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The Fantasmatic Logic of Social Innovation:
The Case of Auckland's The Southern Initiative

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Abstract
Established in 2012 in response to socio-economic challenges in South Auckland, The Southern Initiative (TSI) promises "transformational social, economic and physical change" through social innovation and entrepreneurship (Auckland Council, 2018b). Social innovation initiatives such as TSI have become a structural feature of post-industrial urban governance and the subject of significant academic scholarship since the 2010s. This research has been largely limited to conceptual considerations and analysis of local instantiations of social innovation. This article seeks to use the case of TSI to explore the macro relationship between social innovation initiatives and urban capitalism. In particular, I focus on the means through which TSI articulates the causes of social issues in South Auckland and the solutions to these promises. Utilising Glynos and Howarth's Lacanian-inspired logics approach, I argue that TSI illustrates a central contradiction driving social innovation policy discourse; while these discourses promise transformational change in response to socio-economic challenges, they foreclose upon the structural causes of these challenges and, as a result, are limited to minor interventions that are incompatible with the original mission. In response, a fantasmatic logic has emerged in which the promise of TSI can be reproduced by restaging these challenges as the more manageable failures of individuals, whānau and communities. As such, TSI policy discourse is especially 'sticky' because it offers the possibility of community change without having to engage in radical modes of institutional or macroeconomic transformation.

Keywords: Auckland, inequality, logics approach, social innovation, urban capitalism

Introduction

Auckland, New Zealand's primate city, dominates the country's economy and is New Zealand's gateway to the world (Insch, 2018). It also contains the most marked expressions of the inequality that has been a dominant feature of New Zealand's economy since the country's 1980s neoliberal reforms (Harris, 2013; Kelsey, 1997; Terruhn, 2020). A recent review report from The Southern Initiative (TSI) noted that:

> Tamaki Makaurau [Auckland] has experienced a sustained period of economic success primarily due to population growth and its strategic location within Asia-Pacific but the benefits of the region's success have not been felt by all, particularly in the south and west of the city. (The Southern Initiative, 2018)

Indeed, in 2020, Auckland was ranked as the seventh least affordable city in the world in terms of house prices (Roy, 2020a). In the same year, 5000 Aucklanders were on a waiting list for state housing (Roy, 2020b). Moreover, in 2017, over a quarter of young Māori and Pasifika Aucklanders were not in employment, education or training (Webb, 2017). This deprivation is concentrated in the south and the

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west of the city where Auckland's Māori and Pasifika populations are over-represented (Auckland Tourism, Events and Economic Development, 2020).

It is this deprivation and spatialised disparity that drove the creation of TSI. Established in the first iteration of the Auckland Plan (Auckland Council, 2012b),[2] TSI is a place-based programme that initially covered four South Auckland local board areas: Māngere-Ōtāhuhu, Ōtara-Papatoetoe, Manurewa and Papakura. Aiming to achieve "transformational social, economic and physical change", TSI seeks to 'unleash' "human and economic potential in an area of Auckland with high social need, yet with significant economic opportunity" (Auckland Council, 2012b, p. 41) through social innovation and entrepreneurship.

TSI is part of a turn to social innovation among post-industrial urban policymakers. *Social innovation* represents an approach to social challenges that came to prominence as a form of urban governance in the early twenty-first century (MacCallum et al., 2009; Mulgan et al., 2007; Pol & Ville, 2009). At their core, social innovation initiatives provide a novel solution to social challenges and establish new social processes and narratives in response to these challenges (Cajaiba-Santana, 2014). Social innovation remains a fluid concept, however, especially in public usage (Bragaglia, 2021). As a result, while academic research has sought to both clarify and complexify definitions of social innovation (Marques et al., 2018; Moulaert et al., 2013), the term has been co-opted by a wide range of actors such that initiatives labelled social innovation can potentially both challenge and legitimise the hegemony of neoliberal forms of urban governance (Fougère & Meriläinen, 2021; Fougère et al., 2017).

In this article, I explore the means through which TSI utilises the fluidity of social innovation discourse to respond to the tensions within neoliberal governance in Auckland. Specifically, I use a Lacanian analysis of the fantasmatic logics that animate a given discourse, a method popularised by Glynos and Howarth (Glynos & Howarth, 2008a, 2008b; Glynos et al., 2009), to analyse TSI strategy documents from 2017 to 2021. In this analysis, I seek to understand the fantasmatic logics through which TSI frames both the causes of deprivation in South Auckland and the new solutions and processes required to respond to these issues.

Through the analysis of TSI documents, I argue that TSI illustrates a central contradiction driving social innovation policy discourse; while these discourses promise transformational change in response to socio-economic challenges, they foreclose upon the structural causes of these challenges, specifically New Zealand's neoliberal shift in the 1980s and early 1990s and the global "new urban crisis" of inequality experienced in post-industrial cities (Florida, 2017). As a result of these local and global structural shifts, TSI is necessarily restricted to limited innovations that foreclose upon the possibility of transformational change. In response to this contradiction between TSI's mission and its method, a fantasmatic logic has emerged in which the promise of TSI can be reproduced by restaging these challenges as the more manageable failures of individuals, whānau and communities. As such, TSI policy discourse is especially 'sticky' because it offers the possibility of community change without having to engage in radical modes of institutional or macroeconomic transformation. As a result, I argue that social innovation initiatives like TSI act as a form of what Schubert (2019) calls "disruptive maintenance", wherein social innovation projects are only able to promise transformational change by disavowing the causes of the challenges they address.

Given the earnestness with which the organisation addresses social issues, critiquing social innovation measures and TSI specifically feels ill-spirited. The work itself is admirable and actively supported by the Auckland Council; TSI was one of the few institutions within the Council's remit to avoid

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[2] *The Auckland Plan* (Auckland Council, 2012b) is now archived and no longer publicly available on the Auckland Council website. A pdf of the report is available from this author on request.

post-COVID funding cuts (Latif, 2020). TSI has created and supported several worthy and influential initiatives, from trades training to healthy food initiatives and support for new parents. It has also leveraged its institutional power through mechanisms like social procurement to produce transformational outcomes for some individuals. The well-meaning advocates, co-designers and policymakers in TSI, however, undoubtedly have limited power to make macroeconomic structural changes. And that is the point: anti-poverty measures in Auckland, and across the post-industrial world, have limited capacity to engage with the levers that matter. Instead, as this article argues, the social innovation discourse embraced by TSI acts as a fantasmatic logic that maintains the possibility of transformational change while foreclosing on both the possibility of structural change and the causes of the social issues it is addressing.

The article begins by reviewing debates within the literature on social innovation before turning to the establishment of TSI in the context of these logics of social innovation. A Lacanian method of discursive analysis is then outlined before applying this method to TSI.

The rise and fluidity of social innovation

Social innovation was first used as a pejorative synonym for the utopianism of socialism in the nineteenth century (Teasdale et al., 2021) before re-emerging in academic and political discourse in connection with community development issues from the 1960s (Bragaglia, 2021) and then becoming used as a "counter-reaction to the positivist belief in technology" in the 1970s (Marques et al., 2018, p. 499). From the mid-2000s (MacCallum et al., 2009; Mulgan et al., 2007; Pol & Ville, 2009), however, a new wave of social innovation discourse emerged in which the concept has been institutionalised as a policy tool in the field of new public management (Lévesque, 2013), especially in European liberal democracies (Bragaglia, 2021). Equally, social innovation initiatives have become especially prevalent in urban governance (Ardill & Oliveria, 2018; MacCallum et al., 2009; McFarlane et al., 2021), particularly concerning intercultural, deprivation and sustainability issues (Angelidou & Psaltoglou, 2017; Mieg & Topfer, 2013).

At its core, *social innovation* refers to new solutions to social challenges. Moreover, as Bataglin et al. (2020, p. 452) argue, social innovation includes both these novel responses and the establishment of new social processes. For example, Cajaiba-Santana (2014, p. 44) defines social innovation as "new social practices created from collective, intentional, and goal-orientated actions aimed at promoting social change through the reconfiguration of how social goals are accomplished". As such, Wittmayer et al. (2019) suggest that social innovation initiatives not only seek to address an unmet social need in a novel way, but they also construct "narratives of change".

Conversely, there is a tension in academic scholarship on social innovation (SI) between readings of social innovation as inherently elusive such that "defining univocally what social innovation stands for is impossible and probably also a pointless effort" (Bragaglia, 2021, p. 105) and those researchers who argue that any ambiguity around social innovation needs to be met with greater "conceptual clarity and solid theory" (Pel et al., 2020, p. 1). Notably, Marques et al. (2018, p. 506) express a fear that "SI will remain a well-meaning concept used to talk vaguely about a more equitable world, while being used for a variety of unconnected and contradictory purposes".

In response to this concern, a strand of research on social innovation has emerged that has sought to clarify definitions of the concept and categorise instantiations of the concept. For example, Moulaert, working with a variety of collaborators (Lévesque, 2013; Moulaert et al., 2019; Moulaert et al., 2010; Moulaert & Nussbaumer, 2005), has rigorously developed a reading of social innovation as a bottom-up process of empowerment to meet the needs of local communities. Equally, several researchers have developed nuanced readings of different modes of social innovation, making distinctions between radical forms of social innovation that seek to achieve structural changes and those that either work alongside existing systems or rely upon the work of individual agents. For example, Cajaiba-Santana (2014) divides

social innovation into agentic and structuralist approaches. Likewise, Unceta et al. (2020) distinguish between individualist, regional/national, and organisational social innovations approaches, and Fougère and Meriläinen (2021) make a distinction between social innovation for vulnerable communities and social innovation for society.

Perhaps most influentially, Marques et al. (2018) categorise social innovation into structural, radical, complementary and instrumental forms. Where structural forms of social innovation, such as trade unionism or environmental movements, seek to achieve widescale social change, such radical social innovation programmes as time banks or eco-towns attempt to stimulate significant change within a given context. By contrast, complementary approaches work alongside existing institutional frameworks without seeking to radically reshape them or influence structural power relations. Finally, instrumental forms of social innovation occur when the term is co-opted by actors to "rebrand existing agendas in a way that is more appealing to stakeholders" (Marques et al., 2018, p. 497). Marques et al. (2018, p. 504) argue that the instrumental appropriation of social innovation:

> …allows those who want to push back against these trends to galvanise political, social or even business support for social welfare initiatives. Calling such initiatives SI allows them to demand action on issues such as poverty, social exclusion or gender discrimination, while using language (particularly the word 'innovation') that resonates with current political narratives about the superiority of market-based approaches to solving welfare issues.

While researchers have attempted to classify instantiations and theories of social innovation with increasing clarity and complexity, public use of the term continues to attract a wide range of actors who can co-opt discourse of social innovation to suit their purposes with scant regard for academic classification. Indeed, as Bragaglia (2021) argues, the slipperiness of the concept explains part of its appeal because it acts, as Edmiston (2016, p. 2) puts, "as a unifying policy concept around which diverse stakeholders can coalesce and organise". For example, Bragaglia (2021, p. 106) cites the European Commission's (2013) definition of social innovation which highlights an "indeterminate quality" which makes social innovation "adaptable to a variety of situations and flexible enough to follow the twist and turns of policy that everyday politics sometimes make necessary".

As a result of its productive ambiguity, Bragaglia (2021) argues that social innovation functions as what Pollitt and Hupe (2011) had called a magic concept. By evoking a sense of "novelty and improvement" in the name of the public good, the ambiguity of social innovation leads to "rhetorical advantages and the broad alliances that they are capable of triggering" (Bragaglia, 2021, p. 104). Moreover, Bragaglia (2021, p. 107) argues that the "'positive aura' of social innovation is often amplified and takes on the contours of a panacea to all contemporary issues". Similarly, Fougère et al. (2017) highlight the 'win-win' positivity of social innovation discourse in EU policy. In this sense, as Bragaglia (2021, p. 110) suggests, while social innovation is a cohesive concept when viewed through a bottom-up lens rooted in local contexts, "social innovation also presents some rhetorical advantages that have made it particularly attractive to policy-makers". Thus, while definitions of social innovation in research have become increasingly refined, in urban governance social innovation continues to act as an "empty signifier which grips subjects through fantasy" (Fougère et al., 2017, p. 827).

Fougère et al.'s (2017) understanding of social innovation as an empty signifier that can be occupied by a range of positions allows a different form of analysis. Rather than reading social innovation programmes through a pre-established taxonomy or evaluating the results of a given programme empirically, positioning social innovation as a discourse – or, as shall be more precisely articulated in the following section, a fantasmatic logic – allows us to critically explore the means through which a given

social innovation programme can be co-opted by hegemonic neoliberal political and economic logics despite the intentions of the actors involved.

Indeed, while the earnest and inclusive liberalism of social innovation discourse may be seen as an interventionist reaction against economistic neoliberalism, Fougère et al. (2017, p. 820) suggest that it is "tempting" to see social innovation as "a discourse largely in line with contemporary neoliberal hegemony". For example, in their analysis of European Union social innovation policy, Fougère et al. (2017, p. 820) argue that "rather than being a transformative discourse within European Union policy, European Union social innovation policy discourse reinforces neoliberal hegemony by (re) legitimizing it."

While structural and radical forms of social innovation present themselves as a progressive or emancipatory alternative to urban neoliberalism, social innovation policy and practice are neither inherently radical nor transformative. Instead, the language of social innovation can and has been readily co-opted by instrumental actors to maintain existing power relations in the name of the social good. It is in this neoliberal context that TSI has emerged in Auckland, to which we now turn.

Auckland, neoliberalism and inequality

Neoliberal modes of governance have been dominant in Auckland for some time. Set in motion by the national structural adjustments that came to be known as the 'New Zealand experiment' (Kelsey, 1997) and reaffirmed by the establishment of the 'super-city' in 2010 (Chen, 2014), Auckland's Council's business-friendly approach is dominated by a focus on innovation and productivity (Auckland Council, 2012a, 2014).[3] As has been the case globally, the neoliberal governance of Auckland has had significant socio-spatial economic consequences (Terruhn, 2020). Moreover, according to the latest available research, deprivation in Auckland is focused in Māori and Pasifika communities. Aucklanders of European ethnicity earn 20% more than Māori Aucklanders and 30% more than their Pasifika counterparts (Auckland Council, 2018a).

Driven by both the global trend towards neoliberal governance and local factors, most notably the deregulating Employment Contracts Act 1991 and the welfare reforms of the 1990s (Easton, 2020), many Māori and Pasifika peoples in South Auckland are at risk of falling into an underclass through "the slow violence of poverty" (The Southern Initiative, 2021a, p. 11). As seen in Figure 1, deprivation is concentrated in the south and the west of the city where income, occupational status and qualifications levels are notably lower than the rest of Auckland (Auckland Tourism Events and Economic Development, 2020).

Auckland's ethnically orientated socio-spatial inequality is not unique. Globally, the post-industrial cities that emerged out of the crisis of deindustrialisation and the emergence of neoliberal governance have been marked by the allure of what Scott (2011) calls "cognitive-cultural capitalism" and Florida (2002) celebrated as the "creative city". Equally, however, a range of urban theorists (Florida, 2017; Mollenkopf & Castells, 1991; Nijman & Wei, 2020; Sassen, 1991; Scott, 2011) have identified a central contradiction within this new urban economy: the driving forces of urban economic growth – immaterial production and the return to the city centre – have also become the causes of inequality and social-spatial polarisation. Indeed, empirical research has consistently shown a relationship between cognitive-cultural cities and inequality, including in the United Kingdom (Lee & Clarke, 2019), North America (Breau et al., 2014; Florida & Gaetani, 2020; Zimmerman, 2008), Europe (Bayliss, 2007; Vanolo, 2008) and Australia (Atkinson & Easthope, 2009).

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[3] *Auckland's Economic Development Strategy* (Auckland Council, 2012a) is now archived and no longer publicly available on the Auckland Council website. A pdf of the report is available from this author on request.

Figure 1: Auckland prosperity by local board

Source: Auckland Tourism Events and Economic Development (2020).

Conversely, in response to this inequality, creativity and innovation discourses and their instantiation in policy have proved resilient. Indeed, an increasingly common response to this apparent contradiction within neoliberal urban capitalism has not been to dismantle the systems that create it. Instead, urban policymakers have continued to embrace the creative city and innovation strategies that are thought to offer urban vibrancy and to generate top-line growth (Peck, 2020; Zukin, 2020). Moreover, stripped of alternative policy-making measures and budgets, social innovation programmes have become a popular response to urban social challenges caused by cognitive-cultural capitalism. For example, amid the European debt crisis, the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) stated that "at a time of major budgetary constraints, social innovation is an effective way of responding to social challenges, by mobilising people's creativity to develop solutions and make better use of scarce resources" (Hubert, 2011, p. 7).

It is within this political and economic environment of immaterial production and inequality that Auckland's The Southern Initiative (TSI) has emerged as the city's primary means of responding to deprivation and social issues. In the following sections of this article, I mobilise TSI as a case study to explore the means through which the organisation negotiates the tension between social innovation discourse and urban equality. This analysis begins with a methodological reflection on Glynos and Howarth's logics approach, which will then be applied to TSI policy discourse.

A logics approach to policy analysis

A Lacanian method of analysing discursive environments has been popularised by a range of post-Lacanian theorists who emerged from the Essex School of Discourse Theory (Glynos et al., 2009; Howarth et al., 2000). Following Laclau and then Žižek's Hegelian-Marxist reworking of Lacan, the likes of Daly (1999b, 1999a), Glynos (2001, 2008; Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2004, 2008), Howarth (Glynos & Howarth, 2008b; Howarth et al., 2000) and Stavrakakis (2000, 2007) sought to develop a method of Lacanian analysis of

social life that developed upon Laclau's post-Marxist discourse theory (Laclau, 2003; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985).

In particular, Glynos and Howarth have articulated a logics approach (Glynos & Howarth, 2008b, 2008a) that has been applied across a wide range of fields, including social innovation (Dey et al., 2016; Fougère et al., 2017) and policy analysis (Clarke, 2012; Papanastasiou, 2019; West, 2011). The logics approach is orientated on a social ontology that highlights the "radical contingency" and "structural incompleteness" (Glynos & Howarth, 2008a, p. 6) of social relations whereby meaning is differential and thus there are no positively existing signifiers that mean in and of themselves. Consequently, both language and our realities are negatively charged and radically contingent. As a result, the stuff of politics and ideology is to attempt to reframe meanings and temporarily 'fix' preferred readings of certain signifiers like social innovation.

For Lacan, however, attempts to stabilise meaning are doomed to failure and instead reveal the presence of what he labelled the "*Real*", which Daly (1999b, p. 78) defines as the "primal point of possibility and impossibility for all objectivity". The Lacanian Real marks the ontological point of failure of symbolisation – the point that resists symbolisation within a given discourse – as well as the ontic instantiation of that impossibility in discourse. The presence of the Real may exist as a structural distortion within a discourse, such as when a national myth is unable to acknowledge any readily accessible yet conflicting events or data points. For example, in Aotearoa/New Zealand where there is considerable affective investment in the nation's 'clean, green' national mythology, there is a stubbornly awkward tension about acknowledging the existence of ecological degradation. As an illustration, when the then New Zealand Prime Minister John Key was presented facts about the country's water quality in a 2016 BBC interview, he outright refused to accept the research and instead reasserted the '100 per cent pure' slogan ("Key Rejects BBC Criticism", 2016). Here the ecological degradation acted as an instantiation of the Real because it could not be acknowledged without the discourse fracturing. Alternatively, the Real may appear as a sudden eruption that cannot be accounted for within a hegemonic narrative, such as that which drove the moral panic within conservative media in the UK during the movement to topple monuments to slave traders in 2020 (Martin & Andrews, 2020).

Glynos and Howarth's logics approach attempts to capture dialectical movement between the presence of the Real caused by the radical contingency of social relations and attempts to fix meaning. Here Glynos and Howarth (2008a, p. 11) focus on what they call "regimes of practice" and seek to understand the "transformation, stabilization and maintenance" of these regimes by capturing the "purposes, rules and ontological presuppositions that render a regime possible, intelligible and vulnerable".

In the analysis of regimes of practice, Glynos and Howarth deploy three logics: social, political and fantasmatic. An analysis of *social logics* seeks to understand a regime in itself, characterising the parameters of this practice as well as asking "*why* and *how* they came about and continue to be sustained" (Glynos & Howarth, 2008a, p. 12, emphasis in original). By contrast, *political logics* provide critical explanations for the development of a given regime, considering its "construction, defence, and naturalization", as well as the logics through which it is contested and disrupted (Glynos & Howarth, 2008a, p. 12). Having largely outlined the social and political logics of social innovation and the emergence of TSI, this article focuses primarily on the fantasmatic logics that propel TSI. This focus facilitates understandings of why these logics grip policymakers.

Glynos and Howarth (2008a, p. 12) argue that *fantasmatic logics* extend upon the operation of social and political logics by demonstrating "*why* specific practices and regimes grip subjects" (emphasis in original). Here fantasy, often identified as ideological fantasy to give the signify a socio-political focus, consists of the stories we tell to construct a meaningful sense of reality. Moreover, if the realities we construct can never escape the sense of lack that defines the human condition, fantasmatic narratives

function to explain and pacify the presence of lack *qua* the Real. Fantasy, therefore, is a narrative that seeks to conceal the radical contingency of the social order and our subjective experience (Glynos & Howarth, 2008a, p. 12). As such, Žižek (1989, p. 45) argues that the function of (ideological) fantasy is "not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel".

To reiterate this vital point, a fantasmatic logic is able to grip the subject by making sense of the traumatic presence of the Real, as well as offering the possibility of overcoming this tension by representing the Real in a more palatable form. Moreover, fantasmatic narratives work by offering up the possibility of subjective coherence while maintaining a distance from its structural impossibility. As Daly suggests, the work of (ideological) fantasy involves "an endless (re-)staging of the primordial struggle between the symbolic-discursive order and the Real" (Daly, 1999a, p. 220). The paradox, Daly suggests, is that the most effective means for a fantasmatic logic to promise a sense of fullness is to re-present more palatable obstacles that prevent this closure. That is, if the Real is a structural ontological impossibility within the symbolic order, the dimension of fantasy re-stages this impossibility as a contingent ontic obstacle responsible for our sense of lack. As a result, Daly argues, society is "constituted as a kind of 'whodunit?'" (Daly, 1999a, p. 224).

A logics approach, therefore, seeks to highlight the means through which a given regime is manufactured, maintained and contested as well as why this regime of practice appears 'sticky', despite its ontological contingency. As such, applying a logics approach requires critical analysis of both the discourse produced by a regime and the discourse about that regime. Through this analysis, researchers using a logics approach seek to identify the signifiers that cohere a given regime, the points at which it is contested, the moments in which the Real erupts, and the fantasmatic logics that seek to explain and re-present the troubling presence of the Real (Glynos & Howarth, 2008b).

The following section will apply a logics approach to the analysis of TSI, focusing in particular on the discursive environment in which it operates, as represented by the *Auckland Plan 2050*, as well as TSI's annual reviews from 2017 to 2021, both internal (Auckland Council, 2018b; The Southern Initiative, 2017, 2019, 2021b) and external (Burkett, 2017; Burkett & Boorman, 2020).

The fantasmatic logic of The Southern Initiative

Formed to respond to the clear disparities and social challenges concentrated in the south of Auckland, TSI claims to be "responsible for kick starting, enabling and championing social and community innovation in South Auckland" through "social innovation and entrepreneurship" (Auckland Council, 2018b, p. 69) to tackle "complex socio-economic challenges and [create] opportunities that will benefit the people of South Auckland".

As Wittmayer et al. (2019) suggest, social innovation initiatives construct narratives of change that both explain current issues and articulate a story about how societal transformation is possible. This narrative of change is evident throughout TSI's internal and external review documents. Most notably, TSI positions its work within the systems approach outlined in the explanatory model below (see Figure 2).

In this explanatory narrative, TSI expressly focuses on agential and community interventions, in which those engaged by the organisation use a "think like a system, act like an entrepreneur" mindset (The Southern Initiative, 2017, p. 28). For example, in their review of TSI, Burkett and Boorman (2020, p. 9) note that the "focus of the work is maximising people's aspirations for agency and growth". This political logic, however, forecloses on macroeconomic and political factors. Figure 2, for example, provides no pathway within TSI through which to account for national-level triggers of inequality, such as the welfare and employment reforms that radiated from the neoliberal restricting of New Zealand society in the 1980s. Moreover, the systems approach does not mention the role of benefit cuts in the significant increase in

poverty and inequality in Auckland and across New Zealand over the past 30 years (Easton, 2020; Rashbrooke, 2013) or the rise of the global "new urban crisis" (Florida, 2017).

Conversely, where TSI discourse does acknowledge structural factors, these factors are reduced to community challenges. For example, where its 2017 year in review document recognised that "around the world there is strong agreement the fourth industrial revolution will disrupt occupations and industries in ways we can't predict" (The Southern Initiative, 2017, p. 14), this external threat is re-presented as a lack of suitable skills in South Auckland. Here TSI (2017, p. 16) asserts that:

> We need to ensure our communities are ahead of the game in preventing, mitigating and managing the inevitable changes to our social fabric and way of life. We need to ensure South Aucklanders have the skills to harness change rather than be victims of it. Skills such as complex problem solving, critical thinking, emotional intelligence, creativity and the ability to cooperate, collaborate and negotiate will be crucial.
>
> South Auckland is off to a good start. It is known for its creativity and entrepreneurship, its strong DIY culture and its rich and diverse culture open to innovation. South Aucklanders have all the ingredients to be pioneers, creators and leaders.

Figure 2. "TSI at a Glance"

Source: Burkett and Boorman (2020, p. 3).

It is, as Teasdale et al. (2021, p. 426) suggest in their analysis of the social entrepreneurship organisation Ashoka, as if "'new inequality' is caused not by capitalism, but rather by some people not having the necessary skillset to cope with change." Tellingly, TSI asserts that:

> Solutions lie within local communities themselves. Rather than creating more services to 'fix' South Auckland, the Initiative works with whānau [family], local social change agents, grassroots entrepreneurs, businesses and agencies to explore, create and test radical and innovative solutions. (Auckland Council, 2018b)

Or, put otherwise, "only the 'hood can change the hood'" (The Southern Initiative, 2017, p. 3).

In disavowing economic structures in favour of local solutions, TSI is necessarily corrective of individuals and communities, not economic systems, putting pressure on the former to change rather than seeking to create changes in the latter. Indeed, it is instructive that the main priority in the first introduction to TSI was "early, strong family attachment and learning opportunities that set children up for success at school and in life" followed by the development of a "clear pathway and support for further education, training or employment for every young person leaving school" (Auckland Council, 2012b). Here, in the Lacanian reading, these macroeconomic factors act as an unrepresentable moment of the Real that distorts TSI discourse; acknowledging that social challenges in South Auckland are largely driven by factors outside of the control of the Initiative threatens the very purpose of the regime of practice and thus forms of a palpable point of tension throughout the strategy documents.

As such, we can identify a governing fantasmatic logic that propels TSI policy. This fantasmatic logic articulates a story in which, if 'innovative' changes are made *to* communities in South Auckland so that they are better equipped to deal with inequality and economic uncertainty, an equitable economy would be possible and South Aucklanders could share in the benefits of Auckland's growth. As such, while insisting that it takes a "strengths-based" approach (The Southern Initiative, 2017, p. 3), TSI tells a story in which both the causes of and the solutions to socio-economic challenges emerge from changes in individuals, whānau and communities in South Auckland rather than larger economic shifts.

This fantasmatic logic has become institutionally sticky because it allows for the maintenance of the internal logic of the TSI regime of practice. That is, if the mission of TSI is to achieve transformational change within South Auckland, the specific fantasmatic appeal of the social innovation approach adopted by TSI is that it can articulate this change as a community opportunity rather than a structural impossibility. As such, this fantasmatic logic allows the discourse of social innovation within TSI to function as Pollitt and Hupe's (2011) magic concept by evoking a sense of "novelty and improvement" (Bragaglia, 2021, p. 104) without challenging institutional frameworks inside and outside Auckland Council.

In this logic, TSI forecloses on the possibility of transformational change and re-presents the drive for change on a micro scale. A narrative of change runs throughout TSI policy discourse. Indeed, TSI was established to achieve "transformational social, economic and physical change" (Auckland Council, 2018b). Moreover, TSI's 2017 year in review document states that "We're about transformation and we're about innovation" (The Southern Initiative, 2017, p. 3). Conversely, the agency expressly charged with producing transformational change in South Auckland notes that:

> … we do not attempt to take on grand societal challenges in their entirety, instead we look to identify nimble opportunities for change within the system, seed innovations, test prototypes and support successful efforts to grow and influence other parts of the wider system. (Auckland Council, 2018b, p. 69)

This reduction of transformational change to 'nimble' innovation again reveals the distorting presence of the Lacanian Real within the logics of TSI discourse. Here the economic structures that create the very social challenges TSI was established to tackle seemingly cannot be either symbolised or confronted directly. Instead, this call for innovation acts as a recognition that we must 'go around' the big causes of social challenges in South Auckland. As such, in response to the presence of the Real in the form of the impossibility of transformational structure change, a fantasmatic logic exists in which transformational change is restaged as the frantic and feel-good search for novel solutions to more palatable problems.

This fantasmatic logic is particularly sticky because it is consistent with the political logics of Auckland Council's economic policy discourse (Auckland Council, 2014, 2015; Tātaki Auckland Unlimited, 2020), which focuses on harnessing diversity, creativity and innovation. For example, TSI calls for South Aucklanders to develop "an entrepreneurial mindset that encourages resourcefulness, creativity and vision and builds thriving and resilient communities" (The Southern Initiative, 2017, p. 12). so that South Auckland is "recognised as the enterprise capital of New Zealand" (The Southern Initiative, 2017, p. 4). In this sense, this fantasmatic logic of the transformational change promised by TSI is rearticulated through the political logics of Auckland Council's economic policy, within which economic growth is stimulated by creativity and innovative disruptions that do not disrupt the economic system itself.

This mode of change-without-change reflects Schubert's (2019) positioning of social innovation as a form of disruptive maintenance that reproduces regimes of practice by promising transformational change while foreclosing on the very possibility of this change. In this sense, social innovation initiatives can be Janus-faced: while they can create meaningful change for individuals and communities within a given environment, programmes like TSI can also legitimise the very systems that create these issues. This is what we see in Auckland with TSI. Not only do the fantasmatic logics that propel and solidify TSI foreclose on the possibilities for more radical change, but they also take up the institutional space of transformational change such that there is no metropolitan governmental alternative to specifically address deprivation and disparity in Auckland.

Notably, while acknowledging that the COVID-19 pandemic has muddled the data and the benefits of some of TSI's work with whānau and youth will take some time to accrue, from the point of TSI's establishment in 2012, there has been no observable reduction in deprivation and inequality in Auckland (Auckland Council, 2018a; Auckland Tourism Events and Economic Development, 2020; Infometrics, 2021), despite TSI's remit expanding (Latif, 2020). The transformational change promised by TSI, it seems, is of the people in South Auckland, not of the economic structures in which it operates. Perhaps as a consequence, one of the main 'learnings' reported by TSI is that:

> TSI's work with whānau has demonstrated the implications of toxic stress for whānau and tamariki in South Auckland and that reducing the burden of stress makes a difference. Significantly, change-makers, entrepreneurs, community entities and providers working with South Aucklanders are also experiencing high levels of stress. Service providers are stretched in such a way that bandwidth for change and innovation is limited, and those from South Auckland are driven by additional responsibilities to whānau and community extending well beyond any funding requirements. (The Southern Initiative, 2021b)

Fougère and Meriläinen (2021, p. 8) argue that such a burden is common in social innovation policy practices, which "rely on the immanent capacities of these vulnerable communities, asking them to transform dramatically, in ways that are not asked of 'non-vulnerable' people, and possibly making them even more marginalised in this process". This toxic stress is a symptom of an economy with toxicity, or perhaps just exploitation, at its core. When the burden of that structural inequity is reduced to the capacities

of individuals, whānau and communities, toxic stress becomes part of the social innovation system, co-designed or not.

