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Uses and Abuses of Metaphor in Social and Cultural Analyses

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Abstract

Metaphor has long been used as a tool for studying culture, identity, and communication. Although many other scholars have pointed out the need to be more critically aware of the way metaphors guide our scientific thinking, this paper specifically addresses the question of metaphorical effectiveness - both its strengths and weaknesses - in scientific discourse in the contemporary 'culture' debates.¹

What is metaphor and how do we normally use this term in the social sciences? Metaphor is the figurative conceptualisation of one thing in terms of another - using words or other images - and has always played an extensive role in the dialogues surrounding discussions of identity, culture, and communication. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 19) argue convincingly: 'The intuitive appeal of a scientific theory has to do with how well its metaphors fit one's experience.'

It is increasingly recognized, then, that the use of metaphor is commonplace in academic descriptions.

¹ Much of the discussion that follows is taken from my book, *Metaphors of Identity: A Culture-Communication Dialogue* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).

Consider Plato's original image-metaphor of mind as the pilot of the body ship (there are two images here: body = ship, mind = pilot of that ship).² In the broadest sense, one could even argue that all scientific models, or theoretical paradigms, are metaphorical, a class of sign-images or image-metaphors that reveal hidden meanings and relationships by mediating and connecting causal ideas.

Metaphor, however, may lead a theorist to construct abstract ideas in quite specific ways, often unfortunately contributing to over-simplifications. Through such paradigms, we may inevitably reduce complex realities to too few of its parts. For example, focusing on single aspects of identity can lead to the failure to see this important construct in its many sidedness. This is essentially the blindmen-and-elephant fallacy.³ How do we deal with the multi-dimensionality of reality when metaphor tends to highlight certain aspects while obscuring others?

If the intent of science is to be systematically precise, the use of metaphor in such texts always carries the risk of

² Similes are more tentative metaphors that use the introductory 'like' or 'as': the mind is **like** a computer, not the mind **is** a computer.

³ The children's story about the three blindmen asked to describe an elephant (consider the blindmen as including a sociologist, a psychologist, and a communication scientist) had a simple moral: although each scientist describes a portion of the elephant's anatomy, none described the whole elephant.

false conclusions (Harries, 1979). Although metaphors have achieved unprecedented importance as 'guiding images' for researchers, the use of figurative devices in scientific discourse is, nonetheless, restricted and limited.

First, metaphor is always responsive to context but is rarely unambiguous. Being highly localised and particular, each metaphor must be carefully selected to fit the demands of a particular situation (Owens, 1965: 62). Meaning is not always evident in metaphorical image or statement. They 'tell the truth but not the whole truth,' to quote Thomas Owens (1965: 70). Obviously, then, some metaphors will be more 'apt' than others for the intended communication.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate this notion of 'metaphorical aptness' is in sharing Wayne Booth's (1979) near-classic example of a lawyer's use of the 'catfish metaphor'. A small-town lawyer for a Southern utility company won his case against a giant competitor by evoking the especially effective image of 'gutting a catfish'. Perfect for this deep-South audience, such imagery might not work in another part of the country or in another country. Metaphors, then, must be judged with reference to context and 'intent'.

In my research on identity, I discovered that one of the most neglected contexts for understanding this complex subject has been the biological basis of selfhood. Since Plato's original conceptualisation of mind as 'pilot' of the body ship, there have been numerous attempts to represent metaphorically the relationships between body and mind. Largely ignored in the communication

sciences, the 'one-in-many-selves' debate has become a (if not **the**) contemporary focus of psychological anthropology (Knowles and Sibicky, 1990).

The notion of unity in self-pluralism was first formulated by the psychologist, William James; it is the seeming contradiction between empirically verified 'many selves' and the common-sense conclusion that most humans, nonetheless, manage to maintain a sense of personality continuity. Some scholars, however, see a connection between the recent re-discovery of self-pluralism and the over-diagnoses of so-called 'multiple personality'.

Aldridge-Morris (1989), a British psychiatrist, has argued convincingly that 'multiple personality' is grossly over-diagnosed in the US - probably in part due to irresponsible media exposure. Claiming that there is not a single, unequivocal case of 'multiple personality' in the UK literature, he tries to balance the American excesses by getting his clients to accept responsibility for 'many aspects of one personality'.

Borrowing the metaphorical distinction between 'hardware' (brain) versus 'software' (mind), he makes the point that American psychology today may be too preoccupied with the hardware rather than the software. This metaphorical preoccupation, he believes, has contributed to the spiraling numbers of diagnosed cases of 'multiple personality' in the United States.

Besides this type of confusion, there is always the problem of metaphorical equivalency when doing cross-cultural research. This may be essentially a problem of

translation, although not always resulting in linguistic confusion. A certain amount of metaphoric ambiguity results from mismatches of metaphors **across** cultures, sometimes even **within** the same culture. Compare the metaphorical expression 'to call a spade a spade'. This is a card metaphor that to most Americans meant 'putting your cards on the table,' i.e., being honest, straight-forward, and precise. To some African Americans, it could possibly have a racial connotation, certainly if the word 'spade' is used in a context such as 'black as a spade'.

One needs to be careful here not to yank language and meaning out of proper context. One sociological study indicates that young television watchers, rather than closely following narration's, tend to pay more attention to distinct, out-of-context, images (quoted in Gitlin, 1990: 38). The younger generation has been literally nurtured on metaphorical images, and television only enhances visual learning at the expense of more analytical approaches to knowledge acquisition.

A better example of cross-cultural ambiguity might be Harriet Rosenberg's (1990) account of the difficulties of using 'feminised' metaphors in cross-cultural research on aging. Metaphors typically used in an American context to describe 'caretaker,' she found to be ethnographically incorrect in an African context where both men and women share this role. She concluded that a feminised metaphor, such as 'mothering,' is in fact hard to express in non-gendered language. Although useful in providing new insights and new meanings to social realities,

metaphors call for constant refinement to be maximally effective in cross-cultural contexts.

Metaphors, also, are often difficult to interpret. A splendid example can be found in Dorinne Kondo's (1990) brilliant analysis of identity in a Japanese workplace. Unfortunately, she entitles her book ***Crafting Selves*** Kondo (1990:301) nicely challenges the over-generalisation of the harmonious, stereotypical Japanese worker as always 'singing the company song'. But, are these female workers in such contexts really 'crafting' selves, as suggested by her 'building' metaphor; or are they in actuality being **crafted** by the system? In spite of the active voice in Kondo's original title, she demonstrates clearly that selves are crafted in processes of work and within designated fields of power. Power, gender, and discourse are the subject matter of this intriguing analysis.

Metaphors call attention to certain phenomena and evoke certain responses but - like other aspects of culture and language - change with changing circumstances (Davidson, 1979: 43). Metaphorical descriptions, therefore, need constant scrutiny (Crocker, 1979: 64). For example, with the pervasiveness of TV in our lives, some researchers of this important medium have committed 'metaphorical leaps': TV is seen as American culture! (Piccirillo, 1990: 15). Snow (1983), using a dubious language analogy, equates culture and language, by extension media and culture. The fact that film and other media can be characterised metaphorically as having a 'language' (format) of their

own does not make them a culture in their own right. Snow reifies his metaphor.

Metaphorical images, unfortunately, are never entirely free from ideological manipulations. In an information society, politics rather than reason can easily predominate. Jim Applegate (1990: 1-2), a communication scholar, fears that the use of 'distorted metaphors' in current discourse about communication results in misunderstandings of the rich complexities of the communication processes. Metaphors should be viewed as problematic at several levels.

In my studies of media, ethnicity and identity (Fitzgerald, 1993), I discovered that the radical restructuring of social life and social performance by electronic media helps to facilitate dramatic changes in culture, and to a lesser extent identities, literally from one generation to another. Too much concern with cultural revivalism, then, can have unintended and often negative consequences for second-generation children of immigrants. Unintended or not, the contemporary cry for 'subjective cultures'⁴ may be counterproductive for the next generation, perpetuating a 'culture of poverty' image - at the very least, resulting in a kind of patronisation of the minority

⁴ American educators, wishing to represent all groups - whether culturally different or not - have created 'subjective cultures' in an effort to be more inclusive. However, in so doing, they are reducing culture to psychology. Counsellors in the United States also commit a similar error when they use a term like 'psychological culture', thereby reducing culture to individual feelings about self.

which may only prolong social conflicts and delay progress in the name of 'cultural' distinctiveness.

Identity, however, can still be nurtured without falling into the trap of assuming that, where you find separate identities, you necessarily find separate cultures. Perhaps the most perplexing metaphors in the field of ethnic studies include the now infamous 'melting pot' metaphor, which some feel has been replaced with the particularistic 'salad bowl' metaphor, which carries an image of groups standing in relation to society much as individual vegetables floating in a salad bowl. A little thought on this issue, however, reveals a completely opposite interpretation. Any salad worthy of its name is made distinctive by its dressing, which metaphorically may well equal our common culture.

Perhaps a better image of this complex process of change would be a 'design metaphor' for the shared culture, i.e., a patterned whole, or mosaic, with its many shapes, sizes, beautiful colours, and so on. After all, our common culture is made up of contributions from many different sources, ethnic and otherwise. The design metaphor may provide a more apt picture of contemporary ethnicity in the United States.⁵

⁵ Consider these metaphors and models that have been used to cast illumination on the complexities of the ethnic situation in the United States:

- melting-pot metaphor (emerging culture)
- salad-bowl metaphor (democratic pluralism)
- cultural mosaic (impact-integration)

(cont'd..)

Another positive use of metaphor can be found in gender as a personal context for understanding identity. Today's modern male is literally trying to create his own metaphors to fit the changing circumstances of his life. Psychologists have called the technique for examining old metaphors and exchanging them for new ones 'metaphor analysis' (Deshler, 1990). The task for the social scientist has been to unravel the meanings that are communicated through such 'metaphors of masculinity.'

Figurative language creates metaphoric visions that can have both positive and negative effects. Unfortunately, metaphor too often presents a one-sided view of reality. In my book, *Metaphors of Identity*, (1993), by way of example, I examine the insider-outsider issues for gays and lesbians using the metaphor of 'closet' as this imagery has been employed in contemporary discourse on homosexuality.

Although the development and maintenance of personal identity for homosexuals cannot be divorced from the background of a largely repressive heterosexual world, this dialectic may be more complex and contradictory than our metaphors of identity allow for at this time. Both gays and nongays are guilty of using the 'closet'

Note, however, that 'assimilation,' for many, is still a negative metaphor suggesting forced acculturation, in spite of the fact that a great deal of cultural assimilation has already taken place among immigrants in the US. Hansen's law, perhaps largely a fiction of upper-income intellectuals, is really about 'what the son **wishes** to forget, the grandson **wishes** to remember', with emphasis on **wishing** rather than reality.

metaphor to symbolise and justify 'exclusion' and 'exclusiveness' respectively.

Metaphor, then, is always partial; it dictates certain associations while denying others. Thus, image-metaphors are rarely free from ambiguity. When gay males and lesbians argue for a separate 'culture' - in essence, for the retention of a 'closet' mentality - they may inadvertently perpetuate a 'stranger' role: the metaphor of social stranger being the most persistent and accurate image-metaphor for contemporary gays in America.

Aristotle is said to have described metaphor as 'midway between the unintelligible and the commonplace' (quoted in Lodge, 1988: 112). Despite the wonderful richness of such imagery, metaphors are, nonetheless, limited. This insight was dramatically evident in researching the anthropological literature on aging and identity. Our metaphors about the aged have so dramatically altered over the years that even trying to summarise earlier points of view - using now-discarded metaphors like 'the over-ripe' from older ethnographic accounts - has proven both problematic and puzzling in more modern contexts.

Metaphorical images quickly go out of style; the literature on aging illustrates this phenomenon nicely. Metaphor always depends on conventional cultural knowledge and values.

In considering the effects of technology on cultural and social discourse, communication scholars have addressed the complex relationships between modern-

day communication technologies, culture and community. Is technology causing the disappearance of community, or are we simply witnessing different types of community based on the potentialities of the new media technologies? One can argue, as Kenneth Gergen (1991) and I (1993) have both done, that our largely 'romantic' responses to the processes of modernisation have profoundly affected our understanding of community itself. Community has become the romantic metaphor of our times.

However, to make the equation even more daunting, we live in an information society where the dominant metaphors of the times are themselves becoming quickly obsolete (Toffler, 1990: 86). Thus, we seem to be in perpetual search for new vocabularies of identity.

The central tensions between groups today do not appear to be primarily about culture, but originate more in inequalities over **power** and **participation** in society. Groups are literally trying to 'invent cultures' through self-construction. Identity rather than culture, then, is the point here. In fact, the metaphors that fuel the culture debates today are themselves ripe for mis-interpretation.

The so-called 'culture debates,' as the Spindlers (1991:80) have so eloquently written, do not necessarily celebrate diversity in American life; they may just as well constitute 'a rejection of increasing cultural diversity in America'.

Although the 'multicultural debates' are one of the central intellectual arguments of our times, there is still a wide

discrepancy between rhetoric (unsupported discourse) and reality about this subject. Much of the problem, as I now see it, seems to revolve around social injustices, or perceived inequalities, among the historically deprived minorities within our common American culture: women, blacks, gays, the elderly, and the handicapped. The real issue, then, is not really culture, but the need to have minority 'voices' heard, to use Gergen's metaphor for this phenomenon.

When considering the heated debates over 'multiculturalism', Gergen (1991: 257) makes the sensible suggestion that we shift our focus from principles and abstractions to the participants themselves. Only then, he argues, are you likely to hear the 'voices' of these historically deprived groups, without having to automatically reject the rhetorical message that is so often contradictory.

While researching for **Metaphors of Identity**, I began to see that, by focusing on identity rather than culture per se, regardless of whether or not such groups any longer have separate cultures (even subcultures), they still have the need for separate identities. In the name of 'culture,' then, more and more people in the United States are trying to claim valid identities for themselves, thereby hoping to achieve more social equality. Nonetheless, identity should not be confused with culture.

However, the media and other information channels have actually perpetuated various misleading metaphors about identity and culture, so misleading in fact that there is now serious confusions about 'race' and culture,

social class and culture, and homophobia and culture, and so on.

Media-induced cultural homogenisation of Western societies is a contemporary reality not easily denied. At the same time, one cannot ignore the resurgence of minority consciousness in modern times, which largely takes the form of identity assertions - albeit, articulated as cultural rhetoric. Social changes and culture change, however, are not identical; and to confuse the two often leads to serious misinterpretations about communication.

Reaching beyond culture, how do we maintain the positive aspects of human identity: the celebration of diversity and the re-affirmation of our common humanity, a sense of being part of a larger community? Rather than blaming technology for social dislocations, the public needs to be more reflective of how it interacts with and utilises the existing media. I argue in **Metaphors of Identity** that there is as much potential in a communication-based 'community' today as there was in previous attempts at creating the elusive romantic metaphor of community.

In summary, although literal descriptions have their limitations, metaphorical ones - increasingly subject to ideological manipulations - call for constant scrutiny. Despite the wonderful richness of such imagery, metaphor in scientific discourse remains problematic at several levels. When judging the 'elegance' of research models, the effectiveness of its 'guiding metaphors' must always be carefully evaluated.

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Composition of Boards of Directors and Interlocks in New Zealand, 1987 to 1993

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Previous research on interlocking directorates has neglected to ask the question: which board members hold the most positions on the boards of other companies?. To answer this question, we examine the formal positions of all directors of New Zealand public listed companies in 1987, 1990 and 1993. We find that some directors do indeed hold more positions on the boards of other companies. Of particular note, chairpersons and their deputies were found to hold consistently more positions (interlocks) on the boards of other corporations than all other directors. Also, non-executive directors were found to have more interlocks than executive directors. These results indicate that there is an 'inner circle' of directors holding the majority of interlocks among the inner circle of directors holding all interlocks.

Introduction

The role of boards of directors and their position and function within society has been subject to research since the start of the twentieth century (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). In particular, the study of interlocking directorships has prompted much debate over the power

* The views expressed by the authors do not necessarily represent those of the Ministry of Commerce

of boards and the exercise of directors' power (Schoorman, Bazerman and Atkin, 1981). In more recent times, research has explored the causes of interlocking directorates, with the resulting schools of thought providing quite different frameworks to explain this phenomenon (Boyd, 1990; Useem, 1980; Richardson, 1987). We use one of these schools of thought, namely class hegemony theory, as the basis for examining directors and their influence in New Zealand public listed companies. In the next section, we summarise class hegemony theory and its relevance to interlocking directorships research. We then proceed to generate the hypothesis which will allow us to determine whether there is an 'inner circle' within the group of all directors. This is followed by an examination of the method used and the results found. The article ends with a discussion of these results.

Summary of Previous Class Hegemony Research

Class hegemony theorists propose that individuals who hold multiple directorships form the inner circle of a corporate elite (Davis and Powell, 1992) called a 'unified class stratum' which transcend inter-firm and inter-industry competition (Useem, 1980:62). Members of the inner circle have the capacity to act in the political and financial interests of this elite, which they use to control corporate resources (Useem, 1980, 1984). A lack of evidence to support the control motive of interlocks (Roy 1981; Zajac, 1988) has led class hegemony theorists to describe the inner circle as a way of maintaining class cohesion. Thus interlocks are viewed as a means of supporting the corporate elite by the dissemination and

diffusion of information rather than the exercise of explicit control (Davis and Powell, 1992; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Useem, 1984).

Class hegemony research describes boards as the inner circle of the corporate elite and aims to answer the question, '[d]o those who sit at the centre of the web of interlocking directorates between corporations ... have a special position in the class?' (Zeitlin, 1974:226). Inner circle research has examined boards members as composite units, or as insiders and outsiders¹ (Bearden and Mintz, 1984; Fennema, 1982) in terms of the interlocks they hold. Outsiders are found to have the most interlocks because they are free from specific corporate ties (Bearden and Mintz, 1987; Fennema, 1982). One shortcoming of this research is that it has, hitherto, not explicitly differentiated between more distinct holders of board positions eg. chairpersons, deputy chairpersons, and chief executive officers.

Pettigrew (1992) classifies the study of managerial elites into six themes, including the study of interlocking directorates and the composition of boards. He describes the different lines of research as 'often separated areas of intellectual inquiry' (Pettigrew, 1992:164). It is therefore not surprising that only one previous paper (Dooley, 1969) has examined the relationship between board composition and interlocks. Other board composition research has typically focused

¹ The terms 'insiders' and 'outsiders' typically equate with executive and non-executive directors respectively. However, some studies take a wider view and, for example, include among the insider group retired executives or other former employees.

on board composition and profitability (Dalton and Kesner, 1987; Pearce and Zahra, 1989; Rechner and Dalton, 1991).

While multiple directorships are held by all types of directors, only the research of Dooley (1969) examines formal board positions to determine whether it is certain members of the board or the board in its entirety that hold the majority of multiple directorships and make up the inner circle. Dooley (1969), in the managerialist tradition of the time, studied the proportion of executive directors on the board to proxy management control of boards in order to determine whether management controlled boards had more company interlocks than owner dominated boards. He found the frequency of interlocks declined as the proportion of executive officers on the board increased.

The research presented here takes both a different view on boards of directors and the interpretation of Dooley's findings. Our aim is to examine the effect of the formal title and role held by each director on the number of interlocks these directors hold. We seek to discover whether there is an inner circle among Useem's (1984) inner circle of all interlocking directors with holders of some board positions predominating within the web of interlocks between companies.

