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Symposium on 'The Right'

Editorial Introduction

The three papers that follow are united by a concern with the 'Right' as a political and social phenomenon. Spoonley, drawing on theoretical traditions represented by Poulantzas and Laclau and Mouffe, sets the scene by elaborating the structural framework within which the 'Right' operates. Knight et.al. instantiate the structural framework in the context of recent events in Queensland, and shows that, while some of the specifics are different in New Zealand, there is a structural continuity between the two contexts. Ryan's paper brings the focus sharply onto New Zealand with a penetrating analysis (from the same theoretical tradition) of the discourse of the 'Right', which looks beneath the surface disparities of the groups and their issues, to reveal an ideological unity, bound together with an agreed rhetoric.

The Old Petty-Bourgeoisie and Fascism; Politics, Ideology and Poulantzas[1]

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The question addressed here is why a fraction of the petty-bourgeoisie, the **old** petty-bourgeoisie (see below for a definition and discussion), should have a representational tie with fascist or right-wing extremist organisations.[2]

One reason for addressing this question arose from the need to identify the different fascisms that dominated in various countries in the 1970s and 1980s. In Britain from the 1970s, neo-fascism was most obviously articulated in the National Front and its equivalents. The representational tie here was between the working class and such neo-fascist organisations. Husbands (1982), in discussing London's East End fascism, characterises it as based in relatively homogeneous working class communities and reproduced in a socially transmitted vigilantist culture. By comparison, neo-fascism and right-wing extremism in the 1970s and 1980s in Australia and New Zealand (and to a lesser extent Canada) was dominated by groups that articulated their political concerns differently, although still obviously part of fascist tradition, and adopted different strategies for conveying their point of view. Probably the most influential group in both Australia and New Zealand has been the League of Rights (see Spoonley, 1981, 1984). The League represents an example of an organisation that reflects the ideological concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie. In both countries, the League has been associated with the politics of Social Credit. In Australia, it replaced Social Credit in certain states while in New Zealand, the Social Credit organisation, the third major party in New Zealand politics, has to compete with the League of Rights for ideological authenticity in its articulation of Major C.H. Douglas's views and in representing the concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie. It is this representational tie which requires elaboration.

Undoubtedly part of the explanation for the differences between the fascisms of Britain in contrast with Australia and New Zealand lies in the nature of those societies. The first has an urban industrial history which is lacking in the latter where the rural and provincial sectors have been dominant, at least until World War Two. The relatively recent decline of these sectors in political importance has challenged the status of various groups; the development of petty-bourgeoisie neo-fascist organisations is one effect. But there is also a rather broader question pertaining to the politics of the old petty-bourgeoisie under modern forms of capitalism. The economic recession of the 1970s and 1980s has reduced the already marginal profit levels of small commodity production, and the increase in the 'non-productive' spheres (unemployment, state administration etc) have encouraged the conspiratorial views of the petty-bourgeoisie. Their willingness to embrace and articulate utopian and anti-modernist arguments provide the pre-conditions for a representational tie between the old petty-bourgeoisie and right wing extremist groups.[3] The question then becomes one of identifying the circumstances under which such a link becomes established. The starting point is Poulantzian analysis and the

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2. The term 'fascism' is used here in a relatively loose fashion to refer to a tradition of reactionary politics that is dominated by well-established themes (anti-Semitism, racism, authoritariansim, sexism) and which has played a particularly important role in the politics of many western capitalist societies in the twentieth century. But there are important distinctions within this tradition, especially between those who advocate a corporate state and certain petty-bourgeois groups who are opposed to such a structure. To acknowledge this difference, especially in the New Zealand context where most major reactionary groups fall into the latter category, the term extreme right-wing is also employed. This distinction is discussed more explicitly elsewhere (see Spoonley, forthcoming).

3. See Spoonley (1984; forthcoming) for more detailed case studies of such groups and their politics.

discussion revolves around the discourse overlap between the old petty-bourgeoisie and the traditional concerns of fascism. It is clearly insufficient to argue that the interpellation of the old petty-bourgeoisie is simply the result of hegemonic processes and that it essentially reveals the views of dominant class fractions imposed upon a dependent stratum. The ideology of the old petty-bourgeoisie, at least the reactionary elements, represents a profoundly critical view of the activities of these dominant fractions and of many of the institutions of a liberal democratic society. Thus this world view and the ideological struggle it represents is an important precondition for the establishment of representational ties between the old petty-bourgeoisie and fascist groups.

THE PETTY-BOURGEOISIE: A DEFINITION

Wright and Perrone (1977:33) define the petty-bourgeoisie as those who do not sell their own labour power nor purchase, except in a very limited way, the labour power of others, but they do own their own production unit. The small-scale production of goods and the provision of services characterises petty-bourgeois enterprises. Wright and Perrone (1977) go on to point out that the petty-bourgeoisie employ the labour of others so that the criterion 'employs labour power' is limited in its discretionary power, especially in differentiating between the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. Technically correct, in practice the size of the workforce in petty-bourgeois enterprises differs noticably from other production units, as does the nature of the employment. For instance, the petty-bourgeoisie typically employ non-contractual labour that often works part-time, is either poorly unionised or does not belong to a union, and is often recruited from within the family.[4]

A central problem with the term lies in its past use as a residual category that has been invoked in theoretical explanations to account for counter-revolutionary elements. As Maier (1976:517) comments, both Marx and Engels developed the concept to explain the setbacks of 1848 and it has tended to retain the role of *deus ex machina*. The contribution of Poulantzas has been to regard the petty-bourgeoisie as having a serious potential in political and ideological relations although ultimately restrained by the dichotomous class structure of capitalism. The petty-bourgeoisie are thus not seen as politically impotent nor trivial and outmoded (Bechhofer and Elliot, 1981:184).

Poulantzas (1979:237-39) argues that the petty-bourgeoisie occupy two distinct places in the relations of production although there is a unity on political and ideological planes. The traditional petty-bourgeoisie are those involved in small scale production, that is artisan work or small family businesses in which the same person is both owner and controller of the means of production, and small scale ownership principally involved with the circulation of capital. This group can be contrasted with a newer group, the non-productive salaried employees who are involved with the circulation of capital or who work as civil servants. The growth of the latter group is linked to an expansion in the use of technology. Both groups, it is argued by Poulantzas, exhibit similar political and ideological tendencies.

This theorisation of fractions within the petty-bourgeoisie emphasises the importance Poulantzas places on the divisions between mental and manual labour. The new petty-bourgeoisie are defined by their relationship to the monopolisation of knowledge and by the processes of exclusion and inclusion that control access to that knowledge (see Abercrombie and Urry, 1983:71). Thus the differences between mental and manual labour are used to differentiate waged labour from the petty-bourgeoisie, and to distinguish the two major fractions in the petty-bourgeoisie.

But while the Poulantzian distinction between old and new petty-bourgeoisie is useful, the argument that they share political and ideological tendencies is contested. Poulantzas acknowledges certain differences (e.g. the

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4.   Bechhofer and Elliot (1981) define the petty-bourgeoisie in terms of its dependent position but the notion of dependence is a complex one and it is questionable whether dependence is a sufficient basis on which to elaborate a theory of the petty-bourgeoisie as a distinct stratum (see Winter, 1982:143).

new petty-bourgeoisie's committment to the cult of efficiency and technological neutrality) but these can be extended with quite different political implications. Specifically, it is argued here that the representational tie between the traditional petty-bourgeoisie and fascist groups is strongest. In contrast, the new petty-bourgeoisie, or non-productive salaried employees, do not share the economic circumstances of the small commodity producer, or necessarily the same political and ideological consciousness and struggles, especially with regard to the modern interventionist state. As Abercrombie and Urry (1983:72) point out, the new petty-bourgeoisie are directly involved with the expansion of the state and the growth of monopoly capital while the old petty-bourgeoisie are concerned to see the contraction of both. In Caplan's (1977) words, there is a tension between service and status, between the civil service who are part of the state apparatus and the status of those petty-bourgeoisie whose interests are seen as opposed to the state.

Thus new and old petty-bourgeoisie are contrasted by their relationship to the modern state. Those members of the **new** petty-bourgeoisie who are not so directly linked to the state do share the old petty-bourgeois committment to property ownership and the market, and are suspicious of the power of the state. Here there is rather more potential for a unified ideological and political position between fractions although it tends to be limited for two reasons. The first, and most important, is the involvement of these members of the new petty-bourgeoisie in monopoly capital so that they do not necessarily share the opposition of the old petty-bourgeoisie to monopolies. This is emphasised by their growing unionisation in countries such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand which, while not resulting in alliances with working class organisations, nevertheless moderates the anti-proletarianism of the old petty-bourgeoisie. The second difference arises from the location of the new petty-bourgeoisie in large urban centres compared with the traditional petty-bourgeoisie whose major spheres of influence and strength have tended to be in smaller provincial towns and rural areas. The urban location of the former group has exposed this fraction to a number of liberating influences. These differences have obvious implications for the subsequent articulation of material interests in political and ideological relations, but there is a further matter in the Poulantzian conception that requires elaboration.

Laclau (1979) offers a theorisation that elucidates aspects of Poulantzas's analysis. Laclau (1979:114) notes that the petty-bourgeoisie are separated from the dominant relations of production in society, and thus the contradictions between them and the dominant bloc are posed not at the level of the relations of production but at the level of the ideological and political relations which constitute the system of domination. He argues that these contradictions are not class contradictions, although every contradiction is over-determined by the class struggle, but reflect an interpellation that derives from popular-democratic struggles. A contradiction at the level of the mode of production is expressed at an ideological level in the interpellation of the agents as *a class* while a contradiction expressed in terms of domination, and specifically as the 'underdog', is expressed through the interpellation of the agents as *the people* (Laclau, 1979:107).

> The first contradiction is the sphere of *class struggle;* the second, that of *popular-democratic struggle* (Laclau, 1979:107).

For the petty-bourgeoisie, the dominant contradiction is one 'whose intelligibility depends on the ensemble of political and ideological relations of production and not just relations of production' (Laclau, 1979:108). Thus, while Poulantzas directs attention at the specific political and ideological tendencies of the petty-bourgeoisie,[5] it is left to Laclau to identify the source of this determination in their position outside the dominant

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5. Abercrombie and Urry (1983:73) comment that whatever Poulantzas intended, the focus is almost entirely on determination within the sphere of production while the political dimension is hardly seen as relevant and the ideological is reduced to the difference between mental and manual labour to the neglect of other ideological determinations (of nationality, racism and sexism). This tends to ignore the complexity of Poulantzas's theorisation, although his case is certainly not aided by his formalism. See Lacau and Mouffe (1985) for further comments.

relations of production, their subsequent concern with relations of domination and an interpellation based on popular-democratic struggle.

In contemporary terms, the political and ideological concerns of the petty-bourgeoisie reflect changes in the capitalist mode of production and the role of the state. The expansion of monopoly capitalism and of the liberal state are seen to challenge petty-bourgeoisie commodity production, especially with regard to the use of technology and labour. The traditional use of non-contractual labour differs markedly from the dominant form of social organisation where family and work are separated. The nature of monopoly capitalism adds to the feeling of siege by reducing the profits of the traditional petty-bourgeois enterprise. As Scase (1982:158,160) notes, the old petty-bourgeoisie stress the importance of market forces, of property ownership and small commodity production as a means of rationally distributing societal resources. But the nature of modern capitalism with increasingly large-scale corporate dominance and an interventionist state set the parameters within which small-scale capital accumulation must operate. Financial institutions and monopoly capital are seen as curtailing the control of small commodity producers over their investments and resources (Scase, 1982:153), and of undermining 'market forces'.

The result is a crisis in confidence in the 'natural' or 'automatic' reproduction of the system, and this crisis is necessarily transformed into an identity crisis for the petty-bourgeoisie (see Laclau, 1979:103). One response is to seek support for their position from the state. Their position in the forces of production, however, means that they fall outside the major axis which results in ineffectual alliances or a lack of concessions when the traditional petty-bourgeoisie do align themselves politically with the state. Further, they are suspicious of the state because it is commonly held to promote interests opposed to those of the petty-bourgeoisie, notably those of finance capital and the proletariat. There is a sense of injustice at the profits made by the finance capital while the 'real producers of the wealth, who . . . proceed to do the work and to take the risks for marginal and insecure profits' (Conway, 1981:29), are felt to be inadequately rewarded. This suspicion of monopoly capital and production combined with a position outside the politics of the dichotomous class struggle of capitalism, results in an ideological and political position which is simultaneously hostile to and supportive of aspects of capitalism, which in turn explains the tendency of the old petty-bourgeoisie to vacillate between political positions that are respectively progressive and reactionary (cf. Conway, 1981:5).

From below, the old petty-bourgeoisie feel threatened by the power guaranteed to the proletariat and its organisations by the state and the possibility, however distant, that production may be socialised. Thus the petty-bourgeoisie is suspicious of the major power groupings of politics and as a result their access to elite structures and central institutions is circumscribed by this view. Their main contribution in many western capitalist societies comes in the form of a moral ideology and advocacy that is committed to private property and small commodity production. It is this ideological contribution that signals the fascist potential of the traditional petty-bourgeoisie.

Poulantzas (1979:254-56) lists the main elements of petty-bourgeois ideology but his discussion is generally disappointing. The major criticism is a standard one: that Marxist analyses are often reductionist. Laclau (see above) offers one response. Urry contributes a similar observation when he says that there is a presupposition that:

> . . . there is only one kind of struggle in capitalist societies, namely class struggle . . . It is therefore reductionist, treating gender, racial and generational struggles as derivative from class struggle. The fact that someone who is a member of a particular grouping of gender, race or generation has also a particular class membership, does not mean that the struggles of that grouping are entirely structured by class struggle (Urry, 1981:16).

Urry's (1981) discussion on the reductionist and autonomist conceptualisations of ideology is interesting although his own theorisation is inadequate. Firstly, he argues that ideology is an effect which seeks to conceal the causes and consequences of practice (Urry, 1981:7). Thus ideology is:

(i) ... embodied within such a practice is a concealment of the causes, nature and consequences of that practice or of some other practice; and

(ii) that this concealment is in the interests of one or more of the dominant social forces in society (Urry, 1981:45).

Laclau (1979:101) criticises Althusser for describing ideology as self-subjection to the dominance of the system because it means that all ideology is therefore dominant ideology. Urry can be criticised for the same reason. His definition would apply to hegemonic ideology but by definition excludes deviant and revolutionary ideologies. Secondly, Urry (1981:72) argues that the interpellations of ethnicity, class, religion and politics can be understood in terms of two primary interpellations, spatio-temporal location and gender. This is as reductionist as the analysis offered by Poulantzas and which Urry has criticised. In the present context, an interpellation based on 'race' would seem to be as important as either of the primary characteristics identified by Urry. 'Race' when combined with gender is critical. Interpellations that centre on 'race' are linked through a unified discourse with ideology on the family, the respective positions and roles of women and men (e.g. male dominance and women's 'role' as breeders of 'race') and to issues of biological reproduction. Racial determinism invokes gender determinism, and vice versa.

Laclau (1979:93 ff) is also critical of the Poulantzian approach to ideology but offers more in response than Urry. Laclau argues that Poulantzas has an ambiguous and limited conception of ideology.

> Poulantzas has the tendency to dissolve fascist ideological discourse into its component elements to such extremes as to simply deny its unity: fascism then has a distinct political discourse for each social sector (Laclau, 1979:95).

Specific elements can be attached to a number of classes or fractions, and nationalism, racism or sexism can be representative of aspects of the ideology of quite disparate classes. Therefore it is clearly important to identify the unity of an ideological discourse (cf. Laclau, 1979:100), and specifically the relationship of the various elements and the way in which the ideology is interpellated. In Laclau's (1979:100) terminology, the unity of the ideology comes from a specific interpellation which is governed by organising principles. The unity does not imply a logical consistency but rather the way in which an interpellation evokes others to result in a 'package'. This Althusserian conceptualisation avoids the problems inherent in Poulantzas's approach and allows the interpellation as constitutive of ideology to operate in the same way for the ideology of dominant fractions and for revolutionary ideologies equally (see Laclau, 1979:101).

FASCIST ELEMENTS IN PETTY-BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY

The traditional petty-bourgeoisie offer a competing view of social reality. They seek to deny the validity of other interpellations, specifically those that are held to represent the interests of monopoly capital, of major financial institutions and of the proletariat. Petty-bourgeois ideology is advanced as the basis for reconstructing the entire ideological domain (Laclau, 1979:103). Below are some of the key elements that both reflect the particular ideological and political concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie and which link their interpellation to fascist ideology.

(1) Conspiracy Theory

A conspiracy theory is a convenient method of endowing competing ideologies with a threatening or negative status. It makes the world immediately self-evident without contradictions (Coward and Ellis, 1977:27). Lipset and Raab (1978:17) argue that a conspiracy theory is an extension of 'historical moralism' which defines competing ideologies as illegal. Given the defined illegitimacy of these ideologies and the threat that they are seen as offering, it thus becomes permissible to seek their destruction. This millenial perspective provides the

possibility of correcting a range of economic and social problems through the removal of those said to be the cause of the problems. The personification of evil in racial terms means that genocide becomes the solution (Billig, 1978:343), or its equivalent, repartriation or apartheid.

The conspiracy is said to reside in a small group that has a pervasive influence (cf. Lipset and Raab, 1978:15). A fear is generated that the forces of evil are not confined to a particular period or location but are global and enduring. It is the exercise of this power which explains why good does not prevail (see Spoonley, 1980). The three groups who most often make up the bulk of conspirators include those who control capital, nationally and internationally. From the perspective of the traditional petty-bourgeoisie, capital is divided into good (productive) and bad (financial, speculative) capital (see Edgar, 1977: 113,117). The petty-bourgeoisie directly link their interests, and identify with, productive capital while the conspirators are identified with finance capital. Thus finance capital and its influence is seen in a variety of areas and is personified in political groups (e.g. Illuminati), Jewish groups (e.g. *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*), political forums (e.g. United Nations) and international organisations (e.g. Bilderburgers). The second group, rather less specific, are 'intellectuals'. The petty-bourgeoisie have an historical mistrust of intellectuals because of their 'esoteric' interests and privileged position. The third group are constituted of those who oppose two important characteristics of society, its Christian and capitalist nature. In the undermining of these elements, the ideological opposition is seen as coming from Jews and communists, both of whom are seen as anti-Christian and anti-capitalist.

(2) Distrust of Democracy

Another critical element in the ideology of the old petty-bourgeoisie that follows on from a conspiracy view of power and finance capital is a distrust of democracy. The suspicion generated by the belief in the existence of a conspiracy is linked with an elitist conception of government. For the old petty-bourgeoisie, the modern state is required to maintain a unity of contradictory class and regional interests and in this task, it is seen to fail. The apparent unity of earlier social systems is held to be lacking and as the modern state resorts to rational-legal means of governing, it is deemed to be impersonal, to deny common-sense solutions and it utilises an extensive state machinery to promote particular interests. The petty-bourgeois look to earlier, elitist forms of government as a model, but unlike conservatives, they distrust traditional elites believing that they are committed to established patterns of wealth and power. It is the promotion of new elites and the critique of the institutions of the liberal democratic state that gives this interpellation a radical thrust. There is also the desire to see the petty-bourgeoisie in influential positions in a social system which firmly anchors groups to a particular social status. This requires the installation of sharply differentiated hierarchies based upon 'race', nationalism, gender and class and justification is sought in exclusionary ideologies.

(3) Racism, Nationalism, Sexism

The old petty-bourgeoisie combine the individualism of private property ownership with a belief in the rights and exclusivity of particular groups. An enduring and characteristic element is racism. The content and development of this tradition are well-documented (see Banton, 1977; Poliakov, 1974). As Poliakov (1974:2) notes, many of the arguments come from an episode in the history of anthropology which was badly warped by European ethnocentrism. The reactionary elements of the old petty-bourgeoisie continue to reproduce these arguments in an explicit and coherent form suitable for public consumption. There are differences in the weight given to particular arguments but all share the notion that 'race' is a natural (cf. biological) basis for division in society and an analogy is drawn with animal species to emphasise that such divisions are inviolate (Spoonley, 1980). It is also assumed that these 'races' can be ranked with a designated European 'race' such as 'Aryan', 'Nordic' or 'Anglo-Saxon' as the most advanced 'race'. This classification of humans then becomes the basis for a range of beliefs and policies that would in essence seek to retain 'supremacy' by racial purity.

Nationalism is often an accompaniment to racism. It is a product of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the evolution of the nation-state and is based on notions of autonomy, unity and historical identity (cf. Smith, 1979:48). It typically identifies national boundaries with racial groups or with specific 'racial interests' so that nationalism and racism become part of the same argument. The appeal to national interests is synonymous with racial concerns. It is also used to counter the internationalism of class analysis and arguments. The notion of an international elite of 'blood' and 'race' can be seen as an attempt to establish an equivalent for the rhetoric and appeal of international class solidarity (Rogger quoted in Biddiss, 1968-69:253). This is paralleled at a national level. An interpellation that centres on 'the people', constituted as either a 'race' or a 'nation', eliminates the possibility of the class struggle within a country (see Laclau, 1979:120).

While racism is a central identifying feature, it necessarily invokes a constellation of parallel elements. One critical element focusses on gender. Connected with notions of racial exclusivity is the glorification of aggression and competition and the linking of these to 'manly' virtues. To sustain the purity and impetus of either the nation or 'race', the role of women is seen as being able to produce suitable off-spring and to follow an ordained role in the system of production, notably domestic production. The employment of women in paid production is seen as diverting them from their 'natural' roles in biological reproduction, socialisation and domestic care and represents a threat to the traditional virtues concerning the respective roles of male and female. Thus the organisational and biological principles of western society are seen as being weakened (see Stephenson 1981). Motherhood is therefore granted a high status to encourage 'positive' attitudes and anything that limits fertility or purity (e.g. contraception, abortion, lesbianism/homosexuality, racial intermarriage) is held to be a threat to national or racial 'vitality' (see Women and Fascism Study Group, n.d.).