Conclusion

The case of TSI thus demonstrates the tension in the relationship between neoliberal urban capitalism and social innovation initiatives, suggesting that while the language and the intentions of a social innovation initiative can be radical, these transformational desires can serve to maintain and reproduce neoliberal regimes of practice. As such, while social innovation programmes can challenge neoliberal regimes of practice, the case of TSI provides a concrete illustration of how social innovation initiatives can also serve as a form of disruptive maintenance for post-industrial urban capitalism, promising change by enacting social interventions that preserve the existing order while legitimising and naturalising existing inequities by placing the cause and burden on individuals and communities rather than economic systems.

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The Climate Change Policies of the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand: An Eco-Socialist Analysis and Critical Evaluation

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Abstract

Accelerating climate change and the ineffectiveness of governmental policy responses have led many to hope that green parties will promote more effective policy measures. This article focuses on the Green Party of Aotearoa (GPA) which has maintained continuous parliamentary representation since 1996, receiving from 5.2 to 11% of the vote in national elections from 1999 to 2020. It has been a support partner in Labour-led governments following the 2017 and 2020 elections. Providing an account of how the GPA's climate change policies have developed and shifted since the foundation of the party in 1990, this article seeks to answer the following question: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the intellectual outlook and climate change policies of the GPA with respect to likely effectiveness in reducing carbon emissions and combatting climate change? The critical analysis required to answer this question operates on two levels: with respect to critical policy analysis, the focus is on the scale, scope, sequencing and pace of change; while at a more fundamental level, the article explores the extent to which the GPA's intellectual outlook and policy programme constitute an adequate response to the problems generated by neoliberalism, capitalism, class and the disproportionate influence of business over government. It concludes that although the GPA's climate change policies are better than those of the other parliamentary parties, these policies are problematic at both levels.

Keywords: Green Party; climate change; emissions trading; electric vehicles; neoliberalism; capitalism; eco-socialism.

Introduction

In response to the climate crisis, the world's rulers and policy elites have taken some measures, mostly market-based and largely ineffective, to counter rising global carbon emissions. Their rhetoric, taken at face value, promises much while the policy solutions they can agree upon deliver little. Little wonder that Greta Thunberg (2021) was so critical of the performance of the world's leaders at the COP26 Climate Summit in Glasgow in 2021: "Build back better. Blah, blah, blah. Green economy. Blah blah blah. Net zero by 2050. Blah, blah, blah. … This is all we hear from our so-called leaders. Words that sound great but so far have not led to action. Our hopes and ambitions drown in their empty promises." She eloquently sums up the key problem: "Thirty years of blah, blah, blah and where has that led us? We can still turn this around – it is entirely possible. It will take immediate, drastic annual emission reductions. But not if things go on like today. Our leaders' intentional lack of action is a betrayal toward all present and future generations" (Thunberg, 2021).This view is consistent with the assessment of the AR6 Working Group II (2022, p. 14): "The magnitude and rate of climate change and associated risks depend strongly on near-term mitigation and adaptation actions, and projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages escalate with every

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increment of global warming (*very high confidence*).'[1] These observations highlight the importance of focusing on scale, scope, sequencing and pace when critically analysing climate change policy-making.

Increasing public concern about the obvious ineffectiveness of official international and national governmental policy responses to climate change has led many to hope that green parties can introduce more effective policy measures to halt and reverse rising carbon emissions, especially in those countries where these parties are represented in national assemblies. The Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand (GPA) is interesting in this regard because it operates in a comparatively favourable context due to New Zealand's mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system, long-standing environmentalist and anti-war movements which have been sustained by high levels of popular support, and a union movement that has supported it along with the social democratic Labour Party. This article focuses on the intellectual outlook, political strategy and stated policy programme of the GPA. The central question it addresses is: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the intellectual outlook and climate change policies of the GPA with respect to likely effectiveness in reducing carbon emissions and combatting climate change? Accurately answering this question requires an account of how the GPA's climate change policies have developed and shifted since the foundation of the party in 1990.

The article is structured as follows. First, a condensed overview of the GPA's overall political programme is provided, in Section 1. An analysis of the GPA's climate change policies since 1999 follows in Section 2. The GPA's intellectual outlook and climate change policies are then critically analysed in Section 3, with a focus on neoliberalism and the ineffectiveness of market-based policy instruments (MBIs), capitalism, class and the disproportionate influence of business over government. This critical discussion acknowledges that "Māori have an intricate, holistic and interconnected relationship with the natural world and its resources, with a rich knowledge base – mātauranga Māori – developed over thousands of years and dating back to life in Polynesia and trans-Pacific migrations" (Harmsworth & Awatere, 2013, p. 274). The article concludes by underlining the positive contributions that the GPA has made to struggles for social and climate justice, while highlighting the need for more radical and effective policy formulation and action to prevent cumulative greenhouse gas concentrations reaching levels that will have catastrophic impacts on human societies and the Earth's natural systems.[2]

The Green's policy programme: Greening Third Way social democracy?

The central thrust of the GPA's policy programme is clear from the three main slogans of its 2014 election campaign: "For a Cleaner Environment; For a Fairer Society; For a Smarter Economy." The party retained these slogans for its 2017 election campaign, while the slogan for the 2020 election was simply: "Think Ahead. Act Now." An extensive review of the GPA's formal policies in areas such as economic policy, taxation, welfare, employment relations, education, housing and te Tiriti o Waitangi leads to the conclusion that the GPA's political programme is consistently and substantially left of Labour (this is discussed in more depth in Supplementary Note 5) – although how far left is open to interpretation and debate. For the period from 1990 to 2017, my assessment is that although some of the GPA's economic and social policies are broadly consistent with traditional social democratic Keynesianism, its overall policy programme is best categorised as a left and environmentally focused variant of Third Way social democracy, with which it is kindred both intellectually and politically (see Green Party, 2014a). Advocates of the Third Way consider

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[1] This article is supported by supplementary notes which are used to keep the article within the required word limit while simultaneously providing greater depth of analysis. For a descriptive overview of the ecological crisis see Supplementary Note 1. This and the other notes are available at https://briansroper.blogspot.com/2023/02/the-climate-change-policies-of-green.html

[2] For a brief discussion of the reformist orientation of Green politics, see Supplementary Note 2. A brief description of New Zealand society, history and politics is provided for readers who are unfamiliar with New Zealand in Supplementary Note 3. A historical and sociological overview of green politics in New Zealand is provided in Supplementary Note 4.

that it charts a path beyond the First Way (social democratic Keynesianism) and the Second Way (neoliberalism). They consider it to be "the renewal of social democracy in contemporary conditions" (Giddens, 2001, p. 2). In reality, Third Way social democracy as an approach to policymaking retains the central features of the neoliberal policy regime but ameliorates some of its hasher features, which helps to further entrench and legitimate neoliberalism (Callinicos, 2001, pp. 1–14; Kelsey, 2002; Roper, 2005, ch. 10). The foundations and central pillars of the dominant neoliberal policy regime, such as the prioritisation of maintaining low inflation, fiscal surpluses and reducing government debt, are not explicitly or directly challenged but largely taken for granted as constituting the terrain of the GPA's politics and policymaking.

Interestingly, the GPA's policies released prior to the 2020 election were further to the left than those released earlier in the party's history, perhaps best exemplified by its statements on economic, taxation, welfare, education and employment relations policy (see Supplementary Note 5). Policy highlights (Green Party, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c) include: making income under $10,000 tax-free; introducing a comprehensive capital gains tax and new wealth tax of 1% on individual wealth over $1 million; raising the top marginal income tax rate to 42% for income over $150,000; introducing a guaranteed minimum income; substantial increases to benefit rates; making tertiary education fees-free and re-establishing a universal student living allowance; and supporting "the right of working people and their unions to campaign for political, environmental, social and work-related industrial issues, including the right to strike in support of these" (Green Party, 2020c, p. 4). This has involved a move towards a more traditional left social democratic Keynesian programme. Consequently, it could be argued that the party has broken with Third Way social democracy. Whether or not this is the case will become apparent in the years to come.

Green Party climate change and related policies

This section begins by considering the GPA's shifting orientation towards the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS), then broadens the focus to describe the party's other climate policies and overall climate change policy framework. It proceeds on the understanding that Aotearoa New Zealand has a unique profile with respect to greenhouse gas emissions (see Supplementary Note 6). Since entering parliament as an independent party in 1996, the GPA has advocated a comprehensive eco-tax on carbon emissions as its primary market-based policy mechanism for reducing emissions, in preference to emissions trading. But thus far, the GPA has had little success. The Fourth National Government signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in 1992. Subsequently, in 1997, the Government established a modest target under the Kyoto Protocol (which operationalises the UNFCCC) to reduce emissions to 1990 levels on average between 2008 and 2012. The same Government considered a carbon tax from 1993–1994 but then adopted an approach centred around voluntary agreements between government and industry from 1995 to 1999. In 2002, the Fifth Labour Government passed the Climate Change Response Act which established an institutional and legal framework for New Zealand to ratify and meet its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. It announced a climate change policy package that included "a carbon tax on energy, industrial and transport emissions, capped at $25 per tonne" (Bertram & Terry, 2010, p. 34). New Zealand's most powerful business lobby groups mounted vigorous and effective opposition to the proposed carbon tax (Bertram & Terry, 2010, pp. 48–50). The Fifth Labour Government dropped this policy in 2007 and instead carbon trading became the preferred policy option. Accordingly, it passed legislation establishing the NZ ETS in 2008.

In essence, carbon trading privatises and commodifies greenhouse gas emissions, with the typical unit in such schemes entitling a liable polluter to emit one tonne of emissions. To make this work, the government supplies units and establishes a market where participants can buy units via auction, including previously supplied units being sold by private traders as well as new units being issued by the government.

Obligated parties to the scheme must surrender units to the government equivalent to the quantity of emissions during a specified reporting period. According to neoclassical microeconomic theory, upon which all these schemes are based, this places a price on emissions and sends "price signals to producers, consumers and investors to encourage and enable them to reduce the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions contributing to climate change" (Leining, 2022, p. 1). It does this by "raising the relative cost of higher-emissions goods and services" (Leining, 2022, p. 2).

Acting in accord with the wishes of business lobby groups, the Fifth National Government amended the legislation in 2009, 2012 and 2014. The overall effect of these amendments was to systematically weaken the NZ ETS, among other things deferring the entry of the agricultural sector indefinitely (Blakeley, 2016; Boston, 2015, pp. 488–490). In short, the Fifth National Government amended the NZ ETS legislation to make the scheme utterly ineffective, while stopping short of eliminating the legislation altogether so that it could claim to be doing something about climate change.

As Bertram and Terry (2010, p. 16) point out in an early critical assessment of the NZ ETS, as originally enacted in 2008, the scheme didn't impose a cap and "without such a binding constraint, talk of using 'the market mechanism' to decarbonize the economy is basically empty rhetoric". Furthermore, "New Zealand's carbon emissions from fuel use, industrial processes and pastoral agriculture will be virtually unchanged from what they would have been anyway" (Bertram & Terry, 2010, p. 17). If the scheme was implemented, big polluters would pay proportionately less than small polluters, and households would "pay roughly half the total charges resulting from the ETS, while being responsible for less than 20% of all emissions" (Bertram & Terry, 2010, p. 17). They conclude that the NZ ETS is neither effective nor fair and "therefore will not command legitimacy with the public in the longer run" (Bertram & Terry, 2010, p. 18).

In view of the obvious flaws with the NZ ETS , it is surprising that the GPA took so long to reject it as a viable policy response to rising carbon emissions. Between 2008 to 2011, the party became increasingly critical of the NZ ETS . The GPA's 2011 document *Climate Change Policy* states that "the National-led Government has turned the [ETS] into a massive subsidy scheme that incentivises big polluters instead of making polluters pay" (Green Party, 2011, p. 2). The GPA's position was that: "Our strong first preference is for a carbon charge, recycled into income tax reduction for all taxpayers, and into funding carbon abatement. However, there is currently little chance of this happening in New Zealand, so we will work to improve the [NZ ETS] put forward by successive governments" (Green Party, 2011, p. 8). From 2011 to 2014, the GPA shifted towards rejecting the NZ ETS. In its pre-election document *Climate Change Policy,* the GPA describes the scheme as "ineffective" and needing to be replaced by "an effective levy that provides a greater degree of certainty over the price on emissions, improved transparency, and far greater effectiveness in providing incentives for reduction of emissions" (Green Party, 2014a, p. 5). By the following year, the GPA was putting the point more bluntly: "To make a real difference to our greenhouse emissions, the Government can scrap the ineffective ETS and implement a revenue neutral carbon tax" (Green Party, 2015, p. 10).

Labour leader Jacinda Ardern, in her speech launching Labour's campaign for the 2017 election, called climate change "my generation's nuclear-free moment" (Ardern, 2017). As is clear from Labour's campaign documents and speeches for the 2017 and 2020 elections, as well as from the Government's climate change policymaking, Labour's climate change policies are clearly framed to be operative within the context of the prevailing neoliberal policy regime and so give priority to MBIs over direct state intervention and investment. The NZ ETS had never been effective, yet in 2017 Labour claimed that "the architecture of the ETS is still intact and it can be readily restored to being fully effective." If 'restored', the ETS could "put a price on carbon that drives behaviour change away from carbon-polluting goods and services towards low or zero-carbon options" (New Zealand Labour Party, 2017, p. 5). Accordingly, the Sixth Labour Government made the NZ ETS its main policy instrument to counter rising carbon emissions. No

mention was made of the fact that, in the absence of a more adequate public transportation system, the demand for "transport fuel tends to fall into the 'necessity' category for many people, and therefore displays a notoriously low elasticity of demand. This implies that if a policymaker wishes to limit transport fuel demand with price-based mechanisms, such as fuel taxes, the price increases will have to be quite large to have a significant impact on demand" (Samuelson, 2008, p. 70).

Green Co-leader James Shaw was appointed Minister for Climate Change and tasked with comprehensively 'restoring' the NZ ETS to make it 'fully effective'. After extensive policy development work led by the Ministry for the Environment (MfE), including a public submission process, the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading Reform) Amendment Act (ETRA) was passed in June 2020 to amend the 2002 Climate Change Response Act. This amendment was designed to make the NZ ETS more effective in key respects. It "enacted substantial changes to unit supply, price management, industrial free allocation, forestry accounting, pricing of biogenic emissions from agriculture and coordination of future decisions on key settings" (Leining, 2022, p. 4). More specifically, it announced limits on unit supply to set a cap on total emissions by participants in accord with five-yearly emissions budgets, started quarterly auctions of New Zealand Units (NZUs), set minimum and maximum prices for NZUs, stopped the fixed price option whereby NZUs could be purchased for $25–$35 per tonne for immediate surrender, set phased reductions in free industrial allocations for emissions-intensive trade-exposed sectors, and tightened the rules governing the role played by forestry within the ETS. "As of February 2022, the system applies unit obligations to about 52% of Aotearoa's gross emissions" (Leining, 2022, p. 4).

So far agriculture has been exempted from unit obligations. However, the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading Reform) Amendment Act 202 "provided for the pricing of biogenic emissions to begin under the NZ ETS no later than 1 January 2025" (Leining, 2022, p. 11). In the interim, the Government formed He Waka Eke Noa – Primary Sector Climate Action Partnership, giving agri-business lobby groups an opportunity to development an alternative pricing scheme for agricultural emissions that would operate alongside the NZ ETS . The aim was "to design a practical and cost-effective system for reducing emissions at the farm level by 2025" (He Waka Eke Noa, 2020, p. 1). The inclusion of agriculture in the NZ ETS is thus a fall-back position in which case agricultural emissions are included from 2025 with an initial free allocation of 95% and a 1% annual reduction of the free allocation thereafter.

As I will argue in more detail below, there are many problems with emissions trading schemes and little convincing evidence that they are effective in reducing carbon emissions. For example, there is mounting evidence that the world's most developed emissions trading scheme, the European Union ETS, is not working effectively to reduce emissions (Vlachou & Pantelias, 2017a, 2017b). This is widely recognised within the GPA and, as noted above, the GPA is critical of Labour's promotion of the NZ ETS as the best possible policy instrument to curtail rising emissions. James Shaw cannot voice this criticism as the Minister for Climate Change, however, because he is bound by the rules of the Cabinet Manual and the Confidence and Supply Agreement between the governing Labour Party and the GPA, which states: "The Green Party agrees that any Green Party Minister … is bound by collective responsibility in relation to their respective portfolios. When Ministers speak about issues within their portfolio responsibilities, they will speak for the Government, representing the Government's position in relation to those responsibilities" (New Zealand Labour Party and Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, 2017 p. 5). In short, this commits Shaw to implementing Labour's policy of restoring the NZ ETS .

Labour's commitment to using the NZ ETS as the primary policy mechanism for reducing emissions has generated tensions within the GPA. The GPA's cooperation agreement with Labour following the 2020 election has been controversial; with many party members arguing that the party should have formed a left-wing opposition to the Labour Government. As Godfrey (2022) observes, this agreement has worked well in some areas, but "in the policy area that cuts right to the Greens' identity –

climate change – it is a disaster with the Minister of Climate Change, James Shaw, defending and enacting the government's line. Not the Green party's line. This means balancing regressive farming interests with progressive environmental interests." Megan Brady-Clark, who left the party in protest, argues that "by ostensibly handing over responsibility without the resourcing commitment or power behind the ministerial portfolios and areas of co-operation Labour has managed to silence the Greens on some issues where the Greens should be most clearly and loudly critical of the government" (Hall, 2022). The former party co-leader, Russel Norman, is highly critical of Shaw's performance as Minister for Climate Change. He considers that:

> …the nationally-determined contribution to reduce carbon emissions Shaw took to the COP 26 climate conference in Glasgow in October [is] "a farce".
> "It's just a sham. Almost all of it is being met by these offshore carbon credits, so it's obviously farcical. You can't say you're serious about climate change and then pay other people somewhere else in the world to cut emissions…
> "Agri-business is by far the biggest polluter of climate in New Zealand and the government has completely shied away from confronting agri-business about its emissions, or [driving] any change there. So, until the government is willing to tackle agri-business, they don't have a credible climate change policy. …
> "The issue for the Greens in the government is that they have no power. Labour didn't need them. The Greens aren't in Cabinet. So that makes it pretty difficult to achieve any kind of policy goals, in terms of climate and biodiversity." (Hall, 2022)

As Hall (2022) observes, former GPA MP Catherine Delahunty:

> …echoes these sentiments, saying Shaw's climate position is 'just not leadership'.
> "It's so weak. You'd expect that from Labour. But this is the Green Party," she said.
> "His position around agriculture is terrible ... and buying overseas offsets – that's not changing anything. It's incredibly disappointing. I think they've become, whether it's conscious or unconscious, risk-averse. That happened last term and that's continuing." (Hall, 2022)

The remainder of this section focuses on the GPA's other climate policies from 2014 to 2017, followed by an outline of the GPA's climate change policies while being a support partner in the Sixth Labour Government. The GPA's most recent climate policy framework is uncompromised by its earlier commitment to the NZ ETS and consequently is more coherent and convincing than that outlined in 2011. In 2015, the GPA's key target was to reduce emissions by 40% of 1990 levels by 2030, encompassing a 35% cut in gross emissions with new forestry planting sequestering the remainder, and to achieve a 100% reduction of net emissions by 2050 (Green Party, 2015, p. 4). This is more ambitious than the national targets for New Zealand's contribution under the Paris Agreement which are an 11% reduction in net emissions by 2030 and a 50% reduction by 2050 (Ministry for the Environment, 2017, pp. 17–20). Three "economy-wide measures" were proposed to form the core of the policy framework required to achieve these targets: a "Climate Change Commission to assess the government's progress on meeting targets", an eco-tax on greenhouse gas emissions, and a Green Investment Bank (Green Party, 2015, p. 4). The Climate Change Commission would, among other things, set "the ongoing price of carbon" and recommend "complementary measures for greenhouse gas emissions reduction in order to meet our targets" (Green Party, 2015, p. 4). The carbon tax would be "revenue neutral" with the revenue raised being recycled "back to households and businesses in the form of tax credits" (Green Party, 2015, p. 10). This is also considered necessary to offset the potentially negative financial impact of the tax on low- and middle-income households. The Green Investment Bank would operate on a "government owned, for-profit basis" and

"would partner with the private sector to fund new projects [such as] new renewable energy plants, solar panel installations, energy efficiency retrofits, the development and production of significant volumes of biofuels, and clean technology projects – all helping to reduce greenhouse gas emissions" (Green Party, 2015, p. 12).

These headline policies would be supported by a wide range of policies in related areas including agriculture, industry, forestry, electricity generation, transportation and waste management. It is claimed that market-based eco-taxes will be combined with extensive state intervention in these areas.

> Regulation, direct government investment, public education and a comprehensive set of sectoral policies will deliver reduced emissions, with a price on emissions acting as an incentive. Direct investment by government (such as reforestation on state land or public transport), regulation, support for research and development and public education are often more direct and powerful ways to reduce emissions than relying on price mechanisms alone. (Green Party, 2014b, p. 4)

The raft of proposed sectoral policies includes: phasing out electricity generation that uses natural gas; installing solar panels in state schools and subsidising household solar panel installation; substantially increasing government investment in public transportation, rail freight and coastal shipping; discouraging thermal coal use in manufacturing; using regulation, improved recycling, and public investment in the capture of methane and establishment of bio-digesters at landfill sites to reduce waste emissions; phasing in the carbon tax for agriculture over a five-year transition period and encouraging a shift in pastoral production toward lower-intensity organic farming with lower livestock levels; and providing various government subsidies and tax incentives to encourage tree planting in order to more than offset the large-scale harvesting of forests scheduled between 2017 and 2030.

The GPA released a new climate change policy framework just prior to the 2017 election: *Climate Protection Plan – For a Better Future* (Green Party, 2017). Central to the plan is a Zero Carbon Act requiring "all future governments to reduce emissions to net-zero by 2050", the establishment of a Climate Change Commission for the purpose outlined above, replacing the NZ ETS with a Kiwi Climate Fund generated by the introduction of eco-taxes on emissions, substantially increasing funding for afforestation, light rail, and the development of environmentally sustainable agricultural practices.

A brief description of the Sixth Labour Government's climate change policies highlights some policy wins for the GPA, but also flags areas where the GPA has had limited influence. Influenced by the UK's Climate Change Act 2008, the Government passed the Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act in 2019 (see Supplementary Note 7 on the UK Act). The Paris Agreement requires signatory countries to establish successive national climate action plans known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and submit them to the UNFCCC secretariat. The Act sets the NDC target to reduce net accounting emissions of all greenhouse gases (except biogenic methane) to zero by 2050. Emissions of biogenic methane are to be reduced to 24–47% below 2017 levels by 2050, including to 10% below 2017 levels by 2030. The Government established the Climate Change Commission to monitor and report on "the Government's progress towards meeting the 2050 target, and on progress against emissions budgets and reduction plans" (Climate Change Commission, 2022a). The Commission provides what are, in effect, emission budget briefings for the government to consider and implement. This is necessary because the Act requires the government to develop five-year emission budgets and reduction plans (Climate Change Commission, 2022b, pp. 46–50).

The Government's other climate changes policies include imposing charges ('Clean Car' fees) on petrol-powered vehicles to provide Clean Car rebates to purchasers of electric vehicles (EVs), declaring a climate emergency in December 2020, implementing a One Billion Trees planting programme for the

decade from 2018 to 2028, banning new offshore oil and gas exploration, aiming to achieve a carbon-neutral public sector by 2025, upgrading railway infrastructure, increasing public investment in cycleways and walkways, improving recycling programmes and waste management, and establishing a Green Investment Finance Fund. In the 2022 Budget, the Government announced a $2.9 billion climate change package of measures for the period of the first emissions reduction plan from 2022 to 2025. This spending is to come from the Climate Emergency Response Fund (CERF) established in 2021 as the repository for funds generated by the sale of NZ ETS emissions units. Labour Party supporters point to this as proof that the NZ ETS is fit for purpose.

There are, however, several problems with this means of funding climate change policies and measures. First, the NZ ETS is both a politically insecure and socio-economically regressive form of revenue collection. A future National Government is likely to reduce the costs for business of the ETS, diminishing the revenue it generates. As the NZ ETS requires businesses and local government to purchase units, these extra costs are likely to be passed on to households through increased prices, waste charges and so forth. In effect, it will function like a consumption tax in terms of its regressive impacts on socio-economic inequality, with low- and middle-income households paying more of the costs of the NZ ETS relative to income than high-income earners (MfE, 2019, pp.65–67). The Government's first emissions reduction plan pays lip service to developing an Equitable Transition Strategy while, in reality, ensuring that the Government's transition strategy is inequitable because, among other things, it lacks progressive adjustment according to income of eco-fees, charges and rebates (MfE, 2022, p. 67).

Secondly, the spending is spread out over four years with the annual funding levels being inadequate given the need to front-load measures to reduce emissions. For example, CERF initiatives for 2023/24 total $783.03 million and for 2024/25 total $734.72 million (The Treasury, 2022a, pp. 157–163; The Treasury, 2022b). Total core crown expenditure is forecast to be $131.1 billion in 2024 and $134.1 million in 2025 (The Treasury, 2022b, Table 2.1, p. 22). Hence government spending on CERF initiatives amounts to 0.55–0.60% of total government spending in these years. It is worth noting that this Government has struggled to ensure that promised funding for new initiatives (such as mental health and housing) is subsequently spent due to implementation problems, so some of this funding may remain unspent, especially if there is a change of government.

Third, for the first emissions budget period (2022 to 2025), the bulk of new government expenditure is on the decarbonisation of process heat in manufacturing ($653 million), a scrap-and-replace trial scheme aimed at helping 2500 low-income households to access EVs ($569 million), active and public transport ($375 million), "development and uptake of high impact agricultural mitigation technologies" ($339), native afforestation ($145 million), increasing carbon sequestration ($111 million), and reducing waste emissions ($103 million) (The Treasury, 2022a, pp. 37–40). In view of the urgent need to rapidly expand electric-powered public transport networks in New Zealand's major cities, especially light rail, trams, ferries and buses, the $375 million allocated for the first plan period is a small fraction of what is required. Much the same can be said of investment in other areas.

Fourth, environmentalist critics are also concerned about the large amount directed to EVs relative to active and public transport, e-bikes, eco-housing, native afforestation and public investment in renewable energy generation. The so-called Clean Car fees are substantial and can add up to $2875 to the cost of an imported used vehicle. Since low-income and lower-middle-income earners are unlikely to be able to afford an EV, this funding model is regressive. If one adopts an intersectional perspective, in effect members of the blue-collar working class and/or Māori and/or Pasifika are subsidising the purchase of EVs by relatively affluent Pākehā and tauiwi. The details of the scrap-and-replace trial scheme were not available at the time of writing, but it is possible that the application process may be off-putting for blue-collar working-class applicants. Conspicuous by its absence in the Government's first emissions reduction plan and *Budget 2022*

is recognition of the fact that the lifetime carbon footprint of an EV is somewhere from 50–60% of an equivalent petrol-fuelled vehicle when factoring in manufacturing and disposal (Smith, 2019, pp. 156–160). Manufacturing of EVs relies heavily on the production of plastics and other petroleum-based synthetic materials which is "rapidly becoming the largest factor in the growth of demand for oil" (Hanieh, 2021, p. 50). In addition to this, converting the national light vehicle fleet to EVs will maintain a transportation system based on cars, trucks and buses, and so require continuing carbon-intensive road networks and discourage use of public transportation. As Smith (2019, p. 159) observes, "If the bulk of CO_2 emissions from cars are produced before the car leaves the show-room then, obviously, *the best way to suppress vehicle emissions is to produce as few cars as we need and make them last as long as possible* [italics in the original]." Furthermore, "the entire auto industry – electric or gas-powered – is completely unsustainable. We don't need an auto industry that produces tens of millions of cars a year. The solution to minimizing pollution is to redesign the entire transportation system on the basis of rational social needs, not individual vehicles, not individual corporate profit, to minimize resource consumption instead of maximizing it" (Smith, 2019, p. 160).

At first glance, it appears that the Government has formulated and implemented a comprehensive policy framework to counter rising emissions, including policies that the GPA can claim credit for. Although there is no space here for a comprehensive critical evaluation of the Government's policies, it is worth noting that in September 2021, the Climate Action Tracker (2021, p. 1), which is maintained by reputable climate science and policy institutes, rated New Zealand's climate change policies and action as highly insufficient: "…when compared to modelled domestic pathways. The 'highly insufficient' rating indicates that New Zealand's policies and action in 2030 are not at all consistent with the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C temperature limit. If all countries were to follow New Zealand's approach, warming could reach over 3°C and up to 4°C."

Somewhat ironically, and in contrast to its social justice policies, the GPA has struggled to develop a high-profile climate change policy framework that is substantially to the left of Labour's. In part this is because Labour has adopted some of the GPA's climate change policies, especially the Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Act and the establishment of the Climate Change Commission, but also because the GPA supports Government policy on EVs and has chosen to work with, rather than comprehensively oppose, the NZ ETS . For example, in its *Climate Change Policy* document released for the 2020 election, the GPA urges the Government to "improve the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to ensure this drives a reduction in emissions, while urgently working towards the replacement of the ETS with an effective emissions levy" (Green Party, 2020d, p. 7). Since there is no criticism of the NZ ETS in this document, it is entirely unclear why the Government should be urgently working towards replacing it with a comprehensive emissions levy. The document does, however, call for "a clear strategy, action plan and carbon budget for a rapid transition to a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions economy, in line with keeping the average global temperature rise below 1.5 degrees Celsius" (Green Party, 2020d, p. 3).

An accurate depiction of the GPA's overall climate change policy framework requires an extensive reading of its policies in related areas such as agriculture, conservation, energy, environmental protection, forestry, housing, mining and transport (see Supplementary Note 8 for elaboration). As can be expected, the GPA advocates changes in these areas that are more radical than Labour's. The main political problem for the GPA is that these extensive and detailed policies have not been translated into a comprehensive and convincing critique of the Sixth Labour Government's performance with respect to environmental and climate policymaking.

Problems with the Green's climate change policy framework: Neoliberalism, capitalism, class, and the state

Although a detailed examination of the current Labour-led Government's climate change policies is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to acknowledge the positive achievements of the Greens during the terms of this Government while also highlighting some potential drawbacks.

Greening neoliberalism?

None of the GPA's official policy statements on economic management, taxation, health, housing, education, welfare, industrial relations and climate change explicitly mention neoliberalism or the scholarly and activist critique of neoliberalism. Openly contesting neoliberalism is not considered politically feasible, even though most party members and some MPs are privately critical of it. Consequently, the party's policy documents generally adopt the technocratic tone of a government department or policy ministry and fail to provide a clear and systematic critique of neoliberalism. James Shaw, in his speech delivered to the Green Party AGM immediately following his election as co-leader in 2015, denies that New Zealand's prevailing policy regime can be depicted as neoliberal despite the substantial body of literature that describes and critically analyses the rapid and comprehensive implementation of neoliberalism from 1984 to 1999, and the retention of the central features of this policy regime by the Fifth Labour Government from 1999 to 2008 (Boston, 1999; Kelsey, 1997, 2015; O'Brien, 2008; Perry, 2019; Rashbrooke, 2013; Roper, 2005). As this literature shows, the neoliberal policy regime has, among other things, dramatically increased socio-economic inequality; entrenched mass unemployment; engineered an historic decline in union membership, organisational strength and bargaining power; and substantially increased poverty. Neoliberalism also involves the "co-construction of markets and nature" in which "neoliberal perspectives only allow us to connect nature and economy in one way, as a question of price determined by market competition. … Nature is positioned as something out there we have the right to take and use as we see fit, as long as we are willing to pay for it" (Birch, 2019, p. 25, 19).