Hypotheses

In terms of Scott's (1991) typology, our research uses directors as the unit of analysis and enterprise relations

(the multiple directorate) as the tie which links the units in the network.

1. Executive Directors and Non-Executive Directors

Prior research indicates that non-executive directors have fewer interlocks (Bearden and Mintz, 1987; Dooley, 1969; Fennema, 1982). The role of executive directors is to focus on the activities of the company in which they are employed. As a result of this focus, these directors have little time to hold other board positions. Non-executive directors may be considered senior to executive directors in terms of acting as representatives on other boards. Many of these directors may once have been executives themselves (Bearden and Mintz, 1987; Fennema, 1982), allowing them the opportunity to develop informal networks which will be of value in both obtaining board positions and in performing effectively as a director.

Kotter (1982) first alluded to the network building function of what he described as the 'effective' general manager. Luthans, Rosenkrantz and Hennessey (1985) note that the most successful managers were those most involved with networking activity and interacting with people outside the firm. Research indicates that the effective chief executive officer (CEO) develops a network of contacts around and among the business community at large. Other studies (Kotter, 1990; Cammock, 1992) also affirm the importance of the network function in top level managers. Assuming that selection processes allow mostly 'effective' managers to

become executives, it is likely that most executives will have a network of associates in the business community. The role of the non-executive who has executive experience is to use this experience and networks gained while an executive to benefit the firm by gathering information and reducing environmental uncertainty (Pennings, 1980; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1987). The non-executive brings in these additional resources in part by gaining membership to, and sitting on, boards.

From the previous discussion we derived the following hypotheses. The second hypothesis is a refinement on the first and is based on the assumption that if executive directors as a whole have less interlocks than all other directors, then CEOs will have even fewer:

- H1: Executive directors have fewer interlocks than non-executive directors.
- H2: CEOs (excluding chairpersons) have fewer interlocks than all other directors.

2. Chairpersons and Non-Chairpersons

As leader of the board, the chairperson - and to a lesser extent the holder of the deputy chair - have key roles in the strategic decision-making process (Thain and Leighton, 1992). The perspective of interlocks offered by resource dependence theory is that interlocks are a means of enhancing strategic decision-making by gathering information from the environment and thus reducing resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik,

1971; Pfeffer, 1987). As a key figure in the strategic decision making process, the holder of the chair might be expected to hold more board memberships. Oliver (1990) notes that network ties can serve to increase an organisations legitimacy by associating an organisation with prestigious board members. As the representative of the board, the board chair may typically be offered to such a member. Thus, the board member who holds the chair may be expected to hold more interlocks because of legitimacy effects. From the foregoing, we derive the following hypotheses:

- H3: Chairpersons and deputies have more interlocks than all other directors.
- H4: Chairpersons have more interlocks than all other directors.

Method

A list of directors and the position held by each director was collected for all companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange in one or more of the following years: 1987, 1990 and 1993. Data sources comprised annual reports, *The New Zealand Business Who's Who* and *The New Zealand Company Register*. The number of companies examined was 292 for 1987, 143 for 1990 and 133 for 1993. The positions of board members, ie. directorship positions, were classified in the following manner: executive chairs; non-executive chairs; executive deputy chairs; non-executive deputy chairs; CEO only; other non-executives; other executives. For the executive chairs and executive deputy chairs

category, we noted whether the holder of that position was also the CEO.

In each of the years 1987, 1990 and 1993, we looked at each director on each board and determined the number of other boards he or she also served on. We refer to this number as the number of interlocks each director has. Following data collection, data were analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) for Windows.

Results

Table 1 shows the number of directorships and mean number of interlocks for each directorship position in the years 1987, 1990 and 1993. Mean interlocks measure the mean number of companies linked by a particular directorship position. Total directorship positions declined from 1987 (1793 directorship positions) to 1993 (817 directorship positions) as a result of a declining number of companies in the population, which is directly attributable to the 1987 crash. As a result of these factors, the mean number of directorships held by each position declined.

A ranking of directorship positions - by interlocks held - is also presented in Table 1. Chairpersons (both executive and non-executive) and non-executive deputy chairpersons have the highest number of interlocks over the period. Executive and chief executive officers who are directors have consistently the lowest number of interlocks, while non-executive directors remain in the middle of the scale.

Table 1

DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORSHIP POSITIONS RANKED BY INTERLOCKS

	1987			1990			1993		
	No. of Positions	Mean Rank	Interlocks	No. of Positions	Mean Rank	Interlocks	No. of Positions	Mean Rank	Interlocks
Executive Chairs	54	1.15	2	25	0.84	1	24	0.75	2
Non-Executive Chairs	237	1.60	1	116	0.80	2	109	0.75	2
Executive Deputy Chairs	15	1.13	4	2	0.50	5	3	0.33	4
Non Executive Deputy Chairs	53	1.23	3	22	0.73	3	22	0.91	1
Other Non-Executives	1019	0.90	5	456	0.54	4	485	0.58	3
Chief Executives Only	182	0.55	6	86	0.20	7	83	0.22	5
Other Executive Directors	233	0.40	7	107	0.30	6	91	0.21	6
Totals	1793			814			817		

Table 2

CLASSIFIED DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECTORSHIP POSITIONS*

	1987			1990			1993		
	No. of Positions	Percent	Mean Interlocks	No. of Positions	Percent	Mean Interlocks	No. of Positions	Percent	Mean Interlocks
Distribution by Executive Status									
Executives	484	0.27	0.56	220	0.27	0.32	201	0.25	0.28
Non-executives	1309	0.73	1.04	594	0.73	0.6	616	0.75	0.62
Distribution by Chief Executive Status									
Chief Executives	239	0.13	0.65	111	0.14	0.33	109	0.13	0.34
Other Directors	1554	0.87	0.95	703	0.86	0.56	708	0.87	0.57
Distribution by Chair Status									
Chairpersons	291	0.16	1.52	141	0.17	0.81	133	0.16	0.75
Other directors	1502	0.84	0.79	673	0.83	0.47	684	0.84	0.5
Distribution by Chair and Deputy Chair Status									
Chairperson and Deputies	359	0.20	1.46	165	0.20	0.79	158	0.19	0.77
Other Directors	1434	0.80	0.77	649	0.80	0.46	659	0.81	0.48
Totals	1793			814			817		

* Analysis of variance reveals statistically significant ($p=0.01$) differences in the number of mean interlocks between each of the four pairs of director types tested. These differences were significant in each of the years 1987, 1990 and 1993.

We now test the four hypotheses outlined earlier (refer Table Two for a summary of interlocks by directorship positions). In doing so, we illustrate any differences in interlocking directorships between holders of distinct directorship positions with reference to the most recent year of data that was collected, namely 1993.

Distribution by executive status shows that non-executives have significantly more interlocks ($p=.001$) than executives, supporting hypothesis 1. Non-executive directors have approximately twice as many interlocks as executive directors, a relationship which remains stable over time. For example, in 1993 executives held an average of 0.28 interlocks, compared to 0.62 for non-executives.

Distribution by chief executive status reveals that chief executives have significantly less ($p=.001$) interlocks than all other directors, allowing hypothesis 2 to be accepted. This relationship also remains stable over time. For 1993, we find that the mean interlocks for chief executives is 0.34 compared to 0.57 for all other directors.

In comparing chairpersons and their deputies against all other director, we find that they have a significantly higher mean level of interlocks than do all other directors combined ($p=.001$), supporting hypothesis 3. For example, in 1993, the mean number of interlocks held by chairpersons and their deputies was 0.77, compared to a mean of 0.48 for all other directors combined.

Furthermore, hypothesis 4 is supported. Chairpersons have significantly more interlocks ($p=.001$) than all other

directors combined. This relationship is also stable over time. In 1993, the mean number of interlocks for chairpersons was 0.75, compared to 0.5 for all other directors.

Discussion

The results have several interesting implications. First, for class hegemony research, the results suggest that chairpersons and their deputies are an inner circle among the inner circle of all directors. However, we do not believe that a structural analysis of networks of interlocking directorates in itself can be used to draw significant conclusions. As noted by Fox, Roy and Walker (1994) and Roy, Fox and Hamilton (1994), the interlocks identified by network analysis are **potential** interlocks only. Further evidence of the actual usage of network ties is needed before any inferences about corporate power can be drawn. Qualitative research, especially observation and interviews of boards (such as those conducted by Higley, Deacon and Paul, 1977; Mace, 1971; Woodward, 1980) could identify the actual usage of networks. This applies equally to the second area important for resource dependence and interlock-performance research.

Resource dependence research documents an association between board size, interlocks and uncertainty (Boyd, 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Schoorman, Bazerman and Atkin, 1981). Boyd (1990) found that successful firms in uncertain environments had smaller board sizes and more interlocks, although

some research suggests an opposite relationship (Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994). Interlocks have also been associated in some studies with superior financial performance (Pennings, 1980; Richardson, 1987).

Boards with more non-executive directors have also been linked to superior financial performance (Bearden and Mintz, 1987; Dooley, 1969; Fennema, 1982; Vance, 1964). This suggests an interesting relationship between the number of outside directors (or as our research would more precisely indicate, the number of non-executives, and the existence of a deputy chairperson), the larger number of interlocks these directors have over other directors (excluding chairpersons) and the performance of firms. Specifically firms with superior performance related to interlocks will have more non-executive directors, and are more likely to have a deputy chairman.

In terms of duality research - which has found that boards with independent board chairs out-perform those where the CEO is also chairperson (Rechner and Dalton, 1991) and that boards with more interlocks out-perform those with less - our findings do not suggest that this is because executive chairpersons have less interlocks and therefore less environmental linkages. The role of chairperson would appear to supersede the executive function and executive chairpersons have as many directorships as non-executive chairpersons.

Our findings demonstrate the existence of an elite group within the elite of all directors of New Zealand public companies. The findings also indicate that the classification of board members into insiders and

outsiders may well be imprecise. Future research using qualitative methods is likely to have further implications for resource dependence and class hegemony research.

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Pharmacy Ownership in New Zealand: The Debate in the 1930s and the Impact of the First Labour Government

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ABSTRACT:

Pharmacy ownership was, and continues to be, a contentious issue in New Zealand. The argument over whether the state should regulate pharmacy ownership or whether this should be left to the market reached its peak in the 1930s and again in the 1980s. The question of the form of intervention was also contested. Pharmacists wanted the exclusion of non-pharmacist owners, and in particular large chain store operations. The interventionist policies of the 1935 Labour Government were not quite in accord with this, but a kind of compromise was reached where pharmacy was subject to state licensing and a considerable degree of state control.

In the 1980s, there was considerable political debate and lobbying over the issue of pharmacy ownership. Various reviews concluded that ownership should be de-regulated in some way. This culminated in the preparation of the 1989 Pharmacy Bill, which went before a Select Committee, but was not passed before the 1990 election. This Bill has not been re-activated, but the issue of pharmacy ownership is still on the political agenda. The roots of this debate can be traced to the 1930s, a decade in which pharmacy ownership was also seen as an important political issue.

The 1930s were a crucial decade in the history of New Zealand pharmacy. The 1938 Social Security Act, and the resulting provision of free medicines (from 1941) were crucial to the future security and prosperity of retail pharmacies. Pharmacists were generously reimbursed for dispensing these medicines, and the design of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme guaranteed that they gained considerably from the resulting huge increases in the range, price and volume of drugs provided free.

However, by the late 1930s, pharmacists were already well-placed to establish what was to be a lucrative relationship with the state, as a result of the Labour Government's intervention in retail pharmacy under the Industrial Efficiency Act 1936. As part of the Labour Government's industrial policy, pharmacies had been made subject to licensing and a detailed plan had been prepared for the 'rehabilitation' of the industry. Pharmacists' interests were represented within the state by the Pharmacy Plan Industrial Committee, and regulations protected and strengthened the small-business structure of pharmacy. This guaranteed that pharmacists themselves, rather than non-pharmacist employers, would benefit from the increased income from dispensing free medicines. Thus, pharmacists gained from their strategic location as both businesses regulated under the Industrial Efficiency Act, and as a professional group distributing medicines as part of the new Social Security system.

This paper provides some background on the issue of pharmacy ownership and the state of pharmacy in New Zealand in the 1930s, before describing the debate over pharmacy ownership. At the beginning of the 1930s, any

person could own any number of pharmacies, provided they were managed by qualified pharmacists. By the end of the decade, the model of the 'one-man' shop, owned by a qualified pharmacist was enshrined in law, and the right to open a new pharmacy had to be bestowed by the Bureau of Industry. This paper traces the way in which state interventionism, pharmacists' interest, small business ideology, and emerging nationalism converged to create this situation. It describes the furore surrounding the entry of Boots (a British pharmacy chain) into the New Zealand market and the response of pharmacists and the Coalition, and then Labour Governments, to this.


Models of Pharmacy Ownership

In almost all Western countries, retail pharmacies are privately owned. In New Zealand, the possibility of nationalising pharmacy was mentioned in the late 1930s, when the Industries and Commerce Select Committee suggested that the government investigate the possibility of the establishment of a National Pharmacy Service. This does not appear to have been done. Instead, the government chose to limit pharmacy ownership through legislation and regulation, while leaving ownership in the hands of private individuals and companies.

In regulating pharmacy ownership, governments must make three separate but related decisions. Firstly, should pharmacies be licensed, or should their distribution be determined by the market and the desires of individual pharmacists? Licensing allows state control over the number and geographical location of

pharmacies. It is likely to be particularly popular in countries where there are large, sparsely populated areas where access to pharmaceutical services is likely to be problem, or where there is some other reason for dissatisfaction with the market-based distribution of pharmacies. Secondly, should ownership be restricted to pharmacists? This is particularly likely where pharmacists have successfully made strong claims to professional abilities which might make them more suitable owners of pharmacies than non-pharmacists. Thirdly, should individuals or companies be allowed to own more than one pharmacy? This depends on whether the small independent business or the large chain are regarded as more desirable.

Figure 1: Options for Regulating Pharmacy Ownership



Although these are separate decisions, and therefore all combinations are possible, some are more likely than others. For instance a 'market' model of pharmacy is likely to combine lack of licensing, non-pharmacists ownership and multiple pharmacy ownership. This is the case in the USA. A 'state' model is likely to combine licensing, prohibitions against non-pharmacist and multiple pharmacy ownership. This is the case in Finland and Norway (with the exception of 'subsidiary pharmacies').

In light of this, New Zealand has had quite a strange history of pharmacy ownership restrictions. Prior to 1938, pharmacy ownership fitted the 'market' model (box a). In the 1930s, pressure mounted from pharmacists to move to the non-licensed, pharmacist only model (boxes b or c). However, because of the co-incidence of this pressure and the industrial policy of the First Labour Government, New Zealand moved, in 1938, to the licensed model. But it was, at least officially, a model which allowed the existence of non-pharmacist and multiple ownership (box d). The reasons for this are the subject of this article. In 1954, licensing was removed, but restrictions against non-pharmacist and multiple ownership were instituted (box b).

New Zealand Pharmacy in the 1930s.

The major influence on pharmacists' work in the twentieth century has been the growth of the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. The preparation of drugs moved away from pharmacists' shops, to factories owned by national and international companies.

Thus, throughout the twentieth century, pharmacists' work has changed from small-scale manufacturing of drugs from raw materials, to the dispensing of ready-made products. Pharmacy has changed from a craft-based occupation, in which manual dexterity and a knowledge of drug formulations was taught through apprenticeships, to a science-based occupation in which the scientific basis of modern drugs is learnt in a full-time university course.

In the 1930s, New Zealand was in the grip of a major depression. New Zealanders had experienced a 20% drop in their real standard of living. In the first half of the decade, the ruling Coalition Government under Prime Minister Forbes, had attempted to balance the budget by increasing taxes and reducing expenditure (Sinclair, 1991; Brooking, 1992).

In pharmacy, a large number of small (mostly 'one-man') shops were struggling to compete for a small market. There were no pharmacy chains. Pharmacists were dependent on both dispensing and on retail activities for their income. They sold a range of retail goods now sold in supermarkets. Prices were governed largely by tradition and pharmacy training was by apprenticeship supplemented by evening classes.

The Arrival of Boots

Boots the Chemists (NZ) Ltd, the New Zealand subsidiary of a British pharmacy chain, have played a central role in the whole history of pharmacy ownership

in New Zealand¹. The introduction of pharmacy licensing and ownership regulations appears to have been due to the organised responses of New Zealand pharmacists to Boots' arrival on the retail scene in 1935 and their subsequent expansion. The problem of how to respond to Boots' arrival was dealt with first by the Coalition Government, and then the Labour Government.

Prior to 1935, non-pharmacists could own pharmacies, although the business had to be under the immediate control and supervision of a pharmacist (box a in the model above). Pharmacists wanted ownership restricted to qualified pharmacists. On a number of occasions, they had used the courts to protest any perceived infringements of the letter of the law (Norris, 1993).

Boots (NZ) had become incorporated in 1923. Boots' representatives later claimed that this move was misunderstood by New Zealand pharmacists. Boots apparently were not intending to start retail operations within New Zealand. Nevertheless, Boots' goods were boycotted by New Zealand pharmacists (Combes, 1981, p145). In 1935, Boots sent representatives to New Zealand to investigate the viability of opening a chain of retail pharmacies (Deputation to the Minister of Health by Boots representatives, 9/10/35). Sites for two shops (in Queen St, Auckland and Willis St, Wellington), were purchased to 'test the business relationships which might

¹ The term 'chemist' was the most widely used one for retail pharmacists at the time. It is still frequently used by the public although seldom by pharmacists. Throughout this paper, I have used the terms interchangeably

be established with the public generally' (Deputation to the Minister of Health, 1935).

New Zealand pharmacists were warned of this move in September 1935 in the *Pharmaceutical Journal of New Zealand* (Combes, 1981:145). A group known as the 'Christchurch Chemists Special Committee' was formed and prepared a circular to be distributed to every pharmacist in New Zealand. Entitled 'The Menace of Company Pharmacy', it contained arguments against Boots and in favour of the individual ownership of pharmacy. Pharmacists were urged to use these and 'Wire, Write, Phone or Talk' to their MP 'Today' (Christchurch Chemists Special Committee, 27/9/35). The arguments of the committee rested on the professional motivations and services of pharmacists. Small, New Zealand-owned pharmacies where pharmacists were part of the community were contrasted with large, profit-oriented, overseas chains who treated pharmacy purely as a business activity. Pharmacists attempted to frame themselves as a profession which should be sheltered from market forces. They argued that they were motivated by service values, rather than solely by profits. As evidence of this, they pointed to the establishment of the College of Pharmacy, the running of All Night Dispensaries, and the free or low cost medicines to those in need. The committee claimed that company pharmacy would eliminate opportunities for self employment and concentrate profits in the hands of a few (Christchurch Chemists Special Committee, 27/9/35).

In October, the situation started to heat up. The Pharmacy Board² suggested and prepared an amendment to the existing Pharmacy Act, restricting company pharmacy. Letters and deputations from pharmacists and Boots were sent to the Coalition government and the Christchurch Special Committee sent a strictly confidential progress report to all chemists. This reported that the Amendment to the Pharmacy Act was before Cabinet. It gave strict instructions about the actions required from pharmacists. They were asked to remember that

we are not asking for legislation as 'traders' but are asking for protection as a 'profession'. The Government might be diffident in introducing general legislation to protect one trade from competition; such legislation might create an awkward precedent, but we ARE asking for protection of our profession (Christchurch Chemists Special Committee, n.d.).