PETTY-BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY: A REFORMULATION

The starting point for the above discussion on ideology and the old petty-bourgeoisie was the analysis offered by Poulantzas. But his analysis has been criticised on certain points, and to reflect these departures, a typology is offered below. Aspects of Poulantzas's inventory of key elements of petty-bourgeois ideology are retained (see Poulantzas, 1979:254-56). Others are new in recognition of the importance placed on ideology, of the ideological and political differences between old and new petty-bourgeoisie and to reflect importance given to elements such as sexism and racism. The typology represents a minimum listing of old petty-bourgeois ideological concerns. It is divided into positive elements, that is orientations and policies that the petty-bourgeois would seek to assert or encourage. The negative list identifies the oppositional positions of the old petty-bourgeoisie.

Key Elements of Traditional Petty-Bourgeois Ideology: A Typology

(a) Positive:

(i) in favour of small commodity production and property ownership; this is usually associated with a strong sympathy for individualism and voluntarism;

(ii) pro-market as an efficient mechanism for production and distribution (this almost inevitably refers to a 'free marketplace' which is devoid of monopoly capital, of an interventionist state and of representative bargaining organisations such as trade unions);

(iii) statolatry, or the cult of the state, although this is in the context of an instrumental strategy for asserting, or re-asserting, a form of moral and political economy that favours small commodity production;

(iv) corporatism which is based on beliefs about the guild era and which relies on the petty-bourgeoisie as the mediator of every social construction under the state;

(v) an elitist orientation that derives from coveting the position of the bourgeoisie and an acceptance of the competitive ethic that governs the marketplace and which grants status and rewards as an acknowledgement of success;

(vi) racism which combines with nationalism to provide the basis for the ideological construction of 'the people' and which denies the validity of class interpellations;

(vii) nationalism, or the belief in the mystical entity of the nation which combines racial pedigree with geopolitical boundaries;

(viii) a committment to 'the family' which combines beliefs about the importance of the nuclear family to society with assumptions about the roles of men and women;

(ix) the institution of education as an avenue of social mobility although this is accompanied by opposition to a liberal syllabus and an insistence that education be governed by market requirements;

(x) militarism which combines beliefs about the need for strong leadership with a chauvinistic nationalism and 'racial defense'.

(b) Negative:

(i) anti-capitalist, specifically opposed to those elements of monopoly capital that are seen as limiting the profitability and influence of small commodity producers;

(ii) anti-interventionist state which the old petty-bourgeoisie regard as granting legitimacy and resources to monopoly groups, both capital and labour, in the marketplace;

(iii) anti-Semitism, as a critical element of the conspiracy theory, which is used to explain social and economic events; Jews are Volksschadling (enemy of 'the people');

(iv) sexism, or the re-affirmation of 'traditional' views of the role of women and men, and the denial of any form of sexual equality; the stress on male dominance with prior economic and political rights;

(v) anti-clericalism, or a suspicion of the established churches (fundamentalist religious groups are viewed differently) and of the clergy for their 'liberalism', political activity and power;

(vi) anti-intellectualism, as intellectuals are seen as pursuing irrelevant (i.e. non-productive) concerns or as involved with the conspiracy;

(vii) anti-liberal — petty-bourgeois opposition to progressive political and economic policies or to the granting of political power to 'undeserving' minority groups; opposition to wealth distribution; and opposition to democratic forms of government;

(viii) anti-communism because communism is seen to represent a major ideological threat, and this element is combined with anti-Semitic beliefs and an anti-socialist position.

DISCUSSION

This typology encapsulates the principal ideological concerns of the old petty-bourgeoisie and indicates something of the discourse overlap with the traditional interests of fascism. But certain distinctions do need to be acknowledged. The similarity of various forms of fascism lie in the fact that they seek to invest public debate and consciousness with racist arguments, and they contest hegemonic interpellations. They represent an intellectual tradition that is different from those of social democratic culture (Billig, 1978:96). It is a tradition that is characterised by racism, anti-Semitism, authoritarianism and sexism. But fascist organisations which represent the old petty-bourgeoisie differ from those that represent the working class for example. Working class fascist groups explicitly employ class rhetoric although classes as such are deemed to be subservient to the nation or 'race'. Further, they are not antagonistic to representatives of the working class such as trade unions although, again, such organisations would be required to serve the 'national good'. Working class fascism rejects the petty-bourgeois argument that the market is an efficient distributor of resources and instead supports the notion of a corporatist authoritarian state. Whereas, the petty-bourgeoisie look to the state in

reasserting the political importance of their form of production and moral position, working class fascism regards the state as the embodiment of 'the people', an expression of popular will that has a mandate to transform the relations of production and social relations. Finally, the practice of petty-bourgeois politics is noticably different from that of working class fascist groups. The latter reject the accepted codes of behaviour predominant in a democracy by participating in personal and group violence. Petty-bourgeois organisations are much more likely to operate within the institutions and codes of a parliamentary democracy while continuing to be deeply critical of them. For example, the traditional petty-bourgeoisie retain representational ties with mainstream political parties in Australia, New Zealand and Canada while participating in neo-fascist politics. Thus while there is considerable discourse overlap between what might be classified as working class and old petty-bourgeois fascist traditions, there are also critical differences.

The second distinction that requires reiteration is that between the ideological and political concerns of the old and new petty-bourgeoisie. The typology lists ideological concerns common to both fractions but the emphasis on property ownership and small-scale capital production clearly reflects the material position of the old petty-bourgeoisie. They seek support for petty-commodity production and see a threat in collectivism and monopoly, whether social democratic or economic (cf. Scase, 1982:160). The new petty-bourgeoisie, involved as they are in the state or in large capitalist enterprises, diverge from the old petty-bourgeoisie on such matters which leads to quite different representational ties.

Finally, how important are these politics in the New Zealand context? Given the current trasnformation of politics (new political organisations, altered ties between constituency and representatives, new ideological forms), the old petty-bourgeoisie constitute one element in the reformulation of conservatism and its expression in new forms. Their reactionary Jacobinism supplies arguments and activists to the moral/religious right and the racist right while their committment to 1930s Social Credit arguments creates tensions inside the Democratic Party. The old petty-bourgeoisie actively oppose the 'new movements' of the 1970s and 1980s (conservation, feminism, peace, anti-racism/Maori autonomy), they reject state dominance in preference to a market-led economy and they reaffirm various forms of fundamentalism (political or anti-democratic, religious). In many of these areas, they share a discourse with others and this creates the possibility of new alliances. Their moral crusade is endorsed and their anger given a direction. For a period, the old petty-bourgeoisie and dominant fractions are agreed that the state is incapable of resolving the crises of capitalism. But equally there are important ideological, material and political differences between these fractions, and any tenuous overlap is soon dissolved. At this point, the vulnerability and impotence of the old petty-bourgeoisie is again confirmed and the likelihood of reactionary elements of this fraction explicitly articulating a fascist or extreme right-wing position is increased.

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The Right Side: 'Creation-Science' in Queensland, Australia

(A case-study of the articulation of fundamentalism, social conservatism and the New Right)[1]

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'SOCIAL CEMENT' AND SOCIAL CONTROL: CREATING THE BASICS

To study ideology, as J.B. Thompson (1984:130-32) has pointed out, is 'to study the ways in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of domination.' To this end, meaning is mobilised to legitimate, dissimulate, or reify the way things are. Put another way, 'Ideologies subject and qualify subjects by telling them, relating them to, and making them recognise: what exists, what is good, and what is possible.' (Thompson, 1986:16)

Ideology thus operates through 'the constitution and patterning of how human beings live their lives as conscious, reflecting initiators of acts in a structured, meaningful world.' (Therborn, 1980:15) That is to say, ideology relates to lived experience and bears with it the conviction of 'common-sense', as in 'everybody knows that . . .'. Here Gramsci's (1981:209) comment on 'historically organic ideologies' is appropriate:

> To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is 'psychological';
> they 'organise' human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness
> of their position, struggle, etc.

The intent of such ideological work is the maintenance or establishment of a given hegemonic social order; it seeks to bind disparate elements into one common social formation. It provides a basis for social cohesion; it is meant to be a 'social cement'. But such attempts to legitimate specific relations of power and domination, are open to contestation. Hence there is an ideological struggle over power, manifest in the battle for social control. (Thompson, 1986)

This study analyses a particular ideological formulation: 'the Right Side', which is currently asserted by a range of conservative religious and social groupings. It is concerned to explicate its meaning system in social-historical context and to examine its effects. Its focus is the discourse of 'creationism', and its rejection of the theory of evolution. Here creationism is seen as representing not only fundamentalist concerns over evolutionary science, but as presenting a particular articulation of fundamentalist social and religious concerns with the economic agenda of the 'New Right'. Hence it provides an exemplar of the Right Side as an apparently monolithic force spanning religious, social, political and economic concerns. Discourse, in the sense in which it is used here, is 'language realised in speech or writing'. (Thompson, 1984) The sources used are a body of texts drawn from creationist and fundamentalist literature in Queensland, Australia. These texts present meanings which support, not only creationist and fundamentalist assumptions, but also the ideology and the political and economic agendas of broader conservative groupings.

However, analysis of such texts in itself provides no indication of the degree to which their themes and constructed issues are dominant in the community. It is true that moral and ideological entrepreneurs, conservative intellectuals, lobbies and populist politicians are skilled in perceiving and articulating themes and issues in common usage. They can explicate in a relatively coherent fashion views and attitudes which are otherwise

relatively inchoate, internally contradictory and inconsistent. Thus they present themselves as speakers for or on behalf of groups of concerned but relatively inarticulate persons. (See Gramsci, 1981; Mouffe, 1981.) Thereby they become more or less successful producers and entrepreneurs of meaning, presenting: frameworks for interpreting experience; themes which clarify what ought to be, as against what is; and indicating appropriate action to achieve it. The media typically provide for the mass reproduction and marketing of such views. But, as noted above, we need also to know how effective such action actually is, with detail on its differential penetration of the community. Hence the study briefly reviews a major study of Australian social attitudes (Smith, Knight and Maxwell, 1986) designed to provide such evidence.

Yet the value of such a study may still be queried. Given the apparent continuing secularisation of Australian and New Zealand society, fundamentalist concerns, whether over 'evolutionary science' in schools or permissive values in society, appear essentially irrelevant. Indeed, in the current drive for economic individualism, privatisation, deregulation, monetarism, contract labour and the deconstruction of the welfare state, it might appear a matter of profound indifference whether or not religion (of whatever form) is upheld by the state.

In response, it should be noted that the symbolism of Australia (including Queensland) and New Zealand as 'Christian' nations is residually powerful, though apparently more so (with groups such as Moral Majority) in the U.S. than here. Nevertheless, the fundamentalist conflation of humanism, atheism and 'godless communism' with socialism and the welfare state tacitly and explicitly supports the restructuring of society and the economy in ways suited to the continued accumulation of capital during the transition to the post-industrial era. More, as Marx (1950:255) noted, it is in times of crisis such as the present that the support of time-honoured and traditional systems is sought to legitimise radical change. Thus the demand for the Fourth R (religion) in schooling and the exclusion of ('humanistic') sex education accompanies the rejection of curricula aimed at producing critical or reflective thinking, teaching ways for clarifying values, and so on. Given the turbulence of present social changes, demands for a 'return' of a traditionally based 'moral education' are likely to increase.

Thus in an earlier crisis of secularisation and changing social relations in the modern world, Durkheim (1961) stressed the centrality of moral education for social cohesion and stability. Religion, once the basis of social unity, (Durkheim, 1915) was now diminished by the forces of the Enlightenment. Since education had now replaced religion as the central institution by which 'society perpetually creates the conditions of its very existence' (Durkheim, 1971:79), schools must accept their responsibility for guarding and shaping 'the national character'.

The state, caught in the impossibility of reconciling business policy, collective needs and egalitarian concerns in a capitalist economy, now faces an escalating legitimation crisis (Habermas, 1979). The impending solution may be seen in the breakdown of reform politics in national governments and the push from the Right for voluntaristic agencies to replace public sector social welfare. Hence the likelihood for reinstating a belief system whose focus (as in the ideal-typical Weberian 'protestant ethic') is the autonomous and accountable individual, rather than the now invisible social collectivity. Here the fundamentalist rejection of the 'social gospel' parallels the Right's assertion of the decontextualised (but economised) freedom of the individual.

THE SOCIAL-HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE RIGHT SIDE

Since the mid-1970's Queensland has seen a continued attack on progressive and liberal curricula and school texts. (Smith and Knight, 1978, 1981) The insertion of creationism into the teaching of biological science (Knight, 1984; 1985b) is part of this attack. While such events lead many to dismiss the Queensland situation as a rural and fundamentalist backwater, under a somewhat ridiculous populist leader, there is more to be said. Here I point, for example, to the explicit restructuring of Queensland education and concomitant changes to industrial and other legislation for the demands and constraints of a post industrial society, issues which cannot be fully developed here. Nevertheless, a brief review of certain aspects of Queensland's social-historical context is necessary to situate the analysis which follows.

Queensland presents a particular articulation of social and cultural conservatism which reflects the experience and historical context of Queenslanders. (See Smith and Knight, 1981) Its origins as a recent and isolated outpost of empire, underlie its fortress mentality and its history of xenophobia against blacks and Asians. It has retained a high level of cultural homogeneity in an Anglo-Celtic and Christian tradition. It continues to define itself in terms of dependent nationalism, combining assertions of Queensland worth and singularity with loyalty to the British heritage. Its economy has been heavily dependent on demand from foreign markets for its mining and agricultural products, plus a service sector centred largely on tourism.

That economy is now in disarray. Its manufacturing sector has contracted with the cutting back of national protectionist trade policies, while demand for primary products has diminished due to the continuing world recession and the protectionist policies of the European Community and the United States. It is also experiencing the tensions and threats consequent of a fully floating currency, the growth of speculative capital and the international money market, together with significant foreign control of large areas of its economy.

Hence Queensland now faces intense and continuing social turbulence springing from the conjuncture of major cultural changes associated with the development of the consumer society, the press for permissive lifestyles and consequent changed attitudes to work and social structures, and the coming economic crisis associated with what Gorz (1982) has called 'the abolition of work'. The social and economic restructuring consequent on the transition to a post-industrial society means the further marginalisation of blacks, the unskilled, the young, the less educated, women and some ethnic groups. It means a major increase in the unemployed, casual, part-time and contract workers. At the same time the old alliance of capital, state and the union movement is broken, while new alliances of foreign and trans-national capital with the state see the increasing exclusion of not only workers, but also of farmers, small business people, petty entrepreneurs and so on from power. There is, therefore, the growing threat of social and political revolt from those who no longer have any commitment to the present system.

It is in this context that there is a linkage of presses to reform school curricula and to deregulate and privatise the economy. Queensland schooling and the market-place are to continue to provide for the reproduction of the changing conditions and relations of production. For schooling, this reproduction is to ensure not only skills for the changing nature of work, but the 'social cement' needed to maintain social stability in a period of possible crisis. Hence concerns not only for 'the basics' but for creationism in school science.

These concerns for societal cohesion and stability come not only from the state, but from the common sense of large sectors of the community. Continuing conservative notions of human nature, society and social institutions are drawn on to reconstruct the Queensland past using existing symbols, images and representations so that it has a given history and identity, a particular 'social imaginary'. (Castiodoris, in Thompson, 1984) which will reshape and integrate the present. Such an 'imaginary' is (in Mannheim's (1936) terms) ideologically based. It fears the challenge of the values and attitudes left over from the cultural revolution and alternative life styles of the sixties, and the social critique of liberal, humanist or left intellectuals and academics, and those teachers who have been influenced by their views. These groupings are seen as having the potential to assert, however unconvincingly, alternative (socialistic, humanist) conceptualisations of social and economic structures. Equally such people subvert the maintenance of current relations of domination and subordination during the present transition to a post-industrial era. Hence the constitution of issues such as law and order, land rights (for Aborigines), gay liberation and evolution as moral panics. (Hall et al., 1978; Ryan, 1986) Such issues constitute 'nodal points' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) around which populist pressures for moral purity and national identity may coalesce with business concerns to maintain the conditions (which are as much social and political as economic) for capital accumulation.[2]

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2. For details of similar developments in New Zealand, see Spoonley, 1984; Openshaw, 1985; Snook, 1985; Wellington, 1985; MacDonald, 1985, 1986; and Ryan in this issue.

'CREATION-SCIENCE' IN QUEENSLAND: A BRIEF REVIEW

Debate over the age of the earth and the origins and development of life is a proper and appropriate activity for the growth of 'science'. Indeed, to the degree that the creationist challenge indicates weakness in current evolutionary theory, it is to be welcomed.[3] What is atypical in the creation-evolution controversy, however, is that the debate is not so much within the scientific community as between a fundamentalist and populist grouping on the one hand and the position of orthodox science on the other. Given the current prestige of science and its privileged status for truth claims, such a development calls for explanation, and this I will attempt in the remainder of this paper. For creationism , in the sense in which it is presented here, is a theory of the supernatural origin of life on this earth. Indeed, its meaning has been further restricted to a very recent creation (typically in the last six to ten thousand years) of essentially invariant life-forms as inferred from a particular, fundamentalist, literal reading of Genesis 1. Its ultimate justification then, appears religious, rather than scientific. Nevertheless, (along with other pseudo-sciences such as astrology and palmistry) it claims acceptance as scientific. That is, it appears to acknowledge the current privileged status of science in presenting truth about the physical universe. Nor does it seem to perceive any contradiction between the claims of revelation and science. The history and debate (particularly in the U.S.) around this form of creationism have been reviewed elsewhere (Bridgstock & Smith, 1986; Nelkin, 1976, 1982) as have the claims of creationism for scientific status (Knight, 1984, 1985b). Here I direct attention to the implications of the Queensland situation in which creationism has been successfully inserted into the school curriculum.

This success contrasts with the official rejection of creationism from school science in New South Wales, and the apparent lack of any significant debate on the issue in New Zealand. While both Australian states have fundamentalist lobbies opposed to the teaching of evolution as fact or concerned to have creationism presented as a scientifically valid theory of origins, one major difference is between an apparently liberal Labor government in New South Wales and a clearly conservative National Party government in Queensland. Here the ability of particular populist lobbies to articulate positions which engage with the ideological assumptions of those in political power is critical. I now briefly review the history of the debate in Queensland.

In 1968 biology was added as a separate subject to the Queensland senior (the two final years of secondary school) syllabus. The subject was based on an Australian adaptation of the U.S. Biological Sciences Curriculum Study program, *Biological Science: The Web of Life.* It presented a detailed discussion of the theory of evolution and its mechanisms.[4] Given the concerns of fundamentalist parents and groups against evolution, protest might be expected.

Apparently in response to demands for balanced treatment of creationism and evolution, 1981 saw changes in a core topic, *Origins of Life,* to include special creation and spontaneous generation as well as evolution. However, further revision of this syllabus saw the deletion of any alternatives to evolution. Then late in 1981 the Education Department warned state secondary school principals of community concern over the way some schools were treating 'the theories of the origin of life'. They were therefore advised to give 'appropriate attention . . . to each of the major theories purporting to explain the scientific data.' These were then listed as evolution, spontaneous generation, creation and catastrophism. That is, while the biology curriculum now excludes mention of creationism, the Department has effectively retained it for state schools.

In 1984 the Education Minister addressed creationist concerns. He made it clear that he personally believed that 'the origin of the species lies in creation and not in evolution.' He stated that evolution was 'a theory' and should not be 'taught as a fact, which it is not'. In this context he referred to the previously cited instruc-

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3. For detail on current theories of science, see Chalmers, 1983; for their implications for the creation-evolution debate, see Knight, 1985b.
4. See Maher, 1983, for a detailed review of developments in the biology syllabus from 1968 to 1981.

tion to schools, emphasising the need to present 'alternative models and theories about creation and human development'. Later he expanded his concern in terms of notions of fair play for the Christian majority, religious tolerance and an alleged lack of agreement about evolution on the part of scientists.

While these actions clearly reflected the personal views of a number of conservative Christian National Party parliamentarians, they and later developments should be seen as responses and interactions by the State to and with certain sections of the community—and not others—to whom it saw itself as in some sense accountable. Here I include genuine concern from fundamentalist Christians, particularly from rural areas which form the basis of the National Party's electoral support, and from some more conservative sectors of the community over declining public standards, traditional moral values, law and order and so on. However, such concerns are only a part of issues which are raised with Ministers, and (of perhaps greater importance, in such cases) the Premier. What is needed to make them effective is some mediating and enabling body, some pressure group or lobby to focus such concerns at party meetings, in local church and community meetings around the state, and in orchestrated campaigns in the mass media, thus reconstituting these concerns as issues which have an effect at the centre of power: Cabinet and the Premier. Which in this context, is almost to say, The State. It is in this sense that one should construe the Ministerial and Departmental actions of 1981 and 1984, when lobbies which had failed to get action from curriculum committees acted directly and politically, and achieved success.

This continued contestation of evolutionary science, and the application of political power where debate was unable to achieve the desired results, can be seen as an indication of continuing hegemonic struggle over the proper definition of Queensland and Queenslanders. In this context, conflicting definitions of science and truth, together with claims for equal time for alternative positions in education, are revealed as elements of an ideological conflict for domination and subordination. That the groups involved in this contest were not in themselves class-based supports the contention of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) that the present situation is one where a range of gender, class and ethnic issues are fought out in relative independence, yet have this in common, that they are waged over areas of inequality. Creationist and fundamentalist lobbies effectively articulated public concerns to sympathetic politicians and the community. The existence of evolutionary science, and the opposition of its supporters to the creationist cause, was used (as I will shortly show) to construct a polarisation between traditional (hence good) Christian and moral values and liberal/humanistic (hence evil) threats to the education of children and the integrity of society.