Shaw's failure to provide an overt and effective critique of the neoliberal policy regime has been widely criticised both within the party and by the wider left outside of it. Although Shaw's GPA co-leaders, Metiria Turei (2009–2017) and Marama Davidson (2017–), have been persuasively critical of the negative effects of the neoliberal policy regime, neither have been explicitly critical of neoliberalism (see Supplementary Note 9). With respect to party policymaking, it means that neoliberalism defines the terrain and the parameters of policy development and advocacy. As with Third Way social democracy, even though the GPA advocates many policies that could be broadly categorised as in some sense Keynesian, it has come to accept the central pillars of the prevailing neoliberal policy regime, as demonstrated most clearly by its 2017 co-release with Labour of what are in essence neoliberal *Budget Responsibility Rules* (Dann, 2017).

The GPA's failure to provide an explicit systematic critique of neoliberalism has had the effect of ideologically legitimating and entrenching neoliberalism. Although New Zealand governments since 1984 have occasionally used explicitly neoliberal concepts in their political discourse, this discourse is generally not overtly neoliberal and legitimates the status quo by making the neoliberal character of the prevailing policy regime invisible in mainstream political discourse. Consequently, the Greens' failure to explicitly criticise neoliberalism makes it harder for others on the left to argue for alternatives to neoliberalism, because it contributes to, rather than challenges, the entrenchment of the neoliberal policy regime as the taken-for-granted and only partially publicly visible intellectual, institutional, regulatory and legislative framework for economic management, policymaking, political discourse, parliamentary debate, media reporting and commentary.

The absence of an intellectually robust critique of neoliberalism also weakens specific policies, such as those pertaining to taxation and climate change. (For more detail on the GPA's taxation policies, see Supplementary Note 10). The climate change policies of the GPA, when viewed as a whole, constitute an incoherent combination of neoliberal and Keynesian policy measures. The acceptance of and preparedness

to work with the NZ ETS in the wake of the Fifth Labour Government's abandonment of its initial plan to introduce a carbon tax in 2006, highlights the problems with a kind of 'political realism' that assumes narrow limits on the possible and fails accurately to identify the weaknesses of neoliberal market-based policy responses. As noted above, the party now rejects the ineffective and inequitable NZ ETS and instead advocates eco-taxes. But it remains committed to market-based policy instruments because "pricing mechanisms will seek to ensure that polluting sectors will, within a short time, pay for the environmental and societal costs of their emissions, with no free riders" (Green Party, 2017, p. 1).

Although the kind of eco-taxes being proposed may be more effective in reducing emissions than carbon trading, there are likely to be numerous problems that arise in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and management of them, for reasons outlined in the relevant literature (see, for example, Birch, 2019, pp. 23–26; Bowen & Rydge, 2011, pp. 72–76; Carter, 2007, pp. 332–341). As Carter (2007, p. 336) convincingly argues, these problems include: business lobbying making it difficult to set a carbon tax "sufficiently high to offer a real incentive to firms to reduce pollution and hence to maximise the potential efficiency of the tax"; the regulator needing to gather "detailed technical information, which may be only obtainable from the polluter or technically very difficult to assess"; and finally, market solutions require policing since "it is unlikely that all polluters will be honest citizens", and this can prove difficult and costly. Citing a UK study on the impacts of eco-taxes on energy, water, waste management and transport costs, Giddens (2009, p. 153) observed that "if nothing else changed in these areas, environmental taxes would have a significant adverse impact upon poorer households." Noting that "fuel poverty in Britain reflects the peculiarly inadequate thermal characteristics of the country's housing stock", strikingly similar to the situation that prevails in New Zealand, new carbon taxes may lead to even greater fuel poverty (Giddens, 2009, p. 153). Such an effect would be larger in New Zealand than Britain due to several decades of under-investment in railways, trams, ferries and coastal shipping, which has resulted in a patchy and poor public transportation network. Taxes on petrol are already comparatively high by international standards, and the high cost of fuel is a major source of hardship for low-income households, especially those with children. For these and other reasons, there may be strong political opposition to the introduction of carbon taxes, not only by business lobby groups but also by those on low and middle incomes concerned about the impact of such taxes on their cost of living (Bertram & Terry, 2010, p. 17).

Above all, the GPA's preparedness to advocate market-based policy responses to rising carbon emissions, shifting from advocating eco-taxes to qualified support for carbon trading and then back to advocating eco-taxes, rests on a fundamental failure to recognise the extent to which neoliberalism is both a major policy driver of rising emissions and a deeply entrenched obstacle to an environmentally focused Keynesian policy programme. As Carter (2007, p. 339) observes, "Support for [MBIs] from the neo-liberal right is rather half-hearted and even disingenuous; their support for MBIs is driven primarily by a dislike of regulations rather than enthusiasm for improving environmental protection." Although eco-taxes of some form are still likely to be necessary, these should wherever possible target the profits, carbon assets and capital gains of major emitters, thereby providing powerful and direct incentives for these firms to invest in the development and introduction of new renewable energy sources, technologies and production systems to reduce their emissions. But the scale of government expenditure required for more effective measures to reduce carbon emissions is such that eco-taxes are unlikely to generate more than a relatively small percentage of the required revenue.

If the GPA unambiguously rejected neoliberalism, it could then advocate an environmentally focused Keynesian policy programme, funded by progressive taxation, involving, among other things: large-scale extensive state investment in wind, solar, tidal, wave and hydro renewable energy production; energy efficient and low-emitting public transportation systems; the development of a new eco-housing stock and the retrofitting of thermal insulation and solar panels; reforestation and afforestation; and new waste

management and recycling systems to reduce waste emissions. (There are good reasons to prioritise state intervention and investment over MBIs. For elaboration see Supplementary Note 11.) In contrast to neoliberalism, eco-socialists advocate a green Keynesian political and policy programme that would use progressive taxation to fund large-scale, comprehensive and rapid state investment in areas such as renewable energy generation, active and public transportation, eco-housing, native afforestation and habitat restoration. It would also require extensive state regulation, intervention and public environmental education.

The environmental destructiveness of capitalism

In a revealing interview in the *New Zealand Listener*, the Greens co-leader from 2006 to 2015, Russel Norman (2012), states: "Capitalism was 'humanised' between the 1930s and 1950s and the next challenge is to green it." Here and elsewhere, Norman makes it clear that he is not an anti-capitalist but a reformist. "I support a market economy with an important role for the state. I am not radically different from an old-style social democrat." In another interview, Norman states: "If you look at the Greens, or at least our policies, they are pro-market… My view, and the Green Party policy, is that markets are a really good solution to the big challenges we're facing in sustainability, so that's why we're very pro the use of market forces … You just need to get the prices right, get the incentives right" (Rutherford, 2014, p. 1). This reflects the reformist orientation of the GPA as a whole: "The Green Party envisions an Aotearoa New Zealand in which businesses are locally celebrated, nationally valued and internationally renowned for their economically successful, environmentally sustainable, and socially responsible practices" (Green Party, 2013, p. 1). As this shows, the assumption underpinning all of the Greens' policies is that "a renewed spirit of collaboration between the government, business and civil society" is both possible and desirable (Green Party, 2014a, p. 2).

The GPA's current co-leader, James Shaw, explicitly outlines his commitment to Green reformism rather than anti-capitalism:

> The reality of politics in the wake of the global financial crisis is that there is no longer a struggle between capitalism and socialism. What we have now is a hybrid model that takes some of the good but most of the bad elements of both systems. We have an economy where profits are privatised but the risks – and the social and environmental costs – of that profit are socialised. Paid for by the state. By the people. It's an economy based on rational irresponsibility. It encourages people and companies to extract as much short-term wealth as they can, from the environment or from their workers, regardless of the damage they cause, because they don't have to pay for it. Everyone else does. Now and for many generations. There's no name for this system that we now live under. It's not capitalism or neoliberalism. And it's not conservatism. (Shaw, 2015)

This line of thinking is obviously intellectually superficial and confused, displaying an astonishing ignorance of economic, social and political theory. Shaw also appears to be unfamiliar with the political economy and eco-socialist literature that provides compelling analyses of the underlying economic, socio-political and historical causes of rising carbon emissions and climate change (see, for example, Angus, 2016; Bellamy Foster, 2000, 2009; Bellamy Foster & Burkett, 2017; Bellamy Foster et al., 2010; Burkett, 1999, 2006; Lowy, 2015; Malm, 2016; Neale, 2008; Williams, 2010).

In response to these sorts of statements by GPA politicians, eco-socialists argue that it is vitally important to be crystal clear about why capitalism is highly destructive to the natural environment and environmentally unsustainable in the long-term. First, the history of capitalism from the sixteenth century to the present shows that it has an unprecedented drive and capacity for economic growth. Since the sixteenth century, capitalism has expanded from its origins in England and the Netherlands to encompass

the globe. Marx considers capitalism to be "an unstoppable, accelerating treadmill that constantly increases the scale of throughput of energy and raw materials as part of its quest for profit and accumulation, thereby pressing on the earth's absorptive capacity" (Bellamy Foster, 2009, p. 48). This is exemplified by unsustainable agricultural practices and techniques of industrial production that generate negative environmental effects such as greenhouse gas emissions, pollution of waterways, and the exhaustion and erosion of soils. Second, capitalism undermines "the human and natural conditions on which its economic advancement ultimately rests"; for example, by accelerating use of non-renewable resources such as coal and oil, and the increasing loss of biodiversity (Bellamy Foster, 2009, p. 48). Third, capitalism privatises the benefits of economic production through the appropriation of profits and the accumulation of wealth by the small minority that owns and/or controls the means of production, and the socialisation and externalisation of the environmental costs that are borne to varying degrees by everyone else. Fourth, this means "the logic of capital accumulation creates a rift in the metabolism between society and nature, severing basic processes of natural reproduction. This raises the issue of ecological sustainability – not simply in relation to the scale of the economy, but also, and even more importantly, in the form and intensity of the interaction between nature and society under capitalism" (Bellamy Foster, 2009, p. 49). Finally, fixed stocks of coal, oil and gas are vastly more profitable than free-flows of renewable energy. Profit-driven corporations will therefore favour investment in the former in preference to the latter, unless compelled to do so by government regulation.

For these reasons, together with those discussed below, eco-socialists consider that the project of 'greening capitalism' is likely to fail. They are sceptical as to whether governments will abandon neoliberalism and adopt green Keynesianism unless forced to do so by a global mass climate justice movement and/or after a tipping point obviously has been reached, by which time it may be too late to avoid catastrophic climate change inducing the collapse of advanced capitalist civilisation. From this perspective, capitalism needs to be replaced by an environmentally sustainable, democratic, egalitarian and libertarian socialist society that restores the sovereignty of Indigenous peoples (see, for example, Baer, 2020).

The key transformational agent enabling this would be a revolutionary eco-socialist movement informed and shaped by the knowledge and practices of Indigenous peoples, such as mātauranga Māori. As Mutu (2022, p. 40) points out, "Observations, experiences and knowledge accumulated over more than fifty generations embedded a deep, location-specific understanding of how to maintain the delicate balance between humans and our relations who are the other elements of the natural world." In particular, mātauranga Māori encompasses concepts of kaitiakitanga (guardianship of the natural environment), whakapapa (which "places Māori in an environmental context with all other flora and fauna and natural resources as part of a hierarchical genetic assemblage with identifiable and established bonds"), mana whenua ("having authority or control over the management of natural resources"), ki uta ki tai ("a whole-of-landscape approach, understanding and managing interconnected resources and ecosystems from the mountains to the sea", taonga tuku iho ("intergenerational protection of highly valued taonga, passed on from one generation to the next, in a caring and respectful manner"), te ao tūroa ("intergenerational concept of resource sustainability"), mauri ("an internal energy or life force derived from whakapapa, an essence or element sustaining all forms of life"), ritenga ("the area of customs, protocols and laws that regulate actions and behaviour related to the physical environment and people"), and wairua ("the spiritual dimension") (Harmsworth & Awatere, 2013, p. 274). These values, concepts, rules, practices and customs are continually systematically undermined by capitalism and so must form a foundational element of a collective journey beyond capitalism to flourish within an ecologically sustainable society.

Eco-socialists must be open to humbly and appreciatively learning from the knowledge and practices of Indigenous peoples, while respectfully arguing for the importance of understanding the central

role played by capitalism and capitalist classes in generating the major crises confronting humankind in the twenty-first century. An exemplar of the kind of intellectual work required is the brilliant argument for a "Māori Marx" by Barber (2019). Drawing on Marx's critical analysis of capitalist agriculture in nineteenth century England and a corpus of concepts drawn from te ao Māori, Barber (2019, p. 68) observes:

> The industrial rhythms of capitalist agriculture sever and supplant those of the metabolism of people living in intimate, umbilical connection with the earth. Whereas Papatūānuku [Earth Mother] is formerly the means of reproduction of life on the planet, once dominated by capital this function is devalued, and her ability to do so lessens as she is impoverished by increasingly frenetic exploitation. Capitalist agriculture produces a rift by demanding more from the earth than it is able to give.

Understanding whakapapa as "a field of interrelation and co-constitution [involving] a sociality between and amongst ourselves and the world", and as a powerful tool to explain new phenomena, Barber (2019, p. 69) argues that unsustainable capitalist exploitation of nature and people creates a reproductive sense in which "Papatūānuku, as dominated by capital, is proletarian" (see also Foster, 2019, p. 10). Harnessing the concepts outlined in the preceding paragraph, which are an expression of the "collective powers of the earth", "we might begin to fulfil our responsibilities to Papatūānuku and to each other by negating the ruinous exploitation of her (and us) by capital" (Barber, 2019, p. 70).

Intellectual complexities and challenges abound, especially because eco-socialists have much to learn from the knowledge, experience and values of Māori and other Indigenous peoples, but also need to push back against the anti-Marxist arguments and themes of post-structuralist and post-colonial authors (Callinicos, 1989). This influence has often led to a downplaying or disappearing of capitalism as a cause of environmental and social devastation, while enjoining neoliberalism's rejection of radical intellectual perspectives committed to overthrowing the capitalist status quo (see, for example, Smith, 2012; Chibber, 2013).

Class and the state: The limits of green reformism

An emphasis on the potential universalism of green politics is a major theme in the thinking and politics of the GPA that has been retained from the Values Party. The potentially catastrophic consequences of unlimited demographic and economic growth, accelerating non-renewable resource use, and environmental degradation threatens the well-being of humanity. GPA members think that this imbues the ecological ideas and policies of the Greens with universal appeal since everyone "regardless of colour, gender, class, nationality, religious belief, and so on" have a "common interest in uniting together with people of *all* classes and *all* political allegiances to counter this mutually shared threat" (Dobson, 2000, p. 21; see also, Dann, 1999, pp. 325–326). The problem is that with respect to strategic political thinking, this universalism is profoundly disabling – militating against analytically clear identification of potential allies and real enemies. For example, the Interim Climate Change Committee, appointed by Minister for Climate Change James Shaw in April 2018, was chaired by a corporate lobbyist and had no environmental NGO or union representation. Described by New Zealand's most influential non-agricultural business association, BusinessNZ, as "balanced", its composition reflects the absence of an accurate class analysis of the socio-political forces on either side of environmental conflict, and a lack of recognition of the disproportionate influence business generally exerts over government policymaking.

Related to this, the GPA doesn't fully appreciate the extent to which real reforms that would benefit workers, women, Māori, Pasifika, LGBTI people, the disabled, elderly and students are generally achieved through mass struggles, involving strikes, occupations, rallies and protests outside of the parliamentary process. This is because real power in capitalist society does not, for the most part, lie in

elected governmental assemblies; rather, it is heavily concentrated in the network of economic and political organisations of the capitalist class. Within the state apparatus itself, power is heavily concentrated in cabinet and its key advisory bodies – central banks, Treasuries and other similar financial ministries. Furthermore, capitalism generates massive inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth, which means that capitalists can generally, but not always, exert more influence over the formation of policy by governments than environmentalists, trade unions or progressive social movements can (Lindblom, 1977; Roper, 2005, pp. 88–90; Roper, 2006, pp. 165–167; Roper, 2013, pp. 236–239). The state in capitalist society is constrained by its financial dependence on revenue from the taxation of incomes generated in the process of capital accumulation. Because state power is dependent on capital accumulation, every government in a capitalist society must promote conditions conducive to the continuation of capital accumulation. These domestic constraints have been compounded by the growing internationalisation of the economic system. In short, the particular kind of state that exists in New Zealand, a specifically liberal democratic state, is inextricably linked and fundamentally committed to maintaining capitalism. Therefore, it is receptive to business lobbying and will not implement environmental reform that is fundamentally contrary to capitalist interests.

Finally, participation in the parliamentary system itself, together with the financial and material benefits that this provides, also shapes the intellectual and political development of the GPA and acts to distance the parliamentary leadership from active involvement in social movements, political protests and campaigns, and trade union struggles outside the parliamentary system. This is not, however, to deny the vitally important work of hundreds of GPA activists in numerous campaigns. There are sound reasons to argue, as I did prior to the 2017 general election, that those on the left should vote for the Greens (Roper, 2017). (For a fuller discussion of the points made in this section, see Supplementary Notes 12–13).

Conclusion

The GPA's overall climate change policy framework combines market-based policy responses, especially eco-taxes, with Keynesian policies involving a substantial shift in state investment, intervention and regulation to create the infrastructure necessary for a low-carbon-emitting economy. In a nutshell, it's an approach based on the assumption that 'It's all good'. In other words, that the climate emergency is so serious that anything is better than nothing, that blue-green neoliberal responses are to be supported alongside red-green state intervention. The main problem with this approach is that neoliberal responses, exemplified by the view that emissions trading plus EVs will do the lion's share of the work in reducing emissions, are fundamentally flawed and part of the problem. Such responses delay rather than facilitate the comprehensive green Keynesian approach to reducing emissions that is required to achieve rapid and large declines in emissions. Scale, scope, sequencing and pace of change are all crucially important. Furthermore, if there is to be a genuinely just transition to a low-emissions economy and society, then progressive taxation reform must precede, not follow, the introduction of eco-taxes such as petrol taxes, non-EV vehicle taxes and waste levies which are socio-economically regressive in their negative distributional impacts on low- and middle-income households.

with Green Party members – ngā mihi nui.

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For a longer thematically organised bibliography, see Supplementary Note 15.

Penal Populism, Prison and Performance Measures: Autoethnography of a New Zealand Corrections Officer

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Abstract
This autoethnography outlines contradictions in offender rehabilitation policies that were apparent to me while I was employed as a Corrections officer at a New Zealand prison. I ponder the social, political and cultural barriers to reducing the prison population by story-lining three intersecting topics: contemporary prisoner and officer relations, the goal of reducing reoffending, and the long shadow of (post-)colonialism. I provide analysis of these topics, drawing on both my positionality as a former officer, and my subsequent reflections as a social science academic. I conclude by noting that crime and punishment in New Zealand are salient political issues, and that advocates of progressive penal policies ought to be prepared for more authoritarian attitudes to criminal justice re-emerging in the political discourse.

Keywords: Corrections officer; performance measures; penal populism; reducing reoffending

Introduction

Topics of crime and punishment have featured regularly in recent election campaigns, in both Aotearoa New Zealand and overseas. A confluence of factors has led to the emergence of what is now widely described in academic literature as *penal populism*—a term used to convey the idea that politicians are tapping into a latent punitiveness that the public has towards the perpetrators of crime (see Pratt, 2007). Increasing sentence lengths, a rise in the number of imprisoned, and the likelihood of more austere prison conditions have all been attributed to penal populism (Pratt, 2007; Roberts et al., 2003).

One factor contributing to penal populism has been the spread of neoliberalism, a free-market reorientation of the state away from higher levels of intervention over the economy. An outcome of neoliberalism globally has been an increasingly privatised media landscape, which has resulted in a tendency for media outlets to focus on sensational, violent stories to draw in more viewers (Dobrynina, 2016; Pratt, 2007). It is during this period of economic upheaval that 'tough on crime' policies are thought to have appealed to public anxieties about the deteriorating well-being of individuals and their communities (Mora & Christianakis, 2013; Wacquant, 2009). The combination of penal populism with neoliberalism has also led to the emergence of *neo-correctionalism* (Cavadino & Dignan, 2007), where punishment is centred on the correcting of individual offender behaviours rather than addressing the structural issues that contribute to crime in the first place (see also Kramer et al., 2013).

Much like other anglophone countries, neoliberal reconfiguration led to significant structural changes of the New Zealand economy. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, successive governments in New Zealand loosened the regulatory environment, sold off state assets and withdrew from the areas of employment, housing and welfare, which in turn compromised supports for society's most vulnerable persons (Kelsey, 1995; Larner, 1997). This reconfiguration has been paradoxical, as a greater emphasis on the protection of individual property rights has led to an expansion of the carceral state in

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New Zealand and other liberal democracies (Pratt, 2007; Wacquant, 2009). The rise of corrective approaches to justice has complicated an already messy relationship between a more evidence-based rehabilitation and the public's desire for retribution. What follows is an audit culture of politically motivated performance metrics being attached to the provision of public services, including the justice system (Andrew & Cahill, 2009; Jacobs, 1998). It was within this wider ideological clutter that the goal to reducing reoffending by 25% by 2017 (RR25, hereafter) was introduced in 2012 by the National-led Government (Scott & Boyd, 2016).[1]

After a change of focus brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic, the topic of crime and punishment in New Zealand has returned as a key discussion point leading into the 2023 election. This autoethnographic account uses ground-level observations of the New Zealand prison system to reflect on the National-led Government's failure to substantively reduce the number of repeat offenders between 2012 and 2017. I draw attention to some of the contradictory elements of my role as an officer; namely, superficial prisoner relationships, ill-conceived performance measures, and (post-)colonial justice processes. I conclude by considering the road ahead, noting that progressive approaches to criminal justice in New Zealand are facing strong headwinds.

Context

I am a Pākehā (New Zealander of European descent) man who, from February 2016 to July 2017, worked as a Corrections officer for the Department of Corrections in a New Zealand prison. Implied in the job title is the responsibility to help facilitate a change in prisoner behaviours, encompassing a requirement on the part of officers like myself to talk to prisoners about their past offending and to encourage a different life path. I lived in a town about 20 minutes from the prison and commuted daily. While wearing my uniform to and from work, I would regularly be identified as an officer by members of the public. Consequently, I would be offered their perspectives on the nearby prison and those who were imprisoned, even if it was not clear they knew anyone imprisoned at the facility. The town I lived in is notable also as a nineteenth-century colonial settlement and for its role as a staging ground for the British during the New Zealand Wars. Since that time, it has had a history of racial segregation, with Māori facing explicit discrimination.

As an officer and an aspiring academic, I noted that attempts to rehabilitate prisoners from 'behind the wire' did not appear to have been particularly successful. During the time that I worked as an officer, the overall number of people imprisoned increased, while the rates of reimprisonment remained stable (Department of Corrections, 2017; Johnston, 2016). In the final three months of my employment, I became reacquainted with numerous individuals who had been imprisoned, released and then imprisoned again. By the time I left Corrections in 2017, there had only been a 3.9% reduction in reoffending over the five-year period (this included non-custodial sentences for offending; Department of Corrections, 2017). As strategies to reduce reoffending floundered, I observed that some prisoners were moved to facilities further away from family as the prison network neared full capacity.

Despite the Sixth Labour Government successfully reducing the prison population between 2018 and 2022,[2] the social and economic costs of high-per-capita imprisonment rates in Aoteaora New Zealand remain. According to New Zealand's Ministry of Justice (2023), the nation's rate of imprisonment (170 per 100,000) is higher than the OECD average (147 per 100,000), which includes especially punitive jurisdictions within the United States (629 per 100,000). Furthermore, despite a reduction in the overall rate of imprisonment in New Zealand, disparities between Māori (the Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa New Zealand) and non-Māori (non-Indigenous peoples) persist (Department of Corrections, 2023). In 2017, the

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[1] National is the main centre-right party in New Zealand politics.
[2] Labour is the main centre-left party in New Zealand politics.

then-incoming Minister of Corrections, Kelvin Davis, claimed that Ngāpuhi—the iwi (tribal affiliation) he himself descends from—were probably the most incarcerated peoples in the world (RNZ, 2018). The disparity is evident in statistics made available by Corrections: while Māori only make up around 17% of the total population of New Zealand, they account for nearly 53% of those imprisoned (Department of Corrections, 2023).

Coupled with ethnic disparities in the justice system is a media fixation on certain types of heinous offending. I found this striking because it is at odds with the offender profile of a vast majority of prisoners I dealt with as a Corrections officer. This observation is consistent with data from Corrections that shows that the number of people imprisoned for homicide is less than 10% of the overall prison population (Department of Corrections, 2021). Such misconceptions also seemed to dictate elements of the public debate. After leaving Corrections, I began to wonder what were the social, political and cultural barriers to further reducing New Zealand's prison population? I examine this question through analysing my subjective reflexive experience as a Corrections officer.

Method

Autoethnography offers a highly personalised account that draws on the experience of the author for extending social understanding (Sparkes, 2000). There are numerous definitions of autoethnography, each of which uses a systematic approach to link personal experience to social, cultural and political phenomena (Duncan, 2004; Sparkes, 2000; Stahkle-Wall, 2016). Drawing from Stahkle-Wall, this article uses the scholarly potential of autoethnography to pull together anecdotes from my time at Corrections and illuminate the differences between the realities of prison and what appeared to be the socio-political expectations regarding such places. Such an approach required that I analyse the experiences to link the personal with the social "[thus] preventing the paper from appearing self-indulgent, therapeutic, and egocentric" (Stahkle-Wall, 2016, p. 2).

The data for this autoethnography was collated retrospectively. Cooper and Lilyea (2022) note that the development of autoethnography might rely on self-reflective data, in which the author journals reflections about their experiences related to the topic. For this research, the journaling of experiences took place in the six-month period after I left the Department of Corrections and had embarked on doctoral study. The experiences I have journaled include interactions with prisoners, Corrections officers and members of the public. Without prior consent, the privacy of these individuals must be represented with due consideration of their agency, and to ensure that any of the anecdotes do not risk their identification (Stahkle-Wall, 2016). To protect their privacy, the anecdotes outlined in this autoethnography have been generalised. This includes removing key identifiers such as the prison unit, location of the prison, and any other area where prisoners, Corrections officers and members of the public reside.

This autoethnography is bounded by my social interactions while employed at the Department of Corrections. I consider the effect of correctional policies that have attempted to alter the rate of reoffending, and how many prisoners continue to cycle hopelessly through New Zealand's justice system. Through analysing my own experiences as a Corrections officer, I give consideration to some of the social, political and cultural barriers to reducing New Zealand's prison population. My perspective is different, however, to convict criminology (for a New Zealand example, see Andrae et al., 2017). As an officer, I had certain privileges which preclude me from offering a comprehensive insider's perspective. Not least, I was able to return home at the end of my shift and largely avoid the experiences of isolation, coercion and violence that many prisoners report as part of a custodial sentence (Bevan, 2017; Lancaster, 2020; Richards, 2014). Neither is this a collaborative autoethnography. At no point did I, as the author, collect reflections from the other characters in my story (see Chang, 2013; Roy & Uekusa, 2020).

My story begins, then, with the premise that prisons have failed to 'correct' the individual behaviours of offenders and are unlikely to ever satisfy such an objective. If we wish to continue proactively reducing the prison population, we must consider how the current set of circumstances has come to pass. This includes the role of prisons as social institutions, the social policy settings of government, and the long tail of colonialist thinking in New Zealand. I start with an interaction I had with a prisoner who, in the most general sense, was representative of his peers.

The prisoner and the Corrections officer: A symbiotic relationship

"Luke, Luke! What up, bro?" My eyes scanned wearily up and down the access road that separated one of two remand units. It was the voice of a young man I had come to know quite well. "Hah, Luke, you fat cunt! Where have you been?" he yells again, while standing on the tips of his toes and peering through the grill of the double-gated entrance way. His tone this time suggested that he was excited—maybe because I had registered his voice and started grinning as he came into full view. We had struck up some light-hearted conversations during his previous lag some two months earlier, and maybe it helped him to see a familiar face despite returning to largely hostile surroundings. I also felt ambivalent. Yes, he was back. But at least he was one of the 'good' guys, filling a bed space where someone less hospitable might have been accommodated during my two-day break.

The prisoner and I had been through a similar courting process to that of many others, underpinned by the distrust between prisoner (confined by the state) and Corrections officer (an ancillary of the state). He was the statistical mean of a prisoner—young, brown,[3] athletic and witty—and me being that of a guard—middle-aged, White and overweight, with a similar penchant for joke-telling. These were relationships that would often evolve from a starting point of distrust before reaching a precipice, moving to discussion and, finally, acceptance. It was rare to have any sort of bond with a prisoner without it starting as a form of verbal, and sometimes physical, jousting, setting the tone for how we might liaise with one another in the future. If you were to close your eyes during conversations with these young men, you might have thought you were in another place altogether; sport, food, women, cars, hunting and even politics were regular discussion topics.

Maintaining positive relations between most officers and most prisoners spoke to a more serious need: the mutually understood responsibility to remain safe at all times. Only months earlier, the young man at the gate had intervened when an agitated prisoner challenged me to a fight. Fortunately, other prisoners in the unit also worked to quickly defuse the situation, and it brought to me the comforting realisation that most prisoners can interpret the risks associated with spiralling levels of violence and probably shared a view that violence should only ever be used as a last resort. Ironically, it was as if a Hobbesian view of the social contract had been reimagined from behind the wire by such prisoners; that is to say, from within the facility that they had been held in since it was adjudicated that they were no longer fit to mingle beyond it. If prisoners were able to reason this way inside the wire, it suggested to me that they were at least capable of doing so outside of it.

The prisoner and I knew, however, we would never actually be close. A reasoning perhaps grounded in the belief that it might jeopardise my role as an officer, or his well-being as a prisoner. The prisoner–officer dynamic is rooted in social institutions that define the company we keep, or do not keep, if we are to enjoy the ongoing acceptance of our respective peers. It means that despite having shared experiences and common interests, the respective roles of officer and prisoner maintains both visible and invisible boundaries. We are taught as officers to never trust a prisoner, never share anything regarding your personal life with prisoners, and never have contact with prisoners when they were released. It is a contradictory message for the more contemporary-style corrective services that we are trained to provide.

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[3] In the New Zealand context, 'brown' typically denotes an individual of Māori or Pasifika ethnicity.

Indeed, as officers, we are also expected to build rapport with prisoners, encourage positive behaviours and, where possible, discuss the causes of their offending. In my own time outside of work, I would sometimes sit in the public gallery during sentencing hearings of prisoners I had on my caseload, much to the bewilderment of escorting officers from the prison who would look at me awkwardly across from the dock.

An 'us versus them' dualism is a common feature of populism (Aslanidis, 2016; Canovan, 1999). Within the framing of crime and punishment, most of 'us' are cast as the ordinary, law-abiding members of the public and the other are 'them', the criminals, their lawyers and the prisoner rights' advocates (Pratt, 2007). This is in part because the public assumes that prison populations are composed mostly of violent offenders who pose a threat to society (Roberts & Hough, 2005). Such an assumption is itself a consequence of the aforementioned overrepresentation and sensationalism in the media of instances of especially violent crime (despite these also being statistically the rarest; Pratt, 2007). Both the de-escalation of potential violence by an intervening prisoner and my choice to attend court proceedings in my own time were a challenge to this 'othering' of prisoners by the rest of society.