This was an important distinction. Pharmacists were stressing that pharmacy was not an ordinary business, but a professional activity, and so deserved special treatment.

Instructions were given about what to say in telegrams but chemists were instructed:

² The Pharmacy Board was the ruling body of the Pharmaceutical Society, the organisation to which all New Zealand pharmacists must belong.

Don't use these identical words. It will be [no] use (sic) any M.P. getting ten telegrams exactly the same. Use your originality....

NOT A FEW CHEMISTS

NOT A HUNDRED CHEMISTS

NOT MOST CHEMISTS

BUT EVERY CHEMIST IN NEW ZEALAND MUST
FIGHT FOR HIMSELF AND US ALL NOW ...

MAKE A NOTE OF WHAT TO DO AND THEN BURN
THIS LETTER (Christchurch Chemists Special
Committee, n.d.)

The advent of Boots allowed pharmacists to link their traditional reasons for wanting to restrict pharmacy ownership with patriotic and egalitarian ideals. Boots was presented as a large, foreign firm wanting to displace small, New Zealand, owner-operated businesses solely to increase its already large profits. Ownership restrictions would let young men set up in their own businesses and be their own bosses.

The Special Committee seems to have been very successful in mobilising pharmacists. The government received a great many telegrams from pharmacists opposing the entry of Boots, and urging the government to protect New Zealand pharmacists against this competition.

The Coalition Government appears to have been sympathetic to the New Zealand chemists' cause. The government assured Boots that they would not jeopardise the two shops they were already committed to, but advised them not to open any more shops. They threatened to rush through legislation to stop Boots unless they promised not to open any more shops in the short term (Deputations to Minister of Health by Boots representatives, 9/10/35 and 15/10/35). Boots responded that the two shops had been an experiment to determine the viability of eventually opening 25 to 30 shops (Boots Pure Drug Company Ltd, 14/10/35).

Boots attempted to counter the pharmacists' arguments by pointing out their 'desire to use Dominion [ie, New Zealand] labour wherever possible' (Boots Chemists (NZ) Ltd, 14/10/35). In contrast to the pharmacists, Boots clearly framed the issue as protection of pharmacists' business interests. As business-people, pharmacists should, they argued, be exposed to competition. Pharmacists' opposition, Boots claimed, was motivated by fear of declining prices and thus, the 'issue is clearly between a particular vested interest and the general interests of the public' (Boots the Chemists, 16/10/35).

Although the Coalition Government seems to have been sympathetic to the pharmacists' concerns their response may have been affected by pressure from the British Government to allow Boots entry to the New Zealand market. The British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs sent a telegram to the New Zealand Governor-General expressing the 'earnest' hope that the growth of Boots ('an important United Kingdom interest') would not be impeded (British Secretary of State for Dominion

Affairs, 16/10/35). This message was conveyed by the Governor General (Bledisloe, 18/10/35). At this time, the New Zealand Governor General was a representative of the British Government, rather than the Crown (McIntyre, 1992:346).

There is some evidence that this opposition from Britain caused the delay in enacting legislation. Pharmacists were told that the government 'did not want to cause ill-feeling in the old country by putting hurried legislation through without a thorough investigation' (Pharmacy Board and Friendly Societies, 23/10/35). The possibility of upsetting sensitive trade negotiations with Britain seems to have been behind this concern (Anon, 18/10/35).

The Pharmacy Board continued its campaign to have pharmacy ownership restricted to pharmacists. The Board met with government representatives at least five times in just over a week between 15 and 23 October. Boots agreed not to buy any more shops in the short term until the government could conduct an inquiry.

On 27 November, the Labour Party won a landslide victory, and became the government on 6 December (McLauchlan et al, 1986: 259). The new government was also sympathetic to the New Zealand pharmacists' concerns, although files in the National Archives suggest it may have been less so than the Coalition Government. The Labour Government passed an amendment to the Pharmacy Act prohibiting any person or company from opening a pharmacy, except for registered pharmacists intending to keep a shop in their own right, for twelve

months. This was to give the government time to consider the issue (Cachemaille, 3/1/36).

The Labour Government was sympathetic to the patriotic concerns raised by the pharmacists. They wanted to 'safeguard industry in New Zealand against operatives from abroad' (M.J. Savage in Anon, 15/10/36).

Because the Labour Government believed in a managed economy, shaped by government regulation, they were concerned about 'uneconomic competition' between pharmacies. Too many small units were believed to be causing high prices for consumers. The unfettered operation of the market was seen as leading to unnecessary duplication and inefficiency. The self-interested actions of individual pharmacists, in setting up and running small pharmacies, was seen to be leading to the down-grading of the whole industry. The Labour Government strongly believed in the need for intervention into markets like this to bring about efficient outcomes.

The government believed that pharmacy needed support and re-organisation so that it could compete 'fairly' with overseas operators. The inefficiency of existing pharmacies meant they could be undercut by better organised chains. The goal of policy was to eliminate the problem of too many pharmacies, and to reduce prices to consumers. This was also partly in preparation for the introduction of free prescribed medicines under the Social Security scheme. The primary method of re-organisation was to be control over the number of pharmacies, rather than the restriction of ownership to

pharmacists, which pharmacists wanted. A telegram to the Queensland premier admitted:

Confidentially government has open mind on question company pharmacy believing it may be possible under bureau control to reorganise private chemists and restrict uneconomic overlapping so they may be able to compete on fair basis while at same time company extension may be controlled (Department of Health, 18/11/36).

This suggests that at this stage, the Labour Government may have envisaged allowing overseas chains to enter New Zealand more freely after pharmacy was reorganised.

The petitions and depositions continued. Parliament referred the question to the Industries and Commerce Select Committee (Department of Industries and Commerce Annual Report, 1936, p.5). It is clear that the Labour Government was framing the issue of protection for pharmacists as a commercial or business problem. Pharmacists had not been successful in representing themselves as a profession needing protection. The Committee heard a huge amount of evidence from pharmacists, Boots and others (Combes, 1981, pp.145-150), and reported (9/6/36) that the difference in prescription prices charged by Boots and private chemists was due to Boots' mass production facilities and the high overheads of private chemists. These were caused by an unnecessarily large number of pharmacies. The committee recommended that pharmacy be regulated by licences controlled by the

Minister of Industries and Commerce. This would mean the establishment of state control over the number of pharmacies, their distribution, and who was to own them. The committee also recommended that company pharmacy not be allowed to extend its operations for six months, giving the New Zealand pharmacists time to 'organise and plan their operations with the object of reducing the present scale of prices to the consumer, while at the same time providing an adequate payment for services rendered' (Department of Industries and Commerce, 'Pharmacy Industry: Introductory' n.d.).

Pharmacists' attempts to have ownership restrictions introduced to keep Boots out of the New Zealand retail pharmacy market were partially successful. It appears that the Coalition Government was taking seriously the possibility of outlawing company pharmacy, but they may have wanted to delay the issue because of the implications for British trade. For the Labour Government, the concern about pharmacy ownership coincided with their beliefs about the benefits of state intervention in the economy. Their response was not to comply with pharmacists wishes for ownership restrictions, but to institute a range of measures including licensing of pharmacies. This gave the state increased control over pharmacy and alleviated what the Labour Government saw as the central problem of pharmacy: too many small and uneconomic units.

The Impact of the Industrial Efficiency Act 1936

The election of the Labour Government in 1935, started a marked change in the level of state intervention in the

economy and society. Prior to 1935 state intervention in the economy mainly consisted of providing infrastructure, such as roads and railways (Sinclair, 1980). The 1935 Labour Government saw its role as assisting and rehabilitating industry after the ravages of the great depression. It wanted to provide full employment, and to encourage secondary industry in order to create a more 'balanced' economy (Sinclair, 1980). Import and exchange controls were introduced which sheltered New Zealand businesses from overseas competition. A guaranteed price scheme for agricultural exports was introduced (Hawke, 1992). The 1938 Social Security Act laid the foundation for a reasonably comprehensive welfare state. One of the less discussed aspects of the first Labour Government's policy was direct intervention in a variety of industries, through the Bureau of Industry. Sinclair, (1980), argued that this attempt to rationalise the structure of industry had little effect. However, my research suggests that, for pharmacy at least, it was very significant. Along with the establishment of Pharmaceutical Benefits, it laid the foundations for a significant degree of state intervention in pharmacy.

The cornerstone of this direct government intervention was the Industrial Efficiency Act 1936. It aimed:

to promote the economic welfare of New Zealand by providing for the promotion of new industries in the most economic form and by so regulating the general organisation, development and operation of industries that a greater measure of industrial efficiency will be secured (Boots 1990: 15).

In this legislation, 'industry' could apply to any kind of business - manufacturing or distributing. The Act was administered by a Bureau of Industry which was responsible for the licensing of industries and the preparation of industry plans. Pharmacy was placed under the Bureau, which instituted a licensing system for pharmacies and conducted an inquiry into the problems of pharmacy, with the intention of formulating the industrial plan (Department of Industries and Commerce Annual Report, 1938:21).

By 1938, the Minister of Industries and Commerce reported that 15 industries had been made subject to licensing under the Industrial Efficiency Act. These were a range of manufacturing, importing, wholesale and retail industries, as well as pharmacy (Department of Industries and Commerce Annual Report, 1937-8). The other industries appear to have little similarity to pharmacy, and they clearly illustrate that pharmacy was made subject to licensing not as a health profession, but as a business. In spite of pharmacists' attempts to frame themselves as a profession, the Labour Government's response to their concerns was clearly based on a view of them as business enterprises. Sociologists studying pharmacy have frequently argued that its business character has been an impediment (eg Denzin and Mettlin, 1968; Shuval and Gilbert, 1978). However, New Zealand pharmacy clearly benefited from being classed as a business under the Industrial Efficiency Act 1936.

Under the Industrial Efficiency Act, there was a strong emphasis on gaining and maintaining the support of the industry concerned. Plans and licensing were only carried out if the majority of the people involved in the

industry, as owners, agreed. Licensing was considered to be in the interests of the public and well as the industry, because excessive competition eroded efficiency and service.

The object of licensing is to regulate the entrance of new units into the industry so that there will not be an uneconomic number in the industry involving as this does excessive capitalisation and wasteful competition (Bureau of Industry, 'Information on Licensing and Planning of Industries, n.d.).

Industry leaders were also involved in the formulation of industry plans, which covered such things as quality standards and prices. If the majority of the industry, and the government, agreed, then regulations were made accordingly and the plan became law. In the case of pharmacy, over 90% of pharmacy owners voted for the plan so the Industrial Efficiency (Pharmacy) Regulations 1938 were formulated. Industrial committees, which included representatives from the industry, were appointed to administer plans (Bureau of Industry, 'Information on Licensing and Planning of Industries, n.d.). The Pharmacy Plan Industrial Committee (PPIC) was made up of three government representatives and four pharmacists (3 government nominees, 2 nominees of the Pharmacy Board, 1 UFS Dispensary nominee, and 1 employee nominee) (Myers, 29/4/38).

In the Industrial Efficiency (Pharmacy) Regulations 1938, the Pharmacy Plan Industrial Committee was given very wide powers. It was charged with making recommendations about licence applications, licence

fees and levies and developing a schedule of prices. It was also responsible for carrying out surveys of pharmacies, co-ordinating selling and display methods and the modernisation of pharmacies, and organising and administering the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. It had the power to order pharmacists to furnish accounts, to inspect pharmacies, to arrange amalgamations and transfers of pharmacies, to investigate wholesale prices, to set up an investment fund for pharmacists or to provide loans for them, to arrange for goodwill advertising of pharmacy, and to make sure that pharmacists employed an adequate number of apprentices.

As well as these specified duties, the committee was given the power to 'undertake such other activities as it considers necessary for the effective carrying out of the plan' (Industrial Efficiency (Pharmacy) Regulations, 1938, p.4). The PPIC, and particularly E.R. Myers, the Director of Pharmacy for the Bureau of Industry, became the champion of pharmacists inside central government. The Committee established a prescription pricing system to be observed by all chemists. This was part of the idea of 'rehabilitating' retail pharmacy. The PPIC's pricing system was later adopted as the basis for remuneration of chemists under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. The idea of a generous payment for pharmacists, based on the price of drugs dispensed, was established at this time.

The extent of PPIC support for pharmacy is perhaps best demonstrated by its goodwill advertising. During 1940, the PPIC carried out a six-month 'goodwill advertising' campaign. This informed the public:

that a chemist's dispensing service forms only a minor proportion of his total turnover necessary to keep the pharmacy in operation, and that in order to maintain the dispensing and general emergency services, particularly in suburban and country places, public support is urged in respect of the business in general household drugs and medicines, toilet articles, and chemists' sundries (Department of Industries and Commerce, Annual Report, 1941:13).

In 1942, another advertising campaign, which was also regarded as successful, was undertaken (Department of Industries and Commerce Annual Report, 1943:4). It should be remembered that the PPIC was a state body whose role was to re-organise pharmacy, not an organisation set up to promote the interests of pharmacists.

The licensing of pharmacies meant a degree of state control over the location of pharmacies. It became illegal to operate a pharmacy without a licence, and when applications for a new licence were made, other pharmacists already operating in the area could make objections. This gave those who owned pharmacies a considerable advantage over those who did not, and also probably increased the supply of employee pharmacists as well as guaranteeing a ready market for pharmacies when pharmacists sold them on retirement.

Applications for licences were granted by the Bureau of Industry, but the Bureau did not act without receiving recommendations from the PPIC. The PPIC investigated

applications and made reports to the Bureau (Myers, 14/12/45) and seems to have had real power to make policy about pharmacy.

The aim of licensing was to 'prevent uneconomic overlapping and so bring about stability' (Myers, Entry for a careers booklet, 1944). In the first six years of licensing, 65 transfers were granted (including 46 to those who had not previously owned a pharmacy) and 15 new licences granted (including 10 to those who had not previously owned a pharmacy). Initially the licensing powers were used to reduce the number of pharmacies, in order to make those remaining more economically viable. Although the Bureau could compulsorily close pharmacies, and provide compensation for the owner, this was never done. Instead:

wherever it was found that an owner was a seller, negotiations were entered into for the adjacent pharmacists to buy him out, and no fresh licence would be issued. In other cases a pharmacy would be closed voluntarily. Sometimes an amalgamation of two nearby men would be negotiated (Myers, 14/12/45).

In time, it was judged that the number of pharmacies was appropriate, and as the population expanded new licences were issued.

Licensing, combined with the introduction of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, greatly increased the profitability of pharmacies. Myers suggests there was 'some unrest' among assistants who wanted to own their own pharmacies. In the absence of licensing, the

increased profitability of pharmacy, he claimed, 'could have resulted in a general rush to set up new pharmacies in considerable numbers', which 'could have put the industry back where it was' (Myers, 14/12/45). Licensing meant that the fruits of improved pharmacy profitability due to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme were shared among owner pharmacists instead of leading to a greater number of pharmacies being opened.

Although licensing established government control over the number and location of pharmacies, its implications for multiple ownership and for company pharmacy were less clear. The Provisional Plan stated that 'to provide the primary requirements of the Plan, ... the retention and stability of individual ownership and operation of pharmacies are essential... extension of Company Chain Pharmacy [should] be so limited as to preserve the existence of individual pharmacy' (Myers, 27/3/44). However, under licensing, multiple ownership of pharmacies was not prohibited. Companies or individuals already holding one licence could apply for another supposedly without discrimination (Stevens, 3/6/48). In a memo to the Chairman of the Bureau of Industry, the Director of Pharmacy wondered 'what is individual ownership.... The question arises as to whether the aggregation of several licences in the name of an individual is really individual pharmacy, the retention of which the Provisional Plan states is desirable?' (Myers, 27/3/44). The growth of Boots was impeded by the licensing regulations, but it was not entirely stopped. By 1954, Boots had opened another four pharmacies.

In 1948, towards the end of its fourteen years in power, the Labour Government considered de-licensing pharmacy. Reviewing the impact of licensing, the Chairman of the Bureau of Industry noted that pharmacies were now more efficient and economic and provided a better service to the community. Prices had been stabilised at an economic level and uneconomic units eliminated without force or coercion. The wages and economic outlook for employees were greatly improved. He concluded that 'uneconomic and cut-throat competition caused by ill advised enterprise brings about less efficient service, and, on the part of a small percentage of pharmacists, resource to improper practices' (Stevens, 3/6/48:5). Pharmacy was not de-licensed until five years into a period of a National (ie conservative) Government, in 1954, when ownership regulations were introduced to prevent non-pharmacists owning pharmacies, and prevent ownership of more than one pharmacy.

Conclusion

The 1930s were a key period in the development of New Zealand pharmacy. The dominance of small shops owned by pharmacists was threatened by the arrival of Boots. Pharmacists organised to respond to this threat. Their interests in defending themselves against a large foreign competitor partially co-incided with the interest of the newly-elected Labour Government in re-organising and strengthening New Zealand industry. Pharmacy was licensed under the Industrial Efficiency Act, and this controlled the overall number of pharmacies, limited the spread of chain pharmacy, and improved the profitability

of pharmacy. The Pharmacy Plan Industrial Committee created links between pharmacy and the state, which were later strengthened and made more complex by the establishment of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. The Pharmacy Plan Industrial Committee represented pharmacists' interests within the state. This meant pharmacists were well placed to ensure that the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme provided generous reimbursement rates.

The question of pharmacy ownership was only temporarily resolved by the introduction of pharmacy licensing. When the National Government removed pharmacy licensing in the 1950s, they replaced it with ownership regulations preventing non-pharmacist ownership and the ownership of more than one pharmacy. This full government support for pharmacists' claims was to become problematic again in the 1980s.

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**Review Symposium
Part III**

**Directions in Sociology For New
Zealand/Aotearoa**

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Whereas the symposium in the last issue of *New Zealand Sociology* (Crothers and Pavlich, 1994) reviewed some important trends in sociology internationally, this second installment narrows the focus to review issues facing sociologists based in New Zealand as they practice and develop locally relevant forms of sociology. Such sociologists face many challenges, including how to engage with sociological debates elsewhere in the world without thereby facing the risk of becoming irrelevant to local social contexts. At the same time, the changing conditions of our locale invite, no require, renewed appraisals of sociological practices geared to an evaluation of the associative patterns which comprise New Zealand/Aotearoa 'society'.

Despite a claimed 'economic recovery' as we move through the mid-1990s, a persistent neo-liberalism continues to trap many people in hard times, and refuses to view individuals in 'social' contexts. The globalisation of trade services and telecommunications, the rapid flow of electrically-generated information, the rising enterprise culture that links urban life to a spread of homogeneous

shopping malls and cobble street shopping lanes, are all examples of relational patterns drawn from a global repertoire of possibilities but which are still the products of local, socio-political choices. These require sociological and political understanding, not least of all to counteract the simple and misguided gossip that parades as an economics of inevitable 'market forces'. The local resurgence of social dissent, the ongoing protests, the symbols of a committed resistance to the broken promises of a Treaty are issues which sociology in New Zealand/Aotearoa ignores to its own detriment.

No doubt, the issue of a local sociology is complex. It surely involves more than a clear-cut division between those that argue for a home-grown, indigenised sociology exclusively focused on local context and others that view the local as no more than a case through which to illuminate global sociological themes. An abstracted, global sociology must always be adapted to relate to the localities, regions and countries to which it is applied, and can only be interpreted from the perspectives held within these contexts. Indeed, any global sociology inevitably dissolves into a series of local sociologies which reflect their local contexts. Local sociologies come into their own at the moments when their analyses generate contextually pertinent analyses that positively affects the lives of those to whom they are directed, and that have an impact on sociological practices elsewhere.

