlying psychological aberration; specifically an 'anger' or 'temper' temperament problem. The construct of 'pathology' is a feature of medical discourse and with the rise of the science and the medicalisation of

abnormal behaviour in the 18th Century (Weiten, 1995:558), this provides the men with a readily available and fully legitimated resource for accounting for their self proclaimed 'problem'.

Through constructing themselves as having a 'problem' with controlling their 'inner tension', the men position themselves as *not* being rational free-willed agents at the time of their violence. They position themselves as temporarily 'abnormal'. In effect, through this co-articulation of Romantic and Pathological accounts, the men are able to excuse themselves of taking responsibility for their violence. The dominant story employed by the men suggests to the listener that the men have a character flaw or temperament problem, but that they are not quite abnormal enough to be considered 'mentally ill', given that they are 'normal' and in 'conscious control' over themselves most of the time, when they haven't 'lost their cool'. The men position themselves as insufficiently 'sane', 'aware' and 'responsible' at the time of their violence to be considered a criminal.

The men, consistent with this Romantic-Pathological account, purport that the violence is their 'personal problem' and thus construct the issue as an individual aberration and themselves as needing 'help' in order for their violence to disappear. From the course consequently the men essentially seek 'symptom management' skills. Their 'anger' and problematic 'short tempers' were seen as propelling and facilitating their violence and of the many solutions afforded through their account the one advocated by the men was typically a 'containment' strategy; to contain the 'overwhelming forces' emerging from within.

In this way the men employed a Liberal humanist account alongside their Pathological and Romantic constructions of the issue. The solution given is 'anger management' or 'symptom control'; a blending of Romantic, Pathological and Liberal humanist discourses, reflecting their 'individual' analysis of the 'problem' and their normative assumptions of themselves as 'moral', 'rational' 'free willed' 'autonomous' agents (when they aren't, temporarily, 'out of control'). The men thus considered

themselves able to 'learn' new skills, unbeknown to them as yet, which would enable them to 'manage' their inner tension and thus to curb or at least cope non-violently with their 'explosive' nature.

Not all the men, all the time however, took up this subject positioning; that their violence was their own 'personal' problem, reflecting 'character flaws' and 'anger problems' exclusively on their part. Another account, employing these pathological and Romantic discursive resources once more, organised in a different fashion however, was presented by several of the men and thus constituted the second most prevalent story.

In this explanation the men constructed their partner's behaviour as pushing their 'tension levels' to the 'brink' of violence. Through this account many of the men, at least some of the time, were consequently able to place causal responsibility for their anger and violence onto the woman and thereby 'excuse' their violence towards her once more. Through this account, the woman's 'abnormal', 'irrational' and 'frustrating' behaviour is constructed as driving the man to the point where his 'inner tension' 'explodes' in violence. In this account it is not the man's 'temper' that is the 'problem' but rather the woman's irrational and out of order behaviour although these two variations could be, and frequently were, employed together.

In this alternative yet prevalent story the men's 'expressive tension' has been presented in conjunction with a reversed Pathological position in which the woman is constructed as being, at least temporarily, 'abnormal' and the man paradoxically the 'victim'. A reversal of subject positions is thus evident. He is a victim in the sense that his wellbeing is disrupted from external forces, namely her 'out of order' behaviour, which is having a powerful impact upon his 'inner tension'. This reversed account demonstrates a particular feature of Romanticism – the naturalisation of violence. Through positioning himself as a victim and through employing Romantic linguistic resources the men, in this variation, are able to legitimate their 'explosion' as a 'natural' response to undue 'pressure' from an 'out of order' other. Thus

another means is established through which the men are able to legitimately account for their violence; victim blaming.

Listening to the Men: Some Implications

The results from these interviews are consistent with previous research on men's accounts of domestic violence in that a configuration of 'excuses' and 'justifications' which account for the mens' behaviour are readily apparent in their talk (e.g. Ptacek, 1988:152-155). A most obvious feature underlying this talk is the absence of Liberal humanist agency, as notions of choice and responsibility are negated and subsumed within Romantic-pathological accounts. Constructs of intentionality and accountability are all but absent as 'anger problems', 'explosive rage' and 'out of order' others dominate the men's stories.

Taking the men's stories on their own terms strongly indicate that the men have problems with 'overwhelming inner tension' and 'anger'. One option for the analysis at this stage is to engage critically with these texts; to identify, for example, the functions enabled through such a 'performance' (e.g. Potter and Wetherall, 1987; 168-169). Perhaps there are good reasons why the agents and text makers interviewed would prefer to co-articulate and employ Romantic-Pathological resources over Liberal humanist accounts of the subject, when accounting for their violence. Could it be that Romantic resources are strategically used to excuse their behaviour and mask their true intentions such as patriarchal agents of control? Does it help to preserve their identities as good, moral agents, when they haven't momentarily lost control? Does our society naturalise violence so that this is the most obvious or legitimate accounting device available to the men?

Taking this line further, deconstructing and challenging the way our society constructs violence in general and in particular the ready association it has with Romantic and pathological constructs, is relevant. Such links, as embedded in various cultural practices and institutions such as sport (Marois, 1989:68; Russel

and Pigat, 1991:121; Zanni and Kirchler, 1991:5) and the media (Bridgman, 1993:2; Cumberbatch, 1991:171; Ghinzzoni, 1988:326), warrants scrutiny, articulation and deconstruction. The naturalisation of violence through its association with stress and tension and the pathologising of violent offenders (Meyers, 1997:42) as somehow understandable and excusable agents needing 'help' ultimately serves, it appears to this critical post-structuralist, to legitimate the men's stories and thus to perpetuate men's violence in the home.

The absence of a liberal humanist subject is a cause for concern and this marks an obvious space for intervention, both for the personal and institutional propagation of such discourse. One hallmark of humanism is man's (sic) 'ability to perfect himself by his own efforts' (Johnson, 1994:134), yet the men interviewed here speak of an inability to determine, let alone cultivate, their behaviour. One implication then is to ensure that a discourse of self control, with accompanying practices of regulation, is available to the perpetrators. Prevention and intervention projects aiming to reduce men's violence clearly need to equip perpetrators with a linguistic repertoire which challenges and subverts the excuses and justifications enabled through the men's preferred knowledge regimes. The negating of existing regimes and the circulation of such alternative realities as 'choice', 'responsibility' and 'assertion' is an important step in reducing incidences of family violence (Benedek, 1993:283; Emde, 1993:119; Straus, 1980b:39). In effect this is what 'anger management' intervention practice attempts.

Critical Reflexivity: Bringing It All Back Home

Listening to the men's stories, within a communicative space in which men do not normally inhabit, has had a profound effect on me. The research has transformed me personally, which validates the qualitative approach to the issue employed here.

Personally I have always considered myself to have been non-violent throughout my life. Yet through engaging with the men and hearing their stories I was reminded of an experience I had in my teenage years where I physically assaulted an older male from my family. To my mind now, I felt powerless in this man's presence and in a moment of this being heightened, I blanked out. I behaved violently and became conscious after several seconds. When I regained consciousness I was yelling abuse and attempting to assault the man. He was successfully holding me at arms' length. The repressed memory, which resonates with the men's stories, horrifies me, not least because of the context from which it has emerged – research into men's domestic violence.

This personal experience, awakened through talking with the participants, has altered the place where I stand in relation to men's violence in the home and stimulates me to theorise the Romantic accounts of events on their own terms. As a pro-feminist post-structuralist, influenced by the ideas of Lacan (1977) and Foucault (1969; 1983), I take the position that subjectivity and experience is never fixed, but rather is isomorphic with the linguistic system of signification or, in Lacanian terms, the Symbolic. The Symbolic refers to the cultural system of meanings which organise social life via the construction of bipolar homogeneity and the repression of the heterogeneous 'libidinal chaos' (Butler, 1990:79). A critical connection, I contend, linking many men with 'unconscious' violent outbursts against their spouses, partners and girlfriends, is the hegemony or dominance of particular forms of gender within New Zealand society.

By *gender* I am referring to 'the individual, cultural and institutional ways in which biological sex is given social existence in any particular context or period' (Segal, 1990:92). While I acknowledge that diverse and somewhat contradictory forms of masculinity and femininity exist within any society at any one time, such as in the conflict between the 'man alone' and the 'family man' or between different age groups, social classes or sexualities, I hold that particular images of what it means to be a

man in New Zealand have become dominant; 'the popular ideology of gender' (Phillips, 1998, cited in Schick and Dolan, 1999:52).

Building on Freud's analysis of the *unconscious*, in which social forces are constructed as forming an integral part of the 'psyche' and which repress other libidinal energies (Ashe, 1999:95), Lacan proposes that the Symbolic structures our unconscious and thus mediates our self concept, our needs, our actions and our relationships with others. For Lacan, subjectivity is fluid and masculinity and femininity are not biological 'essences' but socially mediated products of the linguistic order. Lacan claims that through the acquisition of language males and females enter a symbolic system through which our subjectivity is constructed and internalised. Identities are developed and the subconscious structured through 'seeing' oneself as a whole person, a whole which is enabled through a series of binary oppositions, such as active/passive and the presence/absence of the phallus. The symbolic order, he claims, is 'phallocentric' (Ashe, 1999, 108), propagating particular masculine and feminine gender identities. Unconsciously, we repress parts of our multiple libidinal being as we identify with culturally sanctioned unitary subjectivities.

To understand how the 'unconscious' may be constrained by the symbolic order to manifest in some men's erratic displays of violence, I have found it useful to theorise men's Romantic experience as a 'social fact', through a particular feminist application of Durkheim's (1952) social-structural theory. This marginalised account of Romantic experience was employed in the consciousness raising period of the 'Women's liberation movement' in the 1970s (Lyman, 1981:56). This account proposes that personal 'anger' and other 'offsetting' emotions, such as depression or anxiety, are a manifestation of conflicts and pressures stemming from broader social relations. As Johnson (1994:55, 124) outlines, the chaotic Romantic self can be seen as manifesting in response to the role constraints of a gendered

symbolic order. This shifts the focus away from deviant individuals to broader social relations.

From this perspective one source of men's explosive 'inner tension' emerges from their gendered subject positioning; their identification with the construct of 'man' and all that this signifies within the Symbolic. Masculine Gender Role Stress or MGRS (Eisler, 1995) refers to the stress engendered when men try to live up to cultural constructions of what it means to be a man; the dominant images in Aotearoa being rugged, powerful, stoic, sexually active and, when with family, providing. As Butler (1990:33) invokes, gender is realised in an ever present need for affirmation in *performance.* Such performance is ongoing, demanding, contradictory and stressful and as such is a chief 'hazard of being male' (Goldberg, 1976:1) purportedly leading men to disproportionately higher rates of anger, accidents, alcoholism, crime, disease and suicide (Farrel, 1994:165; Eisler, Skidmore, and Ward, 1988:137; McCreary et al., 1996:508; Lemli and Mishkind, 1989:213-5). In short, my analysis holds that particular and dominant cultural constructions of masculinity and femininity create a condition of ongoing, potentially explosive, tension in many men. Such tension manifests in diverse forms of destructive behaviour, including violence in the home.

Furthermore, many men's subjectivity constrain their options in dealing with inner tension, particularly in preventing their stress from escalating to the point of anger and violence. Gondolf (1985:311-324) for example, in his account of the 'male emotional funnel system' proposes that men's emotional experiences are dangerously narrowed as a consequence of their gender role socialisation. Men are trained from birth, he claims, to deny their feminine side; to be unaware of and thus to be insensitive to 'primary emotions' such as fear, depression, hurt, jealousy, insecurity or resentment. Through embracing a male cultural ideal of a rugged, stoic, and masterful individual, many men are left vulnerable to these feelings 'building up inside them'. They lack the emotional articulateness and communication skills

required to recognise, express, constructively deal with and/or to 'release' these feelings earlier.

Additionally many men are more likely to interpret and label emotional arousal only once this tension has intensified to the point where it becomes recognisable as 'secondary' 'anger'. The consequences of this labelling pattern is that men are more likely to 'explode' into a rage and thus to become violent in an emotionally charged situation. Because masculinity constrains emotional sensitivity and emotional expression, 'inner tension' builds up, leaving many men in a constant state of tension and rising anger (e.g. Dutton, 1995:69; Edleson and Tolman, 1992:72). Recent New Zealand empirical evidence supports this theoretical assertion. Leibrich et al (1995:16, 99) for example found that New Zealand men have above average levels of anger and hostility and that these are associated with greater incidences of physical abuse.

Conclusion

Listening to the participants in this study, which has resonated with my own experience, and theorising what may lie behind these experiences, has lead this researcher to reflect upon and alter the place where I stand in relation to men's violence in the home. When I first began this study I was firmly positioned within the feminist model of men's violence in which I constructed perpetrators as intentional and sexist agents who felt justified in using violence to maintain their traditionally higher position as 'man of the house'. In constructing these men as controlling patriarchs I was essentially co-articulating Liberal humanist instrumental and Social systemic discourses.

Now however, after sitting down and engaging with them, I find myself feeling empathy for these men as much as I am angry at them, seeing them as highly strung and emotionally overwhelmed people who find it very difficult to cope with their lives and relationships. This tension and distress experienced by the men seems all to easily to be converted into rage and

aggression. I see these men less as cold hearted patriarchs and more as being extremely tense and emotionally inept at dealing with their experience because of the tension engendered through the internalisation of their symbolically mediated subjectivity. I see the problem more as a product of narrow masculinity constraints, with implications for excessive and overwhelming tension culminating in a gender tendency towards violence, than such behaviour being intentionally a strategy of domestic control. The violence may be sexist too however, in that gendered expectations of women may be a source of the men's frustrations and tension. The interviews do indicate that this may be a contributing factor and this is discussed in a forthcoming paper (O'Neill, in process).

Interpreting the men's Romantic accounts through the social-structural discourse outlined above implies a variety of interventions, ranging from anger management as a band-aid remedy for individual offenders, as the men themselves suggest, to gender consciousness raising as a broader preventative mechanism for these and other men. Because not all men are violent however, intervention also opens the possibility for psycho-dynamic analysis as individuals may seek to explore the dynamics by which their particular 'self' manifests in violence.

In the post-structuralist tradition of Lacan and Foucault, broader challenges, such as discovering new ways of talking about violence and gender, are implicated. If violence becomes more likely to be used in the future once it has 'exploded' once, as observed in the 'cycle of violence' theory (Walker, 1979:55), then to what extent can this be 'out of control'? Personal responsibility is necessitated by the awareness of any pattern which may develop as a means to 'release' tension. At this point Radical humanism (Johnson, 1994:135), with it's emphasis on personal autonomy, choice and potential, becomes a crucial discourse for the regulation of violence.

Because subjectivity, including masculinity and femininity, is seen as a dynamic, rather than a fixed, construct, dependent upon particular cultural forces within the internalising

subject's social and historical mileu (Ashe, 1999:104, 108) challenging the cultural forces which constitute us, through exploring different ways of being and thinking, is a further implied intervention. Dichotomising gender on the basis of sex as we do at present, appears to be a dangerous and conservative discursive practice. Cultural meanings of masculinity, such as those connoting autonomy and power, must be subject to scrutiny. If we could open up a space for new forms of gender we may alter the way in which violence operates. Language here is a crucial issue. New words and constructs are required to step outside bi-polar 'phallocentric' discourse. To this end Butler (1990:33) proposes we actively develop and promote a multiplicity of genders. Dressing in drag is one vivid example of such a subversive act.

I am very aware that this research has led me to become rather eclectic in my understanding of violence and the implications this may have for social and individual intervention. This does not alter the fact that I am committed to a feminist project of removing men's violence from women's lives, both in the private and the public sphere. It remains an important, albeit convoluted, project for me.

References

Adams, D., 1988. 'Treatment models for men who batter: A pro-feminist analysis' in K. Yllö and M. Bograd (eds), *Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse*. London, Sage.

Ashe, F., 1999. 'The subject' in F. Ashe, A. Finlayson, M. Lloyd, I. Mackenzie, J. Martin and S. O'Neill (eds), *Contemporary Social and Political Theory: An Introduction*. Buckingham, Open University Press.

Bannister, P., Burman, E., Parker, I., Taylor, M., and Tindall, C., 1994. *Qualitative Methods in Psychology: A Research Guide*. Buckingham, Open University Press.

Benedek, E., 1993. 'Violence; the malignancy of our times. Is there hope?' *American Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 53:283-293.

Bograd, M., 1984. 'Family systems approaches to wife battering: A feminist critique', *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 54:558-568.

Bograd, M., 1988. 'Feminist perspectives on wife abuse: An introduction' in K. Yllö, and M. Bograd (eds), *Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse*. London, Sage.

Bograd, M., 1992. 'Values in conflict: Challenges to family therapists' thinking', *Journal of Family Therapy*, 18(3):245-256.

Boyle, A., 1994. *Social Report: June 1994*. Palmerston North, Palmerston North City Council.

Breines, W. and Gordon, L., 1983. 'The new scholarship on family violence', *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 8(3):490-532.

Bridgman, G., 1993. 'Looking back on a decade of television: Violence Media Watch', *Community Mental Health in New Zealand*, 8(1):2-25.

Butler, J., 1990. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. London: Routledge.

Coyle, A., 1995. 'Discourse Analysis' in G. Breakwell, S. Hammond, and C. Fife-Schaw (eds), *Research Methods in Psychology*. London, Sage.

Cumberbatch, G., 1991. 'Is television violence harmful?' in R. Cochrane and D. Carrol (eds), *Psychology and Social Issues*. London, The Falmer Press.

Dobash, R.E. and Dobash, R.P., 1992. *Women, Violence and Social Change*. New York, Free Press.

Dollard, J., Doob, L., Miller, N., Mowrer, O. and Sears, R., 1939. *Frustration and Aggression*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Durkheim, E., 1952. *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*. London: Routledge and Keagan Paul.

Dutton, D.G., 1995. *The Domestic Assault of Women: Psychological and Criminal Justice Perspectives*. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Edleson, J. and Tolman, R., 1992. *Intervention for Men Who Batter: An Ecological Approach.* London: Sage.

Eisler, R.M., 1995. 'The relationship between gender role stress and men's health risk: The validation of a construct' in R.F. Levant, and W.S. Pollack (eds), *A New Psychology of Men* (207-225). New York, Basic Press.

Eisler, R.M. and Skidmore, J.R., 1987. 'Masculine gender role stress: Scale development and component factors in the appraisal of stressful situations' *Behaviour Modification*, 11:123-136.

Eisler, R.M., Skidmore, J.R. and Ward, C.H., 1988. Masculinity and gender role stress: Predictor of anger, anxiety and health risk behaviors. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 52:133-141.

Emde, R., 1993. 'The horror: Reflections on our culture of violence and its implications for early development and morality', *Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes*, 58(1):119-123.

Farrel, W., 1994. *The Myth of Male Power.* Sydney: Random House.

Fortune, M., 1991. *Violence in the Family.* New York, Pilgrim Press.

Foucault, M., 1969. *The Archaeology of Knowledge.* London, Tavistock.

Foucault, M., 1983. 'The subject and power' in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow (eds), *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and hermeneutics.* Chicago: University of Chicago.

Freud, S., 1915. 'Instincts and vicissitudes' in E. Jones (ed.), *The Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud.* New York, Basic Books.

Gavey, N., 1989. 'Feminist post-structuralism and discourse analysis: Contributions to feminist psychology', *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 13:459-475.

Gergen, K.J., 1991. *The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life.* New York, Basic Books.

Ghinzzoni, A., 1988. 'A situational view of crime: Prevention aspects'. *Ricerche di psicologia*, 12(3-4):326-347.

Giddens, A., 1989. *Sociology*. Cambridge, Polity Press.

Goldberg, H., 1976. *The Hazards of Being Male*. New York, Cornell University Press.

Goldberg, S., 1993. *Why Men Rule: A Theory of Male Dominance*. Chicago: Open Court.

Gondolf, E., 1985. 'Anger and oppression in men who batter: Empiricist and feminist perspectives and their implications for research', *Victimology*, 10:311-324.

Hollway, W., 1983. 'Heterosexual sex: Power and desire for the other', in S. Cartledge and J. Ryan (eds), *Sex and Love: New Thoughts and Old Contradictions*. London, The Women's Press.

Hollway, W., 1984. 'Gender differences and the production of subjectivity', in J. Henriques, J. Hollway, C. Urwin, C. Venn, and V. Walkerdine (eds), *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity*. New York, Methuen.

Johnson, H., 1989. *Wife Assault in Canada*. Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the American Society of Criminology.

Johnson, P., 1994. *Feminism and Radical Humanism*. San Francisco, Westview.

Kurz, D., 1989. 'Social science perspectives on wife abuse: Current debates and future directions', *Gender and Society*, 3:489-505.

Lacan, J., 1977. *Ecrits: A Selection*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Leibrich, J., Paulin, J. and Ransom, R., 1995. *Hitting Home: Men speak About Abuse of Women Partners*. Wellington, New Zealand Department of Justice.

Lemli, R. and Mishkind, M.E., 1989. Alcohol and masculinity. *Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment*, 6:213-222.

Lyman, P., 1981. The politics of anger: on silence, resentment, and political speech. *Socialist Review*, 57:55-74.

Mahony, P., 1997. 'The Domestic Violence Act 1995: The end of a process and a new beginning', in J. Patrick, H. Foster and B. Tapper (eds), *Successful Practice in Domestic Violence in New Zealand.* Palmerston North, Manawatu Men Against Violence.

Marois, M., 1989. 'The violence of youth hockey in Quebec: Some interpretations of this phenomenon', *Apprendissage et Socialisation*, 12(1):68-71.

McCreary, D., Wong, F., Weiner, W., Carpenter, K., Engle, A. and Nelson, P., 1996. The relationship between masculine gender role stress and psychological adjustment: A question of construct validity? *Sex Roles*, 34:517-516.

McLeod, M., 1984. 'Women against men. An examination of domestic violence based on an analysis of official data and national victimization data', *Justice Quarterly*, 1:171-193.

McMaster, K. and Swain, P., 1989. *A Private Affair? Stopping Men's Violence to Women.* Wellington, Government Print Books.

Myers, M., 1997. *News coverage of violence against women: Engendering blame.* London, Sage.

Misra, G., 1993. 'Psychology from a constructionist perspective. An interview with Kenneth J. Gergen'. *New Ideas in Psychology*, 11(3):319-414.

O'Neill, D., 1998. A Post-Stucturalist Review of the Theoretical Literature Surrounding Wife Abuse. *Violence Against Women*, 4(4):456-490.

O'Neill, D., (in process). An analysis of gender speak in violent men.

Parker, I., 1992. *Discourse Dynamics: Critical Analysis for Social and Individual Psychology.* London, Routledge.

Parsons, T., 1942. Age and sex in the social structure of the United States. *American Sociological Revue*, 7:604-616.

Pence, E. and Paymer, M., 1993. *Education Groups for Men Who Batter: The Duluth Model.* New York, Springer.

Policing Development Group, 1994. *Family Violence is 'the cradle for the perpetuation of violence and crime in the community'. The Roper Report.* Wellington, Policing Development Group.

Potter, J. and Wetherall, M., 1987. *Discourse and Social Psychology.* London, Sage.

Ptacek, J., 1988. 'Why do men batter their wives?' in K. Yllö, and M. Bograd (eds), *Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse.* London, Sage.

Russel, G. and Pigat, L., 1991. 'Effects of modelled censure/support of media violence and need for approval on aggression', *Current Psychology Research and Reviews*, 10(1-2):121-128.

Sampselle, C., Bernhard, L., Kerr, R., Opie, N., Perley, J. and Pitzer, M., 1992. 'Violence against women: The scope and significance of the problem', in C. Sampselle (ed), *Violence Against Women.* New York, Hemisphere Publishing.

Schwartz, M.D., 1987. 'Gender and injury in spousal assault', *Sociological Focus*, 20(1):171-193.

Schick, R. 'Masculinity and A Man's Country in 1998: An Interview with Jock Phillips' in R. Law, H. Campbell and J. Dolan (eds), *Masculinities in Aotearoa/New Zealand.* Palmerston North, Dunmore Press.

Segal, L., 1990. *Slow Motion: Changing Masculinities, Changing Men.* London, Viagra Press.

Seidler, V.J., 1991. *The Achilles Heel Reader: The Men, Sexual Politics and Socialism.* London, Routledge.

Straus, M.A., Gelles, R.J. and Steinmetz, S., 1980. *Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the American Family.* New York, Anchor Press.

Straus, M.A., 1980. 'The marriage license as a hitting license: Evidence from popular culture, law and social science', in M.A. Straus and G.T. Hotaling (eds), *The Social Causes of Husband-Wife Violence*. Minnesota, University of Minnesota Press.

Straus, M.A. and Smith, C., 1990. Violence in Hispanic families in the US: Incidence rates and structural interpretations. M.A. Straus and R.J. Gelles (eds), *Physical Violence in American Families*. New Jersey, Transaction Books.

Taylor, J.J., 1997. 'Intervention into family violence by New Zealand police', in J. Patrick, H. Foster, and B. Tapper (eds), *Successful Practice in Domestic Violence in New Zealand*. Palmerston North, Manawatu Men Against Violence.

Warral, A. and Pease, K., 1986. 'Personal crime against women: Evidence from the British Crime Survey'. *Howard Journal*, 25:18-24.

Williams, R., 1976. *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*. London, Fontana.

Weedon, C., 1987. *Feminist Practice and Post-Structuralist Theory*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Yllo, K.A., 1988. 'Political and methodological debates in wife abuse research' in K. Yllo, and M. Bograd (eds), *Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse*. London, Sage.

Zanni, B. and Kirchler, E., 1991. 'When violence overshadows the spirit of sporting competition: Italian football fans and their clubs', *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, 1(1):5-21.

Globalization and National Differences: The Changing Face of Youth Sport

Rex W. Thomson
School of Physical Education
University of Otago

Abstract

In the contemporary world, sport is regarded as a 'universal language', and since Coleman's classic (1961) study, sport has been seen to hold a privileged position at the centre of male adolescent culture, at least in American schools. However, youth sport participation and the meaning that sport holds for adolescents may well be influenced by wider cultural differences. This current study is an attempt to examine the importance of sport within the wider context of youth culture with a particular focus on the influence of globalization versus historical national differences.

Sport, Globalization and National Differences

In cross-cultural analyses of sport, there are many similarities to be found. According to Brandl-Bredenbeck and Brettschneider (1997:357), 'increasing globalization is a major feature in the development of sport culture(s) among adolescents in western industrial societies'. Robertson (1992:5) defines the process of globalization as 'the compression of the world into a single space', and although the cultural impact of globalization has been much debated, Jackson and Andrews wisely suggest that 'caution is required in both overstating and understating the effects of globalization' (1999:33). The question of how sport is contributing to this process is of considerable interest.

Rees, Brettschneider and Brandl-Bredenbeck suggest that for supporters of modernization theory, sport may be seen as part

of a general process of cultural diffusion, while 'followers of a more economic-based approach have explained globalization as a unidirectional process through which 'American style' capitalism is spread throughout the world' (1998:217). In either situation, sport is seen as 'a key element in the process of globalisation which threatens distinctive national identities' (Bairner, 1994:1). Maguire (1994), however, suggests that because globalization is a two-way process and people do not passively accept sport forms but interpret sport for themselves, there will be local or national differences in the way sport is practised. These national differences can presumably be traced to differing historical and cultural patterns.

Stoddart maintains that sport and games were important in the process of cultural transfer from Britain to her colonial empire. 'Through sport were transferred dominant British beliefs as to social behaviour, standards, relations, and conformity' (1988:651). However, while cricket was particularly potent as an instrument of cultural imperialism, playing an important part 'in maintaining and promoting established class relations because of socially shared beliefs' (1988:652), rugby football was a game where colonial modifications in the style of play in New Zealand and South Africa broke from the imperial mould, and were criticised for becoming far too physical and for being taken far too seriously.

For Australia and New Zealand the emphasis in sport was perhaps less on 'fair play' and the largely unwritten moral code of sport; the emphasis is, or was, on masculinity. In Australia, this can be seen in Daly's (1971) 'noble bushman' ethos (mateship, egalitarianism, courage, tough masculinity). As McKay et al. (1993:24) have suggested, Australian sport has been viewed as 'irredeemably masculine', and 'constitutes and reproduces heterosexual men's power' (1993:25).

In New Zealand, Phillips (1980:218) suggests that the social segregation of the sexes has been unusually strong, and can only be fully understood 'in terms of this country's distinctive

male experience'. He traces the transition from the 'pioneer man', (a community of manly frontier bachelors, a powerful male culture in which a fiercely heterosexual 'mateship' was crucial), to the modern 'kiwi bloke' (rugged, practical, and loyal to his mates). Sport is a key ingredient for Phillips in the forging of this national character. The male stereotype came about through 'the interaction of two powerful traditions: the desire to keep alive the muscular virtues of the pioneer heritage, and the concern to contain that masculine spirit within respectable boundaries' (Phillips, 1987:86). The best expression of this stereotype was to be found in rugby football, New Zealand's national game.

The present study investigates youth sport involvement in New Zealand, and attempts to identify both the effects of globalization and historical national differences within the adolescent sporting context. While the concept of globalization is clearly significant in modern sport, specific local development patterns and cultural traditions must also be taken into account. It is the interplay of personal, social and cultural factors that is perhaps most helpful in explaining adolescent interest and involvement in sport.

The Current Study

The current study is based on a series of studies of German and American adolescents conducted by Wolf-Dietrich Brettschneider and Hans Peter Brandl-Bredenbeck from the University of Paderborn, and C. Roger Rees, Adelphi University, New York. Brettschneider and Rees' original study investigated 1086 German students and 989 American students from the 7th through 12th grade in two large urban cities (east and west Berlin and suburban New York). Later the sample was extended to include a further 1070 German students from Northrhine-Westphalia and Brandenburg, and an additional 752 American students from Memphis, Tennessee.