It was evident to me during my time as an officer that some choices made by individuals that led to a custodial sentence reflected the limited number of alternatives on offer; for example, the consumption of illicit substances to manage mental health issues or the sale of illicit substances to supplement income. This is not to claim that all prisoners are free of culpability, but rather that many are non-violent in nature and have the same desire to maintain order as those of 'us' in the community. This is a view validated in the sentencing hearings I attended, which gave more background to the offender profile than what an officer would typically be aware of.

It was apparent to me that many of the young (brown) men housed in the prison I worked at were being socialised into gangs. Despite the reluctance of prisoners to discuss their reasons for gang affiliation, there is evidence in New Zealand that the recruitment of young people into gangs frequently occurs behind the wire (Lambie, 2018; Taonui & Newbold, 2016). Given the likelihood of gang socialisation and other negative social outcomes arising from imprisonment, it might be assumed that the public would be averse to its widespread use, especially of non-violent offenders. Instead, judging from the interactions I had with the public during my time as an officer, they were indifferent to the efficacy of prisons in addressing recidivism or offender rehabilitation. "You need prisons to put the scum somewhere," was a comment made to me, and one that was typical of those made by people in the town where I lived.

If a young man were to cycle once through the New Zealand justice system—from police, to courts, and then sentencing—the likelihood of him being caught committing similar offences a second or third time is higher than someone who has not had any contact with the justice system in the first place (Kilgour & Polaschek, 2012; Poa & Monod, 2016). While the young man standing at the gate that day was representative of many of other prisoners with whom he shared the compound, it was not just age, gender and ethnicity that this prisoner had in common with his peers. The charges that had led to his detainment by the state were also similar. They covered what he and officers alike would gleefully refer to as 'dumb shit', a catch-all term for offences that were at the less-serious end of offending but were ill-advised, and often the consequence of other choices that preceded the offending, such as alcohol intoxication.

Performance measures versus social forces

Reporting progress on reducing reoffending has continued to be how correctional facilities are assessed and supported (Johnson, 2017; King & Elderbroom, 2014). Such measurements emphasise a view that the future choices of offenders are manipulable through a mixture of rehabilitative courses, reintegration pathways and coercive measures (Scott & Boyd, 2016). When I first applied to become an officer in 2015, Corrections was three years into this ambitious goal of reducing reoffending by 25% (RR25). At first glance,

RR25 (at least in the context of prisons) seemed like an attempt to modestly realign the sector towards prisoners' reintegration post-release. According to the Department of Corrections' 2014 strategic report, RR25 would be accomplished through focusing on the following: "community support" (e.g., housing initiatives); "working prisons", centred on various programmes or employability; "modern infrastructure" to facilitate such programmes both inside and outside of prison; and "visible leadership" (an expectation on staff to act professionally and facilitate rehabilitative outcomes). Critically, however, RR25 did not seek to change public attitudes towards imprisonment, those who were imprisoned, or those recently released from a term of imprisonment. Instead, RR25 upheld a philosophy that those who had cycled through the justice system were inherently more criminal than those who had not.

Questioning RR25 would have been heresy at the time, but there were sound reasons for casting doubt over the Department's vision even before it unravelled. Criminal justice advocate Kim Workman warned that such a broad target would encourage Corrections to either focus less on the needs of its more complex offenders or look for ways to creatively report progress (RNZ, 2017). In other words, any gains were most likely to come from persons completing community-based sentences. The first acknowledgement from Corrections that achieving RR25 by 2017 (cynically or otherwise) was unlikely to eventuate came in mid-2016. An update of the performance measure in the Corrections 2015/2016 Annual Report showed only a 5.6% change relative to the 2011 baseline, suggesting that much of the supposed gain had evaporated from a high-water mark of over 12.7% in 2014. Notable also was that from 2016, Corrections moved reporting on the RR25 target from the first few pages of its annual report to the appendices section, a separate document that would usually only contain technical information regarding the reporting of data (see Department of Corrections, 2016).

Behind the wire, it was clear to me that RR25 amounted to little more than a lofty aspiration featuring at the bottom of staff email signatures. This was no more evident than in an interaction I had with another young man shortly before he became eligible for parole. Upon unlocking him at eight that morning, he emerged from the bathroom with a new tattoo across his right cheek. Such jailhouse tattooing contravened the Corrections Act and cast doubt on whether the young man was ready for the impending parole hearing, despite having already completed a long list of programmes prescribed by his case manager. When I asked the young man what had compelled him to take such a risk, his response was depressingly familiar, "Who cares, jail is mean."[4]

One impact of long periods of imprisonment, particularly among those already socially marginalised, is that it leads to a greater normalisation of prison in the life of a prisoner, and thus, prison itself loses any deterrent effect or, even worse, becomes a rite of passage (Workman & Mcintosh, 2013). A fellow officer shared a view that when considering the prisoner's life outside the wire, jail probably was 'mean'. The officer then went on to remark, "He probably comes from one of those families when you open the fridge and there's just margarine." Anecdotally at least, the prisoner was not alone; other prisoners had made decisions ensuring they would spend the longest possible time in prison. These prisoners would turn down enrolment in programmes geared towards an early release, preferring to avoid the conditional release that comes with parole. It painted a grim picture of the agency many of these prisoners had outside the wire in that, for many of them, the risk of being unable to meet the conditions of release led them to accept a longer period of imprisonment than might otherwise have been the case.

We never found that tattoo gun, though I had marvelled at others in the past. They resembled an intricate bird's nest of materials that had been stripped from pens, wires and batteries. "What do you call this?" I posed to another prisoner as I placed a tattoo gun on the desk in front of him; he grinned and gave a wry smile before replying: "Māori ingenuity." Indeed, it was ingenuity for which I would not have ever had the technical ability, especially from within the confines of a prison with limited access to materials.

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[4] A colloquialism in New Zealand English to indicate something is fun or enjoyable.

Caught within a complex web of social forces, this prisoner might have otherwise been a mechanical engineer, but had instead found himself under involuntary confinement by the state.

The persistence of behaviours routinely characterised as 'dumb shit' could not be attributed simply to failings in either individuals or the justice system. They were consequences of poverty, gang socialisation, inadequate housing, substance addiction, poor education and unemployment (see also Johnston, 2016). Structural changes to the economy are required regarding the provision of housing, employment and justice, as opposed to piecemeal interventions like RR25. In small towns across New Zealand, economic liberalisation shuttered once profitable industries and impoverished families who have lived in the area for generations (Conradson & Pawson, 2009; Gray & Lawrence, 2001; Larner, 2005). In a conversation I had with a sentenced prisoner, another young man scoffed at the idea of not selling illicit drugs again upon release: "Why would I get some shit job paying min[imum] wage when I can make a grand a week selling crack?" I found this statement remarkable, not for its candidness, but the suggestion that an income of $1000 per week was somehow noteworthy, when only a generation earlier, a stable and sufficiently well-paying job had been readily available in the same town he had grown up in.

In 2017, former Corrections Deputy Chief Executive Vince Arbuckle acknowledged the failure of RR25 and the need for structural change when he addressed shortcomings of the performance measure at the Waitangi Tribunal (Waitangi Tribunal, 2017). He spoke to the difficulties faced by Corrections staff who knew they had little chance of reducing the rates of reoffending among those who received a custodial sentence. Of concern to Mr Arbuckle was that there is a sense of inevitability about offenders returning to the same challenging environments upon their release from prison and their involvement in gangs (Waitangi Tribunal, 2017). The issue Arbuckle highlighted is that it was not 'dumb shit' alone which was responsible for young people cycling through the justice system, but a broader set of social forces.

RR25 was one of the few Better Public Services targets that fell significantly short of their stated aims; I resigned in the same week that the Department abandoned its target. Although my decision to move on was not related to the failure of RR25, I had nonetheless accepted that the formula necessary for breaking the cycle of recidivist offending was unlikely to be engineered through the delicate interactions of prison staff behind the wire. When commenting on the surge in correctional programmes offered in the US, Maxwell (2005) opined that to be successful, programmes from behind the wire needed to somehow develop in prisoners the necessary coping strategies to "ameliorate the economic, social, and cultural stresses of post-release life" (p. 519). It was evident from my observations that the story was the same in Aotearoa New Zealand. By 2018, two-year reoffending rates in New Zealand were continuing at levels higher than 50%, despite programmes being widely available to prisoners (Department of Corrections, 2019). Mr Arbuckle was, therefore, correct in his submission to the Waitangi Tribunal when he conceded that it is the environment outside of prison that has the most direct impact on the chances of an individual re-entering the justice system.

Prisons and (post-)colonial Aotearoa[5]

The drive from my home to the prison took around 20 minutes by car, and as a Pākehā with a moderate grasp of the region's bloody colonial history, this daily commute gave rise to an eerie parallel. Each morning I would put on a uniform, adorn myself in protective armour and then travel by convoy into the countryside to a fortification (prison) where most people identified as being of Māori descent. Notably, the car park was only another five minutes by car from the site of a historical pā (settlement) and the location of a series of battles between local iwi and the British. It was common also to hear Māori Corrections staff speak of

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[5] There is ongoing scholarly debate regarding the description of Aotearoa New Zealand as a postcolonial society that goes beyond the scope of this paper (see Smith, 2012).

their discomfort at being party to a justice system which had so routinely disempowered their own people, both historically and in more recent times.

It was ethnicity, then, which became the initial fault line in my interactions with prisoners. Shortly after being assigned to a unit, a high-profile gang member turned to me at the conclusion of a television news story and said, "That Trump character, he'd be your kind of guy, right?" After responding, "Nah, fuck that guy," we both laughed. It was the sort of interaction that served as a reminder that prison could amplify what has been an adversarial biculturalism nurtured throughout colonisation, where the markers of who belongs to which group are crudely assigned to fairly predictable social cleavages: Pākehā versus Māori; officer versus prisoner; us versus them; and, as the public often see it, good versus bad.

A lot of this adversarial type thinking also seems to be entrenched in the minds of the public. Dressed for work in the appropriate Corrections attire, I would regularly stop at a service station to collect a few necessities before continuing on my journey. One exchange was representative of the opportune comments from strangers when noting that I was in uniform. While processing payment for my coffee, a service station attendant said, "I don't envy you, mate." I shrugged, nodded and chuckled awkwardly, all at the same time. When handing back my EFTPOS card, he offered a further unsolicited comment: "Do us all a favour and gas the lot of them." I recoiled, managing only a grimace before hastily retreating to the car—while some of those in the line behind me began to call out approvingly.

Physically leaving the scene that day was straightforward enough, but it was more difficult to eschew the feelings of cognitive dissonance: what was my role, and what purpose did it really serve the public? If the genesis for which many of these young men wound up in prison was connected to colonisation and ongoing systemic racism (Cunneen, 2009; Webb, 2017), at what point do the public attitudes towards these young men become more problematic than the actions that led to their imprisonment? For Māori prisoners, such as the high-profile gang member, a Pākehā officer like myself was another malevolent representation of this power relation, set on upholding the structures of White supremacy.

Part of the early colonial project in New Zealand was to purposefully disempower Māori from participating on equal terms with Pākehā (Hokowhitu, 2007). Māori school-aged rangatahi (youth) were shuffled away from literacy and numeracy and into manual labouring positions, on the pretence that these skills were not required unless they were part of the ruling class (Hokowhitu, 2007). To exacerbate matters, te reo Māori (the Māori language) was also banned from being taught or spoken in New Zealand schools, ensuring Māori were assimilated into the colonial education system (Walker, 1990). This alienation from the structures of government and bureaucratic decision-making occurred alongside Māori alienation from their land, often by consequence of war (confiscation), or dubious acquisition by Pākehā settlers (Boast & Hill, 2010; Taonui, 2010).

More recently, the aforementioned impacts of economic liberalisation have been especially felt among Māori communities, which have further fractured as their working-age adults were forced to leave smaller settlements in search of work in the cities (Larner & Craig, 2005; Murphy & Cloher, 1995). Such upheaval has resulted in children becoming dislocated from meaningful cultural instruction as well as the safety and protection afforded by whānau (the wider family group). It is within both the historical context of colonialism and more recent neoliberal thought, that the failure of corrective approaches to criminal justice ought to be considered (Kim et al., 2010; McIntosh & Workman, 2017; Workman & McIntosh, 2013). The consequence of these structural disadvantages is a normalisation of Māori being over-represented in prison at the same time as they have been made socially, culturally and economically precarious (Cook, 2021; Stanley & Mihaere, 2018).

Understanding the normalisation of ethnic stratification is also critical to appreciating the present-day discrimination faced by Māori. Residents in the town I lived during my time as an officer referred to a particular suburb as the "dark side", due to the fact that most who lived there were either

Māori or Pasifika, a reference to their generally brown skin tones. So common was the term used in social interactions that no further explanation was required. The dark side was then a placeholder term for an area where one might expect social deviance or anti-social behaviours. Such urban segregation between Māori (and Pasifika) and Pākehā residents has inevitably had consequences for how the former interface with agencies of the state, not least of which is the over-policing of Māori communities (McIntosh & Workman, 2017; Workman, 2013).

The ongoing colonisation of Māori has been dependent, then, on the construction of ignorance about their culture, language and beliefs, and of their being designated as the Other (Stanley & Mihaere, 2018). Through its institutions, New Zealand society has nurtured a certain view among Pākehā settler descendants regarding the civility of Māori (Jackson, 2017). Penal populism is then nourished through this entrenched view within Pākehā society, one that represents Māori as having a proclivity towards crime and violence (Hokowhitu, 2007; McIntosh & Workman, 2017). This Othering, or the routine characterisation of Māori as an untamed, warrior-like race, leads to the legitimisation of justice processes among the dominant Pākehā majority that imposes state controls and the colonial institutions that come with it—prisons (see also Jackson, 2017).

With even the most cursory overview of colonisation and postcolonial New Zealand outlined above, it is clear that a belief persists among Pākehā that Māori ought to be managed and controlled (Mihaere, 2015). Such belief among Pākehā has also been routinely validated by political actors. In 2014, then-Prime Minister John Key referred to New Zealand as a country "settled peacefully" (Godfrey, 2015, p. 5). On another occasion, Key, when visiting Ngāti Porou, joked about being fortunate not to be visiting neighbouring Tūhoe, suggesting he might have been eaten by the local population (RNZ, 2010). Such instances of historical revisionism were perhaps convenient, allowing the then-National Government to obscure the intergenerational trauma of colonisation and set aside the structural disadvantages responsible for the disproportionate level of imprisonment among Māori in the first place. Godfrey (2015) referred to this rationalisation of colonisation as a way to legitimise its imposition on Māori, in a manner that is often contradictory to the stated aspirations of redressing past injustices. As an officer, I also noted that some prisoners carried with them sentiments of past injustice.

It is not as if Corrections staff are ignorant of our national history. In the first session of my first day of training in Wellington, the colonisation of New Zealand and its impact on Māori was explained by a senior training facilitator of Māori descent. The topics of colonisation and structural disadvantage were also revisited at different points throughout the six-month training, bestowing a rudimentary sociological explanation of New Zealand society on the department's newest recruits. But having acknowledged as much, the training programme became discombobulated throughout the induction process, frequently circling back to notions that it is incumbent on officers to encourage offenders to better themselves, while keeping them imprisoned for increasingly longer periods of time. Corrections, though, can only act within their remit.

After I departed Corrections a change of government brought a renewed attempt to address Māori over-representation in the prison system. Hōkai Rangi is a comprehensive strategy co-designed in 2018 by Corrections and Māori under the auspices of the Sixth Labour Government. In essence, Hōkai Rangi was designed to fulfil the needs of Māori offenders alongside a range of culturally tailored support, created by Māori for the Māori prison population. However, according to Te Pere (2021), among the problems of implementing Hōkai Rangi has been an inertia within the Department, particularly among staff working in the prisons, far removed from Corrections head office. It is perhaps of little surprise, then, that after nearly three years, Hōkai Rangi has had no demonstrable effect on shifting the proportion of Māori imprisoned, despite an overall drop in the rate of imprisonment and the number of Māori imprisoned (Te Pere, 2021).

There are also numerous critiques from Māori scholars regarding prison programmes, including those with a kaupapa Māori focus. To summarise just one, the co-opting of kaupapa Māori principles into

the prison system validates the use of prisons, which are themselves a colonial construct for managing deviant behaviour (Mcintosh & Workman, 2017; Mutu, 2013; Webb, 2018). Thus, the appropriation of kaupapa Māori by Corrections amounts to another way in which the state continues to colonise and harm Māori (see Jackson, 1987; Tauri, 2013). While Corrections have accepted the role played by colonisation in the disproportionate imprisonment of Māori, the Department remains fixated on folding kaupapa Māori principles into a framework of individual responsibility, an argument which could be extended to include Hōkai Rangi.

Ultimately, the long shadow cast by the entrenched, systemic racism throughout the New Zealand justice system continues to have negative consequences for Māori, their families and their communities (Workman, 2014). The consequential mass imprisonment of Māori is then a human rights issue (Tauri & Webb, 2012). From my observations outside the wire, however, there was at best acquiescence among Pākehā regarding the role that colonisation and systemic racism has played in poor justice outcomes for non-Pākehā and their families.

Change the policy, prisoner or the public?

This article gave a first-person account of the contradictions evident in how New Zealand's Department of Corrections has been configured to operate in the twenty-first century. These include an antiquated us versus them prisoner–officer relationship which inhibits magnanimity and capacity building, ambitious neoliberal performance measures favouring only piecemeal societal intervention, and an inadequate appreciation for the historical and ongoing mistreatment of Māori, despite bureaucratic handwaving to these past injustices. Each of these contradictions (by no means an exhaustive list) reinforce that the onus for change has remained on the shoulders of individual offenders (see also Kramer et al., 2013).

In parallel to these contradictions, the New Zealand public continues to hold inaccurate perceptions of prison and prisoners. If the public were to accept that prison has a limited role to play in reducing reoffending, and indeed ensuring public safety, it might open the possibility of reversing the growth of the prison network and its operations. To accomplish this, advocates for decarceration must navigate widely held yet erroneous ways of public thinking; for example, that offenders are *not* part of society; that would-be offenders are susceptible to the same deterrents as others; and that Māori, who currently make up over half of all those imprisoned, have had equitable interactions with the state. What has proven to be the stumbling block for advocates of this 'progressive' penal reform is that attempts to rebut such assumptions with evidence-based arguments do not seem to be politically effective (Lambie, 2018; Roberts et al., 2002; Tauri, 2019).

This article provides a ground-level understanding of a few social, political and cultural barriers to reducing the prison population, but is only a starting point. It is a precursor to further empirical work; for example, what Corrections officers see as the core function of their role or what appetite the public has for the social reforms necessary to reduce the number of people cycling through the justice system. It also underscores the pervasiveness of colonial thinking in mainstream society, which leads to more obvious questions about how to address anti-Māori prejudices through the national education curriculum.

The prison population began to fall after I left the Department of Corrections, suggesting that penal populism in New Zealand might be receding. A reduction in the number of persons imprisoned was said to be a consequence of streamlining prisoner bail and parole applications (Ministry of Justice, 2021). However, at least some of the reduction in prisoner numbers was a by-product of the COVID-19 pandemic (Ministry of Justice, 2022). The pandemic has been cited globally as pushing down rates of imprisonment, due to the early prisoner releases, long lockdown periods and a backlog of cases before the courts (Brennan, 2020; Chartrand, 2021). It is notable that rates of imprisonment in New Zealand have increased again in the past 12 months (Ministry of Justice, 2023).

In the absence of a mandate for decarceration, or any profound structural changes to either the justice system or the broader economy, it is plausible that rates of imprisonment will continue in an upward trajectory. Such possibilities reflect not only the predominance of neoliberalism, but the return of law and order to the media cycle at a time of heightened anxieties in middle New Zealand regarding economic well-being. As the National Party (currently in opposition) dusts off previously touted policies of boot camps for wayward youth (RNZ, 2022a) and targeted social investment (RNZ, 2022b)—both individualised responses to social issues—it is not inconceivable that performance measures will themselves return. Few options exist for those wishing to push back on a punitive discourse, and a consequential rise in the rate of imprisonment. A politically viable option might be to draw on the economic anxieties of middle New Zealand by pointing out the wastefulness of prisons, and the broader justice bureaucracy. (For a comprehensive discussion regarding populist decarceration strategies, see Oldfield and Mills, 2022.) Such a course of action would seek a mandate for change, recognising that public attitudes are malleable and thus giving space for policies that address the underlying causes of crime to take root (see also Frost, 2010).

It would be difficult for me to overstate how dire prisons are, where the life chances for those entering these facilities, at best, diminish, and where, at worst, prisoners themselves become the victims of horrific crimes. These 'hidden' crimes are part of the basis upon which prisoner advocacy groups have argued that prisons should be abolished entirely, with only the most high-risk offenders being managed under some form of security (Coyle & Scott, 2021; Davis & Rodriguez, 2000; McLeod, 2015). Others have advocated the reform of existing facilities to ensure they are more responsive to the needs of prisoners (Grant, 2016; Johnstone & Van Ness, 2013). This article stops short of endorsing one position ahead of the other, but instead works off a statement of fact that prisons in New Zealand are not effective in one of their key objectives: reducing reoffending. As a society, we can continue to ignore that fact—but at what cost?

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White Cultural Imperialism and the New Zealand Criminal Justice System: Importance of Insider Voices

Jessica Martin*

Abstract

In New Zealand, Māori women and men make up a disproportionate amount of the prison population, reflecting what Indigenous scholars have termed the era of the hyper-incarceration of Indigenous people. Using Tracey McIntosh's conceptualisation of the violence continuum and Donna Awatere's framework of White cultural imperialism, this article examines the colonial past and current state of the New Zealand criminal justice system with a particular focus on how crime is framed in New Zealand public discourse. This article offers insight into how Whiteness is operationalised in re-enforcing Māori as the criminal Other. Voices of incarcerated or formerly incarcerated Indigenous and non-Indigenous people offer counter-narratives to dominant frames of criminality advanced by the state and offer opportunities for moving forward.

Keywords: Donna Awatere, Whiteness, Māori incarceration, incarcerated voices, racialised policing

Introduction

In New Zealand, Māori make up 64% of the female prison population and over 50% of the male prison population (Department of Corrections, 2022; George et al., 2014). Furthermore, the number of people incarcerated in New Zealand increased sharply between 1986 and 2009, and of particular note is the 297% increase in the female prison population, which is almost twice the growth rate of male prisoners (Workman & McIntosh, 2013). In 2022, Māori and Pasifika populations made up 65% of the total prison population even though they only accounted for 24.5% of the New Zealand population, while European or Pākeha New Zealanders made up 70% of the total population but only 30% of the prison population (Department of Corrections, 2022; Stats NZ, 2019). The disproportionate rate of incarceration of Māori should be seen as a disturbing signal that there is a systemic issue leading to adverse outcomes for Indigenous people within the criminal justice system (Andrae et al., 2017; Norris, 2017).

Historically, prevailing narratives explaining racial disparity relied heavily on viewing crime through the lens of individualism and class analysis only. Māori scholars have pointed out that such narrow foci exclude the racialisation of crime control and structural constraints dating back to the mid-to-late nineteenth century when the state enacted laws to hold Māori activists without trial for resisting the colonial project (Cunneen & Tauri, 2016; Webb, 2017). Critical examinations of history bring to light a continuity of racialised targeting from the beginning of the colonial project to the modern day (Agozino & Pfohl, 2003; Alexander, 2012; Awatere, 1984; Proulx, 2014). Contemporary examples of widespread racialised targeting and profiling, such as the case of the extralegal photographing of Māori and Pasifika youth by law enforcement in 2021, illustrate that technologies of surveillance are not neutral but highly racialised (Norris & Tauri, 2021). The racialised nature of criminalising narratives deserves urgent attention, especially with regard to ideologies of Whiteness in upholding the power structures where Māori are locked in a continuous cycle of resisting colonial forces (McIntosh & Curcic, 2020). In responding to the call advanced by

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McIntosh and Curcic, this paper draws on the voices of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people to gain insight into the structural forces that fashioned a web that has ensnared generations of Māori in the criminal justice system. This article introduces Donna Awatere's 1984 concept of White cultural imperialism to discuss the processes that render this web invisible to wider society (Alexander, 2012; Awatere, 1984; de Saxe, 2021; Norris & Lipsey, 2019). Awatere's 1984 book *Maori Sovereignty* presents one of the first critical accounts of Whiteness in New Zealand (Norris et al., 2023). By weaving together McIntosh's conceptulisation of the violence continuum and Awatere's framework of White cultural imperialism, the role in which colonial violence and racialised narratives have become embedded within White New Zealand consciousness and social institutions will be discussed. This successful deep colonisation of the social collective consciousness allows contemporary racialised structures and discourses to appear race-neutral. In other words, New Zealand's collective consciousness of race has been shaped over time in a way that inevitably associates terms like 'gang member', 'offender' and 'welfare recipient' with Māori and Pasifika peoples, thus perpetuating the cycle of colonial violence (Bonilla-Silva, 2000; Norris et al., 2023).

This article proceeds with a brief history of the institution of Whiteness in New Zealand and the policies created to uphold this power inequity. McIntosh and Curcic's (2020) discussion of the violence continuum is considered alongside Awatere's (1984) concept of White cultural imperialism, which offers a lens to examine crime control and related criminalising narratives. Particular focus is devoted to the role of Whiteness within New Zealand, especially in relation to modern strategies used to suppress the reality of racism and Māori voices. The article concludes with a discussion of the importance of centring voices of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated Indigenous people.

History of Whiteness in New Zealand

To understand incarceration rates and structural violence in New Zealand, studies must address the power structure through the context of colonial racialised violence and its role in the creation of 'Whiteness' (Cunneen & Tauri, 2016). Cunneen and Tauri highlight the commonalities of the experiences of Indigenous populations within British settler-colonial societies, which stems from the historical legacy of colonisation that led to significant disruption to pre-existing social orders. Awatere (1984) discussed how White culture in New Zealand was formed through a common greed that superseded historical rifts between Scots, Irish, Australian, British and other Europeans. Whiteness became an operational force in New Zealand when foreigners united their power and purpose towards the common goal of dispossessing Māori of their lands. This strategy was replicated from success in colonising Canada, the United States and Australia; the seizing of Indigenous lands lies at the heart of colonisation, uniting forces among White settlers (Awatere, 1984; Smith, 2020; Webb, 2017). It is important to note that at the inception of the dominant culture of Whiteness, people continued to define themselves by their ancestry rather than their 'new' culture of White identity, which simultaneously gave rise to White superiority and Indigenous inferiority. In turn, Whiteness became institutionalised in that it was considered the norm and the governing force that ruled (Norris et al., 2023).

Awatere situated White culture in New Zealand as an extension of British imperialist culture, with the only distinction being White New Zealanders' deeply held opposition to Māori. This defining factor has been instrumental in shaping New Zealand policies and structures from the outset, which were built to serve White people at the cost of Māori. Joseph Ward, the Prime Minister of New Zealand in 1910, stated:

> "I do not think we require to have a discussion of the policy of New Zealand regarding its preservation of white races only. That policy has been settled long ago and I am just as determinedly in favour of that policy today as I have always been in the past." (cited in Awatere, 1984, p. 57)

This widely held belief is seen through policies such as the Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863, the Land Settlement Act 1863 and the Maori Prisoners Trials Act 1879. These laws were all put in place to suppress Māori justice, political independence and resistance, establishing systems of racial social control (Webb, 2017). This trend followed through into the 1900s with policies such as the Public Health Act 1900, which designed health services for White settlers and completely ignored the needs of Māori, while simultaneously criminalising and suppressing traditional healing practices (Awatere, 1984; Simmonds, 2014).

Awatere's concept of White cultural imperialism offers a framework to examine the processes of domination that consists of three key factors—fraud, military power and systemic exclusion. Fraud begins with the Treaty of Waitangi, which consisted of two separate documents, one written in Māori and the other in English. When read in te reo Māori, the Treaty gives Māori sovereignty of their people and land (Awatere, 1984). Mutu (2011) discusses Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the Māori document which was signed by Māori chiefs at Waitangi, which guaranteed Māori sovereignty and undisturbed possession of their lands, forests, fisheries and other property (Wynyard, 2019). The English document, which holds no legal authority, is a treaty of cession of sovereignty and was crafted by White settlers and used as a weapon for the justification of the violence of colonisation (Jackson, 2019; Mutu, 2011). Military force was used to dominate and destroy the strength of Māori through the decimation of their people, land and agriculture. We are now in an era of extreme social exclusion. Each system built on the foundation of colonisation in New Zealand was created with the intent to exclude Māori from participation. Awatere (1984) identified housing, education and criminal justice as the superstructures that uphold and maintain White cultural imperialism. These superstructures play an integral part in the domination and dispersion of White ideologies and act as a powerful force for executing social exclusion. In addition to the dispersion of White ideology, these structures became a tool for forced assimilation. To progress in the new New Zealand, Māori either had to join and leave Māoridom behind or become locked out of the system completely.

Awatere advanced the concept of White cultural imperialism to also point out how New Zealand began as and continues to be a separatist state under the guise of biculturalism and later multiculturalism. The myth of a bicultural society is most notable in the reality of racism and structural violence, which is well documented and highly visible through the consistent adverse outcomes for Māori in criminal justice, education, healthcare, foster care and housing (Elers & Jayan, 2020; George et al., 2014; Norris, 2017; Tauri, 2014). However, New Zealand has tended to see itself as a model nation for a multicultural identity (Bonilla-Silva, 2000; Elers & Jayan, 2020; Tecun et al., 2022). This projected image is deeply embedded in the hearts and minds of many New Zealanders. It obscures the reality of racism through an ideology of deep denial and mythologised equality, most notable in the myth of egalitarianism ever existing (Bonillia-Silva, 2000; Skilling, 2013). Unfortunately, race has largely been overlooked by White New Zealand writers, many of whom believe New Zealand to be a post-colonial and post-racial society (Gray et al., 2013). Māori scholars have not been so blind and have been documenting the role of New Zealand's settler-colonial, or 'White', systems in influencing and predetermining the lives of Māori for many decades (for example, Awatere, 1984; Gray et al., 2013; Jackson, 1987, 2019; Quince, 2010; Tauri, 2014). As Awatere pointed out, Whiteness is the force that drives myths of biculturalism, making racism harder to prove even when White systems of justice have sustained a system of Māori imprisonment and containment.

The violence continuum

To critically discuss the criminal justice system in relation to the social control of Māori as proffered by Awatere (1984), it is imperative to have a firm definition and understanding of violence. *Violence* can be an individual act, such as physical violence, psychological manipulation and social violence, or a collective or institutional act, such as political violence (Farmer, 1996). *Political violence* can be embedded and perpetuated throughout institutions and systems in the form of direct, structural or symbolic violence. *Structural violence*

constrains the agency of groups of people by having their life choices structured by racism, sexism, political violence or grinding poverty (Farmer et al., 2006). *Symbolic violence* occurs when oppression is made invisible because of systemic normalisation to the point where all parties perceive it as natural or 'just the way things are' (Bourdieu, 1977, as cited in Martin et al., 2021; McIntosh & Curcic, 2020). An essential component of these issues is that they are designed to be invisible through the systems of education and socialisation of the public. Therefore, societal perception is built to view this form of violence as a personal failing of the individual rather than an intentional form of political violence. As a result, these forms of violence are not criminalised in the way individual acts of violence are. Instead, they are rife within social institutions, including the criminal justice system (McIntosh & Curcic, 2020).