However, as a recent article in the SAA(NZ) newsletter observes, unlike Canada and Australia, to give but two examples, a field of 'New Zealand/Aotearoa Studies' has not yet emerged in any formal sense (Crothers, 1994).

This same article urges sociologists to develop material which could take its place within such a framework. This requires local sociologists to take heed of the particularities of New Zealand/Aotearoa, the nuances of context, and to focus to a greater degree on the differences that make this society unique. The call here is not to import overseas frameworks willy nilly, nor to become entirely inward looking; instead, it is to urge sociologists to remain self-reflexive in their attention to global themes, and to be more assertive when placing locally formulated sociological insights on global agendas.

In their various, even disparate, ways, the three papers comprising this symposium either propose visions of sociology in New Zealand/Aotearoa (Shameen), or outline pertinent contextual factors that bear directly on the formation of such a sociology (Casey and Thorns). As one might expect, the themes explored are as wide-ranging as they are divergent, from the global trends that challenge the very idea of a New Zealand/Aotearoa, to personal consequences of exploitation and oppression. Locally-based sociologists will probably find many of the issues raised remarkably familiar, and we hope these contributions assist them to revisit their stances towards current sociological practices.

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Directions for New Zealand Sociology

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In a recent book, *The Coming Fin de Siecle: An application of Durkheim's Sociology to Modernity and Post Modernity*, Mestrovic (1991) points to some of the parallels between the 1880s and 1890s and the 1980s and 1990s when again the end of a century is approached. In the 1880s and 1890s, this period was seen as one of both optimism and pessimism, of a growing cynicism and a view that civilisation would lead to decadence as much as to 'progress'. The still unresolved issue at the end of the last century was 'how to secure a decent just society'. There was the appearance of apocalyptic themes and the destruction of the world was at hand. There were economic crises. For example, the 1890s depression gave rise to a concern for ethics in public life and a distrust of politicians, professionals and lawyers thus prompting a need for a science of morals. Syphilis spread terror and suicide was seen as a social problem.

What of the 1980s and 1990s? Mestrovic sees many parallels. The 'end of modernity' debate has revived a view that 'everything is relative'. A growth in irrationality and cynicism has taken place, and there is a disenchantment with science and scientific rational forms of explanation. There are revivals in religion and a resurgence of concern over national identities. We have turned apocalyptic themes into movies and other forms of entertainment where our planet is saved for us by extra terrestrial beings. Economic crisis has returned with the current depression or is it recession? With this has come a disenchantment with politicians, now universally disliked, and concerns for the probity of lawyers and other professionals, especially in the wake of the company collapses after the share market crash of late 1987. Cynicism and pessimism are again prevalent and increased stress is for many an integral factor in their lives; suicide has become a major problem amongst young people where our rate is now amongst the highest in the world. AIDS provides us with a twentieth century pandemic.

How then do we find sociology as a discipline coping with these changed times? How well does the sociological enterprise look, are we able to address and provide analysis which is relevant to the current set of concerns?

1980s/1990s - Where is Sociology at?

Sociology is at present situated within a debate about modernity and postmodernity. At issue here is whether the world has changed in its fundamentals, or whether we are witnessing yet another re-organisation within the

capitalist mode of operation in response to an accumulation crisis which has required both a new form of production (variously described though usually stressing the growth of flexibility) and a new form of social regulation, centred not around the state but civil society and featuring a greater degree of individualism and market operation (Watson and Gibson, 1993; Thorns, 1992). The sociological debate on the restructuring of industrial capitalism centres around such issues as whether capitalism is now disorganised, fragmented, flexible, 'post modern/post industrial/post fordist and thus whether we have entered 'new times' which require new theories.

Some of the Central Themes for Sociology Within Aotearoa in the 1990s

These themes need to be set within a context which recognises new forms of economic competition within an increasingly global market place, new international divisions of labour, the growing power of finance capital and new forms of ethnic and gender mobilisation and consciousness.

1. Urban and Regional Changes: Continuities as Well as Divergences

In *Changing Places* (Britton et al. 1992), a group of New Zealand geographers have documented many aspects of change to the structure of New Zealand society from the internationalisation of the economy, through to the nature of companies and the workforce to the environment, local government reform and the sense of

place. This is a central agenda of change. Where are the complementary sociological analyses of such changes?

It is necessary to recognise the need for interdisciplinary research programmes and for the development of theories which are capable of making sense of both international shifts and national and local expressions of these trends. However, these can only emerge if sociologists are part of the research process. We cannot leave this task to others. A key question here might be: is the state only less visible or has it really changed in its activities and involvement?

2. Welfare State

Central to the growth and institutionalisation of sociology as a discipline in New Zealand, as much as anywhere else, has been the welfare state. Since the mid-1930s social science has been involved with and largely dependent upon the state for the funding of its research activities. The welfare state also provided a focus for much of our research which identified both the problems and possibilities of state intervention. Sociology has thus historically been strongly linked to the social democratic political agenda. As this has declined, it has created problems for our discipline in the government process and as a state-supported research enterprise.

The state has also provided employment for many and at times the majority of our graduates, especially those who have done post-graduate level work.

The decline and the re-organisation of the welfare state around more market principles radically changes the need for research. We have the growth of policy analysis rather than the need for sociological research and thus the increasing prominence of other disciplines (eg. economics, business and management), as Pusey (1990) has so ably documented for Australia.

These shifts raise for us the question, can sociology survive as a discipline without an extensive welfare state? Do we become part of a 'liberal' education where we 'service' degrees rather than teach a discipline. Will sociology be incorporated increasingly into multi-disciplinary programmes where fashion and fad become important in shaping what we present?

What happens in this shift to the 'sociological perspective'? Does it simply disappear into other disciplines such as history, cultural studies etc., or do we still have something to both defend and offer to the student and to society?

3. Nature of Social Movements / 'End of Class' Debate

The 'end of class' debate is another central issue on our agenda. Class-based movements have declined as the size of the working class (ie manual workers in industrial production) has shrunk, and as a proportion of the total workforce and the non-manual class has expanded. This changing base of the class structure has been linked by some writers, for example Sanders (1990; Sanders and Harris, 1994), to a shift from state to private provision of

consumption in areas such as transport, housing, health, education and public utilities (e.g. water). Such a division provides a divide around the more affluent private consuming and provisioning majority and the state dependent minority, increasingly targeted and portrayed politically as a cost to the majority. This in turn leads to a tax debate shaped around the view that the 'undeserving minority' are being funded out of majority tax, in which that majority get no benefit. This increases resistance to paying taxes and makes it easier to cut benefits.

There is then a need in these changing circumstances to examine the question of what are likely to be the agents of change within our society. Are they to be labour based (class) or 'social' movements? Research into 'new' social movements in Aotearoa has not as yet been extensive but suggests that what we have developing are movements based around values such as equality between sexes, peace, racial harmony, and the environment. Such groups do not appear to want to capture conventional power structures; rather they seek to influence awareness within the community more generally. They are anti-political in a conventional sense and rely more than the 'labour' movements of the past on spontaneity and popular appeal, and persuasion rather than struggle. The growth of an increasingly disparate set of responses to the restructuring of society, as a result of economic and social change, fragments opposition and weakens the overall ability of groups to mount resistance (Thorns, 1992).

4. Individualism

With the current growth in popularity of 'post-modern' sociology with its rejection of grand narratives and totalising discourses, there is the danger of a growth of rampant individualism. Such an individualism poses the danger of the end of sociology if the 'social' disappears under the weight of individual narrative, and there is no longer any collectivity? Would we not then be faced with one of Durkheim's worst fears? Have we in the contemporary phase of our discipline lost sight of some of the 'big questions' of the founders, such as the nature of society, social relations, order, change, and inequality? (Berger 1992). Have we allowed ourselves to be displaced from these debates by other disciplines (eg. economists over debates about income/wealth distributions and inequalities)?

What Kind of a Sociology Do We Need in the 1990s and Beyond?

Do we want an independent or a service sociology, one which becomes absorbed into other programmes, eg. cultural studies, environmental studies, peace studies etc? Do we consider that since sociology arose as an analysis of the rise of the 'modern' world, the 'demise' of this world leaves sociology without its reason for a separate existence?

I would reject both these notions. Sociology needs to vigorously assert its independence and its continued utility as a perspective which allows New Zealand society to be understood and analysed.

Sociology needs to be built around a comparative historical analysis which incorporates both structure and agency. Comparative studies are important as they allow the picking out of the causal from the contingent. Weber's root insight is still valid where he commented that:

Parochialism in sociology is much more than a cultural deficiency; it is the source of crippling failures of perception. It should be part and parcel of the training of every sociologist to gain detailed knowledge of at least one society that differs from their own - a feat that needless to say, involves something many students shy away from: learning of foreign languages, (Berger, 1992).

A theoretical understanding is required for sociology in Aotearoa/New Zealand to accommodate both causal and contingent processes. In *Fragmenting Societies?*, I have tried to do this through examining New Zealand, Australia and Britain. These three countries share common roots, experiences, migratory flows, people, policies, and political institutions but also many divergences, which means that simple 'dependency or 'dominion capitalist' explanations are insufficient.

The three cases explored raise important questions regarding both the commonality of experience and of the conceptualisation of the world system. It is important to recognise that change can flow in both directions, rather than simply downwards from the 'core' nations. It is also necessary to appreciate that changes are mediated through the social structures which have emerged within

nation-states over time, leading to modifications to global processes and the emergence of varied forms of local resistance to change.

A historical base and memory is also a crucial element within our sociology. We need to be aware of where we have come from - thus we need a collective history as well as individual narratives. We need to remind ourselves that things have happened before, which is why I began with drawing attention to Mestrovic's analysis. There have been depressions and reconstructions, and periods of retreat from collectivity into individualism. It is important that we learn from our history so we can build progressive movements.

Finally, we need a sociology which can cope with both structural and individual facets of our social experience. In this respect, the time may be coming when we need to return to a consideration of some of the 'big questions' of power and domination, stability, change, inequality, and social identity.

We need as a discipline to be able to create choices for people between alternative futures. We need to articulate the options and provide a place for the sociological perspective alongside the dominant debates of economic rationalism and so reveal some of its limitations and inadequacies.

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Directions in New Zealand Sociology

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At this time of uncertainty, in discussing new directions in any discipline or field of knowledge, one can be challenged on two fronts: first, that the subject matter under discussion cannot be assumed to need a direction since *maintenance* rather than *movement* can sometimes be a more appropriate strategy; and, secondly, that the search for a direction, while implying that a progressive move is intended, may in reality mean

nothing of the sort. In the following, I shall attempt to write my way out of the self-doubt that my own sociological spirit is currently assailed by, and examine wearily (and absolutely subjectively) the problems and prospects for this mother of all disciplines (founding fathers notwithstanding!) in the future.

When first asked to discuss 'Directions in New Zealand Sociology', I wanted to write about exploitation, prejudice, the necessity for structural change, social justice - in other words, I was determined to show how I personally used sociology in my teaching, writings and films to help illuminate, to refine the mind/research/political platforms, and further to make the obvious point that without sociological analysis, contemporary realities would be perceived merely as 'moments' of history. On the other hand, however, I felt just as strongly that I had to show that it was time to retreat - let sociology (and sociologists) hole up till the deregulation storm passes. There appears to be little point in trying to fight it; all we can do is just watch our backs.

Therein lies the dilemma: what is the choice? Retreat and regroup? Go down with all guns ablaze? Sneak out and pretend to do something else? See it merely as a job - a breadearner - and look forward to early retirement? This intellectual impasse is undoubtedly a consequence of our current state of existence, when a society is in crisis, so is the discipline it has nurtured as a study of itself.

But is all necessarily lost? I have recently taken to teaching and using sociology as a tool, not merely for the

critical study of societal patterns and human relations, but as an instrument of expression and communication, and as a symbol of challenge. The practice of sociology presents a challenge to all institutions to provide us with mechanisms of representation - a voice. From this perspectives even our so-called currently fragmentary state (where we abandon or abuse the slightest hint of grand narratives/totalising theories) does indeed serve the interests of living knowledge and provides us (perhaps unknowingly) with a power base in this increasingly orthodox society. In this society, as possibly in all others, authoritarianism in the disciplines can take on the mantle of the Grand Inquisition, and dogma of radicalism. Under such stifling intellectual conditions, academia can be confused for intellect, or 'jobs' begin to function as professions. But even in these circumstances, sociology can Speak, even as it appears to suffer overmuch from laryngitis. In what ways can sociology Speak?

In my first year Gender and Society lectures, I am often disparaging about the 'founding fathers' inability to perceive gender and/or ethnic stratification as a useful theoretical subject (down with dead white males, I say), but I do point out that gender consciousness (like its class, race, political etc counterparts) arrived in sociological studies at a particular juncture and in context, and that the discipline itself nurtured the emergence of such a consciousness by its adherence to the notion of inquiry. While I might not agree with the old boys' methods of inquiry, I nevertheless have sufficient respect for them to keep going back to their work and to feel regret, despite the unpopularity of overarching world views in this post-modernist world, that

we cannot engage with a theorist of prominence (Foucault notwithstanding) this century. In the first instance, therefore, sociology speaks from the past. How does it speak from the past?

Western sociology (as indeed all sociology - unlike mathematics, physics, philosophy etc) has its roots in the eighteenth century Enlightenment. This era was significant not merely for the emergence of the new 'sciences', but also for the social context which produced the cross-fertilisation of new ideas, technologies and institutions. This social context embodied movement (a dynamic) - of people, of collectives, of classes - from countrysides to cities and further, across the seas as part of the traffic in slaves and indentured labour. But, due to its western roots, the new discipline was initially unable to address any more than what was occurring in its milieu. Human behaviour and social patterns were considered to be like the rest of nature, and must therefore be inquired into with the same methods as those applying to the natural sciences. The counter-view that the human sciences were to be subjected to a different method of inquiry because people, unlike inanimate objects, express meaning and interpretations, was a reflection of *European* activities. If non-western people had been permitted to enter into the debate at this point, the interpretations might have looked a little different, subjecting 'knowledge' to the valid query - 'whose purpose does it serve to choose one method of inquiry over another?' Huge numbers of people of colour were moved without their consent in accordance with a perfectly legal, intellectual and rational 'purpose'. Other groups were studied from the point of view of yet another European pseudo 'science', namely anthropology, which

itself had been born in the period of expansionism of European capital. To this day, studies of the 'other' with their quaint customs and intriguing physical manifestations, continue to be resented by the colonised. Thus, bluntly speaking, while sociology (and anthropology as its alter-ego) Speaks from the past in terms of Enlightenment, it also Speaks as Disenchantment.

This Disenchantment (expressed also as a critique of positivism and functionalism) is, at least in the twentieth century, to some extent mitigated by the theoretical offerings of Marx. Perhaps I am expressing only a personal (and non-European) view when I say that had it not been for the Marxian dialectic in sociology and anthropology, these disciplines might well be dead. For one thing, there would be no debate (a discipline without debate courts extinction), and for another, this metatheorist (as the new labels designate) moved the study from the mere description and articulation of social patterns', and their regularities and irregularities, to critique. For some, this critique inevitably requires social change. For others, it might be furthered in either armchair perusal, or indeed pursuit, of 'power'.

The value of sociology at this time of crisis lies in its ability to be confident about its roots - represented as the Enlightenment/Disenchantment dialectic, and its commitment to critique. This can be undertaken through individual research/teaching projects dealing with topics such as social theory, the media, the law and public policy, sexualities and so on, or by legal and paralegal actions which lead to social change. Obviously, fractures can occur at any time as the discipline moves

through its social contexts. It is well known that orthodoxies within the discipline have flourished at times when academic sociology was undergoing rapid growth in the post-war period reflecting the boom of western economies. Indeed, academic delinquency cannot be seen merely as a feature of external crises, but may well be sustained from within by maintaining strict adherence to various political/administrative or academic regimes in direct opposition to (and at times the suppression of) intellectual endeavours. I am reminded of C. Wright Mills' interpretation of a similar defect within the academic community of the late 1950s:

They live and work in a benumbing society without living and working in protest and in tension with its moral and cultural sensibilities. They use the liberal rhetoric to cover the conservative default. They do not make available the knowledge and the sensibilities required by publics, if publics are to hold responsible those who make decisions 'in the name of the nation'. They do not set forth reasons for human anger and give it to suitable targets¹

Indeed, academic sociology/anthropology can become a vehicle of repression, not critique.

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C. Wright Mills, *The Causes of World War III* (NY, Ballantyne Books 1963), p.145 from Roszak, T (ed) *The Dissenting Academy: Essays Criticising the Teaching of Humanities in American Universities*, Random House Inc., 1967.

The subject of intellectual endeavours takes me to my next point: sociology speaks in the present. The Enlightenment tradition referred to above brought with it, in the purely political sense, liberalism as represented by 'democracy', rights-talk, free speech; in other words, the ideology and discourses of equality. Based on an assumption of equality rather than actual parity (or indeed impartiality) liberalism as a practice was not always infallible, a point the burgeoning women-writers and thinkers of the time (for example Mary Wollstonecraft) forced their male colleagues to confront. In our contemporary world, if sociology is to speak of rights, whose rights would it be championing? Is the liberal, welfare state's idealistic assumption that everyone is or should be equal, and thus capable of demanding equal voice based rather shortsightedly on an ahistorical understanding of society? Conversely, if one believes that the founding fathers were just plain wrong in many respects, especially in their assessment of gender and ethnic/colour stratification, does that mean that all whites or all males can now make only a limited contribution (if at all) to our situations? Without a structural understanding of human societies coupled with political support for the expressions of collective and individual rights, of voices and representation relationally both in the past and in contemporary times, it is not possible to let sociology speak in the present. In my view, sociology can speak in this context only if sociologists make the effort to eliminate the fads (and blinkered political correctness) and re-enter the world of fundamental philosophical debate which may consequently place limits on concepts of 'right' and 'wrong'. My respect for the discipline's self-critical analytical and uniquely moral capacities allows me the

freedom to continue to work from within it, despite my habitual involvement with the Disenchantment side of the sociological dialectic.

Perhaps the most difficult task facing sociologists today is that of constructing a methodology which simultaneously initiates self-critique (turning the camera inwards), as well as projecting strategies for survival and (re)production. Over the ten years that I have been contributing to New Zealand sociological and anthropological studies, I have become disenchanted with the lack of possibilities for our graduates. It appears that critical, people-oriented skills are not much in demand in this re-structured world. Many students take sociology, not because of its career potential but because it enhances their degree structure. It is our responsibility to see that the strength of sociology, notably its essence of criticism, becomes a vital ingredient in students' understanding of other disciplines and that a dialectical relationship among and between/disciplines is forged in the process of learning. This might have the consequence of ideologically demystifying all disciplines, sociology included, and avoiding the self-referentiality ('autopoieses')² currently overtaking a significant proportion. Furthermore, the auto-erotic manipulation which passes itself off as 'cultural', 'post-modern', and even 'post-structural' studies also deserves a long overdue critical jolt.

I believe the question of 'directions' depends on the authenticity and integrity of our commitment. Some of us

² Teubner, G., *Law as an Autopoietic System*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993.

might consider pragmatism and survival in constrained circumstances to be the best way forward and thus concentrate on empirical studies which are attractive to those giving out research grants. Others may prefer to become involved in political parties, or legal and community work, and take the arguments into the public arena. Still others may consider that a career is relevant only for paying the mortgage and getting the kids through school; here sociology becomes a profession like other professions. As a woman of colour, I find that sociology can be neither a job nor a mere explanatory device. It is a social commitment which may permit us to negotiate on behalf of the voiceless (including our societies in the Pacific context), and provides us with the necessary analytical tools to deal with what is really at stake in the various New Zealand situations. In other words, I am interested in the practice of sociology, not its preaching.