The New Zealand study was comparable to this German-American study, and surveyed students in twelve urban secondary schools in the Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch regions. The 1,095 subjects ranged in age from twelve to eighteen years, and there were 592 males and 503 females in the sample. With regard to ethnicity there were three major groupings, with 700 subjects classified as Caucasian/European or pakeha, 255 as Polynesian (Maori or Pacific Island), and 120 as Asian. All subjects who consented to be involved in the study completed a questionnaire under the supervision of the project research assistant.

The Importance and Meaning of Sport

Participating in informal and organised sport ranks highly as a leisure activity in adolescent culture in this present survey, ranking ahead of spending time with friends, listening to music, and watching television. With regard to the importance of sport, subjects rated this at 74.64 on a scale of 1-100. The time spent on sporting activities is also significant, with subjects averaging 4.5 hours per week on school sporting activities and a further 5.8 hours per week on sporting activities outside the school context.

As far as the meanings attached to sport are concerned, 'fun and enjoyment' rated highest as the preferred meaning, followed by 'team sports', with 'health and fitness' also being an important component. The high ranking for 'fun and enjoyment' is similar to findings by Wilson, Hopkins and Russell (1993:16), where the most frequent reason given by 15-18 year old teenagers for participation in physical activity was 'to have fun'. Favoured sports included rugby, basketball, cricket, soccer, swimming, volleyball, touch rugby, rugby league, and netball. Subjects rated their ability in sport, with the majority having a positive evaluation of their physical abilities. Subjects saw themselves as average (33.5%), good at different sports (47.1%), or really good

at one sport (9.3%), and many (40.8%) were regular participants for school sports teams, with 17% being in the top school teams.

In terms of social status in secondary schools, and despite the popularity of sport, subjects rated 'being an individual', 'being popular', 'being a good student', 'getting by without making waves', and 'being a student leader', as the most important factors ahead of 'being a good athlete', a ranking similar to that found by Rees (1994) for American adolescents, although 'being physically attractive' was ranked two places higher by the latter group.

Gender Differences

While both males (77.45) and females (71.38) rate sport highly, the gender difference is still obvious. Sport was clearly a favoured leisure activity for males, and while this was also true for females, for the latter spending time with friends was also very important. With regard to the meanings attached to sport, males were far more likely to think of 'team sports', followed by 'enjoyment', while for females, 'enjoyment' is clearly the most salient meaning, with 'health and fitness' rating next highest ahead of 'team sports' (see Table 1).

Table 1: Meaning of Sport: Gender Differences

	Total	Male	Female
	%	%	%
Enjoyment	21.3	19.0	24.2
Team sports	17.8	23.4	11.3
Health and fitness	10.0	6.9	13.9
Physical demands	7.8	7.5	8.3
Individual sports	6.0	4.6	6.5

Differences are also apparent in the time spent on sporting activities, with males averaging 5.4 hours per week in school sports activities compared with 3.36 hours for females, and averaging two additional hours per week in sporting activities

outside the school. There remain clear gender differences with regard to favoured sporting activities. Males list rugby, basketball, cricket and soccer as their favoured activities, while for females, the traditional women's sport of netball is a clear number one choice, followed by basketball, swimming, volleyball, and touch rugby (see Table 2).

Table 2: Favoured Sporting Activities: Gender Differences

	Total	Male	Female
	%	%	%
Rugby football	32.3	47.1	11.2
Basketball	30.3	32.3	27.7
Cricket	18.5	26.3	4.2
Soccer	15.8	20.0	4.2
Swimming	15.2	-	23.3
Volleyball	15.2	-	22.6
Touch rugby	14.7	13.0	21.9
Rugby league	9.9	14.3	-
Netball	9.8	-	36.5

While both groups had similar leisure interests, males were significantly more likely to play computer or video games, while females were more likely to read books or play a musical instrument, take part in arts and crafts, be involved in volunteer work, go shopping, and do extra school work. All these differences may be seen to support stereotyped gendered activities. Male students ranked 'being popular' as the most significant aspect of gaining social status in schools, but for both genders the importance of 'being an individual' rated highly.

Both genders rated the performance of males in sport ahead of females, but there was strong support from both males and females for the involvement of women in sport, and a clear indication that the notion of 'gendered sports' is losing its hold on the national psyche, at least as far as adolescents are concerned. Despite expressed differences in sporting preferences, the majority of both males and females felt that girls could

participate in any sport, although the males were more ambivalent in suggesting that boys could similarly take part in all sports.

Ethnic Differences

Although members of different ethnic groups may adopt mainstream sporting activities, Allison (1988) suggests that these groups often use these sports as clear expressions of their own ethnic identity. In addition, the meaning that sport has for different adolescent ethnic groups in New Zealand is worthy of further consideration. In rating the importance of sport, Polynesian youth rate sport highest (77.69), followed by pakeha (74.62), but it clearly diminishes in importance for Asian youth (67.82). There are also clear ethnic differences with regard to the meanings attached to sport, with pakeha adolescents rating 'enjoyment' ahead of 'team sports' and 'health and fitness'. Polynesian youth attach similar meanings to sport but rate both 'enjoyment' and 'team sports' significantly higher. Asian adolescents, however, rated 'team sports' highest, followed by 'enjoyment', and gave a significantly higher ranking for 'individual sports' than any other group (see Table 3). In addition, Polynesian students devote the highest hours per week for sport, with Asian students devoting the least amount of time, particularly with regard to sporting activities outside school time.

Table 3: Meaning of Sport: Ethnic Differences

	Total	Pakeha	Polynesian	Asian
	%	%	%	%
Enjoyment	21.3	17.1	24.1	18.2
Team sports	17.8	16.3	21.4	22.6
Health and fitness	10.0	10.9	9.4	6.4
Individual sports	7.8	5.9	-	14.0
Physical demands	6.0	7.7	8.8	7.2

There are also salient differences in sporting preferences. While pakeha list the two traditional sports of rugby and cricket at the top of the list followed by basketball and soccer, Polynesians give basketball a very high rating, followed by rugby, touch rugby, volleyball and rugby league. Asians also rate basketball very highly, followed by badminton (a sport that has clear historical and cultural roots in many Asian countries), and individual sports such as swimming and tennis (see Table 4).

Table 4: Favoured Sporting Activities: Ethnic Differences

	Total	Pakeha	Polynesian	Asian
	%	%	%	%
Rugby football	32.3	35.3	36.5	-
Basketball	30.3	19.9	51.4	49.1
Cricket	18.5	22.9	4.3	10.0
Soccer	15.8	18.0	4.0	14.1
Swimming	15.2	16.7	-	25.0
Volleyball	15.2	4.0	33.0	5.0
Touch rugby	14.7	11.9	34.9	-
Rugby league	9.9	8.5	24.3	-
Netball	9.8	10.7	18.5	-
Tennis	8.6	4.9	4.3	19.2
Badminton	-	-	-	39.2

More Asian and Polynesian youth were concerned that studying left them with insufficient time for sport and leisure activities (this despite the fact that Polynesian youth spend more time on sporting activities than any other ethnic group), but perhaps the most striking ethnic difference relates to attitudes towards sport as a career. For Polynesian youth, in common with a number of minority groups in other cultures, there was a very significant increase in the number who participated in sport because they hoped to make a career out of their participation.

Cross-Cultural Differences

The role of culture in explaining variability in sport behaviour is highly significant, and it seems that the 'universal language' of sport still has some clearly defined 'accents'. With regard to the importance of sport, the New Zealand adolescents' rating of 74.64 is higher (but not markedly so) than the scores of 72.87 for New York adolescents and 69.32 for Berlin adolescents reported by Brandl-Bredenbeck and Rees (1996). The number of hours per week spent on sporting activities is much greater than that found by Waser and Passavant (1997) in France for both boys and girls, but as those authors point out 'the French school day is the longest in Europe... and the school population has relatively little free time during the school term' (1997:10).

Striking cross-cultural differences, however, are to be found in the meanings that adolescents attach to sport in different cultures. American adolescents typically think of 'team sports', ahead of 'enjoyment' and 'victory'. German adolescents give equal ranking to 'team sports', 'enjoyment', and 'individual sports' (see Brandl-Bredenbeck, 1994; Rees and Brettschneider, 1994). In contrast to this, New Zealand youth give 'enjoyment' the highest rating ahead of 'team sports', and both New Zealand and German adolescents give a much higher ranking to 'health and fitness' and a much lower rating to 'victory' than their American counterparts (see Table 5).

Table 5: Meaning of Sport: Cross-Cultural Differences

	New Zealand	Germany*	USA*
	%	%	%
Enjoyment	21	15	17
Team sports	18	15	35
Health and fitness	10	8	4
Individual sports	8	15	5
Victory	1	1	8

* Figures taken from Brandl-Bredenbeck (1994) and Rees and Brettschneider (1994)

There are highly significant differences between the New Zealand and German adolescents' ranking of 'enjoyment', a factor seen as much more significant by the New Zealand students (chi square $p<.01$), while American adolescents give a far higher ranking to 'victory' than the New Zealand or German samples (chi square $p<.01$).

The differing cultural and historical roots are clearly evidenced in some of the sport preferences. Rugby, historically the most significant sport for New Zealand males, remains the number one preference of New Zealand adolescents, but unsurprisingly does not feature in the preferences of American and German adolescents (Brandl-Bredenbeck, 1994).

Significantly, however, basketball is popular in all three cultures, although this popularity is not necessarily reflected in the number of subjects actually participating in the competitive game. Evidence in New Zealand suggests that while just over 30% of adolescents list basketball as one of their three most favoured sports, participation rates are probably at least 10% lower than this figure would indicate (Wilson et al., 1993). Most recent evidence still places basketball behind rugby, netball and cricket in terms of the numbers of competitors in regular school competitions (Hillary Commission, 1999). The adolescent interest in basketball perhaps most clearly illustrates the impact of global sporting figures like Michael Jordan. In fact, in a study of hero-worship among primary school boys in Invercargill as much as seven years ago, Jordan ranked just behind the then All Black rugby captain on the list of sports heroes (Donne and McDonald, 1991), providing early evidence of his emergence as a global popular cultural icon (Andrews, Carrington, Mazur and Jackson, 1996).

While New Zealand adolescents clearly support the increasing involvement of women in sports that have previously been regarded as specific 'male preserves' (such as rugby football), this appears to differ significantly from the attitudes of youth in some other cultures (see e.g. Thomson and Soos, 2000).

The Changing Face of Sport

Perhaps the most obvious change that has occurred in recent years with regard to adolescent attitudes towards sport in New Zealand has been this highly significant growth in the popularity of basketball. This interest has not necessarily been translated into participation, and hence supports the notion of global cultural consumption. There is also the growth in popularity of activities that are less organised and regulated and have less emphasis on traditional sporting values. Informal sport and leisure activities such as mountain biking, beach volleyball, informal basketball, rollerblading, touch rugby, and skateboarding tend to emphasise values such as excitement, spontaneity, rebellion, non-conformity, sociability and creativity, and these are assuming considerable importance both in New Zealand and worldwide within the context of youth culture (Brandl-Bredenbeck, 1994; Eckerstorfer, 1995; Loret, 1995; Thomson, 2000; Waser and Passavant, 1997).

There are other aspects of adolescent culture, however, that provide evidence of the significance of specific local conditions. There is a striking acceptance of the notion that sport should not be seen as a gendered activity. Both males (64.4%) and females (81.1%) felt that all sports were suitable for male participation. In comparing the present study to attitudes of German and American adolescents (see Table 6), New Zealand males are slightly more supportive of non-gendered sports participation for boys than American males, but German males are significantly less supportive than their New Zealand counterparts (chi square $p<.01$). New Zealand females are significantly more supportive of non-gendered participation for boys than both the German and American female students (chi square $p<.01$).

Table 6: Gendered Sport for Boys

Some sports are not suitable for boys	Agree %	Disagree %	n =
New Zealand boys	35.6	64.4	592
New Zealand girls	18.9	81.1	503
German boys*	50.0	50.0	1023
German girls*	45.5	54.5	962
American boys*	37.7	62.3	733
American girls*	29.3	70.7	733

* Figures taken from Rees, Brandl-Bredenbeck and Brettschneider (1999)

With regard to female sports participation, the figures are even more conclusive, with 69.7% of males and 81.9% of females expressing the opinion that all sports are suitable for females (see Table 7). Again, there are striking differences between New Zealand, German and American adolescents, with a significant difference between New Zealand males and both German and American males (chi square $p<.01$), and a similar difference between New Zealand females and both of their counterparts (chi square $p<.01$).

Table 7: Gendered Sport for Girls

Some sports are not suitable for girls	Agree %	Disagree %	n =
New Zealand boys	30.3	69.7	592
New Zealand girls	18.1	81.9	503
German boys*	55.5	45.5	1012
German girls*	47.4	52.6	954
American boys*	60.7	39.3	730
American girls*	42.0	58.0	731

* Figures taken from Rees, Brandl-Bredenbeck and Brettschneider (1999)

Provided we accept the expressed attitudes as an acceptable measure of gender stereotyping in sports, both studies indicate that stereotyping is less frequent among girls than among

boys, but that there is significantly less stereotyping of sport by New Zealand boys and girls than German and American adolescents. This also represents a significant change in attitudes in New Zealand over the past decade or two. For example, in Handcock's (1981) study, adult males felt quite strongly that while swimming, netball and gymnastics were appropriate sports for women, soccer and particularly rugby were deemed quite unsuitable. Crooks and Palmer (1983), in a study of secondary schoolgirls, found that rugby was seen as the most desirable sport for males and the least desirable for females, and that the reverse applied to netball.

The present acceptance by a majority of adolescents of the idea that participation in all sports is acceptable for either gender suggests that New Zealand's 'gendered culture' and the historical ties between masculinity and sport may well be weakening. At least in sport, such attitudes represent success for the work of both the Hillary Commission and a number of other New Zealand sporting organisations in mounting a challenge to gendered attitudes. It is probable that the success of the Black Ferns in the World Rugby Cup for women in 1998 and the huge popularity of touch rugby which is ranked highly by both males and females in this present study and the fourth most popular sport by adult men and women in New Zealand (Hillary Commission, 1999), have assisted this challenge.

References

Andrews, D.L., Carrington, B., Jackson, S. and Mazur, Z., 1996. 'Jordanscapes: A preliminary analysis of the global popular'. *Sociology of Sport Journal,* 13(4):428-457.

Allison, M.T., 1988. 'Breaking boundaries and barriers: Future directions in cross-cultural research'. *Leisure Sciences,* 10:247-259.

Bairner, A., 1994. *Sportive Nationalism and Nationalist Politics – A Comparative Analysis.* Paper presented at the North American Society for the Sociology of Sport, Savannah, Georgia, USA, 9-12 November.

Bairner, A., 1996. 'Sportive nationalism and nationalist politics: A comparative analysis of Scotland, the Republic of Ireland, and Sweden'. *Journal of Sport and Social Issues,* 20:314-334.

Bale, J., 1986. 'Sport and national identity: A geographical view'. *British Journal of Sports History,* 3(1):18-41.

Brandl-Bredenbeck, H.P., 1994. *A Cross-cultural Comparison of Selected Aspects of Adolescent Sport Culture – USA/Germany.* Paper presented at the AIESEP World Congress of Physical Education and Sport, Berlin, Germany, 24-28 June.

Brandl-Bredenbeck, H.P. and Brettschneider, W-D., 1997. 'Sport involvement and self-concept in German and American adolescents'. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport,* 32(4):357-371.

Brandl-Bredenbeck, H.P. and Rees, C.R., 1996. 'Physical self-concept in German and American adolescents', in G. Doll-Tepper and W-D. Brettschneider, (eds) *Physical Education and Sport. Changes and Challenges.* Aachen, Meyer and Meyer, 443-460.

Coleman, J.S., 1961. *The Adolescent Society.* New York, Glencoe Free Press.

Crooks, M.C. and Palmer, S.A., 1983. 'Schoolgirls' attitudes towards female participation in sports'. *Research Reports in Sport and Leisure,* 1 (May):1-40.

Daly, J.A., 1971. 'The role of sport and games in the social development of early Australia'. *Canadian Journal of History of Sport and Physical Education,* 11(2):50-60.

Eckerstorfer, K., 1995. 'Alternative forms of movement as an expression of a new youth culture', in L. Komadel (ed), *Physical Education and Sports of Children and Youth.* Bratislava, Slovakia, Comenius University, 25-26.

Donne, A.M., and McDonald, K.A., 1991. *Sports Hero Worship in New Zealand.* Special Topic, School of Physical Education, University of Otago.

Handcock, G.A., 1981. 'Male attitudes toward female sports participation'. *Research Papers in Physical Education,* 3(2):1-44.

Hillary Commission, 1999. *Push Play.* Wellington, Hillary Commission.

Jackson, S.J. and Andrews, D.L., 1999. 'Between and beyond the global and the local'. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport,* 34(1):31-42.

Loret, A., 1995. *Generation Glisse. Dans l'Eau, l'Air, la Neige...la Revolution du Sport des 'Annees Fun',* Paris, Autrement.

Maguire, J., 1994. 'Sport, identity politics, and globalization: Diminishing contrasts and increasing varieties'. *Sociology of Sport Journal,* 11:398-427.

McKay, J., Lawrence, G., Miller, T. and Rowe, D., 1993. 'Globalization and Australian sport', *Sport Science Review,* 2(1):10-28.

Phillips, J., 1980. 'Mummy's boys: Pakeha men and male culture in New Zealand', in P. Bunkle and B. Hughes, (eds). *Women in New Zealand Society,* Auckland, George Allen and Unwin, 217-243.

Phillips, J., 1987. *A Man's Country? The Image of the Pakeha Male – A History.* Auckland, Penguin Books.

Rees, C.R., 1994. *Sport in the Lives of American Adolescents: The Effect of Age and Gender.* Paper presented at the NASSS Conference, Savannah, Georgia, USA, 9-12 November.

Rees, C. R. and Brettschneider, W-D., 1994. *The Meaning of Sport for German and American Adolescents.* Paper presented at the ISCPES Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, 4 July.

Rees, C.R., Brandl-Bredenbeck, H.P. and Brettschneider, W-D., 1999. 'Globalizing gender: A study of stereotyping among German and American adolescents'. *International Sports Studies*, 21(1):5-22.

Rees, C.R., Brettschneider, W-D. and Brandl-Bredenbeck, H.P. 1998. 'Globalization of sports activities and sport perceptions among adolescents from Berlin and suburban New York'. *Sociology of Sport Journal,* 15:216-230.

Robertson, R., 1992. *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture.* London, Sage.

Stoddart, B., 1988. 'Sport, cultural imperialism, and colonial response in the British Empire'. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 30(4):649-673.

Thomson, R.W., 2000. 'Physical activity through sport and leisure: Traditional versus non-competitive activities'. *Journal of Physical Education New Zealand*, 33(1):34-39.

Thomson, R.W. and Soos, I., 2000. *Sport and Youth Culture in New Zealand and Hungary.* Unpublished paper, School of Physical Education, University of Otago.

Waser, A-M. and Passavant, E., 1997. 'Sport as a leisure time pursuit among the youth of Caen, France'. *International Review for the Sociology of Sport,* 32(1):7-17.

Wilson, N.C., Hopkins, W.G., and Russell, D.G., 1993. 'Physical activity of New Zealand teenagers'. *Journal of Physical Education New Zealand,* 26(2):16-21.

Systemic Bias and the Marginalisation of Somali Refugee Adolescents within New Zealand Education

Louise Humpage
Massey University

Augie Fleras
University of Waterloo

Abstract

Systemic bias has long proven a part of the hidden agenda of New Zealand education. Its effects have become more pervasive with changes in immigration policy that have encouraged immigrants from non-traditional source countries. Of particular note are the consequences for refugees who, because of their social and cultural experiences, are poorly disposed to fit into this country's education system. Using interview-based data on Somali refugee adolescents at secondary school in Christchurch as an illustration, this paper argues that immigrant students are marginalised by consequence, if not necessarily by intent, through practices that diminish their full and equal participation within the school system. It is contended that the eurocentric bias of secondary schooling is systemically discriminatory at the level of rituals, rules, and roles. To the extent that this systemic marginalisation is shown to erode the multicultural principle upon which institutional inclusiveness is secured, New Zealand's initiatives for engaging diversity at educational levels will continue to be sharply contested.

Introduction

Education is widely regarded as a stepping stone for success. Yet the educational system appears to be structured in a way that has the unintended but adverse effect of marginalising some, empowering others. Many have also contended that education is a far from neutral institution (e.g. Walker, 1996; Smith and Smith, 1996). Feminist analysis has exposed a 'hidden curriculum' which favours male and discriminates against female students (e.g. Alton-Lee and Densem, 1992; Jones et al, 1995). Educational theorists have highlighted class-based disadvantage which results from education systems being built upon 'universal' values which reflect only the middle-class (e.g. Apple, 1982; Bourdieu and Passerson, 1990; Harker, 1990).

Ethnicity is no less critical a variable in shaping outcomes (see Fleras and Spoonley, 1999). Just as what counts as science, social studies and maths is often based around male, middle-class interests and experiences, such subjects also reflect the priorities and knowledge of the dominant ethnic group. Consequently, as Jones et al (1995:127) claim: 'What is generally accepted as valuable knowledge in education is a reflection of the interpretations, interests and experiences (the discourses) of the powerful'. The points of view and cultural assumptions of the powerful have thus become the 'norm'. As a result, less powerful minority groups – who do not understand the supposedly 'neutral' rules, regulations, norms and values of education – are frequently excluded, however inadvertently, from the official and unofficial curriculum of schools (Eckermann, 1992:32).

New Zealand research demonstrating the disadvantage that ethnic minority students experience in schools has concentrated mainly upon Maori and to a lesser extent Pacific Island students (see Jones, 1991; Tongati'o, 1994; Smith and Smith, 1996; Bishop and Glynn, 1999). This paper broadens that focus by exploring the systemic bias within New Zealand education which discriminates against *immigrant* students, in

particular those who come from Non-English-Speaking Backgrounds (NESB) and have come to this country as refugees. The trauma and long-term disruption in education that refugees have commonly endured magnifies the impact of the hidden cultural agenda that the New Zealand education system embodies.

The paper explores the process that inadvertently disadvantages Somali secondary students due to the systemic framework of a eurocentric schooling environment. The central focus is not the 'cultural deficit' of the students themselves but the apparent inability of schools to cope with their cultural difference. By examining the predominantly 'one-size-fits-all-mentality' espoused by the educational system, the paper argues that seemingly neutral but unwittingly eurocentric rituals, rules, and roles have the effect of systemically discriminating against those whose culture and life-experiences differ from the dominant group. It also maintains that failure to customise school practices in accord with Somali values and realities has had the effect of further marginalising those poorly positioned to improve their cultural capital. To the extent that this systemic bias is eroding a multicultural commitment to engage with diversity in a positive and proactive way, such actions and inactions do not bode well for advancing the goals of institutional inclusiveness within New Zealand education.

Illustrative examples of systemic discrimination and eurocentric bias towards the dominant culture are drawn from recent research (Humpage, 1998) focusing on Somali refugee adolescents at secondary school in Christchurch. Data for this research were collected by way of semi-structured interviews, observation of certain school activities and focus group discussions. Methodologically, data collection was animated by a belief that school experiences are socially constructed by way of meaningful interaction. This commitment to process and understanding made it doubly important to 'access' the level of those engaged in constructing reality through challenge,

confrontation, negotiation, or compromise. Research objectives sought to capture a sense of this constructed world as a human accomplishment – not from an outsider perspective, but from the point of view of those defining situations and interacting accordingly on the basis of these definitions. Thus, the research tries to address the intolerable fact that: 'Students are the people most affected by school policies and practices, but they tend to be the least consulted about them' (Nieto, 1999:191).

In achieving this goal, a total of 35 interviews were conducted with Somali students and relevant stakeholders including parents, teachers, cultural advisors and administrators. The nature of such a sample makes it difficult, of course, to extrapolate to Somali communities in other parts of New Zealand, let alone to make generalisations and assessments about the refugee experience in general. Nevertheless, the intensity of the Somali secondary school experience suggests the possibility of certain recurrent patterns in how authorities deal with diversity within the education system and how 'new' New Zealanders cope with the systemic biases of eurocentric school practices and organisation. Specific recommendations for improvement within the education system are not offered in this paper but may be found in the original research (Humpage, 1998). Rather, an attempt is made to meet what Hargreaves (1999:341) names the 'challenge of educational research in the postmodern age' by connecting the 'localised narratives' of students, teachers and parents within their own schools to the 'grand narratives' of educational and social change that occur outside the classroom, but nonetheless impact upon their lives.

Systemic Bias and Eurocentric Schooling

Systemic bias is the application of ostensibly neutral rules and universal standards to unequal situations that have the effect of discriminating against some because of their differences. This form of institutional discrimination is, by definition, unconscious

and unintended because of its embeddedness within taken-for-granted structures, functions and processes. It is normally the case that there is no explicit intent or motive to deny or exclude those outside the dominant group from institutional rewards or success (Fleras and Elliott, 1996:81).

The educators who participated in the Christchurch study, for instance, do not display obvious personal prejudice. Instead, they inadvertently but adversely disadvantage Somali by upholding universal standards, enforcing 'neutral' rules while rewarding acceptable behaviour and insisting on treating everyone the same even when differences need to be taken into account. Without being fully aware of it, these educators practice and defend institutionalised rules and procedures which are mistakenly based on a culture perceived to be 'normal' and 'neutral', but in fact reflect the priorities of the dominant culture.

Insofar as reality is routinely and automatically interpreted from a mainstream perspective as superior and universal, while minority viewpoints are dismissed as inferior or irrelevant, the eurocentrism ('monocentrism'?) implicit within educational systems is thus systemic rather than contrived. In other words, there is nothing 'natural', 'necessary' or 'inevitable' about school and education in terms of practice or organisation. Rather, the totality of the schooling experience constitutes a socially constructed convention created by individuals who make choices in contexts that are not necessarily of their making.

Educational institutions are increasingly being conceptualised as service providers and, in this context, schools should be meeting the needs of all those requiring service. Since *Tomorrow's Schools* (Department of Education, 1988:25), school trustee boards have been given the responsibility to ensure education 'promotes and progressively achieves greater equity' for, amongst others, 'Maori, Pacific Islanders, other groups with minority status'. However, in reality systemic biases within the education system diminish the possibility of trustee boards achieving this goal. Such biases stem partly from the

fundamental tension between equality and equity: to one side is a belief that a mass education system must treat all students in the same way for equality to 'kick in'; to the other are attempts to be inclusive of ethnic minority groups within educational institutions based on differential and customised treatment (see Boston et al, 1996:10-11). Biases also arise from a widespread commitment to liberal pluralist principles. These tacitly assumed 'meta-values' extol the over-arching belief that what we have in common and what we do or accomplish as individuals is more important that what divides or separates as members of a group (Fleras, 1998:65-67). This commitment to universalism and formal equality is empowering in contexts where a 'level playing field' prevails. Such a commitment poses problems, however, when group-based differences need to be taken into account as a basis for entitlement to attaining true equality and full participation.

Nowhere is this paradox more evident than in debates over school responses to diversity. Critics of multiculturalism argue that universalism is necessary because it is impossible to address the claims for recognition of small ethnic minorities such as Somali within a liberal-democratic society. However, while internal restrictions that impinge on the individual rights of an ethnic group should not be recognised and accommodated, Kymlicka (1998:62) stresses that claims aiming to *protect* a group's distinct identity by limiting its vulnerability to the power and decisions of wider society *are* compatible with liberal-democratic values. Due to the fluid and dynamic characteristics of culture and ethnicity these claims might also shift depending on the socio-political and temporal context.

In endorsing Kymlicka's (1998:62) argument, this paper positions itself between the cultural relativism and complete disdain for any form of universalism or ethno-cultural rootedness frequently found in postmodernist discussion of the politics of difference (May, 1999:22) *and* the cultural essentialism found at the other extreme of debate (see Goldberg, 1994 and May, 1999

for fuller discussion of these issues). Such a positioning stems from a belief – articulated by May (1999:30-32) – that the cultural difference of minority ethnic groups must be recognised and accommodated within schools, but this alone is not enough. The way in which the dominant group mobilises, expresses and exercises power must also be explored to comprehend the unequal context in which ethnic minorities are situated (Goldberg, 1994:30).

This context includes the considerable confusion that persists in government policy and government initiated studies concerning the concepts of equality and equity (Sharp, 1997:205). Confusion of this nature is reflected in protracted controversies over the primacy of 'equality of opportunity' (everyone should be able to compete equally and sort themselves out accordingly) versus the primacy of 'equity' or equality of outcomes (entitlements should be distributed equitably among all groups in society) (see Boston et al, 1996:10-11; Fleras and Elliott, 1996:117). Education policy certainly uses these concepts without clarification and at times interchangeably. Teachers are, therefore, employed to interpret and implement policies for which they have not been prepared financially, practically *or* ideologically. *Tomorrow's Schools* (Department of Education, 1988) reflects a Treasury-driven conceptualisation of 'equity' as equivalent with free choice in education. The frequent conflation of individual free choice (unencumbered by state bureaucracy) and individual and community 'empowerment' (with state assistance) is problematic (Jones et al, 1995:132) and the case of Somali refugees certainly provides little evidence of such 'empowerment'. There is an assumed neutrality in the 'free' market, which ignores the effects of social and cultural values and beliefs, the differing material conditions of people's lives, and differential access to resources including dominant knowledge and language (Jones et al, 1995:122-123). Education as defined by standards, targets and outcomes is confounded by the need to be inclusive of cultural difference, because such

difference cannot be standardized (Hargreaves, 1999:340). Merely as a result of their culture or circumstances, those who are processed by and through the hidden, yet eurocentric, cultural agenda which resonates throughout schooling and education may be victims of a systemic form of discrimination (see Fleras and Spoonley, 1999).