The violence continuum provides a framework to discuss violence in its many forms and pays particular attention to the fact that violence creates a condition that generates more violence, particularly against historically targeted and excluded bodies (McIntosh & Curcic, 2020). McIntosh and Curcic, when tracing the trajectory of the mass imprisonment of Māori women, employ the framework to illustrate how structural violence begets other forms of violence by creating the conditions for poverty, loss of identity, lack of employment, and lack of housing. Awatere's (1984) conceptualisation of White cultural imperialism links colonisation to the violence continuum. In doing so, she identified White hostility as the engine powering the violence continuum that is rarely recognised and has gone unexamined. Craig Proulx's 2018 article "White backlash against Indigenous peoples in Canada" documents a similar phenomenon of White activists' long-standing practice of promoting White innocence discourse most observed through equality-as-sameness rhetoric which demonises Indigenous people. Such strategies ignore, rationalise and deny responsibility for continuing colonial land and resources theft (Augoustinos & Callaghan, 2019; Proulx, 2018). Without considering and unpacking White cultural imperialism, one could believe that the violence enacted against Māori was a single act committed by those who lived generations ago. However, in a settler-colonial society, violence against the Indigenous people only *begins* with colonisation. As Wolfe (2006) notes, settler colonialism is a structure, not an event. Therefore, these practices are not simply part of shared history but are deeply embedded in modern-day society.

Donna Awatere (1984) mapped the intentional bias embedded within superstructures that upholds Whiteness and a White supremacist order from before the Treaty to the urbanisation of Māori. For example, in the 1840s, due to an investigation by Governor Grey, the Supreme Court ruled that the Crown had legal title to all land in New Zealand. This meant that customary use was no longer enough to establish ownership, and Māori would need a Crown title. This ruling also meant that all land not cultivated by Māori would belong to the Crown. Moreover, in 1865, the Native Lands Act enabled the conversion of traditional Māori housing systems, which were based on communal land use and governorship, into individual and absolute land ownership titles (Gilling, 1994), and in so doing, the Act paved the way for land to be sold off to White settlers, further alienating Māori from their ancestral land and home. After the Second World War, there was a significant migration of Māori from rural to urban areas. Many rural Māori were subsequently forced, either by coercion, lack of opportunities or direct land seizures, to move into paid employment in the larger cities predominantly occupied by White settlers (Awatere, 1984; Gilling, 1994; Kake, 2016). This part of the colonial project aided assimilation by alienating Māori from their land and forcing them into a position reliant on White settlers for employment, accommodation and education.

By 1990, around 80% of Māori had moved to cities (Hill, 2016). Lack of connections, education and permanent housing along with isolation from their home and culture led to multiple forms of social exclusion. The State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986 left many urban Māori without permanent housing due to forestry and railway housing being sold to developers. Simultaneously, the state withdrew support for papakāinga housing, which resulted in significant barriers for urban Māori to return to their home communities. Furthermore, due to the over-policing of homeless communities, Māori were subjected to multiple forms of surveillance, experiencing the weight of the White colonial gaze and being viewed as

dangerous or criminal (Kake, 2016; Lee et al., 2022) This example illustrates the legacy of historical policies, which alienated Māori from their land and fisheries, and the ongoing inter-generational ramifications of these policies, such as increased homelessness and lower homeownership rates (Lawson-Te Aho et al., 2019). Houkamau and Sibley (2015) found that merely looking more stereotypically 'Māori' significantly decreases the likelihood of having a mortgage application approved by a bank or financial institution. These examples illustrate how criminalising narratives, such as the trope of 'savages', that were used to justify colonisation, are still used to justify the subordination and criminalisation of Māori (Norris & Tauri, 2021).

The education system is described by Donna Awatere as a bastion of White power, used to serve the interests of White students and as a tool for the assimilation of Māori students (Awatere, 1984). In 2018, UNICEF's annual *Innocenti Report Card* ranked New Zealand as one of the worst 'rich countries' in education equality (Walters, 2018a). The Children's Commissioner at the time, Andrew Becroft, notes that bias plays a significant role in the disparity between learning outcomes in the mainstream education system and that the enduring legacy of colonisation has resulted in the long-term disadvantage of Māori students (Walters, 2018b). Modern systemic bias and anti-Māori racism are two leading factors causing Māori to be represented at a disproportionate rate in the group who underachieve. To understand how these factors became embedded in the system, we need to look at colonisation policy regarding education. The Native Schools Act 1858 established subsidies for Māori education in missionary schools, but to qualify for funding, these schools were required to teach in English. As the urbanisation of Māori increased, many attended schools in the city where their history, language and culture were not only suppressed but violently silenced. To become a part of mainstream society, Māori students were forced to leave Māoridom behind. In the mid-1980s, following more than 150 years of colonisation, the public education system came under scrutiny and pressure to review and restructure. Māori activists used this opportunity strategically to advocate for kura kaupapa, Māori schools that offered a full immersion experience—but it still took until the year 2000 for the government to fund kura kaupapa (Archibald, 2006; Tocker, 2015). The education system, Awatere (1984) pointed out, is a tool of White cultural imperialism, forcing Māori to live by rules and systems imported by colonisers. Under White culture imperialism, the intention is to assimilate Māori into the White ways and exclude those who do not comply with the dominant rule. Education, along with the church and media, has been the major vehicle for establishing and maintaining White cultural imperialism.

Insider voices: Structural violence and the Criminal Justice System

As stated earlier, Indigenous scholars and imprisoned Indigenous intellectuals have long shed light on colonialism as an ongoing project that is most visible in the mass imprisonment of Indigenous people (see, Cunneen & Tauri, 2016; George et al., 2014; Ogden, 2020; Ross, 1996). Stormy Ogden (2020), a formerly incarcerated Native American woman and author, links the structural violence she faced throughout her life, from the macro to micro levels, to policies made during colonisation. She draws on policies that allowed legitimate dehumanisation, such as the Indian Indenture Act of 1850, which made it legal to own First Nations people as slaves. This policy and similar others led to Native Americans being exposed to violence and dispossession, slavery, kidnapping, rape and mass murder (Madley, 2017, as cited in Ogden, 2020). The foundation of the United States is rooted in violence that permitted and sanctioned systems of monitoring, surveilling and confining Native Americans—systems that are still seen today. These systems institutionalised and deputised the White body as agents over Native Americans' everyday lives and being. Stormy's story parallels that of Stan Coster (Ngāti Kahungungu), who speaks of structural features of the state that rendered his entire life characterised by different forms of state confinement, including becoming a ward of the state at nine and spending more than 25 years in prison (McIntosh & Coster, 2017). McIntosh and Coster draw on Coster's knowledge acquired under conditions of state constraint to address the gap in New Zealand crime control scholarship that has silenced Indigenous experiences in general and, more

specifically, those who have experienced forms of state control and confinement (Deckert, 2016; Goyes & South, 2021).

Insider insight: Suppression and relevance of Indigenous voices

Mills (1959) stated that "neither the life of the individual nor the history of society can be understood without understanding both" (as cited in McIntosh & Curcic, 2020, p. 226). Incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people, or insider voices, hold the key to understanding how these historical harms are weaved into the day-to-day lives of individuals and communities. Luana Ross (1996) and Donna Awatere (1984), alongside many other Indigenous scholars, have long recognised this gap in how these voices are pushed out of both academia and public policy.

In a society in which the power of 'free speech' has been dominated by White people while Māori expressions of dissent are criminalised, we have witnessed a narrative of crime being crafted that shows a distorted image of reality (Elers & Jayan, 2020). Since colonisation began, White hegemonic power has used different tropes and labels to position Māori as less than White people and deserving of their fate through individual moral failings. This notion of White supremacy rests on the shaky grounds of *stadial theory*, which was formulated by Enlightenment philosophers who imagined that societies advance in a linear fashion through predetermined stages of social development from barbarism to 'civilisation', with the latter being a euphemism for 'White culture' (Awatere, 1984). This ideology of labelling Māori as 'savages' has permeated society. In contemporary times, the term savage is largely absent, but society has been socially cued to associate words like 'criminal', 'gang member' and 'violent Other' with Māori (Barnes & McCreanor, 2023; Lewis et al., 2020; McCreanor et al., 2014; Te Punga, 1971). Additionally, the view of crime as an individual problem situates criminality as a character defect, and thus constructs the person as untrustworthy (Alexander, 2012; Norris & Lipsey, 2019). These forces act to discredit and suppress the voices of individuals who are or have been in the prison system. As a result, such voices are not deemed credible experts and so they are, therefore, excluded from crime control discourses. In an effort to advance our understanding of social issues, including incarceration, facing Indigenous people, they need to be acknowledged as experts on their own conditions (McIntosh & Coster, 2017; McIntosh & Curcic, 2020). By recognising their individual and collective experience of structural violence, we are forced to acknowledge how deeply rooted, systemic and predetermined the outcomes are. The contribution of insider voices allows us to examine the systems of power that uphold structural violence and White cultural imperialism.

Stan Coster's life, for example, has been defined by deprivation, dislocation and personal loss. He tells his story as a Māori man whose childhood was filled with violence, both physical and structural. He shares experiences of the Epuni Boys' Home where he grew up, which acted as a "holding pen for an overloaded youth justice system" (Cohen, 2011 as cited in Andrae et al., 2017, p. 127). Coster's path to prison was predetermined by the state (Andrae et al., 2017). He is an insider of the foster care system, gangs and prisons. As an insider, he identifies structural violence—from the protection he did not receive in foster care to the criminalisation and surveillance that has plagued his adult life (Andrae et al., 2017).

Voices like that of Stormy Ogden and Stan Coster tell stories that are rife with structural violence in many forms. Such voices link day-to-day microaggressions to a colonial history of erasure, dispossession and confinement (Andrae et al., 2017; Ogden, 2020; Re: News, 2019). More importantly, such voices shed light on the racialised aspect of policing and surveillance, which has received little attention within the New Zealand context as compared with North America (Norris & Tauri, 2021; Ogden, 2020). Insider voices will also sharpen our analysis of viewing policing and surveillance of Indigenous people beyond agents of crime control to identifying such practices as embedded societal features normalised through White cultural imperialism. Norris and Tauri, in their analysis of racialised surveillance of Māori youth, argue that

Indigenous and Black youth are policed by schools, parents and community members, which becomes part of an interconnected web of surveillance that influences and reshapes daily life. Insider voices bring attention to the reality of the multiple facets of policing driven by narratives, education, mass media and religious views linked to settler colonialism, which birthed and cultivated a dehumanising story about Indigenous people for centuries (Awatere, 1984; Mogul et al., 2011).

Invisibility, criminalisation and racialised surveillance

When looking at Indigenous and Black communities, there is a rigid dichotomy: on the one hand, they are hyper-visible in crime control, policing and media when they are perceived as the perpetrators, while on the other hand, the same groups are invisible or discredited when they are perceived as victims. McGuire and Murdoch (2021) posit that the invisibility of Indigenous victimisation is inextricably linked to their criminalisation and hyper-incarceration. When Indigenous women need protection from law enforcement, they are dismissed and their claims are not recognised as valid; however, that same system criminalises and imprisons these women in acts of self-defence (Monture-Angus, 1999b, as cited in McGuire & Murdoch, 2021).

The inclusion of Indigenous voices, especially incarcerated or formerly incarcerated ones, sheds light on the racialised and gendered nature of surveillance and structural violence (Tauri, 2014). Through their insight and expertise, we are offered the opportunity to redesign a system to reduce harm rather than simply recreating it. Awatea Mita believes that if we are to move forward, we must completely redesign the criminal justice system to foster reconciliation and community-driven solutions to harm (Re: News, 2019). In New Zealand, traditional Māori knowledge provides clues to meaningful solutions for reducing the incarceration of Māori (George et al., 2014). By listening to and validating the voices of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated people, we create new narratives that explain their lives within the context of modern-day New Zealand. As a result, we move away from labelling the individual as a 'criminal' and see the system itself as violent. This process involves directing a critical lens toward Whiteness, unpacking it as a framework and force that obscures the depth of anti-Māori beliefs and maintains and operationalises narratives of Māori criminality.

Ideologies of Whiteness: Realities of racism obscured

This far, the discussion has introduced the influence of White cultural imperialism in shaping the modern-day system of social control of Indigenous people, including mass imprisonment. Moreover, Indigenous people have had to actively combat the widely promoted myth of New Zealand being a model multicultural society. Awatere (1984) cautioned New Zealanders that this projected image, which is deeply embedded in the dominant culture, obscures the reality of racism through an ideology of deep denial of Whiteness that mythologises equality. For example, Charles Mills directs our attention to the system by asking, "Who was the criminal justice system built by, and who was it built to serve?" (Mills, 2012). Awatere (1984) outlined that the White New Zealand system was built for Whites, and thus, White people benefit from living in a society dominated by Whiteness. Conversely, within Western liberalism, there is a trend to separate the individual from the system. Instead, the ideology proposes that society is comprised of autonomous individuals entirely responsible for their own decisions. This view undermines societal and structural violence and inhibits our ability to understand the collective reality of experiences (de Saxe, 2021; Gray et al., 2013). However, White people have a vested interest in overlooking the role Whiteness has played and continues to play in their lives (Awatere, 1984; de Saxe, 2021; DiAngelo, 2018, Hattery & Smith, 2018). Awatere (1984) advanced the notion of White amnesia as a vital condition for White people as it allows them to deny responsibility for the deeds of their racialised position. This separation allows White people to place themselves as victims in their own stories or as 'self-made' people instead of recognising that their

current status rests on the forceful alienation of Māori from their land. Whiteness acts as 'the unmarked marker' and is left unexamined within society, often leading White people to believe that they 'do not see race' (Hattery & Smith, 2018; Heitzeg, 2015). However, that very Whiteness is the standard against which all other groups are assessed, equated and made visible (Elers & Jayan, 2020; Jackson, 1987).

Within the context of the criminal legal system and the role of criminalising narratives, it is crucial to discuss the oppressive structure of Whiteness. Structural violence has become embedded into the foundation of institutions, but White society is socialised into being blind to this violence. The norms that keep White privilege and power intact are upheld through the freedom of [White] speech across media, public, government and policy. Elers and Jayan (2020) discuss how this hegemonic right leads to the erasure of the voices of Indigenous people from these spaces. Thus, by rendering Indigenous voices invisible and untrustworthy, their narrative and story become manufactured and portrayed negatively by the "White colonial master" (Dutta, as cited in Elers and Jayan, 2020, p. 239). Awatere (1984) brought attention to the intersection of negative narratives imposed on Māori as deviant and White dominance and violence, which is omitted from the conversation. The power of implicit referencing of race through terms like 'those on the dole' or 'gang members' is arguably more challenging to contend with as the public has been conditioned to believe that this is not racial discrimination (Norris & Billings, 2017). However, through both blatant and implicit referencing, Māori are placed as hyper-visible in their role as scapegoats for social ills of mainstream society.

Social constructions of groups rooted in negative cultural characterisations or stereotypes of a group are often depicted and controlled through White cultural hegemony (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Over time, the language around negatively racialised populations will change and evolve. While racial hostility against Māori is still deeply embedded in our society, we have constructed coded terms to refer to this group without actually labelling them Māori. Terms such as poor, homeless, gangs, criminals and welfare beneficiaries have been used to disproportionately frame Māori as a burden on society. Despite using race-neutral terms, the consciousness of race is already framed through history. Thus, colonial strategies, influenced by Whiteness, function to continuously link Māori to social ills. From the construction of Māori as gang members and 'troublesome youths', the hegemonic status of White norms and values has ensured that these constructions are understood to be 'reality'. At the same time, White people have never been equated with such tropes, which has triggered a White belief that they are, in fact, the group that needs to be protected (Norris & Billings, 2017).

Conclusion

The systemic denial of racism and inability to address Whiteness prevents us from developing a race consciousness and hinders our capacity to address institutional racism. Charles Mills says that the only way to move 'past race' is to recognise that the system was built for White people and remedy it (Mills, 2012). Insiders' voices help elucidate the process of structural violence and surveillance. Therefore, it is problematic when their voices are suppressed and dismissed as it hides the connections they make between historical context and modern day-to-day realities. Furthermore, it is imperative to acknowledge the influence of Whiteness as a product of White cultural imperialism in inventing the narrative of the 'Māori problem', thus redirecting attention towards individuals.

It is also imperative to recognise that White hegemony continues as the principal engineer of a systemically racist modern society (Elias & Feagin, 2020). Racism exists because it was built into the foundation of our society and is an integral part of the White separatist state, which continues to ensure that power remains in the hands of White people (Awatere, 1984). Tactics such as the suppression of incarcerated and formerly incarcerated non-White voices do not address the dilemma of hyper-incarceration of Māori in New Zealand. Instead, such tactics actively work to refocus crime on the individual and hide

the system perpetuating this cycle. Insider voices broaden our understanding of the collective experience of incarcerated people and examine the criminal justice system and prisons, in particular, as a colonial site actively advancing the colonial project.

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The University of Auckland Sociology "Class of 1984"

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Abstract
A small but socially cohesive cohort of students graduated in 1984 after completing their master's theses at the Department of Sociology, University of Auckland. As well as providing a case study of a postgraduate cohort and especially its cohesiveness, the symposium highlights the subsequent careers of the four key sociologists in the group, who have each made major contributions to Aotearoa New Zealand and world sociology through vigorous book and journal article publishing based on their research programmes. Two have been mainly based in Aotearoa New Zealand, one in Australia and the fourth in the United Kingdom, but they have maintained social (and some intellectual) contact ever since. Their quite divergent careers and career strategies are sociologically set against some of the social characteristics of their times. The accounts of each are far from definitive, but provide some useful insights into career contingencies which hopefully will provoke contemplation.

Keywords: postgraduate student cohorts; Aotearoa New Zealand sociology; Auckland; sociology departments; careers; career contingencies; social change

Introduction

Although it varies between postgraduate (sometimes senior undergraduate) cohort groups ('classes' in American terminology), the year or years spent with a group of fellow students sharing a programme, enduring the difficulties and celebrating the triumphs, to some extent together, can be an intense experience. Every so often there is a particular student cohort that fires. One such group was a class at the University of Canterbury in (or around) 1977, which included several who went on to have careers as applied sociologists in government services as researchers: Penny Fenwick, Mike Waghorne, Gerald Thorns, Marie Keir and others. Another such group finished their master's theses at the University of Auckland (UoA) in (or around) 1983 and went on to particularly productive academic careers. These introductory remarks are made to provide some context for the four short autobiographical accounts that complete this publication.

Claudia Bell's thesis was on Department of Labour subsidised work schemes, Nigel Clark's on ecology, Georgina Murray's on women lawyers, and Martin Tolich's on Tania's March against militant unions. Other members of that class were Hauraki Greenland, who wrote on "The Politics of Maori Cultural Revival", and Gary Barnaby, who withdrew on health grounds. These postgraduates became junior lecturers/tutors, helping to teach the burgeoning numbers of undergraduates attracted to sociology. This group of postgraduate students was socially cohesive in a department which was reasonably new and active. Several were mature students with earlier careers, including school teaching (Georgina) and preschool teaching (Claudia). The group's studies began out of the somewhat decrepit Rex Court building on Symonds Street, but were then mainly housed on Floor 9 of the Human Sciences Building (HSB)—which at the far end included an incinerator for dead Psychology Department laboratory animals. Recently, this building has been demolished to be replaced by updated rooms. Of the teaching line-up at the time, Ivanica

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Vodanovich was particularly important in setting high standards of scholarship, and David Bedggood provided illuminating Marxist analyses grounded in international scholarship.[1]

From this foundation of masters, and later doctoral work, productive careers were launched. However, for various reasons, the impact of their work among other New Zealand sociologists is muted, and the social network linking them likely unknown. Two pursued most of their careers overseas (Georgina in Queensland, Australia and Nigel in the United Kingdom). This case study of a postgraduate group/cohort aims to document some of the group or common processes at play in producing this quartet and seeks to make their work more visible.

Literature concerning sociology groups and careers

Although it is often an intense experience, not much is written about student cohorts. An earlier conceptual article (Crothers, 1991) suggested that Sociology (and other) departments were "feudal" in nature, with postgraduate students occupying an under-labourer caste slot, often relying on the department for part-time employment to subsidise their studies. The New Zealand situation in the 1980s was not too dissimilar. There is an ever-expanding body of autobiographical or biographical accounts of sociologists and many authors (likely all) comment on postgraduate experiences, while some focus on this portion of a sociologist's life.

Some accounts discuss a teacher/mentor's effects on their students. In studies of 'schools' of sociology, accounts are available of the social characteristics of the recruitment grounds for postgraduate students, their education and socialisation into the tenets of the school, and finally their spreading, in their later careers, of the school's doctrines across other universities. (One example is the well-known Chicago School.) Being caught up in a recognisable school is likely a minority experience. Recently, the concept of student cohort has become a professional teaching tool of some postgraduate educators who have deliberately encouraged group cohesion and a sharing of experiences (e.g., GradSchoolHub, 2020).

This set of four case studies aims to add to the stock of historical material on Aotearoa New Zealand sociologists (see Crothers, 2018). A previous conference panel (Schmidt et al., 2014) provided short (and somewhat light-hearted) accounts of their sociological careers. David Thorns (2016) published a retrospective personal account in a special issue of *New Zealand Sociology* on the history of New Zealand sociology. This co-produced study is an attempt to build up such case studies more systematically. The result of the co-production process is the set of questions (see the Appendices) which developed interactively as the authors wrote. An earlier attempt was made by the Sociological Association of Aotearoa New Zealand (SAANZ) to recruit oral histories as sociologists retired and a few have been carried out, but more systematic efforts to record retirees' experiences should be considered.

Personal reactions at writing these autobiographical accounts were clearly ambivalent but the request was seen as unusual and perhaps even gratifying rather than an invasion of privacy. The sociological skills that the authors have exhibited through their careers were turned on their own lives and this required some effort at remembering the details, and then perhaps patching them together into a bigger story.

Some societal context

This section maps aspects of the social framework (with many points referred to below in each of the group members' accounts) that shaped each group member's involvements in sociology over their careers. This especially focuses on the formative period during which they were postgraduates doing master's and PhD research. They enjoyed, to different extents, the good things that benefitted their generation (Baby Boomers) in relation to accessible housing, education and the like.

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[1] For context concerning the Sociology Department, see Crothers et al. (2014).

Over the post-war period, Aotearoa New Zealand was marked by decades of long relative social and cultural stability, articulated as a sleepy colonialist cultural cringe, with somewhat mythical aspirations about Aotearoa New Zealand's supposed dilution of social class and race relations (which was reinforced by the country's ethnic homogeneity at that time). It was a time of hidden sexism, very low unemployment and inflation, strong unionism, and a very limited acceptance of inclusion of diversity where ideological differences (e.g., left/right) were downplayed, although there was a largely supposed threat of more radical thought (on both, the left and right).

Cultural nationalist and populist movements became stronger during this time, with growing confidence in the Aotearoa New Zealand identity in films like *Goodbye Pork Pie* (1981) and *Utu* (1983). There was also more visibility of injustice against Māori and protests, such as the occupation of Takaparawhau Bastion Point in the late 1970s, and the massive struggles around the 1981 Springbok tour. The social movements that had begun to flower in New Zealand in the 1970s continued to be active.

Economic tensions included the United Kingdom (New Zealand's prime market) joining the European European Community and the 1970s oil price crisis, with unemployment and inflation rising. The early 1980s was a hinge period in New Zealand, where the country became a global leader in neoliberalism, with the local variant, and 'Rogernomics', actively developed by the Lange Labour Government. The neoliberal plan was purportedly an endeavour to correct the welfare state excesses of the post-war period and the 'Think Big' development state of Robert Muldoon. This was an era when government privatised state assets and encouraged private investment in major industrial projects. In a gathering social storm of bankruptcies, suicides and evictions, New Zealand's relatively equitable society was thrown to the wolves to supposedly rescue its capitalist enterprises.

Subsequently, New Zealand lurched through various deepening and lessening periods of revolutionary neoliberalism, with struggles more often fought inside institutions than on the streets. It became, if anything, a revolution of capital, achieved with limited public dissent.

Within the group, the four continued with the business of postgraduate student life alongside the further pressures of family and domestic living (both Claudia and Georgina had partners and children, and Martin was married). The commitment to demonstrating and protesting was taken very seriously— sometimes, in 1981, there had been twice-weekly protests (on Wednesday night and Saturday morning) which activists in good standing ignored at peril of their political reputations.

This '84 group were recipients of a universal free education (before the imposition of the neoliberal reforms that later drove the crippling debt of student loans). Though they were largely from working-class backgrounds, with state co-educational secondary schooling, they were able to supplement the reasonably adequate student bursaries and allowances with working-class jobs. There was also excellent distance education available to them, most helpfully when the women were pregnant. This group were among the last cohort of junior lecturers who had taught at half-rate and completed a PhD in the other half of their time.

The intellectual milieu at the University of Auckland Sociology Department in the early 1980s featured theoretical debates that more broadly ranged from right to left than today: David Bedggood was an explicit Marxist whose general classes drew much student interest and whose advanced classes had theoretical appeal. More generally, the Marxism taught at that time was loosely centred on the materialist insight that production is the underlying base of culture but that this must be understood through the filter of ideology. That is, it was a reflexive form of structuralism, before post-structuralism and cultural studies became the dominant alternatives. Methods were not much emphasised but featured the standard approaches.

As the formative period waned and the group fanned out to take up lecturing positions in the UK, Australia and New Zealand, the intensity of their societal interactions faded as the demands of academic survival in new environments became paramount, and different jurisdictions attracted less political intensity.

The Fab Four: A sketched overview

Hauraki Greenland completed his short but powerful academic career at the University of Auckland, writing a much-cited essay (Greenland, 1991) for a collection on Pasifika in Aotearoa New Zealand. He moved on to an illustrious career in several government departments, including Māori Affairs, Treasury and a final stint as a principal adviser with the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). Sadly, he died in 2007. The MoJ set up an annual memorial scholarship in his honour.

Martin Tolich pursued the rigorous training offered through an American PhD at the University of California, Davis (UC Davis) near Sacramento, California. The other three—Nigel Clark, Claudia Bell and Georgina Murray—pursued home-grown PhDs. After that, each had remarkably stable academic careers.

Claudia Bell worked at the University of Auckland, first in Continuing Education, and then after achieving tenure, in the Department of Sociology. Nigel Clark, after a short stint at the University of Auckland as a junior lecturer while completing his PhD, held jobs at the Open University and at Lancaster University, where he still works part time. Georgina Murray stayed at Griffith University, Brisbane, while Martin Tolich moved to University of Otago, after initially establishing his career at Massey University, Palmerston North. Each steadily ascended the academic ladder, with Georgina and Martin achieving associate professorships and Nigel a full professorship. At the time of writing, Claudia, Georgina and Martin have retired, and Nigel continues as an academic.

Claudia Bell built her PhD research into rural ideologies in Aotearoa New Zealand (completed in 1993) into a powerful book (Bell, 1996) on the construction of Pākehā identity in Aotearoa New Zealand social life. This was a bestseller and led to widespread debate at the time. Nigel parlayed his PhD into a range of publications on the natural environment in its social framing. Georgina continued from her thesis work to investigate business elite networks and corporate power, with extensions to Australia and also worldwide. Her magnus opus *Corporate Networks and Social Power in Australia and New Zealand* (Murray, 2006/2017) aptly summarised much of her work. Martin continued some of his ethnographic research into consumption behaviour into other topics; for example, being an experimental drug subject. Various studies resulted and there was also a successful extension into textbook writing on research methods and then social research ethics. These very brief orientating comments introduce a few key themes, but as can be seen from their personal accounts (see below), their careers and publications have been complex and include many studies involving interviewing or other fieldwork.

The class of '84 have been incredibly productive, especially in their contributions to the book literature. Using the University of Auckland library catalogue, I found books authored or edited by the quartet. Some are also available in public libraries. Their respective Google Scholar profiles indicate their stated research interests (see Table 1) as well as outputs and citations. Data from Google profiles, including the presentations available from the program Publish or Perish, shows that the cumulative counts are massive: some 470 items to date, nearly 40 books, and over 10,000 citations (see Table 2). These are uncorrected counts that include mistakes and a wide variety of literature forms, including grey literature.

Some of the quartet's work has involved other authors, and working with others has been one of the skills of all the group's members. For example, much of Nigel's authorship projects have been as part of an Open University development team.

Table 1: Current interests according to their Google profile

Claudia Bell	National identity, tourism, landscape, food, cycling, retiree migration, social justice
Nigel Clark	Anthropocene, nature-society relations, geophilosophy, geopolitics, social theory
Georgina Murray	Political economy
Martin Tolich	Qualitative research ethics; tertiary education: capstones, society and societal issues; sociology: research ethics, qualitative research, conscientious objectors

Table 2: Output metrics

	Items	Books	Citations	H-index
Claudia Bell	84	12	1858	18
Georgina Murray	147	9	1132	19
Martin Tolich	119	11	5599	24
Nigel Clark	150	6	3946	32

The quartet has not much engaged with professional associational activity (such as national sociology associations). On a practical side, Martin is the founder of the innovative New Zealand Ethics Committee (NZEC). NZEC is an independent not-for-profit ethical review committee for researchers undertaking research outside the university context and for researchers not affiliated to universities, conducting research internationally. His emerging teaching specialism is public sociology by way of creating research-based internships for senior sociology students. Martin, and especially Georgina, have been particularly successful with research grants.

Interestingly, none of the quartet has become a mainstream sociologist in terms of a narrow definition, although they have not strayed far, and have provided cutting-edge sociological contributions that have influenced other disciplines: Claudia's interests have lain in cultural studies, Nigel's in human geography, Georgina's in political economy, and Martin's in human research ethics.

Conclusion

A high-flying sociological explanation of this cohort is not required. Occasional confluences arise pretty much by chance in some student cohorts. Nevertheless, examining the personal accounts in the framework of the (appended) questions—with their implied hypotheses—may be fruitful. Perhaps there is a generational aspect: the quartet were undoubtedly each affected in various ways by the '60s experiences that engendered strong concerns for social justice as well as curiosities about social experiences: family circumstances impinged, and while there were some shifts in their broadly stable organisational careers, these seem not to have shaped research interests. Each, rather, has pursued a long-term guiding thread: Claudia has spelt out the cultural furnishing of particular (and general) lifestyle groups, Georgina has tracked corporate power and its appurtenances, Martin has explored occupational subcultures in relation to technologies and then ethics, and Nigel has doggedly explored the human relationship with our Earth and environment. In so doing, the quartet have clearly added much to the stock of knowledge not only about Aotearoa New Zealand society but also that pertaining to other countries, and indeed world social science.

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Appendices: Fab Four life history account guide

- Where did you grow up? Go to school? Was there anything in this background that propelled you towards sociology or that you've drawn on in your writing (or intend to)? What was your main post-secondary training/job, and did this have any relevance for later sociological work?

- Why did you go to university? Why did you take sociology?

- Why did you develop your master's/PhD work?

- What were the benefits of where you did thesis work? Anything about postgraduate work at Auckland that inspired you?

- What topic did you choose for each and why? Why did you choose to do your thesis at University of Auckland (or not)?

- What has your academic career been? How did you decide on this?

- What topics have you worked on? Why those topics?

- Why did you choose to write books as well as articles, etc?

- How did your teaching/supervising fit into your career?

- Were there any particular audiences you saw yourself as addressing? That you felt responsible to?

- What image of the discipline have you held, and how does your work contribute to it? Who were supportive colleagues along the way?

- Have you achieved your career goals? Any lessons?

A1–A4: Case studies and personal autobiographical accounts

A1: Claudia Bell

I grew up in rural Waikato, part of the post-war baby cohort. The local school had just one teacher, and a horse paddock. Isolation led to lots of reading, drawing and writing (for children's pages of the local newspaper and for children's magazines). I was happily publishing from the age of seven.

Later, an all-girls city secondary school was oppressive—I didn't know that word, then. How could adult women—teachers—be so mean to pubescent girls? No one suggested university for me. As it was, I recall my dad's much older sister complaining that "those girls (we three sisters) had far too much education!" (??) Early parenthood (not unusual for my generation; oral contraception was hard to obtain) meant I lived in the country with wee kiddies.

In the mid-1970s, Massey University extramural study filled the intellectual void. This was free and easily accessed by mature students (over 25). Many were teachers upskilling, and/or mothers like myself, whose early parenthood meant they had missed out on tertiary education.