Sociology confirms that power is truly a category of oppression; like exploitation, it is often insidious, passing itself off as 'the way things are done', or 'how we see things'. The questions to ask are: 'why are they done (or seen) like this'?, and 'who decides.'? The answers may well influence our praxis thereafter, whether in the classrooms or courthouses. This, in essence, is what New Zealand sociology might wish to debate in forthcoming years.

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Whither New Zealand? Some Fin-de-Siecle Reflections

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Will New Zealand exist in 15 or 30 years time? Does it, or will it, matter, and to whom? I suspect that it is foolhardy to raise such questions in a New Zealand forum and even more risky to attempt to address them. But considering uncomfortable and unpopular questions is part of what sociologists do, and so, in this reflective essay, I share some thoughts about the future of New Zealand in emerging global conditions. For some people, my raising questions about the meaningfulness and viability of our nationhood might be dismissed as irritating conjecture that is not seriously worth considering. Such questions come too soon after our long struggle to achieve nationhood and to assert sovereign independence, and upon Maoridom's reclamation of Aotearoa that has gained, if somewhat begrudgingly, the recognition of the Pakeha majority. Many might remind me that New Zealand has shaken off Britain and the filial ties we officially held for so long. We no longer go where Britain goes and the British no longer buy our dairy products, unless they are cheaper than everyone else's in the European Union. Furthermore, isn't New Zealand playing its part on the world stage of trade, governance and cultural activities? Aren't we now sure of our identity as a South Pacific

nation? Why, therefore, should we imagine any alteration to our nation-statehood?

Let us consider these questions in the context of global economic, political and technological developments. These questions have many implications, including among them what it means to do sociology in this country, and what contributions sociologists might make to understanding and building the society in which we live. My voice is that of a social analyst, a New Zealander, and a transnationalist. I usually position myself as a scribe of the end of industrialism and modernity, and that abstraction usually provides sufficient psychic comfort to temper what I cannot deny in the disquieting observations I make of contemporary New Zealand and the world. But in this exploration, I will position myself somewhat less grandly and more locally as a New Zealand thinker wondering about some issues that I imagine may be of interest to others who are bonded here, or who find themselves, by whatever vicissitudes of life, living here now.

I'm aware that my interest in New Zealand and concern, if not so much for its nationhood, as for solidaristic community and cultural distinctiveness, may be perhaps only nostalgia for modernity (I am not nostalgic for industrialism!). The bounded nation-state, that great hallmark of modernity, allowed modern social processes and technologies to be developed and practised within the diversity of national cultures. We are now, of course, aware of the alternative traditions and histories that were subordinated by the achievement of national integration in the modern nation-state. But, generally speaking, we moderns have come to like having nations which bestow

our citizenship and by which we feel more or less identified when abroad. But modernity's institutions and cultural practices are now transforming. Among the disruptions to modernity is a renewed struggle by pluralities of local cultures within nations. In the midst of such struggles in this nation in particular, the collective national 'we' faces new challenges from global social, economic and technological events. These events will, in the twenty-first century, significantly affect social processes and will make problematic the bounded nation-state, particularly small and historically recent ones like New Zealand. Altering the category and entity of the nation-state is an event of some moment. While it is, thus far, a less bloody (and less visible) affair than assertions and displays of national bondedness and supremacy currently popular all over the world, it is early days yet. Globalisation and the demise of the nation-state will present serious implications for establishing loci of identity and community, and for maintaining cultural and social diversity. What might be socially possible for us on these islands called New Zealand as we dialectically make our history, and have it made for us, in a world beyond conventional modern nation-states?

Globalisation and the Demise of the Nation-State

A decade or two ago, in my youthful post-colonial fervour, I enthusiastically held the view that New Zealand should be called Aotearoa. I called One Tree Hill, Maungakiekie, the kingfisher, kotare, and I looked forward to an at least bi-lingual and multicultural society.

But much has happened since then. With other social analysts, (including Bauman, 1992, 1993; Castells, 1989; Featherstone, 1990; King, 1994; Kristeva, 1993; Reich, 1992; Robertson, 1990; Sassen, 1991; Wallerstein, 1974, 1987), I observe the powerful rise of the transnational corporation, the emergence of the global world and the regional community, and the demise of the nation-state. I observe the uninterrupted flow of information, knowledge, images, goods, services, and people across geographic and former political barriers. I observe the development and deployment of advanced technologies that are changing what and how we produce, consume, and communicate, and simultaneously globalising those capacities. And I observe the ugly rise of old-fashioned nationalism to end the century as it began. Industrialism decays, modernity is dismantled, and nationalism revives to threaten the germination of new forms of thought and social practices beyond the modern era.

As the century ends, both our post-industrial technologies and our consumption demands ensure the constant flow of products and fantasies across the globe. Communism has failed and capitalism transforms. Postmodernism emerges with hopes (at best) for a world beyond the modern congealment in technocratic domination. But, for the moment it seems, modern productionism - by which I mean the domination of human being by human doing (see Casey, 1995) - not only endures, but triumphs. All other value and social systems, and the diversities and multiplicities celebrated by postmodernism, are subordinated to the modern industrial quest to rationalise, produce and expand. Human creativity and activity is distorted by modernity's

demon of unfettered technocratic rationality, refurbishing Weber's iron cage again and again.

Social analysts are observing the globalisation of culture, politics, religion, economy, and consumption. They variously recognise the dissemination across the world of advanced technological capacities since the 1970s that both facilitate, and are enabled by, social, economic and political changes now taking place. The world community is affected by the interaction of these processes in unprecedented ways. Processes of integration and homogeneity accompany fragmentation and multiplicity. A unitary, monolithic global culture is unlikely, but composites of regional and local accretions are unified in technologically-mediated experiences as spectators of the O.J. Simpson trial and World Cup Soccer, near global moments of solidarity. (Note the 'cultural' origin of my examples). These events, I emphasise, are both processes and products of cycles of production and consumption organised according to the codes of a global capitalism. Accompanying these technological cultural developments are political and legal manoeuvres of transnational and supranational enterprises on the world stage that affect the sustainability and efficacy of national sovereignty and cultural distinctiveness.

The latest round of the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) that comes into effect in 1995 has ensured the economic recovery of the United States and its cultural hegemony for a long time yet. The GATT decisions might be among the last great political acts of modern sovereign nation-states. Small nation-states have opened their fragile borders to the now global

'going rate' for seafarers, manufacturing workers and technologists. Commentators (among them Drucker, 1993; Gorz, 1989; Reich, 1992) argue about an integrated world economy, the growing polarisation of work and consumption prospects, and the limits to modern economic rationality. But for the major GATT players, it is triumphantly business as usual at the end of the twentieth century.

At the same time, other voices now heard through postmodernism challenge modern criticism of cultural imperialism and Americanisation and point to the variety and richness of popular and local discourses and practices of culture. But echoes of old Marxist suspicions thwart my celebrating culture uncoupled from (now global) political economy. Understanding culture free of the nation-state may allow for an opening up of global spaces upon which groups and peoples may meaningfully inscribe their own cultures and identities. On the other hand, the rudiments for local production of culture are increasingly imported from mass culture producers of homogenised and routinised symbols electronically mediated and marketed across the globe. The 'spaces' for localism are often only in vernacular display. For some, of course, there is no cause for lament. As national boundaries soften, reconfigure or dissolve, a free market like never before is possible. National identity dissolves into regional or ethnic loci, or self-chosen technological or virtual solidarity - from television to the Internet.

As with all technologies, though, choices are always made. Advanced information and communication technologies give us many exciting possibilities for self

and social life. A laudatory or condemnatory stance toward these new technologies hearkens modernist polarities and Cartesian dualisms that are no longer adequate for twenty-first century social analysis. We can do better than that. But such logic dies hard. The way we in New Zealand seem to be grappling with social and technological choices is familiar.

Local Iterations

In this country, we tend to adopt one of two readily available strategies: elaborate denial (we are not being socially and culturally challenged by these global events, our problems are local and we just need to elect the Labour, Alliance, National, etc. party, or increase Maori representation, and we will be right). The other view, while recognising global events and challenges, seeks to revive and reassert modern industrial strategies and wishes for managing the future: technology, market, selective control (more technology, freer market, controlled government spending, disciplined unemployed and welfare beneficiaries). More of the same in a global world that is not the same.

With either strategy we must face, eventually, the unintended consequences, as Weber reminded us long ago, of our actions and non-actions. But we are averse to that recognition. As I hear on talkback radio, we don't like gangs of jobless and alienated youths in the streets, but we insist on valuing participation in work, as conventionally understood, as a primary basis of citizenship and a locus of identity in a world in which work (as conventionally understood) will never again be

widely available. We want open trade borders, a free market as the final social arbiter and an unrestrained right to consume all that the Earth and its peoples' offer. But I also observe in popular commentary that most of us want to belong to a clean and green, sovereign and culturally distinct New Zealand, that we are ambivalent about our new waves of immigrants and sojourners, and that we do not want to be absorbed into a regional economic bloc or to become another Australian state.

Now I am not one to scorn anyone, individual or collective, for their elaborate contradictions woven into an idiosyncratically coherent self-narrative that is asserted as rational and verifiable fact, or even as national identity. It is an endearing human trait. But another distinctly human trait is our ability to intervene in the socially constructed world, to make choices and to take action in certain directions. In the midst of global technological and social events, we are now, in this country, at such a juncture of intervention or considered adaptation. We are at a point where we need to deliberate and to decide some things about our future, not least among them, the future of our nationhood. It requires in the first instance a little more conscious awareness of who we are and what is going on in the world, and less denial of both.

For some, and I hear these voices in the academy, the path of least resistance has been embraced early. Let's hurry and join Australia, they say. New Zealand will not be economically viable soon, let's join with our big bold brother Australia. To the now quieter voice (in Auckland anyway) of post-colonialism that ventures the question : but what about Maoridom, and the efforts toward

biculturalism? The response is: you can't be serious! It just isn't realistic. It's too late. In this view, post-colonialism, in its bi-cultural manifestation, is essentially a modernist movement, which is now relegated to the museum of former thought and practice. This view fails to recognise the complexities and pluralities of the post-colonial struggle in this country that was for so long obscured and suppressed in the dominant drive to nationhood. Instead, post-colonialism is read as nostalgia for modernity and dismissed by postmodern questions: why mourn the passing of the particular construct of the nation-state? Why not celebrate the possibilities for free play, multiple identities (and open markets) now available? Indeed, why not.

Not every other nation-state is, however, embracing these possibilities with the same gusto. Notably Britain, the United States, Japan, and also, quaintly, France, are finding ways to protect, to preserve and to defend, in short, to react to threats to their national solidarity. France has moved to legislate to protect the 'purity' of its language, Japan requires by statutory regulation that 100 percent of seafarers on Japanese ships are Japanese nationals, and the United States puts 'made in the USA' labels on imported products. But these are big and powerful, recalcitrantly modern nations. New Zealand cannot, nor should, attempt any of these measures. But what can we do if we wish to remain a national entity, and if we don't, to retain some of those things with which we identify and which create belongingness and solidarity in our ethnically and culturally plural society? How can we build our own society in this region after national distinctiveness, for the small, passes away?

The risk, as I see it, if we fail to address these questions is that our future will be shaped undialectically by global forces. New Zealand will be reduced to a tourist destination for a commodified Maoritanga, white-reebok outdoor adventures, and a regional accent. All the rest will be the same, a dedifferentiated pastiche of shopping malls, cineplexes, casinos and generic motels in which we buy the same goods and services, do the same things, and hold the same consumption-driven values that are produced and disseminated in any high-tech market society from Los Angeles, Hong Kong, or London. We may still rhetorically call ourselves New Zealand, or Aotearoa, but the interesting differences between ourselves and others (for the other is not the enemy and differences can be attractive and not hate-mongering) will fade into the superficial and the petty.

The source of this risk of becoming what for me is an undesirable picture of domination of human life by technocratised, routinised, production and consumption, is two-fold. The first, to be brief, is the ready availability and apparent attractiveness of commodities for the gratification of human wants and needs. These products include medicines and other life-enhancing technologies, that most of us welcome, to mass-culture products of television styles, values and aspirations that we are more ambivalent about. They are all part of our daily lives and choices can be made. We can adopt an identity or lifestyle that has been manufactured elsewhere rendering the ones we culturally produced locally, either obsolete or inferior. Or we can choose appropriate technologies, cultural products and identities without suppressing the local. But the latter requires that we possess awareness and confidence in our primary

self-identity - trace elements of self and society we have so meagrely served in New Zealand culture.

The second source of risk to becoming a generic, could-be-anywhere place, resides in the New Zealand (Pakeha-Maori) psyche. Our writers and analysts have long noted New Zealanders' burden of inferiority, and of *whakamaa*, of our complex fear of never being good enough in the eyes of the colonising cultural powers. What we do locally, except in sport (and we quickly deride those achievements too), must be inferior to what others do elsewhere. We look for affirmation and approval from 'overseas' as we at once struggle to assert our rugged do-it-yourself ingenuity, our egalitarianism, and fortitude. We cannot resolve the paradox, but I think that now, in the face of current and imminent global influences - technological, economic and cultural - we are faltering in our effort to contain it. We are tired of being burdened by our inferiority complex, and by the chorus of external and internal admonishments. We are giving up that psychic struggle. If we join with someone bigger than ourselves, and less manifestly burdened by the colonial legacy of inferiority and resentment, we will gain the self-assurance and strength we now lack. Australia beckons.

There are many possible benefits to be had in such a union with Australia. And I am not talking here of the mere economic, although that, of course, is the only reason they would have us. The upper echelon of the New Zealand middle class will most immediately derive the benefits of a bolder identity. Educated and skilled workers have for years been migrating to Australia and contributing to that economy and society. But those at

the other end of a growing polar division, those with tell-tale accents, persistent affiliations to kiwi low-culture, of do-it-yourself modest houses, of putting the boat out or tending one's garden on the weekend and playing netball into one's forties, are most at risk to the incursions of a revived productionist culture that would be the impetus for such a union.

National dissolutions, unions or clusters will be economic and political events. But this resurgence of modernist rationality will demand a social, cultural and environmental price. The global drive to relentlessly increase production and consumption, to substitute government and civilisation with market forces and unbounded rationality, will produce its anti-hero. One of these counter-movements, visible everywhere, is the revival of nationalism - of primal, non-rational bondedness asserted against the fear of cultural and self annihilation in an acutely rationalised and technologised world society. In other words, the dialectic of global, 'informed' capitalism is counter-modern tribal-nationalism that achieves integration and solidarity through hatred of a projected, demonised other. We need to interrupt this logic of terror.

Beyond National Identity

We have choices to make and positions to take. We do not need to shrug and acquiesce to a rolling globalism - it is neither monolithic nor super-organized. I propose that it is possible for us to seek community and self-identity that is viable, vibrant and life-enhancing and in

which the nation, any nation, is not especially important, indeed may be irrelevant. From such a position, we may be able to make effective choices regarding global social forces that transcend the nation-state yet have implicated it in productionism and environmental collapse.

By all means, let us retain languages, memories of our histories and diverse cultural practices, but let us relinquish the attachment of blame, guilt, revenge, hatred and superiority to those histories. Let us nurture and express our creative energies but relinquish our modern industrial attachment to relentless production and consumption. Such compulsive attachments are as defeating and life-denying as attachment to blame and wrong-doing of the past. The paths of supranational acquisitiveness or of national tribalism are equally mistaken. The new millennium will require new efforts in our thinking to transcend these limited options.

Cultural theorist Julia Kristeva passionately argues from her native France for 'nations without nationalism' in which she recognises the need for identity and collective attachments, but denounces their repressiveness and exclusion. Kristeva (1993) imagines nations as a 'series of differences' in which particular rights might be honoured, and that give way to a 'general interest' based upon our common humanity that transcends particularism. An evocation of an Enlightenment wish perhaps, but a calling far from obsolete. I want to take Kristeva's wish farther still and argue for communities beyond national primacy but that do not revive pre-modern localism. Rather, community and relatedness in the new millennium may be assisted by the

appropriation of the capacities in advanced information and communication technologies to connect human beings across geographic and cultural space. Conversing, relating, bonding via email or the Internet is already generating new forms of community and attachment.

Of course, high-tech communication is not accessible (or desirable) to everyone. It is simply a contemporary manifestation of the human passion for sociality and connection. More grounded, low-tech community attachments can be constructed in our neighbourhoods, schools and cities based upon human commonalities and local needs rather than cultures of exclusion. Transnationalism is an attitude that seeks to build connections and solidarities across and against old national and ethnic boundaries as former geographic boundaries are more readily transcended by advanced technologies and by global environmental imperatives. Transnationalism brings us into positions in which identities and allegiances shift across the globe and bonds may be made by choice rather than inherited obligation. And it does not preclude marching-girl teams or harvesting pipis at low tide, and a worldful of local practices.

Against, and honouring, ethnic, linguistic, religious and geographic origins, we must in coming decades, build civil societies that allow for, but do not enshrine, particularisms - including the idea of the nation - but that transcend repressive and reactionary impulses so often carried in the nation. Governments, whether regional, national or polynational, must be measured on their ability to facilitate the choosing by individuals and

groups of their identities and allegiances alongside the same rights for others. New forms of social democracy for the next millennium are ours for the making, if we relinquish the old grip of national attachments and ethnic hatreds. But it requires, too, a relinquishment of our modernist compulsion to produce and consume, and a new seeking of what it means to be human, and to be in relation with others.

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REVIEW ESSAY

Rock on: Recent Writing on the Sociology of Rock, and the New Zealand Popular Music Industry

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Tony Bennett, Simon Frith, Lawrence Grossberg, John Shepherd, Graeme Turner, eds. (1993) *Rock and Popular Music: Politics, Policies, Institutions*, Routledge, London and New York.

Robert Chapman (1992) *Selling the Sixties. The Pirates and Pop Music Radio*, Routledge, London and New York.

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In an earlier article in *New Zealand Sociology* (Shuker, 1990), I identified the lack of serious academic work on pop/rock music as a major absence in local media/cultural studies, surveyed the few studies which did exist, and suggested some issues which needed to be addressed. I took it as axiomatic that, as both a major cultural industry and as a central part of many people's affective lives, rock music deserved greater attention from cultural analysts. In this piece, I want to 'update' that earlier work, through a consideration of the

contributions made by several recent overseas publications on the sociology of rock, briefly relating these to the New Zealand music scene.

The studies I examine here are indicative of the continued academic maturing of the study of popular music (for an overview of the field, see Shuker, 1994b). They all lie, broadly speaking, within the political economy tradition, which they have revisited, reworked, and revitalised. To a degree, their collective emphasis on issues of cultural production and cultural policy have displaced the earlier preoccupations of rock analysis, particularly the concern with subcultures and the textual. In this respect, they reflect shifts in the theoretical orientation of cultural studies and the relative privileging of particular 'ways into' the analysis of culture. Collectively these authors demonstrate that the practice of music takes place within a nexus of government policies, broadcasting regimes, technology, media corporations, and cultural politics. Both macro and micro studies are present here: the broad brush strokes of the national and the international are placed alongside the analysis of local music scenes and moments such as pirate radio.