Somali students represent a direct challenge to assumptions of neutrality. Their clothing, religion, language and behaviour are quite distinct from that of the dominant culture reflected in New Zealand schools. Consequently, Somali do not fulfil the expectations of what secondary students are supposed to know and do, due to both their culture and the refugee experience. Adapting to school in New Zealand involves Somali students coming into a worldview completely disparate from their own (see Harker and Connochie, 1985:35). As a result, their school day is filled with incidents where the rituals, roles and rules of our educational institutions convey the impression of neutrality but, unwittingly, place Somali and other refugee students at a disadvantage. The cumulative impact of this systemic bias has the effect, rather than the intent, of denying and excluding Somali students from full and equal participation, despite often well-intentioned lip-service toward the principle of inclusiveness.

Such bias is difficult to identify by those who benefit from the system because of cultural blind spots (see Ramsden, 1995). The educators who participated in the study concede that education 'is a system which is failing them [Somali students] dramatically', but do not appear to conceive of themselves as active participants in such failure. The unintentional and tacitly-assumed character of systemic bias makes it no less real. Somali students experience considerable discomfort when their culture does not incorporate the values, practices, or language upon which the New Zealand education system is based. Through little fault of their own, many are inadequately prepared to cope with the demands and routines of educational institutions (see

Eckermann, 1994:33). In the case of Somali, an increasing sense of alienation from school has lead to cases of violence and to students leaving school with no formal qualifications. The remainder of this paper outlines the ways in which Somali students are biased against through a critical exploration of apparently 'neutral' rituals, roles and rules inherent in school practice.

Rituals of Exclusion

Learning and Teaching Rituals

To achieve educational success, students must be familiar with the way in which teaching and learning is conducted. Immigrant students who do not have this familiarity with the rituals of learning and teaching used in New Zealand education – or, in the case of many refugee students, *any* education system – are consequently disadvantaged. For example, in recent years schools in New Zealand have favoured independent learning patterns, lateral thinking, problem solving and group work. It is assumed that all students come to school with a similar understanding of this style, yet Somali students find it very difficult to adjust to this approach to learning and teaching. The Somali education system privileged a more stratified approach to learning that relied on the memorisation and recitation of notes taken under the teacher's instruction. One male student explains that: 'in Somalia, there were less of this, no assignments or tasks, and ... just writing, when the teacher writes something, it was in the exam'. Academic achievement was thus successfully gained by regurgitating information provided by the teacher.

This lack of what is assumed to be 'universal' knowledge has numerous practical implications. Many Somali students are unfamiliar with completing exercises out of books by themselves because 'Somalia don't have many books ... you can't keep the textbooks'. Consequently, a twenty-year-old Somali student notes that he first went to school in New Zealand 'expecting to

write five page [of notes] for the day' and that was all. He and others were surprised to find that the information they write down has to be thought through and discussed in class. A mainstream Mathematics teacher states that Somali students also appear to have no background in logical or lateral thinking and prefer to rote-learn rules that they can then practice. Confusion is created if there is even a slight deviation from standard methods.

In addition, educators indicate that students are not used to working independently of the teacher in groups. An English-for-Speakers-of-Other-Languages (ESOL) teacher states that:

> When I first started and I had two or three Maths groups, I would set a group a task, go to teach another group, look over and realise this group were all sitting there, waiting. They initially felt the need of someone being there.

While these students wanted the teacher to directly facilitate their learning within the group, other Somali will actually absent themselves from groups and work alone, resisting the new ways in which they are expected to learn. Cochrane et al (1993:18) note that Cambodian, Vietnamese and Lao refugees similarly find the concept of working in groups difficult to grasp. A lack of experience using this communal approach to learning is a major factor, but it is also possible that 'survival tactics' learned in refugee camps – prioritising competition over cooperation – may make group work even more difficult for refugees to adopt.

Somali and other refugee students are, therefore, making a huge jump in language-learning *and* conceptual-learning at the same time. This is very difficult, for one usually requires the other. An eighteen-year-old girl suggests that understanding neither the language nor the concepts makes it is hard to know what should be written down in class and a lot of important information goes unnoted:

> And you don't know it's a really problem, you don't think it's really problem at first, so you just – you don't know what it is, so you don't think you'll need it later .... and when you finish, or you almost finish and you didn't do your homework because you don't understand, then you just realise, how important it is, then it is ... hard, trying to learn all over again!

Kalantzis et al (1999:11) note that in such situations an effective pedagogy would involve being 'clear about the core social linguistic and cognitive requirements of the dominant society, yet sensitive to the differential pedagogical techniques necessary to achieve that end'. Due to the taken-for-granted nature of the learning process, however, there has been little recognition of the fact that many immigrant students need explicit tuition in the conceptual knowledge required for study in New Zealand. As a result, Somali tell that they are aware learning is achieved in a different way, but are not exactly sure *how* this is so, creating considerable confusion and uncertainty. A twenty-year-old student highlights that students often gain little subject knowledge in the first few months of school in New Zealand because: 'I think [I spent] two terms, three terms, most of the whole year, trying to understand what is really going on'. This difficulty in learning new conceptual knowledge is exacerbated by a lack of books and teaching material suitable for Somali students. Many of the examples given in ESOL and mainstream books do not reflect their life experiences and thus provide little illumination.

Jones' (1991:95-96) research on middle-class Pakeha and working-class Pacific Island secondary school students suggests that the latter also have difficulty participating in a model of learning which views teacher knowledge as a resource for their own independent study. The chances of Pacific Island, Somali and other minority ethnic groups members achieving academic success are limited because teacher interaction, exams, tests and

assignments reward only the learning that is valued by the dominant culture upon which the formal education system is based. As students realise that their own ideas, words and ways are of no value in education, alienation is possible and the likelihood of successful educational adaptation diminishes (Jones, 1991:127). The systemic bias against Somali students thus marginalises them from school and, as a result, from mainstream New Zealand society.

Organisational Rituals

Somali students also find it difficult to adjust to the organisational rituals of New Zealand. Secondary school teachers can usually assume that students will know how to make class notes, organise them in a folder and use them to complete assignments. Similarly, if a Science teacher does an experiment, it is assumed that students know what an experiment is and the general way in which it is to be conducted, because years within the New Zealand educational culture will have assured most students of this knowledge. If they are not familiar with an organisational method, a quick lesson or demonstration is enough to pass on this kind of information to 'Kiwi' students. Yet, immigrant students often require constant repetition of these lessons and refugee students such as Somali, who are busy concentrating and struggling with the curriculum, tend to completely miss them. Consequently, one teacher states that Somali students 'have very few organisational abilities, they don't know how to keep folders, books, notes, there's no continuity'.

Some teachers demonstrate frustration when Somali students are unacquainted with what are considered to be 'universal' standards. An ESOL teacher tells of asking her students to work down the page on a new work sheet, instead of across as they would normally do. The instructions were ignored, she believes, because they had no concept of how to do this. The same teacher indicates that it is common for a Somali student to

rip a page of notes out of a Science exercise book to complete some work for English. Similarly, they do not follow one lesson on from another, beginning a new page even if the information given relates to a prior exercise. Reading diagrams and graphs is another area of difficulty. The very low standard of handwriting and presentation skills that Somali students exhibit enhances many of these issues.

Some Somali students are simply not aware of the teachers' expectations regarding the organisation of their school work, nor why teachers think such organisation is so important, as one educator explains:

> I *don't* know if it's a value thing, if they've never had it before and they don't see it as being important. I suspect that they don't see the connection between having a complete set of notes, having a folder and having it organised and success at school.

By missing this 'connection', Somali students are set at a disadvantage because the educational culture in New Zealand highly prioritises the presentation of school work. Teachers state that this is because presentation is intimately connected with learning. For instance, Somali students very rarely have a complete set of notes because their notes are not organised and often lost. Thus, when they come to study for a test, they have nothing to revise from. However, Harker (1984:119) also suggests that a preference for style over content can be viewed as an act of social closure. By placing importance on the presentation of school work, the educational culture weeds out those whose cultural background does not preference the same style of organisation. That Somali and other refugee students are unaccustomed to the need for such presentational and organisational skills certainly acts as a barrier to their school adaptation.

Some schools *have* made attempts to bridge this gap in knowledge but struggle against the systemic bias that favours dominant group cultural norms. For example, four of the five schools visited have provided segregated classes and/or subject-specific support in class for Somali and other refugee students so that they are able to receive more individualised attention. Such measures have been implemented only when a large number of Somali students have enrolled at once – forcing schools to acknowledge their presence – and have lasted only a short time. In addition, these forms of educational initiative focus on *transmission* – giving Somali students enough 'knowledge' to embed them within dominant culture – rather than on *transformation* of the system (Wendt, 1985:14).

The ambiguity that educators display in relation to offering differential support for the students has also weakened the initiatives of schools. While indicating that these measures seem to help Somali students, they emphasise the need for them to be treated 'equally' (that is the same as other non-immigrant students) as soon as possible. Despite a shift away from 'equality as sameness' and towards 'equity as diversity' within educational policy since 1975, attitudes have not necessarily changed. Rather, the beliefs of many Christchurch teachers appear to be squarely rooted in the notions of equality of opportunity made famous by Peter Fraser's 1939 speech (Middleton, 1990:77-79). The likelihood of disparities when interpreting policy has been enhanced by the 1990 scrapping of a compulsory equity component in School Charters (Jones et al, 1995:122).

More often a lack of information about refugees and other immigrants and the educational systems of their countries of origin plays a large part in disadvantaging students. An eighteen-year-old Somali male states that mainstream teachers, in particular:

> .... don't know who you are or you background or whatever, so they just treat like you like all the other

> classes, they only hand out assignments and all that stuff, they don't really know ....

Due to this information-deficit, teachers tend to attribute the behaviour of Somali students to personal disposition, often assuming that Somali students are lazy or taking advantage of the more relaxed rules and punishments that New Zealand teachers and schools exhibit. Many of the students, particularly the females, indicate that they are 'too shy to say anything' to counter these attributions.

Other organisational rituals to which Somali students find adaptation difficult relate to the scheduling of assessment procedures and holidays. Although State schools in New Zealand are explicitly secular and do not usually involve religious instruction or prayer, they do reflect the Christianity of the dominant culture. Important dates in the Christian calendar, such as Easter and Christmas, are taken as school holidays and the weekend break is organised to include Sunday, the Christian day of worship. Somali students, who have different dates and days of worship, find that in New Zealand their religious needs are often in conflict with educational requirements.

For example, the Muslim day of prayer and rest is Friday and males over the age of fifteen are expected to attend the Mosque on Friday afternoons. While teachers have come to expect that Somali boys will be absent from school on Friday afternoon and most do not consider this truancy, the boys are still missing out on a half-day's study each week. This creates problems academically for themselves and administratively for teachers. One boy tells how a teacher informed him that there would be a test set on Friday afternoon, in fourth period:

> ... and she said 'You have to make a time for this period, because [otherwise] you have to lose some marks for exam'. Sometimes, most of the exams are on

> Fridays, and she said 'If you can't make a time on Friday, I don't know what to do'.

This student chose to miss prayers at the Mosque in favour of sitting the test. His problem is neither unique to Somali, nor other Muslim students but there is a clear tension when Somali students are forced to choose between the values of their home culture and that of the educational culture. To resist social closure from the rewards and success (grades and qualifications) that the New Zealand educational culture prioritises, Somali students must at times compromise their religious beliefs. Despite freedom of religion in New Zealand and the establishment of prayer rooms by some schools to facilitate the regular prayer that Islam requires, the eurocentric bias within the school system continues to disadvantage Muslim students such as Somali due to implicit assumptions of the 'norm'.

Somali students are also unaccustomed to the time-based organisational rituals of schools and New Zealand culture in general. A teacher noted:

> The initial group of Somalis would come anything up to an hour late. And they'd say things like 'I had a long sleep'. So there wasn't the organisation of, say, having an alarm clock, to wake you up, that sort of thing.

The above situation could be explained by the fact that the limited financial resources of Somali refugees prohibits the purchase of an alarm clock. However, students also differently prioritise the importance of arriving in class punctually and staying there for a set period of time. For example, a Somali student, who upon discovering half way through a period that he did not have a pencil, thought nothing of walking out of class and interrupting another to borrow a pencil from a friend. Similarly, a mainstream teacher stresses how difficult it was to get her Somali students to ask for help with assignments early, rather than leave

them until the day before they were due, because they had not learned to plan their time. These comments reflect others stated about refugees in general. Cochrane et al (1993:18) suggest that Southeast Asian refugees also have significant difficulty adjusting to the priority New Zealand places on time.

The different understanding of time that Somali students display is a recent phenomenon. Cultural advice from Christchurch Somali indicates that historically Somali schools placed as much importance on time as they do in this country. However, years of disruption of and unreliability – resulting from civil war, a shortage of teachers and considerable corruption – created a situation whereby schools were no model for time-related discipline. The aimlessness of life in refugee camps accentuated this pattern and, as a consequence, some students are completely unfamiliar with time-driven life. Conflict is created between teachers and students because they are both culturally unequipped to predict the other's reactions in relation to concepts such as time (see Stockefel-Hoatson, 1982:74). This demonstrates how individuals who follow disparate cultural scripts find it difficult to comprehend the actions and attitudes of those from a different culture.

Only one of the teachers I spoke to was conscious that Somali tardiness at school might result from a differing conception of time. Yet, this awareness has not decreased her frustration because institutional and educational frameworks require students and teachers to complete certain tasks each day. She considers it is impossible to be inclusive of cultural differences concerning time or organisation within these constraints. Other teachers appear to place blame on individual attitudes, rather than cultural differences. Mainstream teachers, in particular, doubt students who state 'I do not understand', suggesting that this is an excuse for making no effort or for failing to 'concentrate'.

Role Conflicts and Confusion

Gender Roles

Expectations of the roles that students and teachers should play also reflect eurocentric assumptions, yet are considered to be 'universal'. For instance, both Somali boys and girls have experienced considerable discomfort as a result of the gender equality formally advocated in New Zealand schools in recent years. In particular, many of the Somali students involved in the research were both surprised and perturbed by boys and girls participating in Physical Education classes together. Somali girls are not comfortable taking part when boys are present and will often just sit and watch. A father describes his eldest son's reaction to the expectation he must play sport with girls: 'He was ... surprised, very, very, shocked, he couldn't say no, he couldn't understand it, so it was a surprise ... It's not our culture'. Yet, teachers view the non-participation of the girls as a challenge to their ideals concerning gender equality, which reflect changes in dominant group attitudes to gender roles in the last forty years.

While teachers act according to Western-liberal ideals regarding gender equality in vogue at present, their enforcement of a 'universal' expectation (that boys and girls should learn how to play together) actually has the effect of excluding Somali students from participation. For example, a seventeen-year-old boy tells of his experience at a coeducational school:

> .... when they was in the gym, my teacher asked me if I got a gear .... and I asked my mother and said 'Gear, for swimming?', my mother said, 'Are girls going to be there?' and I asked, I came back to the teacher and asked, 'We are swimming with the girls?', 'Yeah', 'Oh, sorry I can't do that' and that was okay, he just crossed that ... thing and I don't go swimming.

This exchange highlights the fact that 'universal' expectations do not effect students in a universal manner and, in

cases like this, Somali are denied opportunities available to their peers due to their cultural beliefs.

Behaviour Roles

Other expectations of student behaviour are based on less explicit assumptions of assumed roles. For example, a teacher notes how she has witnessed fights on the basketball court and heard of similar incidences on the soccer field, because Somali boys do not possess the same social skill of 'fairplay' as their Kiwi peers. The concept of fairplay is one that has been popularised as part of New Zealand's national identity. We cannot assume that the cultural script of Somali places the same emphasis upon this idea, particularly when 'survival skills' may have been more relevant in refugee camps. Cochrane et al (1993:18), for instance, found that Vietnamese, Lao and Cambodian refugees who have spent long periods of time in camps in Thailand have difficulty discontinuing behaviour that New Zealand schools define as anti-social. Schools should not, of course, condone violence but an awareness of the reasons behind it is the first step to addressing this problematic behaviour.

Other issues described as 'behavioural' by teachers reflect the differing social skills of the Somali students, as well as their limited ability in the English language. An ESOL teacher explains:

> .... They don't have appropriate language for acquiring things or asking for things – we all know that in English if you say 'Don't get it' you're going to get a different response to 'I'm sorry, I've tried to do this but I don't understand'!

Exchanges like this highlight dominant group expectations that even the most basic communication between themselves and minority group member be encoded with the forms of 'politeness' and etiquette prioritised by the dominant

culture. Of course, 'appropriate' or 'inappropriate' behaviour is a social construction that differs within cultural contexts; an understanding of this fact and an explicit articulation of those expectations would benefit Somali students.

Age-Related Roles

In New Zealand and other Western countries, adolescents are positioned as neither children nor adults and this assumption is reflected in the attitudes and expectations of educators. However, Somali are considered adults at age fifteen. This is the time when Somali begin to take on their adult religious duties and sometimes other mature responsibilities. According to the Refugee and Migrant Service Coordinator in Wellington, boys aged twelve and over were recruited into the army in Somalia, where they felt they had a real and powerful role in life. Yet, in New Zealand they are put into schools and expected to behave like children (Norris, 1998:16). Some of the older boys mentioned 'I am a *man* 'during interviews, wishing to stress that they do not consider themselves children. According to teachers, male Somali students often make what are considered to be inappropriate sexual comments to Kiwi girls, reflecting both the Somali expectations of early sexual maturity and the gender roles within Somali society. The Somali norm of early marriage and child-bearing has also made it difficult for girls to adjust to school. At least two Christchurch Somali girls have left school at sixteen to be married, disturbing the behavioural roles that teachers and peers expect of this age to fill.

Once again, educators in Christchurch tend to attribute differences in their expectations of student behaviour and actual behaviour to inherent personality or racial, rather than cultural or educational, reasons. Failing to recognise their behavioural expectations as culturally-specific, teachers are basing their own behaviour towards Somali students on the basis of personal attribution (Bochner, 1983:12). This is not surprising, given a liberal-pluralist belief that what we do or accomplish as

individuals is a much important framework for evaluation or entitlement that who we are as members of a group. Nevertheless, such an outlook is problematic when it furthers the confusion and misunderstanding between educators and Somali and other immigrant students.

Rules: Expectations in Collision

Entrance rules

In addition to rituals and roles, 'neutral' school rules also ignore cultural difference. Prime examples of this are zoning and other entrance procedures. In Somali culture, males and females over the age of fifteen generally socialise separately. Strict Muslim families have, therefore, been distraught to find that the two State, secular single-sex schools for girls in the city have not always been able to accommodate their daughters, due to their popularity and 'neutral' entrance requirements. As a result, they have had to enrol them at a coeducational school where mixed-sex interaction is unavoidable. There appears to be little recognition that such 'neutral' entrance rules create significant discomfort for Somali and other Muslim students.

Uniform rules

Rules relating to the clothing worn in schools are also assumed to be neutral, yet negatively impact upon Somali girls. An obligation to wear the school uniform, which is often too short to be culturally appropriate, causes tension between schools and the Somali community. While most schools allow Somali girls to wear mufti, this solution has angered some non-Muslim students because they are not granted such leniency concerning uniform. Two Christchurch schools have provided uniforms for a small number of Somali students in an effort to defuse such complaints of discrimination due to this 'unequal' treatment of students.

Western assumptions regarding gender equality also affect teacher attitudes concerning the clothing that female

Somali wear. A sixteen-year-old girl tells of one teacher who imposed a universal rule that students wear shorts when climbing a mountain as part of school camp activities. The Somali girls were told that it was not 'safe' to climb a mountain in skirts and that they should change into shorts:

> And then, it was kind of hard, 'cos, some girls *did* wear shorts and *I* didn't. And the guy said 'Well, I'm sorry but they are wearing it, you have to, too' .... Yeah, 'cos they think 'Oh, she is a Somalian, and she's wearing a shorts', and they ask me and I say 'I'm not going to do that, this is my religion, I wear this' and then he say 'Isn't she Muslim?' .... it was quite hard for that kind of thing, so I decided not to go to other camps.

Somali girls and boys are clearly missing out on many school activities due to the application of universal rules that do not affect students equally. Thus, it is evident that the unintentional character of systemic bias makes its outcomes no less real.

Cummins (1988:138-141) cites considerable data demonstrating that the extent to which a student's language and culture are incorporated into the school programme is a significant predictor of academic success. He adds that cultural adaptation is enhanced when students recognise that their own ethnic identity is reinforced in school. Nevertheless, the systemic bias against Somali students has resulted in little of this cultural affirmation occurring in Christchurch schools, beyond makeshift prayer rooms in some and 'International Nights' in others. While aiming to affirm the cultures of students, they trivialise the concept of culture itself by focusing on differences in cultural 'life styles' rather than 'life chances' (Fusitu'a and Coxon, 1998:34; Nieto, 1999:206). A school counsellor notes that some teachers do not want to know about different cultural understandings because they are burnt out and do not have the time to ponder the philosophy of teaching. Hence, they state:

'Well, they've got to conform to our society, because they're going to live there'. This 'we are all New Zealanders' attitude may have worked in the past. It is doubtful if such an outlook will resonate with meaning in a post-colonising Aotearoa that is rapidly diversifying.

Conclusion: Engaging with Difference?

New Zealand schools have long sought to become more inclusive and culturally safe by engaging with diversity in positive and proactive ways (see Fleras and Spoonley, 1999). But the unmistakably eurocentric conception of schooling and education continues to prevail. As discourses in defence of an ideology that reproduces dominant cultural values, schools and education are not neutral sites of learning. Endorsement of universalism and the principles of liberal pluralism are systemically locked into the very structure and practices of educational systems. As a result some are inadvertently privileged, while others are disadvantaged in ways often unnoticed but conveyed as natural, normal, and necessary. Students whose cultural capital is incongruent with a eurocentric knowledge base are unlikely to derive full benefits from the imposition of rituals, rules, and roles that are embedded in conventional school practices and patterns of organisation (see Simon et al, 1998). Not surprisingly, schools and education remain sites of struggle and contestation involving the intersection of domination, resistance, and compromise in defining what constitutes knowledge, and whose definitions are validated and why (see Walker, 1996; Smith and Smith, 1996).

Eurocentric biases embedded in institutional structures, hidden agendas, and conventional practices have proven remarkably tenacious and resistant to transformation. Dominant cultural values related to knowledge and its transmission tend to prevail at the expense of others that are dismissed as irrelevant or inferior, despite well-meaning institutional and individual efforts to craft a more inclusive educational environment. To be sure,

there is no conspiracy within the education system to consciously promote dominant cultural values over others. Yet, in explaining educational outcomes it is important to take into account, not only the characteristics students embody, but also the part that educational structures, functions and assumptions play in *enhancing* the disadvantages Somali and other immigrant students bring to school. While some Christchurch schools have made well-intentioned attempts to be inclusive of Somali needs, ultimately these exist only as a temporary stop-gap, rather than a means for continuing support. Such 'add-on' measures fail to adequately challenge the systemic biases evident in Christchurch schools which reproduce inequity for refugee students such as Somali. They also fail to recognise that 'cultural accommodation' is a *two-way* process between minority ethnic groups and schools and that ultimately it must result in the transformation and change of educational institutions to succeed (May, 1999:31-33). The exclusive teaching practices described in this paper are also symptomatic of a complex interplay of contributing factors: the resentment that dominant group students demonstrate when minority students are offered differential treatment; inadequate funding and scarce resources; the ambiguity evident in Ministry of Education policy in relation to equity and equality of opportunity; and the fundamental resistance of a *mass* education system to the notion of differential, customised treatment for students.

Failure to recognise the systemic, as well as the individual, biases that marginalise Somali and other refugee students has resulted in severe consequences. Many young Somali in Christchurch are expressing considerable frustration and anger, at times demonstrated through violent outbursts at school. They are completing secondary school without any qualifications or dropping out early due to the alienation they endure there. In both cases, factors associated with the refugee experience – such as long-term youth unemployment and mental health issues – are multiplied by the systemic discrimination

which has made educational adaptation difficult and limited the future prospects of young Somali as socially and economically functioning members of society. If, as Ryan (cited in Eckermann, 1994:18) notes, a change in educational outcomes requires a change in educational experience, there is cause for concern. For the New Zealand education system demonstrates considerable shortcomings in multiculturally engaging with difference in a way that is workable and necessary, as well as fair and just.

Acknowledgment
The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their comments which aided in shaping this paper.

References

Alton-Lee, A. and Densem, P., 1992. 'Towards a gender-inclusive school curriculum: changing educational practice' in S. Middleton, and A. Jones (eds), *Women and Education in Aotearoa 2.* Wellington, Bridget Williams Books, 197-220.

Apple, M., 1982. 'Reproduction and contradiction in education: an introduction' in M. Apple (ed), *Cultural and Economic Reproduction in Education: Essays on Class, Ideology, and the State.* London, Routledge Kegan Paul, 1-31.

Bishop, R. and Glynn, T., 1999. *Culture Counts: Changing Power Relations in Education.* Palmerston North: Dunmore.

Bochner, S., 1983. 'The social psychology of cross-cultural relations', in Bochner, S. (ed), *Cultures in Contact: Cross-Cultural Interaction,* Oxford, Pergamon Press, 5-44.

Boston, J., Martin, J., Pallot, J. and Walsh P., 1996. *Public Management: The New Zealand Model,* Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. and Passerson, J-C., 1990. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (2nd ed). London, Sage.

Cochrane, N., Lee, A. and Lees, P., 1993. 'Refugee students with no previous schooling', *Many Voices: Journal of New Settlers and Multicultural Education Issues*, 5(May): 18-19.

Cummins, J., 1988. 'From multicultural to anti-racist education: an analysis of programmes and policies in Ontario' in J. Cummins, and T. Skutnabb-Kangas, (eds), *Minority Education: From Shame to Struggle.* Clevedon, Multilingual Matters Ltd, 125-157.

Department of Education, 1988. *Tomorrow's Schools: The Reform of Education Administration in New Zealand,* Wellington, Department of Education.

Eckermann, A-K., 1994. *One Classroom, Many Cultures: Teaching Strategies for Culturally Different Children.* St. Leonard's, Allen and Unwin.

Fleras, A. and Elliott, J.L., 1996. *Unequal Relations: An Introduction to Race, Ethnic and Aboriginal Dynamics in Canada* (2nd ed). Scarborough, Ontario, Prentice-Hall Canada.

Fleras, A., 1998. 'Working through differences: the politics of posts and isms in New Zealand', *New Zealand Sociology,* 13(1):62-96.

Fleras, A. and Spoonley, P., 1999. *Recalling Aotearoa: Indigenous Politics and Ethnic Relations in New Zealand.* Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Fusitu'a, L. and Coxon, E., 1998. 'Ko e ulungaangafaka-Tonga mo e ako leilei: Tongan culture and academic achievement', *New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies* 33(1):23-38.

Goldberg, D., 1994. 'Introduction: multicultural conditions', in D. Goldberg, (ed), *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader,* Cambridge, Mass, Blackwell, 1-41.

Hargreaves, A., 1999. 'Schooling in the new millennium: educational research for the postmodern age', *Discourse,* 20(3):333-355.

Harker, R., 1984. 'On reproduction, habitus and education', *British Journal of Sociology of Education,* 5(2):117-127.

Harker, R. and Connochie, K., 1985. *Education as Cultural Artifact: Studies in Maori and Aboriginal Education.* Palmerston North, Dunmore.

Harker, R., 1990. 'Schooling and cultural reproduction' in J. Codd, R. Harker, and R. Nash, (eds) *Political Issues in New Zealand Education,* Palmerston North, Dunmore, 25-42.

Humpage, L., 1998. *Refuge or Turmoil? Somali Adolescent Refugees in Christchurch Schools: Intercultural Struggle and the Practices of Exclusion.* MA thesis in Sociology, University of Canterbury.

Kalantzis, M., Australian Advisory Council on Languages and Multicultural Education and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1990. *Cultures of Schooling: Pedagogies for Cultural Difference and Social Access.* London, The Falmer Press.

Jones, A., 1991. *'At School I've Got a Chance': Culture/Privilege – Pacific Islands and Pakeha Girls at School.* Palmerston North, Dunmore.

Jones, A., McCulloch, G., Smith, L.T. and Smith, G.H., 1995. *Myths and Realities: Schooling in New Zealand* (2nd ed). Palmerston North, Dunmore.

May, S., 1999. 'Critical multiculturalism and cultural difference: avoiding essentialism' in S. May, (ed), *Critical Multiculturalism: Rethinking Multiculturalism and Antiracist Education.* London, Falmer Press, 11-41.

Middleton, S., 1990. 'Women, equality, and equity in liberal educational policies 1945-1988' in S. Middleton, J. Codd and A. Jones, (eds) *New Zealand Educational Policy Today: Critical Perspectives.* Wellington, Allen and Unwin, 77-79.

Nieto, S., 1999. 'Critical multicultural education and student's perspectives' in S. May (ed), *Critical Multiculturalism: Rethinking Multiculturalism and Antiracist Education.* London, Falmer Press, 191-215.

Norris, J., 1998. 'Plan to help young refugees adjust', *The Dominion,* 11 September, 16.

Ramsden, I., 1995. 'Cultural safety: implementing the concept', *New Zealand College of Midwives Journal,* October, 6-9.

Sharp, A., 1997. *Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New Zealand since the 1970s* (2nd ed), Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Simon, J., Smith, L. and International Research Institute for Maori and Indigenous Education, 1998. *Nga Kura Maori: The Native Schools System 1867-1969.* Auckland, Auckland University Press.

Smith, G.H. and Smith, L.T., 1996. 'New methodologies in Maori education' in P. Spoonley, C. McPherson, and D. Pearson (eds), *Nga Patai: Racism and Ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand.* Palmerston North, Dunmore, 217-234.