Effective populist lobbies in the Queensland context include the Society to Outlaw Pornography, an the Committee Against Regressive Education (STOP/CARE) with a claimed membership of some 5,000 and the Creation Science Foundation (CSF) with a mailing list of some 12,000. Such groups appear to share similar aims, concerns and audiences, and to have at least informal linkages or networks. Thus the highly effective (but low visibility) Australian League of Rights has links with conservative rural interests, small business, certain fundamentalist Christians and sectors of the Queensland National Party and Cabinet.[5] STOP/CARE (which echoes many League of Rights themes) has a record of successful past interventions in education through newsletters, mass letter-writing campaigns, state-wide tours, and direct contacts with certain members of Cabinet. The director of STOP/CARE was (until recently) a National Party member and district representative. And the editor of *Wake Up*, a journal for the Council for a Free Australia (itself apparently a League of Rights front) has been also the state director of Women Who Want to be Women (an anti-feminist group) and a National Party district representative. Such linkages should (in my view) be seen as indicating genuine and shared concerns rather than malign or conspiratorial intent. CSF, whose concerns I will shortly address in more detail,

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5.   That the New Zealand League of Rights and other conservative groups have used leading figures from the Australian League for advice and public speaking on recent issues such as homosexual law reform, Maori land and fishing rights, women's issues and the proposed Bill of Rights is not without significance in this context.

employs a considerable staff, produces a glossy journal (*Creation Ex Nihilo*) and a newsletter for supporters (*Creation Science Prayer News*). It has a group of very able and educated public speakers and lecturers who travel around the state speaking in church settings, state and non-state schools, colleges and universities. Its leaders appear to have easy access to the Minister.

Given the earlier comment on the apparent lack of class-related interests in what is nevertheless clearly a hegemonic contest, it should be noted that the social groups from which supporters of these lobbies come tend to be more middle class, rural, petty entrepreneurial or tradespeople than working class professional or managerial groups or ruling elites.[6] Such groups have been accustomed to a degree of economic power and social status and recent events are eroding that position. They have been excluded from the economic settlement of the Hawke Labor 'Accord' between the state, big business, and the union movement. The groups are made up from the people who are flocking to the support of New Right lobbies such as the Australian Free Enterprise Foundation and the Australian Farmers Federation. They support New Right moves for deregulation, privatisation, small government and lower taxes as well as being anti-state, anti-union, anti-bureaucracy and anti-welfare. In sum they constitute a new force in Australian politics. They respond to the social and economic pronouncements of the New Right's think tanks and their conservative intellectuals. These groups see the links between issues affecting the family, business and country, and between economic and social problems. Conservative or fundamentalist religious concerns over lifestyle (anti-humanist) and economic (anti-socialist) issues merge easily with such views.

A FUNDAMENTAL BELIEF SYSTEM

Creationism, in the sense the term has been used thus far, is part of the Christian fundamentalist platform. That is, it is a consequence of a particular hermeneutic which is premissed upon the absolute truth of the Bible as 'the Word of God'. This claim is often expressed in terms of biblical inerrancy (the text is infallible) and verbal inspiration (the actual words of the original text were dictated by God). That this position potentially or in actuality presents a distorted Christianity (a bibliolatry or worship of the text rather than God; see Knight, 1986) is more a matter for Christian scholars than this paper. Here it is enough to note that in this framework the Bible not only presents definitive standards for theological truth and the way of salvation through Jesus Christ, its accounts are also claimed to be historically and scientifically accurate. Christian fundamentalism is defined in terms of such a view of Scripture, together with tenets about other fundamental beliefs, including the innate sinfulness of all mankind, holy living, and proper lifestyles. Any neglect or rejection of these doctrinal positions constitutes an unavoidable denial of true Christianity or the Gospel. In short, there is a clear set of ontological and teleological assumptions which function ideologically to exclude positions such as humanism or evolution from serious consideration by Christian fundamentalists. Particular emphases upon doctrinal shibboleths and differing eschatological and apocalyptic views distinguish various religious groupings within fundamentalism.

The 'Creation-science' of CSF is fundamentalist in orientation and assumptions. Thus its articles of association assert that:

> The Bible is the written word of God . . . inspired and inerrant throughout. . . Its assertions are historically and scientifically true in all the original autographs.

In keeping with this literal fundamentalist reading of the Bible, CSF posits a 'recent origin for man and for the whole Creation'. The earth and all forms or 'kinds' of living organisms were created in six literal and consecutive days, and these kinds have not changed in any major way since that time. The Noachic Flood was

6. See Spoonley in this issue for a more technical analysis of the old petty bourgeoisie.

a real and global deluge, a 'significant geological event' producing 'much fossiliferous sediment'.

But there is more to be said. The absolutist stance of Christian fundamentalism (and of creationism) is historically and socially located. It originated in the United States in the late nineteenth century as a particular conservative religious reaction against a contemporary critical biblical scholarship which originated in Germany and secondarily also from French and English scholars. Modernism of this sort began to spread through the seminaries of mainline Protestant churches and in turn to affect the views and assumptions of ordinary suburban and rural Americans. Linked with this new constitution of liberal Christianity went a social and a political liberalism. In this context, the emergence of Darwinism posed a threat to the survival of conservative American Christianity and its values and lifestyle.[7] It was against such heresies that the specific formulation of fundamentalism as an ideologically based social movement with a set of irreducible religious basics was achieved.[8] And in the New Zealand and Queensland situations, given the social and religious background described previously, fundamentalism has continued as a religious force which in periods when it sees its view of society as under attack is transformed into social and political action alongside broader conservative and capitalistic groupings.

Such an ideological formulation of religious commitment has implications which go beyond and yet link with the rejection of evolutionary science. Given the thesis of the innate sinfulness of all human beings who are yet morally accountable on an individual basis for their lives and actions, and under threat of final judgement and eternal damnation, and given that the Bible is seen as providing an infallible guide for faith and action, not only divine forgiveness and correct beliefs are required, but also godly social behaviour. Thus fundamentalism demands conformity to prescriptions and proscriptions on individual actions and issues such as chastity, homosexuality, pornography and abortion. And in education its absolutist stance denies not only evolution but also multiculturalism, values clarification, peace studies and sex education.

More, while fundamentalism has been typically attacked by more liberal Christians for lacking a social gospel (that is, for having little interest in or commitment to reforming the current social and economic system), the fundamentalist rejection of humanism, socialism, (and more recently, liberation theology) and its stress on personal accountability, has meant an implicit or explicit support of capitalism and the economic agenda of the New Right (often under the more attractive metaphor of free enterprise). (Here see Liebman and Wuthnow, 1985.) Thus in the U.S. (with Moral Majority type groups) and to a lesser degree in Australia and New Zealand (e.g. STOP/CARE, the Coalition of Concerned Citizens (CCC)), fundamentalist views are providing an ideological basis for populist pressure groups and lobbies with political and economic agendas which merge with conservative and New Right concerns more generally. Creation-science is a part of this development.

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CREATIONISM

The linking of creationism and wider conservative Right-wing social and political platforms should not be surprising. The incorporation of Darwinian evolution into liberal theology and humanistic or scientistic social policy enhanced its symbolic and actual threat to the social stability and cohesion of a society already undergoing rapid industrial and economic change and dislocation. This was the context in which conservative and populist rural and religious elements in the U.S. elaborated religious fundamentalism as an ideological imperative for social and political campaigns (e.g. laws against the teaching of evolution in schools; campaigns for prayer in public schools; the temperance and prohibition movements). More recently, a combination of social reform programs (women's rights; land rights; black rights; homosexual law reform; abortion by choice; bills of

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7. In Europe, correspondingly, the Catholic Church was facing a like challenge from its own liberal theologians and scholars and from a linked political and secular liberalism which threatened its privileged status.
8. For a more detailed presentation of fundamentalism see Knight, 1985a; Barr, 1982; and Rudolph, 1958.

rights . . .), national and international industrial and economic restructuring and crisis, and ongoing national and international political crises has once more created a sufficient sense of threat to conservative social and economic groupings, (including fundamentalist/creationist Christians) to impel them to social action. I now briefly review a body of such Queensland discourse which exemplifies the use of creationism to express social, economic and political concerns, and to mobilise sectors of the Queensland population in support of the Right Side. Here ideology works on the commonsense and lived experience of many Queenslanders.

Professor Lee of the Presbyterian Theological Hall at Queensland University is clear that the human race derives from Adam and Eve. But he is also clear that 'all men are not created equal' and that 'the free enterprise system is derived from Christianity.' It is logical that he should therefore oppose communism for seeking 'the destruction of the family, the amalgamation of all nations, races and languages into one conglomerate, and the destruction of private property.' The social consequences of such apparently religious belief include capital punishment, 'strong armies, strict law enforcement, republican government and Ronald Reagan'. And a rejection of 'socialism and redistribution of wealth, abortion, the prison system, secular education, the Islamic religions and humanism.' (*Courier Mail*, 8/1/81)

Such themes are not greatly different from those of the National Party. Thus a proposed advertisement for the National Party in the 1984 federal election presented traditional moral values as under attack from such socialist ideas as gay rights, porno movies, and legalised abortion. Higher taxes, unions running the country, an Australian republic, a new flag, Aboriginal land rights, and more Asian immigrants completed the agenda of threats to the status quo. (*Sunday Mail* 11/11/84) This apparently secular stance nevertheless articulates with fundamentalist concerns through its moralistic and traditional lifestyle stance and its rejection of (godless and humanistic) socialism.

In this discourse of the Right Side, humanism assumes diabolical stature. Its representation in the March, 1985 issue of the League of Rights related paper *Wake Up* is typical. Humanism is presented as opposing the biblical account of creation, along with the Bible, God, Christ and salvation. It denies moral absolutes in favour of situational ethics, and removes the distinctive roles of male and female. It promotes premarital sex, homosexuality, lesbianism, incest, abortion, euthenasia and suicide. It supports conservation of the environment and policies to control and conserve energy. Finally, it seeks an equal distribution of Australia's wealth, along with the removal of patriotism and the free enterprise system, disarmament, and a one-world socialistic government. This article demonstrates how religious fundamentalism, including creationism, can be articulated with conservative rejection of contemporary lifestyles and Right-wing economic and political concerns.

My point is that agendas such as these link and conflate religious, social, political and economic positions into an apparently cohesive framework, the Right Side, which provides the ideological imperative for action in support of the Right as an apparently monolithic force (which it is not). Within that articulation, religious fundamentalism, and creationism as an exemplar or symbolic re-presentation of fundamentalism, is constructed on a series of oppositions such as humanism versus Christianity, free enterprise versus socialism, and so on. This is what Laclau and Mouffe (1985) describe as a discourse of equivalence, a division of the world into two mutually exclusive groups one of which is good, and the other evil. Within each camp, every element is positively linked or equated: their differences are reduced and their commonality stressed. This structuring of social relations through discourse is hegemonic.[9]

It is on such pre-constructed terrain that the case for creationism is fought in the CSF journals *Creation: Ex Nihilo* and *Creation Science Prayer News*. Three articles in issues of the latter and one issue of the former make my point. The first (October, 1985) presents the AIDS epidemic as a consequence of the rejection of

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9.   See chapter 2 of Ryan, 1986, for an extended discussion of the relation between discourse and hegemony.

biblical creationism (with its formulation of 'the rules in regards to sex and marriage') for evolutionary humanism and homosexuality. The second (April, 1984) repeats themes opposing multicultural education from populist education lobbies such as STOP/CARE. Multiculturalism is rejected not only for its moral and cultural relativism, but also for its evolutionary assumptions. It is 'social engineering' by 'backroom evolutionist manipulators' whose final goal is a 'humanistic utopian paradise on earth'. But no such cultural unity of the human race is possible because there are only two classes on this earth: 'the saved and the lost'. Hence this formulation rejects both liberal/pluralist valuations of cultural diversity and radical/marxist constructions of class in terms of economic and political domination and subordination. That is to say, the resolution of cultural or economic inequality is not a matter of concern for fundamentalist Christians. From which it is a short step to passively accepting or actively supporting such inequality. The third article (September, 1983) rejects the validity of personal opinions as opposed to biblical standards on lifestyle issues. Because God is the Creator, he knows the principles for right living. Using those standards, the paper attacks not only homosexuality, pornography, and abortion but also the anti-discrimination act and land rights. In short, Christian principles effectively undergird and justify social conservatism and capitalist economics.

A more detailed elaboration of this stitching together of religious fundamentalism, social conservatism and right-wing politics is found in a special issue of *Ex Nihilo*, 'The Relevance of Creation'. (Ham, 1983) Here the biblical book of Genesis is presented as providing a true picture not only of human origins but also of government, marriage, culture, nations, death, sin and the wearing of clothes. Hence in the past, belief in creation provided the basis for a sound society. Children were sent to Sunday School. Abortion was treated as murder. Homosexuals were jailed. But now Darwinism, evolutionary humanism and an 'anything goes' moral relativism have led to increasing homosexuality, abortion, rejection of authority, abandonment of marriage, nudity, and pornography. Not to mention an increase in those not wanting to work. More: evolution and liberal theology are presented as enemies of freedom; and atheism is linked with socialism and with Marxism. Finally, an apocalyptic future is envisaged in which genuine Christians, rather than pornographers or abortionists, are jailed and persecuted. Here is a social imaginary with power indeed.

Given the current social and economic context in Queensland, such discourse is potentially powerful with a range of readers from conservative social and religious backgrounds. First, it presents itself as a text which (adapting Rokeach's (1960) formulation) is more closed than open. That is, the possibility of constructing variant readings of the text is limited. While its terms and sentences are undoubtedly polysemic, its discourse is such that it implies a preferred reading (See Thompson, 1984, on Ricoeur): it is constructed so that its claims are more likely to be accepted (or rejected) as a whole. Such a reduction of alternatives is affirmed by the tightly related structuring of its themes and issues and their strongly positive or negative valorisation. Thus the text proceeds by a 'discourse of difference' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Ryan, in this issue) in which creationism and the theory of evolution epitomise the on-going global (and even cosmic) struggle between good and evil. What is critical in shaping readers' responses to such discourse is most likely to be the particular cultural and ideological assumptions they bring to their reading of the text and the degree to which the text's themes and symbols resonate to their own lived experience. (This claim is picked up in the section which follows.) Small wonder that the Queensland Minister for Education and certain other National Party politicians should support the teaching of creationism in Queensland schools.

That creationism in New Zealand (as opposed to Queensland and sectors of the United States) does not yet appear to be a significant political issue is in one sense a matter of little consequence. (I agree, of course, that it is of great consequence to teachers of science, students, and the like.) What I mean is that the rise to prominence of specific issues may be of less moment sociologically than their articulation around specific 'nodal points' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) which indicate major areas of debate and contestation in society. For example, abortion now appears to occupy a particular moral (or immoral?) position once ascribed by fundamentalist Christians and social conservatives to birth control and contraception. Both are temporary signifiers of the enduring strength of concerns over the family unit as a central pillar for social stability. They (and whatever replaces them) symbolise social concerns for moral purity and the dangers in neglecting such purity. (See Douglas, 1966

It is in some such sense that I use creationism as an exemplar of the Right Side.[10] I turn now to consider the degree to which such themes have penetrated Australian society generally.

A CONTESTED DOMINATION: THE EVIDENCE

Discussion thus far might seem to imply the overwhelming success of those espousing 'the Right Side'. Evidence suggests, however, that this success remains less than secure. I turn now to a recent major study of Australian social attitudes (Smith, Knight and Maxwell, 1986) for some indication of the degree of penetration of a conservative/fundamentalist/New Right agenda similar to that which has been discussed thus far. The items which were selected recurred across a range of right-wing and Christian fundamentalist literature. These issues were presented as statements to which responses, in a typical Likert-type five point scale, were sought. The resultant questionnaire was sent to a randomly selected group of 3,000 Australians from Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. Some 1,700 usable responses were received.

This survey indicates a differential reception of themes and issues. Given the thrust of this paper, it is significant that Queensland and a fundamentalist/creationist subset of respondents were significantly more conservative overall than the whole sample. .

However, while the conservative agenda was largely accepted by respondents, items such as free enterprise, law and order and the family unit ranked higher than specifically Christian items. On the latter, there was 69% support for upholding Christian standards in society, but only 52% support for the claim that the Bible should be the guide for living. There was 47% support for teaching creationism in schools, and 41% favoured Christian schools. And there was low consensus (38% opposed, 22% uncertain, and 39% support) on humanism and atheism as acceptable positions in Australia.

Similarly, while most items on the economic agenda of the right (anti-state, anti-welfare, anti-union, anti-egalitarian, anti-socialist, anti-land rights and so on) had considerable support (with the exception, surprisingly, of deregulation, privatisation, and rejection of conservation), on lifestyle issues there was a much greater division. Thus (against the conservative position) there was high support for sex education in schools and abortion by choice, and moderate support for alternative life styles. The conservative position on laws against marijuana, traditional moral values, and laws against homosexuality received moderate support, but there was low consensus on de facto relations, peace studies, multi-culturalism, and the feminist movement.

Clearly, the right-wing agenda was more accepted than rejected. Nevertheless, there were several progressive or liberal positions which had considerable support and a number which were still subject to contestation, such as peace studies in schools, privatisation and deregulation, feminism, and significantly, teaching creationism in schools. More, whereas on high consensus items there was little uncertainty as to agreement or disagreement, this level of uncertainty increased greatly as the level of consensus fell. That is to say, there were many people who were still open to persuasion for one side or the other. This may be seen as an indication of a continuing hegemonic struggle over the definition of Australian society.

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10. And that cadres of the Right Side in New Zealand share similar broad concerns with those in Queensland is beyond debate. (Here see MacDonald, 1985, 1986.) Such commitment is exemplified in, for example, four letters in a weekly Palmerston North newspaper, *The Tribune*, of 18/10/86. Three spoke in favour of the CCC, and one against 'Russian clergy and KGB'. These letters were so consonant as to merit treatment as one text. They acknowledge that the positions of 'humanism' and 'biblical Christianity' (and hence of the CCC) are irreconcilable because they are constructed around 'opposing views on the nature of man himself'. Hence the text constructs a discourse of equivalence whose oppositions, themes and issues are identical with those discussed thus far. This means not only a defence of 'the traditional family unit' and 'Christian values as the basis for our laws, our family life and our society' but a rejection of 'liberalism, radical feminism, socialism and Islam', and pluralism and homosexuality. As might be expected, the doctrine of 'personal accountability' for one's actions is used to reject both big government and egalitarianism: 'We seek a free and just society, and equality is not going to be a product of this.'

This claim is borne out even more strongly in a factor analysis of the data. The resulting factors, it is suggested, can be interpreted as representing nodal points (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) or areas of social stress and possible fracture in the Australian community at that time; fault lines where public fears and concerns coalesce; meta-issues which underlie and structure the surface concerns of more emphemeral items and issues. Equally, they may be seen as demarcating the boundaries of the social imaginary. These meta-issues can be summarised under the following headings: social cohesion and stability; suitable standards for living; what constitutes Australia's national identity; liberal and progressive organisations and social movements; the conflict between free enterprise and welfare issues; and the monetarist and supply-side attack on big government, the unions and so on.

Thus one factor presents the perceived contrast between a traditional societal perspective (including the family unit and traditional moral values) and more recent developments (such as Asian migration, multiculturalism, unemployment and alternative life styles) which might seem to threaten the supposed unity and stability of society. Another factor indicates a recognition of the opposition of Christian standards and values (together with the family unit) to aspects of contemporary lifestyles such as de facto relations, abortion, homosexuality, x-rated movies, marihuana, sex education, and humanism and atheism. What this means is that those people who tended to support, for example, Christian standards, would be more likely to oppose modern lifestyles. However, as noted previously, there is division in the community over these matters. An anglo-dependent definition of Australian identity saw the Australian flag linked with 'our British heritage', and the Royal Family against republicanism. Significantly, those factors which addressed economic-related issues did not include lifestyle issues or social standards. Here the New Right agenda was clear, setting free enterprise, privatisation and deregulation against trade unionism, the state bureaucracy, and increased taxation. However, while items such as socialism and unionism lacked majority public support, the community was again divided over this matter.

Clearly, the overall pattern of responses showed a correlation of items which reflected the division of conservative from liberal issues in the texts analysed previously. This suggests the degree to which the conservative polarisation of issues (the discourse of equivalence in Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) terms) is either accepted or recognised in the community more generally. Despite this, the various factors were not highly correlated. (For example, as mentioned previously, lifestyle issues were not greatly associated with economic issues.) It would seem that while the fundamentalist/conservative/New Right position (here presented as The Right Side) exists in texts and bodies of discourse, it is not in fact monolithic in its domination of the community. Rather, differing subjects (that is, people or collectivities and groups) responded differentially to concerns over social cohesion, national identity or economic structures. Nevertheless, as indicated previously, the factors seem to confirm that the elements in the discourse of equivalence set up in the texts treated previously do indeed reflect oppositions of items and themes shared by a great many of the respondents. It follows that the ideological terrain is now so constituted as to favour the position currently articulated as the Right Side.

Meta-issues such as the need for 'social cement' and the nature of economic structures and relations not only contrast left and right positions; they are open for contestation by alternative construings (conservative and liberal). This struggle is represented in symbolic terms: right versus left, the people versus the state, individualism versus collectivism, the truth versus the forces of evil, and so on. These points of stress and social fracture are arguably more durable and of greater significance than the specific (and transitory) items and issues from whose always changing elements they are constituted. It could be argued that liberal and left movements should acknowledge the commonsense of such public concerns over social stability and cohesion, appropriate standards for living, the definition of national identity, and the nature of economic structures.

It would seem also that claims that the discourse of the Right Side excludes possible alternative positions (e.g. socialist, 'green', pluralist or whatever) are manifestly false. For each discourse is premised, not only in terms of its own constructing, but against (and in conscious acknowledgement of) those countervailing ideologies which also seek public acceptance. This is perhaps explicable in terms of Foucault's (Cousins and Hussain,

1984) conceptualisation of an even more durable episteme within which all apparent oppositions are in fact variants of the same meta-discourse.

I turn now to a brief review of a subset defined as fundamentalist-creationist. This group was defined, not by religious affiliation, but by its response on three items: traditional Christian standards, the Bible, and creationism in schools. Such an operational definition is clearly less than ideal. Nevertheless, this small group, some 6.4% of the total sample, was markedly more conservative (to a statistical level of significance greater than .0001) on almost all items, political and economic as well as social and religious, on the questionnaire. It matched the ideological assumptions of the discourse examined in this paper, and its articulation of fundamentalist, socially conservative, and New Right themes and issues. Yet its position cannot simply be read off from a literal interpretation of the Bible. Rather it is the response of individual subjects (including groups, collectivities and classes) to perceived threats to their existence as subjects, drawing on taken-for-granted systems of meaning and prescriptions for action drawn from their past experience in this specific social-historical setting. And this response supports the structured relations of power in a capitalist and increasingly post-industrial era. In this way, as discussed previously, their 'social imaginary' becomes the Right Side.