In their introduction, Bennett et. al. argue that by the mid-1980s, 'initial critical and commonsense discourses of rock were beginning to fragment. Established discourses based on notions of opposition, national cultures and cultural 'meanings' were becoming uncomfortable' (p.3). The international recording industry had changed, as had the audiences for rock, and governmental attitudes towards involvement in rock as a cultural industry. The global music industry is no

longer so dominated by the US/Britain; it is less concerned with the production and management of commodities, and more with the management of rights. The significance of the national, and questions of rock and national cultural identity now tended to be subsumed under broader issues of the globalisation of the culture industries and the tensions and communalities between the local and the global. New concerns have come to prominence, most notably the role of new technologies of sound recording and reproduction, and, often associated with these, issues of intellectual property rights, copyright and the control of sounds. Radio shows a changing demographic constituency and an associated conservatism. Embracing all of the above is a concern with rock as cultural politics.

It is not possible here to do justice to the varied sixteen contributions which make up *Rock and Popular Music*. As could be expected, there are some tensions and disagreements evident as to the relative significance of the various trends identified in the editors' general introduction. For example, Frith accepts that the national is not as valuable an analytical category as it has been in the past, whereas several of the national case studies (most notably Breen on Australia) support its continued applicability. Such differences are part of the volumes vitality, and in opening up trends and debates in the field it provides an excellent student 'reader'.

The book is divided into three parts, each with its own introduction serving to introduce the contributions and the issues they address.. The first part, government and rock, shows how governments are increasingly involved

in the promotion of rock, and how this intervention 'is becoming increasingly explicit, increasingly programmatic and institutional....the role of government has become a crucial factor in the structural organization of rock music at the local, the national and ultimately at the global level' (p.9). Simon Frith explores how British state policy on music is still a local phenomenon, detailing the proliferation of regional and city based music projects, and raising the cultural implications of these. Other contributors examine aspects of government and music policy and industry developments in East Germany, Holland, Canada, Australia, and the United States. The issues highlighted include the defence of national identity, the music industry as a site for youth employment, and the protection of local markets.

The role of government in regulating broadcasting is taken up in the second part of the collection, along with the nature and reconstitution of radio formats. Again, a range of national contexts (Canada, Australia, and Europe) are traversed to demonstrate both communalities and differences. The introduction (to this section) argues that, collectively, the contributions challenge the conventional view of radio as existing in a symbiotic relationship to the music industry, functioning primarily as a secondary 'promotional' medium for the industry's products: 'Consider it this way: perhaps radio was always the primary medium - the commodity experience we (we rock fans, that is) consumed, music simply a means to that consumption....it was not the music which gave meaning to music radio, but music radio which gave meaning to the music'(p.100). This is a provocative thesis, and is certainly partly supported by

Berland's sophisticated analysis of the experience of music radio. However, my reading of the subsequent case studies, and other work dealing with the role of radio airplay (Pickering and Shuker, 1993; Wallis and Malm, 1992), suggest that the promotional role of music radio remains paramount.

Of particular interest here, given the emergence of Polynesian radio in New Zealand (see Wilson, 1994), is Grenier's study of French language music on Canadian radio, which neatly illustrates the difficulties of conflating 'the national' in multicultural/bilingual settings. Her contribution focuses on the 1989 hearing of the CRTC (the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission) which led to a 1990 regulation stipulating 'that at least 65 per cent of the vocal music played weekly by all Francophone AM and FM radio stations, irrespective of format or market, must be French-language song'. Grenier outlines the reaction of the various 'key players' to this situation, and the tensions it created for an industry and artists wanting to remain 'culturally politically correct' but also needing to appeal to the larger, international market: 'the double-bind in which Quebec is caught: like other small nations (sic), it feels the need to protect its local products from multinational conglomerates but aims none the less at generating its own international hits...the debate under study goes to the very heart of this double bind'(p.124).

The contributions to part three, entitled rock and politics, seem something of a grab bag grouping, which simply could not be easily slotted in to the earlier sections. There are chapters on how the new conservatism is framing rock in North America; (Grossberg); feminist

musical practices and rock's sexism (Bayton); the implications of new technologies, especially for copyright (Harley); the debates surrounding crossover and black popular music in the United States, with particular reference to the opposing arguments advanced by Nelson George and Steve Perry (Garofalo); and the marginalisation and emergence of aboriginal rock in Australia (Davies). These last two chapters have considerable relevance to New Zealand, and the question of whether 'Polynesian music' is diluted by its adoption of Western rock genres (especially rap and reggae) and conventions, or whether such borrowings are serving to revitalise traditional forms? (See Mitchell, 1994).

In a final, invited 'Afterword', Georgina Born overviews the volume. This rather novel device works well, offering an insightful critique of the general themes and 'positions' to emerge from the book as a whole, and of particular individual contributions. As she suggests, one of the most striking aspects of the book is the support it offers to Adorno's 'old' argument about standardisation and centralisation in the music industry and, similarly, to the validity of cultural imperialism. Born interestingly relates these to the question of how to best develop broadly democratic cultural policies in relation to rock.

Despite the publishers' claim that the volume consists entirely of new essays commissioned by the editors, a number of the pieces are reworkings of earlier published work (eg. Berland, Grossberg, Breen). Nonetheless, it is obviously useful to have them collected together here, while the 'new' material includes much of value. *Rock and Popular Music* is an excellent reader around which,

as its subtitle suggests, we can hang the study of policies and institutions in rock.

One historical moment encapsulating the intersection of rock as cultural politics and personal memory with market economics and government intervention was British pirate radio in its heyday, 1964-68. Twenty-one different pirates operated during this period, representing a wide range of radio stations in terms of scale, motives, and operating practices. Chapman uses his own extensive tape archive from the various pirate radio broadcasts, and interviews with many of those involved, to paint a comprehensive picture of pirate radio. He has produced something of a 'fan's book', and at times the wealth of detail, with case studies of all the major pirates, rather overwhelms the reader. But the account is always readable and successfully combines an obvious affection for the pirates with a sensible analysis of their location within the general development of commercial radio in Britain and the BBC's initial reluctance to embrace rock and roll.

The myth of the pirates is that they were about providing pop music to the disenfranchised youthful listeners, representing a somewhat anarchic challenge to radio convention and commerce. As Chapman clearly demonstrates, however, while there is an element of truth in this view, the reality was rather more commercial. Given that the BBC's popular music policy was woefully inadequate in the early 1960s, the pirates did cater for a largely disenfranchised audiences; they also pioneered some innovative programmes and boosted the careers of leading DJs Kenny Everett and John Peel. But, as Chapman's outlines of their programming shows, they

were never predominantly about pop music, and were heavily oriented towards advertising. All the pirates were commercial operations: 'though work place and legal judicial circumstances were not typical, in all other respects these were entrepreneurial small businesses aspiring to become entrepreneurial big businesses' (p.167). This was particularly evident in the case of Radio London, set up with an estimated investment of one and a half million pounds, whose 'overriding institutional goals were to maximize profit and bring legal commercial radio to Great Britain' (p.80). In this respect, the station succeeded, with the BBC's Radio One, established in 1967 as the pirates were being closed down, borrowing heavily from the practices of pirate radio, and hiring pirate DJs.

If pirate radio represented a threat to government cultural conservatism in the 1960s, the 'bogey man' of the 1990s is posed by threats to copyright. Hence the importance of Frith's edited volume on music and copyright. The starting point for this lay with a 1989 conference paper by Franco Fabbri, included here as an appendix, which argued that 'copyright stands as an unknown continent that music researchers *must* explore' (p.159). Fabbri presented statistical evidence to convincingly demonstrate that 'a considerable part of the overall turnover of the music industry is based on the exchange of immaterial items: the rights to reproduce a musical 'work' and its performance' (p.159). He noted that new technologies, and the boundaries these introduced between artistic freedom and individual rights, were threatening the traditional notion of intellectual property.

Frith takes up this last point in his introduction, observing that the advent of new technologies of sound recording and reproduction have coincided with the globalisation of culture, and the desire of media/entertainment conglomerates to maximise their revenues from 'rights' as well as maintaining income from the actual sale of records. As he, and a number of the contributors emphasise, what counts as 'music' is changing from a fixed, authored 'thing' which existed as property, to something more difficult to identify.

Attempts to ensure international uniformity in copyright laws have met only with partial success. As shown by a table Frith presents, even within Europe, Conventions and practices vary considerably. Attitudes towards copyright diverge depending on whose interests are involved. There is an emerging hostility towards copyright among many music consumers and even some musicians, due to its regulatory use by international corporations to protect their interests. On the other hand, the companies themselves are actively seeking to harmonise arrangements and curb piracy, while the record industry associations (eg. the International Federation of Phonographic Industries - IFPI), which are almost exclusively concerned with copyright issues, largely support the industry line. Ultimately, it is market control which is at stake. There is a basic tension between protecting the rights and income of the original artists, and the restriction of musical output. As Frith observes, in a clear overview of the moral issues involved (chapter 1), the corporate Goliath versus the sampling David is only one available moral narrative here.

The two major areas of dispute are home taping and, in particular, digital sampling. As Frith shows through case studies of the legal and moral arguments in the cases associated with records by the JAMS and M/A/R/R/S, there are very complex issues involved. These centre around questions of what is actually copyrightable in music? Who has the right to control the use of a song, a record, or a sound? And what is the nature of the public domain? These questions and issues are taken up by the various contributors. While this leads to a certain amount of repetition, there is also some instructive differences of perception arising from different national perspectives. Canada, the United States, Australia, Japan, and Ghana all demonstrate different responses to the development of copyright, depending on the nature of interest groups that make up the local performing rights societies, and national concerns about the potential exploitation of local music, the outflow of funds to overseas copyright holders, and the stifling of local performers' ability to utilise international material.

Through a detailed exposition of the regulatory structures and networks in the Australian recorded music industry, and the 1990 Public Inquiry into copyright, Breen shows how in Australian copyright law has largely helped protect the interests of the major music companies. Theberge traces the situation in Canada, which 'maintains only the most basic levels of copyright protection' (p.52). His case study of the controversy and legal battles surrounding composer John Oswald's 'Plunderphonics' provides a further example of the need for the legal system 'to redefine the legal concept of a musical work, its value and its social uses in light of present technical and creative realities' (p.62). Jones

shows how current copyright controversies in the United States, 'must be viewed as part of the recording industry's exploitation of all income-generating means at its disposal' (p.82). Gaines provides an extended example of Bette Midler and 'the piracy of identity' case in the United States, stressing the danger of confirming culture as private property over culture as a shared experience (p.91). Theberge and Jones both pay considerable attention to the highly problematic issue of sampling. As Theberge concludes: 'The introduction of digital technologies in music production during the past decade has resulted in the development of new kinds of creative activity that have, on the one hand, exacerbated already existing problems in the conceptualisation of music as a form of artistic expression and, on the other, demanded that even further distinctions be made in copyright legislation' (p.53).

Mitsui's study of Japan is particularly interesting, showing how copyright laws were originally imported from the West to a situation where social and moral conditions were basically different: 'the Japanese people do not take well to copyright, or more properly, the idea of the individual right' (p.141). Indeed, before Westernisation, there was no Japanese concept that equated with 'right'. In Japan, 'generally speaking, to claim one's right is regarded as dishonourable or undignified, especially where the right involves money' (p.142). Historically, Japan tried to avoid paying for translation rights, out of a concern not to impede the influx of Western ideas and information, while the observance of domestic copyright law was also dubious. The case of Ghana also illustrates the problems arising from the attempt to straightforwardly apply a Eurocentric concept in a non-

Western setting. Collins argues that Western copyright distinguishes between an ossified folk music and culture and popular or classical works which are composed by contemporary persons, whereas in many third world countries there is 'a living folk tradition existing alongside private creativity' (p.146). Collins also identifies the difficulties of applying European musical ideology to the African music realm. For example: 'In the West, song composer royalties are divided so that 50 per cent is paid for the lyrics and 50 per cent for the music or melody. In African music rhythm is so important that royalties should be broken down into three components: lyrics (33 per cent), melody (33 per cent) and rhythm (33 per cent). This issue becomes even more complex when one considers that African music is usually polyrhythmic, i.e. uses multiple rhythms and cross melodies' (p.149).

Music and Copyright is a successful attempt to map the cultural issues, often obscured in purely legal debates, in a field that 'kept changing as we sought to map it'(introduction). It provides a baseline for the continued investigation of an increasingly significant aspect of cultural politics.

Negus (1992) usefully compliments the concentration on policy and the macro which feature in the volumes edited by Bennett et al and Frith. His central concern is the process of discovery and development of recording artists, which he uses 'as an organising principle to provide a more general account of the recording industry and the production of pop music' (p.vi). In so doing, he consciously avoids what he sees as the two dominant approaches to the analysis of popular music: political

economy analysts in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, who reduce the music industry to the organisational conventions and commercial logic of capitalism; and, secondly, subcultural and postmodernist accounts which stress the activities of audiences in their consumption of the music. Negus is rather at pains to emphasise 'the cultural worlds being lived and constantly remade, highlighting the webs of relationships and multiple dialogues along and around which the musical and visual identities of pop artists are composed and communicated' (p.vii).

To set the scene for this, the first two chapters of the book covers similar ground to Bennett et al, sketching how the music business is now an integral part of a global network of leisure and entertainment corporations, typified by a quest for media synergy and profit maximisation. Negus discusses the Anglo-American dominance of the world music market, and the European 'challenge' to this dominance; the symbiotic relationship of 'major' and 'Independent' music companies; the greater organisational flexibility of the contemporary majors; and the role of technology in the recording industry, especially the 'techno-phobia' generated by innovations such as music video and 'electronic technologies of composition'. In relation to this last point, Negus makes an intriguing comparison between contemporary antipathy to such developments and the reception initially accorded the piano, to illustrate his argument that 'music creation and technology have always been related' (p.31).

Negus draws on Bourdieu's notion of 'cultural intermediaries' to examine the role of personnel in the

music industry in terms of their active role in the production of particular artists and styles of music, and the promotion of these: 'Although often invisible behind star names and audience styles, recording industry personnel work at a point where the tensions between artists, consumers and entertainment corporations meet and result in a range of working practices, ideological divisions and conflicts' (p.31). These personnel are examined in chapters 3 through 7, and include A & R (Artist and Repertoire) who are responsible for finding new artists and maintaining the company's roster of performers; the record producer and sound engineer, who play a key role in the recording studio; video directors; marketing directors and the associated record pluggers; press officers; record retailers; radio programmers and disk jockeys; concert and club promoters. Much of the discussion here draws on extensive interviews, conducted between 1988 and 1992, with industry personnel in the United States and, primarily, Britain. The direct quotes from these sources are frequently both colourful and highly informative.

It should be noted that this account of the concrete operations of the music industry is not, as some critics of the volume have claimed (e.g. Breen, 1993), a purely celebratory one. While Negus stresses the anarchic aspect of many of these industry practices, which he sees as the result of the essential uncertainty endemic to the music business, he also demonstrates how the industry 'has come to favour certain types of music, particular working practices and quite specific ways of acquiring, marketing and promoting artists' (p.vii). Negus frequently subjects these operating practices of the industry to sharp and insightful critique, especially the

way its established modes of operating work against new artists, styles outside of the historically legitimated white rock mainstream, and the employment of women.

The absence of women at most levels of the industry is well-discussed at several points. An instructive example is the link between traditional rock's emphasis on the ideology of 'street cred' and the live club scene, and the difficulties women face to participate in that scene in a working role. Negus quotes one woman working in an A & R department: 'I'll tell you why there are not many women in it. Because, number one, its a very chauvinistic industry, it really is. Number two, the A & R lifestyle does not suit the majority of women at all. The fact of going out every night to clubs, being up all night in sleazy, dodgy clubs or whatever' (p.59). On the other hand, women are well-represented in the role of press/promotion, where their perceived traditional 'nurturing qualities' make them more readily suited to pampering to artists' egos, exercising tact with journalists, etc !

The New Zealand Music Industry

New agendas have emerged in the sociological study of popular music, and these are reflected in the volumes reviewed above. But how do they resonate with the New Zealand situation? Despite its small scale, the New Zealand music industry is a useful example of the tensions that exist between the centre and the periphery in the global music industry, illustrating debates over the nature of local cultural identity vis-a-vis trends towards globalisation in the culture industries. As elsewhere, the

role of government in fostering the local music industry has become increasingly important, recognising its economic and cultural value. Finally, the New Zealand situation is illustrative of the processes identified by Negus, the relationship between policies and institutions and people in the industry.

As I have outlined elsewhere (Shuker, 1994a), the New Zealand popular music scene saw a series of high points in the early 1990s. Greatly assisted by NZ On Air's subsidy schemes, local artists made strong chart showings both at home and internationally during 1991-2. Flying Nun, the country's main independent label, saw continued sales growth, particularly in the United States (Reid, 1993). In July 1993, three of the country's most popular 'indie' bands undertook a highly successful short showcase tour of the United States, supported by Flying Nun, Export Music New Zealand, and the band's respective US (distribution) labels.

Despite such successes, the vital signs of the local music industry are in fact mixed. The local scene remains insufficient to support full-time professional performers, there is still only limited radio and television exposure for local artists, and initiatives to support the industry remain extremely limited. Despite the continuation of NZ On Air's funding of videos and CD compilations of local artists, retail sales have fluctuated (see Reid, 1993) and chart success has not matched the peak level achieved in 1992.¹

¹ According to NZ On Air, as at October 17, 1993, 27 New Zealand singles had reached the top 50, compared with 39 for the same period in 1992 (when a total of 50 New

New Zealand supports the Berne Convention, the major international agreement on copyright, while locally copyright is regulated under the Copyright Act 1962. Several agencies administer the application of copyright; the most important are AMCOS - the Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society - which represents virtually all music publishers in Australia and New Zealand and, by way of reciprocal arrangements, the vast majority of the world's composers, writers and music publishers' (AMCOS information booklet, 1994), and APRA, the Australasian Performing Rights Association, the collecting society responsible for collecting royalties for the exercise of performing and broadcasting rights. As is the case overseas, copyright is emerging as a major issue in New Zealand, with possible support from the National Government for relaxing copyright protection threatening to further constrain the viability of the local industry. Sampling has yet to cause any major legal battles, but there is an obvious nervousness about it amongst industry personnel.

Of the major political parties contesting the November 1993 election, only Labour appeared to be strongly committed to supporting the local music industry, with the then Communication and Broadcasting spokesperson Steve Maharey promising that a Labour Government would establish a New Zealand Music Commission 'to develop and promote our music industry'. Labour are also committed to promoting a

Zealand singles charted) (cited in *Evening Standard*, October 27, 1993).

voluntary radio airplay quota of local music, and reserve the right to legislate for this if the advocacy approach fails.

The global patterns in the recording industry identified by writers such as Frith and Breen (above), and Wallis and Malm (1992), are reflected in the New Zealand situation. Major market trends include the continued fall in the production and sale of vinyl; the continued rise of cassette's market share, with renewed interest in the Cassette Single; and the now clear market preeminence of the CD (Hung and Morencos, 1990; Reid, 1993). The last vinyl pressing plant in Australasia closed in 1992; few record shops continue to stock vinyl, while the second hand market has seen an upsurge of demand for CDs.