Stockfelt-Hoatson, B-I., 1982. 'Education and socialisation of migrants' children in Sweden with special reference to bilingualism and biculturalism' in R. Nann (ed), *Uprooting and Surviving: Adaptation and Resettlement of Migrant Families and Children.* Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 72-77.

Tongati'o, L., 1994. *Challenging Success: Developing Pacific Island's Education in Aotearoa, New Zealand.* Wellington, Ministry of Education.

Walker, R., 1996. 'Contestation of power and knowledge in the politics of culture', *He Pukenga Korero* 1(2):1-7.

Wendt, A., 1985. *An Education System for Whom?* Keynote address at the National Forum on Pacific Island Education in New Zealand, Nga Tapuwae College, Auckland.

Domestic Purpose Beneficiaries and the Community Wage: Her Brilliant Career

Janet Bedggood
Auckland University of Technology

Abstract

This paper considers the government's proposal for a community wage for domestic purpose beneficiaries. It takes a Marxist perspective in reviewing contending theoretical approaches to account for this policy and its implications for women's social status. The paper argues that the proposal was a neo-liberal initiative, which attempted to recast the gendered nature of welfare allocation in terms of what was expedient for the market. In the process it was calculated to push the existing welfare consensus to the right.

The Ministry of Women's Affairs took up the challenge and tried to prevent this erosion of welfare. Ministry officials attempted to modify workfare policy, taking a liberal stance to ameliorate its probable negative effects on women. The government did not adapt its position in response to this effort to influence its policy. Rather, the government decision not to proceed with the proposal appears as a reversion to a conservative position, which privileges women as primary caregivers in the home. The government took this position because it was politically expedient to endorse arguments from community groups that the family (and women's domestic role within the family) is basic to society. The paper argues that this state reproduction of women's domestic role legitimates women's inequality and reinforces women's participation in the reserve army of labour.

Introduction

In April 1998 Peter McCardle, the Associate Minister of Work in the Coalition Government, launched a community wage or 'workfare' scheme which involved compulsory work for beneficiaries. Beneficiaries would do community work or lose all or part of their benefit. Initially the workfare proposal included domestic purpose beneficiaries but before its implementation in October 1998, the Government drew back from this aspect of the scheme.

The welfare to workfare shift had particular resonance for women. 91% of domestic purpose beneficiaries are sole women with dependent children (MWA, 1997d)[1]. Thus, at the core of the proposal to force domestic purpose beneficiaries to work, is the question of the relationship between women's domestic labour and their wage labour. I am interested in the extent to which women's domestic role is seen as the defining feature of 'being a woman' in New Zealand society and their wage labour peripheral to, or constrained by their domestic labour role. The existence of the domestic purposes benefit (DPB) might seem to be an endorsement of this position, whereas the initial policy on workfare might constitute a threat to it.

I begin the consideration of the importance of domestic labour for women's social status by looking at how this issue has been conceptualised by a range of theorists, from conservative, liberal and radical feminists to Marxist. I take a critical Marxist perspective to test/interrogate these theories against government policy on workfare and the Ministry of Women's Affairs attempts to modify the policy in the interests of women domestic purpose beneficiaries. Then I examine the government's change to the policy. The reserve army of labour is the mediating

---

[1] One of several Ministry of Women's Affairs papers released under the Official Information Act.

concept between women's marginal position at work and their domestic labour.

Theorising gender: family/work/ the state

The conservative notion of women as primarily domestic and nurturing has its classic expression in Talcott Parsons' counterposition of the 'instrumental' husband to the 'expressive wife/mother' (Parsons, 1955). The 'proper' gender behaviour learned within the family is functional for society generally.

Men's more socially valued status comes from their activity in the public sphere while women derive their inferior status from their activity in the private sphere. Even when women enter the labour market, they retain their private sphere status because any paid work done by women outside the home is peripheral to their main role of caring for the family and qualitatively different (Parson's code for subservient) from men's work.

Parson's academic model coincided with popular beliefs that women's proper place was in the home. This orthodoxy came under challenge from feminists whose arguments and actions comprised the second wave of women's liberation beginning in the 1960s in the west, and whose ideas took hold in the new circumstances of the massive entry of women into the workforce. These conservative understandings were also the normative position in the debate over the workfare proposal – they underpin popular perceptions of the domestic sphere.

Liberal feminists rejected what Parsons celebrated and sought to overturn women's relegation to the home. They saw state policy as the cause of the problem, but also the solution. Bev James and Kay Saville-Smith argued that the nascent Welfare State in New Zealand in the 1890s, imposed a 'cult of domesticity' through enacting laws which protected women from exploitation in the labour force (James and Saville-Smith, 1994).

Liberal feminists wanted to free women from these constraints through legal and policy changes. But in the twentieth century, the state reproduced women's inequality in the labour market. A series of wage orders gave higher rates of pay for the male breadwinner, confirming the 'family wage' (Du Plessis, 1997). Despite attempts to legislate for equal pay, this was not achieved and women's pay remains less than men's. Recently, the Employment Equity Act 1990, was a sophisticated attempt to attain 'pay equity'. But this act was repealed by the incoming National Government in 1991. In the current debate the liberals line up behind the DPB as giving women a choice to be independent from a male breadwinner.

Gendered citizenship and the Domestic Purposes Benefit

Some radical feminists have argued against the liberal feminist position, claiming that legal solutions are limited and formal equality does not necessarily bring about equality (Brenner, 1993:139-140). In a version of this more radical feminist approach, Carole Pateman argues that the Welfare State is patriarchal and citizenship is not gender neutral (Pateman, 1988). Although women gained the franchise and formal citizenship rights,. their substantive rights under the Welfare State were different from men's rights. Men were incorporated into the state as independent worker citizens while women were incorporated as dependents on the basis of their family role. Workfare policy follows the logic of active citizenship rights being based on work in the marketplace.

Gendered citizenship in New Zealand has developed so that if women become welfare recipients as domestic purpose beneficiaries, the state replaces their husbands as their major means of support. This includes regulation of their sexual behaviour. The state monitors beneficiaries' sexual activity and uses cohabitation as grounds for rescinding eligibility for the DPB.

Pateman points to the increasing numbers of women on welfare as a major component of the feminization of poverty. She cites T.H. Marshall's claim that the Welfare State is failing to deliver the basis of citizenship rights in the twentieth century – social rights to economic resources which secure the ability to participate effectively in society (Marshall, 1964). Paradoxically, both Pateman's claim and Marshall's blueprint are relevant to the operation of the DPB in New Zealand. The stated intention for the creation of the DPB is in line with Marshall's model.

The DPB was introduced as an emergency benefit in 1968 and later as an income-tested statutory benefit on the recommendation of the 1972 Royal Commission on Social Policy as part of their vision for a beneficiary to 'enjoy a standard of living much like the rest of the community and thus is able to feel a sense of participation in and belonging in the community' (Royal Commission on Social Security, 1972:241-2). But in practice this was not a measure that delivered equal citizenship. Underpinning official thinking were concerns over maternal deprivation and the needs of small children for consistent mothering. At the time of the initial introduction in 1968, a Department of Social Welfare study asserted the department's responsibility 'to ensure that women are not encouraged to work to an extent which would be against the best interests of their children' (quoted in Goodger, 1989:40). Hence, the DPB confirmed women as mothers before they were workers (or citizens) in line with Pateman's assertion that women's relation to the state is defined through their domestic role. This role continued to be undervalued, particularly when opposition to state support for sole parents as encouraging family breakdown led to subsequent reductions in the level of support for DPB recipients. Reductions such as the cuts to the accommodation allowance, have been seen to 'push women into poverty' (Beaglehole,1993:32) as Pateman suggests.

Pateman's solution is a Marshall-type Welfare State to be achieved by a collectivist movement of women aligned with

working class movements. Their strategy to solve the problems of women's poverty is to reform attitudes within the framework of the existing state. The distinction between paid and unpaid work would be dissolved through community respect of both. Then women would not be regarded as social exiles.

It is an idealist solution. By redefining status without reducing material inequality, Pateman shifts the focus away from the problem of poverty that underpinned the status in the first place. I argue that to change social attitudes it is necessary to change the material conditions from which they emerge.

Pateman does not recognise the emancipatory potential of work in the public sphere as liberal feminists do. She fails to address the way domestic labour and receipt of welfare are subordinate to the processes of capitalist production and the accumulation of capital, while wage labour is fundamental to it. These issues are critical in a Marxist approach.

Domestic labourers as a reserve army

Marxists have been criticised for neglecting gender dimensions of power. This objection was met when the question of the centrality of domestic labour for women was raised in the domestic labour debates (see Fine, 1992, for a summary of the earlier contributions). These debates among Marxists and others, represented attempts to establish how domestic labour was materially useful to capital.

I contend that those protagonists who argued that domestic labour is part of capitalist production were not convincing because they claimed it had socially abstract value, confusing its usefulness or use value with exchange value (notably these protagonists were Dalla Costa and James, 1972, Gardiner, 1975 and Seccombe, 1974, 1975). They were never able to demonstrate how domestic labour was socially regulated by exchange and part of commodity production. Others argued that because domestic labour is performed apart from the regulation of labour through the value of its product, it remains

privatised. It is outside capitalist production (Adamson et al 1976, Smith, 1978).

This latter position explains why women's association with domestic labour leaves them marginalised under capitalism and disproportionately members of the reserve army of labour. Their domestic labour is important for ensuring the reproduction of worker's labour power which according to Marx, can be safely left to workers' instincts for self preservation at minimal cost to capital (Marx, 1976:718).

Women, as unpaid domestic labourers, would also be available as part of the reserve army of wage labour. Marx saw the formation of a reserve army of labour as a necessary measure to overcome the problems of capital accumulation when the demand for labour varies according to capital's own valorization requirements (Marx,1976:790). In periods of high unemployment the availability of the reserve acts as a pressure on employed workers and 'forces them to submit to overwork' (Marx,1976:788) to maintain profits[2].

The claim that married women constituted a specific group in the reserve army of labour was an important contribution to the analysis of the relation between women' domestic labour and wage labour. As dependents and unpaid workers in the home women were a convenient source of flexible wage labour to be drawn into industry when needed by capital and discarded to the home when they were no longer needed (Beechey, 1978, Braverman, 1974:385-391).

How do these arguments measure up to women's experience in New Zealand? Women are still overwhelmingly domestic labourers yet married women's increasing participation in wage labour since World War 2, illustrates a massive entry from a 'labour reserve'. Most women are no longer waiting in the

---

[2] This is demonstrated in a New Zealand study which looked the effects of a female labour reserve on those in employment during a recession (Hill, 1982).

home for the call to enter waged work – does this mean that primacy of their domestic role is now outdated? Or was this a period of economic growth when the reserve army was mobilised without undermining the primacy of domestic labour? Further, while some women are pushed into the reserves by redundancies,[3] other women retain their paid work in a period of economic downturn. Does this mean they are no longer a reserve?

Domestic Labour and Wage Labour – A Reserve Army?

Now I look at some of the general trends in the labour force participation of all women, to ascertain to what extent their experience in paid work is shaped by their responsibilities for child care and whether any women are part of a reserve army of labour.

Amongst all mothers, the level of employment correlates to the age of their youngest child (Department of Statistics, 1989:26). The women most likely to be receiving the DPB are aged between 20 and 25 years and have children under five years (Statistics New Zealand, 1999: 125, MWA, 1998c). This data confirms the trend for women to prioritise child rearing over wage labour during their prime child bearing years. During this period, the notion of the primacy of domestic duties for women appears entrenched.

Because of women's involvement in childcare, men are more likely to be in the labour force during the years when their children are young. This disparity between parents' labour force participation illustrates how a gendered division of labour at home disadvantages women in paid employment[4]. As women

---

[3] See Hancock's (1982) study on the effects of unemployment on women in the clothing industry after the Mosgiel closure.

[4] Lower participation rates (Statistics New Zealand, 1999; 83) and lower wages overall (Statistics New Zealand, 1999;108).

move in and out of the labour force, this is a factor in their greater vulnerability to unemployment[5] or underemployment (Statistics New Zealand, 1999: 89). Disproportionately mothers are susceptible to membership of the reserve army. Women's higher unemployment rate is likely to be under-reported as married women are not normally eligible for the unemployment benefit and therefore, are less inclined to register as unemployed.

Counter to patterns of unemployment, some women are working during their child bearing and early child rearing years (Statistics New Zealand, 1999:84). These are the most skilled and highly paid mothers who have the resources to pay for childcare and home help (Novitz quoted in Davies and Jackson, 1993:141). A relatively privileged layer of women can circumvent the conditions which constrain most women's labour force participation. At the other end of the spectrum, the high cost of quality childcare makes paid work uneconomic for most domestic purpose beneficiaries.

If some women are part of the active army of labour does that upset the notion of a female reserve army of labour? Some writers reject the claim that women's higher unemployment rates indicate that women are part of a labour reserve (Humphries, 1983, Milkman, 1976 and Walby 1989) because not all women suffer job loss. Gender segregation in the labour market confuses the issue of disposability. Many women's jobs are protected. They argue that full-time 'male' jobs in primary and secondary industries are declining, while part-time 'female' jobs in the service industry are increasing (which is occurring in New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 1996;289). The idea of an undifferentiated female reserve army is a crude explanation.

---

[5] Officially, 8.3% of women in the labour force are unemployed compared with 7.2% of men. The rates for Maori women (19%) and Pacific Island women (17.5%) are the highest (Statistics New Zealand, 1999:89).

But these writers themselves fail to take account of difference. They ignore Marx's category of the underemployed in the reserve army, despite their acknowledgment that part-time work is feminised. Many of the women relegated to part-time work fit Marx's sub-categories of 'floating' reserve and 'stagnant' reserve. The floating reserve flit from job to job as their labour is used and discarded. The stagnant reserve are rarely employed (Marx, 1976:794-7).

The expansion of casualised work[6] has impacted more on women. Women take it up rather than men for a variety of reasons. Some take on part-time work because of lack of full-time jobs and may have multiple jobs. Other women find part-time work convenient to combine with their domestic responsibilities. But most women on the DPB are excluded.

Although sole parents can combine the DPB with part-time employment, few have other reported income (see Goodger, 1998:145-6 for details of policy). Employment rates for sole mothers in New Zealand are significantly below those in most other countries and the gap between sole and partnered women is increasing (MWA, 1997a)[7]. Sole mothers appear to be the most marginalised group of women, trapped in a stagnant labour reserve. Given these circumstances, workfare might appear to

---

[6] Part-time work has risen 40% in the last decade (Statistics New Zealand, 1993). I assume a relationship between casualised work and part-time work.

[7] This gap is widest for Maori mothers. Maori sole mothers have the highest unemployed rate of any female group while partnered Maori mothers have the second highest employment rate (Statistics New Zealand, 1999; 91). These variations show sole motherhood is a better predictor of reserve army status, than ethnicity. But Maori comprise 38% of domestic purpose beneficiaries (Social Policy Agency, 1997) so ethnicity is an important factor in this status that needs further investigation.

solve the problem of their unemployment, but by increasing their underemployment and consigning them into the floating reserve.

The social reproduction function of domestic labour is most evident among these women. Because childcare has not been socialised, they perform full-time childcare and rely on the DPB as their means of subsistence. It is my contention that these women have been important in holding down the costs of wage labour when it has been less costly for the employers to make use of the domestic labour of women in the reproduction of labour-power. The cost equation shifted with the rises in the numbers of beneficiaries and subsequent financial costs of the benefit. The proposal for solo parents to participate in workfare, signified a reassessment of state support for sole mothers through the DPB. I now evaluate the positions of the National government and the Ministry of Women's Affairs on the contentious issue of making domestic purpose beneficiaries work.

Workfare for Domestic Purpose Beneficiaries

The Government policy around the community wage initially proposed that domestic purpose beneficiaries would do community work for their money. They would leave their dependent children (including those under seven years of age) for twenty hours a week while they undertook this work. Did this government policy of work for the DPB mark a fundamental shift in policy on women's position, away from the acceptability of domestic labour as their primary role, recasting them as wage labourers? This measure could be seen as a progressive move to liberate women from their domestic responsibilities and from their 'dependency' on the state, so that they could realise equal opportunity.

However, where there is a lack of affordable childcare and few well paid jobs for women, this measure seemed more like a fiscal saving. Reducing state spending would also cut the family income, increasing the gendered nature of poverty already

signified by hardship among sole parents. It would also have the effect of jeopardising the social reproduction role of domestic labour.

There is no doubt that state financed welfare is a drain on state spending unacceptable to capital in the new conditions for capital accumulation. The social effects of economic recession include increased unemployment which is linked to marital break-up (DSW, 1996; 78) and consequent demands on the state for support from a shrinking purse. The dramatic growth of the DPB has been a major concern for policy makers as a substantial part of the increase in social spending. Levels of expenditure on the DPB increased from 5% of welfare expenditure in 1974 to 15% in 1996 (Goodger, 1998:122). This spending was a drain on profits that was not sustainable for capital in the new material circumstances emerging from the globalisation of capital. It is no longer viable for the New Zealand state to impose limits locally on capital accumulation when that capital is competing in a world market. To accommodate to these new times and reconstitute conditions for capital accumulation, there has been a shift in the orthodox rationale for welfare to the notion of workfare, which has emerged as the neo-liberal ideological solution to the erosion of welfare. This began overseas with programmes such as the Wisconsin welfare reforms which was the model for the New Zealand government (see Bedggood, 1999). Access to welfare is equated with dependence.

The notion of welfare recipients as dependents has come into vogue recently. It was invoked over the 1991 benefit cuts when Jenny Shipley, then Minister of Social Welfare, explained that 'the reforms are designed to encourage self reliance by providing people with sufficient motivation to move from state

dependence to independence' (quoted in O'Brien, 1997:107[8]). Shipley was using independence as a code for paid work. She made this more explicit when she claimed that benefits were too high compared with wages and needed to be cut to 'encourage' workers to 'compete for work opportunities' in the new labour market regime under the Employment Contracts Act (Herbert, 1991). The benefit cuts were calculated to encourage competition for jobs in new conditions that gave employers more power in bargaining wages and conditions with individual workers. The coercive aspect of workfare exacerbates this situation where cheap non-unionised compliant labour would replace more expensive organised/unionised labour. Workfare appears a logical extension of government policy to deregulate the labour market and drive down wages.

---

[8] The Government has been selective about who is termed 'dependent'. Mike O'Brien points out that the government applied the term to the unemployed, sole parents and sickness beneficiaries but not widows, invalids or superannuaitants (O'Brien, 1997). But I argue that all these groups are vulnerable to retrenchment and the new rhetoric. In a move that could be construed as a reaction to halt the sharp rise in invalid and sickness beneficiaries between 1991 and 1996, the government has recently directed many sickness and invalid beneficiaries into 'independence' by redesignating them as able to work. The government promotion of compulsory superannuation was a failed attempt to reframe expectations of state subsistence support to the elderly.

The government is more consistently selective about who *not* to label 'dependent'. It is not applied to those who work and get state support through the family support supplement. Also left out of the equation is the historic dependence of local industry on massive state subsidies to protect the development of local production. Dependence is a convenient term to use as a cover for neo-liberal policies.

By the mid 1990s, the term 'dependence' was widely used[9]. It was a major theme in the government's 1996 electioneering rhetoric. It is embedded in the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) post-election briefing paper which promoted the idea that individuals were choosing to be dependent (DSW, 1996). Dependency was caused by a person's state of mind, rather than structural factors. The policy makers then drew an inference from an increase in numbers of those dependent on state payments, claiming that people were opting to remain on benefits long-term. They made a leap from dependency to long term dependency to intergenerational dependency. Director of Social Welfare, Margaret Bazley, promoted the Beyond Dependency Conference in these terms. She alleged that five-year-olds were starting school and looking forward to life on the benefit. Yet DSW's own policy unit could not verify these assertions nor contradict them. The policy unit noted that any assessment of the length of time spent on DPB was inconclusive and problematic (Goodger, 1997). Both government ministers and officials were unable to substantiate claims of long term dependency. If DSW produced figures which contradicted these claims, it would be embarrassing for the government.

Shipley's stance was against universality in welfare and for targeted state spending and greater individual responsibility. On the surface, this stance appeared gender neutral. Women were to be no longer defined and confined by their family role but forced out to work ('forced to be free' in Rousseau's terms). It was claimed that work for the benefit was a stepping stone to a job. Workfare was in line with the government's unpopular Code of Social Responsibility with its rhetoric of individual responsibility, specifically targeted at beneficiaries when mooted by Treasurer Winston Peters in his 1997 budget.

---

[9] See also Fraser and Gordon (1995) who argue that the term dependency has been used ideologically to stigmatise welfare recipients in the United States. They trace the genealogy of its use.

The government appeared optimistic at the start of 1998 that the economy was buoyant and unemployment would decrease (Armstrong, 1998). These conditions would have lent credibility to the line that job attainment was an individual choice, whereas the economic recession exposed the problem as structural, evident in the lack of jobs to go around. In this situation the Government ran the risk of its policy backfiring in rising poverty and increased family breakdown.

The Ministry of Women's Affairs: Strategic Differences Over Policy

The Ministry of Women's Affairs (MWA) was part of G5 Cabinet group which met to devise workable government policy on workfare. Its particular interest was in the proposals for work for domestic purpose beneficiaries. Anything affecting the DPB is seen as a women's issue since the benefit is predominantly given to women and it was designed originally around supporting women in their domestic role when they did not have male support.

MWA papers (MWA 1997-98) reveal that their ministry approach reflects a concern to support women and protect them against punitive aspect of the community wage. Ministry officials do not take a position against a community wage or even women going out to work, they concur with government policy on this. They differ from McCardle over the way this should be handled and the way women should be treated relative to men because of differences in their social position. They take a position of strategic intervention to encourage/assist women to transfer successfully to sustainable paid employment. They term this approach a 'facilitative case work approach' (MWA, 1997a, 1997c). They contrast this approach with the more punitive approach of sanctions and reciprocal obligations proposed by the government whereby women would be forced to work for the benefit or lose it. They see the benefit abatement system set up in

1996 as an encouragement to work, not a compulsion. In terms of my argument, MWA do not want women to be forced into the reserve army of underemployed when it would be difficult for them to find sustainable long term employment.

They contrast the two different assumptions that underpin these different approaches. The assumption behind the punitive approach is that beneficiaries are unwilling to work, while MWA points to most wanting to work (MWA, 1997d). They identify some of the structural barriers for women to overcome which the G5 group does not address. Women face barriers relative to men on the labour market in that they are less likely to have regular full time work, they are lower paid and they are concentrated in the same sectors (MWA, 1997d). Sole women are less likely than partnered women to have the education, training or even work experience needed to secure on-going employment. To achieve these qualifications they need access to quality childcare (MWA, 1997a, 1997d). Thus, provision of childcare is a key aspect of MWA's approach to helping women into wage labour.

Good quality childcare is documented as an advantage to children over private domestic childcare. MWA claim that childcare makes a positive difference to children from disadvantaged backgrounds; it mitigates against the detrimental impact of poverty. Parents involved in the OSCAR progamme[10] report better personal relations within families, both between siblings and children and parents, and more opportunity for parents to access training and jobs. In arguing the case for

[10] The Government established the Oscar Programme (Out of School Care Services) in response to the Employment Task Force recommendations. It was set up in 'communities of need' as an 18 month pilot project to increase the number of places for the care of school age children so that their parents could participate in education training and employment (MWA, 1997e).

publicly provided childcare and its superiority over domestic arrangements MWA is making the case for socialised childcare.

This position appears implicit in other remarks. MWA appear to reject domestic childcare in their comments which point to a move away from the normative position of women as carers and nurturers bound to their primary domestic role. Although in one document MWA acknowledge that women make a significant contribution to society by caring for their children (MWA, 1998b) this is against the tenor of other comments such as their reference to a 'culture of parenting' held by older women who remain on the DPB when their children are older (MWA, 1997f). In this context a 'culture of parenting' appears as a regression to a traditional cultural norm. If women are locked into a 'culture of parenting' it would inhibit their participation in paid work. This interpretation supports the overall thrust of MWA papers to enhance women's expectation of their return to work.

MWA emphasises that the improved social value of women comes from their participation in the public sphere – education and work make a 'profound difference to their life chances in terms of health, self esteem and work potential' (MWA, 1998a). MWA position papers take a liberal feminist line advocating that the state's role should be to assist women in providing opportunities for them to make choices that will improve their status relative to men. They are saying that women on the DPB should return to work as equals, not as secondary workers or a labour reserve. If society cannot provide adequate childcare and opportunities for jobs that are careers, women should not be pushed back to work.

The thrust of contributions by MWA promotes intervention which is calculated to ensure that a move to work is desired and viable, whereas there is an element of force in the compulsive aspect of McCardle's proposals. The compulsion is masked by the language of individual choice and responsibility. The MWA talks about choice but the choice they envisage is

about better alternatives for women. They want reforms which will make improvements for women possible and the timing of job uptake propitious. Neither position takes account of the structural constraints on choice relating to a contracting economy. Even the Employers Federation response to the scheme recognises that opportunities for work are limited with lack of jobs in the economy, suggesting that the real solution to unemployment is stronger economic growth (Luke, 1998).

The contradictions between the government and MWA approaches remain unresolved. The Government decision to pull back from its requirement for domestic purpose beneficiaries to work, was a reaction to other pressures.

Retreat on the Community Wage for Domestic Purpose Beneficiaries

The government responded to public opposition to workfare for domestic purpose beneficiaries, by reversing policy. They cited community group submissions to the Select Committee on the Bill as the reason for this change.

Submissions on the Social Service (Work Test) Amendment Bill were limited to two half-day hearings, one in Wellington and one in Auckland. Sixty-seven groups and individuals made submissions. Many of these submissions expressed concern about the effects on families of the requirement for domestic purpose beneficiaries to work. The lobby group Children's Agenda claimed that the bill was so concerned with work testing beneficiaries that it failed to consider the consequences for children: ' the Government does not recognise or value the role of parenting, by coercing work on beneficiaries and taking a very punitive approach' (Children's Agenda,1998). The group strongly opposed the proposal to cancel the benefit if parents did not work, claiming that this would put families in hardship, unable to meet their basic needs to sustain life. The Child Poverty Action Group saw the bill as

establishing a penalty driven regime: 'the poverty consequences of the proposed bill will impact on the children' (Child Poverty Action Group, 1998).

This strong emphasis on the social value of parenting was underpinned by the notion that this was real work for women. This was made explicit in some submissions. The National Council of Women rejected the plan to force women to work outside the home stating 'parents [usually mothers] are already doing valuable work...by raising children' (National Council of Women, 1998). The YWCA claimed 'the first message that is given by this Bill to all women is that raising children is not real work and that real work is synonymous with paid employment' (YWCA, 1998).

National MP Christine Fletcher also defended the importance of women's domestic role and accused her own Government of swinging to the right, citing expanded work testing for widows and domestic purpose beneficiaries as an example (Young, 1998).

This opposition was widely reported in the media. The Government responded to submissions on what they termed the 'plight of children', and announced that they would draw back from forcing sole parents with school age children aged 6 to 13, to take part in community work schemes. Domestic purpose beneficiaries would still be available for interviews, training and paid part-time work but would lose 50% not 100% if they did not comply (New Zealand Herald, 1998). The revised Government stance signified that children in 'plight' would be rescued by their mothers. Thus, the Government response to pressure was to draw back on the work requirements for the DPB and reinstate family values, which was a retreat to a classic Parsonian conservative position.

However, the government position was inherently 'shifty'. The Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley covered every contingency. She pursued a policy of curing welfare dependence by introducing mandatory work for welfare recipients including

women on the DPB. Yet in her endorsement of Statistics New Zealand's Time Use survey, she eulogized women's 'unpaid work, including childcare, care for the elderly, household work...is crucial to the New Zealand economy but its value is largely ignored' (Statistics New Zealand, 1997). This latter stance was reactivated when the Government realised it was important electorally to acknowledge the family as the basis of society.

Other factors made the scheme expendable. Although McCardle's original intention was to promote self-sufficiency through workfare, his commitment was tempered by the attitude of others within the Coalition Government. Some National Party members were more sceptical over the viability of the project given the difficulties with previous work promotion schemes in finding jobs (Maharey, 1997).

There were concerns that the workfare scheme would remove jobs from paid workers (Ansly, 1998, Larkin, 1998 and Reid, 1998) which were vindicated later by press reports that this was occurring (Sunday Star Times, 1998).

Conclusion

The resilience of conservative Parsonian sentiment was shown in the community group submissions to the Select Committee which affirmed the importance of women's domestic labour in the family. By accepting these arguments and reversing policy, the state reasserted the central function in society of women's care-giving role. This fallback position, where women are protected and free to continue their domestic labour role, legitimates their inferior status. In the contradiction between fiscal motives for reducing benefits and the rhetoric of family, the ideology of family prevailed. The 'cult of domesticity' survives!

The tensions between the two positions continue to surface. The Act Party has continued to uphold the policy requiring DPBs to work and led the assault on domestic purpose

beneficiaries whom they claim are abusing the welfare system. They are signalling the completion of the New Right agenda when they can implement Wisconsin-type policies for reducing benefits and tie them to work (Prebble, 1999:27-40).

Women beneficiaries' location in either policy option suggests their reserve army position. In the current policy outcome, the primacy of domestic labour is reproduced by the state through the DPB. As domestic purpose beneficiaries, women constitute a stagnant pool of potential workers. This potential was to be realised under the workfare proposal; these women were to be propelled out of the reserves and into work. As a new supply of available (largely unskilled) labour introduced onto a tight labour market, they would function as a floating reserve to suppress wages and conditions.

In the event, the lack of buoyancy in the economy gave credibility to the highly publicised arguments over the consequences of women's forcible induction into the labour force. Uncertainty over the possibility of increased family poverty and disintegration, forced a tactical retreat by the Government.

References

Adamson, O., Brown, C., Harrison J. and Price, J., 1976. 'Women's oppression under capitalism', in *Revolutionary Communist,* 5:2-48.