For example, its members were much more likely to be Anglo-dependent in attitude, supporting the Royal Family, the British heritage, and the present flag, and rejecting republicanism. Likewise, they were more concerned over Australia's social stability, believing that law and order are breaking down, seeking the maintenance of the traditional Australian way of life, seeing the collapse of society in the decay of traditional moral values, demanding more attention to the basics in schools, opposing abortion, supporting free enterprise, and believing that the family unit is being steadily undermined

Their commitment to the Bible, Christian standards and Christian schools, along with the old moral values and the family unit means not only the rejection of humanism and atheism, but also a firm denial of de facto relations, homosexuality and marijuana, a strong demand for greater censorship of x-rated films and videos, and greater likelihood of opposition to abortion and sex education.

Perhaps reflecting fears from the extreme Right over the claimed international conspiracy of evil religious and political forces seeking to set up a one-world socialist dictatorship, they were more likely to see liberal and progressive groups and movements such as the U.N., the World Council of Churches, peace studies, sex education and the feminist movement as harmful to Australia. And on economic issues, they were, as a group, pro free enterprise and the individual, and hence anti-socialist, anti-union, anti-state.[11]

They were, as a group, older, less educated, lower paid, lower in occupational status (or farmers or housewives). They were also three times as likely to be 'Christian Other' (that is, neither Catholic, Anglican or mainline Protestant), and twice as likely to vote for the National Party.

That they were a relatively small group should not lead one to conclude that they are therefore insignificant. Rather they may be construed as the cadres of the Right Side, primed to lead the masses when the situation calls for them. As with the Queensland situation (which was also more conservative in its general response) they represent a possible critical restructuring of the future, not only religiously and morally, but socially and economically. And that 'Christian reconstruction' is manifestly more absolutist and totalitarian in style and assumptions than the present situation (despite denials by some Marxist theorists that this is indeed a 'pluralist' society).

This paper began with the appearance of conflict between a view of religion and a view of science, which was extended into the construction of a particular social imaginary, the Right Side. I turn now to address its justified

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11. Spoonley, in this issue, provides a detailed analysis of the attitudes of the petty bourgeoisie, including their constructions of conspiracy.

concern to restore meaning to everyday life, and to a deeper critique of the inadequacy of science in its construction as 'scientism'.

RESTORING MEANING TO CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY?

Mannheim (1936) distinguished between two forms of 'social imaginary': ideology, which affirms elements of the past, and utopia, which presents visions of an alternative and unlike future. At present, the second set of meanings seems relatively ineffective in engaging with the experiences of everyday life. As Barthes' (1972:147) points out:

> Left-wing myth never reaches the immense field of human relationships, the very vast surface
> of insignificant ideology. Everyday life is inaccessible to it: in a bourgeois society there are
> no 'left-wing' myths concerning marriage, cooking, the home, the theatre, the law, morality, etc.

But the imaginary which uses the symbolism of 'God, Family and Country' (from the CCC) or 'Tradition, Family and Property' (from a like Catholic group) effectively incorporates the symbols of apparently secular groups such as the Australian Free Enterprise Foundation as presented in, for example, the call to 'Support Your Family, Your Business and our Nation'. Here, the strength of the fundamentalist/creationist underpinning of 'the Right Side' is its identification of apparently credible threats (pluralism, atheism, humanism and relativism) to the moral fabric of society, which itself is presented as supported by and centred in the family, the individual, traditional religion, traditional values, and private property.[12]

Indeed, given the need to ensure an appearance of continuity with the past and its myths most strongly when change is in reality most acute, the assertion of traditional (including religious) systems of meaning and symbols is to be expected. Thus fundamentalism and social conservatism legitimate the economic agenda of the New Right, and their articulation constitutes the Right Side.

This press to underpin society with a religiously grounded morality is equally (in Berger's (1973) formulation) a press to unify a fragmented secular society by restoring a transcendent and cosmic system of meanings.[13] Here I return to the significance of the creationist attempt to integrate religion and science. My claim is that the distorted consciousness of fundamentalist creationism nonetheless correctly recognises the limits and inadequacies of science as it is presently construed. I refer in particular to the failure of science to give meaning and significance to existence, that is, to play a role which was once the function of religion. So that, underlying the flawed arguments of creation-science is a valid perception of the dichotomisation of reality between the (diminishing) realm of ontological grounds for being and the (expanding) domain of an instrumental techno-science. (And of the loss of worth and identity of individuals in such a context.)

Here Marx's (Bottomore and Rubel, 1963) recognition that religious protest is a genuine acknowledgement of the flawed conditions of human existence, provides a complement to Weber's (1958; Gerth and Mills, 1970) insight to the spirit of disenchantment of the modern world and the iron cage of a desacralised society. For the growth of religion has meant the displacement of religion into the irrational and the margins of contemporary existence. The ongoing secularisation of society is integrally linked with the instrumental power of science and its effective application through technology. This instrumentalism equally shapes the form of impersonal bureaucratic authority and the inhumanity of capitalist/New Right economic assumptions. Hence a technocratic rationality, grounded in the principles of a neutral and value-free science, which justifies the continued domination of nature and humans. (Habermas, 1970)

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12. See Ryan, 1986 for an elaboration of this ideological construction.
13. And also to give value to the individual. We should not reject out of hand the underlying import of the attack on big government and the state, or the New Right's distortion of freedom into free enterprise.

Ironically, the change in social consciousness associated with the cultural revolution of the sixties supported the return of fundamentalism, not only by arousing a conservative reaction, but by its challenge to the dominion of scientific orthodoxy. It is true that its response to the abyss of meaninglessness was to attack all boundaries and structures, thus (temporarily) expanding the margins of the expressive and the non-rational. (Martin, 1981) It is true also that it not only rejected the legitimacy of the state but that of established forms of religion as well. Yet this development led not only to the birth and growth of alternative religious forms but also to the colonisation of fundamentalism itself. It is in this setting that the shift from the cognitive prescriptions of conservative Christianity to affective and charismatic phenomena should be seen. It reflects both the residual consciousness of that era and signifies the continuing marginalisation of mainstream religion.

Hence one may question the long-term success of the fundamentalist-creationist program. Will this attempt at 'world maintenance' through a 'sacred and cosmic frame of reference' (Berger, 1973) remain ascendant when the current crisis is past? Here I would suggest that while fundamentalism supports the New Right almost by necessity, the support of the latter for the former is more equivocal. I conclude with a brief examination of the contradictions of fundamentalism.

RESTORING THE BASICS OR MARCHING INTO THE FUTURE — BACKWARDS?

Thus far I have presented creation-science as epitomising fundamentalist assumptions about human nature, society, what is and what ought to be. Its meaning system offers both a common-sense and a cosmic explanation of the coming social and economic crisis associated with the transition to a post-industrial society. It is therefore attractive to many who seek satisfying answers for their threatened or disadvantaged situation. I have also shown that, in this present conjuncture, fundamentalism and creationism express credible concerns which are shared by other conservative groups and by the emerging New Right. This articulation, by its inherently absolutist nature, presents itself as a monolithic force (which it is not): the Right Side.

There is an irony of the sort which Durkheim, Marx or Weber would have recognised in the contradiction between the other-worldly assumptions of fundamentalism and the need for its members to accommodate to contemporary, secular society. Its resolution sees religious concerns (including creationism and the rejection of humanism) serve symbolic but this-worldly functions. For example, belief in the inherent sinfulness of all human beings sets the present (cosmic) battle between good and evil in the context of God's final judgement and punishment of the wicked. Hence the need for godly living, upholding morality and supporting law and order in this present world. Hence also the ontological justification for Christian involvement in politics, as Moral Majority, the Coalition of Concerned Citizens and STOP/CARE demonstrate. Such a stance explicitly supports present relations of domination and the use of power for purposes of social control. A focus on the private aspects of morality and its surface manifestations in contemporary lifestyles (abortion, homosexuality, drugs, de facto relations, permissiveness) justifies an accommodation to the assumptions of western capitalism. It leads also to a silence on issues of public morality rooted in social injustice or structural inequality. Indeed, the distinction between private morality and public action enables many fundamentalists to maintain their sense of identity and superiority, and their religious exclusivity, while participating freely in the mainstream of economic activity and (more recently) the political arena. Thus the effective consequence of creationism and funda-mentalism is the maintenance of respectability, material prosperity and an orderly (controlled/dominated) society. This is the essence of the Right Side. But its support of the political and economic agenda of the New Right for such reasons and from fears of humanism, socialism and ontological chaos indicates a bankruptcy of vision for a better future. Constructions of the individual based on an atomistic view of society and a deficit model of human nature predominate over humanistic concerns for growth, freedom and sociality. And so the shape of the future develops by default as they march blindly into the future, backwards.

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'For God, Country, and Family':
Populist Moralism and the New Zealand Moral Right

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INTRODUCTION

There has been much popular discussion about the moral right in New Zealand particularly since the establishment of the Coalition of Concerned Citizens (CCC) in 1985 and the heated debate over the Homosexual Law Reform Bill. However the moral right has been a significant social movement in this country since the early 1970s, and in particular has escalated its activities since 1980. While there has been some speculation on the nature and significance of the moral right in this country there has been very little systematic analysis of the movement within the Left.[1] Various left-wing and feminist groups have made some attempts to understand the moral right, but in general the analysis has been sketchy and lacks a clear theoretical approach. This paper is concerned with struggles on the Left to make sense of the moral right and with establishing an understanding of this phenomenon through an analysis based on the concepts of hegemony and populist moralism.[2] To begin with I will define the moral right and describe its development in New Zealand. Secondly I will outline briefly one orthodox socialist analysis of the moral right. In contrast to this approach I develop an analysis based on a discourse-theoretical approach to social life. Here the central analytic concept of populist moralism is used to explain the development and significance of the moral right in New Zealand. In conclusion I will advance some possible strategies that can be used in addressing the problem of the moral right in contemporary New Zealand.

THE MORAL RIGHT IN NEW ZEALAND

Before I go onto the substance of my argument it is necessary to define the moral right and map out briefly the history of its development in this country. The moral right may be defined as a section of what has been called variously the 'new right', the 'radical right' or the 'extreme right'. These terms are often used interchangeably although some writers favour the use of the term 'new right' for the 'new' economic right, while the 'radical' or 'extreme' right refers to right-wing groups that have the notions of 'nation' and/or 'race' as central concepts. (Spoonley, 1981, 1984) Other writers favour using the 'new right' as a blanket term to describe all the racist, moral and economic right-wing groups that have emerged since the 1960s. I favour the use of the term 'new right' to refer to all of those 'new' right-wing groups that include free market devotees, libertarians, right-wing political philosophers, moral conservatives, religious fundamentalists and biological determinists. (Sawer, 1981) What is *new* about this political configuration is its articulation of certain right-wing ideologies in response and reaction to the activities of the 'liberal' and welfare state of the fifties and sixties.[3] The moral right is clearly part of the 'new right'. It is a neo-conservative movement that is concerned with maintaining the authority of the family and traditional ideas about gender and sexual relations. Power (1984) makes a comment about the new right in America that I believe provides a baseline for a definition of the moral right in New Zealand.

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1. My paper is situated within the discourse of the Left. I take the Left to include socialist, feminist and other radical progressive movements.
2. This article is based on my unpublished M.A. Thesis ' "For God, Country and Family": Populist Moralism and the New Zealand Moral Right'. Education Department, Massey University, 1986.
3. For a more detailed discussion of the issues involved in definition of the 'new' right see Levitas, 1986.

The new right is not a monolithic organisation, but a loose grouping of political single-issue, and religious organisations with somewhat divergent interests. In recent years . . . these groups were able to forge a fairly high level of unity, which focussed in part on reproductive, sexual and 'family' issues. This unity is anti-feminist at heart. (Power, 1984: 34)

In New Zealand we can see the moral right in a similar light. It is a loose coalition of various single-issue and religious groups. While there is diversity in the organisational base, membership, strategy and goals among the groups, there is a unity amongst them in their common ideological concern with preservation of the 'family'. This institution is constantly invoked as being in a precarious position and therefore in desparate need of preservation and protection from the destabilising influences of 'permissive' society.

There are approximately forty organisations and churches in New Zealand that can be defined as being part of the moral right and active in 1986.[4] These groups have as their main interest areas of social life that are commonly (and mistakenly) seen as 'private' issues dealing with morality. These include sex education, contraception, sterilisation, abortion, homosexuality, pornography and sexual permissiveness.

I believe the beginnings of the development of the moral right in New Zealand can be traced back to 1970 with the establishment of the Society for the Promotion of Community Standards (SPCS) and the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC). Patricia Bartlett set up the SPCS after the failure of her petition to Parliament calling for amendments to the Cinematograph Act 1961 and Crimes Act 1961 that would have made nudity and homosexual scenes illegal in film and stage shows. SPUC was set up along the lines of a similar organisation in Britain and in anticipation of moves being made in New Zealand to liberalise the abortion laws. In 1973 the Family Rights Association (FRA) was set up because there was a belief that the family was coming under increasing attack in society. The publication in 1973 of the Ross Report on human development and sex education, and the circulation to schools of the contraceptive comic 'Too Great a Risk' led to the establishment of the Concerned Parents Association (CPA) in 1974. In 1975 the Labour government established the Royal Commission on Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion and precipitated a flurry of activity by conservative groups—Women for Life (then Feminists for Life) had been started in 1974. In 1977 the Christchurch Integrity Centre was set up and the Save Our Homes Campaign was begun to coincide with the United Womens Convention. 1977 was also the year that the Johnson Report was published and in 1978 the Council on Moral Education (COME) was formed by members of the FRA and SPCS in response to that Report. The Council was joined by SPUC in the following year. 1980 saw the establishment of the anti-feminist Working Womens Council (Inc) set up in opposition to the Working Womens Charter that had been accepted by the Federation of Labour in that year. Throughout the early 80s these morally conservative groups increased their activities but it was really not until 1984 and the election of a Labour government that the moral right took a high profile and became a much more constant presence in everyday politics. Many of the platforms of the Labour Party were seen as being in direct opposition to the ideas of the moral right. Alarm was expressed at the proposed ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Women's Forums, the establishment of the Ministry of Women's Affairs and the introduction of the Education Amendment Bill (1985). The intention of the Minister of Education to introduce sex education into schools was a major reason for the more concerted effort on the part of the various groups to work together against what they saw as a common enemy. In March 1985 the introduction of the Homosexual Law Reform Bill was seen as a crisis point and there was a massive effort to stop the passage

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4.   The most active of these groups are the following:- Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child, Society for the Promotion of Community Standards, Family Rights Association, Concerned Parents Association, Coalition of Concerned Citizens, Credo, Christians for Life, Women for Life, Integrity Centre, Kiwi Forum (formerly Working Women's Council Inc), New Zealand Organisation of Moral Education (formerly Council on Moral Education), Pro-Life, Catholic Women's League, Country Women's Institute, Women's Christian Temperance Union, the publishers of *Family Alert*, *The Tablet*, *The Issacharian Report* and *Challenge Weekly*.

of the Bill. Bruce Ansley sees the petition against the Bill, leading to the Coalition of the Concerned Citizens (CCC), as

> a gathering-point for people troubled by a changing social and economic landscape, a platform
> for conservatives to hurl rocks at the agents of change; the Vietnam war protestors, feminists, greenies,
> the entire candelabra of the 'permissive society'. (Ansley, 1985:17)

Indeed Barry Reed, the CCC's press officer, claimed that 'Homosexuals came along at the very wrong psychological moment'. (quoted in ibid:16) The aim of the national Coalition was to form a united front to fight the permissive enemy through disseminating information and acting as a catalyst to motivate and spearhead action on moral issues. In addition to these specific interest groups there was from the late seventies an escalation in the numbers of people belonging to fundamentalist churches. Between 1976 and 1981 membership of the Pentecostal churches rose by 127.3% while membership of the institutional churches by only 7.27%. (Vodanovich, 1985:70)

THE MORAL RIGHT AS THE RULING CLASS IN DISGUISE

With the development of morally conservative groups the Left has been faced with trying to understand the significance of a new type of political movement. The establishment of the first of these new conservative groups was seen primarily as a backlash to the proposed liberalisation of abortion laws and the sexual 'permissiveness' that had developed throughout the sixties. It was not until about 1980 that the Left began to see not just a number of new conservative groups, but the genesis of a *movement* that was becoming increasingly vocal and politically active. On the whole most discussion of the problem has been descriptive rather than analytical. Feminists have tended to see the development of the moral right as representing a backlash against the feminist movement and as being profoundly anti-feminist. Marxist analyses of the moral right are characterised by the orthodox position that the right wing is merely the ruling class in disguise. This position seems to me to be the dominant analysis on the Left and a critique of its central assumptions leads to an alternative theoretical approach that I believe better addresses the issue of the moral right.[5]

The main approach of the orthodox Left to the problem of the moral right has been to reduce it to an effect of class. A clear example of this kind of approach can be found in the writings of the Socialist Action League (SAL). The SAL in discussing the right wing campaign against the Homosexual Law Reform Bill, maintained that the right wing offensive can be explained as a reflection of the deepening class polarisation that is happening in New Zealand. 'At the heart of this polarisation is the fundamental class conflict between working people and the ruling capitalist class which exploits them'. (Morgan, 1985b:4) The mobilisation of right wing forces is seen in the context of an assault on all democratic rights (including those of women, ethnic minorities and the working class) and is an attempt to halt social progress. The move to take away democratic rights 'goes hand-in-hand with the capitalist anti-worker austerity offensive and imperialism's drive towards war'. (ibid:8) Although the SAL does not claim that the capitalist ruling class is *directly* responsible for right wing actions, they do however believe it is the ruling class who will benefit from a successful right wing campaign. (Morgan, 1985a:3) The anti-homosexual campaign is therefore interpreted as a tactic of the ruling class to use prejudice against the working class in an attempt to divide them as a class and stop them from seeing the issue for what it 'really is . . . the cutting edge of the class struggle'. (Morgan, 1985b:8)

A critique of this approach is based on Gramsci's concept of hegemony and the development of this concept by Laclau and Mouffe (1981, 1982, 1985). Basically the class reductionism of the orthodox Marxist approach

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5.   For a fuller discussion of this approach and three others, see Chapter 1 of Ryan, (1986).

must be addressed. Mouffe argues that the persistence of Marxist theories in articulating a class reductionist position is the result of their

> lack of understanding of the nature of ideology and of the way in which we are constituted as subjects. The prevailing conception — which manifests the general problematic of class reductionism — has been that all subjects are class subjects; that each class has a paradigmatic class ideology; and that each ideological element has a necessary class belonging. (Mouffe in Laclau and Mouffe, 1982:94)

The SAL reflects this shortcoming in their theorisation of the moral right. Taking the first point of class reductionism that maintains all subjects are class subjects, it can be said that this neglects the fact that people enter many kinds of social relations and not just those arising from their position in the relations of production. Individuals also live out their lives as members of an ethnic group, as gendered beings, as having a particular sexual orientation, religion and so on. Each of these social facts has an autonomy of its own that is not *only* secondary to class. Laclau and Mouffe provide a powerful critique of class reductionism in their work (1981, 1982, 1985) and the basis of their argument can be summarised as follows. In contrast to a conceptualisation that places class at the heart of an analysis of social relations it is necessary to expand on Gramsci's notion of hegemony.

> There is first of all the most strictly political aspect which consists of the capacity of a fundamental class to articulate the interests of other groups to its own interests, thereby becoming the leading element of a collective will. And then there is the aspect of intellectual and moral leadership which indicates the ideological conditions which must be fulfilled for such a collective will to become possible, the ways in which it is 'cemented'. (Mouffe, 1981:172)

Although Mouffe speaks of a fundamental 'class' in this quote, she later rejects that it is necessarily a class that must play this role. Any social group that can articulate to itself the interests of other groups can play a hegemonic role. There is no predetermined class character of hegemony because by its very nature it must be the outcome of a process of political and ideological struggle. Subjects are not pre-constituted prior to the struggle for political power but are themselves created through the process of hegemony. We can take for example the subject position — 'anti-feminist woman'. As a particular subject she did not exist until the advent of an identifiable feminist movement. The existence of feminism as a discourse created a situation where certain women, threatened by these ideas, constituted themselves as anti-feminist women and so created a new subject position. This does not imply that these women simply created a position for themselves out of thin air. Rather they worked on a terrain created through feminism and other existing discourses (e.g. fundamentalist Christianity) which they used to buttress their position. Rather than seeing ideology as merely a reflection of class interests it is necessary to examine the specific conditions and struggles that give rise to an ideological formation. There can be no privileging class subjects because they are merely one of the 'vast plurality of subjects . . . hegemony must be seen in terms of the discursive articulation of different subjects'. (Jessop, 1982:198-9)

Mouffe's second point is particularly important in relation to a critique of the tendency within a class reductionist position to explain ideological domination through the imposition of the dominant group's ideology on subordinated groups. The process of domination is in fact much more complicated than this and depends on the ability of a group to win the consent of subordinated groups. This is done by combining elements of competing world-views into an ideological system that partially absorbs and neutralises their antagonisms. In order to understand an ideological system, such as the moral right in New Zealand, it is not important to locate what class or group lies behind it, but rather the system should be broken down into its elements and the element that provides the organising principle of the whole should be located. The key to understanding is therefore the *organisation* of ideology rather than some notion of an underlying class or other subject position which is creating ideology in its own interests.

HEGEMONY, ARTICULATION, AND EQUIVALENCE

If we accept then the centrality of hegemony as an analytical concept it is necessary to identify the ideological conditions which must be fulfilled for a collective will to become possible, the ways in which the discourse is 'cemented'. (Mouffe,1981:172) What is needed therefore is the notion of articulation. Articulation is the organisation of ideological elements that gives them a new form of unity which is contingent and external to the original ideological fragments. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 94) Articulation is that practice which links different positions and elements and constructs 'nodal points' around which meaning is partially fixed. As a practice, articulation establishes a new relation among elements of an ideological system which is more than the sum of the parts.