The majority of New Zealand record sales are for pop/rock music and its various subgenres. In terms of the national source of this music, judging by chart entries, the majority is still from the UK and the USA, with a significant contribution from near-neighbours Australia (cf. Lealand, 1988). This situation is a product of the Anglo-American music hegemony referred to by Frith in 1991 'Contemporary popular music, rock, is Anglo-American; the language of success is English' (Frith, 1991: 263). As Bennett et al demonstrate, this domination is no longer as extensive or secure, but it still carries considerable force in New Zealand. While Maori is an officially recognised and supported New Zealand language, songs sung in it rarely receive mainstream radio airplay and achieve chart success (see Mitchell, 1994).

In terms of 'making it' as a musician, radio airplay and the live scene remain crucial for the success of performers in New Zealand, which has no MTV channel, and few television programmes devoted to pop/rock. For bands with commercial ambitions, live performance leads to a recording deal and the opportunity for wider exposure in the market place. Groups come together, play and build an audience, get a recording contract and make a record (now usually an EP or an album, and increasingly CD in format). In order to break out of a purely localised scene, they tour to promote their release, and (hopefully) get radio play, exposure on television's music video programmes, and coverage in the music press. Beyond this are further releases, more touring, and, for the more successful, industry awards and possible government support. Success at the national level leads to efforts to break into the overseas market, historically by going to Australia (the Mutton Birds are the latest to make the trans-Tasman jump) and the UK. More recently, bands such as the Chills achieved their commercial breakthrough in the USA, especially through support from American college radio. Thus the path to success in the New Zealand music industry follows Frith's pyramid model of 'The Rock', with its 'ruling ideology of success being earned by hard work, determination, and skills honed in practice' (Frith, 1988: 112).

There are a number of established New Zealand independent labels, along with branches of the Majors who dominate the global music industry.² While any strict

² The major record companies (SONY-CBS, EMI, BMG-RCA, Polygram, Time-Warner WEA) have branch companies

division between the majors and the 'indies' is no longer really tenable, with distribution deals tying the two sectors of the industry together, there remain interesting questions about the dynamics of their relationship. This is particularly the case with the policy of the majors with respect to 'local product'. Locally produced music and independent labels (especially Flying Nun, Pagan) have enjoyed greater chart success in recent years, and there are signs of increased local support for New Zealand performers. Nevertheless, according to industry sources, the subsidiaries of the multi-national record companies continue to supply approximately 90% of the domestic market.

The New Zealand branches of the Majors do see themselves as developing local talent, but primarily only where it has potential international appeal. Grenville Turner, Managing Director of Polygram Records, points to the advantages of New Zealand performers dealing with a major, and the economies of scale involved: 'When I sign a band I sign them for the world and we allocate the funds to do the job properly'. This is because 'essentially the chances of signing, recording, making videos for, promoting and marketing a band within the New Zealand market alone, and doing it properly, and coming out with a return on your investment, are remote. With a major recording

throughout the Americas and Europe, and in parts of Asia and Africa, and all are now part of a larger parent corporation. Indeed, the majors now project themselves as global organisations, as epitomised by Sony's images of the globe in their corporate advertising, and their slogan 'Our artists mean the world to us...wherever you're listening our music is there.'

company you obviously have the global network potential' (Music NZ Convention, 1992). While Polygram companies in particular countries will assess a recording on its potential for release in their market, prior success of that record in New Zealand can favourably influence their decision. The major companies, he went on to observe, have the necessary contacts in particular (overseas) local markets, contacts which are difficult to access and develop from an independent label or individual band level.

Logically, given the economies of scale involved, the Majors concentrate more on promoting their overseas artists, with their local performers treated as a lower priority. The Majors also in a sense feed off local labels, treating them in the same fashion as North American professional sports franchises use their 'farm teams' to foster talent and provide back-up as necessary. But this is as much a symbiotic relationship as it is a parasitic one. The Independents need the distribution and marketing support the Majors can provide, particularly in overseas markets, while NZ performers who outstrip the strictly local need the Majors to move up a league. This is evident with the two main New Zealand Independent record labels currently operating: Flying Nun, and Pagan (see Mitchell, 1994).

While the record companies and live work are to the fore in establishing NZ performers, there is an accompanying infrastructure of support generated by the music press, radio airplay, television music video programmes, and several forms of government assistance. Export Music New Zealand, founded in 1990 and linked with the New Zealand Trade Development Board (TRADENZ), works

with local musicians and industry personnel on a support and development programme 'to help facilitate the increase of New Zealand's foreign exchange earnings in the music area' (personal communication to author, March 1993). In 1992, the Board funded half the cost of New Zealand participation in the influential New Music Seminar in New York, and also met half the costs of running the 1992 Music NZ Convention.

Radio airplay is a crucial aspect of record promotion in New Zealand. Historically, Radio Hauraki (1966-70) followed the example of British pirate radio, challenging the musical conservatism of the monopolistic New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation, catering more for teenage rock listeners, and initiating 'personality radio' (see Flint, 1994: 5-7). Hauraki's airplay formats proved widely influential on the subsequent development of commercial music radio in New Zealand. The recent debate over a compulsory quota for New Zealand music on the radio traversed the arguments over the importance of supporting the local music industry, the constitution of the 'local', and the relationship between airplay and commercial success (see Pickering and Shuker, 1993). The emergence of student radio, and Maori and Pacific Island radio stations, with their greater airplay of New Zealand music, has kept such questions to the fore (Mitchell, 1994; Wilson, 1994).

A central concern remains the question of how do we situate the New Zealand music industry within the international scene? Along with Bennett et al, several recent studies address the question of the relationship between the national and international markets for popular music, and offer models/typologies within which

particular national contexts can be placed (Rutten, 1991; Wallis and Malm, 1992: chapter 2; Robinson et al., 1991). These suggest New Zealand can best be regarded as an example of a country with a small market for recorded music, with a small share for local music within the Major-dominated turnover of the local phonogram market, and with a relatively unimportant role for local sounds within the international music market. This places New Zealand on a similar footing to Canada and the Netherlands. As Rutten observes, the fact that there is a very limited domestic market for local music in such countries 'poses important problems, given the skyrocketing costs of recording and marketing. It is necessary to look to larger markets in order to recoup investments in a band or an artist' (Rutten, 1991: 300)

Accordingly, New Zealand artists who remain 'at home' will always remain marginal to the international music industry, since the country lacks the population base to support a music industry on the scale of neighbouring Australia. The result is a tension between the support for the purely local, and the need to go offshore to follow up national success.³ In this respect, New Zealand

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This is epitomised by Don McGlashan, a musician highly conscious of the issues involved. He observes that 'we can support a much healthier local industry than we have at present. I'm sure it's going to come - if everybody keeps working at it, then it will happen' (Press report, January, 1993). But McGlashan is also conscious of the limitations of the purely local: following their national tour of early 1993, his group, The Muttonbirds, began work on a new album for international release, with Australia as their first overseas target.

musicians are similarly placed to their counterparts in the other commercial arts (see Beatson and Beatson, 1994).

As studies such as Bennett et al, Frith, and Negus demonstrate, the transformation of the global circulation of cultural forms is creating new lines of influence and solidarity which are not within geographically defined cultures, and popular music is not exempt from such processes (see also Straw, 1991; Laing, 1992). Accordingly, we need to be conscious of the danger of too easily dichotomising the local and the global, recognize the dynamism and intertextuality of at least the best of contemporary popular music, and avoid adopting a narrowly defined cultural nationalist position here. That said, however, there remain important economic arguments for the support of the local. The continued development of the infrastructure of the New Zealand music industry is central to generating opportunities for local musicians, and for providing a launching platform for access to the international market.

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REVIEWS

David C. Thorns, **Fragmenting Societies?
A Comparative Analysis of Regional and
Urban Development**, London and
New York, Routledge, 1992.

*Reviewed by
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I enjoyed this book by David Thorns, although I must say I found its title - **Fragmenting Societies? A Comparative Analysis of Urban and Regional Development** -- to be somewhat misleading. Rather than focusing strictly on urban and regional development, the book centers more generally upon economic and political restructuring and the resultant social change in three nations: Britain, a 'core' capitalist society, and Australia and New Zealand, two semi-peripheral 'dominion' capitalist societies. Nevertheless, I was pleased to read work from a sociologist whose writing illustrates a sensitivity to the idea that 'place' matters.

Thorns argues for adopting a comparative approach to analysing social change, specifically utilising a revised version of the New International Division of Labour perspective. As I read it, one reason he utilises a comparative perspective is to subvert hegemonic theories of social change that are based upon the 'narrow' experience of academics from Europe or the United States. As one who is often frustrated by the asymmetries of the international (academic) publishing industry, and the

ethnocentric (read 'Europe- and USA-centred') character of much social theory production, I fully support the author's approach.

Following his introductory arguments, Thoms' second chapter provides a theoretical discussion and critique of the New International Division of Labour thesis. According to proponents of this thesis, the New International Division of Labour began to develop in the 1960s with the end of the long post-war boom. The ensuing series of crises of capitalist accumulation which characterised the decades since have brought about a number of significant changes to global capitalism. These include the breakdown of the Fordist compact between capital and labour that distinguished the post-war boom years; rising structural unemployment and concomitant development of a new international reserve army of labour; development of new technologies that allow for the de-skilling of tasks and (to paraphrase David Harvey 1989:147) 'time-space compression'; development of an international market for capital; and development of a superstructure of international agreements (i.e. GATT, IMF) to 'police' the international financial system. As a result, manufacturing has been restructured and is relocating away from the core towards the periphery of the world capitalist system.

While sympathetic to the New International Division of Labour thesis, Thoms is critical on a number of points, particularly its economism, its aggregate level of analysis, and its emphasis upon top-down explanation. To correct these shortcomings, he posits a number of measures for contextualising the analysis by focusing upon the regional and local scale, and its relationship to the system of global capital accumulation. Unfortunately, from my perspective,

Thorns is here reliant upon Wallerstein's (1974) hierarchical 'world system theory' and did not have access to more recently published contextual theorisations of the dialectical relationship between the local and the global (e.g., Howitt 1992, 1993). Five subsequent chapters of the book are dedicated to elaborating Thorns' arguments. These examine, respectively, changes in manufacturing and service sector employment, the nation state, regional policies and programs, the welfare state, and home ownership and consumption. I found all of these chapters to be interesting and informative, but I particularly enjoyed the discussions on the state, and home ownership and consumption. I was pleased to note that he utilised ethnicity and gender as analytical categories alongside the more common class-based analysis. Many (masculinist) geographers could take some cues from Thorns here. The penultimate chapter discusses locality-based social movements. As a geographer I found Thorns' arguments in this chapter interesting, although I felt he had not illustrated a complete understanding of recent theorisations of the way in which socially constructed space is (re)constitutive of social relations (e.g. Le Febvre 1991). Thorns concludes the book by summarising his arguments and offering some tentative thoughts about future social and economic change in the three nations under study. I felt that the conclusion was the weakest part of the book.

Thorns has successfully set out to illustrate the idea that despite the ever-increasing globalisation of capital and resulting tendencies towards homogenisation, local and regional differences in capitalist development can be discerned if the analysis is employed at the appropriate geographical scale. His book is thus a useful corrective to the aspatiality (and Eurocentric character) of some existing

theories of social change. Along the way his work illustrates, as many geographers have been at pains to point out (e.g. Harvey, 1982; Massey, 1984), some of the ways that geography does indeed make a difference to capitalist development.

Fragmenting Societies? is not without flaws. Some are minor annoyances, such as a relative paucity of punctuation. I was dismayed by Thorns' irritating tendency to use the universalising pronoun 'we' instead of the more specific 'I'. In just one of many instances, for example, he states:

In providing a broad theoretical framework within which **we** can explore the questions **we** have raised, **we** need to turn to the regional and urban literature and debates and develop a position which allows for both general features to be identified and the particularities of **our** chosen nation states. (page 24, my emphasis)

It may seem a trivial complaint, but given the movement towards acknowledging the 'situatedness' and 'partiality' of scientific knowledge (Haraway, 1988; Berg, 1993a,) this type of rhetorical maneuver is becoming unacceptable. I was also concerned about Thorns' discussion of 'ethnicity', as I felt his use of taken-for-granted 'ethnic' categories (for example, see the tables on pages 91, 93, and 94) rather unreflexively serves to reinforce an insidious process of racialisation (Berg, 1993b). Finally -- and this is surprising given Thorns' focus on 'locality' -- most of Thorns' empirical examples from Britain and Australia are taken from the standard administrative region or state level and therefore

fail to adequately support his argument for taking the locality seriously.

Notwithstanding these concerns, I feel that David Thorns is to be congratulated for this thoroughly researched book, which provides an excellent introduction to the recent history of economic and political change in Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The book's strengths lay in its discussions of Australia and New Zealand, as these are the most up to date and informative. Thorns provides detailed and comprehensive (especially for Australia and New Zealand) empirical data to support his arguments. Coupled with his well-devised author and subject indexes, the book makes a good reference guide that I plan to keep handy on my bookshelf. I recommend the book especially to those with interests in the economic development and restructuring (and resulting social geographies) of Australia and New Zealand, particularly researchers seeking a comprehensive introduction to these nations.

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Rollo Arnold, *New Zealand's Burning: the Settlers' World in the 1880s*, Wellington, Victoria University Press, 1994.

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This is a rather strange book, but the strangeness creeps up on the reader. One's initial impression is straightforward. Arnold's purpose, it appears, is to examine widespread conflagrations in drought-stricken New Zealand during 1885 and 1886. In the first nine chapters, he provides a narrative account of selected

fires from this dry summer. One chapter examines a blaze on Lambton Quay in Wellington; two others treat, rather cursorily, blazes in the South Island and in scattered sections of the North Island. But the heart of this section, and Arnold's principal concern throughout his book, is an account of troubles in Taranaki centring on the Stratford firestorm of early January 1996, and rather earlier conflagrations in Hawkes Bay and Seventy Mile Bush. The book's second half, organised in a further nine chapters, seeks to use these events to anatomise New Zealand's settler economy and society in the mid-eighties.

There is much to admire. Arnold has worked diligently through many sources, notably local newspaper files, to produce a full narrative both of the fires themselves and of attempts to ease consequent distress in Taranaki and Southern Hawkes Bay. Much of his account of pioneer farming is subtle and nuanced. He notes the preponderance of mixed farming among bush farmers, before deeper insertion in the world system (not that he uses that phrase) encouraged greater specialisation. He insists that New Zealand's wheat boom must be understood as a stage in establishing grazing regimes built on exotic grasses. His detailed discussion of the choices which led to the establishment of a dairying monoculture in south Taranaki is illuminating. Arnold urges the great (though hidden) significance of coastal shipping in communication networks. Using the distinction between the village and the world which he proposed in earlier work, he unpicks local political mentalities. This approach decentres the central New Zealand state, radically (and, perhaps, usefully) challenging conventional wisdom among sociologists

about the Vogel era and its aftermath. In his view, political New Zealand in the 1880s is a complicated force-field. Old provincial practices attenuate, while retaining some atavistic legitimacy. The central state is obsessed with broad-brush development planning, uninterested in other things. Intense localisms set petty political notables struggling among themselves, and with other tiny towns' notables, for crumbs from state bureaucracies' tables. Railways play a leading part here. (Ah! The days when New Zealand Railways was a state enterprise!) All this is valuable.

There are problems. In the face of a mountain of scholarly evidence, Arnold takes local newspapers a century ago simply to mirror what happened in their districts. He should read **Bad News** and its many children. His strong focus on Taranaki and Hawkes Bay/Seventy Mile Bush renders material on other places distinctly marginal. It never becomes clear why we are invited to contemplate that fire which spread from a Lambton Quay glue-pot, for instance. Both his central episodes followed pioneer farmers' excessively successful bush burns. There are curious narrative and analytical absences here. In his conclusion, Arnold regrets that he had no space in his book to consider the impact of fire (or anything else) on contemporary Maori. For Taranaki, at least, this looks like Hamlet without the prince. He also recognises that significant ecological issues were involved in clearing bush by fire, but declines to consider the topic. Not only no prince, one might think, but no Denmark either.

Beyond that, one senses a real missed opportunity. Picking up a book subtitled **The Settlers' Word in the 1880s**, I anticipated some engagement with Miles Fairburn's argument in **The Ideal Society and its Enemies** (1989). Rollo Arnold responded to that book almost immediately, with a 1990 **New Zealand Journal of History** paper on community in rural Victorian New Zealand; but simply by piling up anecdotal evidence to show that some people did not find the place so God-awful as Fairburn suggested. With four more years in which to ponder, and with Arnold's focus on bounded districts at limited times, we might anticipate some detailed test of Fairburn's atomisation thesis in this book. At the least we might expect to find some solid flesh built on 'social organisation', the huge uninterrogated concept that lurks within this argument. Don't hold your breath. Arnold never engages with Fairburn's thesis. Implicitly he denies it, for the word 'community' lies spattered liberally over the text. Unfortunately, community seems to mean something different each time we meet it, so this linguistic turn produces no real challenge. Arnold does note evidence of mutual aid among settlers, both in fire-fighting and mundane farming activities, but he never puts this in any developed social context. He quotes Arensberg and Kimball on West Clare, but appears to know nothing about the more illuminating critical work that followed. (As somebody once noted, all Irish sociology seems to be a restudy of **Family and Community in Ireland**). Nor does he consider social factors cross-cutting or inhibiting 'community:' class differentiation in town and country, gender and age differentiation within farm households. There is some discussion of insurance offices' shady practices when

faced with a nation of pioneers living in wooden houses and using fire to clear land, but there is never any other sense that financial and commercial agencies might help - or hinder - all those 'felden yeomen' in Taranaki and Hawkes Bay. And how can a New Zealand-born historian use a term like felden yeomen so blithely, let alone deploy so uncritically his distinctions between 'Lincolnshire', 'Kent' and 'West Country' farming models?

Better analytical tools lie close to hand, implements tied less tightly to the time and place of their manufacture. To pick these up would require much more attention to contemporary social scientific approaches to agriculture than Rollo Arnold seems willing to contemplate. But he, or others, should make the effort; for bits of this book begin to show - 'at last', one is tempted to say - what a proper social history of New Zealand agriculture might look like.

**Evan Willis, *The Sociological Quest:
An Introduction to the Study of Social Life*,
Allen and Unwin, New South Wales, 1993.**

*Reviewed by Mary Holmes
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The first thing to strike you about this introductory text is that it is not six hundred pages long. This may lead sceptics to ask: 'is it a 'Sociology the Kwik and Easy

Way' kind of book'? Its compactness (120 pages) is the only way in which it is 'kwik' compared to the usual tomes on offer to beginning Sociology students. It does not take the common topic by topic approach complete with photographs, diagrams and chapter summaries (as per Giddens, 1992, Robertson, 1978 etc.), but needs to be read through more like C. Wright Mill's *The Sociological Imagination* (1959) and Anthony Giddens's *Sociology: A Brief but Critical Introduction* (1983).

Willis aims to outline to new Sociology students 'some of the important components of a sociological way of understanding the social world' (Preface: v). He is concerned with offering, then, more general answers to the question: 'What is Sociology?'. Willis describes his approach as like a 'buoyancy vest' for students entering Sociology. He wishes to avoid over-simplification but prevent 'drowning'.

The metaphor of the quest (as in computer games) is used to organise the text. In the introduction, he sets the scene, briefly explaining the historical context of the emergence of Sociology, and outlining the 'tools' that will be needed for the quest, which are detailed in the following chapters. He also attempts to explain what the quest is for, or what constitutes a sociological problem. His writing is accessible and the examples are good, making this a fairly easy starting place for students.