Ansley, B., 1998. 'Kick Start' in *New Zealand Listener,* May 9:18-21.

Armstrong, J., 1998. Welfare reform cabinet's main thrust, in *New Zealand Herald,* 24 January, A14.

Beaglehole, A., 1993. *Benefiting Women: Income Support for Women, 1893-199.* Wellington, Social Policy Agency.

Bedggood, D., 1999. Beyond Dependency or Beyond Capitalism? A Critique of New Zealand's Drive towards Workfare in *Policy Studies,* 20(2):133-141.

Beechey, V., 1978. Women and production: a critical analysis of some sociological theories of women's work, in A. Kuhn and A. Wolpe (eds), *Feminism and Materialism,* Routledge, London, 155-197.

Braverman, H., 1974. *Labor and Monopoly Capitalism,* New York, Monthly Review Press.

Children's Agenda, 1998. Submission 52 to the *Social Service (Work Test) Amendment Bill.*

Child Poverty Action Group, 1998. Submission 34 to the *Social Service (Work Test) Amendment Bill.*

Dalla Costa, M. and James, S., 1972. *The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community,* Bristol, Falling Wall Press.

Davidson, C. and Bray M., 1994. *Women and Part Time Work in New Zealand,* Christchurch, The New Zealand Institute for Social Research and Development.

Davies, L. and Jackson, N., 1993. *Women's Labour Force Participation in New Zealand: The Past 100 Years.* Wellington, Social Policy Agency.

Department of Social Welfare, 1996. *Strategic directions. Post-Election Briefing Paper,* Wellington.

Department of Statistics, 1993. *New Zealand Social Trends Work,* Wellington.

Department of Statistics, 1989. *Families and Households,* Wellington.

Du Plessis, R., 1997. Women, Feminism and the State, in C. Rudd, and B. Roper (eds), *The Political Economy of New Zealand,* Oxford University Press, Auckland, 220-236.

Fine, B., 1992. *Women's Employment and the Capitalist Family,* Routledge, London.

Fraser, N. And Gordon L., 1995. 'A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a keyword of the U.S. Welfare State', in B. Laslett, J. Brenner and Y. Arat, in *Rethinking the Political: Gender, Resistance and the State,* London, University of Chicago Press, 33-60.

Gardiner, J., 1975. 'Women's Domestic Labour', in *New Left Review,* 89:47-58.

Goodger, K., 1998. 'Maintaining Sole Parents in New Zealand: an historical survey', in *Social Policy Journal of New Zealand,* Issue 10:122-153.

Goodger, K., 1997. *Domestic Purposes Benefit Trends*, paper released from the Social Policy Agency.

Hancock, M., 1982. 'Invisible workers: women, redundancy and unemployment', in *New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relation,* 7:173-178.

Herbert, P., 1991. Stripping away workers' protection, in *The Dominion,* 20 February, p.14.

Hill, R., 1982. 'Women, work and recession: the other face of unemployment', in *New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations,* 7:157-171.

Humphries, J., 1983. 'The 'emancipation' of women in the 1970s and 1980s: from the latent to the floating' in *Capital and Class,* 20:6-28.

James, B. and Saville-Smith, K., 1994. *Gender, Culture and Power.* Oxford University Press, Auckland.

Larkin, N., 1998. 'Churches, unions oppose dole work', in *New Zealand Herald,* July 9:A5.

Luke, P., 1998. Employment master plan, in *The Press*, 25 April:11.

Maharey, S., 1997. 'Work for the dole plan unlikely to succeed', in *New Zealand Herald,* 4 February, A13.

Marshall, T.H., 1964. *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development,* New York, Doubleday.

Marx, K., 1976. *Capital,* Harmondsworth, Penguin.

Milkman, R., 'Women's work and the economic crisis: some lessons of the Great Depression', in *The Review of Radical Political Economics* 8(1):73-97.

Ministry of Women's Affairs Paper, 1997a. Comment on *DPB Review – Barriers to Employment: Childcare*, 19August.

Ministry of Women's Affairs Paper, 1997b. *Benefit reform Progress Report*, 16 September.

Ministry of Women's Affairs Paper, 1997c. *Benefit Reform: DPB Review and Sickness and Invalids Benefits Review*, 17 October.

Ministry of Women's Affairs Paper, 1997d. *Benefit Reform: DPB Review*, 17 October.

Ministry of Women's Affairs Paper, 1997e. *Out-of-school-care and recreation (OSCAR)*, 3 November.

Ministry of Women's Affairs Paper, 1997f. *Benefit Reform Review: Papers for Meeting of G5 Ministers*, Tuesday 25 November 1997, 24 November.

Ministry of Women's Affairs Paper, 1998a. *Annex 2: Education and Training Programmes for Young Single Parents [from G5 Ministers paper: Facilitative Measures]*, 20 February.

Ministry of Women's Affairs Paper, 1998b. *MWA Paper A: DPB Review*, 23 February.

National Advisory Council on the Employment of Women, 1990. *Beyond the Barriers: the State, the Economy and Women's Employment 1984-1990*, Wellington, Department of Labour.

National Council of Women, 1998. Submission 9 to the *Social Service (Work Test) Amendment Bill.*

New Zealand Herald, 1998. Government in retreat on work scheme, in *New Zealand Herald*, 23 July, A1.

O'Brien, M., 1997. Dependency: beliefs assumptions evidence, in M. O'Brien and C. Briar (eds), *Beyond Poverty: Conference Proceedings.* Auckland, Unemployed Rights Centre.

Parsons, T., 1955. Chapters 1-3, in T. Parsons and R. Bales, *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process.* New York, Free Press.

Pateman, C., 1988. The Patriarchal Welfare State, in A. Gutmannn (ed), *Democracy and the Welfare State.* Princeton University Press, 231-260.

Prebble, R., 1999. *I've been Writing.* Wellington, Fraser Holland Publishers.

Reid, N., 1998. 'Working for dole will remove jobs'. *New Zealand Herald*, April 24:A13.

Seccombe, W., 1974. 'The housewife and her labour under capitalism', in *New Left Review* 83:3-24.

Seccombe, W., 1975. 'Domestic labour: reply to critics', in *New Left Review* 94:85-96.

Smith, P., 1978. 'Domestic labour and Marx's theory of value', in A. Kuhn and A. Wolpe (eds), *Feminism and Materialism: women and modes of production.* London, Routledge.

Social Policy Agency, 1997. *A profile of Sole Parents, Women Alone and Carers in receipt of Social Welfare Benefits.* Wellington.

Statistics New Zealand, 1999. *New Zealand Now: Women.* Wellington, Statistics New Zealand/Ministry of Women's Affairs.

Statistics New Zealand, 1998. *New Zealand Income Survey, June 1998 Quarter Statistics.* Wellington, Statistics New Zealand.

Statistics New Zealand, 1996. *New Zealand Official Yearbook.* Wellington, Statistics New Zealand.

Statistics New Zealand, 1993. *All about women in New Zealand.* Wellington, Statistics New Zealand.

Sunday Star Times, 1998. 'Beneficiaries paid $21 as teacher aides'. *Sunday Star Times,* 8 November.

Walby, S., 1989. 'Flexibility and the changing sexual division of labour', in S. Wood (ed) *The Transformation of Work?* London, Unwin Hyman.

Young, A., 1998. Fletcher unhappy at swing to the right, in *New Zealand Herald,* 10 June, A5.

YWCA., 1998. Submission 49 to the *Social Service (Work Test) Amendment Bill.*

Social Effects of the New Zealand Neo-Liberal Experiment: Change Over Time of the Subjective Financial Situations of Households

Charles Crothers
University of Natal

Abstract

Survey data from the several waves of the New Zealand Election Survey are used to measure the changing distribution from 1987 through to 1996 of households in terms of their subjective financial situation. It is found that the difficulties of 1990 have been partly overcome, although most households report no change rather than an improvement. The second concern was to examine for each time-slice what the social correlates of subjective household financial situation were. The expected class gradient in which the rich report being better off while the poorer report being worse off was found, but the survey data allows a more nuanced picture to be drawn in which other related social conditions (such as household composition, housing situation) have additional effects.

Introduction

New Zealand's institutional structures have largely been redesigned over the last decade-and-a-half, under the general aegis of a Government-led neo-liberal reform program. The economy, public service, and welfare system have all been overhauled and moulded into the same institutional architecture, it terms of values, vocabularies, and velocities of change. Some of these changes have been physically etched in New Zealand townscapes: whereas previously 'The state itself was clearly

represented in the landscape of every community, small or large, in the shape of such facilities as post offices, banks, housing and hospitals' (Le Heron and Pawson, 1996:22) the visual impact of townscapes is now dominated by the glittering glass towers of financial capital (to invoke the poignant image in Jesson, 1987), the spread of wine-bars and coffee-bars, and the lines of the quietly desperate filing in to soup kitchens and food-banks. It presumably, too, has been etched in the souls of New Zealanders: no longer cosseted within the cloying levelling-down of the cradle-to-grave welfare state and a walled-in protective economy, but now keen-eyed for the individualistic main chance and vigorously accumulating their own personal portfolio of assets to tide them over difficult times and into old age.

Along with such changes, so has New Zealand's international reputation changed. 'New Zealand used to claim credit as the first country to give women the vote, as the birthplace of the welfare state, for a harmonious multi-racial society and, more recently, for being "clean, green and nuclear free"' (Kelsey, 1995:1). Now, we are seen as an excellent experimental-site for the early trial implementation of what seems to be the most extreme developments of neo-liberal ideas.

Indeed, the fame of the current New Zealand experiment is widespread. This is documented by Kelsey (1995:5-9). The New Zealand story that is told is very much one of the successes achieved and the down-side is filtered out, except amongst the minority 'critical press' which high-lights the casualty-lists. A further study of accounts of New Zealand in the British press between 1989 and 1993 (Crothers, 1995) confirmed this picture. Boston et al (1996:3) document some of the mechanisms through which the 'good news' of the New Zealand model is marketed:

- sending to New Zealand of senior officials ('..in some cases sizeable delegations');
- commissioning of detailed reports on New Zealand reforms; and

- invitations to senior New Zealand public servants and academics to international conferences, scholarly journals and as experts for legislative inquiries.

In addition, some senior politicians have set up consultancies to gain personally and organisationally from spreading the message further afield.

But not only are the stories one-sided, they are hardly data-based! One feature shared by each of New Zealand's so-called experiments over the last century is that each has been a 'leap of faith' – partly theoretical, partly ideological, partly pragmatic. At no point has adequate provision been made for the adequate evaluation of the experiments. Procedures such as out-sourcing and privatisation usually reduce the availability of public information and can sweep knowledge of social difficulties under the cover of 'commercial sensitivity'. The description and commentary on the contemporary New Zealand experiment is rife with comments about the difficulties in obtaining appropriate information. 'Attempts to evaluate the success of the New Zealand model to date have been hampered by a dearth of empirical data and evidence' (Boston et al, 1996:353 passim). And here they are concerned with fairly standard institutional book-keeping information! This is not entirely accidental, as a partial consequence of the reforms has been some roll-back the provision of adequate social (and to a lesser extent economic) information.

Moreover, the narratives of reform are often upbeat 'Whiggish'. Boston et al go on to say that '..on the whole such reports have relied heavily on the opinions of senior managers and key players in the reform process' (354). At best the muffled voices of middle management are heard occasionally, and the voices of the public are usually utterly stilled.

Yet, on the other hand, fresh sources of information have been generated. Boston et al (1996:354) point out in an aside that '..many service-orientated agencies now undertake regular client satisfaction surveys', a duty – it could be added – which extends

to local authorities. In addition, the morale of employees is now often canvassed. However, although its findings should be recruited into sociological discourses, this neo-liberal management-directed 'client-sociology' seldom provides other than quite routine measures of the effectiveness of programmes and is hardly an adequate basis for understanding the social impacts of the neo-liberal program as a whole. In sum, the type of questions asked about the New Zealand experiment, the type of information mobilised in its study, and the mechanisms through which this information is diffused all conspire to tell a very limited story. On the other hand, some of the counter-literature might be seen as too shrill, too prone to invoking conspiracy theories, and also insufficiently data-based.

This paper is concerned to add to a more balanced and factually-based assessment. I do so in two steps. One is a brief overview of the literature concerning the 'New Zealand Experiment'. The second is to provide an analysis of the winners and losers of this reform process over the last 15 years. This paper is part of a broader theoretical and research program investigating the effects of neo-liberalism in New Zealand and abroad.

Key Features of the Neo-Liberal Programme and its Periodisation

There are many descriptive accounts of the development of the 'New New Zealand' (see for overviews: Bollard and Buckle (1987); Boston et al (1991); Boston and Dalziel (1992); Boston et al (1996, 1999); Britton, Le Heron and Pawson (1992); Deeks and Perry (eds)(1992); Easton (1997, 1999); Holland and Boston (1990); James (1992); Jesson (1987, 1989); Kelsey (1993, 1995); Le Heron and Parson (1996); Roper and Rudd (1993); Rudd and Roper (1997); Sharp (1994) – useful chronologies are provided in the appendices to Duncan and Bollard, 1992:183-187 and Boston et al 1996:367-370, and for unpacking the several theoretical

foundations see especially Boston et al. (1996:chapter 2). Yet others endeavour to provide explanatory accounts of how the new institutional arrangements came to be (e.g. Easton 1989, 1999); James (1992); Walker (1989). Alongside these accounts should be placed those which endeavour to monitor economic, political and social change in New Zealand over this period (e.g. Dalziel and Lattimore, 1999). It is unnecessary here to review this literature, let alone endeavour to add to it, except to provide a brief sketch of the context.

The 'Neo-Liberal Experiment' is not one monolithic unitary package. Nor can it be readily covered under one term: while 'Rogernomics' was a useful label for its early stages, Douglas has not been at the centre of the political stage for a decade. Seeing it as a unified approach can come more with the benefit of hindsight and belies the lurches and leaps which made up its path as it happened. Moreover, it is important to disaggregate, since different components may well have quite different social effects. However, a clear account of its elements and stages is not easy. Le Heron and Pawson (1996:especially Chapter 7) provide both a useful description and periodisation.

> 'The initiatives themselves fall into three clear groups. The first covers public service reforms, user pays and corporatisation, concerning government departments, their trading arms and other state trading agencies. These initiatives were concentrated in the period 1986-89 with many elements that were particular to New Zealand. The second is that of privatisation, which began in 1988, reaching a peak in 1990 as part of the global trend of reassessment of the role of the state. The third concerns social spending and the adoption of corporate models of delivery in areas of social policy. Such reforms have been mainly a feature of the 1990s' (214). These phases may be linked. Le Heron and Pawson, for example, suggest that the third phase is, in part at least, a consequence

> of the first two: 'the bulk of such changes [social policy] have occurred in the 1990s after the failure of the first two groups of initiatives to deliver sufficient pay-off to alleviate the fiscal crisis of the state' (245).

However, there is also a certain neo-liberal logic to the extension into the third phase by a National government, after the fourth Labour Government had endeavoured to soft-pedal this arena of reform. To this would now need to be added the period of electoral and parliamentary reform ushered in by the experiment of Proportional Representation (PR), and of quite recent developments in extending the long march of neo-liberal institutional transformation, including further privatizations. However, the ideological fervour for reform has more latterly been mediated by pragmatic considerations. Reform seems now to march hand-in-hand with attempts at counter-reform as the concern to implement PR can be seen as a mobilisation to curb the power of the neo-liberal reform machine.

The point that the reforms moved in spurts, each with a different focus, needs to be considered carefully as there is an implication that the social effects which this paper attempts to establish might also vary according to whichever institutional reforms took place in each period. However, the main thrust of this paper is to identify the cumulative social effects, and it is doubtful if the measurements of suffering, and of opportunity, which are available are sufficiently precise to identify specific period-effects, relating to specific phases.

Since neo-liberal reforms also took place in many other countries, there is a disparate literature attending to the social effects of these (notably Castles et al., 1996, for a cross-Tasman comparison, see also Saunders and Harris, 1994). A useful point raised in this literature is that, at least for Australasia, as opposed to the UK and the US, social reforms involving ethnic relations, women's rights, sexual orientation and especially the environment formed another agenda alongside (albeit interacting with) that of economic reform.

Whereas accounts of New Zealand institutional change, especially in government or the economy, are voluminous (e.g.: Bollard and Buckle (1987); Boston et al (1991, 1996, 1999); Dalziel and Lattimore (1996); Duncan and Bollard (1992); Easton (1997, 1999); Hazeldine (1998); Roper and Rudd (1993); Russ and Roper (1997); Spicer et al (1992, 1996), there is very little consideration in this literature of the social impacts of these changes. This social insensitivity in much of the literature could be documented at greater length.

Not only do many accounts of change hardly even touch on the more human side, but those authors who do show some sensitivity fail to actively recruit sociological work to fill in this gap. Perusal, for example, of works by Kelsey (1993, 1995) or Hazeldine (1998), who are both very much concerned to show up social effects, shows that there is little formally sociological literature which is drawn on. Insofar as social material is drawn on it is almost entirely that provided by social economists such as Easton, Saunders, Stephens or St John. To some extent this is through limited scholarship, and perhaps inadequate digging up of 'grey literature'. (Examples of pertinent sociological grey literature include Collins (1994); Crothers (1993, 1994, 1997); Dann and du Plessis (1992), Sceats et al, (1999) and West Auckland Women's Center (1994)). A fairly solid literature has now grown up on the steady rise of inequality, social exclusion and poverty in New Zealand (e.g. Ponder and Chatterjee, 1998; Stephens, 1994; Waldegrave et al, 1997), however, this is not always seen in terms of its linkage to neo-liberal reforms. However, it does also seem to be largely true that New Zealand sociologists have not adequately addressed the social effects of the neo-liberal reforms of the last decade-and-a-half. This paper intends to build on the slender number of pertinent New Zealand sociological studies that are already available.

The impact of the neo-liberal program is not exhausted by its more obvious effects on the economy, the polity, social arrangements, and perhaps ideological and cultural emphases. As

well, there are clearly some major transformations in the very way in which New Zealand society constitutes itself. A major impact has been on the ways in which New Zealanders think of themselves and their society. Study of the effects of the neo-liberal program should not be confined to a sociology of its victims, even though this is my present task. (For discussions of the powerful see Murray et al, 1995: and Vowles in Rudd and Roper, 1997.)

Social Effects

Studies of social impacts seem bifurcated between broad treatments and narrowly focused technical studies. I will review a couple of the broader treatments and then summarise some of the technical work on income matters. Although much of the more sociologically-pertinent literature contributes to institutional description and explanatory accounts of the rise and perpetuation of neo-liberalism I will not use these passages here.

Kelsey (1995) divides up her account of the impact of Rogernomics into economic, social, democratic and cultural 'deficits'. Although my concern here is largely the second of her categories, issues she discusses under her other categories will clearly affect strictly social deficits. Under economic deficits she examines the key indicators of 'economic growth, inflation, public debt, balance of payments, income distribution and unemployment' (243). Under political deficits she largely provides an account of the heavy-handed way in which economic reforms have been driven through. One consequence of the neo-liberal programme which needs to be brought into the overall tale is that of 'organisational deviance' within the business community (e.g. as reported in accounts such as Molloy, 1998 and Wishart, 1995 and 1997). Under the heading of cultural deficits, Kelsey comments on the broader attitudinal climate, which has come into being. Other treatments extend several of

these broader concerns (e.g. Butterworth and Tarling (1994) on New Zealand universities.)

Kelsey's summary social judgement is harsh. 'The result of a decade of radical structural adjustment was a deeply divided society. The traditionally marginalised had been joined by growing numbers of newly poor. The social structure was severely stressed. Hundreds of thousands of individuals, their families and communities had endured a decade of unrelenting hardship. The burden fell most heavily on those who already had least. This was neither coincidence nor bad luck. It was the calculated outcome of a theory which many New Zealanders viewed as morally and ethically bankrupt' (1995: 271).

Kelsey posits a 'social class effect', suggesting that the rich were getting richer, the middle class facing increasing costs, but with the poor taking aboard the main burden. 'Real wages and conditions for lower income earners were forced down throughout the recession and locked in by the [Employment Contract Act], despite the return to economic growth. Benefits were constantly being cut to maintain relativity to paid work, to provide "incentives" for reduced dependency and to lower the fiscal deficit' (273).

She also attempts to identify more specific losers. '(I)t was the purported beneficiaries of this new streamlined system of targeted state support – Maori, the poor, the sick, women and the unemployed – who bore the brunt of the changes. Faced with a daunting combination of unemployment, benefit cuts, enforced dependence and user part-charges, their freedom of choice was whether to use their scarce resources to buy housing, health, education or other essentials like food – and which of these essentials to go without' (273). Some pages on she is more focused: 'Maori were the most marginal of the marginalised' (283). A few pages further on we find the view that 'The ultimate indictment of the structural adjustment programme was in its effect on New Zealand's youth' (289).

O'Brien and Wilkes (1993) endeavour to theorise the transformation in terms of a crisis of 'dependent-agricultural Fordism', which was incompletely resolved by a transition to 'Labour Post-fordist Monetarism'. They particularly examine the handling of poverty and unemployment. In some useful tables (see pp.92-95) garnered from 1990 Department of Statistics reports, they show how the bottom quintile has gained less in changed average gross income between 1980 and 1990, than the top (5th) quintile, and that it has actually lost in terms of real disposable income. On top of this, the bottom quintile has faced an increased tax burden (whereas that of the top quintile has somewhat commensurably decreased), and that although it faces substantially less direct tax (as a percentage of income) than the top quintile, its indirect tax burden (again as a proportion) is exactly double: and rather than being 'progressive', the overall tax burden is relatively evenly shared amongst the three quintiles included in the tables. O'Brien and Wilkes also present Statistics Department statistics to show that amongst the lowest quintile there are proportionately more of 'the retired, single parents, those receiving social security payments, and the elderly' (96). Their table also shows a high preponderance, in this group, of single people, childless couples, renters, Maori, and those on household duties. This account has now been updated in several studies, but the particularly evocative way it makes its statement deserves preservation here.

These studies of income distribution change seem to produce somewhat complex results (Brosnan and Rea (1992); Easton (1993); Martin (1997); Saunders (1994); and Waldegrave at al (1997)). Clearly, there has been an expanding spread of incomes and the rich have become richer while the poor have become absolutely and relatively more poor. However, the effects should not perhaps be exaggerated, and it is possible for the decade of the 1980s at least that the proportion in poverty only increased marginally. However, one effect of the 1991 benefits cuts was to immediately increase the proportion in

poverty (from some 12% of households to 16%). It is not clear, however, what these 'hard data' studies tell us about the social conditions behind the various financial situations.

Le Heron and Pawson (1996) draw a wider canvass than one concerned only in pining down the effects of the neo-liberal program, and their work is particularly valuable for providing case studies in the areas of '..health, housing, education and income support' (211). An important point reiterated through their volume is that the effects of restructuring are spatially variable: for example 'Towns like Carterton with a high proportion of small manufacturing industries were sharply affected in the late 1980s.. as were those dependent on employment in state production activities, such as Reefton and Kaikoura' (379). On one issue they provide particularly pertinent information: 'There has been no comprehensive survey on the users of foodbanks, but information collected by small-scale studies shows that some groups are over represented. These include female sole parents, large families, single adults, Maori and Pacific Island peoples and peoples on benefits' (244).

'Economic Voting' and the NZES

The last preliminary step in moving towards the presentation of my own evidence is to review the way in which issues of the neo-liberal programme and effects on household financial situation have been handled within the successive New Zealand Election Study (NZES) volumes: Vowles and Aimer (1993); Vowles et al (1996); and Vowles, et al (1998). Amongst the large volume of variables deployed by NZES the group of variables concerned with 'economic voting' is particularly salient to the topic of this article. This 'block' endeavours to examine the extent to which voters see past, contemporary and future economic performance as relevant to their political views and their voting decisions. The broad argument of the 'economic voting' approach is that voters will reward governments they see as having or are likely to

provide better economic conditions for their household and the country as a whole, and will punish those which do not perform successfully. (Of course, other factors shaping voting may be involved besides economic voting!).

The studies reported in the three NZES volumes show definite over-time correlations between views on the economy and voting support. They also show that, in each of the four cross-sectional studies, only some of the full set of 8 measures links with voting (see Vowles et al, 1996: 71,96). My interest in the 'economic voting' variables is, rather, the reverse, which is to cast them as dependent variables in order to link them to their social correlates. What are the social characteristics of the winners and who are the losers?

Design and Methodology

This paper draws on the extremely valuable data-source of the NZES, which has conducted surveys associated with the 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996 elections (and now the 1999 elections). For the 1990 and 1993 elections the methodology was similar: surveys of approximately n=2000 collected by mail questionnaires together with a telephone top-up. In 1987 a smaller sample (n=1000) was used, confined to telephone interviewing in urban and 'close-rural' areas only. In 1996, the main sample was similar to that of the previous two surveys, but there are several additional sub-samples (including a specific Maori over-sampling) which swells the sample size to n=5000. Sample response-rates are of the order of 70%. More details on the methodology are available from the appendices in each of the volumes. (For some further comparisons and investigations see Crothers, 1998.)

The neo-liberal reforms are certainly not the only influence that has borne on New Zealand society over the last decade and a half. So, there are some difficulties in sorting out causal linkages. For a start, the neo-liberal reforms were

themselves clearly embedded within a global economic context. In addition, globalisation has undoubtedly had a wider range of affects in social and political arenas: for example in the rise of post-materialism (see Inglehart, 1990; and for its NZ application Vowles and Aimer 1993:138-145; Vowles et al 1995:71-78). Environmentalism, indigenous people's rights, sexual concerns and other matters have all had their effect. Behind the scenes, too, there may well have been important demographic patterns operating, such as generational-effects (see Thomson, 1991: and in its particular political manifestations James, 1992). Alongside the changes effected by the neo-liberal programme, and partly reinforced or dampened down by it there has been social structural change, which also needs to be more thoroughly studied. How can the impact of the neo-liberal program on households be separated out from these other influences? In this study, its narrow focus on the correlates of changing financial situation reduces the range of variation in causes that are considered, although measures of internal household changes would have been a valuable addition. But perhaps, it is only through international comparative studies that major progress will be made in tracking down causal mechanisms.

Since households are usually units involving income- and resource-sharing, it is important that as far as possible social effects should be considered on a joint household basis, while still being sensitive to within-household differences. However, there are some difficulties in placing the dominant individual voter orientation of the NZES into a household framework. (This is a general problem with voting surveys and has led to fierce debate, especially in the UK: see Vowles and Aimer 1996 for attempts to overcome gender and headship bias in NZES). Fortunately, several questions were asked about households, and in other cases it is considered that given high intra-household correlations, those characteristics held by the respondent are likely to be shared across the others in the household. But a more pragmatic recommendation for data analysis can be reached:

since the use as explanatory variables of characteristics of individuals within households or of the characteristics of the households themselves yields much the same results.

As opposed to the more straightforward income dispersion studies (noted above), this paper is based on a relative measure, which picks up on changing household situations. The argument is that major social effects are likely to accompany changes in subjectively perceived financial situation, rather than necessarily being directly 'read-off' from a household's objective financial situation. To some extent household stress may be linked to subjective as well as, and perhaps more than objective financial situation. Subjective household financial situation may pick up the more diffuse and subtle effects of difficulties. This argument is not empirically tested here, although the data do throw some light on this issue. This perspective may pick up some important social dimensions of household functioning, although it does not do away with the need for continuing study into household income distributions. This study flanks and extends the work cited above on income distributions.

Another contribution of this paper is to carry out multivariate analyses, as opposed to the dominant single-variable studies that have been available to date. These are required to help sort out several issues:

- the extent to which 'presenting symptoms' (as it were) are really the crucial variables;
- the extent to which each of several alternative mechanisms seem to be at work; and
- whether certain groups seem to suffer multiple difficulties.

A particular approach to presenting analysis of variance data is used entitled multiple classification analysis (MCA): this has advantages of producing user-friendly presentations of the data coupled with quite rigorous analysis of the extent of causal effects and their level of statistical significance. Briefly, the betas provide a measure of the strength of the presumed causal link between a predictor and a dependent variable (controlling for the

other variables in the equation). The results themselves are presented in terms of 'deviation units', which can be quickly represented as percentages. (For details see appendix). Although the dependent variable deployed here is a 5-point Lickert scale, which might be considered ordinal rather than nominal, I will assume (as is conventional amongst many applied statisticians) that analysing it as if it were nominal is appropriate.

Although data from all four surveys is presented, the analyses are merely set side-by-side: with each year being considered separately. This contrasts with the more rigorous over-time modelling suggested in methods texts (e.g. Dale and Davies, 1994). Although the similarities in methodology across the four surveys encourage some faith in between-survey comparability, there are clearly several problematic methodological issues (e.g. non-response/weighting) which may undermine precise trust in the data (see Crothers, 1998).

This paper focuses on one variable: the change in financial situation of households over the previous 12 months, as subjectively assessed. There are several advantages of the NZES data which are not drawn on here: in particular the longitudinal segment of the 1990-1996 surveys is not used in this paper, although it is potentially of particular value for tracing through over-time changes in household financial circumstances and its correlates. Hopefully, some of the further possibilities in this rich data-set can be exploited in other studies.

There are at least two directions in which data-analysis can be proceed. One is to investigate the changing national circumstances, which might explain the changing distribution of responses on this variable. A difficulty in this approach is to control for the effects of other changes in the internal and external economic, political and social environments which are not in any way propelled by the neo-liberal reform programme.

A second approach, which is adopted here, is to endeavour to trace through its possibly changing social distributions over time. The standard social categories are

deployed in order to capture the changing social effects. Thus, in the main tables of this study a set of ten predictor variables is used to provide a common framework. These are:

- highest educational qualification;
- marital status;
- work status;
- type of community;
- gender;
- age-group;
- ethnic identification;
- housing status;
- household size; and
- household income.