> thus ideas such as 'people', 'motherhood', 'competition', 'equality', and 'citizenship' acquire different connotations according to their articulation with other elements to form a specific discourse. (Jessop, 1982: 196)

Laclau and Mouffe refer to two basic modes of political discourse which may under certain circumstances secure hegemony. They maintain that hegemony can be secured through either a discourse of difference or a discourse of equivalence. The concept of equivalence is central to both discourse. Basically it refers to the process whereby a second meaning is created through discourse which subverts an original meaning. An example of this is the way the moral right has made a series of equivalences between sex education, sexual permissiveness, the distortion of gender roles and the breakdown in the family and society.[6] So whereas liberal discourse may originally have linked sex education with progressive notions, the moral right has rearticulated the concept to have a negative meaning. With a discourse of difference equivalences are *negated*.

> hegemony depends on the neutralisation of ideologically constituted antagonisms through their re-interpretation as differences within a national-popular collective will. (ibid: 197)

In this way antagonisms are made to appear like mere differences that can be integrated within a discourse. An example of rupturing the chain of equivalences is to partially absorb demands and turn them into positive differences within the system. An example of this can be seen in New Zealand after World War Two.

> . . . while the war offered women new opportunities it still served to accentuate the separation of the male and female worlds. After the war, the two spheres were expected to coalesce in the post war reconstruction of New Zealand society; ideas were encapsulated so graphically and sentimentally by the media that they reinforced the post war rush towards marriage, family and home. (Cook, 1985:47)

Here we see a discourse of difference where antagonisms between men and women disappear and different 'spheres of life' are accepted for the good of the 'national-popular collective will'. As a consequence integration and consensus is achieved. In contrast to the discourse of difference the other form of hegemonic articulation relies on a discourse of equivalence which involves;

> the constitution of a system of equivalences among different positions and subjects by either (a) a common polarity which is juxtaposed in an irreducible dualism to another pole, and defined as superior to it or (b) a common antagonism to an internal and/or external enemy which must be defeated as a condition of advancement of each particular position or subject. This involves the polarisation of the different positions or subjects constituted in and through discourse and the

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6.   For a more detailed discussion of the campaign around sex education see Ryan (1987 forthcoming).

interpellation of the two poles as either contrary and unequal or as contradictory and antagonistic.
(Jessop, 1982:197)

Examples of (a) are apartheid and patriarchy, and of (b) Chartism, Fascism, Maoism and Jacobinism. Laclau and Mouffe give the following example of a discourse of equivalence by discussing millennarian movements.

> Here the world divides, through a system of paratactical equivalences, into two camps: peasant culture representing the identity of the movement, and urban culture incarnating evil. The second is the negative reverse of the first. A maximum separation has been reached and no element in the system of equivalences enters into relations other than those of opposition to the elements of the other system. There are not one but two societies. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:130).

In contrast to the logic of difference, the logic of equivalence is one of the simplification of political space. During periods of unstable social relations any system of differences is likely to be less successful and there will be an increase in the points of antagonism. The proliferation of antagonisms makes more difficult the construction of a system of differences and more likely the establishment of chains of equivalence. (ibid:131) A popular positionality is created through a discourse of equivalence by dividing society between the dominant and the dominated, and presenting itself as articulating all of society around one fundamental antagonism. What is of particular interest to an analysis of the moral right is the second type of discourse of equivalence. While both types divide the political space into two antagonistic camps and produce subjectivities of a 'popular' position, a populist rupture is said to be created when the antagonistic relation is articulated 'not as the pole of an irreducible dualism but as *the dynamic point of confrontation*'. (Laclau, 1980:91) It is this process which characterises the moral right in New Zealand.

THE MORAL RIGHT AS POPULIST MORALISM

Taking then the notions of articulation, hegemony and a discourse of equivalence it is possible to theorise the moral right and analyse it as a form of populist moralism. There are two steps to outlining the development of populist moralism. Firstly it is necessary to describe and analyse the *conditions and constraints* that give rise to this political movement. This is distinct from the second task which involves deconstructing the discourse itself—i.e. the ideas and practices that are actually employed by the moral right.

(1) Conditions of Existence of the Moral Right

The moral right can be seen as a response to a 'crisis in morality'. During the sixties and seventies the consensus that had existed in New Zealand around gender and sexual relations was being broken down by three major social factors. Firstly there was the establishment of new progressive political movements. Cherished ideas about sexuality, family life and the relationships between men and women were coming under the scrutiny and attack of liberal, feminist and gay movements. At the same time society was undergoing a process of 'secularisation' and established religions were losing their role as a major social legitimator. Religion's traditional hold on morality was loosened and more liberal notions of morality based on individual freedom and choice came to be accepted. Thirdly during the sixties the state was also increasing its activity in areas that had previously been seen as 'private' and outside the legitimate arena of state intervention. In particular the state was beginning to make some moves to incorporate liberal feminist demands in the areas of equal pay and divorce legislation. There was also an attempt to expand the influence of the state into sex education. Taken together the changes of the sixties can be seen to represent a 'liberal/permissive' movement. The moral right arose in response to this 'moral crisis'. It identified both state intervention in 'private' areas of 'morality' and family-life, and the new progressive movements, as 'the enemy' that had to be defeated if morality and authority were to reign once again.

Prior to the 1960s the hegemonic construction of sex and gender relations can be seen as displaying the characteristics of a discourse of difference. Here differences between men and women are seen as the 'natural order

of things' that do not imply inequality or antagonism. During the sixties there were significant changes in state activity and the population in general which increased the points of antagonism and led to an increase in the chains of equivalence. With the new progressive movements the antagonisms that existed between men and women, and between the 'sexual majority' and 'deviants', were no longer interpreted as *legitimate* but rather as *significant areas of conflict.* The moral right entered into this debate too, but rather than seeing *antagonisms* between men and women as being a problem they saw the *breakdown of consensus* over sexual values and gender roles which typified the late sixties and early seventies as having only negative effects. It is in response to the liberal challenge to traditional morality that a new moral movement arose in the early seventies. The various progressive movements were seen as constituting a 'crisis in authority' and therefore had to be defended against. The increasing tendency for the state to involve itself in 'private' issues and to incorporate some of the demands of the progressive movements was seen as even more of a threat to traditional ideas about sex and gender. In the British context Weeks has commented that 'permissiveness' became a political metaphor that marked a social and political divide. Opponents of the movement use the phrase to weld together complex changes into a 'potent symbolic unity'. By erecting this symbol of moral and sexual relaxation

> of loose moral standards, of disrespect for all that was traditional and 'good', it became easier in the 1970s to recreate a sense of crisis around social changes and the beginnings of a mass support for authoritarian moral solutions. (Weeks, 1981:249)

This is clearly what also happened in New Zealand.

(2) 'The family' and populist moralism

Starting from a formulation of populist moralism as the division of the world into two parts—one 'good' and the other 'evil', and the recognition that the moral right sees conflict between the state and progressive forces and 'moral' people, it is possible to fill out in more detail how the moral right 'cements' together its discourse. The moral right has picked up elements of a liberal discourse on sexuality and gender relations, and rearticulated these away from the concepts of 'liberalism' and 'freedom' towards a solution based on an *authoritarian* definition of the family. Where liberal discourse speaks of individual rights and 'doing your own thing', populist moralism emphasises responsibilities harnessed to the family.

The moral right uses the concept of 'the family' as a principle around which certain equivalences are constructed. A discourse of equivalence involves the creation of a system of equivalents among different subjects by constructing a common antagonism among subjects to an internal enemy. Different subjects are constructed into polar opposites through discourse and the two poles are interpellated as contradictory and antagonistic. What is more, a discourse of this type constructs subjectivity based around a popular positionality, i.e. the world is divided up into the dominant and the dominated, and all of society is articulated around one fundamental antagonism. In the case of the moral right, the antagonism is between 'moral' people and the 'immoral' (the state and various subversives). For example the CPA in 1983 warned that documents recently published about sex education advocated

> virtually the complete take-over by the state of the upbringing of children in New Zealand. Under the guise of promoting a healthy lifestyle, it is proposed to mould children's attitudes, morals and values concerning just about every facet of life—how they view themselves, relate to other people, develop sexual morality, set goals for the future. And it would all be done in a manner which undermines traditional morality and opposes Christianity. (CPA,Oct/Nov 1983:7)

Moreover the state is joined in its task by 'a political *revolution* comprising the Women's Rights Movement, the abortion controversy, population control and the multi-million dollar world-wide contraceptive industry, the pornography industry and the *tidal wave* of *militant* homosexuality'. (CPA, Dec 1980,11—my emphasis)

The immoral section of society must be defeated if 'morality' is to reign. The moral right sees itself as signifying 'the good' while feminism, gay liberation and the 'liberal' state are the reverse of this. There are no points of contact seen between these two camps, so a maximum separation is maintained between them. No ideological element in the discourse of the moral right is allowed into a relation with the 'evil' society, except that of pure opposition. Furthermore, the moral right is able to create a popular movement because populist moralism does have a grasp on elements of traditional popular morality. It is able to work on people's conceptions of 'values' and 'morals' which are seemingly outside the sphere of politics and which are able to make sense of their concrete experience of family life and relationships. Populist moralism can be seen as having changed certain of the parameters and elements on which struggle around 'morality' has taken place. Where previously liberalism had articulated a postion on morality constructed around notions of individual choice, the moral right have turned the debate back onto the family. The moral right has responded to real issues and problems that have been identified on sexual and gender issues. This has partly been a response to the failure of liberalism to articulate a position on gender and sexual relations that made good sense to people. That many people do feel anxiety over sexual relationships, emotional security and family life is evident and can be seen in the extent of the moral right's increasing support among 'middle New Zealand'. What the moral right has done is to suggest a solution to these insecurities based around the articulating principle of the family. The family has proved to be such a successful articulating principle for the moral right because it has a resonance in everybody's lives. The family means all things to all people. It is a space where people feel comfortable, where they are assured of a place—even if it is one prescribed by sexual, age and gender relations. The moral right recognises the power that the idea of the family has in everybody's lives. It is a concept that has secured over time a place in traditional and popular thought and its strength lies in what Betty Freidan has called its ability to be

> 'the symbol of that last area where one had any hope of control over one's destiny, of meeting one's most basic human needs, of nourishing that core of personhood threatened by vast impersonal institutions and uncontrollable corporate bureaucracies'. (Freidan, 1981, quoted in Barrett and McIntosh, 1982;16-17)

CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE LEFT TO DO?

If we accept that the discourse of the moral right represents an attempt to win 'moral hegemony' in New Zealand, then the counter from the Left must develop through a strategy based on hegemonic politics. This means engaging constructively with the moral right on a number of different levels rather than simply opposing their ideas. One of the things that must be addressed by the Left is the ability of the moral right to divide society into two antagonistic camps, in which the Left and radical ideas about sex and gender represents the evil pole. What has to be broken down is the idea that 'morality' can only be defined in relation to some concept of a normative authoritarian family. Instead of constructing discourse about morality as a battle between two opposing and mutually exclusive positions, the Left must construct a space to struggle *over* morality where feminism and sexual diversity and 'freedom' are not seen in opposition to morality and the family. Where the moral right has constructed a set of equivalents that unite diverse subject positions around preservation of the family and rejection of feminism and sexual freedom, the Left must establish a different set of equivalents based on principles of democracy and equality. Rather than harking back to old calls to 'smash the family' progressives need to build a viable alternative project that can answer people's insecurities and uncertainties about family life, gender relations and sexuality. These are *real* fears and not simply figments of the imagination. We must recognise that some of the claims of the moral right do have a basis in the experience of many people. For instance it is true that the state *has* encroached on our 'personal' lives often to the detriment of social and individual justice. It is also true that the family does embody many values and functions that the Left would also want to uphold. 'The family' and 'morality' do not belong to the moral right—but the Left needs to be clearer and more concise in its analysis of oppressive features of both of these as they are currently

constructed. We need to replace the 'common sense' of the moral right's solution with some strong and progressive 'good sense'.[7]

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7. There is not room to go into more detail here about the content of such a proposal but the book *Alternatives: Socialist Essays for the Eighties* (Maharey and O'Brien, 1986) might be a good place to start.

The State and the Arts: The State of the Art

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INTRODUCTION

The emergence of a cultural infrastructure in New Zealand indicates some more or less coherent belief about, and commitment to, the place of artistic production in this society. In subsequent parts of this paper, I would like to look at the relationship between artistic production and the hegemony of dominant groups through the state's activity as patron of the arts.

THE STATE AS PATRON

State patronage of the arts is clearly a major factor in their survival and in the most recent financial year (1985-86) the level of funding of the arts through the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council was in the region of $10 million. In this section I will look at the historical pattern of state funding of art, and in so doing I shall identify underlying definitions of art and the implications of such definitions for the practice of arts administrators and artists themselves.

A significant level of state patronage of the arts began in 1940. That year was the occasion of the centennial celebrations of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi.[1] In conjunction with the celebrations, there were a number of 'high' cultural events as well as a new general self-awareness among New Zealanders—a type of emergent nationalism—and, in particular, a recognition of local achievements in the field of the arts. In 1940, Peter Fraser succeeded Michael Joseph Savage as the leader of the Labour Government, and through the personal support of Fraser and his administration, there was a favourable climate in which the arts flourished. In conjunction with the Centennial celebrations there took place a National Exhibition of New Zealand art, a National Music Competition, and the establishment of a National Symphony Orchestra. The Orchestra did not continue after the Centenary but was reassembled several years later as one of a number of measures that were introduced as part of a new, large-scale public patronage of the arts instituted by Joseph Heenan, Under-Secretary of the Department of Internal Affairs.

In 1949, the Labour Government was removed from power. The new National Government exhibited a different attitude to the arts. According to Oliver (1981:450),

> . . . though little was dismantled, the 1950s were the years of private not state initiative in the arts. The state settled down to the role of pay-master, rewarding enterprises that had already demonstrated a measure of success.

In 1960 there was a significant increase in the level of arts funding by the government, and the Arts Advisory Council was set up. This was superseded by the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council in 1963. Commenting on the changes in the cultural infrastructure, Oliver (1981:452) wrote:

> The time of the do-it-yourself individualist had passed; both pioneer and proletarian virtue were at a discount. The era of the cultural bureaucrat, the patronised producer, and the subsidised consumer had arrived.'

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1. In 1940 there was less ambivalence than there is at the present time about describing the event as a 'celebration'.

During the 1950s the suggestion that a body similar to the Arts Council of Great Britain should be established in this country had been made several times. It was envisaged that such a body, if it came into existence, would function to advise the government on matters relating to the arts, would distribute state funds to artists, and would promote the practice and appreciation of the arts.

In the 1960 Budget, the first move towards setting up such an organisation was made, with the allocation of 60,000 pounds to be distributed by a group of people working in conjunction with the Department of Internal Affairs. The same level of funding was allocated again in both 1962 and 1963. The establishment of the Council signified the introduction of an important principle: by allocating funds earned from taxation, the state accepted direct responsibility for fostering the arts, outside of existing support through education and broadcasting. (Turnovsky, 1969:38)

The enabling legislation for the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council created a structure and a set of functions similar to those of the Arts Council of Great Britain, which was the first such Council in the world. The British Council was established in 1946 in recognition of the important role the arts were claimed to have played in maintaining morale in the Second World War. From the 1963 Act, the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council derived four main functions, which also constituted the base of four main budget categories. These were:

(1) the development of professionalism by establishing professional standards through support of professional performing institutions;

(2) the development of the practice and appreciation of the arts;

(3) accessibility of the arts and regional development; and

(4) public education, promotion and research.

In 1983 a fifth budget category was introduced — that of 'the preservation of our cultural heritage and assistance to Maori and other Pacific artists'.

The Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council is funded from government Vote, from Lottery Board profits, and from other sources such as rents and donations. In contrast to arts patrons of the past, the Arts Council is a public body spending public funds, for allegedly public purposes. At the same time, one of the more important features of the Arts Council is its status as a 'quango' (a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation).

Before and after the establishment of the Arts Council, there were fears that state patronage of the arts would mean political interference. Among artists there was a certain amount of skepticism, even hostility to the proposed Arts Council. The poet Fairburn was one such critic. He claimed,

> ... any artist who gives positive encouragement to State expenditure on the arts — especially to certain forms of it — is asking for a collar and chain. For State subsidies mean some measure of State control sooner or later, however much disguised it may be ... The arts, above all other activities except religion and love, should be carried on by individuals acting in free association. (1956:206)

There are a number of assumptions about the nature of the arts and their relationship to society contained in this statement, which I will take up in this paper, but for the moment it is enough to say that Fairburn expresses eloquently the fear of censorship which, initially at least, caused much ambivalence and suspicion about state patronage of the arts. Interestingly, there seems to be a less clearly articulated concern about the censorship process in regard to art sponsored by private individual and corporate patrons of the arts.

The Arts Council's position in relation to government and artists was riddled with ambiguity. It was located at 'arms length' from government, a deliberate distancing, a buffer between artists and government. However, its non-governmental status is clearly questionable — its independence nominal.

It is subject to Treasury decisions about levels of funding and to variations in the policies of successive governments. Membership of the Arts Council rests heavily on the favour of the Minister for the Arts. The Council

serves the Government by attending to some of the need of artists for income maintenance, and by setting up a legitimate channel for communication.

Overwhelmingly, the investigations that have been carried out by academics and others have looked at the economic aspects of state funding of the arts, in order to produce theories about the most efficient use of the resources that are allocated to the arts, and also to promote the idea that the arts are a respectable and worthy recipient of funds because they enhance the economic development of the nation. The public importance of the arts as promoters of tourism, as earners of export income, as providers of employment opportunities, as perceived sources of enhanced social life, justifies, in the Arts Council's view, a continuing and consistent programme of state funding of the arts. For arts administrators, the ingredient that is integral to a favourable level of funding is a change in society's attitude to the arts so that there is a greater appreciation of the arts. Such a change could be most successfully brought about through education.

Similarly, when there are doubts about the legitimacy of state funding of the arts, and especially when there are charges that the way the state becomes involved in the arts serves to reproduce social divisions and inequality, the state's response (specifically, the actions of the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council) is not one of a radical questioning about the intrinsic meaning of its role. Instead, the focus is placed on intrinsic factors—especially the place of educational processes in determining the differential responses to cultural activities among various groups and the impact of marketing in the creation of audiences. Thus, where groups in society appear to accrue little or no benefit from state (that is, publicly) funded arts activities, the onus is on the provision of education to generate a response from such marginalised groups, and also on the expansion of opportunities for those groups to experience the officially-recognised arts activities.

THE IDEOLOGICAL TERRAIN

It becomes clear that to understand, and ultimately to intervene, in the official construction of art is precisely an intervention in the ideological terrain of struggle. This term, the 'ideological terrain', is defined as 'those images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, and understand and 'make sense' of some aspect of social existence' (Hall, 1981:31).

Too infrequently has there been any analysis of the ideological and political aspects of state patronage of the arts. There is fairly scant attention given by New Zealand sociologists to the maintenance or change of power relations through cultural products and practices. As Hutchinson (1982:13) has argued:

> the arts are value-saturated, and to the extent that it controls resources which create, transform and interpret society's values and norms, the Arts Council is an intensely political organisation . . . The profoundest source of the Arts Council's power lies in its official capacity to conceptualise and to identify the arts and the artistic.

It is this capacity to conceptualise that I would like to explore further in this paper.

The Arts Council has considerable capacity to control the agenda of 'issues'. Controlling the agenda involves powers of decision-making and also of non-decision-making (Lukes, 1974). Non-decision-making is the suppression of an issue that threatens the present power structure. Lukes asserts that some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out. As Hutchinson (1982:105) says,

> The State is a political activity. The exercise of State power is a political process. The intervention of the State in art is political. The exercise of State power in support of the . . . arts (or, rather, *in support of particular understandings* of the arts) has to be understood in political terms.

For this reason it is useful to examine the discourse in which discussion about the place of the arts in society is couched, attempting also to expose the ideological underpinnings of that discussion. The dominant discourse

about the arts has produced certain myths, I would argue, which conceal political interests and which detract from a critical enquiry into the role of state patronage of the arts.

The Arts Council is perhaps the major undertaking of the state in the sphere of the arts. However, other measures have been taken, reflecting the enormous growth of interest internationally (especially in western industrialised countries) in supporting cultural activities. In New Zealand in 1969 a report by the Social and Cultural Committee of the National Development Conference outlined a democratic concept of culture that has remained part of the later policies:

> Culture is neither an indulgence of an elite nor the preserve of those with special gifts or attain-ments . . . It offers all people a greater enjoyment of life and a means by which they can overcome the feeling of alienation and aimlessness in a world of increasing technology and rapidity of change. By cultural experience, people can be made aware of the greater possibilities living latent within them; it is therefore important to the well-being of any community that the means to this experience be available.

This statement has been reiterated in words of similar effect by a number of planning groups and by the policy statements on cultural development issued by the major political parties. There are a number of assumptions which underlie it:

(1) that development of the arts is valuable to economic and general social development;

(2) that New Zealand artists should be supported;

(3) that 'cultural experience' enhances the quality of life; and

(4) that 'cultural experience' should be available to all. Culture is seen as a public good, essential to the general welfare of society and individual members of society.

A closer examination thus reveals that notions about the relevance of 'the arts' and 'cultural experience' have political ramifications in terms of influencing existing power relations and therefore art becomes a place of struggle. In particular, there is a certain understanding of art and culture employed by politicians, policy-makers and arts-administrators.

OFFICIAL DISCOURSE

Burton and Carlen (1979:48) have described official discourse as '. . . the systematisation of modes of argument that proclaim the state's legal and administrative rationality.' They see official discourse as a 'necessary require-ment for political and ideological hegemony'. Discourse is formulated in order to construct a particular social and political reality out of which consent may be achieved. Frequently the discourse of the state is used to conceal the existence of conflicting interests and unequal power relations, and to achieve acquiescence to strategies that are declared to be 'in the public interest' (Codd, 1985:23).

For a long time before the Arts Council was set up, a pervasive belief was that the arts constituted a special form of superior knowledge. Fairburn (1956:199-200) expresses this particular belief:

> An understanding of the fine arts is part of the mental equipment of the civilised man. It is in painting, sculpture, music and poetry that the greatest concentration of esthetic meaning, and refine-ment of taste occur.

Wane (1975:67) argued that this emphasis on 'high' art forms dominated the practice of the Arts Council:

> Throughout its early years . . . the Arts Council maintained an *artistic* conception of culture. In fact, the word 'culture' did not appear in the original enabling legislation . . . Very few artistic activities other than the 'fine arts' were included in the Council's scope of activities as it saw them.