The main costs were postage of essays and to return library books (yes, books were lent and delivered by mail), and transport and attendance at a one-week block course in Palmerston North for each enrolled course. At that time, I had no thought of completing a degree—only clever people did that! My first papers were in sociology, because they looked interesting (!). I also took a lot of literature papers, completing five more than I needed for a degree. At that time, I worked part-time at weekends on Heylen Polls, doing door-to-door social/market research, in Auckland City. With three preschoolers, I also worked part-time at their playcentre and at occasional cleaning or catering jobs.

In those days (late 1970s), Massey Stage 3 was not offered extramurally, so I bussed—or hitch-hiked, if broke—into Auckland Uni. In 1981, I then enrolled in an MA programme, very surprised I could get paid for tutoring. (As an extramural student, I had never experienced a tutorial.) The main public debate at the time was the Springbok tour protests, which was causing huge divisions in New Zealand society. The events heightened the nation's self-examination of race relations here, leading over time to extensive social changes. Sociology students were eager to discuss these events in tutorials. We took seriously the university official mantra of "critic and conscience of society". This was a lively, stimulating, fun environment.

An appreciated and influential colleague was David Bedggood, a Marxist sociologist. Plus, I worked alongside Margot Roth, an inspiring legend of second-wave feminism. Her impact on sociology, and on students, was in-estimable. My first book was published at this time: *Women and Change* (1985), a commissioned study of the impacts of the United Nations' Decade for Women (1974–1984) on New Zealand women. These included significant legal changes, such as the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 and the Family Proceedings Act 1980. That was an era when we often popped out during the day to join street marches up Queen Street, demanding greater rights for women. (I hate to even write this, but remember that awful phrase by nervous, appeasing woman: "I am not a feminist, but…!")

There were no student loans—the appalling debts which blight today's students. Over summers, I did paid fieldwork in various parts of New Zealand. In 1981, one project was underwater social research at Leigh Marine Reserve, looking at recreational users' activities in a scientific marine environment. To do this, I had to get a scuba diving qualification. As a single parent—hey, I needed a job!

My employer was what is now the Department of Conservation. This led to other DOC fieldwork contracts throughout New Zealand. Land use surveys in the East Cape, and investigations for potential for cycle trails and other recreational activities in DOC lands; for example, Woodhill Forest and Lake Otaola (Kaipara Harbour) were two such projects. For the latter, I had the joy of carrying out interviews by kayak, to reach people fishing various parts of the lake. Often there was no accommodation available, so camping in a small tent was not unusual. Once, somewhere inland from Ruatoria on the East Cape, I stayed in a

shepherd's hut. The only access to a farmhouse was by horse, so someone kindly lend me one, and pointed the way.

Early on, I found the value of hands-on primary research. My MA thesis fieldwork was in Hokianga, researching government job creation schemes (Project Employment Programme or PEP). These were make-work projects in return for a dole equivalent. Any person eligible for work could be employed. Hence many households could draw several wages. In an area that had long experienced high unemployment, this was significant. PEP schemes were enthusiastically encouraged by the local council, which received generous overheads for managing each local project. The work was mainly physical and outdoors. 'The Wombles' collected rubbish and debris from roadsides. Others cleared willows from choked rivers, made mud bricks, repaired marae, established horticultural units, or cut fence posts in the forest. (Sadly, once the subsidies ended, so did most projects. High levels of unemployment returned.)

Concurrently I was writing feminist articles for magazines, including a weekly column in the *New Zealand Woman's Weekly*, and doing commercial book reviews. I also taught evening and weekend courses for various organisations, including the Workers Educational Association (WEA) and the Centre for Continuing Education (CCE), University of Auckland, and carried out small research commissions.

Amazing as it seems now, though a solo mother of three children with no permanent employment, just numerous contracts, by the end of my MA (1983)—raised by frugal parents—I had saved from scratch enough money to buy a house in Grey Lynn. I needed one third deposit for the 'handyman's dream', walking distance to university. First mortgage: 21% interest, second mortgage 26% (I am not joking!). Coincidentally, Nigel Clark bought one nearby shortly after. For both of us, flatmates helped cover costs. I mention this as a reflection of the different times we lived in. Without student loans, we had no choice but to earn money. So we did. Pre-gentrification, inner-city houses were not the commodity they are now; they were simply homes for people to live in. The standard of living was much lower: far fewer mod cons, just one bathroom per household, neither Nigel nor I owned a car, we did not have or expect international holidays; it was before expensive electronic devices were required in every household, and before designer labels dictated popular taste. My children lived with me there until they all left home, by about 1990. Another contrast with today: teenage children left home to go flatting. They shared mostly run-down old houses and villas, affordable in those days.

In 1986, I was appointed to a permanent academic position at the CCE. My community education job involved designing and running non-degree events for the public: seminars, night courses, conferences, workshops. This required that I establish large networks across a wide range of organisations and interest areas, from the city council and political parties to various pressure groups and interest groups. Topics included inner-city development, housing, environmental issues, health topics and the arts. A monthly series featured famous visiting overseas writers. I also re-established the Elam Summer Art School, then added summer and Easter writing schools. I chose the lecturers, wrote the advertising blurbs and managed events, with the support of one secretary. At the same time, I taught one undergraduate course in Sociology. Eventually, after ten years, there were major changes in the CCE. As a tenured academic, a review provided me with the opportunity to transfer to the Sociology Department full time.

I completed my PhD in 1992, on rural ideology in New Zealand. Dr Charles Crothers was a practical, encouraging supervisor; Professor Ian Carter was not. The topic reflected my upbringing, when farmers believed they were the 'backbone of the economy'. Late 1980s Rogernomics shattered that. My fieldwork was funded by piggy-backing my own research onto a commissioned review of the New Zealand National Rural Library Service. As the project continued through New Zealand, conditions for rural people became more and more fraught. Rogernomics was resulting in the closure of many rural services, such as post offices and hospitals. The cancellation of farm subsidies (guaranteeing export prices) meant that this sector had to compete with every other business; privilege and security were over. There were fears of growing depopulation as young people left the country for town. It was an extremely depressing time, with

enormous concerns about the escalating rural suicide rate. Interviewing in this situation was sometimes deeply traumatic.

Putting our Town on the Map (1994) also drew from observations during my PhD fieldwork. Co-written with artist and my new life-partner, John Lyall, it was about small towns in New Zealand struggling to assert their identity and retain population in the face of social change. John and I visited every small town in New Zealand. This was shoe-string research: in lieu of funding, we took our tent and usually camped. John's Cibachrome photographs of each small-town attraction were later a large component of a major exhibition at Rotorua Art Gallery, which bought the entire collection, and which toured the show throughout New Zealand. Some of those photographs were also used on a set of New Zealand postage stamps, and in a 16-page article in *New Zealand Geographic*. The book resulted in numerous speaking invitations, and in a prime-time TV documentary, produced by EyeWorks pictures. The book was a finalist in the 1994 New Zealand Book Awards.

As I was completing my PhD, in the early 1990s, I was invited to produce a manuscript for Penguin Books. The result was *Inventing New Zealand: Everyday Myths of Pakeha Identity* (1996). This was an instant bestseller, with wide media attention.

For some years most of my writing and teaching was about various aspects of New Zealand culture and identity. I edited several academic collections of articles, mostly used in teaching (Dunmore Press; Oxford University Press). I also co-ordinated the first cultural studies Stage One course in New Zealand, at first team-taught.

Non-academic art catalogue essays were also produced (to accompany exhibitions), then a new book—*Excavating the Past: Michael Shepherd, Painter* (2005)—plus numerous items for fine arts magazines (e.g., *Art New Zealand*). Arts writing included occasional involvement with John Lyall and a South Korean-based international touring artist group called Nine Dragon Heads. As their English language writer, I accompanied them to various parts of Korea, and to Bosnia and Serbia. Outputs about that group appeared in the organisation's own publications, on their extensive website, in arts magazines, and as chapters/papers in academic journals (such as *Space and Culture*) and books (e.g., *Lifestyle Mobilities*).

Across decades, I published extensively on New Zealand topics. From 1995, this was only in international journals, despite the persistent mythologies by local academics that global publishers would not be interested in us. But then, by *not* publishing in local journals, there were accusations of failing to support the local! Academia is often a 'can't win' game. Research on kiwiana, by definition local, involving a field trip throughout New Zealand to visit collectors, resulted in several articles, all published in reputable international journals and in overseas edited book collections.

At the end of the 1990s, the Waitangi National Trust commissioned a visitor study of the Waitangi Treaty House and grounds, across a whole year. Some of my students were employed to carry out fieldwork at the site, in five different sampling periods. We were given the onsite visitor residence as a base. Some students didn't like the large wetas that came inside, but we all loved to hear the cry of kiwi in the night. The project resulted in six reports, a list of recommendations, and a presentation that one student and I made to the Treaty Board. This project provided students with a practical, hands-on, paid fieldwork experience, as a well as a CV line.

By the late 1990s I was teaching a course titled Sociology of Food, despite the head of department at the time wondering why it was in the programme; "It is not very important, is it?" she suggested. Duh? I researched and published articles on New Zealand farmers' markets, Balinese cooking schools, Tasmanian roadkill (what is food?). Sociology of Food segued into another commercial best-selling book, my third: *The Great New Zealand Piecart* (2008)*,* co-written with Lindsay Neill. The university has little respect for commercial publications, however successful. (An occasional congratulations would have been nice, but commercial publications just don't 'count'). Lindsay and I were joint writers of nine academic publications that drew from this research.

Again, public presentation opportunities arose from this project, including at Auckland City Art Gallery (*Kai to Pie* exhibition), and Auckland War Memorial Museum. The final pie cart article was in 2016, about ethical and methodological dilemmas of carrying out research in a small country like New Zealand, where individuals might easily be identified. "Think of New Zealand as a small town," Martin Tolich advised.

My commitment to local material overlapped with increasing international projects. From the 1990s, I taught a postgraduate course in tourism and heritage, continuing this until 2018. Tourism is—or was, before COVID-19—essentially about marketing identity, with diverse, far-reaching impacts. This became a key focal point of my research for the remainder of my career. I co-wrote a book with John Lyall: *The Accelerated Sublime: Landscape, Tourism and Identity* (2001). The Chicago Art Gallery compiled a major photographic exhibition, *The Universal Eye,* based on our book. The catalogue featured an essay by Umberto Eco. The exhibition toured the USA, London and Italy in 2005 and 2006.

Research into tourism topics continued. There were articles about tourism in Vietnam, visitor experiences of Mongolia, and—with fieldwork funded by the Canadian Government—polar bear tourism at Churchill, Manitoba; 'Collecting eco-tourism capital: Polar bear tourism' was published in the *Journal of Social Sciences Research* in 2012.

At this time, New Zealand's claimed green ethos was widely promoted in tourism discourse. For a further project, I employed students to carry out fieldwork over summer at backpacker hostels throughout New Zealand. I selected hostels claiming elements of eco-tourism or 'clean and green' on their websites. The students—and I—carried out interviews with guests at the hotels as well as with the operators, to see how those claims matched actual practices. The article, 'Branding for backpackers', appeared in the *Journal of Vacation Marketing* in 2008. This led to a series of other 'greenwash' articles, and to international invitations, including a visiting fellowship at the University of London, presentations at Harvard and at the Sorbonne, Paris, and participation with a study tour group to an eco-city (Curitiba) in Brazil with a New Zealand Government-led party.

My teaching and research then moved into international migration, which I was also teaching—a logical extension of having taught postgraduate tourism and heritage for some years. This sat comfortably with the current academic 'buzz' around theories of mobility. In the final ten years of my career, I undertook annual field trips for projects in South-East Asian countries. Small budgets meant I mostly stayed in family-run modest guest houses. This was a great advantage, both for learning more about local culture, and for meeting retiree travellers who were looking to settle.

This began with research into retirees migrating to Bali to live (tourists or migrants?). The topic was further explored in Cambodia, Malaysia and Laos: places where many Western retirees could afford to reside more comfortably than in their home countries (e.g., Australia, UK and Europe). My interviewees ranged from 65 years of age to 82. Most were in their late 60s and 70s. If they had very little money, they could afford to live in South-East Asia rather than wherever they came from. Some had cashed up to do this: sold their flat in Switzerland or Belgium, then escaped to paradise (they hoped).

None were from New Zealand, probably largely because of the pension system here: everyone over 65 qualifies for a pension but may live out of New Zealand for only up to six months of the year in order to keep receiving it. For people of slender means, this works against permanent settlement anywhere else.

My discovery that some migrant retirees set up small aid projects in their new countries led to my final academic research: investigation of foreigners establishing social justice projects in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. The writing and publishing factory continued. My last field trip, January to February 2019, included a few weeks interviewing subjects in Myanmar, all creators of non-NGO social justice projects. There was cautious optimism about the prospects for democracy in Myanmar. Then, in 2021, in the new COVID-19 world, and with domination by the military junta, I watch in horror what was happening in Myanmar. Destruction.

My final book, *Western Retirees Migrants and Older Tourists in South East Asia: Collected Papers,* was translated into Chinese: 九里校区:四川省成都市二环路北一段111号西南交通 大学. This was a result of my visiting fellowship at a university in Chengdu, Western China in 2019.

Alongside the international material, I continued to write about New Zealand topics, always published overseas. The editors invited an analysis of kiwiana for a book *Designing Worlds: National Design Histories in an Age of Globalisation* (2015). The final local article, '"Great Rides" on New Zealand's new national cycleway: Pursuing mobility capital', was published in *Landscape Research* in 2018.

People may hate this comment, but I never found the actual writing difficult. (A colleague once complained that this gave me "unfair advantage".) It was just a matter of fitting it around all the other academic commitments; plus, of course, constantly applying for research funding. I wrote in a manner that students found accessible, so was able to use a lot of my own research-based material in my teaching. That engagement with students, especially those extraordinary international students working in their second or third language, was such a pleasure. Some were development studies students. I managed to visit several of them at some stage in Mongolia, Vietnam and Cambodia, seeing them in their new post-university roles.

By its nature, academic writing is an isolated activity. Colleagues were working on their own diverse topics, none of them parallel with mine. There was no collegial sharing of drafts or discussion required or expected: they were the experts on their own topics. Hardly anyone took any interest in the weekly seminar programme, which was once a focal point for hearing about the work of others. Plus, most people worked at home, which was perfectly logical in car-congested Auckland. I lived near the university and preferred to use my university office. (Peace! Better computer! IT support!). The departmental fun, friendship and social life of the 1980s had long disappeared. Loss of office staff (into a larger school structure) and of our beautiful harbour-view staff room finally destroyed any possibility of a workplace culture. Most weeks there would be several days of not seeing any colleagues at all.

The trick to being prolific: write quickly, obsessively maybe, and publish several items each year. Writing is a job; treat it like a job. My final academic paper was submitted the day before I retired. I then cleared my computer (office already emptied), and quietly left (31 January 2019). I have no incomplete leftover articles. Nor am I continuing any academic work in retirement.

Charles asked about lessons from this career. Constant intellectual curiosity is essential: for me, the need to understand a topic required that I research and write about it. I always selected conferences where the paper had to be submitted first, before the event. That ensured a publication quite quickly after the presentation, wherever it might be (Croatia, Poland, Finland, London, Naples, Macedonia, Macau, etc.). This meant that every hard-crafted conference paper wound up in proceedings, and/or was extended into a journal article somewhere.

The *worst advice* I ever received from a head of department: just write the same thing over and again, for different publications. So *boringly tediously* self-stultifying! Bah!! Hey, there are so very many things in the world one wants to know more about!

My career was very firmly based on primary research fieldwork. Over those 30+ years, I met and interviewed hundreds of people. A life of *listening…* Flexibility is essential: a topic might change, as one undertakes fieldwork. (This may be fun!) I think writing fluency co-relates to being a lifelong reader: fiction as much as non-fiction. I have no idea how to encourage a work ethic in other people.

Like the other three people in this article, I was never interested in media limelight. Requests for opportunities to appear on TV news or blabber-banter show, or to be (mis)quoted in a trivialising manner to add 'academic authority' to news or feature articles: such requests were rapidly passed on to others. Even writing this is with a little discomfort; who would be interested?

Unlike my three peers, I never left New Zealand to study or for a position in an overseas university. My family commitments kept me here. I did have sabbatical experiences as a visiting fellow at the University of London, at Bloemfontein in South Africa, and in Chengdu, Western China. One sabbatical was spent as

a chicken-bus traveller across South and Eastern Africa, resulting in several articles about Namibia, and a publication on the racism intrinsic to African tourism, published in *Blackwell's Companion to Global Inequalities*. I also had a writers' residency in Chicago, and another at the Bellagio Centre, Italy. In 2006, I was awarded a Fulbright to teach in the USA; sadly, I had to withdraw on health grounds. I attended international conferences annually, enjoying the scholarly company of people working in similar fields to my own. I often tacked personal travel onto each trip, before rushing home to teach classes. But New Zealand remained home base.

Notably, none of this group of four were particularly bewitched by committee work. That must correspond to the prolific outputs Charles observed in the introduction. Yes, we all made solid service contributions, as required. But I happily ignored—despaired at—the advice of a senior female colleague, who frequently proudly boasted that she need never bother to publish, as she was on so many important committees instead. Clearly, there are various ways to be an academic.

I do acknowledge that this story is of its time. International fieldwork-based research would not be as do-able in this new COVID-19 world. Plus all that aeroplane travel, emitting more than my share of carbon emissions; this would now be a severe conscience issue. And with various serious constraints on teaching resources, there may now be less choice in one's teaching topics. It would, for now, be impossible to construct such a research career.

Is this a Baby Boomer story? Or course it is, simply because of the time when I was born. We had free good healthcare and education. My Depression-era parents had not attended high school. We grew up in a very conservative nation, expected to conform without question to the same values and views as our parents. But along came the 1960s. The youth generation rebelled. Then second-wave feminism appeared, and we rebelled even more, many of us now resisting our husbands ('head of the household'!) as we had resisted our parents. We developed a powerful sense of agency; a determination to forge our own lives. The personal was political; politics was personal. We threw enormous time and energy into redressing social injustices, both local and global. Anti-Vietnam War! Gay rights! Anti-apartheid! Civil rights!

So much has happened since. This doesn't include world peace, or global cooperation for equality across nations. In New Zealand, equal pay is still elusive; domestic violence and child abuse are increasing; the cost of living is challenging. But there is a growing consciousness of the enormity of climate change; and far more women and people from diverse ethnic backgrounds are in positions of power than ever before. To me, one of the most important progressions for the next generation of women has to be the Me Too! Movement. Bravo! At last!

It is sad that so much university work is now online. This is so detrimental to forming classmate friendships. University is not, and should not be, just about scholarly work and gaining qualifications. My own continuing warm friendships with these three people, whom I met in 1981 during that first MA year, now 40 years later, remain significant.

Selected publications

Bell, C. (2005). The nervous gaze: Backpacking in Africa. In M. Romero & E. Margolis (Eds.), *Blackwell's companion to global inequalities* (pp. 424–440). Blackwell.

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A2: Georgina Murray

Where did you grow up?

My parents were British working-class migrants who paid for their ticket to New Zealand with the sale of my father's red MG sports car. (The car had been bought by him with his British army 1939–1945 demobilisation money.) My father had left Liverpool and came first to Wellington where he went to Teachers Training College, and my mother followed him, leaving Birmingham a year later. She looked after my older sister and gave birth to me in Wellington in 1951. Full of enthusiasm for the new classless country, they lost their working-class accents on the boat trip over.

When my father got his first teaching job at Kaimarama, in a sole-teacher school on the Coromandel, my mother thought the journey over the Tapu Range was literally the road to hell. This suspicion was confirmed for her when they reached Whitianga and the schoolhouse had hay bales in it and sheep, hens and goats wandering aimlessly through it. The house was without electricity, though it had running water. Being my mother, she sat on the dirty shit-encrusted floor and sobbed until something better was found.

My first experience of school was going to Kaimarama School with my father, well before I turned five. I remember being awestruck by the Troy boys singing country and western songs on their ukuleles and guitars. Then going for nature walks with the big kids and learning about insects and birds. Curiosity there was always rewarded with attention and answers. School was fun! Learning was fun and people were fun to be with.

Going to school? Was there anything in this background that propelled you towards sociology or that you've drawn on in your writing (or intend to)?

We left the sun-soaked beaches and blue waves of Whitianga when I was four and my father went to teach prisoners at Waikeria Prison in the landlocked Waikato. Living in the Waikeria village meant living with other United Kingdom expats; being taught early to be afraid of men; wondering what it meant to have grandparents, aunts and cousins; and living under strict instructions never to talk to prisoners wandering around the farm and in the village. We were made aware of the distinction between us (that is, assorted migrant prison officer families = good) and them (that is, prison inmates = bad), although later they became more interesting, different and deviant.

My father, a communist, used to bring inmates home, not to work as other officers did, but to have a family meal and read and study if he was tutoring them for university courses. My father was always doing university courses that he had first begun as a returned soldier at the London School of Economics with Harold Laski. The famous Laski was not the reason my father had become a Marxist, though. That had

been a process that began in a railway signal box when he was a very young teen, working with a communist who turned his Catholicism upside down in their nightly debates between trains.

My father's socialism was something I took on board from him. But it was also something that was reinforced by reading, as an 11-year-old, Jessica Mitford's book *Hons and Rebels,* given to me by the women whose convenience shop I worked at in Ponsonby Road after we moved in our little green Ford Prefect with all our belongings up to Auckland. Socialism always made sense to me. When my father went on protests against Diem, the South Vietnamese President, in the early 1960s, it easily followed that I should do the same at later Vietnam protests. I was a Progressive Youth member and marched with my friend Graham Franklin Brown and the Lee boys et al. to Paratai Drive where the United States Ambassador (purportedly) lived and where a policeman was shoved over the cliff.

I did not like Auckland high schools at all. My parents both left home early and worked late. This was good because, apart from having to cook dinners often (I still hate cooking), it meant I could stay home with a book after they left. This was one of the times when I read most—anything I could get my hands on. Was it sociological? Not directly, mostly novels. Are they sociological? Often, just not explicitly so. Consequently, I failed University Entrance, presumably to the disappointment of the headmaster, Mr Wolloxall, who had told me as a 13-year-old student that he expected a University Scholarship from me because of my IQ. So, denied by my parents the option to go hairdressing, I went to Teachers Training College.

Training College was irritating. I remember fights for women to be able to wear pant suits (not even jeans); I can remember being paid $16 while a male student was paid $22; and I can remember them trying to make all the students swear on the Bible as to their fealty to the profession, and me refusing to and having to walk up by myself in front of the whole assembled staff and students and swear on something that wasn't a bible. One kind thing I remember there (and have always subsequently tried to pass on to students whenever possible) was Betty Gilderdale (a lecturer and author) who, when she handed back our essays, told me in front of the class that "I could write". This was an important piece of information for a dyslexic.

My mother in Auckland bloomed again, being back into city life. She became active in abortion reform and was instrumental in helping set up the abortion clinic at Remuera. So, the feminist theory and experiences multiplied all around me.

My first teaching job was at Ohai, a small coal-mining village at the bottom of the South Island. There I saw the New Zealand class system in action in microcosm. There were the coal miners' children, who were the majority of the 5-year-olds I taught, and a few local farmers' children, and in the distant hills were the Speight children, who were sent to boarding school in Switzerland. Their parents were the owners of Speights Brewery. The Speights were spoken of by locals with a mixture of contempt and envy; they remembered it all including such things as when, in the Depression, the Speights' car (the only one in the district) broke down in the village. The wife, who was a model, got out of the car and the husband put mohair blankets under the car wheels to un-stick it. When un-stuck, he and his wife then drove off, leaving the mohair blankets in the mud. I didn't last very long at Ohai Primary School because I didn't get on with the headmaster. This became a pattern with other headmasters. I particularly remember one in Christchurch, who rebuked me soundly for taking the 44 children in my class for a walk to a local park. This had been an attempt to break the tedium of a very boring curriculum. Getting pregnant and becoming grounded, as was standard then, I stopped teaching and joined with my friend Mary Hancock to organise a domestic violence shelter for women. This was in Napier in 1975 when New Zealand, like most countries, was in denial about domestic violence—it was only the second shelter started in New Zealand. We spoke too and organised women's groups to make contributions, and eventually succeeded in opening a shelter.

What was your main post-secondary training/job, and did this have any relevance for later sociological work?

Schools where I taught were boring even when the kids were funny, bright and lively, which they often were. My relief was doing university study through Massey. It was ego-boosting to get As for essays in sociology, which I loved, and I devoured J. V. Baldridge's text *Sociology: A Critical Approach*. It treated sociology so self-reflexively; for example, quoting from the Martin Nicolaus's 1968 speech at the American Sociological Assocation, which is still worth repeating:

> Sociology is not now and never has been any kind of objective seeking out of social truth or reality. Historically, the profession is an outgrowth of nineteenth century European traditionalism and conservatism wedded to twentieth century American corporate liberalism. That is to say that the eyes of sociologists with few but honourable (or honourable but few) exceptions have been turned downward, and their palms upward. Eyes down to study the activities of the lower classes of the subject population…

It was irresistible to be part of such a bad-ass reflexive way of thinking. It gave me permission from the beginning to research the rich and famous as ruthlessly as I could, simply to reduce a power imbalance in sociological writing and society. Other disciplines like economics and history didn't offer me that option. I was told by a history tutor to never question historians in print until after I had done my PhD. It seemed to me then (and now) that most history is written by White middle-class men in the interests of legitimating White male upper-class interests.

Why did you develop your master's/PhD work?

I did my master's on the sociology of women in the legal profession—*Sharing in the shingles: The distribution of rewards in the NZ legal profession*—because I had gone to law school in Auckland and had seen even in the early 1980s how women in law were being treated. Women were the majority (and often the brightest) of my master's law class, but once they left law school, they were subject to misogyny and did badly compared with their male peers—and if they were Māori women, they were subject to both misogyny and racism. I interviewed 100 lawyers (50 men and 50 women). The interviews were great fun and the lawyers were generous with their insights (maybe because fewer people were surveyed or interviewed in the 1980s) and some of my worst suspicions about the treatment of women were confirmed. But writing it up was never quite as easy as my head of department had said it would be: "Interview pieces write themselves." They don't. But I managed to write two articles (1987 and 1989) and three chapters (1988, 1990 and 2003) on the situation of women in the law. A highlight for me was in 1984, just after I finished my master's, when I was invited to Bellagio in Italy (where George Clooney now lives) to the Rockefeller Institute. There, as a young person, for the first time in Italy, I sat around a huge table with a group of elderly academics critically debating facets of the legal profession. They were leading high-profile academics, including Philip Lewis, a senior fellow at Oxford, Rick Abel, a professor of law at the University of California and Harry Arthurs, the dean of Osgoode Hall and later president at York University (Canada). None of them were the uninvited and unwelcome individual who turned up at my bedroom door early one morning. Women are vulnerable to unwelcome sexual overtures at conferences then and now. The Rockefeller Institute itself was magnificent and had reputedly been lived in by Mussolini before the war. The output of our labours was a three-volume piece called *Lawyers in Society* (1988). My chapter was "The New Zealand legal profession: From colonial GPs to the servants of capital?" At that time, looking out across the snow-capped mountain surrounding Lake Camo, I thought that academia had a lot going for it. Travel, fighting for change and social justice, and meeting people—what more could a job offer?

What were the benefits of where you did thesis work? Anything about postgraduate work at Auckland that inspired you?

I loved being a critic of the law and happily never felt inhibited by thinking I would ever need to get a job as a lawyer. So, I decided to do my PhD on the law too but look at it from a Marxist perspective. (I was at this time heavily influenced by reading *Capital* in a reading group with David Bedggood, which was hugely important to me.) Using Marx, I hoped to put the legal profession within a circuit of capital framework. Then I came to the conclusion that the law was only of secondary importance and the real kernel of power was business—how it organised, for whom, and what were its strengths and weaknesses. So, I interviewed 108 top businessmen and 4 businesswomen in New Zealand for my doctorate. In those days before Zoom, it meant lots of plane travel between Auckland and Wellington. Eventually after six years of long nights, with tutoring, a wakeful toddler and a lot of coffee, I was awarded my PhD, *New Zealand Corporate Capitalism,* in 1990.

The University of Auckland Department of Sociology at that time too was lively and generally a good place to be where some of the staff were generally supportive and not all into the sociology of railway trains and stamps. My peer group was unusually stimulating too. Tutoring sociology was largely fun, particularly when I knew what I was talking about (which wasn't when I had to tutor statistics). And my overall advice to anyone thinking of doing a PhD and tutoring, is don't—unless you desperately need the money and cleaning toilets is the only other alternative open to you, because you will be consumed by the effort. Much better to finish the PhD early and get a full-time job.

What has your academic career been? How did you decide on this?
The exotic Italian experience at Bellagio, plus having published a number of journal articles on the legal profession and having finished my PhD in 1990, motivated me to apply for academic jobs—though my daughter, by now at primary school, told me she would "like me to get a job on the checkouts at the supermarket like Michelle's mum". But I went ahead anyway and got a job at Griffith University that year. I had thought Griffith was next to Wagga Wagga and had quite fancied being able to put out a business card with Wagga Wagga on it, but disappointingly, Griffith is in Brisbane. But I knew neither place, and leaving family and friends for a place where I knew no one was a big challenge.

Happily, when I first went to Griffith the place was hopping with Marxists and radical lesbian separatists who had just fought a colleague who had publicly called for the closure of their new Women's Studies Centre within the Humanities. It was all very lively and confrontational. My colleagues were doing exceptionally good work—Tony Van Fossen on tax havens, Brian Head on Australian society, George Lafferty and Geoff Dow on Karl Marx and Sweden's social democracy, and Malcolm Alexander on interlocking directorates—so it was all very exciting. I was able to continue my work on top business with Malcolm, who had been instrumental in getting me the job. We wrote the article 'Business power in Australia – the concentration of directorship holdings amongst the top 250 corporates' in 1992 and got a large Australian Research Council grant in 1994. The grant financed interview travel around Australia, enabling me to interview top Australian businessmen and some women. For me the culmination of this work was my book *Capitalist Networks and Social Power in Australia and New Zealand* (2006, 2017). This work was then (and now) closest to my heart because it pulled no punches in its underlying call for a more equitable (non-neoliberal) society that was better than the one determined for us by capitalists. And this was certainly the theoretical basis of the book John Scott and I edited, *Financial Elites and Transnational Business: Who Rules the World?* (2012).

The other research topics that I have been happily side-tracked by (other than the already mentioned feminism for which I did an edited collection with David Peetz called *Women, Labor Segmentation and Regulation: Varieties of Gender Gaps* (2017), also involved looking at power and its misuse by the powerful—this time, power abuse by think tanks. I wrote about them first with my PhD student Vladimir Pacheco (2000), and later with Alejandro Salas Portes when we did an edited collection called *Think Tanks and Global Politics: Key Spaces Within Global Structures of Power* (2017). And the other industrial relations topic I researched

was coal mining and the work of female miners and domestic workers, in a book written with David Peetz called *Women of the Coal Rushes* (2010). We were commissioned to do this by a union—the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU)—who were concerned that the stories of women were dying out with their ageing. They included not just the women miners (they were still a minority in the mines where they had only begun to work in the 1970s) but also the domestic women workers who had major roles in bitter work disputes and long, drawn-out protests. This meant interviewing women in the coal-mining towns of the Bowen basin in Queensland. Many of the women were old but they were very happy to talk and to know that their stories would be preserved and written into our book.

Why did you choose to write books as well as articles, etc?