This set of predictor variables seemed to capture much of the fuller potential range of social characteristics likely to be associated with changing household financial situations. Several are of course inter-related: e.g. age and education or work status and ethnic identification, but the MCAs will help to sort out their joint effects.

This set of variables is available for the 1990-1996 surveys, and most for the 1987 survey: although housing status is not available for this first survey, and a measure of number of children had to be substituted for household size. The analysis is restricted to 'main effects', although some 'interaction' amongst the various causes seems likely. Once understanding of variations based on this general set is established other interesting variables could be introduced in further analyses.

This paper is a preliminary cut at the wide issue raised in this paper. Its focus concentrates on a few of the immediate effects of the neo-liberal programme, whereas there are undoubtedly many longer-term and perhaps more subtle social effects which still need to be unearthed. So much more work on the topic attempted here is still needed.

Results

Table 1 presents the proportions responding to the categories of the 'household financial situation' questions over the period of the NZES. Between 1990 and 1996 the proportion of households reporting a gain over the previous year doubled from 13% to 24%, whereas those reporting being worse off almost halved (from 58% down to 30%). For 1993 and 1996 financial circumstances seemed more stable as some 40% reported no change in their household financial situations. 1990 was experienced as the worse period, with reports of household financial circumstances steadily improving since then. To some extent this could be the effect of rapid shocks as the incoming National administration somewhat unexpectedly continued, and indeed deepened, the neo-liberal reform process, but then eased off in subsequent years. It may also be, of course, a more psychological phenomena, as reform-weary households become habituated to continuing reform.

Table 1: 'Financial Situation of Household' (1987-1996): Percentages. Don't knows not reported

Variable/Year	1996	1993	1990	1987
Past Household				
Lot Better	5.8	6.0	4	8.3
Little Better	18.1	15.3	9	22.5
Same	40.7	36.5	25	28.8
Little Worse	10.4	14.8	25	26.9
Lot Worse	20.0	22.0	33	10.6

Correlates of increased difficulties or gains for households include many of the ten variables used in the equations reported in tables 2 and 3. Only a moderate amount of variation in the dependent variable is statistically explained by these equations: about 15%. In general, education, work status, household income and age-group seem to be the most powerful predictors, although almost all the other predictors make some

appearance: with the partial exception of gender. The absence of strong gender effects is not surprising when it is remembered that this is a household-based study. For many of these variables the 'raw' effect is rather higher than its 'controlled' effect: for example, in the 1996 data education, marital status, work status, type of community, housing status and household size (also gender) have their causal effect at least halved once controlled, although the causal effects of household size and household income category remain relatively stable. These reductions are because of the overlapping impact of 'common variation' shared amongst groups of variables.

Table 2: MCA betas predicting Changed Household Financial Situation (note: betas indicate causal impact controlled for the other predictors in the equation).

Year	1996	1993	1990	1987
Mean	3.14	3.09	3.67	3.10
Highest Educational Qualification	.12 **	.11	.07	.08
Household Income	.20 **	.20 **	.08	.20
Work Status	.18 **	.16 *	.16 **	.09
Marital Status	.04	.07	.05	.04
Community Size	.06 *	.08 *	.07 +	.10
Gender of Respondent	.02	.02	.02	.03
Age	.18 **	.15	.06	.16
Ethnic Identity	.06*	.05	.05	.05
Housing Status	.07 *	.14	.11 *	na
Household Size	.05	.10	.16 *	.10
Multiple R	.411	.439	.321	.322
Multiple R2	.169	.193	.103	.104

Note:

+	significant at under the .10 level
*	significant at under the .05 level
**	significant at under the .01 level

Looking in more detail at the correlates of the household financial condition variable, the following patterns seem to hold across each year that was surveyed:

- education: there is a definite 'class' pattern with the poorly educated being losers while university graduates are winners, although in 1990 the poorly educated are about average, and those with secondary school qualifications do seem to be in much better shape than their position on this educational hierarchy might suggest;
- Household income: a strong 'class' gradient appears, with few anomalies: the rich report less change for the worse than the poor;
- work status: whereas those remaining in the full-time workforce did better over all 3 surveys, the unemployed, disabled and unpaid family help respondents did particularly badly;
- marital status: although non-married respondents clearly did worse in 1993, in 1987 they seemed to do better than married, as did the widowed in 1996;
- community of residence: residents of one or other of the major cities did better across all 3 surveys, with rural dwellers facing more difficulties (except in 1993);
- gender: males did better (especially in 1993, and except for 1987!);
- age-group: In 1996 there is a clear pattern of younger - and also the most elderly - age-groups doing better, whereas the 45 to 65 age-groups suffered more;
- ethnicity: Europeans did better, and in 1993 'other' (but of course hovered around the average), whereas Pacific Islanders and Asians reported heavy suffering, with some Maori concern (except in 1987);
- housing situation: renters and those living with parents reported decreased hardship: mortgage-holders reported less hardship (except, in 1993, for those holding mortgages with the Housing Corporation) – Boarders and Housing Corporation (HC) tenants reported greatest affliction;

- Household size: smaller households (2 or 3 members) did better than single-person households or those which are larger; (see Table 3).

Table 3: MCA deviation units predicting Changed Household Financial Situation
(Uncontrolled and controlled for 1996, 1993, 1990 and 1987).

Variable/ Category	Uncon	Con	Uncon	Con	Uncon	Con	Uncon	Con
Year	**1996**	**1996**	**1993**	**1993**	**1990**	**1990**	**1987**	**1987**
Educational Qualification								
None	-1.02	-64	-22	-08	-15	-04	-08	+04
Primary Complete	-36	-11						
Secondary, No UE	-13	-04	-18	-10	-02	+01	-02	+03
Secondary, Complete	+24	+13	+25	+18	+11	+07	08	-16
Other Tertiary	-06	-08	+10	+01	-08	-10	+04	00
University Incomplete	+04	-05	-11	-05				
Degree	+43	+23	+26	+06	+32	+16	+27	+12
HH Income								
1 Low	-34	-21	46	-25	-30	-18	-08	-06
2	-33	-18	21	-10	-24	-14	-30	-31
3	-14	-17	19	-16	-30	-22	-10	-09
4	-09	-12	06	-06	-06	-02	-04	-05
5	+11	+03	+15	+07	+02	00	-03	00
6	+25	+21	+17	+09	+18	+10	+33	+33
7	+42	+36	+44	+31	+48	+37	+36	+33
8 High				-38	-26		+65	+59
Work Status								
Full-time	+24	+17	+15	+01	+21	+13	+14	+08
Part-time, over 15 hours	-05	-05	+07	+12	-13	-10	-15	-16
Part-time, under 15 hours	-08	-10						
Unemployed	-46	-33	-75	-36	+19	+13	-13	-04
Retired	-29	-12	-23	-12	-17	+04	-29	-13
Temporarily Disabled	-85	-68						
Permanently Disabled	-76	-48						

School	-07	-22	-24	-25			+16	+11
Help Family Unpaid	-52	-48						
Other Unpaid	-44	-45	-12	+01			+11	+15
House Duties	-05	-14	-08	+18			-13	-10
Marital Status								
Married	+04	-00	+06	+03	-01	00	-02	-03
Widowed	-20	+09	-21	-11	+11	-06	-17	+08
Divorced/ Separated	+13	00	+10	+05	+12	+02		
Single								
Community-type								
'Big City'	+12	+05	+09	+01	-01	-09	+06	+04
'City'	-10	-07	-14	-11	+21	+14	+14	+10
Town	-05	+04	-08	00	-07	-03	00/17	+06/1
Rural	-15	-10	+06	+16	-07	00	-31	-28
Sex								
Male	+04	+02	+09	+10	+03	-02	+01	-04
Female	-04	-01	-09	-10	-03	+02	-01	+04
Age Group								
15-24	+26	+37	-23	-04	+03	-08	-22	-29
25-34	+32	+27	-09	+06	+13	+10	+23	+19
35-44	+11	+03	-09	-14	+02	-01	+02	-01
45-54	-06	-17	+09	-02	-02	-06	+15	+08
55-64	-19	-16	+08	00	-07	+01	-27	-36
65-74	-33	-15			-24	-08	-21	00
75, over	-13	+07	-03	+18	-06	+04	-12	+11
Ethnicity								
European/Pakeha	+01	+02	+06	+03	00	-01	-01	-01
Maori	-17	-14	-90	-59	+09	+24	+21	+18
Pacific	-23	-33	-48	-08	-05	+13	+01	-05
'Asian'	-12	-32			-01	-07		
New Zealander	-05	-10	-06	-06				
Other	-09	-10	+39	+37	-09	-07	-09	-17
Housing Situation								
Own Freehold	-10	-04	-10	-05	-13	-10		
Mortgage	+09	-06	+23	+13	+19	+10		
Rent	+12	+05	-09	-07	-25	-18		
Rent HC	-38	-15	-90	-07	+04	+06		
Board	-26	-21	-20	-04	-13	+05		
Rent Coop	+16	-07	-31	-17	+18	+23		
Live with Parents	+23	+20	-21	-17				
HH Size								
1	-14	-04	-04	+36	-09	00	-03	00
2	-03	+01	-02	00	+02	+05	+14	+10

3	-01	-01	-05	-03	+05	+06	+05	+01
4	+12	+07	+11	00	+04	-02	+07	+01
5	+18	-03	-00	-12	-04	-10	-50	-61
6	-01	-05	+11	+06	-31	-30		
7, 7+	-03	-04	-42	-26	-16	-18		

In sum, the expected class gradient in which the rich report being better off while the poorer report being worse off was found, but the survey data allows a more nuanced picture to be drawn in which other related social conditions (such as household composition, housing situation) have additional effects.

The existing literature on income distribution trends has already established that there has been a marked increase in income inequality. This study reinforces this picture by showing that this class-based pattern extends to the rather more diffuse area of subjectively experienced financial situation. Both education and income level are strong predictors in each year of the survey, and these class-related factors are reinforced further by work-status. Those in full-time work, those with higher incomes and those with higher education have experienced better financial prospects at each point. Of these three predictors, education tends to be least important, which throws some damp water on the thesis which has attracted widespread support, that in a post-industrial society it is educational capital which is the most important resource to have. This strong class-related interpretation also tends to side-swipe accounts which emphasise other factors as the most important.

Indeed, the effects of other than class-related variables are far less significant, and far more variable over time. There are tendencies for marital status groups other than singles, rural dwellers, the middle age-ranges, Maori (since the mid-1990s) and most recently Pacific islanders, freeholders and HC tenants, and those from either small or large households, in particular to report suffering. These effects are in addition to the class-related effects.

This roll-call of misery includes some of the groupings identified in the accounts summarised above, but not all. The inclusion of rural dwellers and freeholders is surprising. This analysis also points to the multiplicative nature of downward financial mobility: each of these 'further' characteristics can add misery to that imposed by the class-related main axis of social exclusion. Although the detailed patterns change from year to year, the overall effect of this grouping of variables is relatively stable. Broadly speaking, these 'further factors' are similar in their impact to any one of the three main class-related variables. The social impact of the neo-liberal reform programme is clearly multi-dimensional. The evidence from this study confirms and solidifies the rather more speculative and fragmentary accounts of Rogernomics's social effects which were recounted above.

Conclusions

In the early 1980s the New Zealand economy was clearly sick, and the prescription of the neo-liberal economic doctors was a dose of 'economic rationality' (cf. Pusey, 1992). Whether or not its health has been restored is debatable, and depends on when an evaluation is carried out, and what aspects are emphasised in the diagnosis (see Dalziel and Lattimore, 1999, for one interpretation).

But if the economy has in some ways been healed, have the patients themselves survived? There have been wide ranges of individual and household experiences arising from the neo-liberal program. There has undoubtedly been a class-splay, with many of the rich becoming richer while many of the poorer have become poorer. And we can specify some of the particular groups of people who have particularly been at risk. The actual content of those influences is more difficult to pin down. Beyond financial stress, what other social effects there have been across the board is more difficult to assess.

Indeed, to social scientists concerned with monitoring macro trends, what is appalling is the lack of high-quality information, let alone convincing theories about what has been happening. This paper has attempted to clear some ground so at least some of the more subtle social effects of the neo-liberal program can be made more clear. But much more sociological analysis of how New Zealand society has changed over the last decades is urgently needed.

Appendix

Methodological Note on Multiple Classification Analyses

In order to succinctly present the available evidence, 'multiple classification analyses' (MCAs) are used. The MCA is a variant way of presenting the results of a multiple analysis of variance, in which the dependent variable is assumed to be at an interval level-of-measurement while the independent variables are either ordinal or nominal. This approach combines the advantages of quite sophisticated multivariate analyses with providing information which lay readers can readily understand information is presented both for the immediate ('raw' or 'direct') effect of each of the independent variables on the dependent measure and for the effect of each independent variable controlled for each of the others in the equation. This allows the extent to which the apparent effect of a variable is 'shadowed' by another predictor variable to be assessed. It is also possible to cumulate what the full explanatory power of the set of predictor variables is, through the R2 measure.

The output for each equation comprises:

- an analysis of variance table which reports tests of the statistical significance of each predictor variable and for the equation as a whole (the usual rule is to interpret only those below 0.05 as being significant, although in this exploratory study I am drawing attention to those under 0.10);
- a grand mean (this is the average 'score' of the sample on the dependent variable);
- number of cases missing;
- unadjusted deviation units (i.e. normed against) for each category of each predictor variable; which provides an estimate of the extent to which the scores from respondents in that category vary from the overall score (the original score can be recalculated by adding or subtracting the deviation score from the grand mean);

- the deviations are prefaced by a positive or negative sign: the former indicates that the category concerned considers themselves better off while the negative indicates worse off;
- adjusted deviation units (where the effects of the other predictor variable are statistically controlled);
- etas and betas, which are analogues to controlled and uncontrolled regression coefficients, provide estimates of the conjoint causal effect of each predictor variable (in both unadjusted and controlled versions);
- a multiple correlation coefficient which provides a sum of the joint effects on the dependent variable;
- the square of the multiple correlation coefficient which indicates the 'proportion of variance explained' by the set of independent variables.

In interpreting results it is particularly important to see the relative sizes of the betas to get a feel for the overall way in which the results are panning out, but also to see to what extent there is a change within the pairs of etas and betas (often betas decline relative to their eta since the immediate effect of a predictor variable may in fact be better attributed to other variables). It is not possible to develop perfect multivariate equations which satisfy both theoretical and methodological considerations. This set of equations is both descriptive as well as analytical. The results allow alternative interpretations of each equation to be made and also for the interpretations of different measures to be compared.

Acknowledgements

The data for the study were obtained from the NZES. Data-sets for 1990 and 1993 were obtained from Prof. Vowles and for 1996 from the Australian National Data Archive. In addition to thanking these institutions I would like to extend my gratitude to those who funded these studies, especially the New Zealand Foundation for Science, Research and Technology. An earlier version of this study was presented in the Department of Social

Policy, University of Kent at Canterbury, and a later one in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Waikato, with useful comments being made at both institutions.

References

Bollard, A. and Buckle R. (eds), 1987. *Economic Liberalisation in New Zealand,* Wellington, Allen and Unwin.

Boston, J. et al (eds), 1991. *Reshaping the State: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution,* Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Boston, J. and Dalziel P. (eds), 1992. *The Decent Society? Essays in Response to National's Economic and Social Policies,* Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Boston, J. et al, 1996. *Public Sector Management: The New Zealand Model,* Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Boston, J. et al (eds), 1999. *Redesigning the Welfare State in New Zealand,* Auckland and Sydney, Oxford University Press.

Britton, S., Le Heron R. and Pawson, E. (eds), 1992. *Changing Places in New Zealand: A Geography Restructuring,* Christchurch, New Zealand Geographical Society.

Brosnan, P. and Rea D., 1992. 'Rogernomics and the Labour Market', *New Zealand Sociology* 7(2):188-221.

Butterworth, R.H. and Tarling, P.N., 1994. *A Shake-up Anyway: Government and the Universities in New Zealand,* Auckland, Auckland University Press.

Castles, F.G., Gerritsen, R. and Vowles J. (eds), 1996. *The Great Experiment: Labour Parties and Public Policy Transformation,* Sydney, Allen and Unwin.

Collins, J., 1994. 'Ordeal or Opportunity?: "Redundancy in the Middle"', *Working Paper 28,* Department of Sociology, University of Auckland.

Crothers, C., 1993. *Manukau Quality of Life Survey: Overview Report,* Manukau Healthy City, August, 70 pp.

Crothers, C., 1994. 'Housing in Manukau City: overcrowding, poor housing and their consequences', Auckland Uniservices Ltd March, 1993, 22 pp with appendices (with R. Kearns and D. Lindsey), *Working Paper 27*, Department of Sociology, University of Auckland, 22 pp.

Crothers, C., 1995. *New Zealand's Image in the British Press* MS, Department of Social Policy, University of Kent at Canterbury.

Crothers, C., 1997(1991). 'Auckland Inner City Household Standard of Living Survey, 1991' (with E. McMullan, P. Purcell, K. Sutton, and A. Woodley), *Working Paper* 32, Department of Sociology, University of Auckland 53 pp.

Crothers, C., 1998. 'A Methodological Case-study of a Survey: Description of and Investigations into the NZES' MS, Department of Sociology, University of Natal, Durban.

Crothers, C., 1999. 'The International Literature on New Zealand's Neo-Liberal Experiment' MS, Department of Sociology, University of Natal, Durban.

Dale, A. and Davies R. (eds), 1994. *Analysing Social and Political Change,* London, Sage.

Dalziel, P. and Lattimore, R., 1996. *The New Zealand Macro Economy: A Briefing on the Reforms,* Melbourne, Oxford University Press.

Dalziel, P. and Lattimore, R., 1999. *The New Zealand Macro Economy: A Briefing on the Forms,* 3rd edition, Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Dann, C. and du Plessis, R., 1992. 'After the Cuts: surviving on the Domestic Purposes Benefit', Working Paper 12, Department of Sociology, University of Canterbury.

Deeks, J. and Perry, N. (eds), 1992. *Controlling Interests: Business, The State and Society in New Zealand,* Auckland, Auckland University Press.

Duncan I. and Bollard, A., 1992. *Corporatization and Privatization: Lessons from New Zealand,* Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Easton, B. (ed), 1989. *The Making of Rogernomics,* Auckland, Auckland University Press.

Easton, B., 1993. 'Poverty in New Zealand: 1981-1993', *New Zealand Sociology* 10(2):182-213.

Easton, B., 1997. *The Commercialisation of New Zealand,* Auckland, Auckland University Press.

Easton, B., 1999. *The Whimpering of the State,* Auckland, Auckland University Press.

Hazeldine, T., 1998. *Taking New Zealand Seriously,* Auckland, Harper Collins.

Holland, P. and Boston, J. (eds), 1990. *The Fourth Labour Government: Politics and Policy in New Zealand,* 2nd edition, Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Inglehart, R., 1990. *Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society,* New Jersey, Princeton University Press

James, C., 1992. *New Territory: The Transformation of New Zealand 1984-1992,* Wellington, Bridget William Books.

Jesson, B., 1987. *Behind the Mirror Glass,* Auckland, Penguin.

Jesson, B., 1989. *Fragments of Labour,* Auckland, Penguin.

Kelsey, J., 1993. *Rolling Back the State: Privatisation of Power in Aotearoa/New Zealand,* Wellington, Bridget Williams Books.

Kelsey, J., 1995. *The New Zealand Experiment: A World Model for Structural Adjustment?,* Auckland, Auckland University Press.

Le Heron, R. and Pawson, E. (eds), 1996. *Changing Places: New Zealand in the Nineties,* Auckland, Longmont Paul.

Martin, B., 1997. 'Away from Equality: changes in Personal Incomes, 1951 to 1991' *Discussion Paper* 20, Population Studies Centre, University of Waikato.

Molly, A., 1998. *Thirty Pieces of Silver,* Auckland, Howling at the Moon productions.

Mowbray, M. and Detail, N., 1994. 'The Fall and Rise (??) of Household Incomes', *Social Policy Journal of New Zealand,* 2:114-120.

Murray, G., Berlin, J. and Alexander, M., 1995. 'The Rich Countries: Australia, New Zealand and Japan' in G. Murray (ed), Corporate Power in the Pacific Rim *Current Sociology* 43(1):11-64.

O'Brien, M. and Wilkes, C., 1993. *The Tragedy of the Market: A Social Experiment in New Zealand,* Palmerston North, Dunmore Press.

Palmer, G., 1992. *New Zealand Constitution in Crisis: Reforming Our Political System,* Dunedin, John McIndoe.

Podder, N. and Chatterjee, S., 1998. 'Sharing the National Cake in Post-Reform New Zealand: income inequality in terms of income shares', Social Policy Research Center, Massey University.

Pusey, M., 1991. *Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-building State Changes Its Mind,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Richardson, R., 1995. *Making a Difference,* Christchurch, Shoal Bay Press.

Roper, B. and Rudd, C., (eds), 1993. *State and Economy in New Zealand,* Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Rudd, C. and Roper, B., (eds), 1997. *The Political Economy of New Zealand,* Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Saunders, P., 1994. 'Rising on the Tasman Tide: income inequality in New Zealand and Australia in the 1980s' *Social Policy Journal of New Zealand* 2:97-113.

Saunders, P. and Harris, C., 1994. *Privatisation and Popular Capitalism,* Milton Keynes, Open University Press.

Sceats, J., Pool, I. and Brown, P., 1999. 'Provincial/Rural Impact Study: prepared for Zone 2 of Local Government New Zealand', Portal Consultants, Hamilton.

Sharp, A. (ed), 1994. *Leap into the Dark: The Changing Role of The State Since 1984,* Auckland University Press.

Shirley, I. et al, 1990. *Unemployment in New Zealand,* Palmerston North, Dunmore.

Siegfried J. and Hazeldine, T., 1997. 'How did the Wealthiest New Zealanders get so Rich?' *New Zealand Economic Papers.*

Spicer, B. et al, 1992. *The Power to Manage,* Auckland, Oxford University Press.

Spicer, B., Emmanuel, A. and Powell, M., (1996) 'Transforming Government Enterprises: managing radical organisation change in deregulated environments' Center for Research in Public Management, University of Auckland.

Stephens, R., 1994. 'The Incidence and Severity of Poverty in New Zealand 1990-1991' *Working Paper* 12/94 Department of Economics, Victoria University of Wellington.

Thomson, D., 1991. *Selfish Generations?: The Ageing of New Zealand's Welfare State* Wellington: Williams Books

Vowles, J. and Aimer, P., 1993. *Voter's Vengeance,* Auckland, Auckland University Press.

Vowles, J. et al, 1996. *Towards Consensus: The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to PR,* Auckland, Auckland University Press.

Vowles, J. et al, 1998. *Voter's Victory? New Zealand's First Election under PR,* Auckland, Auckland University Press.

Vowles, J. 1998. 'Results of mid-Term Survey, 1998' from web-site http://www2.waikato.ac.nz/politics/nzes/

Waldegrave, C., Frater, P. and Stephens, B., 1997. 'An overview of Research on Poverty in New Zealand', *New Zealand Sociology* 12(2):213-259.

Walker, S. (ed), 1989. *Rogernomics: reshaping New Zealand's economy,* Wellington, GP Books.

West Auckland Women's Center, 1994. 'Feeling Stretched: women and families in transition'.

Wishart, I., 1995. *The Paradise Conspiracy,* Auckland, Howling at the Moon Productions.

Wishart, I., 1997. *Lawyers, Guns and Money,* Auckland, Howling at the Moon Productions.

REVIEWS

Greg Newbold, 2000 **Crime in New Zealand.** Dunmore, Palmerston North. $34.95, 279p.

Reviewed by Robert Webb
Political Studies
University of Auckland

Recent debates on marijuana law reform, the focus on police actions in Waitara, and increased sentences for violent crimes, make this book timely in its analysis. There have been few contemporary books that have been devoted entirely to the sociological analyses of criminal offending in this country. As a text on crime, it deals primarily with recent data on criminal offending from the last few decades, producing descriptions of crimes, sentencing outcomes, criminal justice statistics, and the changing legal definitions of criminal acts. As a wide-ranging introduction to crime in New Zealand, this book's coverage of issues is ambitious in its scope, with topics examined including property crime, drugs, violence, organised crime, sexual deviance, offending by women, justice and inequality in the criminal justice system. Its nine chapters stand alone as examinations of different criminal offending aspects or the operation of justice. Newbold's stated focus moves away from a purely dogmatic Marxist interpretation of deviance (p.18), yet he does acknowledge that deviance is socially constructed, in that it can reflect the norms of certain groups with power in society, whereby they can be privileged by the justice system, while the activity of others can be problematised and targeted. With this in mind, certain types of crime are analysed within social and historical structures.

The strength of this book is the clear illustration of how certain acts become viewed as deviant. This is achieved largely through a framework of comparative analysis on acts that

become defined as criminal as opposed to others. The chapter on property crime for example, highlights the different definition and treatment of blue and white collar crime. Newbold notes that while white collar property crime such as business fraud is probably more extensive and harmful in its social impact, involving larger amounts of money than blue collar offending, it was until recently largely ignored. Even now, Newbold argues white collar offending still receives minor penalties in relation to the amounts involved. The criminalisation of drugs is similarly analysed, with illicit drugs put into historical context, and then compared to pharmaceutical drugs, and the socially harmful alcohol and tobacco. Clearly highlighted is that the process that defines certain drugs as illegal, is based upon negative perceptions of the drug users, rather than the socially harmful effects on the community. Alcohol and tobacco for example are drugs with highly negative consequences, in contradiction to their legal status. Another major theme in the book is that the criminal justice system can involve injustice in its processes. Newbold reviews the Peter Ellis and Arthur Allan Thomas convictions to illustrate cases of injustice, questioning the processes by which they were found guilty. Building on this theme, a section on police misconduct shows that some officers have lied, falsified evidence to achieve prosecutions, taken drugs and committed crimes. These examples are used to show the criminal justice system does not necessarily provide justice for all. In light of these interesting analyses, it would be remiss of me as a reviewer to ignore some of the more contentious areas in the book. These involve women's crime, and Maori and Pacific Island offending. While there is not space to review all of these issues, I want to concentrate on several examples to suggest there are arguments that need further supporting data.

Newbold correctly observes that the male dominated criminology field has traditionally focused on men, leaving women's offending on the margins of study. This theoretical

absence has been challenged by a growing feminist criminology, which has increasingly critiqued the inability of criminological theory to explain women's offending. The analysis on women's crime in this book therefore, should probably be a welcome addition to theoretical debates, as it does examine women's offending in the local context, analysing offending, and sentencing differences between men and women. There are however, several conclusions from this chapter that are likely to draw criticism or provoke debate. Newbold himself does not shy away from acknowledging the book, 'sometimes tramples over popular notions about sex, gender, ethnicity and drugs', but he argues, this is done, 'in a way that draws upon data, research and argument in the conclusions it offers' (p.8). The intent may be to question and offer an alternate view to current beliefs, but this aim is not fully achieved by the data provided. One example is the issue of domestic violence.

While acknowledging that women are more often victims of injurious spouse beating, Newbold argues, 'contrary to popular belief, there is good evidence that men are not the principal perpetrators of family violence. In fact, the propensity of females to assault their male partners seems at least equal to the reverse, if not greater' (p.59). Newbold may be overly ambitious in extrapolating this conclusion from a self-report study sampling one thousand Dunedin 21 year olds, and a 'barrage' of American studies (ibid.), when such conclusions appear to contradict local studies with wider samples such as the 1996 *National Survey of Crime Victims* (Young et al., 1997), or the Leibrich et al. (1995) study into partner abuse. These studies indicate men in New Zealand largely perpetrate domestic violence against women, and to provide an argument to the contrary requires further elaboration.

In another contentious example, Newbold argues women receive less severe penalties than men for crime, due to preconceived views about them being less capable and more passive than men, or what can be described as sexist attitudes in

the justice system. Newbold's examination does highlight differentials in sentencing between men and women. The existence of sexist attitudes however, is explained as occurring because, 'feminist groups have focused only on areas where women are disadvantaged in relation to men' and therefore, 'women's anomalous treatment by the criminal courts remains unchanged' (p.254). It is debatable whether sexism exists in the justice system due the failure of feminist focus. The work of Elisabeth McDonald (1993) and Joanne Morris (1997) for example on the justice system and gender bias tends to contradict this assertion. Furthermore their work locates the persistence of sexist attitudes as a structural feature of the New Zealand justice system rather than the failure of a feminist focus. They also highlight that this gender bias can disadvantage women, in contradiction to Newbold's evaluation on sentencing.

Another area that could have been improved was the analysis of Maori and Pacific Island offending. Newbold correctly notes that Maori and Pacific peoples have higher recorded offending rates than Pakeha when measured against their respective population sizes. In light of the general book theme that locates crime with social and historical context, it may have been useful to engage with contemporary debates derived from Moana Jackson's (1988) critique of the criminal justice system's impact on Maori. It would have been particularly useful to evaluate whether Jackson's theory that colonisation and the breakdown of traditional cultural norms combined with the imposition of a Western legal system has manifested itself in higher Maori (and by extension Pacific peoples) crime rates, or whether criminal offending by Maori and Pacific Island peoples can be understood as a feature of both class and social inequity within the wider capitalist economy. With references to differences in treatment for some groups by the criminal justice system used elsewhere in the book, the absence of Jackson's work is notable.

In summing up, this book does have some useful evaluations of crime in New Zealand. Its broad overview will provide useful data for the study of crime in this country. And while my stated concerns are that some debates do not provide enough theoretical background to fully support Newbold's conclusions, I believe even the contentious areas of this book will provide a useful place to start a critical dialogue encompassing various aspects of crime in this country.

References

Jackson, M., 1988. *The Maori and the Criminal Justice System: He Whaipaanga Hou: a New Perspective*, Wellington, Department of Justice.