He claims that despite its being accorded wider powers, the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council followed very closely the pattern established by the Arts Council of Great Britain, by which the fine arts and professionalism were fostered, to the near exclusion of other art forms. This concept of art is one that is still in contemporary usage. In 1982, Bob Cater claimed that New Zealanders were a 'cultured people' on the basis that

> ... annual admissions to New Zealand's museums and art galleries probably exceed 4.5 million people ... New Zealanders buy more books than any other country in the world ... We buy more recorded music than any country but Sweden. Not long ago, a definitive issue of the Beethoven Symphonies recorded by the Berlin Philharmonic ... sold twice as many per capita as in any other country.

Related to this first conceptualisation of art as a special form of superior knowledge is the conceptualisation of art as a 'public good'. Accordingly, people's exposure to artistic practice and products stimulates 'community advancement'. Community advancement here implies quality of life and well-being, as well as economic benefits. It was stated, for example, that through cultural activities an innovative and imaginative workforce could be developed.[2]

A third conceptualisation of art involved ideas about the independent status of art, and the need of the artist to practise in freedom. Alan Highet (1982) testified to this when he said,

> We value the freedom of the artist. We have never regarded his role as being subservient to the State. Indeed, the reverse is true. The responsibility is true. The responsibility of the State is, in our view, to support the artist's freedom to develop freely along his own lines.'

The hegemonic quality of the state's power is established through its very declaration of support for the artist's freedom. By such discourse, the state obtains the consent of artists who perceive their freedom to be protected and respected by the state. In the way that they give assent to such a role, as it is defined by the discursive practice of the state, artists conform to the authority of the state's discourse.

Christopher Lasch (cited in Merewether and Stephen, eds, 1977:22) describes this concept of the independent, free artist as a means by which the state intervenes in the ideological structure of society. He argues that the state

> ... in order to be successful demands the co-operation of writers, teachers and artists, not as paid propagandists or as state-censored time-servers, but as free intellectuals. This new version of 'free intellectual' is self-censoring in his or her so-called professional detachment from the economic realities of society. That isn't implying that they don't hold political views. Instead, they may hold strong left political views, but as long as they remain based within the 'intellectual environment' they are displaced from political or economic impact. In fact, the more 'dissident' such a person is, the more useful they are as propaganda, as symbols of 'freedom of expression' within an 'open and free society'. By presupposing an abstract or academic relation to the political dimension of what they do, artists and intellectuals alike become an eloquent expression of the harmlessness of such 'freedom' and finally its social meaninglessness.

The subsequent effect is that political action within the art establishment is simply a token gesture, liberal front, which the existing hegemony can afford, at least for a while, to have exist. It is the lack of a thorough-going questioning or analysis of the *mystification of art*, or of our race, class and gender-divided social reality that permits the institutional organisation of art to persist.

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2. See *Arts Conference '80*, a discussion paper for working parties involved in the organisation of a proposed national arts conference (October, 1980).

A thorough-going analysis of art acknowledges that one is never outside the politics of representation. While some may cling to the belief that art may retain a radical or subversive potential, Foster (1983:xv-xvi) dismisses the idea of an artistic realm which can exist apart from history:

> The adventures of the aesthetic make up one of the great narratives of modernity: from the time of its autonomy through art-for-art's sake to its status as a necessary negative category, a critique of the world as it is. It is this last moment (figured brilliantly in the writings of Theodor Adorno) that is hard to relinquish: the notion of the aesthetic as subversive, a critical interstice in an otherwise instrumental world. Now, however, we have to consider that this aesthetic space too is eclipsed — or rather, that its criticality is now largely illusory (and so instrumental). In such an event, the strategy of Adorno, of 'negative commitment' might have to be revised or rejected, and a new strategy of interference (associated with Gramsci) devised.

Earlier the 'arms length' principle was mentioned — as a specific feature of the relationship between the Arts Council and the state. The intention of this particular formulation is to convey an impression of distance, so that the state's control is not directly traceable. Pearson (1982:104) sees this as part of the

> . . . systematic development of overt politics from the exercise of State power and authority. Overt politics is displaced by a cultural consensualism which, while being in fact political, is experienced ambiguously but powerfully as a kind of informal consensual benevolence.

The establishment of a 'semi-autonomous' Arts Council is thus based on the creative genius notion of culture which demands an 'arms length' approach on the part of government. The effect of this is that art is seen to be removed from politics. The idea that government must not be in a position to inhibit the expression of a genius is used to legitimate and provide the organisation for the depoliticisation of art.

A materialist theory of art requires that ideas about art be identified as arising from particular economic and political relations in society that are empirically verifiable. These 'ideas about art' serve to construct and reproduce hegemony. While discourse theory is a powerful explanatory tool with recognition of the necessary specificity and effectivity of discursive practices, it is also important to avoid the conflation of the social structure of reality with its signification in discursive formations. Language or discourse may have a determining effect on society, but this must not be extended to the point of stating that society is nothing but languages or discursive formations.

The official discourse about the arts and the role of the Arts Council reiterates the idea of the responsibility of the Council to serve public priorities. The discourse is permeated by bourgeois ideological constructions of the relationship between the Council, the state, and the public. Michael Volkerling (1981) once expressed it thus: 'The system effectively represents a form of contract between the public, whose will is expressed through the legislation, and the Council . . .' This implies a faith in the ability of bourgeois democracies to represent in legislation the will of the public.

There is sometimes a tendency to regard the Arts Council as a passive institution that *reacts* to pre-given evaluations of and developments in the work of artists. Pearson, insisting on the *active* role of Arts Councils, wrote (1982:98):

> Just as the collecting and exhibiting policies of the Tate Gallery shape understandings of what constitutes current art (and set the conditions for arguments over what constitutes significant art) so the decisions of arts councils, and regional arts associations [the British equivalent of New Zealand's Regional Arts Councils] shape and define aspects of what shall constitute the culture of art.

In contrast to the idea that the Arts Council represents the public interest, and acts in response to pre-given values, I would argue that the Arts Council, as a somewhat less-than-autonomous governmental organisation,

intervenes *actively* in its support of certain definitions and contexts in which art is recognised. For example, it funds particular kinds of art; it defines art and introduces new categories of art (such as film, photography, mixed media) in addition to those things traditionally regarded as art.

The Arts Council is thus to be seen as part of the state's ideological apparatus. The state exercises its hegemony through a particular bourgeois and patriarchal[3] ideological definition of what constitutes artistic/aesthetic merit.

CONCLUSION

Examination of expressions of official views about the arts is a method of enquiry that provides useful insight into the relationship between the state, the arts, and ideological hegemony. In this paper, a certain liberal understanding of the arts and the state's relationship to the practice of art, conveyed via the discourse of its art administrators (the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council), has been explored. There are many other sources of discourse about the arts, but here the focus has been on the way art has been constructed in order to become a factor assisting the hegemony of the state. Whereas many of those who have been members of, or who have been employed by the Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council, would see themselves as battling against central government (especially the Treasury), it is clear that the very location of the Arts Council as a 'buffer' between government and artists, is part of the ideological hegemony of the bourgeois state.

Observations made by Codd et.al. (1985:10) about the discursive nature and hegemonic processes that are characteristic of the education system in New Zealand may be applied to the state's involvement in art. The popular myths and the liberal rhetoric that constitute traditional discourse about the arts in New Zealand are to be seen as having an ideological role in concealing underlying political interests and detracting from a critical enquiry into the role of state patronage of the arts. Such discourse operates as inherently political, by contributing to social and cultural reproduction through hegemonic strategies. The dominant discourse achieves its domination through winning consent as a result of its shaping of meaning and commonsense understandings of the world (that is, the myths and rhetoric referred to above).

Janet Wolff argues (1981:55) that 'art is clearly an ideological activity and ideological product', but arts administrators generally ignore this fact (or, at best, are uncritical of the ideological component of art). The social construction of aesthetic and literary criticism is not often acknowledged, let alone satisfactorily theorised, so arts administrators base their practices on assumptions about what is of artistic quality.

Notions of 'quality' tend to be vague and unproblematic, and, especially among those who formulate (explicitly and implicitly) policy for the arts, there is an uncritical faith in the fact that standards can be established. Yet, as Janet Wolff (1983:51) argues,

> 'the defence of "objective standards" by those whose job it is to maintain them provides little reassurance that they can either be defined or be shown to be objective.'

Barrett (1982) and Wolff (1983) reject the more extreme relativist position, according to which there are no objective criteria. As Barrett (1982:50) says, the tendency towards 'complete relativism'

> '... leaves us with total inability to distinguish between a random scrawl and a finely-wrought painting that has moved generations of people.'

She goes on to argue that it is possible to establish some standards for assessing aesthetic value by taking account of two aspects: imagination and skill. It is true, she acknowledges, that the definition of skill is the outcome of struggle, but at the same time there is an objective element to this. Moreover,

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3.   Most of the quotations about art cited in this paper assume the artist is male.

... an emphasis on aesthetic skills is in fact *democratising* rather than elitist — for skills may be acquired, whereas the notion of an artistic 'genius' forbids the aspirations of anyone outside the small and specialised group'.(Barrett, 1982:52)

The 'imagination' component of art-work has tended to be devalued, and sometimes condemned as reactionary, but Barrett (1982:52) believes it is possible to consider the imaginative process in art-work without resorting to 'the individualistic romanticism of traditional bourgeois theories of art'. For a more democratic form of administration and development of the arts, it will be necessary for arts councils to recognise that they do constitute an ideological state apparatus. It is by seeing themselves as (at least once) removed from the organ of government that idealist conceptions of art and artists, and the accompanying elitist practices of such conceptions are able to flourish.

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Educational and social inequality:
the theories of Bourdieu and Boudon with reference to
class and ethnic differences in New Zealand

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A recent issue of the *British Journal of Sociology of Education* asks 'Whatever happened to Inequality?'.[1] One might perhaps better enquire, 'Whatever happened to the sociology of education that this question needs to be asked?' Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the sociology of education, particularly in Britain, had been concerned to monitor the social effects of universal secondary educational provision. What proportion of working class pupils, for example, (i) entered selective schools, (ii) gained useful qualifications, (iii) were admitted to further education instititutions, and (iv) became occupationally and socially mobile? In general, what *were* the effects on the social class structure of the educational system? The social arithmetic tradition impressively documented the relative impotence of educational systems to interupt established patterns of social reproduction—and disappointed hopes for social reform predicated on the egalitarian agency of the school—but the atheoretical stance of this tradition left it with no satisfactory account of the efficient mechanisms of educational and social reproduction that its surveys so persistently revealed. The survey methodologists could only propose, in an inadequate conceptual discourse, that what they called 'factors', 'home-background', 'parental aspirations', 'environmental disadvantage', and so on, were—in some way that was left just 'obvious'—largely the cause of educational inequality and the degree of social inequality that both represented and perpetuated. Bernstein's (1975) socio-linguistic theory, published in an early version almost thirty years ago, remains noteworthy as the first influential *sociological* theory to incorporate an explicit explanatory mechanism of the determining processes of class related differences in educational attainment. This failure of the traditional paradigm to develop a sound theoretical construction of the essential problem of the sociology of education provoked a direct challenge to its hegemony by radical phenomenological and Marxist theories with a consequent fragmentation of the sub-discipline throughout the 1970s. The focus of this theoretical investigation, nevertheless, always remained informed by the fundamental issues of social and educational inequality. In one way or another to make sense of that phenomenon and to interupt its mechanisms has always been central to the sociology of education. Moreover, this unsettled period has, of course, seen the publication of major works within the traditional paradigm—one hardly abandoned by the groups working with Halsey (1980) or Gray (1983) for example. The problem of socially differentiated educational attainment remains—as it has always been—*the* core area for theory and practice in the sociology of education.

It is not always clear, however, what this problem *is*, for there are, in fact, two conceptually distinct educational inequalities to be explained. In this respect Boudon's distinction between the primary and secondary effects of stratification is especially useful. In Boudon's terminology the former concept, refers to actual differences between social groups in educational achievement, such effects are generally assumed by sociologists to be the result of variant socialization (although genetic influences should not be arbitrarily dismissed); and the latter concept refers to differences in educational attainment caused by the tendency of equally qualified students of different social origins to make different educational decisions. Boudon's analyses of O.E.C.D. data clearly demonstrate that because of this secondary effect of stratification middle class students gain a collective advantage over equally qualified working class students. In other words we have to explain the causes of (i) actual differences in educational attainment between social groups, visible at least as early as the infant school, and

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1.   Whatever Happened to Inequality? *British Journal of Sociology of Education*. 1986.

(ii) differences in access to courses and educational institutions between social categories that cannot be explained by initial differences in the qualifications of the students. Sociological accounts of primary effects have an uneasy epistemological status. Biological (genetic) and psychological (developmental) theories may leave little space for a purely sociological contribution and in so far as they explain individual differences also explain group differences. Eysenck's (1982) path analysis models, for example, account for attainment by intelligence, considered to be developed largely under the control of the genetic code, and leave only about 20 percent of the variance to be distributed to various environmental effects (this presumably explains the ratio of sociological to psychological research in education). In this respect it should be noted that sociological theories which account for group differences in terms of cultural socialization, such as Bernstein's and Bourdieu's, are thus necessarily also theories of individual attainment.

Rather little is known about the effects of class and ethnicity on educational attainment in New Zealand; it is certainly not a matter for joy that our major source of information on these matters is N.Z.C.E.R. test standardization data. However, despite various inadequacies, such data undoubtedly demonstrate that differences in scholastic attainment between working class and middle class groups and between pakeha and Maori are substantial and can be noted at least as early as the junior school.[2] Educational inequality between classes seems no longer to be a matter of public concern in New Zealand but there is, of course, a great deal of concern with the educational inequality of Maori students. NZCER standardized tests reveal a difference of approximately one standard deviation between the Maori and non-Maori populations and this is reflected in examination results; non-Maori students currently gain proportionately three times as many UE awards as Maori students. But for all the publicly troubled consciences of educational administrators there is scarcely any informed research on this matter, not even the routine collection of basic statistics, and certainly no explanatory account of the mechanisms generating this inequality able to command scientific authority. The NZCER's test division appears to believe, without a shred of direct evidence, that Maori family socialization practices fail to produce the cognitive schematas (which it calls 'abilities') necessary for the performance of scholastic work. (See Reid, *et.al.*, 1983) This 'cultural deficit' theory is, however, firmly rejected by most commentators who favour a different theory. It is now widely accepted that the relatively poor educational achievements of Maori students are primarily a consequence of their poor conceptions of themselves as people unable to succeed in pakeha society. Maori cultural theorists, for example, Walker, (1985), bolster this theory with the argument that Maori people, the victims of historical colonialism and contemporary racial oppression, continue to suffer the loss of traditional cultural values and a consequent weakening of the true basis of their collective identity as a people. In children this *true* cultural deprivation is manifested as a negative self-image that actively inhibits the development of cognitive structures required for the acquisition of what is, in any case, regarded as a culturally alien scholastic knowledge, transmitted by a culturally alien pedagogy, and evaluated by culturally alien procedures and standards. It follows from this theory that if Maori students can be provided with a cultural and educational environment in which they can develop vigorous, ethnically based, conceptions of self-identity the level of Maori educational attainment will rise.[3]

The dominant theory of educational and social inequality in New Zealand is thus a theory of primary effects with specific reference to ethnic differences. It is perhaps not surprising that with such a perspective New Zealand sociology of education should turn for theoretical sustenance to the critical work of an anthropologist and a major theorist of cultural and social reproduction—Pierre Bourdieu. In this paper I shall examine aspects of Bourdieu's theory of schooling with reference to certain common criticism. One of Bourdieu's sharpest critics —Raymond Boudon—is less widely known to New Zealand educationists and this paper will introduce

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2.   TOSCA can be regarded as a test of school attainment for these purposes. Recent data are provided by Reid, et. al., (1983).
3.   I have expressed my views on these beliefs in 'Measuring Up and Falling Into Line', Nash, (1983).

his work both in its own right and for the critical perspective it provides of Bourdieu. I will conclude with the outline of a synthesis which looks to both Bourdieu and Boudon.

BOURDIEU ON EDUCATION AND SOCIAL AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION

Bourdieu's theory of social and cultural reproduction has attracted great attention from sociologists of education in the English speaking world since the first translations of his work in the early 1970s. Yet although the Bourdieuian concepts of cultural capital, *habitus*, symbolic violence, mode of reproduction, family strategies of reproduction, and cultural inheritance, are increasingly evident in the discourse of the sociology of education, these concepts are not invariably articulated within what is, to be sure, a complex theoretical position. Bourdieu's theory is, for example, commonly held — by Boudon among others — to be a culturalist theory, that is a theory which maintains that middle class students enjoy a relative privilege because the cultural practices of their homes and those of the school are essentially consonant whereas this is not usually the case with respect to working class homes. It is supposed that middle class children acquire, as a result of their family socialization, the class *habitus*[4] of the dominant group and that this *habitus* is legitimated by the school and certified by 'objective' credentials which thereby disguise the operation of the class privilege that ensures those positions become 'naturally' theirs. This somewhat crude story *can* be derived from Bourdieu[5] — and has then correctly been criticized as mechanically reproductive — but a closer reading of the key texts reveals a more subtle account. Given such misconceptions, however, it is necessary to insist that Bourdieu's theory, (i) does recognize the school as a site for the generation of *habitus*, and (ii) does contain a viable theory of agency.

First, then, the school is not a passive instrument that merely recognizes and 'objectively' certifies the dominant code or *habitus*. Bourdieu's investigation of the connection between the school and systems of thought situates the school as the central generative site, in non-traditional societies, of the distinctive *habitus* of the culture, thus it is Bourdieu who writes, 'it may be assumed that every individual owes to the type of schooling he has received a set of basic, deeply interiorized master patterns.' (Bourdieu, 1971:192-3) For in this theory, schooling does have its own power to shape consciousness, over and above the power of the family, and it is clear that the role of the school is acknowledged as active, and not merely passive in its 'legitimation' of family acquired *habitus*. In a particularly fine passage, an example of the richly detailed ethnographic description that forms an essential component of his methodology, Bourdieu describes the relationship of homology, that is the 'fitness' or 'family likeness', between the forms of Gothic art and architecture,[6] in order to illustrate how these connections he posits at the deep level of *habitus* a generative structure are realized in the productions of the culture. Again, the style of the *leçon* — the French school form for dissertations — is similarly argued to be a product of school generated forms that must be interiorized and 'lived' by successful students. It is not difficult for Bourdieu to demonstrate how a stress on the strictly arbitrary elements of class style and personal presentation serves the purposes of working class exclusion and elite reproduction. Bourdieu's theory does, therefore, and contrary to the views of certain critics, recognize the school as the productive locus of a particular *habitus* which gives rise to, as he says, 'patterns of thought which organize reality by directing and organizing thinking about reality and makes what he thinks thinkable for him as such and in the particular form in which it is thought.' (Bourdieu, 1971:194-5)

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4. I understand *habitus* to refer to the cultural code which may be analysed as such *and* as the internalized representation of that code acquired by members of a culture through socialization and thus open to analysis by reference back to the code. *Habitus* may thus be thought of as a set of master patterns from which an infinite number of individual statements may be generated — rather as a grammatical structure, a code, enables the generation of an infinite number of sentences.

5. Read in isolation, Bourdieu (1974) can support such an interpretation.

6. Ibid. Interestingly, Hauser (1951, 239-40) points out that it was the German critic Gottfried Semper who first speculated on these relationships more than a century ago.

Second, although schools are, indeed, theorized by Bourdieu as institutions responsive to an intrinsically arbitrary class cultural code accepted at all levels of the educational system as an indication of receptivity ('readiness') to acquire school knowledge—in a process that thus knits together in a single social legitimacy arbitrary class cultural style and scholastic and technical knowledge—Bourdieu does *not* argue that in making these judgements the school acts arbitrarily in any practical sense. Lower working class children, he says, do not 'bring to their school work either the keenness of lower middle class children or the cultural capital of upper class children' and, consequently, often 'take refuge in a kind of negative withdrawal which upsets teachers.' (Bourdieu 1974:41) There is no suggestion that such 'negative withdrawal' describes a 'socially constructed' process rather than an actual process, nor that the cultural capital children 'do not bring to their school work' is to be understood as anything other than real cognitive structures and behavioural dispositions developed within a class culture. Bourdieu actually confirms this interpretation by his advocacy of 'systematic and widespread educational priority programmes' as a 'really effective way' of challenging the practices of schools which simply allow these social and cultural practices to take place. (ibid) Thus, although Bourdieu recognizes strictly arbitrary elements of class culture and practices of exclusion based on those elements, his general argument is that the school's essential contribution to social and cultural reproduction is effected merely by its tendency to respond to students' who are, in fact, 'ready' for such schooling, to privilege them in this sense, and to allow the rest, through its structured inability to interrupt that process, to 'withdraw' as their only rational response to this relative neglect. In Bourdieu's theory the school's failure is located in its structured refusal to develop a 'universal pedagogy'—a pedagogy that takes nothing for granted—able to succeed with relatively unprepared working class pupils.

A school system controlled by the socially and culturally dominant classes, it is supposed, will perceive students who possess the *habitus* of the dominant classes as evidence of 'readiness' for school knowledge, and perceive students who possess the *habitus* of the dominated classes as evidence of a deficit of the child or the home, as cultural deprivation, rather than as an indication of a deficiency on the part of the school to develop pedagogic practices responsive to the mental formation and behavioural dispositions such children bring to school. Thus, Bourdieu's theory suggests that the school will generally ignore the *habitus* of children of non-dominant classes, and that this mechanism, indeed, is the primary cause of the low attainments of working class students, but where that *habitus* is produced by a culture of resistance to class or ethnic domination ('negative withdrawal which upsets teachers') the strategies of the school, and other agencies collaborating with it, will be to isolate, transform and eradicate the expression of that culture of resistance (even though denied recognition as 'culture') and its very forms.