In the next chapter, 'The Nature of Sociological Explanation,' he examines how sociological explanations differ from other explanations, covering positivist versus non-positivist (his favourite) approaches, empirical evidence, objective knowledge and 'precise language'

(p.25), and how Sociology differs from other academic disciplines. This is fairly basic stuff, but what is good about Willis is that he never assumes anything is obvious. His claim that sociological knowledge is objective (p.25), however, seems naive and a mention of challenges to notions of objectivity (eg post-structuralism) would be useful here. Otherwise, the boundary lines he draws are quite helpful.

Willis then spends a chapter discussing the sociological imagination, focusing on the historical and cultural sensibilities necessary to understand social processes (p.39-40). These he takes from Giddens (1983) discussion of the sociological imagination along with a 'critique' which he discusses in the following chapter, there adding structure as a fourth necessary sensibility. He takes the student through the way in which these sensibilities can be used very carefully, providing a good grounding in how to look at problems sociologically. The topics covered are quite sensitive, for instance cultural relativism, but sometimes he makes rather shallow generalisations. For instance, he trots out the often repeated idea that Maori women cannot speak on marae (p.51). This fails to recognise differences between tribes and uses a white definition of what constitutes speaking, common problems which Kathy Irwin (1992) has described.¹ I also found his attempt to address the complex issue of clitoridectomies less than satisfactory.

¹

Irwin, K., 'Towards Theories of Maori Feminisms' in *Feminist Voices: Women's Studies Texts for Aotearoa*, 1992.

'Theory and Method' is the fifth chapter and has some use in outlining the importance of the inter-relationship between theory and method. It is unfortunate, however, that Willis lurches back to a rather old-fashioned portrayal of sociological perspectives in terms of Functionalism, Conflict Theory, and Interactionism. Willis does state that there is no general agreement on what constitute the major perspectives in sociology and that different sociologists use different names. I wonder then whether a more pluralistic litany of perspective's might have been better, with more detailed explanation of some that students are actually likely to be required to make use of. This may rule out a detailed explanation of functionalism, its arguments may have been dominant in mid-century, but it is now discredited and tends to be frowned upon even when it appears in first year essays.

I personally found his lack of discussion of post-structuralist and feminist 'perspective's' in Sociology disappointing. I know that feminism can be a dirty word to eighteen year old students (and others), but avoiding the important work of feminist scholars in sociology is not the answer. Similarly the 'p' word (post-structuralism) can bring about a severe rolling of eyes in students and some staff. Maybe we do have to teach modernism before we teach 'post-modernism', but given that Willis has said that he doesn't want students to have to learn later that it is not as simple as all that, it would not hurt to let them know that third year sociology at many universities is more likely to include feminist topics and post-structuralist theory than it is courses on functionalism and interactionism.

The final chapter is 'Doing Sociology', which is not as might be expected a further chapter on method, but a more philosophical look at the process of doing sociology. He declares that 'Like sex, sociology is much more fun to do than to read about or talk about!' (p.114). This is a rather sad attempt at appealing to adolescent humour and sets up a false distinction between reading and talking, and 'doing'. This somewhat undermines the good efforts Willis makes in describing *how* to use personal experience without mistakenly generalising it too far and how to distinguish what is 'acceptable' as evidence in sociology.

The book is neither stunningly inspiring nor is it dreadful. Willis makes good use of examples, most of which come from New Zealand or Australian society. This in itself makes the book a good extra reference source for courses in this corner of the Pacific. I think Willis's book, aside from the criticisms I have made, fulfils its aims well and provides very good solutions to some of the common problems which first year students experience in trying to figure out what sociology is all about. His explanations are very coherent and I admit to feeling a lot clearer about one or two concepts from outside my research interests! For first year University courses, I would recommend this as a good companion to one of those six hundred page extravaganzas with the photographs.

Peter Kramer, *Listening to Prozac: A Psychiatrist Explores Antidepressant Drugs and the Remaking of the Self*, New York, Viking Penguin, 1993.

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At first glance, this may seem an unusual book to review for a sociology journal, but in fact it touches on fascinating and important issues about the relationship between biological and social explanation, the role of genetics in contemporary culture and explanations of the world, perceptions of self, and the sociology of science. Prozac is a new generation anti-depressant which is very rapidly become extremely popular, and which has been the subject of a great deal of controversy. Proponents like Kramer claim it is effective for a wide range of symptoms, and has few side-effects. Others have claimed that it sometimes leads to violent behaviour and a range of other undesirable effects. The book is a lucid, well-written, thoughtful and entertaining discussion of the potential impact of this new drug, in a style reminiscent of Oliver Sacks.

'Listening to Prozac' is not an extended advertisement for the drug. The questions raised by the book exist irrespective of the existence of Prozac. The presence of the drug only makes them more real and immediate. Thus, whether Prozac actually does what is claimed, and the extent of unwanted side effects, are irrelevant to the arguments and discussion in the book. Kramer makes

this point in his introduction. But it seems almost inevitable that the book will lead to increased consumer demand for Prozac, since however the ethical dilemmas are viewed, the case studies are powerful. Kramer describes patients whose whole personalities appeared to change when they took Prozac. They changed from shy, inhibited, sensitive and unhappy people into happy, relaxed, socially successful people who seemed in control of their lives.

Observing these changes in his patients led Kramer to ask questions about the continuity of self, questions about which aspects of self are seen as contingent, and which aspects we see as 'really' us. Kramer asks whether we should use drugs to alter personality, under what circumstances, and how does this affect contemporary notions of self and personality. He notes that 'like psychoanalysis, Prozac exerts influence not only in its interactions with individual patients, but through its effect on contemporary thought' (p.300). Previous decades have seen much resistance to the 'medicalisation' of non-medical problems, from the women's health movement in particular. Prozac, if it does what is claimed in the book, represents an opportunity for this process to extend further.

The book presents scientific evidence about whether trauma can cause changes in neural structures and functioning that then become functionally autonomous. That is, whether emotional pain can leave a biological imprint on the brain which persists long after the trauma. If this does occur, and the evidence seems strongly suggestive, then chemical solutions may be logical and possible. Kramer looks at this question, but more

importantly, also asks about the consequences of viewing people as a collection of functionally autonomous biological disorders rather than as a product of their biography. This is one of the ways in which medication can have a pervasive influence, changing the way we see people and understand their predicaments.

Kramer asks a sociology of science question about how the discovery of new drugs affects the way psychiatrists view personality and personality disorders. He outlines how the discovery of new treatment technologies has affected the development of the field of psychiatry. Another important drug, lithium, led to the development of the diagnostic label, 'manic depression'. He then asks about how Prozac, and the new generation of anti-depressants it heralds, might affect the field. He suggests the idea of 'sensitivity' as a new dimension of personality as one possible development. This is an interesting development of Hochschild's view of emotions as providers of information about the relationship between self and the environment. Kramer suggests that people vary in the setting of their 'emotional thermostat' and thus in the accuracy of the information their emotions provide.

The major omission of the book is an appreciation of the political economy surrounding drug use. Kramer ignores the powerful interests aligned around the marketing of drugs, and the money to be made from the drug for which the potential clientele is large and poorly defined. He does however, have useful insight into the way in which different cultures value different personality styles. He argues that Prozac can give people the personality

valued in the USA in the 1990s where confidence, flexibility, quickness and energy are rewarded.

Unfortunately, the book sometimes fails to live up to its early promise to tackle social and philosophical issues head on. Much of the middle of the book is a discussion of the evidence for the anatomical encoding of stress and trauma, for the functional autonomy of these changes, and discussions of temperament and genetic make-up. The beginning and the end of the book show Kramer at his thoughtful and reflective best. In many ways, this is a very impressive book.

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Hochschild, A. R., 1993. *The Managed Heart: Commercialisation of Human Feeling*, Berkeley, University of California Press.

Lloyd Geering, **Tomorrow's God: How We Create Our Worlds**, Wellington, New Zealand, Bridget Williams Books, 1994.

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In keeping with the current mood of socio-cultural analysis, Lloyd Geering's work can be located firmly within that trajectory of thought that inherits, most

notably from Weber, the 'disenchantment thesis'. Obliquely contextualising his narrative in terms of the globalisation of modernity and its critical self-questioning (see Geering, 1991), Geering highlights the point that the confrontation of conventional religious orthodoxy with the secularising processes of modernisation have both loosened the tutelage of external authority systems, such as church and nation-state, and increased the scope for individual choice and freedom. In this new millennium characterised by a 'loss' of cultural integrity, the paradigms and social institutions of old are called into question, since they can no longer access, nor process, the new information and experiences thrown up by cognitive, social and technological changes. It is clearly within this context that Geering's thought finds its heretical home, as his voice joins the throng of many other social analysts and commentators remarking on the self-engendered problems of foundationalisms, be these religious or rational.

If Geering's position on the resurrection and immortality of the soul was once considered heresy in the eyes of establishment religion (see Geering, 1968), then today his writing presents another challenge: this time for orthodox sociological discourse. As bricoleur of a vast array of philosophical, religious and sociological texts, Geering dares to push the theological province of meaning to its limits, and in so doing invite disciplines such as sociology to rethink their place and role in a changing world. By subverting the relationship between sacred and secular text, Geering dissolves the conceptual hermeneutic grid between discourse and discipline, thus challenging the preciousness that disseminates from without and from within institutional

boundaries. Reading Geering's latest work, one is left to wonder why theology should be the sole, or rather rightful, custodian of the question of the divine as the highest pursuit of knowledge and why the social sciences claim that reason has freed us from the unnecessary yoke of blind faith and God's will, ought not to be rethought. As Anthony Giddens (1982) has constantly reminded his readers since the early eighties, the so-called ivory tower of institutionalised thought is never as impermeable or as hermetically sealed as folklore writes it. Indeed, Geering's most creative semiotic feat is to maximise the practical implications of the double hermeneutic: this time not to challenge the certainties of Judeo-Christian fundamentalisms, but to pose for sociology, and the discourses of the social sciences generally, a plethora of questions about the politics of the truths it has traditionally espoused, and to place the question of ethics firmly on a sociological agenda that has for too long dismissed it as irrelevant.

Here Geering's work crosses the divide of strictly theological discourse and enters into sociological terrain - calling into question the conventional disciplinary boundaries that would serve to keep 'religious discourse' in its place - and preferably out of sociological and social theory. For sociology has attempted to craft for itself the ironically uncontaminated status of a purely secularised discourse. In fact, when the much marginalised question of ethics is cautiously raised within conventional sociology (latterly the issues have been posited through the pathbreaking ideas of such interdisciplinary theorists as Lyotard, Foucault and Irigaray), it is regularly dismissed with the remark that ethics properly belongs to theology and not sociology. If the embarrassed

sociological scholar thinks the quest for truth is best left to the fictive scopic imaginations of the likes of Spielberg and his creation Indiana to pursue via the Holy Grail of the constructed simulacra of a Hollywood film set, then it is because he or she refuses to fully engage the question of fiction and its relation to the real, as germane to the sociological project. I find this default position a curious one given that it conveniently forgets the legacies of its so-called founding fathers: a point Robert Nisbet (1966/1980:18) made when he observed that the sources of the sociological imagination are never 'divested of their moral origins'. But then over the course of its brief history, sociology has proved most effective at marginalising and displacing the 'other' of its analytical point of reference.

This desire to absolve sociology of any metaphysical pretension. Furthermore, refuses the insight and the paradox of the modern age, well explicated by Weber that while science could not teach us about the meaning of the world, the question of ontological security remains an intellectual obsession. It is this paradox of rationalisation, which on the one hand increases personal freedom as it simultaneously extends institutional coercion and domination, that Geering picks up on and makes central to his brand of existentialist humanism. Geering begins his epistemo-existential travail into the perplexities of the meaning of modern life with the knowledge that the transcendental God of yesterday is almost certainly dead, even though he postulates that his creator, 'man', may still be well and truly alive. Arguably unlike Weber however, whose response to the existential angst extant in the modern world was to find meaning in vocation and an ethics of

responsibility, Geering's protestation and call for the future is much more nostalgic in orientation. Decrying the anthropocentrism of what he perceives as today's purposive rationality and instrumentalism, Geering argues for an ethic receptive and attentive to global planetary concerns, one which respects the Mother Earth principle, wherein, Geering argues, lies 'Tomorrow's God'. If Geering has not chosen the aestheticism or eroticism that has arguably shaped the later work and ethos of other analysts influenced by the disenchantment thesis and rationalisation, then his prescription for modern people is certainly to re-divinise the world by a 'return' to the paradise of Gaia. Despite recognising the paradox of modernity, Geering takes the cultural pessimism of the disenchantment thesis as a given, refusing both the stand of political liberalism or that of an 'accomplished nihilism' which might both be possibilities of this broadly speaking Nietzschean-Weberian narrative. The question therefore remains, just how far does Geering's treatise actually veer from belief in yesterday's God?

Perhaps one way of answering this question is to turn to the opening statement of Geering's book where he defines religion as 'the human concern to find meaning in existence'. What is distinctive about religion as opposed to any other metaphysical meaning system is not elaborated here. Yet perhaps it is not so strange that Geering situates meaning as exclusively the property of religion, when one considers this an issue upon which Nietzsche (1990) may well have been in total agreement. Yet for all Geering's posturing regarding 'a transvaluation of values' and the traditional breakdown of morality after Nietzsche, 'Tomorrow's God' is a work of a

modern human caught up in the perplexities of a postmodern condition of knowledge, unwilling to relinquish the search for truth. Whether or not Geering's 'solution' for the future concurs in perfect detail with one's own, the sales figures of the book surely confirm the point that these ostensibly postmodern times cannot be understood merely as a linear epochal shift obliterating the signs and traces of tradition or of delimiting (albeit reconstructed) resurrections of the sacred from postmodern forms of life and experience.

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Redmer Yska, *All Shook Up. The Flash Bodge and the Rise of the New Zealand Teenager in the Fifties*, Penguin Books, Auckland, 1993

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New Zealand in the early 1950s was dominated by strict notions of consensus and conformity, an affluent and somewhat smug society, still largely insulated from American cultural influence. As Yska demonstrates, this changed in the mid-fifties: 'The drift into urban areas, and the rise of drab and overcrowded housing estates were creating a modern urban society with all the problems that accompany it. Children born during the strain and privations of the war years experienced as teenagers a world of leisure and full employment far removed from the thirties Depression that shaped their parents' (p.10). Into this context, two threats to social stability emerged: the 'Red Scare' of communism and the delinquent teenager, seduced by looser American morality and popular culture: the novels of Mickey Spillane, comics, a new subgenera of 'juvenile delinquent' films, and rock and roll. Paradoxically, the Communist Party was one of the major critics of the negative influence of American mass culture. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that these threats were greatly exaggerated, and were utilised for political advantage by both the Labour and National parties. At its most extreme, the State resorted to the reintroduction of capital punishment as a means of regulating the moral chaos that was seen to threaten the establishment.

Yska traces the local reaction to 'Reds under the bed', American popular culture, and the new youthful folk devil, the bodgie. His main thesis is that: 'By 1954, urban adolescents were reaping the benefits of full employment and a growing economy. As an autonomous special interest group, they could survive outside the family unit if they wished. This shift in economic status armed young people with the symbolic, cultural and, finally, political power which was at the heart of many of the conflicts of the decade' (p.36). This is to accord adolescents a more coherent age-based identity than is justified (see Brake, 1985, chapter 1), while even with the lowering of the voting age, youths' political clout has arguably never been great. And while young people represented a new consumer group - as Yska notes, the term 'teen-ager' was coined by a New York market research company in 1945 - the debates over adolescent tastes and behaviours were rather at the level of cultural politics, representing forms of moral panic (Shuker and Openshaw, 1990, chapter 1). Theoretical quibbling aside, there is much of value in 'All Shook Up'.

In the first section of 'All Shook Up' - the title is presumably a reference to the Elvis Presley hit - Yska tackles the 'Red Scare', beginning with the Holmes 'snatchel' affair of late 1948 and the attempt to demonstrate undue communist influence in the trade unions. This is placed in its Cold War context and Prime Minister Fraser's increasing obsession with the spread of communism, a view maintained by the National Government which returned to office toward the end of 1949 and remained in power until 1957. A significant and to my knowledge previously largely unrecorded aspect of this, was the extensive use of the Prime

Minister's Information Section 'to run an elaborate and unacknowledged propaganda campaign against the perceived threat of communism' (p.23). From this expose, Yska moves to post-war affluence, the instant bleak suburbs of state housing, the 'teenager', and the emergence of new consumer goods and tastes. Beginning with the wartime influx of American GI's, the country was exposed to 'the reality of a sleek and frivolous urban culture that village-minded New Zealand had only ever seen as fantasy in the films of Hollywood and the popular songs of Tin Pan Alley....'(p.30).

Yska then deals with the Parker-Hulme murder in Christchurch in 1954, the Hutt Valley 'sex scandal' in the same year, and the Mazengarb Committee's subsequent investigation into 'Moral Delinquency in Children and Young People'. As Yska shows: 'the committee was composed of Anglo-Saxon, middle-class professionals; a team of upright citizens who could be relied upon for strong religious moral codes. No social workers, educationists, or those with 'hands on' experience of 'problem' adolescents were included.' (p.70). Predictably, the committee's report identified the roots of the problem with working mothers, excessive wages for teenagers, the drift from organised religion, and the decline in family life. It also emphasised the cultural influences it saw as undermining adolescent morality, including comics, the 'pulp' stories of crime writer Mickey Spillane, and unsupervised film going in 'darkened theatres'. On the eve of the 1954 election, the Mazengarb Report was distributed free to each of New Zealand's 300,000 families.

The report was the basis for new legislation, most notable the Indecent Publications Amendment Act, which provided the justification for a censorship campaign during 1955 against selected comics and novels, notably those by Spillane. In 1956, a governmental Comics Advisory Committee outlawed 'The Lone Ranger' because of its violent tone and because wearing a mask in a public place was an offence in New Zealand.

The latter part of 'All Shook Up' focuses on the treatment of two other forms of popular culture aimed at the new teenage audience - juvenile delinquent' films, such as 'Rebel Without a Cause' and 'The Wild One', and rock and roll - and two murder trials involving teenagers: the Sommerville's milkbar murder in March 1955, and the fatal 'jukebox' stabbing in a Queen Street cafe in July 1955. Both cases involved sexually active young women and young working class men. In the case of the 'jukebox' stabbing, those involved were part of a bodgie subculture, which was placed on trial as much as the particular episode. Both men were hanged, and Yska uses the cases to examine the controversy surrounding capital punishment. As he concludes, while the two perpetrators were brutal killers, 'it would be naive to discount the circumstances, settings and political pressures surrounding their crimes. Both men were on trial for the way they lived their lives, as much as for the crimes they committed. Killings which in different times other juries might have decided were manslaughter here came to represent the murderous handiwork of juvenile delinquency.' (pp.193-4).

At times, Yska's prose is reminiscent of 'Hard Copy'. When 'jukebox killer' Paddy Black was sentenced: 'on

the final day, the high spirits in the public gallery vanished when the judge placed a small black cloth over his wig and pronounced the death sentence on the pale youth standing before him. Tears streaked the brunette's make-up and cries of disbelief came from the teenage assembly' (p.11). That said, 'All Shook Up' is a very readable and well-documented account, and Yska has clearly done his homework. There is a mix of archive and press sources, and some fascinating interview material, including the observations of Oswald Mazengarb's daughter, Rosemary McLeod; New Zealand's answer to Elvis Presley, Johny Devlin; and several former bodgies. There are also some provocative and at times emotive illustrations, most notably a smug Keith Holyoake, and a demure but confident Sharon Skiffington on the day of her murder.

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
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