Leibrich, J., Paulin, J. and Ransom, R., 1995. *Hitting Home: Men Speak About Abuse of Women Partners*, Wellington, Department of Justice.

McDonald, E., 1993. 'Provocation, sexuality and the actions of "thoroughly decent men"'. *Women's Studies Journal* 9(2):126-147.

Morris, J., 1997. 'Women's experience of the justice system', *Victoria University of Wellington Law Review,* 27:649-672.

Young, W., Morris, A., Cameron, N. and Haslett, S., 1997. *New Zealand National Survey of Crime Victims 1996*. Wellington, Victimisation Survey Committee.

Paul Havemann (ed), 1999. **Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.** Auckland, Oxford University Press. $65.00, 520p.

Reviewed by Lynne Alice
School of Sociology and Women's Studies
Massey University

In the past few years in New Zealand there have been significant publications on cultural identity issues and rights and Paul Havemann's edited collection *Indigenous Peoples' Rights* is an expansive yet detailed contribution of historical and contemporary writing about legal and political interactions between theorists and activists in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Havemann's collection is broader in scope than Paul Spoonley's and Augie Fleras' *Recalling Aotearoa: Indigenous Politics and Ethnic Relations in New Zealand* (1999) or Paul Spoonley's, David Pearson's and David MacPherson's *Nga Patai: Racism and ethnic Relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand* (1996). It is conveyed with much of the same political challenge yet reader friendly style of Mason Durie's *Te Mana Te Kawanatanga: the politics of Maori Self- Determination* (1998), although lacks the intensity of Durie's insider perspective. *Indigenous Peoples' Rights* interrogates the range of relationships between settler states and indigenous peoples through an analysis of the social impacts of colonisation within the discourses of international human rights, differing indigenous standpoints and the development of Anglo-Commonwealth nation states.

Indigenous Peoples' Rights is a carefully edited and well organised collection in which the 20 contributors explore commonalities of colonial experience and social and legal moves towards self-determination in countries with a similar legal and constitutional history. Havemann explains the methodological

approach of the book in the introduction where historical contingency, contextual specificity, the interdependence of internationalised discourses are stressed as organising aspects of the contributions which together are intended 'to promote thematic coherence across countries while reaping the advantages brought by assembling expert contributors able to explicitly address specific and historically contingent factors relevant to their own jurisdictions' (4). Three chronologies are included to 'assist readers to trace the evolving recognition of indigenous rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand' (10) they are perspectives of 'Euro-American law of Nations and Indigenous Peoples'; 'Twentieth-century Public International Law and Indigenous Peoples' and 'Indigenous Rights in the Political Jurisprudence of Australia, Canada and New Zealand: Parallel Chronologies'. Thus the collection does not ignore specificities in indigenous peoples' experiences within each jurisdictions, and the care with which comparative studies of legal, political structures and indigenous issues are presented exposes ongoing problems for governance, where similar juridical themes have resulted in different legislation or self-definition within Aboriginal struggles.

Paul Havemann has written several chapters that comprise an historical and thematic framework for the contributors' close analysis in the six parts, which are titled: Public International Law; Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Coexistence; the impact of colonial settlement in the Anglo-Commonwealth; Indigenous Peoples' Rights Claims; the relationships between criminalisation of indigenous peoples and colonisation; administering citizenship and self-determination and constitutional issues arising from indigenous rights claims. What is especially challenging about this collection is its apparent attention to detail, lack of generality and avoidance of stereotyping and puffery. Yet within each part and despite the length of most essays (around 15 to 20 pages) it is clear that the

sections are held together by Havemann's careful definition of the assumptions and framework of themes.

In the final part, 'Constitutionalising Indigenous Rights?', for example, three essays cover native title in Australia, issues around Aboriginal rights in Canadian law and discourses about sovereignty and rangatiratanga in New Zealand. In themselves these essays are informative and usefully provide signposts to common law and social theorising that enables the reader to read beyond the collection. And this is augmented by extensive footnoting and referencing. Taken on its own, part six only touches on the complexities of historical events that have produced the plethora of contemporary issues around its topic. A more compelling starting point is arguably to be found in Mason Durie's *Te Mana Te Kawanatanga* where the analysis of Maori aspirations and relations with the Crown is told from the more 'on the ground' vantage point of a range of iwi (a heterogeneity often not thoroughly reflected by academics) rather than through the intellectual frameworks expertly defined and selectively illustrated in the Havemann collection. The final sections of Paul Spoonley's and Augie Fleras' *Recalling Aotearoa* also provide a contrasting analysis as these authors offer several speculative arguments about how New Zealanders might engage with the diverse versions of cultural politics and history, grouped around themes like 'Bi-culturalism: double-edged and "multicultured"' and 'Towards a multiculturalism within a bi-national framework'. The difference between the methodology of *Recalling Aotearoa* and *Indigenous Peoples' Rights* is that the former outlines the debates and suggests angle of inquiry that provoke further talking, whereas the *Indigenous Peoples' Rights* collection seeks to better inform current debates by providing comprehensive analyses of wide-ranging histories from legal and political sources as well as the subjects themselves.

In part three on 'Colonisation, Criminalisation, and Indigenous Peoples' Rights', David MacDonald writes about the

Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in Australia, while Scott Clark and John Cove analyses the Canadian Commissions of Inquiry into Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice. These chapters are followed by John Pratt's review of 'Assimilation, Equality, and Sovereignty in New Zealand/Aotearoa Maori and the Social Welfare and Criminal-Justice Systems'. In this section the conclusions of the comparative study are fairly unsurprising. John Pratt argues that debates about the over-representation of Maori in criminal statistics have shifted from being seen as about how to deal with inequalities that have Maori social positioning in focus to being about the right of Maori to control their destinies on their own terms. Scott Clark and John Cove conclude that commissions of inquiry in Canada have been used more readily and extensively than in New Zealand and Australia but their effectiveness, beyond publication of impressive reports, is not generally reflected in progressive social change. David MacDonald ends with the observation that the Royal Commission provided a framework for both government and Aboriginal organisations to respond to and largely failed to address the underlying unrest between Aboriginal peoples and the Australian state, but despite this it has 'let the genie out of the bottle, and it will not return' (300).

The value of the selectivity in the collection is that examples seem chosen for their similarities as well as stark contrasts and this produces a useful teaching tool. For example, part two, 'Settling the Anglo-Commonwealth' compares and contrasts through the chapters by Henry Reynolds, Ken Coates and Ranginui Walker, quite different practices of colonisation despite common experiences of attempted profiteering by commercial enterprises in the shaping of contemporary economic structures in each country. Havemann maintains in his introduction that a 'demythologising' of colonial history is necessary to 'recast justice for indigenous peoples' if there are to be appropriate changes to the political and legal present. The

comparative methodology outlined in the introduction to the collection is put to the test in part three, where in just two chapters by Augie Fleras and Catherine Iorns Magallanes, issues around theorising a politically responsive notion of indigeneity and its relations with international human rights law to indigenous peoples is surveyed in all three countries.

Possibly the most 'case study' examples within the collection are to be found in part five, where 'cultural imperialism' in Australia is analysed by Christine Fletcher in her outline of the emergence of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in the 1990s, under the Hawke-Keating Labor government. Hamar Foster recounts the relationships between the first nations peoples following the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to the 1990s where Aboriginal rights are increasingly understood as entailing the right to self-government. Alan Ward and Janine Hayward outline the ongoing assertion by Maori of their sense of rangitiratanga, as either autonomy or sovereignty under the Treaty of Waitangi, and then how land disputes arose in response to assimilationist assumptions in legal and political discourses that did not or could not negotiate Maori expressions of self determination. In all the coverage gives a detailed roadmap of legal and political relations in Anglo-Commonwealth countries and like any reference book is rich with suggestions for further study.

Although *Indigenous Peoples Rights* does not claim to be an exhaustive coverage of the heterogeneity of indigenous viewpoints, its style and the size of its project gives it a coolly authoritative edge. Arguably all collections contain unevenness and fail to completely satisfy their objectives, yet this work generally avoids caricature of the key differences and commonalities wrought by colonisation in Canada, Australia and New Zealand and demands the reader pay attention to historical complexity in both indigenous narratives as well as the contested nature of law as it is developed in each context, whether or not it

is dealt with in sufficient depth.. The collection requires time and thought to fully digest, since its multi-dimensional methodology impresses upon the reader the further research possibilities opened up by the questions raised by its contributors. Overall Indigenous Peoples Rights offers an intelligent and complex overview of debates about 'rights', 'indigeneity', 'self-determination' and international law.

Bruce Jesson, 1999. **Only Their Purpose is Mad: The Money Men Take Over New Zealand.** Dunmore Press, Palmerston North. $27.95, 279p.

Reviewed by Pahmi Winter
School of Sociology and Social Policy
Waikato University

Recently a Hungarian sociologist, knowing little of our country, asked me who our intellectuals were. Bruce Jesson immediately came to mind, then I hesitated. How to explain to some-one from a society vibrant with intellectual life, a culture where being called an 'intellectual' is an insult; where to identify oneself as a sociologist or an academic spells the death of conversation. Waddarya?

And how to explain to some-one whose life had been defined by the Soviet State, and for whom 'the velvet revolution' bringing liberal democracy meant gaining freedom, that for many New Zealanders the 'quiet revolution' from social to liberal democracy after 1984 spelled devastating loss; of public assets and space, of jobs, security and social cohesion. That since then, the number of New Zealand households living in poverty had

doubled and social polarization had became a structural feature of our society.

Jesson's book provides his interpretation of that critical period in New Zealand's recent history. He analyses it within the context of the emergence of a new business oligarchy (a term he prefers to elite), and its culture of finance which, he seeks to argue, gutted the productive and collective basis of New Zealand society. His intention is to challenge the assertions of New Right politicians, business elites and their tame imported 'experts' that 'the good life' can be secured only with an unfettered market economy and a residual state.

To explain the rationale behind his book's title, and its central thesis, Jesson turns to Melville's classic *Moby Dick.* Captain Ahab, in drawing on the tools of science to pursue a private obsession, symbolizes for Jesson the contemporary neo-liberal economic rationalist whose 'intellectual rigour is put at the service of madness' (p.9). Jesson emphasizes that it is not 'mere madness' he is concerned with, but the irrationality of instrumental reason which seeks total control in the obsessive pursuit of something indefinable and remote until it produces 'its ultimate disaster'. He writes:

> I am included to see Ahab as an entrepreneur of free-market capitalism. A thorough individualist, dominated totally by an obsession which is his alone, Ahab's power as an individual depends upon his ability to control other people's wealth and labour and turn them to his own ends (p.10).

Jesson compares Ahab to the New Right in New Zealand and its obsessive belief in the rationality of an unfettered market being the necessary condition and only mechanism by which a people and nation might prosper.

> The parallel with the market economy is obvious enough once it is pointed out. Science and reason are embodied in the industrial and commercial process yet industry and commerce often appear destructive and irrational. They are also dehumanizing. As Melville says, 'To accomplish his object, Ahab must use tools; and of all tools used in the shadow of the moon men are the most apt to get out of order.
>
> A century and a half later, the argument continues about the rationality of the marketplace. Modern capitalism is highly rational in the methods it uses, but is highly deranged in the purposes to which it puts them. (p.10)

Illustrating the irrationality of the market is an enduring theme of the book, which Jesson does with his characteristic skill, drawing on his broad knowledge of New Zealand history, political theory, rigorous critical reasoning and judiciously-weighed polemic. He also provides some compelling insights into the conditions which allowed the New Right to secure a neo-liberal hegemony with so little resistance from New Zealanders.

He argues that a feature of New Right culture is a collective amnesia which mythologizes the past (i.e. pre-1984) against which an idealized market economy is compared. 'They see a gloomy past of an oppressive society that they would prefer not to remember' (p.61). Jesson seeks to correct this ideological sleight-of-hand, highlighting the many weaknesses of the New Right's doctrinaire individualism by comparing it to Mill's classical liberalism which, he reminds us, didn't reduce the political to the economic at all. As he notes:

> one of the ironies of twentieth-century politics is that the utilitarian ethic was strongest in the period following the Second World War, which is precisely the period the New Right looks back on with greatest abhorrence. (p.67)

Jesson argues the New Right were able to get away with their revisionist history because New Zealand has never had a strong and vigorous civil society. He locates the roots of our apolitical pragmatism in the dependence of the settlers on the colonial state to 'establish and sustain a market economy' as well as using it for a number of functions that might, elsewhere, have been left to the market such as the 'buying and selling of land, the building of railroads, roads and ports, and the borrowing and lending of money for development' (p.31). As a consequence, a vigorous civil society failed to emerge, creating a 'hollow society', 'a society without texture, without centres of resistance' (p.70).

Jesson's book has many qualities to recommend it: there are a number of illuminating discussions about a range of historical aspects of New Zealand society; the contrast between Maori society and English capitalism in the 19th Century, the eclipse of the 'old money' business oligarchy by the New Right, the detailed view of his personal fight against privatisation of public assets as a member and then Chair of the Auckland Regional Services Trust.

Perhaps the most surprising part of the book is the revelation of the schizoid nature of global financier and speculator *extraordinaire,* George Soros who, in a 1997 article in *Atlantic Monthly*, defended the values of an open society and welfare state against the predations of global capital! (p.54) Jesson uses Soros as an unlikely ally in developing his thesis that the transformation of New Zealand since 1984 was not caused by an economic crisis, but as a consequence of the deliberate political strategies of specific individuals who stood to gain personally from convincing us all that there was no alternative but to steer the economy according to the dogma of economic rationalism.

In demonstrating how market values came to infiltrate and dominate all areas of social and political life, Jesson openly

declares his own agenda – that of building nationhood through republicanism:

> the goals of New Zealand's low-key tradition of progress – the goals of nationhood, democracy and equality – were dismissed as irrelevant in the mid-1980s, but all that this did was leave New Zealand defenceless. These goals stand as a critique of the material and spiritual poverty to which the New Right project has brought us, but also to provide us with something cohesive to which we might aspire. (pp.78-79)

Jesson's book is something of a historical document now, in that it was written in a climate in which it seemed that the New Right had a stranglehold of the political process and policy making. It is a strategic intervention in the cultural politics of our time, seeking to push aside political apathy and historical amnesia. Aimed at much more than a scholarly audience, Jesson examines the structural trends of the last decade and a half in order to provoke us into taking responsibility for making our 'shallow' society something much more democratically robust, and foster the conditions that will restore a productive economy. Ralph Miliband, in his 1962 eulogy of C. Wright Mills wrote:

> he taught us that social analysis could be probing, tough-minded, critical, relevant, and scholarly, that ideas need not be handled as undertakers handle bodies, with care and without passion, that commitment need not be dogmatic, and that radicalism need not be a substitute for hard thinking (Katznelson, 1996:7).

Both C. Wright Mills and Jesson saw their public role in terms of helping constitute an international community of agents of change. Like Mills, Jesson also sought to 'tell truth to power'. While a political economist rather than a sociologist, he practiced 'social science as a sort of public intelligence apparatus' (ibid:9)

Jesson's praxis was guided by a thirst for extending the range of human freedom. Passionate about social democratic values, skilled in political theory and rigorous debate, he embodied the left intellectual as society's critic and conscience.

Elsewhere, he has argued that 'the intellectual life of a society should need no functional justification. It is a worthwhile thing in itself, and is part of a good life and not merely a means of achieving it. Intellectual endeavour aims at telling the truth, however that may be defined... Consequently there is always a basic honesty to any worthwhile intellectual endeavour. Truth is not something to be bought and sold by a political sponsor or tailored to suit the prevailing political mood. It is something that is sought by people of integrity, people who are vital to a vibrant society' (Peters, 1997:10).

As we enter a new century and millennium, times are changing. The election of a Labour/Alliance coalition government heralds the possibility of the unfolding of a new political and policy agenda. the new government's stated commitment to decentralization and fostering a vigorous civic society is hopefully indicative of new epoch in New Zealand history when substantial moves are made towards realizing an independent nationhood grounded in human values and an ethos of collective responsibility. A vibrant and vigorous civil society depends on informed public debate about where we are headed as a society and what directions we might take. It is time for New Zealand sociologists to make a collective and sustained contribution to the intellectual life of the community, fostering such a debate and helping to ensure it is characterized by those qualities Jesson exemplified so well, a commitment to reasoned debate, intellectual vigor and honesty.

Note: Bruce Jesson died in April, 1999.

References

Katznelson, I., 1996. *Liberalism's Crooked Circle: Letters to Adam Michnik*, Princeton, J.J., Princeton University Press.

Peters, M. (ed), 1997. *Cultural Politics and the University of Aotearoa/New Zealand*, Palmerston North, Dunmore Press.

Maureen Baker and David Tippin, 1999. **Poverty, Social Assistance, and the Employability of Mothers: Restructuring Welfare States**. University of Toronto Press. Cloth cover US$60.00; Paper cover US$24.00.

Reviewed by Brigid Thompson
C/- Sociology Department
University of Canterbury

In their book, Baker and Tippin argue that mothers, as a category distinct from women in general, have occupied a particular position in the welfare state, and that public sector restructuring that has taken place over the past 15 or 20 years has affected low income and beneficiary mothers in particular ways. Their research examines restructuring in four countries – Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom – that have developed similar welfare provision, and have adopted similar methods of restructuring these welfare states. Using a feminist analysis of welfare restructuring, they argue that the state, in discussing and implementing reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, have generally treated their citizens as gender neutral. This has meant that mothers in these four countries have been expected, to a greater or lesser extent, to make themselves employable in the same way that other people have been expected to.

The book begins by outlining the development of welfare provision in all four countries, looking at unemployment assistance programmes, family allowances, child support, sole parent benefits and other forms of social assistance, for example housing and healthcare subsidies. It uses this discussion to develop a comparative analysis of how welfare for mothers has developed and changed over time between these countries. For example, Canada since the early 1980s has expected that single mothers find full time work rather than rely solely on state support while raising children. In Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, this expectation has come much later, and the focus has been on mothers obtaining part time rather than full time work.

Baker and Tippin argue that the historical development of welfare states have resulted in different outcomes for mothers during restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, they argue that in Canada it has been easier for governments to restructure welfare provision for mothers, and define mothers as employable citizens because the importance of a stay-at-home mother was not recognised to the same extent that it has been in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. In these countries, it has been harder to introduce work tests for mothers on benefits because raising children is seen as an important role that requires a full time mother.

Although this book provides a good discussion of the ways that public sector restructuring has affected single mothers, I would argue it does not say enough about the differences between single mothers in these four countries. The authors make a good case for the fact that many single mothers are poor, arguing that about 50% of single mothers in each country studied live in poverty, but they do not say much about the other 50% of single mothers. I would argue that the state treats single mothers differently depending on factors such as marital status, age and employment and academic qualifications. For example, the fact

that workfare for single mothers in all four countries includes the opportunity for retaining or improving educational qualifications indicates that the workfare scheme is aimed at women who are not highly skilled or well educated. I would suggest that women who are considered to be easily 'employable' – those that are well educated or have a track record of employment – would not be subject to the same scrutiny that those who are considered less employable by the state.

An important part of any discussion of welfare for mothers is the idea that providing social assistance to mothers occupies a contradictory position in society: that single mothers both have to stay home and look after their children, and get off the benefit and find work (or a new breadwinner). Baker and Tippin allude to this idea throughout the book, but do not deal with it in detail. For example, they discuss the lack of state support for state subsidised childcare in New Zealand, arguing that this is connected to a 'cultural message in favour of stay-at-home motherhood' (p.184), but do not say enough about the contradictory positioning of these women as both stay-at-home mothers, and potential workers. I would argue that women who find themselves in this situation can benefit from being positioned in this way, because it means that those mothers who want to obtain employment have greater support from the state in terms of things like childcare subsidies and re-training opportunities, but at the same time, women who want to stay at home with their children have a greater opportunity to do so in a society that recognises the importance of stay-at-home motherhood. By seeing mothers in these contradictory ways, the state opens up an opportunity for these women to have a significant amount of power because it means they can play these ideas off one another in order to get what they want from the state.

It is significant that the book does not discuss in any detail social welfare in the United States, even though much of the rhetoric of 'welfare dependency', particularly with regard to

single mothers, has come from here. The countries that the book focuses on were chosen because of their similarities, specifically in terms of the discussion and implementation of particular policy options (p.24). Although it is certainly the case that Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have influenced one another's welfare policies, I would argue that Canada's proximity to the United States means that it is both influenced by, and pressured by the United States to implement particular welfare policies. Indeed, it could be argued that all four nations discussed in the book have picked up ideas from the United States in terms of policy reform, making the United States an important part of a discussion of social welfare restructuring in these other countries.

This book provides a good summary of the similarities and differences in welfare provision in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, both generally in terms of single mothers. It brings together a wide range of information about welfare arrangements in these four countries, providing a good outline of the historical development of social welfare that is easily understood and quickly accessed through well set out chapters. Although the book does not provide an in-depth look at the differences between welfare states and the reasons why particular welfare provision has been offered at different time in different places, it does provide a very good cross-national summary of what social welfare benefits have been and are currently available to single mothers and to the general population. This makes the book a very useful text for those interested in comparative social welfare development and restructuring.

Alex Sundakov and John Yeabsley (eds), 1999. **Risk and the Institutions of Government**. Institute of Policy Studies and New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, Wellington. $29.00, 110p.

Reviewed by Ruth McManus
C/- School of Sociology and Women's Studies
Massey University

> Whatever the rhetoric, our public sector policy-making and delivery appears to function, by and large, as if the world is a deterministic place. Risk analysis is a marginal activity, focusing on insurable, technical risks. The world, however, is plainly not like that. (Sundakov and Yeabsley 1999:7)

Prior to reading this collection I had a lukewarm interest in economic policy analysis and a lackadaisical attitude to 'risk'. I have since come to understand its basic tenets and its increasing importance in today's policy analysis. A diverse group of contributors analyse present practice and offer ways forward. The overall effect of their wide ranging contributions is to explain and support Sundakov and Yeabsley's assertion that public policy has to stand up and take notice of 'risk analysis' if it is to successfully cope with the contemporary dynamics of New Zealand society. The introduction clearly sets out the aims, methods and conclusions of each contribution and brings them together in an astute summary that calls for deep changes in public sector attitudes to risk management and a move away from the naive application of corporate risk models onto the public sector in New Zealand.

The individual chapters contribute an array of insights and suggestions about 'risk' in the public policy sector. According to Graham Scott in Chapter two, government has to manage operational risk (which can be identified and assessed beforehand) and policy risk (which is the danger that comes from

'poorly conceived or poorly implemented strategy'). Risks are at the mercy of political intervention. This has lead to a policy culture that treats reforms as one off events. This in turn discourages reflexivity, increases the tendency to repeat previous blunders and leads to an overall situation of 'crisis' management. Scott bases his conclusions on an analysis of policy decisions made during the 'Think Big' projects and the 'Health Sector Reform'. His analysis also highlights the inherent intractability of risk management in the public sector. Even so, he suggests that the distinctive features of public sector management can be offset by 'high quality strategic policy analysis' independent of political vagaries. This strategy would challenge present policy culture, and improve the knowledge base from which informed policy decisions can be made.

Chapter three explores the unique difficulties that public policy faces in the management of environmental risk. Peter Clough uses familiar examples of bio-insecurity (the Tussock Moth infestation in Auckland and the saltmarsh mosquito in Napier) and the risk management models that guided the subsequent programmes of eradication to argue that 'dynamic resilience in the face of constant change' is a better approach for managing environmental sustainability than the previous focus on achieving ecosystem stasis or stability. This would enable more flexible and responsive management attuned to foreseeable and unforeseeable hazards in the environment.

The Hon. David Caygill, past Minister of the Crown, gives a candid account of how he managed crisis in two public sector superannuation schemes he was responsible for (the Government Superannuation Scheme and the National Provident Fund). From these experiences of risk management he asserts that more often than not, policy 'mistakes' have been the result of poor decisions taken too far. Philosophically noting that there will always be 'poor decisions', his advice is to set procedures in place to enable review and rectification. This would generate

reflexive habits that would off set poor decisions before they generate high risk situations.

Chapter five explores the specific risks associated with the banking business. Arthur Grimes identifies sources of risk and potential responses, and explains how such policy responses can themselves engender other risks. Listing the advantages and disadvantages of a range of options available, Grimes concludes that any approach to banking regulation incurs risk, and consequently, government must choose a regime that minimises risk to itself but does not slide into counter-productive risk aversion.

Ian Duncan in chapter six compares two management frameworks (State Owned Enterprises and Crown enterprises) that aim to rationalise and co-ordinate large and disparate service organisations. SOEs, despite being a political compromise between privatisation and state ownership, have been surprisingly successful in achieving their goals of making public organisations more efficient and flexible. However, Crown enterprises do not hold such promise. They are harder to monitor because they are removed from the public eye, and difficult to manage due to their internal diversity.

The collection concludes with a summary of the nature of risk and best practice in the corporate sector. John Boshier presents a well-organised account of strategic and trading risk theory to show how corporate companies quantify risk. He then summarises the difficulties and stumbling block that these models face if applied to the public sector. Deterministic methods, which deal with foreseeable and calculable risks, can be used without much difficulty. However, probabilistic models are harder to apply because public organisations are much larger and more complex so predictive data is harder to generate. In theory, commercial techniques can be applied to the public sector's only if systems of data collection and analysis are put in place.

In summary, this collection stresses the qualitative difference between the private and the public sectors and the

need to understand their different risk profiles. Specific issues of size, complexity and public expectation hamper the straight application of commercial techniques of risk management to the public sector. The editors stress that private risk management models are inappropriate for the public sector unless they are adapted. The crossover has potential but requires increased policy management analysis and thorough monitoring systems. 'Safe' adaptation relies upon an increased appreciation of the distinctive 'risks' for the public sector, and this rests upon the ability to face past mistakes and failures as positive learning experiences. This goes against present public policy climate that has a history of both unrealistic and risk aversive management decisions.

Although the collection sometimes gets bogged down in jargon, it gives insight into the way economists approach the analysis of risk and also increases awareness of the value of risk management to public policy. It also offers insightful overviews of past public policy management in the various political and economic climates that New Zealand has experienced over the last three decades. The collection is itself an example of the kind of historical reflexivity, which it argues, is necessary to inform risk management strategy in the future. This verifies the claim made in the introduction that it is a good text for both policy analyst practitioners and students.

For a sociological readership, this collection is useful even though the material does not engage with the familiar 'risk' literature of Beck[1]. It offers a reasoned case against recent practices (the naïve imposition of corporate management of 'market risk' into large-scale public institutions) and best practice

[1] For example see Beck's use of 'risk' as the new basis of political activity in contemporary Western society in Jane Franklin (ed) *The Politics of Risk Society* Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998.

guidelines for the future. Even though I support this move, I am concerned about the attitude to political activity that it implies. The methods suggested, based on increased knowledge and analysis to guide risk decisions, presents politics as a 'thorn in the side' of public management that more often than not gets in the way of good risk management practice. It subtly suggests that public policy mistakes and hardships are the result of 'political mis-management' of risk and that the best way forward is to focus on data collection and analysis to provide a sound basis for policy decisions in the future. This widens the distance between public policy and party political activity. For me, such a move is no guarantee of 'sound' public policy as it encourages the institutionalisation of a culture of 'risk management'. Such a culture is not inherently free from undemocratic policy initiatives or readjustments and so must always be tied to systems of political accountability. I am not convinced that increasing bureaucratic independence will automatically reduce mistakes, or that a 'smoother', more reflexive public policy is more democratic. Whether the present system of political influence is the best, most representative, most democratic is an issue that gets lost in Sundakov and Yeabsley's move away from political engagement and for me, is the limit of this collection.

In conclusion, this collection is insightful and constructive, and calls for sensible procedures to increase the public sector's system of accountability. However, I am uncomfortable with the reification of 'good' risk analysis as a salve for complex and democratically significant issues embedded in public policy debates.

Peter Davis and Kevin Dew (eds), 1999 **Health and Society in Aotearoa New Zealand**. Oxford University Press, Auckland. $45.00, 312p.

Reviewed by Allanah Ryan
School of Sociology and Women's Studies
Massey University

New Zealand sociology students often complain when they are introduced to the discipline through American or British texts. They want to learn about sociology through examples that they are familiar with, and they want to learn more about the society in which they live. I am therefore very pleased to have this new text to teach my students about the sociology of health. The editors are to be congratulated on bringing together scholars of a high calibre, and ensuring that the full range of health sociology and public health research is covered here. Each of the individual contributors says something interesting about the complex relationship between health and society. Whether or not the text as a whole provides the introduction to the sociology of health that I would like my students to receive is perhaps another question - and one that I would like to explore briefly here. But first, an overview of the book contents.

This edited collection draws together recent research from sociological as well as public health perspectives. Part One provides 'Foundations' for the text with chapters on the key sociological theories about health and society (Kevin White), different methodological approaches used in health research (John McKinlay, Libby Plumridge and Vivien Daley) and a discussion of health from the perspective of kaupapa Maori (Papaarangi Reid). Part Two explores how patterns of health status are related to the 'Social Structures' of socioeconomic status (Philippa Howden-Chapman), Maori (Papaarangi Reid) and age (Arvind Zodgekar). In Part Three the attention shifts

onto the ways in which 'Cultural Patterns' shape health outcomes. Judith Macdonald takes an anthropological approach to the culture of health and illness, while Sitaleki Finau and Colin Tukuitonga examine health and culture for Pacific peoples in New Zealand. Janett Levien discusses the different kinds of caring work involved in the formal and informal sectors. The fourth part of the book explores different aspects of 'Professions and Practices' through detailed case studies. Elizabeth Tully and Belinda Mortlock examine the professionalising strategies used by nurses and midwives, Ann Opie outlines her research on knowledge-based teamwork and Mike Lloyd explores processes involved in medical communication. Finally, Part Five examines elements of health policy through chapters on the health reform process since 1984 (Pauline Barnett and Ross Barnett), the shape of Maori health service delivery in this context (Chris Cunningham and Mason Durie) and health promotion and health technology in relation to the cervical screening programme (Pamela Hyde).