Bourdieu is by no means the first to believe that a 'universal pedagogy' (or, indeed, a culturally specific pedagogy) can be devised and implemented with the result that differences in cognitive structures developed by modes of socialization practiced within class and ethnic cultures (or sub-cultures) can be eliminated by advancing the progress of students from such origins to the level of middle class children. There is little in the literature of pedagogy, however, to encourage this view. Specifically, it is difficult to imagine a way of imparting numeracy and literacy, a developmental imperative in a technical society, in such a way that those already cognitively and socially prepared to assimilate this instruction will not move ahead and stay ahead of those not so prepared. The fundamental task of the school is to enable students to learn to comprehend the nature of the social and material world and to act upon it to achieve the individual and collective goods. All this requires a certain cognitive structuring that is independent of the cultural arbitrary. It is a verbal quibble to insist that some forms of socialization do not produce children who are not deficient in these actual (and inherent) cognitive structures or lacking in the behavioural competencies such preparation provides. It is vitally important, in this context, to differentiate between, (i) cognitive structures and forms of behaviour generated by class and ethnic cultural codes, that reflect the cultural arbitrary and thus *are* amenable to a universal or specific pedagogy, and (ii) cognitive structures and forms of behaviour generated by familial incompetence or neglect, even if common within a community, that cannot be derived from the entire meaning complex of the culture. Where a community has generated a culture of demoralization (Bourdieu's (1978) discussion of the demoralization

that affected French peasant families in the economic crisis between the wars is relevant here), the school has a responsibility to assist in the task of cultural reconstruction which will necessitate working with elements within the broad cultural traditions of the community.

A final criticism may be noted. Elster (1980) has suggested that Bourdieu's theory actually contains a dual account of educational inequality and is in that respect open to the charge of redundancy. It seems that Bourdieu argues that the middle classes are generally able to reproduce their position in successive generations, first, because they possess the culturally requisite intellectual and social resources necessary for success in an educational system controlled by them *and*, second, because their cultural practices actively exclude as inferior those of the culturally dominated classes. However, if personal cultural resources, understood as cognitive structures and behavioural dispositions, account for the superior educational performance of children of the dominant cultural classes, and if their consequent possession of credentialled knowledge determines their placement in the directive positions of the occupational class structure, then to suppose in addition that social and cultural practices of exclusion and systematic attempts to foster internalized conceptions of social inferiority *also* account for educational and social inequality is to over-explain the phenomena. This is a neatly formal criticism that may be addressed briefly. We may note that Bourdieu insists that the habits of mind, the categories of thought, that is the *culture* of the dominant group, are (and is) acquired 'naturally', through the processes of socialization practiced within that group. Now, in so far as those cultural practices are arbitrary it becomes necessary—if real privileges based on those codes and practices are, in fact, maintained—to protect the means of their transmission, to legitimate by objective mechanisms their arbitrary, and to negate the social and cultural pretensions of other groups. In other words, if elements of the taken-for-granted constructions and practices of a socially and culturally dominant class are specifically employed as potent emblems to signify class membership, then it is necessary to recognize such practices as practices of social and cultural exclusion. Bourdieu argues that such practices *can* be recognized and that those who inherit the dominant culture *do* actively strive to maintain what they regard as *their* symbolic patrimony, *their* heritage, by various systematic devices. Bourdieu argues that in this manner *their* culture, the culture of the dominant classes, becomes 'culture' itself and the exclusion of those deemed to have no 'right' to inherit thus involves a denial of their claim to possess any culture—indeed, 'culture' itself. It cannot sensibly be denied that such practices could exist and, therefore, it must be concluded that a theory lacking the 'dualism' of Bourdieu's denies its capacity to determine in any particular cultural instance whether they are practiced or not. If, as a matter of fact, the educational achievements of working class students are affected at any level and to any extent by, (i) cognitive skills and behavioural dispositions acquired through class socialization, that is development within a culture lived by certain groups within a class, *and* (ii) by social practices of exclusion, then a theory able to conceptualize that reality is necessary.

BOUDON ON EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

Boudon's contribution to the sociology of education has been relatively neglected in the English speaking world and the prompt translation of his latest works is therefore of some significance. Boudon's theory of inequality of educational opportunity (IEO) and inequality of social opportunity (ISO) is elaborated most fully in Boudon (1974) and presented more generally in Boudon (1981) and (1982). Most unusually for a French social theorist Boudon situates himself within the empiricist Anglo-American tradition represented by Sorokin, Coser, Merton, Lazarfeldt and Eisenstadt and, while at home in the French intellectual field (as evidenced by his discussion of structuralism, Boudon, 1971a), the major French social theorists have been an apparently minor influence on his thought. Boudon even reads Durkheim in the Anglo-American tradition primarily as a major methodologist of empirical sociology. Boudon's social theory is, in fact, informed by a rather simple idea well expressed in the title of his most recently translated work, *The Unintended Consequences of Social Action*. As individuals and collective institutions—families, firms, unions, nations, and so on—act in pursuit of their best interests, their collective, aggregated, actions often produce unintended, largely unexpected, and typically perverse effects. If, for example,—and this is, of course, Boudon's original thesis—individuals improve their level of educational credentials in the hope of maximizing their opportunities of obtaining an occupation this

will have the collective effect, if all or most people adopt such a strategy, of raising the overall level of expenditure on education and inflating the levels of qualification, while leaving everyone in the same *relative* position. As it happens this is an apparently universal feature of educational systems. Unintended consequences of this sort are the central concern of Boudon's sociology and emergent or perverse effects the paradigm sociological mechanism.[7]

Boudon's approach, far from universally acceptable to contemporary sociologists, thus theorizes man as *homo sociologicus*. Boudon treats human beings as rational, goal-directed, actors — game players — calculating the odds and placing their stake accordingly. The game he is really interested in is the game of social mobility, or social reproduction, and the relative importance or unimportance of educational systems in that game. Boudon is struck by what seems at first sight to be a puzzling and contradictory phenomenon. During the last thirty years educational inequalities have lessened in almost all advanced countries whilst rates of social mobility have remained relatively unchanged. As I noted earlier this is not what social democratic politicians and educators intended or expected to happen and Boudon explains it as a perverse effect of the interaction of the interdependent systems of education and of family and economic reproduction. In this view, therefore, the educational inequality caused by the secondary effects of class stratification (and Boudon regards such effects as probably more important than primary effects), results 'from the aggregation of individual behaviour and decisions rather than from the ends sought by social agents.' (Boudon, 1981:69)

The statistical over-representation of upper class children in the highest levels of the educational system and in the most prestigious faculties of the universities is due, he argues, to rational cost-benefit analyses made by lower class and upper class students. At successive choice points it becomes more rational for lower class students to settle for the gains they have made, whereas for upper class students only the highest levels of education will improve or even maintain their position. Thus he argues:

> The subject's class or origin (or the class to which his family now belongs) will crucially affect his chances of one or the other option. If the current success is mediocre, the family unit will consider itself 'satisfied' if the child has reached an academic level enabling him to aspire to a social status equal or higher than his own, even if this status is not equally high. A well-placed family unit will on the other hand strive (I ought to add: more often than not) to 'push' the child so that he doesn't fall (even if he doesn't enjoy a greater success. (Boudon, 1982:192)

Since it is, nevertheless, in nearly everyone's interest to attempt to gain as much secondary education as they can the aggregated effect is that the collective suffers.

Boudon's demonstration of IEO as a perverse effect utilizes statistical simulation models to represent the real constraints of the distribution of credentials and occupations, and game theory concepts to analyse the decision making process. In the credentialling 'game' the object is to obtain the level of qualification required for entry to desired occupations (which is, of course, ever-rising due to this mechanism). It is axiomatic that at any point in time these occupations are fixed and fewer in number than the set of potential applicants. Those who choose to play this game, to enter the processes of competition and place a stake, that is to invest time and resources and forgo other opportunities, do so with a more or less accurate knowledge of the likelihood of their success.

I first applied Boudon's methods in a simple attempt to model the flow from school to work in New Zealand.[8] Here they are put to a different use. In brief, if Boudon's methods are used to model the flow of Maori and

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7. Boudon is aware that he has no claims to originality in identifying 'emergent effects' as an important social phenomenon. The idea can be found in the Enlightenment thinkers, is known to Marxism in the concept of 'contradiction', appears in structural functionalism as 'latent effects' and in social psychology as negative effects of 'self-fulfilling prophecies'.
8. See 'Structures of Credentialling: the Flow from School to Work', in Codd, Harker and Nash (1985).

non-Maori pupils from class of origin at t_0 (time zero) to educational attainment at t_1, and so on through successive cohorts, it can be shown that the proportion of Maori students reaching the highest levels of educational attainment, and so entering the highest occupational categories, is subject to a progressive rise. This is an interesting effect, and since it appears contrary to what might be predicted by a theory of cultural domination, seems worth a little attention.

Suppose there are a total of 60,000 school leavers with three levels of credentials, L1 (high), 20,000; L2 30,000; and L3 (low) 10,000; and that the further education (F.E.) and labour market (Employment) structures have available, respectively, 10,000 and 30,000 positions. In such objective circumstances then, assuming that the highest credentials command the highest destinations, the distribution of applicants may be represented by Table 1.

Table 1: *Expected Distribution of Qualified Leavers Assuming Destination to be Total Function of Educational Credentials.*

	FE	Employment	Non-employment	Totals
L1	10000	10000	0	20000
L2	0	20000	10000	30000
L3	0	0	10000	10000
	10000	30000	20000	60000

Boudon's models attempt to reflect reality (which is *not* like this) more accurately by using emprically derived parameters to generate closer approximations to the observed figures. If, for example, the actual situation more closely resembles that depicted by Table 2 (which it does) then a parameter of eighty percent may be assumed to operate.

Table 2: *Distribution of School Leavers Assuming that Destinations are Controlled by a Parameter of Eighty Percent.*

	FE	Employment	Non-employment	Totals
L1	8000	9600	2400	20000
L2	1600	16320	12080	30000
L3	400	4080	5520	10000
	10000	30000	20000	60000

This table is generated by a 'staircase procedure' as follows: there are 10,000 FE positions and therefore, 10,000 $\times$ .8 = 8,000 to be filled by applicants with L1 credentials. There remain 2,000 FE positions, and applying the parameter, we find 2,000 $\times$ .8 = 1,600 positions to be filled by L2 applicants. The residue of 400 FE places must be allocated to L3 applicants. Then there are 30,000 employment positions and, since 30,000 $\times$ .8 exceeds the total number of unplaced leavers with F1 credentials, it is necessary to use that total, i.e. 20,000 − 8,000 = 12,000, in its place. Thus, 12,000 x .8 # 9,600 and so the residue of 2,400 is also determined. Then, 30,000 − 9,600 = 20,400 (noting that to be less than 30,000 − 16,000 = 28,000) and the parameter is applied for the last time, 20,400 $\times$ .8 = 16,320. The three remaining cells are constrained by the marginal totals. Little familarity with educational statistics is required to see in this distribution a much closer fit to the empirical data than that

represented in Table 1. Using these simple procedures Boudon is able to model the statistical processes of educational and social inequality as they are empirically observed and to illuminate thereby mechanisms difficult to interpret by other methods. The models depicting the educational and occupational distribution of Maori and non-Maori students given in the section that follows are constructed in the manner demonstrated.

BOUDON'S MODELS APPLIED TO MAORI AND NON-MAORI ATTAINMENT $t_0 - t_3$

The parameters of the models that follow may be briefly described. I assume 50,000 non-Maori and 10,000 Maori school leavers (this is a greater proportion of Maori than actually found but the ratio is convenient) giving a total of 60,000 which, with this population cohort falling, is a little higher than actuality. The credentials available are: L1 (approximately in proportion to the group formally awarded UE); L2 (approximately in proportion to the group formally gaining School Certificate only); and L3 (approximately proportional to the group formerly leaving without a useful School Certificate). There are three destinations: 10,000 further education places, 20,000 openings in skilled employment, and 30,000 places in unskilled labour or 'training'. The marginal figures used in the base table, Table 3, are proportional to the situation in 1979, the last year for which the Department of Education published a breakdown of school leavers by qualification, destination and ethnic group. (Recent reforms to the examination structure may give these data an antiquated appearance, however, such appearances are likely to be deceptive for the underlying distribution of attainment will not be altered by the changes to the examination system.) It should be borne in mind that the figures do represent a reality of New Zealand life experienced by thousands of school leavers each year.

The tables show (i) educational attainment as a function of class or origin and (ii) occupational destination as a function of educational credentials for three 'generational' transformations. The benchmark is established by Table 3 which is generated in the manner described earlier by reference to the observed data. Table 4 shows that at t_1 there is a new cohort of school leavers whose class and ethnic origin is that established by the cohort who entered the occupational system at t_0. It is assumed that (regardless of ethnicity) occupation, or class location, controls educational attainment of the second 'generation' by a parameter of .8. With levels of attainment thus distributed the original parameters used to control the distributions of destinations at t_0 are then reapplied to calculate the destinations achieved by that succeeding 'generation' at t_1. These procedures are repeated twice more to create Tables 6-9. The effects on Maori levels of education and occupational mobility of these transformations are evident. Equality with the non-Maori population in both respects is not fully attained even at t_3 but considerable, even dramatic, progress has been made towards that direction.

Do Boudon's models depict a future situation we can expect to become a reality? The axioms state, (i) that class location controls educational level by a meritocratic parameter of .8 (likely to be somewhat higher than reality as the scant data available suggest that the achieved educational attainment rate of the upper 17 percent of the population is actually between 60 and 70 percent).[9] and (ii) that educational credentials control access to occupations, regarded as class locations, according to the empirically derived parameters shown in the tables. There is assumed to be no ethnic related differential in respect either of the mechanisms controlling educational access or occupational placement. (Although, if this is thought unrealistic, a bias factor set at some appropriate level could be introduced.) It should also be noted that no allowance is made for any change to the structures of destination and credentialling nor for the progressive effects of differential fertility.

Boudon has little doubt that models of the sort presented here are, in themselves, evidence that the class-cultural (and presumably ethnic-cultural) account of secondary effects of stratification is inadequate and that an explanation in terms of the decision fields that structure rationality differentially for class located students is more convincing. He expresses his conviction unequivocally:

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9.   See the data reported in 'Schools Can't Make Jobs', in Nash 1983).

> Equality of educational opportunity did not bring with it equality of social opportunity and whilst naive theories treat this contradiction as if it were the product of an opposition between a dominant and a dominated class, it is a simple matter to show that this hypothesis does not work and that the contradiction does in fact derive from perverse effects. (Boudon, 1982:11)

But this conclusion cannot be justified. Boudon's simulation models represent constraints in the structure of educational and occupational opportunities by fixed marginal totals and represent the value of educational qualifications in the labour market by variable parameters. These models actually have only a rhetorical relation to game theory for although Boudon uses the concepts and illustrations of game theory he certainly does not elaborate this structured competition for qualifications and occupations (a non-zero-sum multi-player game), in formal terms. Moreover, as Boudon appears to suspect, the epistemological status of game theory is incompatible with certain scientific claims empiricist sociology likes to make.[10] One cannot, for example, derive the magnitude of the generative parameters of simulation models from game theory nor predict their empirically observed magnitudes from theoretical postulates. Boudon's theory consequently makes no attempt to explain why the empirically observed parameters are maintained at a particular level—they are simply accepted as given. It is clear that the effect observed in the models presented here occurs because at each transformation a greater proportion of Maori than non-Maori students are pulled towards the upper left sector of the table. It happens, in fact, because there are no secondary effects operating on Maori access to higher education—on the contrary—Maori students with U.E. are *more* likely to proceed to university than non-Maori students with U.E.[11] Whether this relative privilege nullifies the effects of class is not known. It would be particularly interesting to know whether working class Maori students with U.E. are more likely to enter university than non-Maori working class students with U.E., for if that is so, as it may be, then the strategies of ethnic consciousness and affirmative action may be proving effective.

These models are, of course, extremely simple, and primarily intended for the purposes of illustration—it would certainly be better to increase the number of cells and thus increase the degrees of freedom—nevertheless, they possess some useful properties. It is possible to alter the marginal totals in order to model the effects of changes in the structures of destination or attainment, and to alter the generative parameters for one or both populations in order to model, respectively, the effects of differential success in the class transmission of education and the differential value of credentials in determining occupational placement. It would be all too easy, on certain assumptions, to model a situation in which the Maori population retained its relative position for ever. The point is that, as they stand, Boudon's models do *not* show that. In the absence of any special factors of cultural bias it seems that the parameters of the model, parameters likely to be rather more stringent that those empirically observable, will, in time, lead to equality of educational attainment and an equal distribution of positions in the class structure. It should also be said that evidence of such biasing factors is rather hard to find. An inspection of the 1981 New Zealand Census (ten percent sample) revealed no differences in the value of credentials to Maori and non-Maori young people. In other words qualified Maori school leavers were just as

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10. The empiricist tradition in sociology has attempted to situate itself as social *science* (rather than as social *theory*) and Boudon, like other empiricists, often makes ritual reference to Popper when it suits him. Thus, Boudon argues that the neo-Marxist culturalist explanation of educational inequality must be rejected. Refering to this view he writes (1971b:45-6), 'the cultural system, being under the control of the dominant groups makes the school culture appear to the members of the lower classes as at variance with their own subculture, whence they conclude that school is not for them. A major logical problem is raised by this kind of explanation, however, for in Popperian language, such assumptions are not falsifiable.' This appeal to Popper is unfortunate because, as Boudon is later obliged to recognize, this philosophy of science will not support his own position. At that point, however, Boudon declares (*ibid*:179), 'it seems clear that Popper's criterion of falsifiability is inadequate to account for the *reality* of scientific work or scientific discovery.' Needless to say, his reasons for rejecting the 'neo-Marxist' theory, thus invalidated, are allowed to stand. It seems necessary to conclude that Boudon's liberal-conservativism, his politically motivated distaste for 'expensive' theories of cultural domination, and his scientism, have produced an unsound sociology fundamentally limited in its explanatory range.

11. In 1983 I purchased tables from the 1981 ten percent sample showing occupation by credentials for the cohort 15-19 years broken down by sex and ethnic group. An inspection of these data revealed that qualified Maori students were as likely as qualified non-Maori students to be found in the highest occupational categories.

likely to obtain higher occupations as other groups. They were not, to be sure, as likely to obtain those credentials, but that is another matter. And, as I have noted, Maori students with U.E. are *more likely* to enter further education than equally qualified non-Maori students. Most non-Maori students with UE do *not* enter further education but a large proportion, perhaps even a majority, of similarly qualified Maori students do. The 1986 Census will provide further information on this highly important question. It would also be most interesting to discover whether the children of professional Maori families are as successful as the children of non-Maori professional families in gaining educational credentials. In other words, if we could confirm that the assumptions of the model presented here are, at least, more correct than not then the Maori population might, indeed, gradually flow through to equality as a consequence of the *imperfect* privilege that the—certainly privileged—classes enjoy.

Table 3: *Education and Occupational Destination*

		Professional		Skilled		Other	Totals	
L1	NM	9892		5846		1462	17200	
	M	697	(.9)	98	(.8)	25	820	18020
L2	NM	769		8142		3489	12400	
	M	54	(.7)	1367	(.7)	59	1480	13880
L3	NM	330		3507		16561	20400	
	M	23		542		7135	7700	28100
	NM	10991		17497		21512	50000	
	M	774		2007		7219	10000	
Totals		11765		19494		28731	60000	

Table 4: *Education and Occupational Origin*

		Professional	Skilled	Other	Totals	
L1	NM	8793	6159	1290	16242	
	M	619	707	432	1758	18000
L2	NM	1758	8697	1816	12271	
	M	124	997	608	1729	14000
L3	NM	440	2641	18406	21487	
	M	31	303	6179	6513	28000
	M	10991	17497	21512	50000	
	NM	774	2007	7219	10000	
Totals		11765	19497	28731	60000	

Table 5: *Education and Occupational Destination*

		Professional		Skilled		Other	Totals	
L1	NM	9631		5033		1578	16242	
	M	1169	(.9)	471	(.8)	118	1758	18000
L2	NM	736		8074		3461	12271	
	M	104	(.7)	1138		487	1729	14000
L3	NM	276		4220		16991	21487	
	M	84		1064		5365	6513	28000
	NM	10643		17327		22030	50000	
	M	1357		2673		5970	10000	
Totals		12000		20000		28000	60000	

Table 6: *Education and Occupational Origin*

		Professional	Skilled	Other	Totals	
L1	NM	8514	5432	1676	15622	
	M	1086	838	454	2378	18000
L2	NM	1703	8372	1901	11976	
	M	217	1292	515	2024	14000
L3	NM	426	3523	18453	22402	
	M	54	543	5001	5598	28000
	NM	10643	17327	22030	50000	
	M	1357	2673	5970	10000	
Totals		12000	20000	28000	60000	

Table 7: *Education and Occupational Destination*

		Professional		Skilled		Other	Totals	
L1	NM	9373		4999		1250	15622	
	M	1427	(.9)	761	(.8)	190	2378	18000
L2	NM	719		7880		3377	11976	
	M	121	(.7)	1332	(.7)	571	2024	14000
L3	NM	288		4023		18091	22402	
	M	72		1005		4521	5598	28000
	NM	10380		16902		22718	50000	
	M	1620		3098		5282	10000	
Totals		12000		20000		28000	60000	

Table 8: *Education and Educational Origin*

		Professional	Skilled	Other	Totals	
L1	NM	8332	5679	1363	15374	
	M	1268	1041	317	2626	18000
L2	NM	1666	8167	1960	11793	
	M	254	1497	456	2207	14000
L3	NM	382	3056	19395	22833	
	M	98	560	4509	5167	28000
	NM	10380	16902	22718	50000	
	M	1620	3098	5282	10000	
Totals		12000	20000	28000	60000	

Table 9: *Education and Occupational Destination*

		Professional		Skilled		Other	Totals	
L1	NM	9224		4920		1230	15374	
	M	1576	(.9)	840	(.8)	210	2626	18000
L2	NM	708		7760		3325	11793	
	M	132	(.8)	1452	(.7)	622	2207	14000
L3	NM	294		4100		18439	22833	
	M	66		928		4173	5167	28000
	NM	10226		16780		22995	50000	
	M	1774		3220		5005	10000	60000
Totals		12000		20000		28000	60000	

BOURDIEU AND BOUDON ON SECONDARY EFFECTS

Boudon and Bourdieu demonstrate, with much the same statistical evidence, that working class students are distinctly less likely than middle class students to enter further or higher education or, when they do, to select a course leading to one of the higher professions, even though their educational qualifications at that stage are not inferior. Parkyn (1967) reported such a differential tendency affecting university matriculation in New Zealand a generation ago and it presumably continues to operate. Boudon considers two theories widely held to account for this process, in his terms 'value theory' and 'cultural theory', and rejects both as, at best, only partial explanations. Differences in the valuations of education characteristically held by distinct social classes are, he argues, insufficient to explain class related education decisions since it has been established that students' occupational and social aspirations are largely a function of school attainment, IQ, and other variables and by no means fully accounted for by values associated with class of origin. Moreover, the mechanisms by which particular class values do affect educational choice is commonly unspecified leaving such accounts at best incomplete. In such a form Boudon thus regards value theory as only partially correct. Cultural theory, the belief that family cultural environments differ in their ability to produce congnitive skills and behavioural dispositions necessary to school success, may, Boudon conceeds, be necessary to a complete explanation of the *primary* effects of social stratification on educational attainment, but obviously cannot explain secondary effects.