I chose to write books because I could and because I was always irritated by other peoples' truths and thought (probably wrongly) that I knew a better truth about power and its abuse. And because I enjoyed collaborating with people who were better writers than me and pushed me further than I would ever go on my own. And second, when I started, writing books was still seen as being necessary for academic promotion. Not that I was ever particularly good at being promoted. And the goal posts were always being shifted upward. When I started in 1990, a senior staff member confidentially complained to me because he had three books and wasn't a professor. I had five books (three edited collections) and never became a full professor. This might have been because at that time being a woman held female academics back, but also because I had received only three (old) major grants (1994, 1994 and 2009). Typically, the university is now dominated by a business agenda, the largest part of which is getting large grants from wherever possible, and the funding source, by choosing your project, will have a positive role in determining the direction of your research—even if they never directly interfere with processes or outcomes (both of which do happen). Sadly, this means the unfunded—however socially or medically worthy—fades into research oblivion.

Have you achieved your career goals?

Not yet, as I am still involved in two projects. The first is with an ex-student, Marco Oechsner, who is currently at Cambridge, working in a COVID-ridden UK hospital, and in his downtime trying to finish his part of our overdue-with-the-publisher book *Capitalism Ate My Body*. The other project is with David Peetz and Ian Lowe on an Australian Research Council project called the Intimidation and Voice of Research Scientists. My part has been interviewing women worldwide on their stories of harassment in science. This book should be mostly finished by the end of 2023.

Any lessons?

Any lessons—don't accept anyone else's negative definition of you. Particularly, if you are a woman academic, you are still the recipients of a gender pay gap (men get discretionary bonuses whereas women generally don't; see Bailey et al., 2016) and you are likely to be hindered in your expectations of promotion. But if you can now get a job in academia, I would still recommend it—the travel's great!

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A3: Martin Tolich

Where did you grow up?

I was born in a state house in Bayswater (Auckland) before moving north for intermediate school and returning to Marcellin College for my high-school years. My education was based around Catholicism.

Go to school? Was there anything in this background that propelled you towards sociology or that you've drawn on in your writing (or intend to)?

The turning point for my education came in School Certificate geography where I scored a high-grade. Although the focus was on New Zealand geographies—relief, climate, soils, vegetation and drainage—my interest was taken by people who lived in these places. So that was really a turning point.

Leaving school, I went on my OE, and when people ask me which of the countries that I had visited were my favourite —California, Europe, May Day 1977 in Red Square, the trans-Siberian railway, climbing Fuji on my 20th birthday—my answer was always the same: it was the six months that I spent in the freezers at Westfield freezing works that provided the greatest insight into human life. I remember the sense of alienation that gripped my life when I saw a truck driver—we had loaded meat onto his truck— being able to escape the factory where I was stuck. Freedom.

What was your main post-secondary training/job? Did this have any relevance for later sociological work?

The sociology of work became my main focus and that was trying to understand the meaningless working life in freezing works.

Why did you go to university?

When I returned to New Zealand in 1977, I looked at jobs in the newspaper and saw that a tertiary education was essential.

Why did you take sociology?

I took psychology and sociology and anthropology, but I excelled in sociology. I found it difficult to answer multiple-choice questions in psychology as there was always a more complex answer then yes and no.

Why develop master's/PhD Work?

I did a master's. One feeble attempt at Auckland University. I was attempting to use research methods when really this had not been taught to me systematically at Auckland University. The focus at Auckland was on essay writing. I was an empirical researcher I was soon to learn.

Thus, when I went to California in 1983 to get married, the master's at Auckland gave me some background in postgraduate studies and I took methodological courses that allowed me to more systematically study the sociology of the workplace. The journal article I wrote from the PhD is titled 'Alienating and liberating emotions at work'. The source of that inspiration was the Westfield freezing works experience of alienation.

Why did you choose to do your thesis at University of Auckland (or not)?

I did a master's thesis but was totally unprepared for it.

Anything about postgraduate study at Auckland that inspired you?

Being part of a really strong cohort of Nigel, Claudia, Gary, Hauraki and Georgina. I found those people to be very supportive and we gelled in Ivanica Vodanovich's class for mutual protection. There weren't a lot of PhD students around, so we were kind of senior students. Tania's March captured the low ebb of a trade union movement that I wanted to champion. When I moved away to California, I intended to drop the trade union as social movement part of my portfolio.

In the US, I was fascinated with how technology was used by workers. I was interested in green fields and brownfields. I was interested in how this new technology was easier for new workers than older workers. My research focus was on the UPC code that you find on any consumer item. When that was introduced in cash registers, how did it affect workers? Surprisingly—not helpful for my PhD—they loved it. But because I had the skills of an inductive iterative research design, I could see that the workers were talking about other forms of alienation, what Hochschild calls the "estrangement from emotion". The supermarkets were the location.

What were the benefits of a US doctoral education?

There are two stories here. One is fretful—would I succeed?—and that stayed with me for 6½ years. But the other story is just the brilliance of people like Lyn Lofland, Gary Hamilton and Judy Stacey who just lit up the room with their teaching in their research.

What has your academic career been? How did you decide on this?

My academic career began with my first academic position at Massey University where I saw an opportunity to study the workplace in an occupation that always interested me. I wrote eight or nine articles about the feminisation of jockeys and jockeys in a total institution, asking questions like why weren't jockeys anorexic?

My career took a detour in an ethics application to study jockeys in and around the Manawatu. A local bishop who was a member of the ethics committee questioned me about my ethnography, asking why I was doing journalism at the university. I literally fell off my horse, on my road to Damascus, and chose a new career, which was championing qualitative research ethics. I'm currently writing my 12th book on the subject.

It is interesting how things turn out. I remember a mentor at UC Davis telling graduate students to go forth into the world and find a place to dig and dig deep. Research ethics was that place, and it has been good to me. I have been a member of an ethics committee at Massey University—I became its deputy chair—and a member of the health and disability ethics committee for Manawatu, and when those committees were disbanded, Annette King, Minister of Health appointed me the inaugural chair of the multi-region health and disability ethics committee, based in Wellington. I served there for four years, and

I saw a need—researchers who were not from a tertiary institution or doing health research had no ethics committee, so I set up a not-for-profit company, The New Zealand Ethics Limited, that hosted a New Zealand ethics committee, which has been running now for the last 12 years. I have the distinction to be the only person in the world who actually owns an ethics committee.

What topics have you worked on? Why those topics?

The topics have always been trying to understand qualitative research ethics. My 11th book—*Finding Your Research Ethics Self*—is just out. The book assumes that qualitative researchers (according to a 2006 article I wrote) go to an ethics committee and tell them: 1) what the research is about, 2) what the ethical issues are raised by that research, and 3) how they (the researcher) are going to address those ethical issues. This is stupid. There is also a fourth question that ethics committees deliberately don't ask: "What are you going do when your research question changes?"—as it invariably will in qualitative research. This book addresses that fourth question by finding a way to better train qualitative students.

Why did you move to the University of Otago?

In 2003, I had a sense that Massey University was in decline, and I feared that the government would move to have fewer universities. Auckland University and Otago University were the safest bets, and a position came up at Otago University. They wanted someone to teach year 2 research methods. I asked them what textbook they used—they use *Social Science Research in New Zealand*—which I had co-written with Carl Davidson. Otago was just a more prestigious university.

Were there any particular audiences you saw yourself as addressing, that you felt responsible to?

Ethics committees.

Who have been supportive colleagues along the way?

There are many people who have supported me along the way, some in New Zealand but most overseas. It would be impolite to mention any of them because I would miss out someone.

How has your teaching/supervision related to your career?

When you look at teaching in the United States in a State College or at the University of California, one can see an elitist system working. In Sacramento State University, you would be teaching four classes each semester. In a University of California University, you would be teaching two classes per semester. This would give you more time to do research. New Zealand universities are more elite than that. At Otago, we teach three courses a year and first- and second-year courses have tutors who do all the grading.

Have you achieved your career goals?

Yes, I have.

Any lessons?

To cherish the autonomy to see work as teaching and everything else—writing books—as fun. I have taken every opportunity I have been given.

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A4: Nigel Clark

I grew up in Kohimarama, in the eastern suburbs of Auckland. I went to St. Thomas's, a state primary/intermediate school, where my final-year teacher, Samuel McHarg, introduced me to environmental issues (through the 1973 Sick Earth project). I then went on to King's College but got out as fast as possible and went straight to university in 1978, originally aiming to do town planning until I was derailed by sociology and the prospect of revolutionary change. I just have this sense of arriving at university very naive and unformed, having not done a lot of living (I think I enrolled on my 17th birthday). As I came out of my undergraduate years, still fairly unfamiliar with the ways in the world, it meant a lot to be taken seriously by my Fab Four friends.

I just kind of stayed on for a master's in 1983 and ended up writing a dissertation entitled *Ecology and the limits to capitalism*. 1984 was really my turning point to being a theorist, both because I was increasingly drawn to theory and because I was too shy to interview real people. Being with a small group—the Fab Three plus Hauraki and Gary—who were all more grown up than me, but also loved what they were doing —was central to being a postgraduate and a formative experience. But another formative moment was facing off against the police during the 1981 Springbok tour and looking down the row of people in the front line and seeing three of my sociology lecturers (I'm thinking it was Ivanica, Cluny and David).

I wandered round the world for a few years and then came back to do a PhD, really because I wasn't sure what else to do, but I knew that I wanted to really push some issues at the intersection of radical social change and radical ecology. Along the way, with some help from Barry Smart, I discovered post-structuralism, got deeper into theory, and my thesis, after many turns, morphed into a genealogy of artificial nature entitled *Prospects of enchantment, Dreamworlds of nature* (1994). After that I knew that I wanted to keep on pushing the question of how social agency and physical processes impacted upon each other, from as many different angles as I could find, which increasingly drew me further from mainstream social science/sociology.

In the 1990s, I lived in the same street in Arch Hill as Claudia and her partner, artist John Lyall, and we jokingly referred to ourselves as the 'King Street School of Cultural Theory', but in all seriousness, our work together and conversations were vital in drawing me into a world of art, literature and cultural production. My collaborations with John Lyall around his notion of 'feral theory' played a big part in my thinking around nonhuman agency in a postcolonial context, and in the late 1990s, I curated two art exhibitions: alt.nature and Shrinking Worlds (John featured in both of them). I was also increasingly influenced by Australian feminist theory at this time.

I was always a bit reluctant to take on a proper academic career, as I (rightly) recognised I wasn't really suited to big institutions and a linear career path, and I eventually stumbled into a job lecturing back in the Department of Sociology at the University of Auckland. This was a familiar and supportive environment for learning the basics of lecturing, but me and the department were probably both ready for a break from each other, and I ended up taking a job in early 2000 at the Open University (OU) in Milton Keynes in the UK, and living in London, and then Oxford. This entailed a move into a human geography department, but this was just as conducive to my interest in nonhuman agency: the transition was no big deal and I continued to publish in social theory/sociology journals and to hang out with sociologists as well as geographers. I liked the pace of the OU, the time we took to develop teaching material, and I got to

work on one of the first online distance learning environment courses and to work in very interdisciplinary teams.

There was a feeling in coming to the UK that I was starting again, and a lot of what I had done previously didn't count, though in my case this was not just a matter of coming from New Zealand, but of publications and achievements in the art world not really counting for much in social science. My feeling has always been that in issues around environmental issues, nonhuman agency and questions of decolonisation, Europe and the North Atlantic has a lot to learn from the Antipodes, though one of the things I miss about being in the UK is feeling out of touch with Māori thought and politics and scholarship, and with the Pacific more generally. But in many respects moving to the UK wasn't a big leap, especially as it has often meant working closely with people who are also diasporic in some way, and often in ways that are more visible than it is for me.

Alongside numerous side projects, my long-term interest in nonhuman agency eventually crystallised into the book *Inhuman Nature: Sociable Life on a Dynamic Planet* (2011) which, as the title suggests, was about trying to draw social theory into a full engagement with the Earth and with volatile and variable Earth processes. These are themes I've continued to push, up to and including a more recent book that I co-wrote with Lancaster sociologist colleague Bron Szerszynski: *Planetary Social Thought: The Anthropocene Challenge to the Social Sciences*. Books, especially these two, have always held the appeal of drawing diverse material into a bigger, deeper and more idiosyncratic statement than you can get away with in papers or chapters.

Moving to a small geography department nested in a bigger environment centre at Lancaster University in 2012 drew me back into face-to-face teaching, and the 'joys' of PowerPoint and big lectures. I hold the Chair of Social Sustainability in the Lancaster Environment Centre. A lot of the teaching I've had to do, as in many places, is just covering the bases, but in the last few years I've been able to experiment with courses where I really get my students to think with and through Earth processes. It's interesting to see how raising questions of how you might work and play and engage with the Earth 'otherwise' seems to work as an enlivening and creative alternative to simply confronting the threat of climate change.

My version of social science has always been relentlessly interdisciplinary, not only in the sense that I cross over into neighbouring disciplines, but that I also work with artists, humanities scholars and natural scientists. I've co-authored books and papers with natural scientists, and published in the fields of literary studies, geography, sociology, anthropology, philosophy, cultural and media studies, environmental studies, feminist studies, art theory and whatever else comes along, but I guess when you're interested in what the Earth gets up to, a certain amount of wandering comes into it. I've watched environmental catastrophe gradually loom ever since primary school in the early '70s, and my abiding interest is to try and reshape social science to take account of the jittery planet on which it finds itself. I also feel immensely lucky that I got my tertiary education just in advance of big fee hikes and that I had my major career breaks before it was compulsory to attract research funding, which I've never been particularly interested in or successful at—frankly, because I never needed it. Currently, I'm ever more appalled by the fact that a generation of students are going into deep debt to learn about how fucked their planet is, and then being increasingly brutally policed when they try and do anything about it.

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Checking Subtler Gender Differences in New Zealand Sociology Phd Students' Article Production During Enrolment (2010–19)

Adam Rajčan and **Edgar Burns**[*]

Introduction

This research note outlines the findings from empirical analyses of subtle gender differences in the rate of producing published outputs during enrolment in a PhD. Roksa et al. (2022, p. 47) cite studies reporting that "scholarly publication is a long-recognized 'coin of the realm', which serves as a significant, though not sole, criterion in faculty hiring decisions." The rate of publication, an output measure, has to be interrogated, as does the different effort required or obstacles needing to be overcome for different groups of students, such as men and women, to be successful in achieving the same level of research productivity. Other major influences enabling or constraining research productivity during enrolment may include key variables such as ethnicity and socioeconomic status. These structural factors are invisible in university measures of output rates.

Ninety-five New Zealand sociology students completed their doctoral theses in the most recent decade, 2010–19. We had previously reported on a smaller five-year cohort in this journal (Burns & Rajčan, 2019). Over half of these students produced at least one article or book chapter. The present research note is based on the analysis of the refereed journal articles. In effect, the background question of our ongoing research into PhD productivity is whether the highest-earned university qualification is still a PhD—or whether in the reality of the contemporary academic labour market, it has become a PhD plus publications.

The 95 doctoral students achieved overall 131 outputs, of which 104 (79.3%) were journal articles and 27 (20.7%) book chapters. Two thirds of thesis completions were by women. This proportion is in keeping with a decades-long ratio for sociology students (Crothers, 2018; Rajčan & Burns, 2020). The higher proportion of women students and staff in sociology than in other academic fields has not, however, translated into elevation to positions at more senior level (Germov & McGee, 2005; Larkins 2018). The consciousness of the need for a better-balanced gender workforce has grown over several decades in the academy (Bönisch-Brednich & White, 2021).

Bönisch-Brednich and White's (2021) recent Australasian study looking at the push for gender balance referred to variability in individual university responses. For example, they pointed out that only one third of strategic plans specifically mentioned gender, debates about gender quotas for such things as university appointments or senior academic promotions varied markedly, and that senior university managers varied in their commitment to equality or "tinkering around the edges" (Bönisch-Brednich & White, 2021, p. 111). This meant uneven career progress for women in an era of constant restructuring. The goal of greater gender fairness has tended to be assimilated as one strand of a general diversity approach. Marked differences in gender balance by discipline persist through to the present (Winchester & Browning, 2012). Despite these dilemmas, Bönisch-Brednich and White (2021) were broadly positive about

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the progress being made, though there continues to be a rhetorical gap between the commitment of university managers and the outworking of gender policy.

More detailed questions about gender and research productivity

A primary measure of academic research productivity by gender in our study was the count of refereed articles and book chapters. Refereed outputs have become a key criterion in the contemporary academy for entry into postdoctoral positions and academic jobs, as well as for promotion and career progression (Bartkowski et al., 2015; Lei, 2021). Aside from benefit to individual researchers' careers, well-placed outputs have become increasingly important in the Performance-Based Research Fund (PBRF) environment for survival of individual departments and disciplines. This continues for international competitiveness of universities in the neoliberal global higher education sector. There is no necessary connection between gender equality and universities' neoliberal productivist agenda. Some attempts are being made today to link these. For example, the *Times Higher Education* in its Impact Rankings section (Times Higher Education, 2020) states that it:

> has produced a ranking focusing on how universities are contributing to gender equality. Some of the measures looked at as part of the ranking are research on gender, policies on gender equality, commitment to recruiting and promoting women, the proportion of first-generation female students and student access measures.

Historically, Curtis and Phibbs (2006) provided an early baseline discussion of five potential drivers of gender differences in the research quality score in New Zealand's then just-introduced PBRF. The importance of gender equality politically and academically means thinking beyond simply counting the number of research outputs. For example, the likely gender differences in efforts to overcome obstacles can vary widely between individuals in achieving a completed thesis (Dever et al., 2008). For instance, women in academia experience higher workloads of pastoral care in teaching roles (Ding, 2021; Hochschild, 1989; O'Meara et al., 2017). In particular, gendered cumulative advantage or disadvantage starts with publishing during the PhD (Horta & Santos, 2016; Lindahl et al., 2020). Brower and James (2020) examined all academics in all disciplines in the PBRF system, and found that "research score and age explain less than half of the approximately \$400,000 lifetime gender pay gap in NZ universities" (p. 8).

Our recently published study focused on PhD publishing practices in sociology, during the period of candidates' enrolment, by institution and gender (Rajčan & Burns, 2022). These analyses were primarily based on the number of refereed journal articles and book chapters involved. After establishing that there was no statistically significant difference in terms of output production between men and women during PhD enrolment (measured by the number of articles and book chapters produced), we pursued a further investigation of potential gendered differences in this cohort's publishing practices by posing the following questions. First, within the similar numbers, were women and men achieving the same quality of publications in terms of journal ranking? Second, was the gender distribution of outputs in sociology versus non-sociology journals the same or different? Third, were women and men equally publishing in local (that is, Australasian) versus international journal outlets? Addressing these three questions is important because of the implications for labour market competitiveness of PhD completers, as well as the long-term future of the sociology discipline.

Method

To see if men's and women's publishing practices were similar in these subtler patterns within the overall count of research outputs, we ran six analyses using non-parametric statistical tests. We initially chose chi-square tests, and then for the journal quality metrics, because of the ordinality in the rankings, applied

the Mann-Whitney test. Running these analyses allowed the broad quality measure of an article's refereed status to be further explored. Gender of PhD students was decided based on names and personal pronouns in their thesis and published work; we did not find any students identifying as non-binary. It is worth considering, however, that gender identity does not equate to personal pronouns or names, which means that nonbinary students may be included in this data. For example, some trans, gender-diverse, takatāpui, and non-binary people do use she/her and he/him pronouns, while not necessarily identifying as a woman or a man. A wider issue in the context of gender inequality in universities is that some PhD students may not feel comfortable asking supervisors or others to use their non-binary pronoun. Using data based on public information from university repositories and research databases meant that this level of granularity was not available.

The variables were operationalised as follows: First, for testing journal quality, SCImago quartile ranking of journals (https://www.scimagojr.com) and 2010 Excellence in Research in Australia (ERA) journal rankings were used (Murray & Skead, 2020). Second, for determining distribution between sociology and non-sociology outlets, the ERA 2018 journal list was used (Australian Research Council, 2018). Third, Ulrichsweb and journal homepages were used to determine whether journals were Australasian or international (https://www.ulrichsweb.com/ulrichsweb/faqs.asp). These measures are further explained as part of presenting the findings.

Results

The results of the six analyses were tabulated and calculated individually providing a more fine-grained assessment of differences between men and women PhD students' publishing patterns (Table 1).

Table 1. Gender by publication quality, sociology vs non-sociology, Australasia vs international

Measure	Test	p-value	significance
SCImago quartiles	Mann-Whitney	0.62	not significant
ERA 2010 A*, A, B, C rankings	Mann-Whitney	0.19	not significant
Sociology vs non-sociology journals	chi-square	0.82*	not significant
Sociology vs non-sociology articles	chi-square	0.80*	not significant
Australasian vs international journals	chi-square	0.16*	not significant
Australasian vs international articles	chi-square	0.37*	not significant

*Yates correction

Journal quality metrics

To determine whether there were gendered differences in the publication quality between men and women, we adopted SCImago's quartile ranking of journals which allocates journals into four quartiles—Q1 being the top quartile and Q4 being the lowest—based on the SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) indicator (Moura et al., 2019). SJR "considers journal impact in terms of the citations received, taking into account the quality of the citing journals" (Jokić et al., 2018, p. 1379). We also used the 2010 ERA journal rankings where journals were assigned A*, A, B or C ranking (subsequently discontinued) (Murray & Skead, 2020). According to the ERA 2010 Evaluation guidelines, these rankings range from an "A* journal [which] would be one of the best in its field or subfield" through to C which "includes quality, peer reviewed, journals that do not meet the criteria of the higher tiers" (Australian Research Council, 2010, p. 51). In both cases, the Mann-Whitney test indicated that the differences between the men's and women's publishing quality do not go beyond what would be expected by chance.

Sociology or non-sociology publishing

We tested gender differences in publishing in sociology and non-sociology journals using the journal FoR coding (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008) published in the ERA 2018 journal list (Australian Research Council, 2018). Publishing inside or outside sociology may have potential consequences for career progression within the discipline, as well as being important for the long-term future of the discipline (Burns and Rajčan, 2021; Crothers, 2018; Warren, 2019). It is not surprising that both genders are publishing in sociology, the greater count by women a reflection of the gender balance overall. The two chi-square tests showed no significant differences between genders in terms of publishing in sociology versus non-sociology. The tests examined potential differences whether considered in terms of the articles that were published or the journals in which the articles appeared.

Australasian or international publishing

We tested if sociology doctoral students are eschewing New Zealand and Australian journals (considered as the local sphere) in preference for international journals and whether there is a gender difference. To distinguish between Australasian and international journals, we used Ulrichsweb and journal websites. The results showed that there was no significant difference between men and women in Australasian versus overseas publishing. Overall, PhD completers published more in international journals, but without significant differences between men and women in this practice. It can be noted that men were 1.74 times more likely than women to publish internationally rather than domestically, but on the sample size here, this was not statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval.

Conclusion

This report documents six statistical analyses of three comparisons affecting men and women producing refereed articles during contemporary PhD enrolment in sociology in New Zealand. We looked at journal quality, publishing in sociology or non-sociology journals, and Australasian or international journals. By doing this, we aimed to show a more nuanced consideration than a gross comparison of the number of refereed outputs between genders. We make four main points in summary here.

First, that there is no statistically significant difference on any of these six measures is noteworthy, and potentially a good sign. There are, however, many points for interrogation for improving gender equity that these results raise. As noted earlier, gender differences in publishing contribute to cumulative advantage starting within the PhD (Lindahl et al., 2020). There is clear room for examining gendered publication opportunities in the early career period, as well as thinking about PhD completers who follow different career paths outside universities.

Second, as well as several theoretical points when interpreting these results, it is necessary here to be very cautious of these results because of the small sample size involved; larger data sets mean the power of such tests could be relied on much more. What is worth noting here, along with this strong caution, is the usefulness of the present exercise as a template for other researchers repeating the analyses with other cohorts or adding different analyses to investigate other possible subtle differences.

Third, for some decades, issues of gender equity and opportunity have grown increasingly central in higher education, both in New Zealand and internationally. Obvious progress measures can easily obscure hegemonic patterns of gender difference that persist or re-emerge in different forms. What these are and how they function remain ongoing questions. A short report such as this is simply a minor contribution to these much larger and important social changes and the accompanying debates about them.

Reporting this statistical information necessarily speaks to wider debates by feminist scholars and others who bring their perspectives to interpreting the substantive significance that these differences and non-differences may indicate (Sang, 2018). Major cultural shifts such as gender participation, roles and

success take many years. Furthermore, theoretical and qualitative perspectives are necessary to invigilate these patterns in relation to structural and discursive frameworks that may undermine or redirect patterns of change. Even a sense of positive change needs continual questioning as each decade reshapes the contribution and valuation of women and men in the contemporary university environment.

Acknowledgements

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Social Mobility:
Contemporary Theoretical Considerations and the Constructivist Structuralism of Pierre Bourdieu

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In this research note we explore how the discipline of sociology could reconceptualise social mobility. Within sociology, Sorokin (1960) is often seen as the father of social mobility studies. Sorokin defined *social mobility* as the phenomenon of individuals' circulation within the social space, meaning any transition of an individual, object or social value from one social position to another. Sorokin argued that a fundamental factor in the social distribution of individuals is the material human itself, its physical and mental qualities, whether inherited or acquired. However, within this definition, how can you explain people's change in social mobility? Indeed, Sorokin's conceptualisation of social mobility obscures that not everyone has equal opportunities or begin their journey at the same starting point. We suggest in this paper that conceptualisations of social mobility need to take into account dynamic and fluid conceptualisation of social mobility that recognises the inherent power relations within social structures. We use the theoretical insights of Pierre Bourdieu to generate new considerations for the analysis of social mobility, in a field of study that is characterised by deterministic approaches focused on quantitative data and that underestimates the complexity of social mobility as a process (Friedman, 2014, 2016; Horvat, 2003; Horvat & Antonio, 1999; Horvat & Davis, 2011; Lee & Kramer, 2013; Lehmann, 2009).

Elements to build new paths of research on social mobility

Bourdieu built a theoretical-methodological framework where the different categories of analysis function as a system where each of them can only be understood by reference to the others (Baranger, 2012; Gutiérrez, 2005). Within Bourdieu's theoretical approach are conceptual tools such as social space, field, capital, habitus, practices, domination and symbolic violence, which are mutually linked as parts of a whole and provide instruments of analysis that need to be considered together within the theoretical system that they configure (Baranger, 2012; Gutiérrez, 2005).

The social space as a field and the field as an object of study

According to Bourdieu (1977), every society is presented as a multidimensional and asymmetric place that is governed by a series of dynamic forces through 'fields', which are defined as relational social spaces where agents are distributed in a series of social positions. For Bourdieu, a field is determined by what is at stake in it, normally a specific type of capital that is the very condition of its operation. Bourdieu strips

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the concept of capital of its economic connotation and leads it to all kinds of resources that can be accumulated and used in different markets as an instrument of power (Bourdieu, 1998; Bourdieu & Gutiérrez, 2010, p. 12). These *capitals* are presented in four different forms—economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital—the last corresponding to the symbolic effects of capital when it obtains recognition and legitimacy (Bourdieu et al., 2001; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). A *field* is an objective structure of differences in which the system of positions of the agents is determined by the distribution of these forms of power contained in capital. It is important to highlight that within the field, an agent's location in it is not necessarily defined by the merits of the individuals, but by the trajectory followed by the family or rather their location within social space (Bourdieu, 1977). In this way, it is not only possible to think about an agent's position in the social space and their movements in it synchronously, but also diachronically (Bourdieu et al., 2001; Bourdieu & Gutiérrez, 2010).

Emphasising the historical dimension (diachronic and synchronic character not only of the fields but also of the agents) allows us to recognise the dynamism of the social space as a field of struggle that seeks to preserve or transform the forces contained therein. Therefore, each field is also constituted in a space of conflict where those who are inclined towards conservation strategies tend to defend orthodoxy and the legitimate principle of domination (Bourdieu, 2002). To emphasise the importance of this element of friction, which is a product of conflict in the theory of the fields, Bourdieu proposes the existence of a 'field of power' as a kind of meta field in which the encounter between agents occurs (Bourdieu et al., 2001). The exercise of domination in current societies depends on a multiplicity of 'elites' possessing different forms of capital that constantly reinvent the mechanisms of legitimation and reproduction of the social order (Bourdieu, 1977). Within Bourdieu's approach, he seeks to: (1) define the position of the social field under study in relation to the field of power, (2) establish the relationships between the positions that structure the field, and (3) analyse the different systems of dispositions that the agents have acquired through the internalisation of the social conditions in their trajectories (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2005). These theoretical innovations are important for understanding social mobility. However, we would argue that is perhaps his concept of habitus that has the most potential to contribute to new understandings of social mobility.

The social space as the cradle of habitus

The concept of *habitus* has been taken by Bourdieu from classical philosophy to "refer to the set of dispositions to act, perceive, value, feel and think in a certain way rather than another, dispositions that have been internalised by the individual in the course of their history" (Gutiérrez, 2005, p. 68). The habitus is considered a social product. It is not acquired innately or naturally but responds to the characteristics of the position that agents occupy in a specific field within social space (Bourdieu et al., 2001). Agents are inclined to accept the social world as it is, to see it as natural, without rebelling against it or opposing it with possible worlds, or at least different ones. An agent's sense of position within the field is often marked or maintained, respected or enforced (Bourdieu, 1990). Habitus becomes a meeting place for the individual and the social insofar as it intersects objectivity and subjectivity; it is contained in the body and at the same time connected to the outside world. The habitus constitutes the connection point of Bourdieu's constructivist structuralism.

On the one hand, the habitus originates within an individual's oldest dispositions from socialisation, such the family environment. However, habitus also involves tacit knowledge that is collective, the product of a specific group of agents who share similar conditions of existence. This social

inheritance of the habitus offers the group one of the most effective means of perpetuating itself as such, transcending the limits of biological finitude and thus safeguarding its distinctive way of existing (Bourdieu, 2011). If the reproduction of the dispositions within the collective habitus adjusts and varies according to the position occupied by the agents within social space, the habitus then is constituted as an embodied structure resulting from the lasting experience of a position in the social space (Bourdieu & Mizraji, 2000). The habitus, therefore, gives rise to social practices, which are understood only from their double dimension: an 'objective' meaning and a 'lived' meaning (Gutiérrez, 2003). According to this understanding, social mobility could not be analysed without understanding the social structure that makes it possible and the characteristics of the agent that executes this social mobility within the field.

Social practices as a product of the field/habitus relationship

Bourdieu (1998) believes it is essential to consider the position of the agent and the trajectory of that position within the field. But it is also necessary to examine the social structures that shape the habitus and that are embodied by the agent that produces the practices (Gutiérrez, 2005). Consequently, if there is an alteration of the explanatory factors of the practices, the habitus loses practical sense within the field. Furthermore, social practices are analysed in terms of strategies implemented by the agent to improve the conditions of their position, preserving or improving it and defending the instruments that allow the agent to stay in the game. Bourdieu thus intends to rescue the capacity for action, invention and improvisation of the social agent in the dynamics of the fields of which they are apart (Bourdieu, 1998; Bourdieu & Gutiérrez, 2010). The practices, whether individual or collective, are characterised by being inhabited by a common sense of *doxa* (unquestioned beliefs). Practices become doxa through their conformity and their constancy over time (Bourdieu, 2007; Bourdieu & Gutiérrez, 2010).

Social mobility

Bourdieu's theoretical and empirical development begins with the fundamental idea that positions within fields are shaped by the relationship between two dynamic principles of habitus/structure. On the one hand, a field is an objective structure that through the distribution of capital, guarantees its reproduction; on the other hand other, the reproduction is also achieved through the habitus to provide a set of strategies that are dynamic but are perpetually socially reproduced (Bourdieu, 2011).