Such a broad range of substantive topics, as well as widely diverging theoretical and methodological approaches, is impossible to adequately summarise here. Nor is it appropriate to single out particular chapters for detailed discussion. Instead I want to say something about how this collection stands as a whole in terms of its suitability as a textbook for sociology students. The text has many strengths. The level of scholarship in each of the chapters is very high with authors expounding clearly, and often compellingly, on their topic. As well as being of interest in an academic sense many of the chapters are also politically timely. For example Pamela Hyde's discussion of the national cervical screening programme takes on special relevance in the context of the current Ministerial Inquiry into the Under-reporting of Cervical Smear Abnormalities.

While the book clearly does an excellent job of bringing together current research I had hoped for something more from the editors. There may be different views as to what the role of an

editor is in texts such as this. Davis and Dew have certainly written more than many by providing a full introductory chapter as well as brief introductions to each of the five parts. In many respects they have done an excellent job of placing the individual contributions in the context of wider theoretical and political debates. However there are at least two issues that would have benefited from more editorial comment than they received.

Firstly the editors are clear that they have sought to provide a text that 'reflects the diversity of medical sociology and public health research in Aotearoa/New Zealand' (p1) – and so they have. However it seems to me that there are significant differences between the research and scholarship that is produced within Schools of Medicine (the institutional home of most public health research) and the more strictly discipline-based sociology departments. These differences deserve comment and perhaps some reflection on the kinds of knowledge produced within each setting. For example it might be worth discussing the ways in which a sociology, which seeks to be critical of medicine, might be shaped and constrained through its location within the institutions responsible for the production of medical practitioners. Moreover in what ways does 'public health research' differ from the broader state-provided 'public health' that may in many respects reproduce problematic power relations?

My second point relates to the theoretical and methodological pluralism that is acknowledged within the text. Perhaps this approach is unavoidable in edited texts – by their nature they bring together academic scholarship that starts from a range of premises and sets out to accomplish different things. However I would have liked to have read a more sustained discussion of the potential strengths and weakness of the different approaches explored in the book. Outside of the polite tone of the textbook you can be sure that many of the authors presented here take issue with each other. This lack of attention

to the vigour with which different positions may be held is undoubtedly a feature of textbooks in general. Ludwik Fleck (1935/1979) comments that by their nature textbooks present knowledge as more 'settled' and unproblematic than 'journal knowledge'. Debates that might be hotly contested within journals receive more measured and tempered response in textbooks. It may be misguided of me to want this text to read more like 'journal knowledge' however I think the text could only have been strengthened by such attention to exploring the unsettled and contested nature of knowledge. Beginning students are ill-equipped to make the kinds of distinctions and judgements about the value of different positions that more experienced scholars can. I wonder what students will make of the widely diverging ways in which the postmodern floats throughout the book. Perhaps more could also have been written about the differences between the kind of knowledge produced through sociological and public health research and that derived from kaupapa Maori. How do these different paradigms sit alongside, or in competition, with each other?

The role of the editor is undoubtedly unenviable. Should editors simply describe the different views they present or engage in a more thoroughgoing critique of the work? I have taken the editors to task for not doing more of the latter and giving their readers some idea of where they stand on the lively debates around health. My concerns about the book may have more to do with a desire to see a fully worked through discussion of the relationship between health and society (in the mould of Peter Davis' *Health and Health Care in New Zealand*, 1981) than any real deficiencies with this text. While Davis' book is clearly dated now, both in terms of its substance and theoretical approach, it does have the advantage over an edited text of advancing a clear argument with which one can engage. Perhaps it is time for another book that attempts just such a task. However, while we wait, this book provides much that is

interesting, challenging and enlightening about the relationships that exist between health and society.

References

Davis, P., 1981. *Health and Health Care in New Zealand,* Auckland, Longman Paul.

Fleck, L., 1935/1979. *Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Peter Beatson, 2000. **The Disability Revolution in New Zealand: A Social Map**. Massey University, Palmerston North. $39.95, 483pp.

Reviewed by Don McKenzie
South Auckland

Had this book been written twenty years ago, the lives of the 19% of the New Zealand population who, in the last census claimed to have disability, may have been better supported by more sensible and consistent State policies and practices based on the true meaning of disability.

This book is a lively and absorbing read, relatively free from dry sociological jargon and intensely insightful with respect to its subject matter; disability and society. The author puts the often misused term 'disability' through an academic and experiential prism with refreshing and enlightening results.

While the text is primarily written with undergraduate students in mind, and the 483 pages seem daunting at first glance, the reader will be rewarded by a new yet reasoned analysis of the topic and its implications for society.

The book sets out to be a social map that guides the reader through the different spheres of social life showing how each facet impacts on the lives of people with impairments, so contributing to the multi-dimensional phenomenon of disability. By analysing these parts of social life, a comprehensive view of disability is built up and the relationship between disability and society is explored. Disability is thus integrated in an holistic framework.

The text is divided into nine parts covering definitions, the social map, the impaired body, demography, economics and employment, politics, welfare, community and culture. An extensive chronology and bibliography are appended.

The text begins by sorting out the terminological minefield surrounding disability. The euphemisms and pejorative terms that muddy the field and hamper creative policy development are exposed. Touchy subjects such as suffering and abnormality are addressed. A Pandora's box of biting ethical issues is revealed when disability is examined in the context of the right to life, to reproduce, racial eugenics and genetic engineering.

The point is made that it is not enough to see disability as a phenomenon to be cured or compensated for: the concept is also determined by the unique features of society as well as the impairment itself. Impairment sets the ground rules for disability but society determines how the disability game is to be played, as it is with ethnicity and gender. Even if we cut through the jungle of institutions, policies and managerial inconsistencies that make up today's disability support services, people with disabilities would still remain a race apart. The experience of disability then, cannot be understood and sensible policies devised to minimise its effects unless both the impairment and its social context are addressed with equal fervour, intelligence and skill.

The wide range of conceptual and empirical material is underpinned by three sociological questions: How do social factors create disability? How do social factors govern the experience of being disabled? And how does the presence of people with disabilities affect other sectors of society? Notwithstanding the answers to these sociological questions, Beatson, unlike many other writers on Disability Studies, emphasises the fact that the irreducible core of disability rests on some biological deficit that interferes with coping in the real world and which may contaminate one's sense of personal integrity.

This is an excellent book, written with flare and a rare understanding of the topic born of personal experience and academic rigor. Great value for money.

Highly recommended for libraries serving health and human service organisations and for those who want a more keen and clear insight into what is, after all, a neglected field affecting nearly one in five New Zealanders.

Copies of this book can be purchased by sending a cheque for $39.95 made out to Massey University to:

The Publications Secretary
Sociology Programme
Massey University
Palmerston North

Elizabeth Rata, 2000. **A Political Economy of Neotribal Capitalism.** Lexington Books, Maryland, 265p.

Reviewed by Farida Tilbury
Department of Anthropology
University of Western Australia

I first met Elizabeth Rata when we shared a time slot at the 1999 SAA(NZ) conference. I noticed she was treated almost reverently by many. While I could tell from her demeanour that this was a woman with great personal mana, yet also a rare humility, I was not sure quite why she was held in such high esteem. Having read her book, which is one of the few good examples of a thesis turned into a single publication[1], it is becoming clearer to me why she is so respected.

Most striking in this book is her fearless addressing of methodological and theoretical issues which many prefer to avoid. For example, in regard to the vexed question of who should research whom, Rata asks where to place herself as a researcher whose ancestors are all Pakeha, but whose descendants are all Maori, and how to speak simultaneously to both the Maori and the Western academic world. Rata openly criticises the development of an emerging Maori 'bourgeoisie' in whose hands are concentrated authority and access to resources. She also addresses the issue of what happens to urban Maori who cannot identify their tribal affiliation, in a system where genealogy is everything.

Rata's main contention is also challenging. She suggests that the retribalisation movement, rather than simply being the authentic restoration of traditional social forms, or alternatively the inauthentic invention of such forms for particular economic

[1] Her research into the kaupapa Maori education movement, which was also part of her thesis, is the subject of another publication.

ends, is instead a response to the harsh material circumstance of global capitalism. As such it has become incorporated within the capitalist system producing entrenched inequalities among Maori. Consequently, a potential force for structural change has been lost. Within this argument is a criticism of the romanticism implicit in some Pakeha approaches to Maori, which maintains simplistic moral hierarchies, and ignores issues of access and gate-keeping in the control of cultural knowledge. Rata does not shy away from criticising traditionalist ideologies for their exploitation of women, children and lower caste males, as well as their exclusion of those who cannot prove ancestry. She decries the fragmentation of universality and loss of democracy which such thinking has prompted. Yet, throughout the book it is clear that Rata tackles these difficult issues with nothing but the best interests of Maori in mind.

In Part One Rata gives some of the history of the issues in New Zealand, as well as a theoretical backgrounding of her argument. She defines her neologism 'neotribal capitalism' as 'the articulation of exploitative class social relations of production and a neotraditionalist ideology of revived communal relations within a social formation structured by a capitalist regime of accumulation' (p33). While it retains the main features of traditional capitalism, such as commodification, accumulation of capital and exploitative class relations, there are two distinguishing features of neotribal capitalism. These are collective ownership of the means of production (the collective being the tribe), and the reification of class relations of production within an ideology of traditional communalism, specifically that of kinship.

Rata moves on in Part Two to the substantive section of her argument, providing a number of case studies to illustrate the incorporation of grassroots Maori initiatives into a neotribal capitalist system. She provides detailed analysis of the process of incorporation, describing how original definitions and aims have

been permuted by the system to produce quite different outcomes. The development of the concealing ideology of communal revival and the emergence of exploitative class relations is traced.

Specifically, Rata describes how the bicultural project ironically led to a separation of the two protagonists, Maori and Pakeha. Another example follows one kin group's tracing of whanau roots, in order to reconstitute a kin group which then moves from detribalised urban proletariat life to ancestral lands. The idealistic expectation that such a move would provide not only a new way of life based around traditional cultural values and the use of traditional resources, but that it would yield economic prosperity as a result, is shown to have given way to the reality of a commodification of the very form of that whanau and those traditions.

Rata moves on to describe the initiative of a family marine farm to demonstrate the conflict between the two social forms – the new tribe-based economic activity and 'the reified communal relations of neotraditionalism (p104). Ultimately, the farm is a capital resource rather than an economic means for revival of a whanau group and traditional way of life. The examples illustrate the underlying tension between revivalist ideology of neotraditionalism and the class character of capitalism.

Finally Rata describes the tribal fisheries development, which moved through processes of retribalisation and traditionalism, to juridification and institutionalisation in the creation of neotribal capitalism. What this particular case did was to allow the structural inclusion of the tribes into the capitalist state, through their legal recognition as property owning corporate entities.

The result, argues Rata, is that there are now two ethnically distinct regimes within capitalism in New Zealand, the dominant based on 'undemocratic neoliberal ideology of the self-

interested individual', the other on the 'undemocratic neo-traditionalist ideology of the worker-in-community' (pp231-232).

At one point Rata asks whether the worst effects of capitalism can be softened through its embedding in forms which traditionally emphasise community, locality and blood ties. Although she claims not to have answered this question, there is a clear message throughout the book, that the capitalist form itself is stronger than any community/flaxroots based attempts to subvert it. Such a stance will grate with those idealists who see the power of a collective aspiration (the development of a 'class for itself') as being powerful enough to change the material foundation on which a system of social relations is based. In many ways her blatant political agenda is unusual and refreshing among academic work in NZ, which often tends to play it safe. Her stance in the culturalist versus materialist debate is clear and provocative.

However, it is here where some theoretical slippage arises. Rata seems to view democratic principles as the best approach to producing an equitable society – this is clear in her concluding chapter which details how ethnification, indigenisation and retribalisation constitute a 'threat to democracy' by concealing class divisions under the rhetoric of community and tradition. As such, this false identification of common interests based on ethnicity renders class consciousness unrealised, and unrealisable. This, together with her emphasis on universalism, seems to conflict with her critique of culturalism generally, a critique which is based on the principle that material forms outweigh the ideal. This is a perennial debate among Marxists and is unlikely to be resolved in one book. However, her meshing of humanist Marxist with materialist principles is somewhat jarring.

To this end, a Gramscian approach may have been useful. Gramsci (1971) noted that by giving piecemeal concessions to counterhegemonic movements, the State can

incorporate such movements into its mainstream power base[2]. The processes Rata describes contain elements of what Gramsci described as a 'passive revolution' – an extensive structural re-organisation to re-establish hegemony. As such it is a symptom of the 'war of position' constantly being carried out between existing power structures and those movements which seek to challenge these. Rata does touch on the extent to which the process of juridification of tribes and their property results from a conscious embracing of the commodity-based capitalist regime, as opposed to a foisting of the model on an unsuspecting group, and she does note levels of resistance, but a Gramscian analysis of the manner in which hegemonic domination is achieved through a combination of consent and coercion of the political and ideological leadership (Simon, 1982) would have been a valuable addition to her argument.

Rata's book is significant for its timeliness. The substantive data which gives concrete examples of the processes involved in Maori resource development projects is useful in itself, and becomes very valuable in its illustration of the extent to which current movements for the liberation of indigenous peoples may simply be local adjustments to global capitalism – the Sealord case is a good example of this. Of particular value is its detailing of the contradictions in both the intentions and outcomes of any grass roots movement for political, economic and social change. It will appeal to those with an interest in Maori affairs, indigenous movements, and Marxism. A word

---

[2] Using this argument, Morris and Tauri (1995) have suggested that the gradual acceptance of Marae-based court sessions and family justice systems are little more than an element of the hegemonic process by which the state can be seen to be responding to Maori concerns over their lack of power in the fields of social and economic development, and justice, while at the same time containing and diffusing revolutionary activity.

of warning however. As the quotes used above demonstrate, this is not an easy read. The writing style is both turgid and jargon-filled. Structurally, too, the book could be tighter – Rata makes her argument many times over in each chapter. This is partly a result of the fact that analysis and argument is meshed with description throughout the book. While it works in some ways, the book would have profited from a clearer differentiation between the two. Similarly the existence of many typographical errors, particularly in the concluding chapter, are irritating. Despite these criticisms, the book is still worth the effort of reading. Rather than simple theorising, Rata gets down to the nitty gritty of the actual daily problems encountered in trying to mesh two incommensurate systems. The outcome is essentially a lament for the loss of the humanist ideals of social justice and mutual obligation, a timely message for those working within the social sciences.

References

Gramsci, A., 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, New York, International Publishers.

Morris, A. and Tauri, J., 1995. 'Maori Justice: Possibilities and Pitfalls', paper presented at the Legal Research Foundation Conference, *Rethinking Criminal Justice*, Auckland, 12-13 May.

Simon, R., 1982. *Gramsci's Political Thought*, London, Lawrence and Wishart.

Edward B. Fiske and Helen F. Ladd 2000. **Policy Paper Six: The Tomorrow's Schools Reforms: An American Perspective.** Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 27p., $15.00 (plus NZ$10 p&p – international only);
Colin James 2000. **Policy Paper Seven: Funding Our Culture.** Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 17p., $15.00 (plus NZ$10 p&p – international only)

Reviewed by Chamsy Ojeili
The Open Polytechnic
Lower Hutt

In the first of these Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) papers, Edward Fiske, former education editor for the *New York Times*, and Helen Ladd, a Duke University professor, review the major conclusions of their *When Schools Compete: A Cautionary Tale*, a book analysing the Tomorrow's Schools reforms, from their introduction in 1989 until 1998. With the educational ideology underpinning these reforms globally on the ascendant, the New Zealand case, argue the authors, is of great interest.

The three strong philosophical currents around the period of Tomorrow's Schools were reduced to two as democratic populism was sidelined by managerialism and neo-liberalism. The results, argue Fiske and Ladd, have been mixed. On the one side, schools often prefer self-governance to the bureaucratic system of the pre-reform years. On the other side, however, a decade of Tomorrow's Schools has resulted in a movement from parental to school choice, a decline in collegiality among teachers, a flight from low decile schools, with ethnic minorities concentrated in these schools, a growing gap between low and high decile schools, and a failure to balance competing interests. While these outcomes are somewhat NZ-specific, Fiske and Ladd (2000:5) reject the simplistic neo-liberal solution to educational ills: 'The invisible hand will not do the job'.

The papers that follow Fiske and Ladd's summary piece respond to the conclusions of *When Schools Compete*. Ron Crawford, a senior analyst in Treasury, casts doubt on Fiske and Ladd's interpretations of the polarised outcomes of the enrolment policy changes of 1991. Relatedly, Howard Fancy, CEO, Ministry of Education, contends that the lack of focus on the pre-1989 period has meant an overestimation of the success of the school system prior to the reforms. Finally, in the closing contribution of the paper, Keith Sullivan, School of Education, Victoria University, argues that *When Schools Compete* lacked proper attention to ideology and the ideological struggle as it played itself out in the public service during the period in question. Sullivan also contends that the authors made the grave mistake of neglecting the radical educationalist perspectives of thinkers like Codd, Lauder, and Jones. Perhaps because of this omission, Fiske and Ladd are insufficiently critical of notions such as 'provider capture' and the assertion that NZ education was in 'crisis'. Despite their criticisms, Fancy, Crawford, and Sullivan all view *When Schools Compete* as an important moment in the debate on education in this country.

In the second of these IPS policy papers, Colin James – that rare NZ creature, the public intellectual, writing in a fluent and popular style for a wide audience – surveys the broad issues arising from four roundtable forums (convened in March this year by the IPS) on the funding of the arts, cultural activities, and heritage.

The criteria for such funding are, unsurprisingly, 'murkey', and the issues difficult. Culture in this country has so often been viewed as an 'add on'. Yet, in recent years, more and more emphasis seems to have been placed on culture's role in identity and nation-building. The problems around the idea of a national culture and of biculturalism are touched upon, as are the dilemmas concerning hybridity of cultural forms, cultural diversity, integrity, and democracy, and tradition and innovation.

Participants at the forums accented the importance of finding out what, culturally-speaking, we New Zealanders want – a vital 'baseline' for consideration of the funding of culture, according to James. James also reports the desire to move from present ad hoc funding practices to strategic funding, and the need for funding to be, as Wrightson puts it, transparent, logical, patterned, and rigorous. A stimulating and important range of issues these, and well worth being fleshed out at book length.

Knowing the Social World: an interdisciplinary conference on social theory, methodology and method July 5th-7th 2000

University of Salford, Greater Manchester
Institute for Social Research, University of Salford:
Department of Sociology, University of Plymouth

Key organizers:
Professor Tim May
Institute for Social Research, University of Salford;
Dr Malcolm Williams
Dept of Sociology, University of Plymouth

Reviewed by Maureen O'Malley

How useful are conferences, especially conferences that attempt to diagnose the state of a discipline? Sociology's predilection for auto-examination does not appear to lead to resolution of its problems nor even agreement over what those problems are. Perhaps the most this introspection achieves is merely the clarification of our disagreements about the constitution of sociological practice and theory. Although benefits may be limited, low returns evidently do not deter investment. The imminent advent of the new millennium has intensified disciplinary self-scrutiny, with the British Sociological Association leading the way when it held a questioning '*For Sociology*' conference in 1999. Most recently, Britain's sociological community continued this trend with another conference, called '*Knowing the Social World*', held at the University of Salford and convened by Tim May and Malcolm Williams.

Three general areas were covered by the keynote speakers: philosophy of social science (Rom Harré), social theory

(John Holmwood), and social scientific methodology (Mary Maynard). Presentation and discussion sessions broke these themes into slightly more specific topics, such as explanation and generalization, reflexivity, social construction and realism, feminist research, policy implications and evaluation. Rather than sessions being given over primarily to presentations (with limited opportunity for discussion), the conference organizers set up a round-table format. This meant that up to four presenters had a maximum of 10 minutes each in which to convey their main ideas, and that this was then followed by at least 50 minutes of audience interrogation and discussion. Another intention of the organizers was to ensure the equal participation of postgraduates alongside established academics. To this end, most sessions (though not the plenaries: equality has its limits, obviously) assembled a mix of postgraduates, new PhDs, and more and less well-known professional sociologists. Interdisciplinarity and internationalness were also aspired to, and although participants were primarily British (and mainly English) sociologists, there were representatives from further afield, both geographically (Europe and the US) and disciplinarily (international relations, economics, business and management studies, social work and policy, literature, anthropology and development studies). Within sociology itself, a number of specialities were in evidence. Dominant (numerically) were quantitative sociology, feminist perspectives, sociology of science and technology, discourse analysis, and medical sociology.

I have somewhat belaboured the variety on offer at the conference because normally, such an eclectic array of interests and topics would lead to only loosely connected – and sometimes incoherent – discussion (as, for example, did the BSA conference mentioned above). The usual means by which conference participants deal with such eclectic fragmentation is to focus on a narrow range of presentation and ignore the rest. Happily, this did not seem to be the experience of the majority of *Knowing the Social World*'s delegates. Session after session homed in on the

key issues of how to properly connect research and theory, how to engage in either to the maximum benefit of the other, and how to assess the progressive value of both research findings and theoretical achievements. Numerous presenters deplored the abyss they perceived between good solid research and illuminating theory; fewer, however, were able to express this in more than a truistic, hand-wringing attempt at expiation. A remarkable number of speakers and questioners presumed the answer to all sociology and social science's divisions lay in an axiomatic acceptance of the mutual entailment of realism and social constructionism: 'We should all at heart be realists and resist relativism, while agreeing that, of course, a great deal of the social world is socially constructed.' Such simplicity, alas, cannot even recognize the complexity of philosophical issues involved, let alone offer adequate solutions to the complex epistemological problems these issues incorporate.

Mention of the word 'complex' brings in a buzz-word of this and no doubt many other conferences these days: the utilization of complexity theory in sociology and other social sciences. Again, there was a naïve appeal to complexity which ran along the lines of 'everything is so complex that we should just acknowledge it, accept complexity's irreducibility, and not try to unify or connect disparate insights.' This summation, I would argue, is antithetical to the very purpose of complexity theory which sets itself the mission of *reducing* complexity in order to generate better comprehension of the phenomena under examination. There were, fortunately, some more sophisticated versions of complexity thinking which wrestled with models and measurements (computer simulations, neural network analogies, decision making models), and addressed the three themes of the conference all in one (philosophy, theory and methodology).

I detected a spirit of dogged optimism at the conclusion of the conference: a broad agreement with the core statement of the second plenary speaker, John Holmwood, that sociology had

to conceive of itself as a problem solving activity – conceptually and empirically. This was conjoined with a related premiss that the multiple perspectives proposed were not incommensurable and should not be conceived of as if they were, though agreement to this tenet was less whole-hearted. Quite how to proceed in working out the variety of theories and bodies of evidence held by each participant in relation to one another was not the outcome of the conference and nor could it have been.

Can any conference, in fact, do more than provide the most superficial airing of contested issues and new (as well as old) approaches to their resolution? I would argue that conferences can and should achieve disciplinary progress and that there is nothing inherent in the discipline of sociology to prevent that. Indeed, if we continue the problem solving metaphor, disagreements are the triggers for better, mutually acceptable accounts. '*Knowing the Social World*' moved closer in this direction than any conference I have attended. The real work, however, is going to be accomplished in our research environments and journals in a far more detailed, precise and laborious way. Conferences can at best be catalysts of this process, and '*Knowing the Social World*' may well have had this important precipitating effect on its participants and their future work. Let us look for signs: attention to empirical and conceptual inconsistency, commitments to resolve it (and not question beg 'incommensurability'), and the burgeoning of more successfully integrated accounts of the social world.

Contributors to this Issue

Lynne Alice teaches sociology and women's studies at Massey University and has published articles on feminist theory and social justice issues.

Janet Bedggood is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Communication Studies, Auckland University of Technology. She teaches materialist cultural studies, ethnic relations and mass communication, focussing on contemporary questions of class, gender, work and ethnicity.

Charles Crothers has lectured sociology in New Zealand and South Africa. He has also worked for the Town and Country Planning Division, Ministry of Works. Charles has numerous publications to his name, including a range of works on various aspects of life in New Zealand, and volumes on Robert K Merton (Routledge, 1987) and on social structure (Routledge, 1996).

Louise Humpage is a PhD candidate at Massey University, Albany. Her thesis will critically explore the notion of 'closing the gaps' between Maori and non-Maori, as exemplified in National government policy 1990-1999.She has recently co-authored a working paper called *Refugees in New Zealand: The Experiences of Bosnian and Somali Refugees* with Vladimir Madjar.

Augie Fleras is currently an Associate Professor at the University of Waterloo, Canada but has a long standing research interest in Aotearoa New Zealand, particularly around the issues of binationalism and Maori policy/administration. His most recent publication is *Recalling Aotearoa: Indigenous Politics and Ethnic Relations in New Zealand*, co-authored with Professor Paul Spoonley.

Don McKenzie is a blind physiotherapist who has worked in the South Auckland area for 37 years. He served on the Blind Foundation's Board for 20 years and was that Board's chairman for 12 years. Don is currently a member of the Physiotherapy Board of New Zealand and on the Executive Committee of the New Zealand Rehabilitation Association.

Ruth McManus is a graduate student in the sociology programme at Massey University. She is writing up her doctorate on Representations of Suicide in New Zealand.

Chamsy Ojelil completed his doctoral thesis at Massey University. He currently lectures in Communication at the Open Polytechnic of New Zealand.

Maureen O'Malley completed a BA(Hons) at Massey University, Palmerston North. She is currently working on a PhD at the University of Sussex.

Damien O'Neill is a lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at Massey University. Currently he is working on a number of research projects including the construction of family violence in the media and the evolution the New Zealand English language.

Allanah Ryan works in the Sociology Programme at Massey University. She teaches in the area of introductory sociology and health sociology. Her research interests include the connection between health, risk and sexuality.

Farida Tilbury completed her PhD at Victoria University of Wellington, investigating friendships between Maori and Pakeha and how such friendships affect the interactors' sense of their ethnic identity and attitudes to race relations issues. She has recently returned home to Perth where she is teaching Anthropology at the University of Western Australia and doing health research for the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners.

Rex Thomson is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Physical Education, University of Otago. He completed his PhD in sociology of sport at the University of Alberta and has lectured in this area since introducing the subject at Otago in 1976. His research interests include sport and gender, and he is currently researching hegemonic masculinity in New Zealand.

Brigid Thompson is currently enrolled as a Masters student in the Sociology Department at the University of Canterbury. Her thesis explores the relationship between social work practice and social policy for community social workers who work with the care and protection of young people. Areas of interest include: social policy, specifically the ways the policy is designed, implemented and then worked with at ground level; sociology of gender; and political sociology.

Robert Webb is completing a PhD on Maori and criminology in the Political Studies department of the University of Auckland. He is currently teaching in the School of Education and Social Sciences at Auckland University of Technology.

Pahmi Winter Pahmi lectures in the Sociology Programme at the University of Waikato. She teaches media and cultural studies, sociology of deviance and social justice issues. She is currently completing research on the intersection of poverty and housing in Hamilton. Her latest research project is investigating sites in NZ popular culture where the kaupapa of promoting decolonizing discourses and post-colonial identities is being pursued.

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS:

1. **Two copies of manuscripts** should be sent to the editors for consideration. Authors should retain a third copy for their own reference during proof-reading. Copies submitted will not normally be returned. To facilitate 'blind' reviewing, the **title and name(s)** of its authors should be given on a separate sheet, and the **title only** should appear on the **first page** of the article.
2. A **disc** should accompany the manuscript. The disc should be **IBM compatible**. If submitting a manuscript word-processed on a Mac obtain an IBM disc and save your article as Rich Text Format.
3. While articles **should not normally exceed 4500-5000 words**, longer articles may be accepted in special circumstances.
4. Manuscripts must be accompanied by a **short abstract** (about 100 words) typed on a separate sheet of paper.
5. Manuscripts should be typed **double spaced** throughout on one side of A4 paper with reasonable margins all round (2 cms. Approx.). Please supply an IBM compatible disc along with details of the software used.
6. Authors should consult articles in current issues of this Journal for general indications of style conventions on: capitalising titles, headings, sub-headings; paragraphing; quotations, and so on.
7. Do not underline any words in the text unless they are to be printed in *italics.*
8. Type each table on a separate sheet with as few lines as possible, and indicate the placing of the table in the text. Use wide spacing in tables. Tables should be numbered in Arabic figures with a clear legend to identify the table.
9. Drawings (graphs, figures, etc.) should be on good quality white paper and on separate sheets.
10. References should normally be indicated by citing in parentheses the author's surname and the year of publication (together with page numbers where relevant, as given in the list of references or the bibliography at the end of the article. For example: 'it has been argued (Baker, 1948:26) that...' etc. The full list of references at the end of the article should be arranged alphabetically by author's surname. The following examples should be used as a guide, paying particular attention to the sequence of the items in the reference and to punctuation.

    Able, P. and Collins, S., 1961. 'Structuralism and the concept of class', **Journal of Social Class**, 24(3):138-159.

    Baker, R.S., 1948. **Sociology and Social Change**, London, Charles Publishing Co.

    Note that in the first example the words in the title are not capitalised (as they are for the title of a book, as in the second example).
11. Footnotes are to be reserved for substantive commentary. Number them from 1 upwards. The location of each footnote in the text must be indicated by the appropriate superscript numeral. Footnotes will appear at the foot of the page where they are located.
12. The typescript submitted should be in the form in which the author wishes the paper to appear. Preliminary consultation with the editors about the suitability of an article does not necessarily guarantee its publication. Authors are encouraged to seek comments from colleagues before submitting a paper for publication.
13. The editors reserve the right to make minor editorial alterations or deletions to articles without consulting the author(s), so long as such changes do not affect the substance of the article.
14. Authors will receive a copy of the issue in which their article appears.