These arguments are convincing and Boudon's elaboration of value theory by a rational cost-benefit analysis is entirely helpful. To reiterate the position succinctly, Boudon suggests that socially differentiated choices by equally qualified students at the point of entry to higher education can be accounted for by the fact that it is rational for working class students to enter courses with a *relatively* low status destination, for example technical work, since, for such students, such a destination nevertheless represents a gain and may open up further opportunities, and, in a similar manner, it is less rational for middle class students to choose a course of study that, for them represents or threatens *relative* downward mobility, and hence their aspirations are more likely to be directed towards the higher level courses, accountancy, law, medicine, and such like. Working class students, however, stand to gain even from less prestigious courses of study, general arts, applied technology, and so on, and also stand to lose more, in terms of family solidarity and such like considerations, by choosing to enter a higher course. Reflecting on the status of his theory Boudon comments, 'there is considerable

evidence to suggest that given two possible educational alternatives *a* and *b* (where *a* is associated with higher social expectations), the anticipated cost of *a* generally will be greater the lower the status of the family.' (Boudon, 1973:30) Some comment is required here. That families are class-located and thus possess different resources is all the evidence necessary for this to be true, but Boudon is unable to relinquish his conviction that the reported statistics and the ability of his simulation models to replicate those statistical patterns (although *any* patterns can be reproduced) demonstrates the validity of his own theory of secondary effects and justifies his scathing criticism of the 'culturalist' account. It can be shown, however, that not only is Boudon's own theory 'unscientific', if Popper is to be the judge of what counts as science (a point Boudon has seen), and therefore a theory with the same epistemological status as his own (a point Boudon has not seen), but that his dismissal of Bourdieu's 'naive' theory is even then based on a misreading of that theory. Bourdieu writes:

> although success at school directly linked to the cultural capital transmitted by the family milieu, plays a part in the choice of options taken up, it seems that the major determinant of study is the family attitude to the school which is itself, as we have seen a function of the objective hopes of success at school which define each logical category. (Bourdieu, 1974:33)

Bourdieu actually relates his discussion of the processes by which social groups come to 'interiorize their statistical fate' to Lewin's (1948) reference group social psychology (as, significantly, does Boudon) and although obscure hints of Durkheimian mysticism — the notion that social statistics are a reflection of the determing *conscience collective* — may be detected in Bourdieu's discourse this is not his considered position. Most importantly Bourdieu separates in this passage the concept of *cultural capital*, as acquired cognitive schemata and behavioural dispositions, and *family attitudes* to the school, *that is to say class values*. Families adopt a constellation of values, cultural values, as a result of their class location. In this respect class location generates a culture of scholastic expectations — that may also be mediated by ethnicity and sex — reflecting the objective destiny of 'people like us'. It is evident that Boudon's depiction of Bourdieu's theory as a culturalist account of secondary effects, in terms of *habitus*, rests on a misunderstanding. Bourdieu's account of the class related tendency of students to enter further education, independently of their attainments, (that is his theory of secondary effects) is a value theory of the type Boudon elaborates within game theory. Moreover, although Bourdieu does not discuss such a mechanism and, indeed, fails to offer any mechanism at all, thus leaving the process through which individuals interiorize the collective expectation produced within their culture 'for people like us', obscure and open to criticism as determinist, his account is actually fully consistent with Boudon's thesis.

Neither Bourdieu nor Boudon have much to say about class culture (an omission that on the part of the former is so glaring that it might even be suspected that he has accepted the view of the dominant classes that no such culture exists), but the general theory suggests, despite this gap, that objective situations, specifically the class distribution of educational opportunities, are known to working class communities and inform their culture. This culture, the systems of meaning produced by working class people as they live within the framework of opportunities and constraints that structure their life chances, is internalized and lived in such a way that 'naturally' shapes the perceptions of those socialized within it. We can recognize that a culture is produced in which 'settling for what you have got', 'not pushing your luck' becomes the common-sense of that culture. We can recognize also that for an individual to make a choice outside this construction of commonsense means to break with the culture, to part company with family and friends for an unknown destination, the opportunity costs of which are pressingly apparent while the benefits are vague and indeterminate. The practices developed by social groups as 'right and proper', 'fitting', 'natural' and 'taken for granted' in relation to schooling should be understood as elements of the reproductive strategies of the group in as much that adherence to these 'obvious' routines will, in general, achieve the 'natural' outcome of social reproduction. Bourdieu's theory of educational inequality and social reproduction must be regarded as enhanced by recent work on youth sub-cultures and school resistance, and this work, together with Boudon's elaboration of the mechanisms of secondary effects helps to clarify the obscure processes hinted at by Bourdieu's. When working class students choose to pursue lower rather than higher level educational paths they probably are influenced by considerations and lines of

reasoning that Boudon has described. But among the considerations they may also take into account are that higher level positions are the cultural property of another group, that they will not 'fit in', that they will be 'put down', academically and socially excluded. Boudon does not deny this but he does reject the suggestion that bourgeois cultural practices might not only 'psyche out', that is demoralize working class students simply by their confidence, their self-assurance, just by their taken-for-granted certainty of success that the possession of an elite class *habitus* generates, but are also to some extent retained within the cultural repertoire because of this very effect. Nevertheless, such processes are open to investigation by the methods of cultural studies and they may well have relevance.

Only brief remarks will be made here on Boudon's sociology. It is an unbalanced attempt to elaborate a well recognized social phenomenon into a general social theory. There is no concept of ideology, no concept of cultural domination, and no proper realization that decision making must be embedded in a theory of information as a cultural resource. Boudon's explanations in terms of perverse effects are often superficial and grotesquely inadequate. One of his favourite examples of a perverse effect concerns United States Blacks who were once excluded from trades unions on the grounds that they acted as blackleg labour but, because they were excluded from unions acted as blacklegs. A good example of a socially self-fulfilling prophecy, perhaps, and Boudon concludes, 'Only when the original assumption is questioned and a new definition of the situation introduced, does the consequent flow of events give the lie to the assumption. Only then does the belief no longer gather the reality.' (Boudon, 1982:179) But this phrase of Cooley's, 'definition of the situation', is a most uncritical concept with which to grasp the power of racism as ideology. There is no hint of interest in Boudon's work in how this particular belief, this particular element of racist ideology, came to be successfully questioned, or of the tiring struggle that ideology critique demands. We know that Southern Blacks were systematically excluded from civil socity, barred from schools, buses, restaurants, denied the franchise, and generally subjected to various gross and petty discriminations, and while it is obviously true that whites maintained these practices to protect their own privileges, to account for them in terms of the perverse effects of rational individual decisions is a blatant historical distortion. These practices were supported by a widespread conviction among whites of their mental and moral superiority over blacks effective at a more than cognitive level. Racism is not sufficiently explained as a perverse effect brought about by rational, individual, cost-benefit motivated actions.[12] Moreover, even where this paradigm is applicable, without some understanding of the deeply interiorized character of ideology in its guise as cultural common-sense the full richness of the sense in which we must see 'individual choices' as cultural choices cannot be appreciated. However, while Boudon's *general* theory can be disregarded, his account of the generative mechanism of the secondary effects of class stratification is likely to be an accurate reflection of reality and his statistical modelling of educational systems provides a useful tool. Moreover, his conclusion that, 'the main effect of the increase in the demand for education would seem to be the onus it places on the individual to acquire a schooling that just becomes longer and longer whilst social expectations remain unchanged' (Boudon, 1982:29) is impeccable.

THE CONCEPTS OF A SYNTHESIS

A complete theory of inequality of educational opportunity and inequality of social opportunity needs to be

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12. The epistemological status of game theory in Boudon's work is ambiguous. Boudon (1981:69) formally constructs the notion of *homo sociologicus* as a methodological device only, 'it would be purely and simply a misunderstanding', and a 'brutal simplification', 'to interpret this hypothesis as an ontological statement'. However, game theory makes no sense unless it is understood as an analysis of actual decision making, and to illustrate, indeed, just this ontological character of game theory Boudon states elsewhere, citing a working class student, 'the notion of mathematical probability is itself implicit in reasoning which runs as follows: 'I have little hope of obtaining the *aggregation*—though one can never be sure; I have a reasonable chance of getting a CAPES and at worst I could always use my first degree to get an appointment as an assistant teacher." (Boudon, 1982:102). It would be interesting to discuss structure and agency in Boudon's work but that cannot be done here.

located within a theory of social and cultural reproduction and requires, minimally, (i) a theory of the reproduction strategies of class-located (patriarchal) families, which itself requires a theory of class, and theory of the family; (ii) a theory of schooling as a site for the transmission of organized knowledge that should incorporate, from Bernstein (1975), the concepts of, (a) curriculum as the mode of organization of knowledge, (b) pedagogy as the mode of transmission of such knowledge, and (c) evaluation as the mode of realization of such knowledge; (iii) a theory of credentialling; (iv) a theory of labour market segmentation; (v) a theory of cultural production and the formation of class/ethnic/sex trajectories; and (vi) a theory of the state, capital and civil society. This is, to be sure, a tall order. However, it is necessary, in my view, to face up to the stringent requirements a comprehensive sociology of education demands. It is time to bring together in an acceptable synthesis what we know about the explanatory mechanisms that generate educational and social inequality.

Progress is being made in the sociology of education. First, I think it can be demonstrated, this is not a matter of 'perspective', that class-located families adopt distinct strategies in pursuit of their short term and long term, that is intergenerational, goals. Second, I think it can be demonstrated that in as much as families are class-located they possess certain resources which may be categorized as, (i) intellectual, that is cognitive skills and the categories of thought acquired through socialization, (what Bourdieu calls cultural capital);[13] (ii) social networks, both of kin and non-kin; and (iii) capital as financial and real property. Third, I think it can be demonstrated that students generate themselves, through processes that have been identified as cultural production, group conceptions of their social and cultural situations and plot what may be regarded as cultural trajectories, class/ethnic/sex trajectories targetted at destinations, not only occupations, considered attainable in the light of the knowledge they possess—which is just this specifically class/ethnic/sex mediated cultural knowledge—of the costs and risks of the trajectories possible for people like them. One of the most valuable insights of the work of the last decade is that these processes are now seen as cultural processes, processes of cultural production, patterned by elements of class cultural practice that can be shown to have *their* origin in the fundamental relations of domination and subordination maintained between classes, ethnic groups and sexes. These three core advances in theory and practice are now integral to a general theory of educational and social reproduction. I will make a brief comment only on the question of knowledge.

The sociology of education has become deeply aware, not least thanks to Bernstein's analysis of the transmission of knowledge, how the knowlege of the school, in its structure and organization as curriculum, in the forms of its pedagogic transmission, and in the nature of its realization by distinctive methods of evaluation, is connected to social forms and not least to the division of labour. Knowledge *can* be identified as the culture of a class or of an ethnic community, by its origins, by its forms, and by its actual distribution, and where it can be shown that a class controls the system of education and organizes that system for the transmission of its own knowledge, so then can it be shown that the knowledge of other cultures is thereby excluded and denied. Bourdieu's theory—despite its weakness to the charge of redundant dualism and its vagueness on the mechanisms of socialization—*is* able to incorporate the possibility of cultural domination through and within the educational system. It is just a matter of fact that scholastic knowledge and the forms of its transmission in the New Zealand educational system are derived from the European not the Maori tradition, but how important, if at all, this really is as an explanation of the primary and secondary effects of ethnicity on educational inequality is entirely unknown. If the attempts to construct an educational system for the transmission of Maori knowledge by a Maori pedagogy, a culturally specific rather than a universal pedagogy, are realized and prove successful, then this theory of Maori educational inequality will be strongly supported. In this respect

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13. In Bourdieu's analogy 'cultural capital' is invested in the educational system, there 'objectively' signified and legitimated by credentials, and invested to produce a dividend. The term 'cultural or symbolic capital' draws attention to the convertibility of the sign—that is to a system of social relations in which the sign can be converted into real capital *via* the mediation of the school. I believe this has been a useful analogy—but it should not be taken literally.

the pedagogic successes of existing schools with a strong Maori tradition, including private schools, would seem to offer important sites for research.

It remains only to point out in conclusion that this examination of the theories of Bourdieu and Boudon with respect to the primary and secondary effects of class and ethnic differences raises more questions for us in New Zealand than it answers. In fact, before we can say anything much more useful about these important issues we must have more information: a good, old-fashioned, survey is long overdue.

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Reviews

Sociological Theory in Transition
Edited by M.L. Wardell & S.P. Turner (1986), London, Allen & Unwin, pp183.
ISBN 004301206Xp6, No price shown.
Review by Roy Nash.

Mark Wardell of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and Stephen Turner of the University of South Florida have assembled ten papers written by themselves and fourteen other social theorists (including Bary Hindess, John O'Neill [Sociology as a skin trade] and John Urry) on the dissolution of traditional sociological theory and the movements for reconstruction. The writers are widely scattered throughout North America and Europe (but, oddly in view of the interest taken by several authors in Foucault, not France). How they all came to contribute to this book is a mystery, most edited collections stem from a conference, or a strong departmental interest, but the editors give no clue about the origins of their volume.

The publishers state on the cover that 'the book contains no orthodoxies and no answers', but seeks to identify 'the range of issues that will constitute the agenda for the next generation of sociologists'. There is a distinct suggestion here that *this* generation—and most of the writers I know to be in early middle age—have given up. I think perhaps they have. There is a weary lack of passion—post-marxist *ennui*—about this book that I found disagreeable. This is a book written exclusively by male academics who have confined themselves to a narrow, inbred, area of social theory. The book is only 183 pages, including preface, introduction, epilog and index, and the papers are therefore short—3-4000 words in some cases—and 'bitty'. The material is new in the sense that they have not been reprinted from elsewhere, but they are not *original*. We all know what Barry Hindess, for example, thinks by now, if we still care.

The concerns of these theorists are of little interest outside their own scattered circle (the book is actually an attempt to confront that state of affairs by self-critique) but those of us outside this circle can hardly be expected to take a great interest in that, even then, self-satisfied exercise.

History's Mistress: A New Interpretation of a Nineteenth-century Ethnographic Classic
Edited by Paula Weideger (1986), London, Penguin Books, pp276. $10.95.
Review by James Urry.

The Library of the Royal Anthropological Institute in London (now part of the Museum of Mankind) used to keep a number of books in a special locked room. The volumes selected for such seclusion included old, valuable editions, sometimes autographed or containing other manuscript material, books of a racist nature (for instance the 'scientific' journals of *Rassenkunde* produced by the Nazis) and works considered pornographic. Among the latter were the various editions of Hermann Ploss's *Dass Weib (The Woman)*, a strange collection of information on women of other cultures, their bodies, customs and costumes (or the lack of them). This book first published in 1885, but reissued and expanded with typical Germanic fervour by later authors, was translated into English by that strange fellow Eric Dingwall, author of numerous works on sex and pornography, who died earlier this year at an advanced age. The reason for its banning to 'the locked room' had less to do with its turgid prose, where pornographic description masquaraded as science, and more with the *Wunderbar Fotografen* which illustrated its many pages.

I was, therefore, more than a little amused to encounter the present book 'authored, so the blurb has it, by a noted feminist writer'. The sub-title claims that it is a 'new interpretation' of Ploss's work, while in fact most of the book consists of a selected translation of the main text reduced from the original 2,000 pages to less

than 250. The text, accompanied by pale and somewhat pathetic illustrations, is presented without any kind of correction, comment or even criticism.

In the introduction Ms Weideger justifies the reprinting of these strange details of women's customs (under headings such as 'sex', 'beauty', 'menstruation', etc.), as a 'contribution to women's history'. She then proceeds to give a brief outline of the history of the various editions of Ploss's book, speculating on the 'porcine expressions' on the faces of its authors, revisors and translators ('with goose fat still wet on the hairs of the moustaches the men gossip about this woman . . . "Breasts!" one of them exclaims'). Finally Weideger attempts to place the book in a broader historical context including the development of anthropology and the place of women in western thought. The latter part is totally inadequate. Not only are the sources she quotes never properly identified, but also her views of the place of women in nineteenth century Germany and the history of anthropology are superficial and in places incorrect.

This last inadequacy is clearly indicated in the book's subtitle. Ploss's book cannot in any sense (or in any of its editions for that matter) be considered an 'ethnographic classic'. In fact it is not even an ethnography. Ploss was not an anthropologist, but a doctor who, like many nineteenth century savants, loved to collect bizarre facts on the customs of queer folk recorded by a motley band of travellers, officials, missionaries and other Europeans in remote areas of the world. His compilation of disconnected, second-rate bits and pieces of information belongs to a tradition of such works produced in the nineteenth century most of which, thankfully, have vanished from sight. To credit such authors with the title of 'anthropologists' and their works as 'ethnographies' is ridiculous. Weideger compares Ploss with Sir James George Frazer, author of *The Golden Bough*. While the method of amassing 'facts' is similar, the aims and undoubtedly the style of their writings are entirely different.

This brings me to my final point. I am at a complete loss why the main text of this book has been republished in the 1980s. Weideger is extremely vague about her intentions. Is the book an historical curiosity, reproduced to illustrate the perfidious nature of male scientific 'knowledge' in the nineteenth century? Or is the material, in spite of its faults and prejudices, somehow valuable beause by default it reveals aspects of 'women's history'? Weideger seems to hint that it is the latter which is her major motive for publishing this rather strange and bizarre mis-match of ill-conceived 'facts'. If so, one can only say that her energies would have been better utilised if she had bothered to take note of the vast literature on women's lives produced by professional anthropologists in the twentieth century. In such work women, their bodies and their lives are placed in broader social and cultural contexts. At the same time, anthropological debates over the analysis of gender have reached a high level of criticism, which merely makes this book seem even odder and out of place in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Perspectives in Sociology (second edition)
Edited by E.C. Cuff and G.C.F. Payne. London, George Allen and Unwin, 1984. (£4.95)
Review by Ken Stevens

This is one of the best sociology textbooks I have encountered in ten years of teaching the subject. Cuff and Payne outline a sequence of four sociological perspectives: consensus, conflict, symbolic interaction and ethno-methodology before synthesising them in a discussion of their implications for research. A major strength of this book is its orderly approach to the complexities of social theory although a possible weakness is that there is little critical evaluation of each perspective. The authors obviously wish to leave such discussion to students and their teachers and accordingly conclude each chapter with a set of questions.

The strengths of this book are three-fold. Firstly, its organization enables the reader to compare and contrast the different ideologies within which each theoretical perspective is grounded and so develop an understanding of each as a sociology in itself. Secondly, each of the four perspectives are analysed in terms of their origins

and subsequent development so that the reader is introduced to the major contributors and their contributions (albeit very briefly) and thirdly, although all the perspectives are covered in separate chapters, the reader is constantly made aware of their interrelationships, especially for research.

The chapter on consensus provides an introduction to the contributions of Compte, Durkheim, Parsons, Merton and Smelser and a brief look at the implications of this perspective for the family. The debate that has surrounded this perspective is not raised and the questions with which the chapter concludes are not likely to draw attention to it. This, the authors obviously consider to be outside the scope of their introduction to social theory, but it is surprising that the 'further reading' they recommend would not lead students to consider the criticisms that surround the consensus perspective. The chapter on conflict provides a particularly good introduction to Marx's basic concepts and theories, followed by a disappointingly brief section on Weber and Dahrendorf. The suggested 'further reading' on conflict would not give students a very good understanding of contemporary interpretations of Marx and this is the major weakness of the chapter.

The chapters on symbolic interaction and Ethnomethodology constantly draw attention to implications for qualitative research while providing brief introductions to the major figures and their ideas. In the chapter on Ethnomethodology, the introduction to conversational analysis is a major feature.

This book is, as its title states, about a range of major perspectives in sociology. Its primary use will be as a first-year text and as such it provides a clear and systematic introduction to social theory. It is a text that could be recommended to more advanced students of sociology reading in one or more of the substantive areas of the discipline, especially those who do not have strong backgrounds in social theory. For such students *Perspectives in Sociology* should be recommended reading.

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Fabian, Suzane. **The Last Taboo: Suicide Among Children and Adolescents.** Penguin Books Australia. 1986.

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Metge, Joan. **In and Out of Touch: Whakama in Cross Cultural Context.** Wellington, Victoria University Press. 1986.

Books received and not taken up for review will be deposited in the Massey University Library.

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2. While articles should not normally exceed 4500-5000 words, longer articles may be accepted in special circumstances.

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4. Manuscripts should be typed double spaced throughout on one side of A4 paper with reasonable margins all round (2 cms. approx.).

5. Authors should consult articles in current issues of this Journal for general indications of style - conventions on: capitalizing titles, headings, sub-headings; paragraphing; quotations, and so on.

6. Do not underline any words in the text unless they are to be printed in *italics.*

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'it has been argued (Baker, 1948:26) that...' etc.

The full list of references at the end of the article should be arranged alphabetically by author's surname. The following examples should be used as a guide, paying particular attention to the sequence of the items in the reference and to punctuation.

Able, P. and Collins, S. 1961. 'Structuralism and the concept of class.' **Journal of Social Class,** 24(3), 138-159.

Baker, R.S. 1948. **Sociology and Social Change.** London, Charles Publishing Co.

Note that in the first example the words in the title are not capitalized (as they are for the title of a book, as in the second example).

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