For one's social position to move, it is necessary to understand the habitus/structure that reproduces its doxa. Bourdieu insists that belonging to the field and the position occupied by the agent depends on specific social conditions that legitimise the privileges that are transformed from social inheritance into individual grace or personal merit, precisely through the discourse of their naturalness. (Bourdieu et al., 2001). The success of this discourse of naturalness lies in the strength of the system to reproduce these perception and appreciation schemes. This harmony between the categories of perception of the social world and the division of the established order within the field contributes to the preservation of the system of positions (Bourdieu, 1998).

Bourdieu (1998) states that the preservation of the system of positions is due to the mutual relationship between social structures and mental structures. For example, one's own first experience of the social world becomes one's doxa. Within the context of social mobility, an agent's doxic experience makes mobility difficult. We mean this in the sense that the agent would tend to eliminate any type of ambition that would allow them to move at least upwards, as their social position becomes doxa and is apart of their habitus, and also how those within the field view them. However, Bourdieu et al. (2001)

goes against the dominant discourse on social mobility, and suggest that social position can change—one's position within the field is part of a social 'trajectory'; that is, a series of positions successively occupied by the same agent or the same group in a social space over time.

The analysis of social trajectories seeks to analyse why some agents have different life trajectories even though they are endowed with the same capital and habitus within the field. For the analysis of social mobility, it is pertinent to recognise that agents do not move at random within social space because the forces that create the structure of the field are imposed on them. It follows that a certain volume of inherited capital or power corresponds to a bundle of probable trajectories for the agent. The passage from one trajectory to another is periodically dependent on collective and individual events such as moments of crisis and fortunate or unfortunate coincidences. Additionally, not all arrival positions are equally possible for all starting points. This can be evidenced by cases in which agents originating from the same family develop different relationships with the world (Bourdieu, 1998).

Determining elements of social mobility from a Bourdieusian approach

The classic studies of social mobility describe an increase in the educational level and the improvement of the conditions of occupation compared with the previous generation's as indicators of upward mobility. However, Bourdieu's understanding implies that not only should the possession and use of the different forms of capital by agents be considered, but also their habitus as a factor that influences the perpetuation of inequality (Bourdieu & Boltanski, 2009). Therefore, conceptualisations of social mobility need to take into the account the number of factors that influence an agent's social trajectory, such as symbolic violence, domination, symbolic systems and habitus acquired through intra- and intergenerational mobility processes in each social space. Understanding that power dynamics play an important part in understanding social mobility is important. As power within social space leads to a social construction of the world that validates the social space, a discourse by those who are in a dominant position give it meaning, or as Bourdieu and Passeron say, the social space could become a "sociodicy—a social order that is justified and maintains the distribution of power and resources and its consequent privileges (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1995).

Bourdieu (2011) also notes that power within social space is not limited to economic or political power, but includes also symbolic power. Within fields, the 'symbolic' violence that is exercised upon an agent is often complicit in the maintenance of social orders (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) suggest that symbolic violence is an instrument of domination and has a key role in the production and distribution of social inequalities. Thus, the constitutive power relations within fields become internalised into the habitus, which develops a sense of social orientation (sense of one's place within social space) for the agents, from an image of reality, or that experience of that world, that allows one to act as if the structure of the world is the natural order of things (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 470). Within such a context, social mobility can be limited. So how can we overcome this theoretical paralysis?

Conclusion—new research pathways

Within the discipline of sociology, there is a strong tendency for empirical works that include social stratification and mobility processes to be supported by an analysis of class trajectories. However, within our post-COVID times, there is a need to better understand the complexity of society. We suggest that social mobility must be understood as an intra- and intergenerational process that depends on multiple factors articulated with each other, grouped into three levels: macro-, meso- and micro-social (Bertaux &

Thompson, 2017; Sautu, 2003). The macro-social level is represented by the structure of opportunities and limitations of a society in each socio-historical context. The meso-social level is made up of the social relations framework of the individuals; that is, the social interactions where lifestyles are configured. And the micro-social level refers to individual behaviours, values, motivations and beliefs and the constitutive elements of human agency. This tripartite structure incorporating into the theoretical approach of Pirre Bourdieu, we would argue, can lead to new insights into social mobility within sociology.

Bourdieu's field theory represents a viable option to advance new research pathways and influences an emerging vision in the study of social mobility. Analytical categories such as habitus, social and symbolic capital and social space represent theoretical tools to understand and explain the different iterations of the mobility experience in people's social trajectories. It is not surprising that increasing social mobility is part of the main social policy objectives of contemporary governments. However, this vision does not make sense, unless policies take into the account the structural, but also embodied, nature of an agent's experience. If we are to understand the complexity of social mobility within sociology more completely, we need to critically engage and conceptualise social mobility as a social practice that must:

1. reveal the characteristics of the field of power that controls the relations of domination
2. reveal the mechanisms and instruments of power created and implemented that ensure the permanence of the established order in each field within social space, and
3. understand the history of the system of objective relations (functioning of capital in time) for agents, and the history incorporated in the agents in the form of habitus, especially over time.

If these elements are not used to conceptualise and understand social mobility, sociology will find it hard explain social mobility to key audiences, such as policymakers who are seeking to address inequities and inequalities in our societies.

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Wilson, M. (2021). *Activism, Feminism, Politics and Parliament.* Bridget Williams Books, 266 pages, ISBN 9781988587844

Reviewed by Tracey Nicholls*

Former Labour Party president and Member of Parliament Margaret Wilson has lived a ground-breaking life in New Zealand law and politics. Among her other significant achievements, she was the first woman dean of a law school (Te Piringa, University of Waikato), the only woman to serve as Attorney-General (Helen Clark's Fifth Labour Government), and the only woman to serve as Speaker of the New Zealand House of Representatives (2005–2008). Wilson curates the events of her life in the context of New Zealand's emergence from cultural and economic dependence on the United Kingdom in the 1960s and 1970s and our subsequent grappling with how to decolonise the institutions of our public life, principally to convince women readers of the importance of working within feminism and within politics in order to bring about gender equality.

Wilson's memoir of her extraordinary life begins and ends with meditations on equality and difference. In between those two framing discussions—how she learned "the politics of difference" in her Waikato childhood (pp. 1–5) and what we must understand about difference in order to have equality before the law (pp. 244–245)—she reflects upon her public life spent working in law and politics to advance the cause of women's social equality with men. Working from diaries she has kept throughout her life, she reconstructs an account of her life that she freely acknowledges is selective, focusing on her public life and political achievements (p. 5). She makes some trenchant observations throughout her memoir about what it is like to live in the public eye with a disability and with chronic pain, and about the rigid inaccessibility of institutions like Parliament that confronts people with disabilities, but Wilson's primary focus as she sifts through her lifetime of achievement is always on the struggle that presented itself to her because of her gender.

In the opening chapters, Wilson writes of her early childhood as an education in learning to live a minority identity, by growing up Catholic in a town (Morrinsville) where religious affiliations mattered, and of learning to be a free-thinker in politics, thanks to her grandfather's influence. She writes also of learning, as a young woman, to live with disability and constant discomfort as a result of being diagnosed with a form of bone cancer and having her left leg amputated (p. 21). Recounting this period of her life, she reflects poignantly on her early decision to treat disability as a "secondary part" of her life. She tells us: "I do recall consciously deciding that being a woman in law and then in politics was a big enough disability; it seemed unproductive to focus also on the politics of disability" (p. 25). It is this reflective honesty and self-analysis that I find such a strength of Wilson's memoir. Being a woman interested in law and in politics in the late 1960s and 1970s *was* still a disadvantage, and women who are working in these spaces today are benefiting from the efforts that Wilson and her generational cohort have made towards gender equality. But even as we catalogue how much

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work remains in achieving that objective, it is also instructive to note how much has changed in, for instance, Parliament, as current members openly self-identifying as people with disabilities invite us all to think more inclusively about embodiment and inclusion in public life. As Wilson tells us, "An understanding of law requires an understanding of policy, and policy requires an understanding of the society within which the law is implemented" (p. 28).

Wilson locates her political awakening in her university years, as "a member of the post-war baby-boom generation that had the confidence to assert its identity as distinctly of New Zealand" (p. 2). It was in the heady, exciting era of student protest, the emerging gay rights and women's movements and counter-cultural possibility of the late 1960s and 1970s that Wilson learned the need to marry theory and practice. She was reading Marx and Mao and Gramsci, but she names as a singularly influential text Saul Alinsky's (1971/1989) *Rules for Radicals*, praising Alinsky's argument for redistributing power to the people for its "emphasis on practical organising rather than theory" (p. 31). She also read widely in feminist theory, again drawn to theory and activism that foregrounded women's realities—the idea propounded by radical feminism that the personal is political (pp. 32–34).

Describing her post-law-school shift out of university research and into politics—what she terms a "tentative foray"—Wilson recalls that it was obvious even then that women's ability to control our own lives requires that we have our own financial security (p. 39). This is what led her to become involved in the equal pay movement emerging in Aotearoa New Zealand at the end of the 1960s, the movement that would later, in its calls for equal pay for work of equal value, become known as pay equity (pp. 47–48). Reflecting on her early political organising—including a 1975 submission to the Select Committee on Women's Rights on the discrimination women faced in the workforce—she examines the possibility that her efforts could have been directed differently, to encourage women into leadership in business, for instance (p. 45). But her longstanding commitment to investigating the reasons for gender inequality led her to the conclusion that "women's inequality was embedded in the economic system" (p. 45) and efforts to change the political conditions of women's working lives would ultimately bear more fruit than trying to change business practices within unreformed policy frameworks. The work she did throughout the 1970s, attending United Women's Conventions (pp. 49–54) and contributing to the Working Women's Charter eventually adopted by the Labour Party (pp. 55–58), was all part of her ongoing effort to normalise women in the workforce, as she continued to debate to herself the merits of working within the political system and a Labour Party that she experienced as "male-centred, hierarchical and authoritarian" (pp. 60–67).

Wilson's work both in the 1970s, doing political organising at the community level, and in the 1980s as she entered New Zealand politics on the threshold of neoliberalism's rise, are of interest for their detailed examination of entrenched attitudes about women's roles in society. Her determination to introduce a policy on women's equality to the Labour Party took shape in the early 1980s as a discussion paper that outlined a socialist-feminist programme for gender equality and which cemented her commitment to working within the system (p. 68). From the standpoint of Wilson's grounding in democratic socialism and feminism, the discussion paper urged "a rejection of patriarchal values of dominance, destructive competitiveness and authoritarianism, and an acceptance of the feminist values of cooperation, consensus and peace" (p. 69)—an analysis recognisable to those of us who work in critical areas of scholarship like feminist peace studies as the still un-met challenge of Second Wave feminism. Discussion of her steadfast commitment to socialist and feminist principles is woven throughout Wilson's recollections of her political life, identified at one point as her "primary reason for being in politics" (p. 119). Reflecting on the causes she contributed to in the 1970s and 1980s, Wilson is struck by how widely accepted arguments for pay and employment equity have become, and

by how persistent problems such as the gender wage gap and sexual harassment remain, observing that "fundamentally, the labour market has not changed much for women since 1990" (pp. 156–157).

Another part of the appeal of this memoir is Wilson's first-hand accounts of the networks she was part of. Over successive chapters that chart an extraordinary life, Wilson recounts and analyses her early involvement in feminist activism and theorising during her university days, her initiation in the late 1970s as an institutional insider to party politics, through the Labour Party (including a two-term stint as party president), working relatively briefly outside government as the first woman dean of a law school (Te Piringa, at the University of Waikato), and finally entering Parliament by standing for Labour as a list MP in the 1999 election at Helen Clark's request (p. 111). Her life as a member of parliament began with her immediately entering Cabinet as Attorney-General, Minister of Labour, and Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations (p. 121), and finally put her in a position to implement gender equality measures she had championed since university. As she gives us this account of her record of public service and achievement, Wilson also walks us through a fascinating overview of her longstanding working relationships with some of the most high-profile women in New Zealand politics, Helen Clark among them. The memoir includes many photographs taken in Wilson's personal and public moments, but the one I am most struck by is a 2001 shot of Wilson during her time as Attorney-General, standing next to then-PM Helen Clark, Chief Justice Sian Elias and Dame Silvia Cartwright, who has just been sworn in as Governor-General. Wilson's caption of the photo observes that "for the first time, these four positions were held by women" (photo text, between pp. 224–225). This predominance of women in political leadership continued when Wilson took up the role of Speaker of the House in 2005, becoming New Zealand's first woman Speaker as Clark, Elias and Cartwright continued in their roles (p. 221).

Wilson's reminiscence of her time as Speaker is notable for being one of her most extended discussions of the adaptations she made in the course of a public life lived with a disability (pp. 220–221). "Living with a disability means you are outside 'normal' life", she had already observed earlier in her memoir (p. 24). "You become the exception and therefore must argue for accommodation within a system that is not designed to include you" (p. 24). But always, Wilson's account of working within a system designed not to include her returns to gender differences. She recalls her nine years in Parliament as years in which she tried to conform to what was 'normal', explaining in retrospect that she "was already somewhat used to this position, of course, because women frequently have to conform to norms of behaviour that are based on the male experience" (pp. 220–221). She notes that it is a common feature of many women's lives that we feel unheard. "As more women achieve positions of authority, our voices are heard more often," she acknowledges, "but whether what we are saying is understood is still a relevant question" (p. 124).

Exploring how patriarchal institutions and practices have shaped women's lives, and doing this exploration during the decades in which neoliberal policies were imposed and normalised in Aotearoa New Zealand, has led Wilson to the uncompromising conclusion that "if women are to achieve equality, neoliberal policies are definitely not the way to do it … It will require a fundamental change in the value system that underlies policy-making for women to obtain control over their lives" (p. 3). This, she says, is why "more than any other reason" she wrote her memoir: "to help other women understand the need to become engaged with feminism and politics if our society is to sustain the drive for equality for all peoples" (p. 245). In the scrupulous self-evaluation with which she concludes the memoir, Wilson identifies equality as "a main thread" running through her life. Making a point reminiscent of Catharine MacKinnon's (1987) analysis of equality and difference in *Feminism Unmodified*, Wilson notes that much of the progress made towards gender equality has been because we (women) have adapted ourselves to the system not designed for us. "There is still no

fundamental recognition that equality means respecting difference and not expecting women to be like men," she observes, declaring that "this will be the next major challenge" (p. 238).

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language of Brash and others, communism. Brash's speech saw a marked rise in his popularity, with National surging in the polls and very nearly winning that year's election. The myth of Māori privilege then, while perhaps nonsensical, has nevertheless had very real, material effects, animating as it did a good deal of the political right's electioneering in the early 2000s.

Meihana's central claim throughout the book is that the myth of Māori privilege is as old as the colony itself. He carefully and convincingly traces the roots of the myth back to the very first interactions between Māori and Pākehā, and the signing of Te Tiriti. The book thus represents an important intervention, demonstrating the ways in which the myth of Māori privilege has been a constant, if shape-shifting, presence throughout the history of Aotearoa New Zealand.

The idea that Māori are the recipients of some sort of unearned and unfair advantage has a long whakapapa and Meihana skilfully guides the reader through its various iterations across the decades. He begins, as noted above, with the publication of Scott's book in 1995, before reaching back in time to demonstrate the various ways in which the myth has manifested since the earliest days of the colony.

The myth has, of course, morphed and changed over time, reflecting the particular concerns and anxieties of Pākehā in any given period. In the nineteenth century, for example, Māori were said to be the recipients of Crown benevolence and protection, despite the fact that, as Meihana shows, the Crown consistently failed to honour its obligations under Te Tiriti. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the myth has attached itself to a range of issues, from land and fisheries to health and education.

Meihana's book is a valuable contribution to the literature and will no doubt become an essential text for anyone seeking to understand the history of race relations in Aotearoa New Zealand.

words of David Round: "it encourages divisiveness, bitterness and hatred"and the Treaty of Waitangi is "if we are not careful, a recipe for anarchy and civil war" (Round, 1998, p. 25).

Sustaining the myth of Māori privilege is, of course, incredibly difficult if not impossible for anyone with even a cursory knowledge of Aotearoa's grubby colonial past or any understanding of the perilous position too many Māori continue to occupy in contemporary Aotearoa. Yet, Meihana demonstrates with patience and clarity just how persistent this myth has become. For Meihana, the anti-Tiriti and anti-Māori rhetoric of the 1990s and early 2000s was nothing new but merely the latest manifestation of a long tradition of "stubbornly persistent prejudice" that surfaces with alarming regularity and has done since the eighteenth century. Meihana notes that Māori were supposedly privileged to "make the acquaintance of the British Empire in the person of Captain James Cook" (p. 34) and were later privileged to be comparatively well regarded in racial (and racist) typologies that were being developed by European scientists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (pp. 35–36). Māori were privileged with the status of 'superior savages' in the minds of key figures in the Scottish Enlightenment who pointed to their comparative intelligence and acumen for commerce as evidence of their "potential for progress" (p. 38). As such, Meihana argues, Māori would, in time, "be privileged with a Treaty", with "royal protection" and with all the "rights and privileges of British Subjects" (p. 38).

Meihana goes on to argue that, at the heart of the myth of Māori privilege, lies the erroneous idea that the colonisation of Aotearoa was somehow 'fair and just', or, at least, comparatively benign when considered against, say, the experience of settler colonialism in Australia or North America. The presence of a Treaty is often touted as an advantage that Māori enjoy over Indigenous peoples elsewhere yet Meihana notes an important paradox of Māori privilege––that is, the royal protection and rights and privileges extended to Māori through the Treaty of Waitangi would soon become "the most effective means of separating them from their lands and resources" (p.38). Meihana goes on to note, for example, that the promise of royal protection in article 3 of Te Tiriti, often held up as one of the main privileges extended to Māori, was, in fact, interpreted in a paternalistic way that only served to undermine existing leadership structures and "rangatira decision-making" (p. 57).

Crucially, Meihana demonstrates how Māori were apparently privileged by being accorded individualised private property rights to erstwhile communally held lands. Private property was touted by many Pākehā politicians as the basis of European civilisation and any attempt to spread that venerable institution to Māori could only be seen as "a liberal and generous policy" (Williams, as cited in Meihana, p. 78). However, much has since been written about the actions of New Zealand's Native Land Court and the forced individualisation of title to Māori land, which led to the dispossesion of millions of acres of Māori land in the latter half of the nineteenth century. For Hugh Kawharu, the Court was "a veritable engine of destruction" (as cited in Meihana, p.78), for Judith Binney it was an "act of war" (as cited in Meihana, p.78). Tony Simpson (1986, p. 168) refers to the Native Land Court as "one of the most pernicious measures ever enacted by a settler community to get its hands on the estate of the native inhabitants" and Alan Ward (1974, p. 267) notes that it was "the sordid and demoralising system of land purchasing, not war and confiscation, that really brought the Māori people low".

The final substantive chapter in Meihana's book deals with the supposed citizenship privileges accorded to Māori through enfranchisement, through representation via Māori electorates, through the right to petition, through the appointment of commissions of inquiry into Māori affairs and so on. Here too, Meihana offers a critical lens with which to view these apparent privileges, arguing that these citizenship privileges did little, if anything, to prevent the "continued dispossession and marginalisation of Māori" (p. 103). If the privilege of private property was weaponised against Māori and contributed to the systematic dispossession of their lands, then the privilege of citizenship was only ever illusory (p. 114) and offered a veneer of benevolence that served as a useful distraction to the ongoing injustices of settler colonisation.

In summary, Meihana delivers a sustained critical engagement with the oddly enduring myth of Māori privilege. His elegant, succinct book traces the myth from its inception in the eighteenth century through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but very much speaks to our present where this myth stubbornly continues to hold some sway, particularly among those on the political right. That today, some continue to rehearse the myth of Māori privilege in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary requires almost heroic ignorance and Meihana presents a compelling, sustained argument against the idea that Māori have somehow been advantaged by the processes of settler colonisation. It is, depressingly, a very timely read.

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provides the basis for what Burawoy calls a "sociology of the real utopia" whereby sociologists must actively seek to engage with the social world and seek to improve it.

Throughout the book, Burawoy focuses on some of the challenges that public sociology faces. In particular, Burawoy examines how a public sociology should respond to the changing nature of the university. For Burawoy, the commodification and marketisation of the university is one of the biggest challenges that sociology faces. Burawoy is concerned that the neo-liberalisation of the university is eroding the ability of sociology to provide a critical and engaged voice within wider society. Burawoy suggests that the "regulation, commodification, and privatisation" (p. 167) of the university and academic knowledge is a threat to the production of a public sociology. Rather than the university being a place for the production of knowledge for the public good, the university is increasingly becoming a place for the production of knowledge for private gain. As such, Burawoy suggests that sociologists must fight to defend the university as a space for the production of knowledge for the public good.

Burawoy's book is an important contribution to the discipline of sociology and provides a clarion call for sociologists to engage with the wider social world. The book is a useful reflection on Burawoy's own intellectual journey and provides a useful overview of the development of his thinking about public sociology. The book is also a useful reflection on the state of sociology as a discipline and the challenges that it faces in the contemporary world.

However, there are some limitations to the book. For example, whilst Burawoy's focus on the commodification and marketisation of the university is important, his analysis of the challenges that sociology faces is at times a little too focused on the American context. Whilst many of the challenges that Burawoy identifies are also relevant to other contexts, such as Aotearoa New Zealand, the specific nature of these challenges may differ. As such, it would have been useful for Burawoy to have provided a more nuanced analysis of the challenges that sociology faces in different contexts.

Moreover, whilst Burawoy's focus on the utopian and anti-utopian essence of sociology is interesting, at times his analysis can be a little abstract. For example, Burawoy's discussion of the tension between utopian and anti-utopian thinking can be a little difficult to follow at times. As such, it would have been useful for Burawoy to have provided more concrete examples of how this tension plays out in practice.

Notwithstanding these limitations, Burawoy's book is an important contribution to the discipline of sociology. The book provides a useful overview of the development of Burawoy's thinking about public sociology and a useful reflection on the state of sociology as a discipline. The book also provides a clarion call for sociologists to engage with the wider social world and to fight to defend the university as a space for the production of knowledge for the public good.

was because Du Bois challenged orthodox sociology at the time by examining his own lived experience as an African American that placed 'race' at the centre of his sociological analysis. It was not only Du Bois' reflexive sociology, but the fact that he straddled academic and public worlds, such as his sociologically informed policy advocacy and interventions, which really inspired Burawoy to pursue public sociology.

While Burawoy is reflexive about his journey and outlines some hard-won lessons from his experience of exploring what a more public sociology looks like, he also asserts that social problems cannot be divorced from the context out of which they arise (p. 63). His exploration into a more policy-oriented sociology made him aware that "behind any solution to a social problem were a set of interests" (p. 63). Like Bourdieu, Burawoy acknowledges that the social context is a field of forces competing and conflicting over a multitude of interests. These competing and conflicting interests are also reflected in many of the later parts of the book, such as when Burawoy reflects on the growth of Marxism within sociology through American academia and his ethnographic work in communist Eastern Europe, which helped build his career into the intellectual giant we know today. These fields of forces are also explored within the rise of the neoliberal university and Burawoy's drive to reconceptualise the practice of sociology within the confines of academia.

A real strength of the book is the openness in which Burawoy shares his success and failures as a sociologist as he has navigated his career and intellectual journey. Burawoy should be commended for the integrity to outline and live his beliefs—too few sociologists have had the guts to do this. As a reader, I had two key reservations, although only one about the book. The first, is that we gain insight into some of Burawoy's intellectual development as a sociologist, but in many ways some of the more personal thoughts that have driven this development are not shared. Given that Burawoy's father was born in the Ukraine and that Burawoy has spent a great deal of time immersed in communist eastern Europe and post-communist Russia, insight into these more personal motivations would help provide greater understanding into his journey and intellectual development.

My second reservation is more of a conceptual one, mainly about what is 'public sociology' and why is it useful? Burawoy describes public sociology as not merely transmitting the result of research to broad publics, but a "conversation between sociologists and publics concerning the devastation of society" (p. x). I raise this as the book is marketed as simply, *Public Sociology*, but does not offer much guidance about the *practice* of a public sociology. While this criticism may be a little unfair, as a key concern of the book is Burawoy's own intellectual development—which can be understood as a conversation between a sociologist (Burawoy) and publics concerning the devastation of society that he has seen and experienced as part of his research career. However, I would suggest that the book in many ways is illustrating just one trajectory that a public sociology could take. Is Burawoy's vision for public sociology one that can allow us to engage with the critical issues of our times and reconceptualise the practice of contemporary sociology?

As Patricia Hill Collins warned, "the banner of public sociology may foster a kind of sociological ghettoization, primarily because those who gravitate towards public sociology may already hold subordinate status within the discipline itself" (2007, p. 104). In many ways, a public sociology that seeks to engage with the world is the antithesis of academic sociology, especially as many practitioners of public sociology are marginalised within orthodox sociology (Collins, 2007, p. 103). Moreover, Collin's public sociology is also about values, but for her these values are democracy, social justice, colour blindness, and feminism, among others. These values, in comparison to Burawoy's humanistic values, are embedded in people's lived experiences and realities of living under contemporary capitalism. In her critique of public sociology, Collins (2007, p. 103) reflects: "I wonder how discussions about public sociology will assist sociologists who currently practice public sociology?" Burawoy's book does provide an answer, but I would argue more work needs to be done within the discipline to reconceptualise sociological practice to reflect today's realities.

I would also argue that Burawoy's intellectual history of a public sociology resembles a history of the fall of communism—a nostalgic encounter with a former utopian life that held much promise but does

not provide much substance of how we can engage with the challenges of our times. Burawoy engages with some reflections on the neoliberal university but does not reflect on the implications for the practice of a public or engaged sociology within this context. For sociology to try and continue to be relevant in our present times and into the future, we need to reconceptualise sociology away from a purely academic form of practice. By this I mean we need at the centre of the practice of sociology an *engaged* sociology—sociology as a profession. By sociology as a profession, I mean expertise and competencies that enable the practice of sociology outside of the academic context, away from misguided attempts to classify sociology as 'applied' or 'outside academia'. The practice of sociology and especially the practice of an engaged sociology is about more than misguided attempts at securing symbolic and cultural capital. Here I would suggest we need to co-opt Burawoy's misuse of the term professional sociology. In his book, Burawoy uses the term professional sociology to basically mean academic sociology. I believe this is somewhat too narrow, we need to configure engaged sociology as a *professional sociology*. If we see professional sociology as a profession, at its core is an engaged sociology that is supported by institutional practices that enable and nurture the development of sociological expertise with a focus on skills, competencies that helps guide sociologists to engage with the wider world. This version of sociology sees sociology as a craft that offers tools for practitioners to create a more hopeful sociology and world. Indeed, a professional sociology needs to be guided by the sociological practices that are currently taking place within the discipline but are often ignored. For example, the sociologists who practice within medical schools, hospitals, engineering schools, teacher colleges and within industry.

In summary, Burawoy's *Public sociology* is required reading for anyone embarking or reflecting on their sociological journey and practice. Burawoy has made a career of walking where others fear to tread. The book is a worthy account of his career. It is my hope that it will inspire other canonical sociologists such as Anthony Giddens, Nik Rose, Alan Petersen and others to also share their journeys to help us all reflect and think critically about our decisions and journeys so we can use our sociological skills and expertise to make the world a better place.

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Charles Crothers: A Tribute

Cluny Macpherson*

Charles Crothers was a gentleman, in all senses of the word, and a productive scholar. He was also fortunate. Early in life, he became fascinated by human society and, at about the same time, found a discipline which allowed him to explore and teach about human society. Those interests kept him engaged and passionate until the end of his life. Unlike many whose interest and any passion for work ends with their last salary payment, Charles was still thinking, writing, and planning new projects the week he died.

He discovered sociology as an undergraduate at Victoria University in Wellington where he completed an honours degree and Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in 1978, while working as a junior lecturer. Apart from a brief period at the Town and Country Planning Division of the Ministry of Works, he spent the rest of his life in academic roles around the world. He joined sociology at the University of Auckland in 1982 and spent 13 years there as a lecturer and senior lecturer, he spent six years as Professor at the University of Natal in Durban, South Africa and 19 years as a Professor at the Auckland University of Technology from which he retired as Emeritus Professor in 2019. In between these appointments, he held visiting appointments at universities in Oregon in the United States of America, Graz in Austria, Sussex in the United Kingdom, and the University of the South Pacific in Fiji. Even after retiring as Emeritus Professor, he was invited to visit universities and was giving seminars in Milan, Italy earlier this year.

He was a prodigious scholar and published four books on Robert K. Merton, whose work had impressed him during his undergraduate studies; one on social structure, which he believed was essential to any reasonable understanding of society and one on sociology in New Zealand, for which he was a passionate advocate. He wrote for and edited 11 special issues of journals in a determined attempt to bring research material together and stimulate debate and dialogue around issues which he considered important.

Charles authored and co-authored 109 articles in local and international journals. However, unlike many scholars who confine their research and publication to a narrow area, Charles published on issues in development, political science, medicine, psychology, psychiatry, law, the history and sociology of science, methodology, and intercultural education. Who else but Charles could boast a CV which contained articles on *The frequency and incidence of low back pain/sciatica in an urban population of New Zealand*, to *Subjugation of bodies: The historical sociology of total institutions in New Zealand*. While New Zealand society was his passion, it did not constrain him: his CV also contains journal articles on the state of Austrian sociology and on justice, pollution, inequality, and its consequences in South Africa.

He also wrote 45 chapters in books and encyclopaedias on a similarly wide range of topics from the very esoteric *Sztompka's analysis of Merton's writings: A description and some criticism*s to the very grounded *Parameters of community development in New Zealand: An Auckland case study*.

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Despite this impressive record, Charles recently mentioned that he wished he had started earlier and had covered more issues than he had. I had to remind him that he might well have published more had he not stopped to help every community group that ever came to his office and asked him for help with a social survey. As long as groups were trying to better understand their community and how they could bring about change, Charles was there for them. I remember working with him on various research projects and planning meetings only to find that Charles had to rush off to help some play group gather and analyse information for an overdue application for funding. As often as not, he then wrote their reports and helped with their funding applications!

But if he was concerned about the significance of his work, he should not have been. It has been translated into Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese, French and German. He was appointed to the boards of national and international sociological associations and to editorial boards of both local and international journals within the discipline. Perhaps the most significant recognition of his work came, fortunately, earlier this year when he was awarded the Robert K. Merton Medal by the International Sociological Association at its annual meeting. At the same time, he received a heartfelt message from Merton's colleague and widow, Harriet Merton, whom Charles respected, thanking him for all his work on extending understanding and appreciation of her husband's work.

In 2021, in what passed for retirement, and after a period editing the Royal Society's Kōtuitui: New Zealand Journal of Social Sciences, Charles decided that there was a gap in the publication of certain sorts of research in Aotearoa and instead of moaning and moving motions at AGMs, he simply went ahead and launched his own journal *Aotearoa/New Zealand Journal of Social Issues* and became its founding editor.

One of Charles' most significant contributions to the academy was the energy which he invested in his students: he took on any project which promised a better understanding of society. When Charles took students on, non-completion was not an option. His advice was always frank, and his editing was not always the most patient or tactful, but his perseverance was legendary.

Another contribution was Charles' collegiality. His preference for cooperation over confrontation led him to spend a lot of time looking for solutions and compromises in departmental and university matters in which no one was hurt unnecessarily. He was generous with support for colleagues. Many of us recall Charles' ability to locate and copy or, more recently, forward links to anything that he thought might help us in our own work. He was always willing to read and comment on drafts and was the first to congratulate colleagues when their work was published, or their achievements were recognised. All of those students and colleagues who went to Charles for advice know that his frankness, and occasional impatience, was only ever intended to get the best from those who sought his help.

While his record of research, teaching and publication is broad ranging, it is bound together by, and reflects his lifelong commitment to four things: an empirically driven analysis of society, to exposing the consequences of social and economic inequality, a commitment to social justice, and concern with the betterment of humanity. His contribution to scholarship is much greater than he believed and will endure longer than he may have anticipated.